Mainland Spouses Speak: Taiwanese Nationalism and the Political Movements of Marriage Migrants from the People's Republic of China

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(Abstract) This study examines the anti-Sunflower Movement of marriage migrants from the People's Republic of China in Taiwan in 2014, to explore migrants' political movements in their destination countries. Previous studies revealed that migrants' political movements are possible with cooperation from local civil society and international solidarity, as long as the government of the destination country allows such activism. Mainland spouses in Taiwan, however, were isolated, due to the government's suspicions of their links to China and Taiwanese civil society's efforts to establish "new Taiwan." Nevertheless, mainland spouses participated in the anti-Sunflower Movement while making their presence known to Taiwanese civil society through strategies of supporting friendly parties, making their own political parties, speaking out in public, and appealing to their origin country. Though the political movement of mainland spouses remained limited and failed to achieve its goals, it was meaningful in that it raised the public profile of marriage migrants from the PRC.

1. Introduction

On March 30, 2014, some 500,000 people wearing black clothes and carrying sunflowers gathered on Taipei's Ketagalan Boulevard (凱達格蘭大道). They chanted slogans calling for swift annulment of the Cross-Strait

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Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA)[1] and the resignation of the Ma Ying-jeou government. Known as the Ketagalan Boulevard Protest, this event became a turning point in Taiwan's 2014 Sunflower Movement, which lasted approximately 23 days, from March 18 to April 10, and saw an alliance of Taiwanese student and civic organizations occupy the country's Legislative Yuan.[2]

On the same day, others gathered in Taipei Station wearing white clothes and carrying Blue Sky with a White Sun flags (the flag of the Republic of China). These were supporters of the CSSTA, who regarded the Sunflower Movement's occupation of the Legislative Yuan as illegal. Among them were marriage migrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and their partners, angry that the occupation of the Yuan was causing indefinite delays to a legal amendment bill that would reduce the amount of time needed for the spouses to obtain permanent residency status in Taiwan. They later organized and went with their flags to Taipei Station or Ketagalan Boulevard, where they confronted Sunflower Movement protesters.

Why did marriage migrants from the PRC take to the streets and oppose the Sunflower Movement? In what context did the Sunflower Movement emerge in Taiwanese society, and how did it relate to marriage migrants from the PRC? What did the marriage migrant protestors want from Taiwanese society? Such questions provided the starting point for this study. In my search for answers, I lived in Taipei, Taiwan, from 2014 to 2015, conducting interviews with members of several mainland spouse organizations (Orgainzation A, B, C) and their families and taking part in the organizations' political movements. Since 2016, moreover, I have visited

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1 The CSSTA is a follow-up treaty to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a trade agreement between the PRC and Taiwan. Because the two parties to the ECFA differ on the notion of a state-to-state relationship, the treaty is not labeled a "free trade agreement (FTA)" but described as "equal to an FTA." The agreement was finalized by PRC and Taiwanese representatives in Chongqing on June 29, 2010, and came into effect on January 1, 2011, following ratification procedures on each side.

2 The movement adopted the sunflower (太陽花) as its symbol for the following reason: On March 19, 2014, the Black Island National Youth Front (黑色島國青年陣線), one of the movement's main participants, uploaded a social media post calling for people to buy sunflowers to boost the movement's morale. Seeing this, florists in New Taipei City donated 1,300 sunflowers. The sunflower signifies that the movement opposed the opaque processes surrounding the CSSTA, the content of which was not properly made public, and that the radiance of the sunflower will eliminate the darkness of backroom political dealings and offer Taiwan a brighter future (Yi Gwangsu 2015).

Taipei every year to trace the evolution of this movement.[3] In this study, I have granted anonymity to all but the few participants who asked me to reveal their names; the study was reviewed by Seoul National University's Research Ethics Committee.

I begin by explaining several terms that may be of help in understanding marriage migration in Taiwan. Marriage migrants in Taiwan can be broadly divided into two categories, according to two separate pieces of legislation. Due to the special national and regional relationships between Taiwan and the PRC, marriage migrants from the latter are referred to as "mainland spouses" and managed according to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (hereafter the "Cross-Strait Act"). Marriage migrants from other countries are labeled "foreign spouses" and managed according to immigration and nationality laws. Mainland spouses must wait at least 6 years to obtain a Taiwanese permanent residency, according to Article 17 of the Cross-Strait Act, while other foreign spouses may receive the same after a shorter period of at least four years.

When it comes to welfare and education, by contrast, marriage migrants living in Taiwan are placed in a single category, regardless of nationality, and referred to as "new immigrants" (新移民) or "new residents" (新住民).[4] The Taiwanese government's welfare policies that attempt to combine mainland spouses and foreign spouses as new migrants provide the former with opportunities to meet the latter, but it proved impossible to lump the two types of spouses together as one because of their fundamentally different legal and institutional civil rights. Mainland spouses used these welfare policies to remain organized on a continuous basis, but the more they entered Taiwanese civil society by organizing, the more they felt

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3 I began planning this research with the question of why Chinese marriage migrants organized so actively in Taiwan. When I started my field study, the Sunflower Movement arose and I started detecting various changes in the organization of mainland spouses. Rather than adopting the perspective of an observer, I took an active part in the activities of the spouses, gradually gaining their attention. After first being viewed as a foreign exchange student who wanted to know about them, I transformed into a novel Korean "younger sister and comrade" as I took part in all their events and movements. Nonetheless, some migrants did remain wary of me on the grounds that I was a foreigner. Because I was a foreigner, I took part more actively, and these limitations caused a sense of distance to form, allowing me the space to actually observe.

4 In Taipei, the term "new immigrant" is generally used, while "new resident" is used in other areas. The latter term generally has a stronger connotation of settlement.

discriminated against, hurt and betrayed by it because of their different legal and institutional civil rights.

