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Master's Thesis of Luna Bordas

France's development policies  
since the early 2000s

The French Development Agency's projects in  
Senegal case study

2000년대 초반 이후 프랑스의 개발정책

세네갈 사례 연구에서 프랑스 개발청의 프로젝트

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# Abstract

In his works such as *The White Man's Burden* (2006) William Easterly contrasts planners and searchers. According to him, Official Development Assistance (ODA) as it is implemented corresponds to the "planner" logic. The planner designs large projects, has big general ideas and is not accountable for his actions to the people he is supposed to help. Easterly contrasts it with the "searcher", whose pragmatic point of view makes it possible to find solutions to local problems. This opposition between the planner and the searcher logic will be the theoretical framework of this paper and will be applied to the case of France to determine on which side the French Development Agency's development policy is.

Development aid is a field of research that remains to be explored. The current French Development Agency (AFD) was created in 1941 during the Second World War, both as a central bank and a Treasury of Free France. It had different names during the 20th century and became the AFD in 1998. There are many publications on French ODA, but it remains under-theorized.

In order to complete this master's thesis, I first define official development assistance based on the OECD definition and show its different evolutions. The focus is then on French official development assistance, its various bodies, amounts and beneficiaries, reforms and evaluation methods, and then on Senegal.

Senegal has always been one of the priority countries for French aid. It is a country that was colonised and a historical partner of France. At an equal level of development, it is the country that receives the largest amounts of French aid. It was therefore chosen as a case study.

A census and analysis of all the projects launched and closed by AFD in Senegal between 2000 and 2018, of which there are 11, is carried out here. These projects are analysed using an analysis grid that takes up the criteria that Easterly gives for defining a planner or searcher.

It will be concluded that France has more of a searcher approach but that this opposition is not as relevant as it seems. It has its flaws, but it still does provide some guidance for improving ODA.

**Keyword:** French Development Agency, Senegal, Aid, Development

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# Acronyms

ADETER – Training for the Development of Rural Areas  
(Apprentissage pour le Développement des Territoires Ruraux)

AFD – French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)

APIX – Agency for the Promotion of Investments and Major Infrastructures (Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et Grands Travaux)

BCEAO – Central Bank of West African States (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest)

CICID – The Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (Le Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement)

CNDSI – National Council for Development and International Solidarity (Conseil national du développement et de la solidarité internationale)

CPA – Country Programmable Aid

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

DAC – Development Assistance Committee

ESP – Emerging Senegal Plan

GBS – Global Budget Support

GNI – Gross National Income

LDCs – Least Developed Countries

MDGs – Millenium Development Goals

MEFA – Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs

MEN – Ministry of National Education (Ministère de l'Education Nationale)

METFP – Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (Ministère de l'éducation technique et de la formation professionnelle)

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MINEFI – Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PSF – Priority Solidarity Fund

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

UCITS – Undertaking for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities

VAD – Value-Added Tax

WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Study Background

Development aid started after the end of the Second World War and it first aimed at reconstructing European countries whose population, infrastructures and economy had suffered a lot. The institution in charge of development and reconstruction was the World Bank, it was created in 1944. Its first loan was a loan of \$250m to France in 1947. The European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan was led by the US which transferred around 3% of its national income to help restore Europe. New bilateral donor agencies, other than the US (such as France), were mainly established in the 1960s. Quickly, development aid became a political and ideological tool during the Cold War.

At the beginning of the 1990s, and after the failure of structural adjustment policies, official development assistance experienced a deep crisis of legitimacy, leading to a relatively sharp drop in aid flows. This drop was also reinforced by a combination of many other factors, notably those resulting from the severe budgetary constraints weighing on several donor countries, such as those in the euro area.

In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted by the United Nations and reversed the downward trend. These goals cover important humanitarian issues such as the

reduction of extreme poverty, child mortality, access to education, gender equality, the fight against several epidemics and the implementation of sustainable development. The MDGs had 8 goals and 18 specific targets. Nevertheless, the MDGs, their goals and targets were not really achieved and considered as not specific enough. In 2015, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 were adopted. The SDGs have 17 goals and 169 specific targets. These goals concern both donor and recipient countries and focus on a much wider range of social as well as economic agendas.

Changes in development policies have led to recurrent debates on the foundations of development aid and its effectiveness, accompanied by a reflection on the underlying reasons why developed countries provide aid to developing countries. It was in a context of unfavourable economic climate for aid that the World Bank relaunched the controversy on aid effectiveness with the publication of its *Assessing Aid* report in 1998. According to this report, the effectiveness of aid depends largely on the quality of macro-economic policies and governance reforms, an idea developed by Craig Burnside and David Dollar from 1997 onwards. This is how the principle of selectivity of aid and the logic of conditionality appeared.

“Aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies” (Craig Burnside, David Dollar. 2000.)

In his article “Can foreign aid buy growth?”, the aid pessimist

William Easterly contradicts Craig Burnside's and David Dollar's findings about the link between aid and growth in countries with good policies. Easterly shows that their report was the basis of a recommendation to increase aid, that their thesis was widely broadcast even if their regression results can be distorted. Easterly calls on development agencies ("planners") to have a more realistic vision for foreign aid. He is not against the principle of conditionality but thinks that agencies provide additional loans to poor countries with little regard for the performance of the previous loans. According to him, development agencies should condition their loans to progress on liberal economic reform indicators. They should also promote honest, scientific, independent, transparent evaluations and adopt a "searcher" method.

We may disagree with the pessimist and caricatural vision of William Easterly. However, he points out the failures and slowness of results of aid as well as their potential causes.

The aim of this paper is to determine the position that France's development policy in Senegal takes with regard to William Easterly's vision. And this, while knowing that since the Monterrey Consensus (2002) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), an era of country partnership and recipient-driven development started. Conditionality today means helping countries to choose which reform are most important (Joseph Wright, Matthew Winters. 2010.).

## 1.2. Significance and purpose of Research

Lots of research have been made in the field of development aid. France's ODA has also been diagnosed and its effectiveness questioned. This is why it has evolved, continues evolving and trying to improve.

The purpose of my thesis is to understand and illustrate the French Development Agency's (AFD) approach to development, to see if the organization can be seen as either a "planning" or a "searching" organization. The goal of my research is also to test whether Easterly's opposition between planners and searchers is relevant and observable. This vision can seem Manichean but I think it can also be very useful to overcome the failures of ODA.

I decided to choose the AFD's intervention in Senegal between 2000 and 2018 as a case study. Senegal has been colonized by France and received assistance since the early 1940s. It is one of France's historical partners. The AFD uses all its financial instruments in Senegal. This wide range of development tools used in Senegal allows to have a very meaningful overview of the French

Evolution of the top twenty foreign countries receiving French bilateral ODA from 2015 to 2019 (in million euros)										
Rank	2015		2016		2017		2018*		2019*	
1	Colombia	414	Morocco	274	Irak	396	Côte d'Ivoire	301	Côte d'Ivoire	326
2	Morocco	193	Jordan	258	Turkey	368	Maroc	259	Cameroon	268
3	Dominican Republic	179	Cameroon	215	Morocco	299	Cameroun	183	Morocco	250
4	Brasil	163	Egypt	187	Cameroon	241	Senegal	154	Senegal	180
5	Cameroon	146	Colombia	171	Egypt	196	Algeria	119	Viet Nam	124
6	Mali	134	Mexico	133	Indonesia	168	Colombia	116	China	121
7	South Africa	111	India	125	Mexico	168	India	113	Tunisia	119
8	Jordan	105	Brasil	113	India	160	Cuba	112	India	117
9	Senegal	99	Turkey	92	Jordan	141	China	110	Algeria	114
10	Madagascar	90	Algeria	80	Brasil	138	Turkey	110	Brasil	109
11	Viet Nam	76	Senegal	79	Senegal	112	Maurice	96	Wallis and Futuna	102
12	Egypt	75	Armenia	74	Bolivia	106	Indonesia	92	Ecuador	99
13	Ecuador	74	Ecuador	74	Cuba	90	Tunisia	89	Cambodia	99
14	Chad	70	Cuba	71	Pakistan	85	Viet Nam	73	Burkina Faso	88
15	Gabon	65	Ghana	68	Mali	84	Burkina Faso	72	Mali	85
16	Kenya	64	Niger	66	Chad	82	Brasil	70	Chad	84
17	China	62	Tunisia	62	Cambodia	82	Chad	67	Gabon	73
18	Burkina Faso	60	Burkina Faso	59	Burkina Faso	76	West Bank and Gaza Strip	67	Egypt	72
19	Indonesia	60	Mali	54	Gabon	75	Egypt	65	Niger	71
20	Cambodia	59	Nigeria	53	Algeria	73	Mali	65	Kenya	71

Development Cooperation policies. Also Senegal has since 2000 consistently been part of France's top 10 ODA recipients and is figuring on the poor country priority list of France (Cf III, 2). Some countries such as Morocco or Côte d'Ivoire receive more ODA but do not figure on this priority list because they are at a higher level of development. Thus, I chose the poorest country among the ones that are receiving the largest flows of ODA.

Moreover, Senegal's net ODA received per capita (in US\$) is much higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa and in lower middle-income countries, on average. The example of the net ODA received per capita in 2004 is striking: 98.6\$ for Senegal, 35.8\$ for Sub-Saharan Africa and 10.3\$ for lower middle-income countries. In 2014, Senegal received 78.2\$ net ODA per capita, Sub-Saharan African countries received in average 48\$ per capita and 17.7\$ per capita for lower middle-income countries (World Bank. 2019.).

Even though the Sahel region is the subject of particular attention from France because of the rise in terrorism and violence, Senegal has a stable democracy and is peaceful. It also has a national development plan and recently discovered oil and gas resources.

As such, it is a relevant case study to understand the prevailing situation, the evolutions and reforms of French ODA as well as to understand its motives and its challenges concerning its effectiveness.

On a more personal note, I am very interested by the West African



region. I also worked for the AFD during 6 months as an intern and Senegal was the country for which the most documents were available.

Concerning the period I chose : from 2000 to 2018, I thought it was important to take into account the most recent period where most documents and research are available. The 2000s are also considered as a fresh start for development cooperation with the Assessing Aid report of the World Bank in 1998, the MDGs and later the SDGs, the Monterrey consensus in 2002 and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. I wanted to see if this period had really seen a shift from what Easterly considers as a planner approach to a searcher approach, if aid effectiveness has really improved recently.

### **1.3. Hypothesis and research questions**

The main question to which I will try to answer through my thesis is:

- Does the AFD, the French Public Development Agency, have a planner or a searcher approach to development?

The sub-questions that will also be discussed are the following:

- How is the French development policy implemented? What are the determinants of French foreign aid? What has to improve? What could be done in the Senegalese case that could also be expanded in other Western African countries in order to

reduce poverty and increase well-being?

I will base my thesis on the assumption that public development agencies such as the AFD have an approach that is similar of Easterly's vision of planners whereas NGOs or some private initiatives have an approach that is similar to searchers. Another hypothesis of my work is that the reasons why French ODA does not have a significant impact on poverty and inequality reduction in Senegal are: structural failures, an ODA that is fragmented and not independently evaluated, a lack of transparency and of accountability.

## **1.4. Scope of the thesis**

My research will focus on France's development policy and its evolutions and then on AFD's action in Senegal between 2000 and 2018.

# **Chapter 2. Theory and methodology**

## **2.1. Literature review**

### **2.1.1 OECD definitions**

The first piece of literature that I think we need to look at is that of the OECD. Indeed, the OECD is the reference in terms of definitions, data, statistics production and coordination of development policies.

France's development policy is based on OECD recommendations, which is why this information is very relevant to this paper. Here are some ODA insights and definitions according to the OECD.

- **ODA definition**

According to the OECD, “Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows to countries and territories on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions are:

- Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies
- Concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective.”

“ODA can take the form of grants<sup>①</sup>, where financial resources are provided to developing countries free of interest and with no provision for repayment, or soft loans, which have to be repaid with interest, albeit at a significantly lower rate than if developing countries borrowed from commercial banks.”

“Bilateral aid (ODA) represents flows from official (government) sources directly to official sources in the recipient country. Bilateral ODA may go towards providing general budget support to the

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<sup>①</sup> Grants can be offered in the form of contributions to international organizations, debt write-offs or project grants

recipient country or be used by a government agency to deliver a specific project, such as a Ministry of Health delivering a vaccination programme.

Multilateral aid (ODA) represents core contributions from official (government) sources to multilateral agencies, such as the many agencies of the United Nations, where it is then used to fund the multilateral agencies' own programmes.

Bi/Multi (counted within bilateral aid) is the term used when a donor contracts with a multilateral agency to deliver a programme or project on its behalf in a recipient country.”

“Over the years the DAC has continuously refined the detailed ODA reporting rules to ensure fidelity to the definition and the greatest possible consistency among donors.

- **Country Programmable Aid (CPA)**

According to the OECD again:

“Donors' contributions to country-level development programmes are best captured by the concept of CPA. It is a subset of gross bilateral ODA critical for the support of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). CPA tracks the proportion of ODA over which recipient countries have or could have significant say. CPA reflects the amount of aid that involves a cross-border flow and is subject to multi-year planning at regional level. Several studies have also shown that CPA is a good proxy of aid recorded at the country level

(excluding humanitarian aid).”

- **ODA providers and receivers**

Concerning ODA providers, the OECD DAC has 30 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

“The DAC List of ODA Recipients is designed for statistical purposes. It helps to measure and classify aid and other resource flows originating in donor countries. It is not designed as guidance for aid or other preferential treatment. It includes all low- and middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank, based on GNI per capita), except for those that are members of the G8 or the European Union (including countries with a firm accession date for EU membership). In addition, the list separately includes all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the UN.”

## **2.1.2 General literature on development**

These readings helped me to have a general understanding of development, ODA, its impacts and challenges.

- Inequality reexamined (1992), Amartya Sen
- Development as freedom (1999), Amartya Sen

- Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? (2000), Alberto Alesina, David Dollar
- Can foreign aid buy growth? (2003), William Easterly
- The utopian nightmare (2005), William Easterly
- The end of poverty, chapter 3 and 4, (2005), Jeffrey Sachs
- How to help poor countries (2005), Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian
- Poor economics (2011), Esther Duflo and Abhijit V. Banerjee

My analysis will contribute to the existing literature by transforming William Easterly's theory into an analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of official development assistance. William Easterly developed his theory based on general facts and figures. Here his theory is applied to a concrete case study where existing and precise development projects are analyzed.

Moreover, William Easterly's framework focused on Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and more particularly the World Bank. My analysis applies his framework to the case of France and the AFD which is not taken as an example in Easterly's work. I therefore choose a new subject for analysis and use a new methodology for assessing France's development policy.

## 2.2. Theory

Development economics is a branch of economics that applies modern techniques of macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis to the study of economic, social, environmental and institutional problems faced by developing countries. It deals with the determinants of poverty and underdevelopment as well as with the policies to be implemented to enable better development in poor countries.

This field is characterized by a debate between aid optimists and aid pessimists which can be embodied by Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly.

According to Jeffrey Sachs ODA is absolutely essential to help at least one generation to come out of poverty. Aid can trigger the development process and it enables concrete methods of poverty eradication (financing agriculture: better seeds, improved irrigation, etc.; mosquito nets). Concerning the issue of corruption, which is also seen as a poverty trap, ODA must be primarily aimed at reducing poverty and be allocated to specific, easily controllable objectives (malaria, food production, drinking water...). Raising living standards will gradually give civil society and States the strength to enforce the law.

In the chapter 3 of *The End of Poverty* (2005), Jeffrey Sachs gives 8 explanations on “why some countries fail to thrive”. First, poverty

traps. Indeed, poverty itself is seen as a cause of economic stagnation. In poor countries, no income above survival can be saved and invested for the future. Accumulation of capital could pull some countries out of misery. Second, physical geography. Landlocked countries have high transport costs, arid conditions, low agricultural productivity, ecological conditions that favor diseases. These countries need additional investment to achieve development. Third, the fiscal trap. Governments may lack resources to provide public goods because its poor population is not able to pay taxes. The government may also be corrupt, incapacitated, or indebted which also created a poverty vicious circle. The other reasons of the failure to achieve economic growth are governance failures, cultural barriers, geopolitics (ex: embargo), the lack of innovation in poor countries (no invention and no importation of technology) and the demographic trap.

Overcoming the poverty trap is the biggest challenge and foreign aid (a “big push”) is then necessary.

In the chapter 4 of *The End of Poverty* (2005), Jeffrey Sachs makes a parallel between good development economics and good clinical medicine. He proposes a checklist for making a differential diagnosis for poverty reduction. He admits that economic development practice had gone wrong at the end of the 20th century. At this moment, development aid plummeted. Nevertheless, Millenium Development Goals offered the world a chance to do better. But, to achieve these goals, aid amounts need to be increased so that ODA can close the



financing gap by providing basic necessities of health, education, and infrastructure.

On the other hand, in *The White Man's Burden* (2006) William Easterly announces the failures of Western aid policies. 40 years of ODA have not allowed poor countries to catch-up. He criticises in particular debt cancellations and considers that they have led to a vicious circle, in which debt is expected to be cancelled, which invites waste while at the same time creating incentives for lenders to stop lending to those in need. He also considers that Western agencies have an ethno-centric vision of development. They try to apply a model without taking into account local specificities, but poor countries are best placed to know their own problems. Also, aid can be diverted and replace national savings; it can even destroy national activity. Public development aid as it is implemented today corresponds to the "planner" logic. The planner is someone who designs large projects, has big general ideas and is not accountable for his actions to the people he is supposed to help. Easterly contrasts it with the "searcher", whose pragmatic point of view makes it possible to find solutions to local problems.

This opposition between the planner and the searcher logic will be the theoretical framework of this paper and we will try to apply it to the case of France and determine on which side France's development policy is.

William Easterly wrote « Planners versus Searchers in Foreign Aid »

in 2006. It was published in the Asian Development Review (Volume 23, Number 2). This paper will be the basis of the theory used for this thesis. Nevertheless, Easterly's vision and proposed solutions can be criticized and will not be taken for granted.