Within this Taiwanese context, mainland spouses unified in different ways and on different fronts to those of other migrants and entered the political arena by appropriating and resisting Taiwanese civil society. In the next section, in order to analyze this political movement, I will examine how previous studies have analyzed migrant political movements with regard to the governments and civil societies of their home and destination countries, providing an explanation by way of comparison with the Taiwanese government and civil society. I will then analyze the mainland spouse political movement through the revival of Taiwanese nationalism, the Sunflower Movement, and strategies of the mainland spouses opposing it.

2. Theoretical Background: Migrant Political Movements and the Taiwanese Context

In the past, the most pronounced meaning of migration was that of migrants relocating from their country of origin to their destination country and settling there. Now, however, migration is so frequent that the number of migrants worldwide has reached almost one billion. As migrants went beyond settling in their destination countries and began creating reciprocal networks with their countries of origin, scholars began focusing on movement between destination country and country of origin (Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1995). Some, in particular, focused on the way these movements could cause political change in both destination country and country of origin, asserting that these movements must be viewed within the contexts of transnationalism and social movements (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Smith 2003; Vertovec 2003; Miller 2011).

Though scholars generally agree that the movements of migrants affect both their countries of origin and destination, each scholar has shown a slightly different approach when it comes to emphasis placed on connections to civil society in destination countries, the strength of migrant networks, and the mobilization of international solidarity and human rights discourses.

Firstly, the concept that emerged from the migrants' connection to civil society in their destination country and relationship to the strength of migrant networks is transnational activism. Emphasizing the participatory

action of migrants in their destination countries, this concept stresses that migrant networks are comparatively strong and strongly connected to civil society in the destination country (McClean 2018). Another concept focuses on processes of political practice that link migrants' destination countries and countries of origin. Known as political transnational practices (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), these are aimed at promoting the rights and interests of migrants, in ways such as expanding their political, social, and economic rights and eliminating discriminatory treatment in their destination country; they appear when countries of origin help their overseas compatriots in an attempt to improve their legal and socioeconomic statuses.

Others emphasize the link to international alliances pursuing universal values worldwide, for the reason that political participation by migrants is always relatively lacking in power, even when it links their destination country to their country of origin. This is known as "migrant transnationalism" (Gray and O'Sullivan-Lago 2011). It becomes apparent when migrants seeking help from their destination country do not emphasize their networks in their countries of origin but stress that their agenda is universal. For instance, when the Filipino community in the United States wants to provide help with typhoon damage in the Philippines, it adopts a strategy of emphasizing to Americans—members of its destination country's society—that fundraising and activism regarding the damage is humanitarian in nature.

Though they each differ in emphasis, transnational activism, political transnational practices, and migrant transnationalism all recognize that the transnational practices of migrants affect both destination country and country of origin. But the direction and magnitude of this force are not equal. In particular, the more undemocratic society is in the country of origin, the more the direction and magnitude of the force tilt in the direction of the destination country (Castles and Miller 2013 [1993]). In this process, control in the destination country, interest on the part of the country of origin, and the gender of migrants function as important factors. I will now examine previous studies while noting how cases in East Asia and Taiwan can be reassessed, with a focus on these factors.

Firstly, let us look at how migrant political movements affect control in the destination country. McClean (2018) considers how Korean communities in the United States request aid from American civil society, focusing on the installation of a bronze statue of a comfort woman by one such community. When the statue is approached as a Korean issue, Americans distance themselves from the plan, calling the comfort women Korea's business, and

the community's project is jeopardized. Korean-American communities thus emphasize to Americans that the issue is not just a Korean affair but a war crime and a case of violation of universal women's rights. In other words, the United States, as the "policeman of the world" and a country of human rights, cannot overlook the comfort women issue. Korean-American communities use such strategies because of humanitarian concerns espoused by their destination country, the United States. Destination countries feel uncomfortable when migrant organizations have strong links to their mother countries. Destination countries have a duty not only to protect the people living within their territories but to manage them too; strong support for the values of their mother country on the part of migrants may appear as a failure to control migrants on the part of the destination country. But when issues are approached from the humanitarian angle of women's rights or war crimes, the possibility of alliance with US human rights movements or feminist organizations appears. In other words, the practices of the Korean-American community reassure the destination country while leaving the potential for connection to the destination country's civil society and to international society.

As long as the control of the destination country is not challenged, it may encourage the formation of migrant organizations, according to their status in the country's society. Ireland is relatively encouraging of organizations led by migrants because they actually facilitate the promotion of social integration policies introduced by the government (Lentin and Moreo 2012). In South Korea, a careful approach is taken to social integration, according to the status of migrants. The reason the South Korean government promotes the self-help organizations of marriage migrants more actively than those of migrant workers is that the latter have to go back after staying for a certain period, while the former will live in South Korea for a long time to come. Therefore, the government supports self-help organizations of people from the same mother country only to an extent that enables them to restore the social networks severed by marriage. Such self-help organizations help the government to manage or control any (multicultural) policies it implements later on.

Destination countries allow organization among migrants for the purpose of social integration, as long as this does not threaten their own control. It is not easy for migrants, with scant social resources and networks, to engage in sustained political practices without the help of civil society in

the destination country.[5] The fact that migrant political movements, even when triggered by a particular incident, are ultimately hard to sustain produces the irony of intervention by the destination country. If, however, the country of origin now takes interest in the political practices of migrants, the situation changes. This is also why interest from the country of origin must be noted as a factor in migrant political movements. Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco (1997), when analyzing how political elites in the country of origin draw resources from overseas communities, divides the former's policies into two categories. One is that of homeland policies, whereby countries of origin create organizations for overseas migrants, including returning migrants; the other is that of global nation policies, whereby countries of origin support overseas migration among their people, then help them maintain contact with the mother country. Turkey, in particular, makes active use of such a policy, helping its people living in the EU to engage in lobbying on the political front and money remittances on the economic front. Turkey's global nation policy is aimed at building a positive image of Turkey in Europe via Turkish compatriots.