In order to better understand his definition of the two positions, here are his own words:

“This is bad news for the world's poor, as historically poverty has never been ended by central planners. It is only ended by “searchers”, both economic and political, who explore solutions by trial and error, have a way to get feedback on the ones that work, and then expand the ones that work, all of this in an unplanned, spontaneous way. Examples of searchers are firms in private markets and democratically accountable politicians. There is a robust correlation (0.73) between economic and political freedom, on one hand, and economic development, on the other hand.”

“[...] Planners announce good intentions but do not motivate anyone to carry them out; searchers find things that work and get some reward. Planners raise expectations but take no responsibility for meeting them; searchers accept responsibility for their actions. Planners determine what to supply; searchers find out what is in demand. Planners apply global blueprints; searchers adapt to local conditions. Planners at the top lack knowledge of the bottom; searchers find out what the reality is at the bottom. Planners never hear whether the plan got what they needed; searchers find out if the

customer is satisfied.”

According to Easterly, whereas searchers prefer very specific and piecemeal interventions that can show positive impact when evaluated, planners elaborate utopian big plans, framework and strategies (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, MDGs, etc.) and waste time, money and energy. Whereas searchers take responsibility for their actions, no one takes responsibility for failure in the “planning world”. Indeed, aid agency offer their own plans with multiple goals, but no agency is responsible for a particular outcome. The plans are not questioned, and they often face poor effectiveness and set too optimistic goals. Whereas, searchers are held accountable by their beneficiaries, receive feedback and try to adapt to local conditions, planners have a top-down approach and impose their solutions to populations they don’t know. Whereas searchers prefer projects that go directly to the beneficiary, planners prefer delivering aid from government-to-government, even if the governments in question are autocratic or corrupt. But the aim of aid should be to make individuals better off, not to transform governments and societies.

Also, in Easterly’s view, investment and growth are not related which invalidates the poverty trap theory and “social expenditure does not equal social outcomes”. The best way to achieve development is to let the market and democracy do the work. Aid should utilize more private firms (Bottom of the Pyramid approach) to propose services, funding, monitoring and training. Effective aid should have aid agents

accountable, let them search for what works, experiment, evaluate based on feedback and scientific testing, reward success and penalize failure and make sure incentives are strong enough to do more of what works.

The aim of this thesis is to determine on which side France is: on the planning or on the searching side? In order to do that we will research on AFD's projects in Senegal (the kind and the scale of the projects, their transparency and their evaluation).

### **2.3. Methodology and sources**

The first step of my research is to examine France's development policy. For this purpose, I will look at data provided by different sources:

- International sources: OECD
- French sources: AFD, the French National Assembly and Senate, Légifrance (the public service of the diffusion of law in France), script of debates from the French Parliament
- Research articles from journals: *Afrique et Développement*, *Politique étrangère*, *Mondes en développement*, *Afrique Contemporaine*, *Foreign Affairs*

This information will be mostly qualitative, except some financial data concerning the amounts of ODA flows, for example, that will be quantitative.

Then, I would like to see concretely which projects the AFD financed in Senegal between 2000 and 2018. In order to do that, I will gather information thanks to AFD project documents as well as their evaluation documents in Senegal.

Last, I will construct an ideal type of the searcher vs the planner. I will classify AFD's projects in Senegal within this ideal type and determine whether the AFD has a searcher or a planner approach.

This progress, from a general perspective to a more specific analysis will enable me to assess France's development policy and to formulate some recommendations.

# Chapter 3. France's Official Development Assistance (ODA)


In 2010, France's cooperation strategy was defined in a framework document "Development cooperation: a French vision" and structured around four interdependent priorities: sustainable and equitable growth, fight against poverty and inequality, preservation of global public goods and promotion of law and stability. In this part we will describe French ODA, France's development strategy and how it has evolved.

## 3.1. The organization and structure of French aid

In France, the general State budget is presented in missions that identify the major public policies. They are themselves divided into programmes. These programmes are then broken down into actions, with objectives and performance indicators. French ODA budget is made up of 24 separate ministerial budget programmes distributed within 14 missions, along with extra-budgetary funds (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2020, p.8-9).

While, in many countries, development policy is the responsibility of a single institution, in France it is the responsibility of a multiplicity of actors. The MFA, the MINEFI

and the AFD share the main part of public aid management and they are coordinated by the CICID. However, other ministries and several public or semi-public actors also contribute to it, for example, local authorities.



### 3.1.1 The CICID

Created by Decree No. 98-66 of 4 February 1998, the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) defines the orientations of French international cooperation and development aid policy.

### 3.1.2 The French Development Agency (AFD)

The AFD is a state-owned industrial and commercial institution which was created in 1941 as the “Central Fund of Free France”

(“Caisse centrale de la France libre”). Its missions and organisation are set out in Articles R. 516-3 (and following) of the Monetary and Financial Code. The Agency is primarily responsible for the implementation of French cooperation and development policy, within the framework of the guidelines defined by the CICID. The Agency is placed under the joint supervision of the MEFA and the MINEFI. Its capital is 100% owned by the French State.

The agency’s aid represents about 30% of French ODA and about 40% of French bilateral ODA. The AFD has a strong presence in the field and has its own offices that are independent from French embassies (Toute l’Europe. 2017.). It finances development projects in 90 countries or territories and has a network of 70 agencies and offices around the world. In 2017 it employed 2027 people, 707 of whom were based abroad (Frédéric Barbier. 2018.).

Its recipients may be States, international organisations, as well as legal persons. The agency may award aid either on its own behalf or on behalf of the State, or of other French or foreign bodies, such as the European Commission. The agency's support for the private sector is led by its subsidiary Proparco created in 1977.

AFD has to be sure that the selected projects fit France’s priorities in terms of geography and policy. According to their website:

“When an application for funding, whether a loan or a donation, is submitted to us, it systematically goes through several levels of validation within AFD: an opinion is issued on the



sustainable development aspect, a carbon assessment is done, and then the project initiator's action plans are assessed by our specialist teams. The aim is to evaluate the impacts, risks and any points requiring vigilance. The entire process takes several months. Finally, the application is put to the board of directors (whose members are elected officials, representatives of the ministries and civil society) before being finally validated.”

The assistance provided by the AFD Group may consist of loans, advances, equity investments, guarantees, donations or any other form of financial assistance. The majority of its assistance is nevertheless represented by loans (concessional loans but also credits that may not be subsidized). Thus, it is as much an agency for implementing France's development policy as it is a development bank, concerned about profitability. The AFD borrows resources on financial markets at very favourable rates (close to the ones obtained by the State). France is practically the only major donor whose main development instrument is a financial institution. The European Commission, the United States or the United Kingdom for example almost exclusively use grants, without resorting to loans, which are instead used by the multilateral banks. Germany and Japan have developed a significant lending activity, which however represents a smaller share of the volume of activity than for the AFD: respectively about 55% and 75%, compared to 85% for AFD (Frédéric Barbier, 2018.).

### 3.1.3 The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MINEFI) & the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MEFA)

The Interministerial Mission “Public Development Aid” brings together the two main programmes contributing to French ODA. These are “Programme 110 - Economic and Financial Development Aid” which is implemented by the MINEFI and “Programme 209 - Solidarity with Developing Countries”, implemented by the MEFA. This mission accounts for about 40% of the total amount of ODA, as declared to the DAC of the OECD (Hubert Julien-Laferrière. 2019.).

The MINEFI’s main actions in terms of development policy implementation are providing bilateral aid credits, providing loans to multilateral development institutions and financing bilateral and multilateral debt cancellations.

Within the MEFA, the General Direction for Globalisation, Culture, Education and International Development is responsible for budgetary programmes relating to international cooperation and development. The Ministry exercises supervision or co-supervision and draws up the policies and strategies of seven French international cooperation operators: the AFD, Canal France International (media industry), Expertise France (technical cooperation), France volontaires, International Centre for Agricultural Research for Development, Research and Development

Institute. The MEFA essentially plays a role of political validation.

### 3.2. The amount of French aid and its recipients

According to the OECD, among DAC member countries, France ranked ninth in relation to its ODA/GNI ratio and fifth in relation to its ODA volume in 2019. The government has committed to achieve a 0.55% ODA/GNI ratio by 2022 and France is committed, at the European level, to collectively achieve a 0.7% ODA/GNI ratio by 2030.

We can consider these objectives as very optimistic since the 2019 ratio ODA/GNI is still far away from the target (Cf table) but the COVID-19 crisis which puts a burden on GNI might reverse the trend.

	Total	GNI share
2000	6 674.0	0,305%
2001	6 886.0	0,309%
2002	8 378.4	0,375%
2003	9 070.4	0,403%
2004	9 483.0	0,412%
2005	11 005.0	0,474%
2006	11 276.3	0,468%
2007	9 400.1	0,380%
2008	9 618.0	0,385%
2009	11 500.9	0,471%
2010	12 262.0	0,495%
2011	11 644.6	0,460%
2012	11 523.3	0,453%
2013	10 435.9	0,406%
2014	9 724.9	0,368%
2015	9 788.5	0,368%
2016	10 397.6	0,384%
2017	11 956.9	0,428%
2018	12 839.7	0,427%
2019	12 446.9	0,440%

Source: OECD (<https://data.oecd.org/fr/oda/apd-nette.htm#indicator-chart>)  
 Note : the amounts for 2018 and 2019 are calculated on a grant-equivalent basis

France concentrates its solidarity effort, in grants and donations, in a limited number of priority LDCs countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.


Since the 2018 CICID meeting, the list of priority countries includes

19 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

### 3.3. French multilateral aid (France Diplomatie. 2020.)

French development policy is part of an international framework: the United Nations framework as well as the European Union's action programme.

Multilateral aid accounts for 39% of France's official development assistance (ODA) in 2019 (€4.3 billion). Between 2008 and 2018, the share of multilateral aid in France's ODA varied from 31 to 38%.



The multilateral channel enables France to increase the leverage effect of the resources invested in development and, by pooling resources, to address issues that are beyond the scope of bilateral

action. The multilateral channel also enables France to participate in the international solidarity effort in geographical areas and sectors where it does not intervene bilaterally.

France uses the multilateral channel to intervene in certain strategic priority sectors: in the health sector in the first place, where French ODA is almost exclusively multilateral, as well as in support to basic education or the environment.

In 2017, France has adopted a strategy for multilateral aid. This strategy defines France's priorities in multilateral organisations and identifies ways of articulating bilateral and multilateral aid and reducing aid fragmentation.

France's multilateral aid is divided between four type of international development organisations. First, European development instruments. Second, vertical funds for health and the environment account for 24% of French multilateral aid. Third, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Last, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

### **3.4. French bilateral aid and its different forms**

The bilateral approach plays a key role in France's development policy, it represents 61% of France's total ODA in 2019, €6.6 billion (France Diplomatie. 2020).

#### **- Loans**

Loans represented 28% of France's total gross ODA, and 45% of its

gross bilateral ODA in 2016. Also, 64% of the AFD's ODA portfolio consisted of loans. This strategy based more on loans than grants, encourages AFD to invest in middle-income countries and profitable sectors (Bérenghère Poletti, Rodrigue Kokouendo. 2018.). Loans can be granted to different kinds of recipients: States and public companies, private companies or financial institutions. They can be offered in foreign or in local currency.

- **Guarantees**

Proparco, the AFD subsidiary, can provide guarantees of solvency or liquidity. These guarantees may take various forms and have different types of underlying assets: loans in foreign or local currency, bond loans, UCITS quoted on a financial market, etc. In this way, Proparco facilitates the resources mobilisation from banks or institutional subscribers and can act on the depth and liquidity of financial markets.

- **Equity contributions**

Proparco, which is in charge of the private sector, can also offer equity capital to private companies. At the same time, it can also offer close support in the definition of their strategy, the improvement of their governance or access to international professional networks.

- **Debt write-offs**

Debt write-offs may consist of moratoria on interest payments on

the debt of the most heavily indebted low-income countries, debt cancellations, debt relief contracts financed by the 209 programme. In the case of the latter, the country benefiting from a debt relief and development contract continues to repay its debt but, as soon as repayment is made, France transfers the corresponding sum to a specific account at the country's central bank to finance programmes selected by mutual agreement to fight poverty.

#### - **Grants**

Most of France's ODA is made up of donations. In 2019, ODA consisted of 59% of grants and 41% of concessional loans (in gross flows, i.e. not taking into account repayments made during the year). In net flows (taking into account repayments made during the year), 81% of France's aid is made up of grants, i.e. €8.8 billion in 2019 (Laurent Saint-Martin, 2020).

Grants can take the following various forms:

- Global budget support: funding of the global budget of a State or a government.
- Project-grants: resources are allocated directly to local projects via the AFD, French embassies or funds such as the Solidarity Fund for Innovative Projects (FSPI).
- Humanitarian assistance: resources are devoted to crisis management and recovery.

- Support to NGOs: funds to support civil society action which include grants to NGOs from the AFD and support for volunteering programs.
- Technical assistance or technical expertise operations: complementing the provision of financial resources for development, technical cooperation helps to strengthen the quality of public policies in developing countries. France exports services (human resources, training, etc.) to public actors and these services are intended to increase the administrative capacity to develop and conduct public policies, including public infrastructure. Expertise France coordinates and implements national and regional projects in the following areas: democratic, economic and financial governance, peace, stability and security, climate, biodiversity and sustainable development, health and human development.
- Tuition fees payed to foreign students (from the DAC list of ODA recipient countries) studying in France
- Expenditure related to the hosting and care of refugees
- Operating and administrative costs of French development programs or institutions are also included in the accounting of grants



## Chapter 4. The Senegalese case

Senegal is situated in West Africa and is bordered, as we can see it on the following map, by Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia which is surrounded by Senegal. The Cape Verde Islands are located 560 km away from the Senegalese coast. Senegal had 9,797,734 inhabitants in 2000 and 16,296,364 in 2019 (World Bank. 2019.). A quarter of its inhabitants live in the region of the capital, Dakar. The other major cities are Thiès, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis and Touba. Senegal has a great linguistic diversity since it has 21 national languages. French is recognized as official language since 2001. Wolof is the most spoken language, but Diola, Malinké, Pular, Sérère and Soninké are also common. The Senegalese population is today predominantly Muslim (around 95%) and practises Sunni Islam. Christians represent 4% of the population and animists the last 1%.




Source : [geographicguide.com](http://geographicguide.com)

## 4.1. ODA and French ODA in Senegal

From the 1980s to 2000 Senegal undertook several structural adjustment policies. After 2000 development policies focused more on poverty.

France is Senegal's first bilateral donor but it is far from being Senegal's only development cooperation partner. Delegations from numerous countries are present in Dakar and the rest of the country. Almost every international organisation has a representation in Senegal, as well as a wide range of non-governmental organisations. The sectors favoured by development aid are mainly energy, transport and communication infrastructure.



*Source: [OECD - DAC](#)*

In Senegal, most of AFD's programs are financed in association with other donors: European Union, European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, World Bank, West African Development Bank, etc.

The AFD Group has been active in Senegal since 1946. It is

represented in Dakar by a regional agency, which also covers Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, to implement and supervise projects financed by the Group. The AFD finances projects or programs that are in line with the priorities set by the Senegalese and French governments.

AFD's areas of operation in Senegal are in line with the orientations of the Partnership Framework Document signed in 2006 which was negotiated between the Senegalese and French States. The document was renewed in 2013 and 2016. Today, the AFD's action in Senegal is focused on the economy and the employability of young people, its agricultural potentials, the access to quality services and the fight and adaptation to climate change.

In 2014 Senegal launched its Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP). It is a ten-year strategy for the period 2014-2023, based on a vision of an emerging Senegal by 2035 through three strategic axes. These three axes are (i) structural transformation of the economy and growth, (ii) human capital, social protection and sustainable development and (iii) governance, institutions, peace and security. The PES is supported by a Priority Action Plan (PAP), itself divided into two phases. Phase 1 (2014-2018) has led to satisfactory results and phase 2 (2019-2023) is a continuation but with a stronger involvement of the private sector.

### 4.3. Focus on some AFD completed projects

In this part we will focus exclusively on AFD bilateral project. Multilateral and multi-country grants are excluded from the review for the very simple reason that it is impossible to determine how and how much France is contributing to a multilateral project. It would be impossible to assess AFD's way of working and of implementing development projects in a multilateral context.

The AFD's website is equipped with a web portal ([opendata.afd.fr/](https://opendata.afd.fr/)) that allows the observation of data concerning their projects. In the "AFD's development aid data" category, an Excel file with data on achieved projects in Senegal was downloaded. For each project, the file had a short descriptive, the dates of the project, its sector, the amount of the grant in euros and a link to the "project file".

- **Rice Partnership Promotion Programme in the Senegal River Delta (3PRD)**

The accessible "project file" concerning this project is an Operation Communication Note. However, the document is not complete since some pages are missing. The availability of land and water is largely sufficient to cover Senegal's grain needs, especially for rice, the main cereal consumed. However, most of national consumption is imported, representing foreign exchange losses of CFA francs. Thus, the programme CSN1250 aimed to contribute to Senegal's economic growth by strengthening its food security through the consolidation

of a competitive private rice sector. It was financed by the AFD but also the European Union, the West African Development Bank, the Senegalese State and private beneficiaries.

The programme was launched in **2011** after the realization of a rice sector study which concluded on the competitiveness of Senegalese rice production and which justified its financing. It was supposed to last **4 years** but its duration was extended and its operational completion date was March **2020**. The aid consisted of a **grant of €13.3 million**. The project was under the management of the **Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture and the Development and Operation of the Senegal Delta River and the Falémé National Company** (“Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation du Delta et de la Falémé”, SAED).

The proposed programme had two major components, a construction component (infrastructures and hydro-agricultural developments) and an institutional support component for the different actors involved in the rice sector (PNAR Committee, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Market Regulation Agency, SAED, Management Centres/CGER, Rice Growers, Local Marketing Partnership Companies, etc.). Thus, one of the objectives of the program is the creation of 2,500 ha of developed land for economically viable farms (between 5 and 100 ha) and it also includes a specific component to support the improvement of rice commercialization in Senegal.

According to the program Operation Communication Note:

“The monitoring and evaluation of the activities will be ensured by the Project Management Unit and the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the SAED. For impact studies on all cross-cutting issues related to the allocation process, land allocation, financing mechanisms or rice marketing, external expertise may be mobilised within the framework of the "institutional support component", at the request of national authorities or specific stakeholders in the sector. Programme supervision missions will be carried out every year in a joint manner between the co-financing donors. An external evaluation of the achievements and results of the Programme will take place at the mid-term and at the end of the implementation phase. An annual external audit will be carried out by an independent audit firm, recruited after an open call for tenders, after approval by AFD.”