Migrants build (political) relationships with their countries of origin in two ways. One is by participating directly in the country of origin's politics via enfranchisement for overseas compatriots (Castles and Miller 2013 [1993]); the other is by maintaining connections with political organizations or institutions in the country of origin. In the cases of the Philippines and Turkey, both of which have large numbers of overseas compatriots, the votes of these compatriots sometimes influence politics in the country of origin. In Turkey's case, outside Kurdish Sunni Muslim organizations and Turkish nationalist organizations contact Turkish institutions by email or directly. Because migrant organizations often encounter financial problems, they react positively to contact from the mother country and the possibility of assistance that it brings.

But movements reinforcing such alliances with countries of origin can

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5 Help from civil society in the destination country does not always proceed in the direction that migrants want. Jang Jeonga (2013) describes how new migrants from the PRC to Hong Kong must live in the latter for seven years before acquiring full citizenship, enduring discrimination in the meantime. Hong Kong civic organizations attempt to help them by joining their protests or searching for legal methods, but this can have the paradoxical effect of further reinforcing the stigmatizing and othering of new migrants in Hong Kong. This is because the relationship between Hongkongers and PRC citizens has yet to be clearly defined.

be restricted by destination countries. Therefore, migrants sometimes widen the scope of their political practices through alliances with international NGOs instead (Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Tibetan migrants who have fled to India or Nepal, for example, cannot receive active support from the governments of their destination countries because the latter are mindful of China's feelings. Instead, they ask the United Nations or the European Parliament for help, citing the universal value of human rights.

Finally, recent studies of migrant political movements focus on the gender of their protagonists. Previous studies have generally concluded that men engage in boundary-transcending political movements, regarding the role of women as that of assistants or as highly private and invisible. Recently, the feminization of migration has led to an increase in the number of female migrants, with women newly emerging as the subjects of migrant political practice.

A key example of this is political movements by female domestic workers. The Hong Kong-based Filipino domestic workers' unions examined by Constable (2007) and Lim (2016) steadily portray how domestic workers in Hong Kong engage in everyday resistance, create alliances, and achieve political movement. Everyday resistance on the part of female domestic workers consists of exposing the hard nature of domestic work through verbal play, such as jokes, or by occupying parks or public squares on their days off. But when their working hours and environments fail to improve, due to the nature of domestic work and its lack of separation between work space and personal space, the workers try to go beyond their daily resistance and creative avenues of opposition. The union they created appealed for help from their country of origin, the Philippines, and allied itself with Indonesian domestic workers and with a Hong Kong-based labor union to achieve a political movement. It also formed international alliances with domestic worker networks in the EU and Australia, bringing about amendments to related Hong Kong laws in 2006. These networks, moreover, gathered in Uruguay in October 2013 to launch the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). Constable (2007) attributes this ability to receive support from destination country, country of origin, and international alliances to several factors: long history of domestic worker migration between Hong Kong and the Philippines, allowing the formation of various networks; the impetus for alliance among domestic workers due to unreasonable laws; and the fact that this unreasonableness, as a violation of

women's human rights, is able to draw international agreement and support.

As we have seen so far, to become possible, migrant political movements needed to ally themselves with civil society in their destination countries to an extent that does not go beyond those countries' control; to make use of attention from their countries of origin; and to receive help from international alliances. If, at this time, migrants obtain more stable residential status from their destination countries, receiving support becomes easier, allowing them to secure both space and continuity for their movement. In particular, the reason women have recently been able to take part in transnational political practices is that migrant women have entered the social realm via the labor market, providing a chance to secure resources.

How, then, can we consider attempts at political movements by mainland spouses within the context of existing studies? Firstly, in terms of their general status in Taiwan, the lives of recently migrated mainland spouses have been vulnerable both in terms of laws and systems and of social rights. With no guaranteed health, labor, or residential rights, mainland spouses are forced to organize in search of the most basic rights. Then, within the context of government policies that gradually allow them social rights solely as mother-citizens, and amid exclusion from Taiwanese civil society, which tries to distance itself from the PRC, they ultimately have no choice but to embrace and make use of education programs as a way of securing resources.

Such widespread practices by mainland spouses have placed a burden on the Taiwanese government and civil society, which have tried to prevent the practices by further limiting the spouses' legal–institutional citizenship. Taiwanese civil society has long avoided supporting and empowering mainland spouses because their Chinese language abilities are superior to those of other marriage migrants, and other laws apply to them. According to Hsia (2008), the application of different laws to mainland spouses and foreign spouses has inevitably divided migrant movements in Taiwan. Nonetheless, Hsia also notes that an organization called the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM) was formed for mainland spouses and other foreign spouses to struggle together against unreasonable Taiwanese laws relating to marriage migration. Contrary to the claims of Hsia, who traces the history of this struggle until 2008, my subsequent field study found that though AHRLIM still exists, the mainland spouse organization that took part in it at first ended up leaving early on, sensing a difference in values, and were no longer taking

an active part in it. Only one mainland spouse organization remained in AHRLIM, cooperating in order to represent the interests of marginalized mainland spouses. Mainland spouse organizations had gradually dropped out because gender- and human rights-related organizations in the alliance did not take a friendly stance towards the PRC. The main organization in AHRLIM focused on the 'empowerment' of marriage migrants by making books and CDs for learning Chinese, helping the migrants learn about Taiwanese society, and granting them their own space. Mainland spouses, by contrast, already spoke Chinese because they came from PRC; because of this, they were not guaranteed the support or resources of Taiwanese intellectuals, experts, or activists. Ultimately, mainland spouses had no choice but to organize among themselves amid the apathy of Taiwanese civil society. A comparison of previous studies and the organizational processes of mainland spouses is shown in Table 1 below.

In the context of Taiwan's thus-divided migrant landscape, this study—based on the premise that mainland spouses have organized independently, using resources acquired throughout their relatively long history of migration—attempts to address how the recent resurgence of nationalism in Taiwanese civil society and the Sunflower Movement have influenced

Table 1. A comparison of factors influencing migrant political movements

	Country of origin		Destination country		International society
	Government	Civil society	Government	Civil society	International organizations and alliances
Relationship to migrant political practices	Friendly	Friendly	Supportive to the extent that national identity is not threatened	Friendly	Friendly, preferably when universal values are asserted

	PRC	Taiwan		International society
	Government and 'society'	Government	Civil society	International organizations and alliances
Relationship to mainland spouse political practices	Friendly	Both friendly and antagonistic	Antagonistic	No connection

these organizations and how mainland spouses create their own political movements. To this end, in the following section I consider recent trends in Taiwanese civil society.