Impact indicators were supposed to measure what the programme would bring. 4 aggregated indicators were used: the population directly benefitting from a agricultural or irrigation project, the population benefitting from a project to support a sector, the created or rehabilitated irrigated areas and the number of firms benefitting from the programme. Some other specific indicators were mentioned in the Operation Communication Note such as the cultivation intensity, the tonnage of rice produced, etc.

In addition to that, a “Retrospective Evaluation of Interventions of the AFD in the Irrigation Sector” was published in 2019 (Audrey Barbe et al. 2019.). The authors of this ex-post evaluation published by the AFD are engineering consultants working for Hydroconseil and

Agriate. This evaluation is centered on the following principles: relevance & coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and durability. It also identified 4 areas of improvement of the AFD projects in the irrigation sector.

- **Support programme to improve the quality and efficiency of basic education and vocational training in Senegal**

The accessible “project file” concerning this project is also an Operation Communication Note which was published in 2011. Senegal needed to create jobs to facilitate the professional integration of the young people who enter the labour market every year and who weigh on the social and economic balance of the country. The performance of the education and vocational training system in Senegal is a handicap in this respect. The education and training offer is generally insufficient and poorly adapted to the qualifications required by companies. The level of apprenticeships is insufficient. Training centres lack resources. The aim of the project is the economic and social development of Senegal through the improvement of the level of human capital. To this end, strengthening the quality and efficiency of basic education and vocational training is necessary.

The project CSN 1338 was launched in **2011** and was supposed to end **3 years** later but its operational completion date was also in **2020**. The total amount of the project is €9m and the AFD financed 8 of them. Out of these **8 millions euros to the Senegalese Republic, 4 millions consisted in a grant and the other 4 millions of a**

**concessional loan.** The project had two components, one was to strengthen the Ministry of Education's capacity for innovation regarding the efficiency and quality of Senegalese basic schools, the other was to set up two training centres in the fields of energy management and mechanics.

Concerning the first component, one objective is to improve the management of the education system by consolidating and disseminating some of the successful results achieved in previous projects. The other objective is to provide the Ministry of National Education with the capacity to explore and develop innovations by supporting it during a strategic phase of reform programming and by providing specialised expertise and technical exchanges with international counterparts. The **Senegalese Ministry of National Education** (MEN) was the project owner for this component and was represented by the Direction of Educationnal Planning and Reforms (DPRE). A Permanent Technical Secretariat, composed of four MEN staff members, was responsible, for programming and monitoring the implementation of activities.

The second component stems from the results of the Human Resources Skills Enhancement Program also supported by the AFD. Indeed, this project offered various professional branches the possibility of formulating their training needs to the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (METFP). The building & public works and automotive sectors expressed their wish to create a mobile mechanics centre and an extension of the Diamniadio



centre to include energy management. The results of these studies made it possible to identify 20 training courses to be developed. The project was supposed to enable the design, implementation and operation of the centre and the additional training course in energy management over three years. To this end, the setting up of a contractual partnership framework between public authorities and the private sector, the creation of infrastructures, the acquisition of the necessary equipment, the development of training courses, the renovation of teaching methods and setting up autonomous management of the two centres were planned. The project was managed by the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (METFP) which relied on a Project Monitoring and Coordination Unit for this purpose.

- **Apprenticeship training in para-agricultural trades and multi-stakeholder consultation for the development of rural areas**

This training project for the development of rural areas is called ADETER, its number is CSN 1422. The AFD document available concerning this project is a short summary which gives some details about the aims and objectives of ADETER, its expected results & impacts, the structuring of the project, its operating mode and its funding.

In Senegal, vocational training has been the topic of an in-depth reform from 2001 (creation of an Apprenticeship Directorate in 2008) and the Programme for Improving Quality, Equity and Transparency

(2013–2025) promotes labour market-oriented vocational training, the integration of apprenticeship and a strengthening of the public-private governance. The St Louis Region was the focus of the project (St Louis and Dagana districts) and gave priority in its Regional Integrated Development Plan (2013– 2017) to the development of economic activities upstream and downstream of agricultural production. The project tried to respond to a mismatch between the training offer in agricultural activities and the strong potential for the development of rural areas.

The ADETER project was launched in **2014** and was achieved in **2017**. Its operational completion date is in **2018**. The AFD **granted €657,108** to the project which was carried by two civil society organisations (CSOs): the **GRET** (which also manages funds) and **Enda Graf Sahel**. Indeed, the AFD co-develops projects with CSOs in order to enhance and encourage their innovation capacities, to create synergies between them and the AFD and to improve the coordination of public policies with non-governmental cooperation initiatives. CSOs are also suitable means of providing assistance in situations of failure of public works management.

The objective of this project was to enhance the strong potential of the Senegalese rural economy and to make a sustainable contribution to the strengthening of the skills of young people (especially girls and women), to food security and employment. The project achieved the development of training programmes with the Ministry of Vocational Training, Apprenticeship and Handicrafts (MFPAA).

- **Establishment of short commercialisation circuits for local products – around the city of Kolda**

The accessible “project file” concerning this project is a Public Operation Communication Note. The project CSN 1458 intended to support agricultural producers' organisations by setting up short distribution channels for local products grown with agro-ecological production methods. Kolda is a trade hub, located between Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry. The region around the city of Kolda is agricultural, pastoral and poor. This poverty can be explained by the low remuneration of agricultural production in relation to a low level of productivity and by the low level of extra-agricultural incomes in relation to the low processing capacity of primary products.

The project launched in **2015** lasted **3 years**. Its total amount was €773,648 and the AFD financed **€696,283** of them, in the form of a **grant**. The **Farmers and Veterinarians Without Borders** organization was responsible for the overall management of the project, the implementation of field activities and monitoring-evaluation.

The project sought to strengthen the production and diversification capacities of five agricultural organisations (selling milk, market gardening, cereals, cashew nuts and non-timber forest products) by supporting at least 1,500 family farms using agro-ecological techniques and technologies; to strengthen the technical and productive capacities of 27 processing units over the duration of the

project; to develop short marketing by putting the five organisations and the 27 local product processing companies by putting them in direct contact with more than 5,000 urban consumers in the Kolda region. The primary goal of the project was to disseminate intensive agro-ecological production methods to 1,500 agro-pastoralists while limiting the use of chemical inputs, through a better valorisation of the natural potential of soils and ecosystems. Secondly, the management and production capacities of the processing units were strengthened. Various direct sales mechanisms have been set up to increase the marketing capacity of the processing units. The project accompanied the formalisation of relations between the different stakeholders.

- **Programme for the upgrading of Senegalese enterprises**

The accessible “project file” concerning this project is shorter than the ones concerning the previous projects and was published in 2007. The aim of the programme is to stimulate growth and employment by consolidating and boosting the business fabric in Senegal. This upgrading is regarded by the Government and the private sector as a priority in order to meet the challenges posed by international commitments to open markets.

The project CSN 6000 for the upgrading of Senegalese enterprises was launched in 2004. It consisted in a grant of **€11.9m** for the Senegalese **MINEFI** which was also responsible for its implementation.

The goal was to enable Senegalese companies to make the gains in competitiveness and the strategic choices necessary to face foreign competition on the local market. The objective is also to take advantage of the export opportunities offered by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and international markets. The ambition of the government and the private sector is to enable the medium-term upgrading of all its industrial and service enterprises. To this end, it was planned to put in place a national mechanism allowing transparent and open access to a range of financial and technical support. AFD supported the government in a support phase with three specific objectives. First, to help set up the upgrading mechanism and support it over a 4-year test period. Second, to provide the necessary funding to upgrade some sixty companies, enabling a demonstration effect in addition to an economic impact. Last to support the sustainability of the upgrading mechanism at the legal, technical and, above all, financial levels, by helping to channel Senegal's internal resources but also the additional resources that may be provided by development partners and the WAEMU.

- **Extension of the toll motorway from Diamniadio to Blaise Diagne International Airport**

The available file for the CSN 1402 project is a Public Operation Communication Note.

The toll motorway brought into service in 2009 between Dakar and

Diamniadio has provided an alternative to National Road 1 which was until then the only access road to the capital. It is a new type of infrastructure, in a protected site and privately managed. It is made up of two sections: the Malick Sy – Pikine section with a length of 11.5 km and the Pikine – Diamniadio section with a length of 20.5 km. The construction of a new international airport, called Blaise Diagne International Airport, started in 2008. It is located in the commune of Diass, 45 km south-east of Dakar. The extension of the Diamniadio motorway to the airport (17km) was in response to the need to serve the new airport and to continue to relieve congestion on the connecting roads between the capital of Dakar and the interior of the country.