3. Mainland Spouses and The Resurgence of Nationalism in Taiwanese Civil Society

Mainland spouses appear to have been excluded, in terms of legal and institutional factors, due to Taiwan's distinction-based immigration policies and divided migrant landscape. But a more fundamental reason is that mainland spouses appeared to Taiwanese civil society as an organization symbolizing the PRC, their country of origin. In Taiwan, the term "China" originally meant the Kuomintang (KMT)'s Republic of China, which had crossed over to the island of Taiwan after 1949. But the growing power of the PRC led to the emergence of another "China." In response, Taiwanese civil society constantly attempted to create a state based on "Taiwan consciousness" in order to erase the Republic of China from the island.

What, then, was the process of creating a state based on Taiwan consciousness? Here, it indicates a shift of influence to those originally from the island of Taiwan rather than mainland China. "Creating a state based on Taiwan consciousness" means laying the foundations of a state by Taiwanese. Taiwan consciousness first materialized in the 1970s.[6] At this time, Taiwan

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6 Scholarly opinions are divided on the question of when Taiwan consciousness first emerged. Some place its origins in the 1920s, corresponding with the first use of the term hontōjin (本島人; "main islanders") by Taiwan's Japanese colonial rulers to denote the island's resident Han Chinese. The latter, resenting their discriminatory treatment by Japan, rejected this term and instead called themselves "Taiwanese." This included both Hoklo people from Fujian Province and Hakka people from Guangdong Province, but not the island's mountain-dwelling aboriginal population (Brown 2004, Heo Irin 2012). Taiwan became part of the territory of the Republic of China in 1945, with the surrender of Japan, and was then reduced to a source of supplies for the Kuomintang in its ongoing war with the Communist Party of China. On February 28, 1947, when Taiwanese people could no longer stand the endless exploitation and oppression of the Kuomintang, mainlanders conducted a purge in what is now known as the February 28 Incident. From then on, the Kuomintang government continued to purge large numbers of Taiwanese intellectuals that went against its will and to enforce oppressive rule and policies, such as making Taiwanese citizens learn Mandarin and banning them from using their own language (Kim Minhwan 2012, Yang Taegeun 2012, Heo Irin 2012). Taiwan consciousness was suppressed by mainlanders until the 1970s, when it underwent a revival.

was undergoing various external and internal changes. Externally, Taiwan was ejected from the UN in October 1971, while China was admitted to the organization; internally, this delivered a considerable shock to Taiwanese society. This prompted a movement in political society critical of the "Kuomintang dictatorship from China" and a movement in civil society to "rediscover the true Taiwan." In the political realm, opposition factions within the Kuomintang joined forces with outside organizations and attempted to create a new party;[7] in civil society, the growth of Taiwan consciousness gave rise to a controversy about Taiwan nativist literature (鄉土文學).[8]

From 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power, Taiwan pushed harder to create a state based on Taiwan consciousness. The first achievement of this project was the Name Rectification Campaign (正名運動), which sowed the name Taiwan throughout society. The Name Rectification Campaign aims not only to change the current name of the country from Republic of China to Taiwan, Taiwanguo ("Taiwan Country") or Taiwan Gonghuaguo ("Republic of Taiwan"), but to replace "Chinese" or "China" with "Taiwan" in the names of private organizations and companies, and to join the UN under the new country name. Pushing mother tongue and localization education, the campaign has made elementary school children take courses in Taiwanese Hokkien, Hakka, or aboriginal languages since 2001, while amending all mentions of the PRC in textbooks from "the mainland" to "China." This localization in the fields of language and history was an attempt to instill Taiwan consciousness.

To younger generations, who grew up amid the process of creating a state based on Taiwan consciousness, the Kuomintang's policies of rap-

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7 The Meilidao (美麗島) Incident of the 1970s was a key example of a movement to form a new party. Intellectuals were caught trying to organize a new party at the headquarters of a magazine named *Meilidao*, and the leaders of the movement were subsequently persecuted by the Kuomintang.

8 "Nativist literacy debates" arose between the pro-unification faction, which sought to instill Chinese consciousness, and the pro-independence faction, which sought to instill Taiwan consciousness, on the question of how a democratic Taiwan should be seen. The pro-independence faction entered the Taiwanese political sphere together with the arrival of democracy. It established the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986 and worked with Taiwan-born president Lee Teng-hui to develop policies to entrench Taiwan consciousness. On the administrative front, the faction amended the country's Household Registration Act to eliminate distinctions between those born on the Chinese mainland and those born in Taiwan and worked to revise society as well as geography and history textbooks to establish a Taiwan region-centered view of history (Yang Taegeun 2012).

prochement with the PRC upon gaining power in 2008 gave rise to confused values. This was because the student movement, known as a progressive force in Taiwan, had arisen in defiance of the Kuomintang dictatorship, which represented "China." The Wild Lily Movement (野百合學運) of the 1990s,[9] the Wild Strawberries Movement (野草莓運動) that arose in 2008 in opposition to the Ma Ying-jeou government's pro-PRC policies, and the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement (反媒體壟斷運動), which aimed to block dictatorial control of the media by pro-Chinese companies, also emerged in this context.