The financing of the programme by the AFD took the form of a **sovereign loan to the Republic of Senegal**. The State of Senegal entrusted the project management to its executing agency **APIX** (Agency for the Promotion of Investments and Major Works). The loan is for a period of 25 years, including 5 years of grace. The first payment was made in **2014** and the operational completion date of the project was in **2018**. The total cost of the project amounted €145.9M. The AFD financed **€89M** (61%), the concessionaire SENAC SA financed €35.7M (24.5%) and the Senegalese State financed €21.2M (14.5%). SENAC SA, who was in charge of the work, is a subsidiary of the French construction and concessions group Eiffage. SENAC SA had already built the 4 km long Patte d'Oie–Pikine section, which was put into service in November 2011. The group collects toll

revenues but the Senegalese State also benefits from some revenues linked to the traffic on these motorways: the Value-Added Tax (VAD) collected on the toll rate as well as the corporate taxes that will be paid by the concessionaire.

To monitor and evaluate the project, the AFD monitored disbursements, followed quarterly project progress reports by APIX on technical, financial, social and environmental aspects and organized annual supervisory missions of the Dakar agency.

- **Public policy loan in support of public finance management in Senegal**

The available file concerning the project CSN 1658 summarises the project context and strategic challenges, the project content and objectives, its stakeholders, cost and expected effects.

In the short term, Senegal faces a double challenge: fiscal consolidation and financing priority investments as well as social spending. The country will only be able to meet these challenges by increasing the mobilisation of its own revenue, controlling operating expenditure and improving the performance of public spending.

The cost of the project amounts to **€50m**, disbursed in two parts in 2020. It is a transfer of financial resources in the form of a **loan**, but also a dialogue on public policy. The funds were paid into the Senegalese Treasury account of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). The funds are not earmarked for specific

expenditures but provide the **Senegalese authorities** some resources to achieve some objectives of the ESP II.

The specific objectives of this support operation are as follows. First, the implementation of the budgetary reforms of the Organic Law of the Finance Act. Then, to encourage an increase in the mobilisation of domestic revenue, notably through the development of tele-procedures and the intensification of intelligence and recovery work. Finally, to strengthen the management of the state's assets and liabilities, through a better selection of public investments, an improvement in the financial monitoring of public institutions and of the state's budgetary risks.

This operation was monitored by a steering committee bringing together the AFD and some departments of the Senegalese Ministry of Finance and Budget, Ministry of Economy, Planning and Cooperation.

- **Agricultural risk management**

The accessible “project file” concerning this project is a “Project Description”. The aim of the project is to contribute to the reduction of the vulnerability, the improvement of food security and of the living conditions of poor rural families. This would be achieved through improved access to viable agricultural risk management options.

The first specific objective of the project was to verify the potential



of remote sensing for index insurance by adjusting methodologies and indices to a wider variety of crops and climatic conditions. Index-based insurance is an innovative insurance approach which allows farmers to be insured at a lower cost and in accordance to meteorological indices. The second specific objective of the project is to support the implementation of pilot projects on the basis of defined indices and to identify the potential for operationalisation. The project is a continuation of the CZZ1715 - Index Insurance in West Africa, a €1M project granted at the end of 2011, in support of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (€500K) and PlaNet Guarantee (€500K). The phase 1 of the Index Insurance project with IFAD started mid-2012 and ended in 2014. The project focused on four zones: Djourbel, Kaffrine, Niore and Koussanar in Senegal. The project CSN 1449 is, in fact, the Phase 2 of the project CZZ1715. It allowed the result verification, dissemination and use.

The project was expected to take **3 years** to complete. The budget for the whole project was estimated at \$1,590,000, or approximately €1,155,000. AFD's financing was **€500,000**, i.e. 56% of the total project cost.

- **Urban development programme and motorway in Dakar**

The project file accessible for this project gave very general information about the project which was not signed yet.

The project consisted of the construction of several sections of a toll

motorway to open up Dakar and facilitate trade with the rest of the country. It also compensated the populations affected by the work, around 30,000 people, and by built a resettlement site for them in the east of Dakar.

The project CSN 6020 consisted in a **bilateral loan of €60m** which was granted in **2010**. The total cost of the project was €415m, so it was co-financed.

- **Promotion of food sovereignty through the valorisation of local cereals in Senegal**

No project file was accessible for this project CSN 1470.

The project aims to strengthen food sovereignty in Senegal by reducing dependence on cereal imports (wheat) and increasing the nutritional value of food in rural areas, as well as to increase incomes and reduce unemployment in rural areas.

It was launched in 2015 and its operation completion date is in 2019. It consisted in a **€230,000 grant to an NGO, SOL Agroecological and Solidary Alternatives** (SOL Alternatives Agroécologiques et Solidaires).

- **Improving maternal and child health through an integrated e-health system**

The accessible “project file” concerning this project is a “Project communication form” and details the expected results, the planned

actions, quantified monitoring indicators and targets.

The aim of the project is to strengthen access to quality maternal, neonatal and child health services through the development and implementation of an information and communication technology (ICT) system in the Kolda region.

The total cost of the project CSN 1459 is €1,144,922 and the AFD finances 79% of it, that is to say €900,000. The **grant** beneficiary and manager the **Association for Medicine and Research in Africa** (AMREF). It was launched in **2015** for a period of 3 years.

The information figuring above which was found on the AFD website consists in my data and will be analysed. In the next part you will see how I converted this data into my conclusions.

# Chapter 5. Assessment of France's Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Senegal

## 5.1. Ideal type

According to Easterly's article *Planners vs. Searchers in Foreign Aid* (William Easterly, 2006.) it is first possible to create an ideal type defining the two categories of planners and searchers and their approach to aid. This ideal type has 6 variables.

Variables	Planner	Searcher
<b>Kind of projects</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aid from government to government is preferred</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aid/project that go directly to the beneficiaries are preferred (from the private sector or the not-for-profit sector to the poor for example)</li> </ul>
<b>Scale of projects</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large scale projects</li> <li>• Global blueprints</li> <li>• Universal, big and multiple goals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Narrow-scale and piecemeal intervention</li> <li>• Precise, narrow and earmarked goals</li> <li>• Projects that intend to make</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Projects that intend to transform governments and societies</li> </ul>	<p>individuals better off</p>
<b>Transparency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited access to information and data about the projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to clear information and data about all the steps of the project</li> </ul>
<b>Responsibility &amp; accountability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No responsibility for their action even if they raise high expectations</li> <li>• Are not held accountable for their action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Take responsibility for their action</li> <li>• Are held accountable for their action (answerability, enforceability, ability to report)</li> </ul>
<b>Conditionality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do not penalize the failure of a project</li> <li>• Do not verify if the conditions they imposed are met</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aid is conditioned to the impact, the results of previous project</li> </ul>
<b>Evaluation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internal evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Independent and external evaluation</li> <li>• Use of feedback and</li> </ul>

		scientific testing
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### 5.1.1 Kind of project

According to William Easterly, the government-to-government model is cherished by the planners who deny the existence of bad governments or force bad governments to change in return for aid. Nevertheless, planners would renew loans even if the conditions of the previous ones were not respected. According to him, poverty has more to do with bad governments than with the poverty trap.

“The international financial institutions’ view is that aid should always work through government but conditions on aid should try to change government behavior. Apparently, this is not working as far as punishing countries that are corrupt or tyrannical.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

In Easterly’s theory, private firms or NGOs have a better impact on reducing poverty than developing agencies because they have a direct impact on poor people, the beneficiaries.

“Aid could utilize far more one group of agents who do have an incentive to find things that please the customers: private firms. For example, private firms can provide services that reach the poor, function as watchers, provide funding for poor entrepreneurs, and train aid workers to think like searchers for customer satisfaction. » (William Easterly. 2006.)

The Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International measures the corruption of a country's public service. Each country is scored on a scale of 0-100 where 0 means highly corrupt and 100 means very clean. Senegal's score was 36 in 2012 and 45 in 2018. Concerning this variable we could consider that the AFD has a planner approach since large amounts of flows are going from the AFD to the Senegalese government every year despite a corruption score that is high. Nevertheless, as we want this research to be based on the study of 11 projects financed by the AFD in Senegal, to determine whether the selected projects of the AFD in Senegal are the ones of a planner or a searcher we will see for each project if it is government to government aid or aid that goes directly to its beneficiaries through a non-governmental structure.

### **5.1.2 Scale of project**

According to Easterly, investment and growth are not related. Planners try to fill the financing gaps with huge amounts of money.

“The political economy of aid in the rich countries tends to reward grand gestures and utopian promises rather than piecemeal efforts to gradually improve the well-being and opportunities of the poor – particularly in a situation where there will be only weak monitoring years later of whether the promises were kept.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

Nevertheless:

“In foreign aid, searchers could find ways to make a specific task work, like getting medicines to dying children, if they could concentrate on that task instead of big plans.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

To determine whether the selected projects of the AFD in Senegal are the ones of a planner or a searcher we will see for each project if it is a large-scale (>€1 million) project with big and universal goals and that intends to transform governments and societies or a piecemeal intervention with narrow goals (<€1 million) and that intends to make individuals better off.

### **5.1.3 Transparency**

“Perhaps the foremost best practice is transparency, since without transparency, all other evaluations of best practice are impossible.” (William Easterly, Tobias Pfutze. 2008)

According to Easterly and Pfutze, the data on aid agency spending is poor. These agencies are not transparent about their costs and about how they spend their money. In their research, Easterly and Pfutze evaluate the transparency of aid several agencies thanks to data provided by the OECD and by an investigation about the operating costs of these agencies. The results are the following:

“If we accept that at a minimum all the numbers ought to be available after inquiry, we can conclude that a score below 0.5 is indicative of



serious deficiencies in transparency. By that benchmark, only 10 out of the 31 agencies listed earlier pass our transparency test, with a large number doing abysmally badly.” (William Easterly, Tobias Pfutze. 2008)

France’s average score in their study is 0,75.

In this thesis, I will focus on transparency concerning projects financed and managed in Senegal by the AFD. Thanks to the data gathered on the AFD open data portal I will determine whether the selected projects of AFD in Senegal are the ones of a planner or a searcher. We will check if there is enough information accessible concerning the projects financed and closed between 2000 and 2018 and more specifically if there is less than one page of relevant information about each project.

#### **5.1.4 Responsibility & accountability**

According to Easterly:

“Planners raise expectations but take no responsibility for meeting them; searchers accept responsibility for their actions.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

Responsibility and accountability are different but close concepts. Accountability calls for responsibility and implies that someone responsible for doing something has done it and showed it. One is accountable when one proves its ability to fulfill its responsibility. Concerning international aid at the global level, responsibilities

between donors are hard to establish and even if they can be established, donors do not specialize in a specific field. About this issue:

“Having multiple agents creates the obvious problems of collective action and free riders. If everyone is to blame if something goes wrong, then nobody is to blame.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

“Instead of promoting individual agency accountability for specific tasks, the aid community engages in such fantasies of collective responsibility as the following.” (William Easterly. 2006.)

As France is not responsible for very specific or precise objectives, as several other agencies have similar projects in similar fields, it cannot really be held accountable.

Strategic evaluations and impact evaluations can improve the quality of some strategic tools and can increase an agency’s accountability but there are not systematic.

I found no data about how locals and beneficiaries of projects financed in Senegal by the AFD were taken into account when preparing, conducting and evaluating the projects. Responsibility and accountability are thus difficult to assess.

Due to these difficulties and the lack of data concerning these variables of accountability and responsibility we will set them aside for the purpose of this paper.

### **5.1.5 Conditionality**

Conditionality here does not mean conditioning aid to change in government behavior but rather conditioning aid on the impact and results of previous projects. Planners do not penalize the failure of a project and do not verify if the conditions they imposed are met.

It is to be noted that conditionality can be achieved only if a project is correctly evaluated and if the concepts of responsibility and accountability are also respected. Otherwise, it is impossible to learn from a previous experience since we cannot know what worked and what did not and we cannot link a project to a specific result.

Moreover, conditionality cannot really be measured in the timeframe I chose for my study. Indeed, some projects lasted more than 10 years. Also we cannot know if these projects were launched based on the results of previous projects because data is not accessible for projects that happened before the 2000s.

Thus, the variable of conditionality will be set aside for my analysis.

### **5.1.6 Evaluation**

According to Easterly:

“Perhaps the aid agencies should each set aside a portion of their budgets (such as the part now wasted on self-evaluation) to contribute to an international independent evaluation group made up of staff trained in the scientific method from the rich and poor

countries, who will evaluate random samples of each aid agency's efforts. Evaluation will involve (i) randomized controlled trials where feasible, (ii) less pure statistical analysis if randomized controlled trials are not feasible, and (iii) will at least be truly independent even when randomized trials and statistical analysis are not feasible. Experiment with different methods to just ask the poor if they are better off. Mobilize the altruistic people in rich countries to put the heat on agencies to make their money actually reach the poor, and to get angry when the aid does NOT reach the poor.” (William Easterly, 2006.)

France's ODA refers to the evaluation criteria developed by the OECD DAC which defines the purposes of evaluation this way :

“[...] to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned; to provide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to the public” (OECD DAC, 1991.)

As it is stated in the document “AFD's Evaluation Policy” (AFD, 2013.), the AFD mainly conducts four types of evaluations: ex-post project evaluations, in-depth evaluations, strategic evaluations and evaluation summaries. Some impact evaluations are also conducted but not many: by 2014, 6 impact assessments had been concluded and 20 had been launched by the AFD. Two groups are supposed to be responsible for different types of evaluations: the Evaluation Division of the AFD and the local AFD agencies (since 2007).

External evaluators are also contracted to carry out some evaluations.

- Ex-post project evaluations are produced by local AFD agencies and concern most of the financed projects. These evaluations are brief and simple: they assess to which extent the objectives of the project have been achieved. When it is not possible to isolate the AFD's contribution to a project, a joint evaluation or an analytical review can replace ex-post project evaluations.

- In-depth evaluations represent both evaluation and research work. Indeed, links are still missing between theoretical research and development practices. Easterly highlighted the failure of most research on the relationship between aid and growth to establish the kind of causal relationships that are essential to assess development policies (William Easterly. 2003). So, the aim of in-depth evaluations is to find solid evidence to support or disprove the impact of an intervention, to promote experimentation before the generalisation of a policy, and to broadcast accurate information about what works in development policy.

- Strategic evaluations cover intervention frameworks (geographical, sectoral or cross-cutting frameworks) or strategic elements that have not been formalised yet. These evaluations are much less complex than in-depth evaluations and can give rise to analytical reviews which assess the performance of complex and difficult to evaluate interventions.

- Evaluation summaries about a topic, a sector or a geographical area are conducted by the Evaluation Division of the AFD. Their goal is to improve interventions thanks to the lessons learned by previous evaluations. These summaries as well as meta-evaluations take a critical look at the evaluation process and its effectiveness.

To determine more precisely whether the selected projects of the AFD in Senegal are the ones of a planner or a searcher we will see if each project has been evaluated and if it has been evaluated internally or externally.

## **5.2. Data analysis and answer about France's position**

The previously mentioned 4 variables (kind of project, scale, transparency, evaluation) will help me to assess the 11 previously mentioned projects that were financed by the AFD in Senegal and to conclude if the AFD is a planner or a searcher. For each project, each variable will be assessed according to the definitions presented in the ideal-type.

To determine if a project has been conducted under a planner or a searcher approach, it will need to have more than 2 variables leaning to one side. After assessing the 11 projects it will be possible to determine if the AFD adopted a planner or a searcher approach in Senegal.

	Kind of project	Scale of the project	Transparency	Evaluation	Conclusion
<b>Rice Partnership Promotion programme in the Senegal Delta River (CSN1250)</b>	Government earmarked grant of €13.3 millions	Large scale project (EU, WADB, private sector also financed the project)	Limited access to information about the project since some pages were missing from the Operation Communication Note	External evaluation of the achievements and results at mid-term and at the end of the implementation phase  Annual external audit carried out by an independent audit firm, recruited after an open call for tender, after approval by AFD	<b>Planner</b>

<p><b>Support programme to improve the quality and efficiency of basic education and vocational training (CSN1338)</b></p>	<p>Government earmarked grant of €4 millions and loan of €4millions</p>	<p>Large scale project with multiple co-financers and goals</p>	<p>Availability of the Operation Communication Note (11 pages)</p>	<p>AFD supervision missions and external audits will be carried out annually during the project implementation period but no ex-post evaluation</p>	<p><b>Planner</b></p>
<p><b>Apprenticeship training in para-agricultural trades and multi-stakeholder consultation for the development of rural areas (CSN1422)</b></p>	<p>Grant of €657,108 to 2 NGOs (GRET and Enda Grad Sahel)</p>	<p>Narrow-scale project and goals (development of training programmes and material support in the St Louis region)</p>	<p>The available project file is a short project summary</p>	<p>No specification about the evaluation method  Evaluation carried by the NGOs + internal evaluation by the AFD</p>	<p><b>Searcher</b></p>
<p><b>Establishment of</b></p>	<p>Grant of</p>	<p>Narrow scale</p>	<p>2 pages long</p>	<p>NGO</p>	<p><b>Searcher</b></p>



short commercialisation circuits for local products – around the city of Kolda (CSN1458)	696,283€ to an NGO	project and precise goal	Public Operation Communication note available	responsible for the evaluation	
Programme for the upgrading of Senegalese enterprises	Government earmarked grant of €11.9 millions	Large scale project	1-page long file available (very limited information)	No information	<b>Planner</b>
Extension of the toll motorway from Diamniadio to Airport (CSN1402)	Government earmarked loan of €89 millions	Large scale project, co-financed by Senegal State and a private company	Availability of the Operation Communication Note (11 pages)	Monitoring but no evaluation of the project	<b>Planner</b>
Public policy loan in support of public finance management (CSN1658)	Government loan and technical assistance for a total amount of	Large scale project	2-page long summary of the planned project	No evaluation planned	<b>Planner</b>

	€50 millions				
<b>Agricultural risk management (CSN1449)</b>	Grant of 500,000€ to the International Fund for Agricultural Development and PlaNet Guarantee an insurance company	Narrow scale project	2-page long summary of the planned project	The project is an evaluation in itself	<b>Searcher</b>
<b>Urban development programme and motorway in Dakar (CSN6020)</b>	Government earmarked loan of €60 millions	Large scale project	1-page long file available (very limited information)	No evaluation	<b>Planner</b>

Promotion of food sovereignty through the valorisation of local cereals (CSN1470)	Grant of 230,000€ to an NGO (SOL)	Narrow scale project	No project file accessible	No information	Impossible to determine
Improving maternal and child health through an integrated e-health system (CSN1449)	Grant of 900,000€ to the Association for Medicine and Research in Africa	Narrow scale project	2-page long summary of the planned project	The project is an evaluation in itself	Searcher
<b>Total: 11 projects</b>	To government: 6 Not to government: 5	Large scale: 6 Narrow scale: 5	At least 2 pages of clear information: 6 Limited information: 5	Project without evaluation: 6 Project with evaluation: 5	<b>Planner: 6</b> <b>Searcher: 4</b> <b>Impossible to determine: 1</b>

Thus, we can say from this analysis grid that AFD, and therefore by extension France since AFD is its main operator, has a planner

approach. Indeed, among the 11 projects analysed in Senegal between 2000 and 2018, 6 correspond to the categories defined above for a planner. We also have one projects where it is impossible to determine on which side it is leaning and 4 projects that have a searcher approach.