Amid social trends calling for strengthened Taiwanese identity, "China" became associated with the Kuomintang and came to represent the coercive politics of the old generation, which had to be overthrown. Mainland spouses who, along with the Kuomintang, represented "China," conjured various negative images, such as those of Communist Party agents who knew nothing about democracies, migrant prostitutes, lowlifes only in Taiwan to make money, or individuals supporting the Kuomintang in order to achieve unification with their motherland. Such images evoked emotions beyond mere fear on the part of original inhabitants, who saw PRC migrants as a threat to their livelihoods. Their fears were enhanced by feelings of animosity towards the PRC, the immigrants' country of origin.[10]

Mainland spouses fought against these negative images in a variety of ways. In the following section, I will focus on how they responded strategically, by appropriation or resistance, to Taiwanese perceptions of them amid the Sunflower Movement, which appeared as a fierce backlash against backroom political dealings between the PRC and the Kuomintang. We will see, for example, how mainland spouses, while not denying the Taiwanese perception of them as "supporters of the dumbass conservative

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9 A 7-day Taiwanese student movement that ran from March 16 to 22, 1990. Students from around the country gathered in Liberty Square by National Chang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and issued four demands: dissolution of the National Assembly; abolition of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (designed for putting down communist rebellions); the holding of a national council (to discuss key matters of state); and a timetable for political and economic reform. This was the biggest student demonstration since the Kuomintang government had crossed to Taiwan, and it influenced democratic politics in the country. President Lee Teng-hui held a national council after the student movement and abolished the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion in 1991.

10 For more regarding Taiwan's complex about the Chinese mainland, see Lan (2008).

Kuomintang because they're Chinese too," earned a bad reputation for themselves by claiming that only the Kuomintang acknowledged their place in Taiwanese society. While discussing this event, I will ultimately address the significance and limitations of the movements of mainland spouses entering the political arena.

4. Mainland Spouses and the Sunflower Movement

As mentioned above, the Sunflower Movement prompted Taiwanese students and social organizations to occupy the country's Legislative Yuan for a period of approximately 23 days, from March 18 to April 10, 2014. The movement is known to have begun as a protest against the way the ruling Kuomintang had, on March 17, rushed through the passage of the CSSTA, a follow-up to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA); it passed in just 30 seconds in the Internal Administration Committee of the Legislative Yuan (Jeong Yuseon 2016).

The Sunflower Movement broadly comprised the following stages: 1) occupation of the Legislative Yuan on March 18; 2) occupation of the Executive Yuan and forcible eviction of protesters by armed police on March 23 and 24; 3) dramatic growth into a national movement with a street demonstration by 500,000 people on Ketagalan Boulevard on March 30; 4) a promise by Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-ping (王金平) to postpone review of the trade pact until a supervisory ordinance for cross-strait agreements has been passed; and 5) dispersal of the Legislative Yuan occupation at 6:00 pm on April 10. The Sunflower Movement led to a landslide defeat for the Kuomintang in local elections in November of the same year and produced a change of government at the January 2016 general election. It is known to have spawned new political entities, such as the New Power Party (時代力量) and the Social Democratic Party (社會民主黨), breaking away from the Kuomintang-DPP two-party order, allowing students and progressive forces to discover their true identities and build their own society (Beckershoff 2017).

Recent studies of the Sunflower Movement have analyzed it from three angles. The first of these focuses on the superficial reasons for which the movement arose: namely, the opacity and undemocratic nature of procedures involved in concluding cross-strait agreements (Kang Junyeong and Jang Yeonghui 2016). In other words, the foundations of the movement

were young people's anger at the backroom politics of the Communist Party of China (CPC)–Kuomintang alliance and concern about strengthening economic bonds with the PRC due to unilateral opening of the economy (Ho 2015). The second angle analyzes the Sunflower Movement within the context of social movements in Taiwan. This approach interprets the movement as the product of a collision between the growing trend of Taiwan consciousness under the governments of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian from the 1990s to the late 2000s, and the trend of boosting cross-strait exchange policies in a bid to develop Taiwan's economy under the Kuomintang government of Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 onwards (Yi Gwangsu 2015; Ho 2015).

According to the third angle, some scholars offer the analysis that the Sunflower Movement further developed social movements in Taiwan. It broke away from the conflicting dualities of unification/independence and Kuomintang/DPP, allowing those with a wide range of stances on topics such as security, sovereignty, the economy, society, equality, culture, and national identity to join in solidarity (Jeong Yuseon 2016; Hsu 2017). Student leaders, having already taken part in the Wild Strawberries Movement and the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement together, knew to some extent how to mobilize and achieve solidarity; while alliances with human rights movements, such as Taiwan Association for Human Rights, women's organizations, such as the Awakening Foundation, and environmental organizations, such as the anti-nuclear movement, in and outside the Legislative Yuan, meant that the protesters were ultimately able to have almost all of their demands met. The movement's diverse protagonists successfully overcame its internal complexities and conflicts, influencing the establishment of a new democratic order, including the majority won in the local elections that November. Moreover, the diversity of people in the movement meant that their views of the PRC were also diverse. Hsu (2017) has called the Sunflower Movement collective self-defense by Taiwanese civil society in the face of China's expanding influence and examined how China acted as an influencing factor at each stage of the movement. Hsu's analysis finds that the influence of the PRC harmed Taiwanese democracy, as the Ma government suddenly established a close relationship with communist China and unilaterally announced this move; and the Ma government, despite witnessing how China was encroaching upon Hong Kong's economy, tried to erode Taiwan's own economy in the currents of neoliberalism by allying itself with the neoliberal policies of its

powerful neighbor. In the same vein, Hsu (2016) attributes the emergence of the Sunflower Movement to backlashes against a combination of China, the Kuomintang, neoliberalism, and developmentalism.

In sum, previous studies of the Sunflower Movement note that it not only took issue with the processes involved in cross-strait agreements but marked a turning point in Taiwanese social movements; that it prompted unity among civic organizations concerned with various issues including security, sovereignty, the economy, society, equality, culture, and gender (Jeong Yuseon 2016; Hsu 2017); that it constituted collective self-defense in the face of intervention by the PRC (Hsu 2017); and that it amounted to democratic-(Taiwanese) nationalist resistance combining anti-PRC and anti-Kuomintang sentiment (Hsu 2016). What I have focused on primarily here is the way scholars until now have perceived PRC not as a single other to be kept at bay but as another approaching from a variety of angles, including democracy/communism-development-neoliberalism-(Chinese) nationalism. The existence of this other focussed the various protagonists of the Sunflower Movement on the question of who they were.

But while previous studies have led a discussion focusing only on the protagonists of the Sunflower Movement or the Kuomintang government response to it, they have not paid attention to the existence of civic movements concerned with the new society envisaged by the Sunflower Movement. Mainland spouses, excluded from the "we" of Taiwanese society, did not welcome the movement. This was not simply because they were

Figure 1. The Sunflower Movement on March 23, 2014: Students occupying the road in front of the Legislative Yuan on March 23, at the height of the Sunflower Movement. Photo by the author.

from the PRC. To them, the movement was not just one that aimed to erase their country of origin; the students' occupation of the Legislative Yuan was also causing further and indefinite hold-ups to the already-delayed bill that would grant them rights equal to other foreign spouses in the process of gaining permanent residency. To mainland spouses, the movement both delegitimized their identity in Taiwan and denied their very place there.

In fact, mainland spouses failed to show much interest at the beginning of the Sunflower Movement. When they gathered at Organization A on March 20, 2014, the third day of the occupation, they talked animatedly about the previous day's earthquake, but when it came to the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, they simply commented that students had occupied it or optimistically predicted that the affair would be over soon. Although Organization A was located not far from the site of the protests, not many mainland spouses thought the Sunflower Movement would keep going.

However, as the student occupation grew longer and led to the occupation of the Executive Yuan, mainland spouses began to view the Sunflower Movement as something out of the ordinary. Leaflets describing it as a political movement spread among members of Organization B. One message that spread in Organization B on March 25, for example, held that "the March 18 people's occupation of the Legislative Yuan happened because faculty in the Sociology Department at National Tsing Hua University gave the students one week off, without the agreement of the university, and was helped by leaders of the DPP." The next day, on March 26, Organization B issued a statement saying, "We cannot agree with the student movement, which has degenerated into a political movement. We must first grow the pie of the stagnating Taiwanese economy, through the Chinese market, before planning how to distribute it equitably." The statement was accompanied by a protest asserting that the Legislative Yuan's process of passing the CSSTA did not go against the democratic order.

On March 30, 2014, a demonstration in support of the CSSTA[11] was held at East Gate 3 of Taipei Station, in protest of the Ketagalan Boulevard

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11 This is known as the Movement for the Return of the National Assembly, or the Anti-Anti-CSSTA Movement, terms that encompass all collective action against the Sunflower Movement. Signifying both opposition to the Sunflower Movement's occupation of the Legislative Yuan and the students' demands, the movement was joined by organizations such as the White Justice Social Alliance, the Kuomintang, the Citizens' Justice League, and Organization B.

demonstration, the climax of the Sunflower Movement. At the core of this demonstration were different interpretations of process-based democracy and justice to those of the Sunflower Movement. While the Sunflower Movement camp viewed the rapid passing of the CSSTA as a procedure that disregarded process-based democracy, those who supported the agreement claimed the occupation of the Legislative Yuan by members of the Sunflower Movement blocked channels for dialogue and ignored proper process. Mainland spouses also took part in this protest, wearing white clothes and carrying Blue Sky with a White Sun flags.

They did so because, as mentioned above, the students' occupation of the Legislative Yuan was indefinitely delaying parliamentary discussion of the "6 to 4 Amendment."[12] Mainland spouses were already edgy that the amendment had been delayed for the past several years; now, the Sunflower Movement seemed highly likely to delay it even more or lead to its rejection. To mainland spouses, this situation appeared to jeopardize the search for their own place in Taiwan. The huge wave of black clothes affected even mainland spouses who had previously seemed uninterested in politics.

> Case 1. Before the start of the Organization A Korean language class, March 31, 2014
> Mainland spouse 1: Did you see the news yesterday? Loads of people gathered all the way from NTU Hospital Station to Ketagalan Boulevard. The traffic was at a standstill.
> Mainland spouse 2: Taiwan seems too democratic. Opposing the CSSTA (服貿) means telling us Chinese not to come. They hate Chinese people.
> Mainland spouse 3: Still, you can't let your bad feelings show. You need to stay neutral. Otherwise, we might get beaten to death for nothing. I took my children to see, and people dressed in black were sitting there completely blocking the street. Seems like a lot of people hate China.

To the mainland spouses in the example above, the Sunflower Movement was caused by bad feelings towards China, was an abuse of democracy, and was the work of young children. The kind of democracy mentioned by the mainland spouses was that which allowed anybody to express her or his own opinion, but they held that doing so with no regard for etiquette was bordering on self-indulgence. Seeing the negative opinions about China on the part of younger generations, mainland spouses were both disconcerted

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12 A slogan used by mainland spouse organizations to demand the reduction of the period needed to acquire permanent Taiwanese residency status from 6 to four years.

and worried that the discrimination already present in Taiwanese society would grow worse. The mainland spouses in this case were on the young side, between their 20s and 40s, and had suffered relatively little discrimination compared to that found in Taiwanese society earlier on. Their daily lives, too, were not particularly hard, thanks to the relatively relaxed policies of the Ma government. They were therefore all the more surprised at the "anti-Chinese movement" in Taiwanese society and more sensitive in their reaction. Moreover, having learned in the PRC that Taiwan was a part of the former, they were considerably shocked by the movement.

By contrast, many of the mainland spouses taking Cantonese classes (another course offered at Organization A) were, on average, at least 20 years older than those in the Korean class. Those above age 60, who had been in Taiwan a long time, expressed particular concern about the Sunflower Movement before their class began. Their views were similar to those of the mainland spouses in Organization B, who had taken part in the pro-agreement demonstration on March 31, expressed through the following comments: "What do they mean by democracy?"; "I wish students would just study"; "There's something wrong with teachers who don't stop their students skipping classes"; "What if things get hard again, like in the past?"; "China's economy is doing better than Taiwan's—I wish some Chinese capital would come in"; "They're scared because China's getting more powerful"; and "If they stop procedures in the Legislative Yuan, when will the 6 to 4 Amendment get passed?" But such conversations only took place briefly when mainland spouses got together and did not last for long.