## **5.3. Balancing the results**

### **5.3.1. Some efforts be closer to the private sector**

I would say, from my experience as an intern in the Entrepreneurship and Inclusive Economy team at AFD headquarters in Paris from July to December 2021, that AFD tends more and more to have a searcher approach.

Indeed, more and more public-private partnerships are being implemented. Partnership contracts or PPPs (public-private partnerships) were introduced in France by the ordinance of 17 June 2004. Projects implemented by NGOs are also much more numerous than before even if they often represent small sums of money. Many projects are also implemented on behalf of governments by contracting authorities (public or private) whose efficiency and flexibility is higher than the one of a Ministry.

There is also a growing emphasis on a results-oriented organisational culture and New Public Management (Jean-David Naudet. 2012.)

### 5.3.2. An emphasis put on evaluation

As we can understand, evaluations are not systematic for AFD projects. Indeed:

“The systematic evaluation of all operations is not an appropriate option as it leads to a dispersal of resources that is not conducive to quality research, and to evaluations that may be of little use. The projects to be evaluated are thus selected according to several criteria: opportunity of a dialogue on the results with the beneficiary, interest of the evaluation in terms of learning...” (AFD. 2013. p.21).


Also, as François Bourguignon says:

"In the real world, the evaluation of specific programmes indeed faces many obstacles, often difficult to overcome. It is difficult to conceive ex ante what the results of a project will be. It is equally difficult ex post, except for projects that are carried out in an experimental setting. In any case, it is very difficult to assess the results in terms of the final social objectives. It is difficult to aggregate the different dimensions, especially the non-economic dimensions of these objectives. Finally, it is difficult to take into account the exact effect of the context of a programme or policy on the final outcome and, therefore, to draw general conclusions from a specific evaluation." (François Bourguignon. 2012.)

In any case, AFD faces some challenges but has committed to take action concerning evaluation by improving the evaluability of

interventions, having a better allocation of resources thanks to more strategic programming, clarifying the roles and responsibilities for evaluation, strengthening the quality of its work (AFD. 2013.).

The importance of evaluations was raised since AFD's proportional budget for centralized evaluations was lower than the one of other development agencies.



Source: *Evaluation systems in Development Co-operation, 2016 review, OECD*

Evaluations are not always possible and require large budgets but the evaluation team at the AFD headquarters (EVA) has seen increase in resources dedicated to evaluation and these resources are mainly directed towards strengthening and diversifying EVA's service offer. This diversification aims to improve the quality and usefulness of the evaluations carried out, as well as to advance the evaluation culture at AFD.

### 5.3.3. Criticism toward Easterly's theory and

## methodology

Easterly has a very liberal vision which is, of course, subjective and subject to criticism. I think he overestimates the ability of free markets to drive development and welfare. He gives several examples that are supposed to show how private firms can find in their interest to solve the problem of the poor. The first example is taken from C. K. Prahalad (*The Fortune at the BoP: Eradicating Poverty through Profits*) and concerns HLL who sells soap and who increased awareness about the benefit of washing hands to prevent diseases. He also cites the example of Mohammad Yunus' initiative of microcredit for the poor. However, I think that the impact of these initiatives on well-being and development is limited, I do not consider them as revolutions or solutions who could eradicate poverty.

The role of public development agencies such as AFD is to strengthen the public sector and the services poor countries propose to their citizen. Public sector and government aid cannot be set aside.

I also think that the notion of development is much broader than the one of economic development and growth. As Amartya Sen shows, it is very important to consider human freedoms and capabilities before assessing development. And freedoms can be from different types: political, economic, social, concerning transparency and security. I also wonder whether searching and planning are as incompatible as Easterly presents them. Amartya Sen also shows that the WB and the

IMF, described as the planners par excellence by Easterly, are in fact the producers of the “searcher” methods (Amartya Sen. 2006). He gives the example of *Voices of the Poor*, a World Bank project with a searcher approach.

### 5.3.3. What still can be learned

In any case we can learn a lot from Easterly’s criticism and caricatural view. The critics he addresses to development agencies are very useful for them to improve their ability to reduce poverty and inequalities by being more accountable, transparent, responsible, by evaluating and financing more narrow-scale projects that go directly to their beneficiaries.

Easterly and Pfutze share some best practices of international aid:

“We then consider four dimensions of best practice: Specialization measures the degree to which aid is not fragmented among too many donors, too many countries, and too many sectors for each donor. Selectivity measures the extent to which aid avoids corrupt autocrats and goes to the poorest countries. Ineffective aid channels measures the extent to which aid is tied to political objectives or consists of food aid or technical assistance. Overhead costs measures an agency's administrative costs relative to the amount of aid it gives.” (Easterly and Pfutze. 2008.)

Even if these measures can seem difficult to put in place, development agencies get recommendations about what they should



lean to.

## Chapter 6. Conclusion

To conclude, my work consisted in giving an overview of official development assistance with a focus on French official aid and AFD's intervention in Senegal between 2000 and 2018.

My analysis consisted in determining whether AFD was a planner or a searcher, a concept derived from William Easterly's theory, based on 11 projects launched and completed between 2000 and 2018.

I constructed a typical ideal with 4 salient criteria: project type, project size, project transparency and project evaluation. For each of the 11 projects I then determined which side of the scale the searcher and planner were on. It turns out that among the 11 projects, 6 have more than 2 criteria belonging to the planner typology, 4 have more than 2 criteria belonging to the searcher typology and it was impossible to determine for one project. This leads to the conclusion that AFD has a planner's approach.

That being said, this opposition is open to criticism and has many flaws as seen above. William Easterly's theory, which is a caricature and not necessarily applicable to concrete cases such as this one, does, however, provide some guidelines for improving ODA.

It should also be noted that my work has its limitations as it is a qualitative analysis and therefore cannot be generalised. I also had to

deal with a limited amount of data.

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## Abstract

The White Man's Burden(2006)과 같은 그의 작품에서 William Easterly는 계획가와 탐색자를 대조합니다. 그에 따르면, 공식 개발 지원(ODA)이 구현됨에 따라 "계획자" 논리에 해당합니다. 계획자는 큰 프로젝트를 설계하고 큰 일반 아이디어를 가지고 있으며 자신이 도와야 할 사람들에게 자신의 행동에 대해 책임을 지지 않습니다. Easterly는 실용적인 관점에서 지역 문제에 대한 해결책을 찾는 것을 가능하게 하는 "탐색자"와 그것을 대조합니다. 계획자와 탐색자 논리 사이의 이러한 대립은 이 논문의 이론적 틀이 될 것이며 프랑스의 경우에 프랑스 개발청의 개발 정책이 어느 쪽인지를 결정하는 데 적용될 것입니다.

개발 원조는 탐구되어야 하는 연구의 분야입니다. 현재의 프랑스 개발청(AFD)은 제2차 세계 대전 중 1941년에 중앙 은행이자 자유 프랑스 재무부로 설립되었습니다. 20세기에는 다른 이름을 가지고 있었고 1998년에 AFD가 되었습니다. 프랑스 ODA에 대한 많은 출판물이 있지만 아직 이론화되어 있지 않습니다.

본 석사논문을 완성하기 위해 먼저 OECD 정의에 기초한 공적개발원조를 정의하고 그 다양한 발전과정을 보여준다. 그런 다음 초점은 프랑스 공적 개발 지원, 다양한 기관, 금액 및 수혜자, 개혁 및 평가 방법, 그리고 세네갈에 있습니다. 세네갈은 항상 프랑스 원조의 우선 순위 국가 중 하나였습니다. 식민 통치를 한 나라이자 프랑스의 역사적 파트너입니다. 동등한 발전 수준에서 프랑스의 원조를 가장 많이

받는 나라입니다. 따라서 사례 연구로 선택되었습니다.

AFD가 2000년에서 2018년 사이에 Sen-egal에서 시작 및 종료한 모든 프로젝트(그 중 11개)에 대한 인구 조사 및 분석이 여기에서 수행됩니다. 이 프로젝트는 계획자 또는 검색자를 정의하기 위해 East-erly가 제공하는 기준을 사용하는 분석 그리드를 사용하여 분석됩니다.

프랑스는 탐색자 접근 방식이 더 많지만 이 반대는 보이는 것만큼 관련성이 없다고 결론지을 것입니다. 그것은 결점이 있지만 여전히 ODA를 개선하기 위한 몇 가지 지침을 제공합니다.

**키워드:** 프랑스 개발청, 세네갈, 원조, 개발

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