On April 6, 2014, a promise from, and agreement with, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-ping prompted student representatives and civic organizations to proclaim that they would end their occupation at 6:00 pm on April 10, and they did so. The Sunflower Movement thus appeared to be over, but, for mainland spouses, it was not. The movement had been particularly shocking for those who had not been in Taiwan for very long. In 2014, the National Immigration Agency's Taipei City Service Center offered bimonthly courses for recently married, newly arrived marriage migrants, explaining Taiwan's migrant welfare system. The mainland spouses taking the course on April 8 had not even been in the country for a month, and the Sunflower Movement presented a very strange scene to them. It felt to them like a movement opposing or repudiating their motherland, while the police sent to stop the movement seemed only to be defending Taiwanese. In an already-unfamiliar society, this only deepened

the lack of belonging that the spouses felt.

On the afternoon of the same day, April 10, Organization A hosted a lecture on cross-strait law, delivered by an employee invited from the Legal Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council. When the speaker said that the 6 to 4 Amendment was still not being deliberated by the Legislative Yuan, a buzz went around the mainland spouses. The ongoing student occupation of the Legislative Yuan meant that it was unclear when the bill would be reviewed. In the end, the guest speaker and the official from Organization A promised to keep doing their best, but it was not easy to assuage the anxiety of the mainland spouses. The world envisaged by the Sunflower Movement was thus unfamiliar and uncomfortable to the spouses, regardless of how long they had lived in Taiwan and whether they were interested in political issues or not. They believed that this kind of world held no place for them. If they were to remain in Taiwan, the Sunflower Movement, which denied their existence, had to be stopped, and they had to meet people who opposed it.

To mark Taiwanese Mother's Day and the anniversary of the May Fourth Movement in 2014, Organization B decided to take part in the "New May Fourth Patriotic Movement." This was mentioned due to an advertisement by New Party (新黨)[13] Chairman Yok Mu-ming (郁慕明) in the April 27 edition of the *China Times* for a street parade, under the title "New 54 Movement." The purpose of the parade was to condemn the Sunflower Movement as wild rioters plunging the country into chaos (亂臣賊子太囂張) and to assert that those in favor of unification should unite and achieve unification, and that Taiwan should examine the various benefits that the PRC could bring to it. This movement involved not only the New Party but an ROC veterans' association, White Justice Social Alliance, and mainland spouse organizations.

Case 2. Messages from handouts about the New May Fourth Movement
"Good people, country-loving compatriots, let us meet at 2:00 on May 4 on Ketagalan Boulevard, defend true democracy, return to genuine rule of law,

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13 The New Party was formed in 1993, primarily by legislators revolting against President Lee Teng-hui's aims for independence. The party strongly advocates reunification with the PRC, and, along with the Kuomintang and the People First Party, is part of the Pan-Blue Coalition, which calls for reunification led by the Republic of China. The New Party also advocates the creation of a "Greater China Economic Zone" through economic integration with the Chinese mainland and is strongly in favor of unification with China, even within the Pan-Blue Coalition.

> re-establish a new order, and save our state! Tell each other and pass this on to your close friends. Thank you." (Mainland Spouse A, May 1, 2014)
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> "Those opposed to the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, as they push for 'Taiwanese independence,' have attacked and occupied the Executive Yuan and have besieged Zhongzheng First Police Precinct, wicked acts that create true disorder through false democracy. We have therefore decided to hold another New May Fourth Movement. We are doing so to demand 'democracy' and 'the rule of law.' On May 4 at 1:00 pm, at Exit 1 of NTU Hospital Station, let us all head to the Presidential Office Building on Ketagalan Boulevard!" (Mainland Spouse B, May 4, 2014)
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> "Let us pledge to create a new order again before the state (相約國旗下重建新秩序). Let us defend democracy and return to the rule of law (捍衛民主, 回歸法治). […] Let us all run out courageously and save our country by ourselves. On Sunday, May 4 at 2:00 pm, come to Ketagalan Boulevard, carrying a national flag!" (New May Fourth Movement Handout)

"Genuine democracy," the slogan of the New May Fourth Movement, was a re-use or slight modification of the slogan used by students during the Sunflower Movement. While the May Fourth Movement of 1919 had discussed only democracy and science, the New May Fourth Movement of 2014 added the rule of law. Here, the term was used to assert that the leaders of the Sunflower Movement had occupied the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan, and Ketagalan Boulevard illegally,[14] that strong rule of law was needed to punish them, and that such illegal acts of occupation had damaged democracy in the Republic of China.[15]

Though mainland spouses in Case 2 adopted "genuine democracy" and "rule of law" from the slogans of the New May Fourth Movement, their perceptions of the Sunflower Movement, democracy, and the rule of law were both the same as and different from those of the New May Fourth Movement. On the surface, the message promoted by mainland spouses, like that of the New May Fourth Movement, was that the Sunflower

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14 Taiwan's Supreme Court made a final ruling in March 2017 that the occupation had not been illegal.

15 In Jang Jeonga's (2005) Hong Kong example, the rule of law is shown to be the identity that places Hong Kong in opposition to mainland China. Hong Kong observes the rule of law, while lawlessness is rife in mainland China. But this rule of law has, in fact, generally been used in terms of British-style common law and economics. In the anti-Sunflower Movement and the New May Fourth Movement, the rule of law is generally linked to events. The claim here is that the Sunflower Movement's occupation of the Legislative Yuan was illegal and, therefore, violated the rule of law. The Sunflower Movement counters that it was the unilateral concluding of the ECFA with China that broke the law.

Movement wanted Taiwanese independence, and true democracy and the genuine rule of law had to be defended in order to calm the rebellion. But in the eyes of mainland spouses, defending themselves meant defending the status quo—the ROC order—in which there was a place for them, rather than Taiwanese independence, in which there was no place for them. To this end, they had to join the New May Fourth Movement, protecting their place and making their voices heard. To mainland spouses, in other words, the supporters of the New May Fourth Movement at least acknowledged the existence of China, and they joined this movement because defending the status quo in the form of the ROC order would clearly allow them an existence within it.

But among mainland spouses taking part in the movement, leadership disputes arose. Much of the mainland spouse movement was led by Organization B. But while Organization B did not engage in excessive political statements or actions due to its extreme caution about such movements being used for politicization of the cross-strait relationship, new political parties and organizations of mainland spouses, which had grown rapidly since 2012, liked to show off their participation in such movements inside Taiwan or in their mother country. In this process, it sometimes appeared as if movements led by Organization B were led by other organizations. This led to increasing criticism and demands for honesty within Organization B by members who had also joined other organizations.

Organization B, as mentioned above, was extremely cautious about political misconceptions of cross-strait marriages and therefore refrained from behavior that could implicate it, in the eyes of mainland Chinese or Taiwanese, in issues other than cross-strait marriage. But because the Sunflower Movement threatened to undermine the very existence of mainland spouses, Organization B took a leading role in counter-demonstrations. Despite its general caution when it came to taking political action, the events of the day forced it to act in the interests of mainland spouses. This inevitably clashed with the intentions of new mainland spouse organizations that wanted to make their existence known.

The struggle for supremacy among new mainland spouse organizations was also due to a desire for recognition from the motherland, "China." This reached a peak during the visit of Zhang Zhijun (張志軍), head of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAOSC).[16] Yet Zhang's visit

16 The PRC re-activated its Central Leading for Taiwan Affairs (中央對台工作領導小組)

was a chance not only for the new organizations to make themselves known but to end their struggle and unite. In the next section, I will examine the strategies of mainland spouses using Zhang's visit to appeal to their motherland,[17] Sunflower Movement members who opposed the visit, and the political movements of mainland spouses after the Sunflower Movement.

5. The Strategies of Mainland Spouses: Appealing to the Motherland and Entering Taiwanese Political Society

After the Sunflower Movement, China's TAOSC started showing more active interest in Taiwan. In June 2014, TAOSC head Zhang Zhijun, the PRC's most senior official for Taiwan-related affairs, made his first visit to the island. Because the purpose of Zhang's visit was to discuss details of the ECFA,[18] which had caused the Sunflower Movement, it seemed to the Sunflower Movement's supporters, who had wanted to distance themselves from China, like interference in Taiwan's internal affairs. However, to supporters of the anti-Sunflower Movement, who hoped for greater cross-strait exchange, the visit was a welcome event.

To mainland spouses, Zhang's arrival was like that of reliable reinforcements who would protest to the Taiwanese government about both the Sunflower Movement, which threatened the very existence of the spouses,

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and Central Taiwan Affairs Office (中央臺灣工作辦公室) in the 1980s as it intensified its offensive for peaceful unification, with the latter organization later being re-named as The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (國務院臺灣事務辦公室). The state also had all of its provincial, municipal, and county governments open their own Leadings for Taiwan Affairs (對台工作領導小組) and Taiwan Affairs Offices (臺灣事務辦公室).

17 Momesso and Lee (2017: 473) comment that the gathering of multiple mainland spouse organizations during the anti-China protests and their welcoming of Zhang Zhijun were not merely acts of socioeconomic unity but expressions of support from the spouses for Beijing's nationalism. But I do not see this only as participation in PRC government nationalism. I will offer a more detailed analysis in the following section.

18 Zhang stated that a meeting between Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou and PRC President Xi might be possible, adding the uncompromising statement that this would depend on Taiwan's attitude, since a meeting between the two leaders would not be an international event. See "Zhang Zhijun: Ma-Xi meeting is available anytime (張志軍: 馬習會隨時都可以)," *Next Magazine* (壹週刊), June 25, 2014. http://www.nextmag.com.tw/breaking-news/news/20140625/4761827 (Accessed: July 1, 2014)

and the 6 to 4 Amendment situation, which they themselves were powerless to change. Their hope was that a word from the motherland might change something with regard to the 6 to 4 Amendment, about which their appeals to Taiwanese legislators, the Kuomintang, and Taiwanese society had failed to produce a resolution. Because Zhang's visit was expected to include a meeting with the Mainland Affairs Council to decide the details of cross-strait exchange, mainland spouses were particularly hopefully that their situation would be discussed there.

On June 25, the day of Zhang's visit, mainland spouse organizations including B and C went to the airport to welcome him. They carried red banners bearing slogans such as "Comings and goings bring us closer (有來有往, 愈走愈親)," "Both sides of the strait are one family (兩岸一家親)," and "We welcome Chief Zhang Zhijun from our home country (歡迎娘家來的人, 張志軍 主任)." The spouses cried out phrases such as "Both sides of the strait are one family," "Welcome Zhang Zhijun," and "Let's move towards peaceful cross-strait development and peaceful unification." They also sang a song called "We are all one family (我們都是一家人)."

On the other side of the airport, leading members of the Sunflower Movement held a protest against Zhang's visit, as did another crowd at the hotel near Taoyuan Airport, where Zhang was to meet Wang Yu-chi. They held up a sign fiercely opposing Zhang's visit, bearing the slogan "We reject the Wang-Zhang meeting (王張會) and have already given a warning." The

Figure 2. Conflict surrounding TOASC head Zhang Zhijun's Taiwan visit: Crowds welcoming Zhang and those protesting his visit face off at Taoyuan Airport. Source: http://www.storm.mg/article/23185. (Accessed: July 1, 2014.)

Sunflower Movement's claim was that a third perspective existed regarding PRC-Taiwan exchange, in addition to those of the CPC and the Kuomintang, and that a meeting that did not reflect this perspective must not take place. Despite physical clashes between Sunflower Movement and anti-Sunflower Movement members, the meeting ultimately went ahead.

Some Taiwanese media criticized anti-Sunflower Movement members for holding Five-starred Red Flags, saying they no longer knew if they were in Taiwan or the PRC. Others present in the airport at the time uploaded such images to the internet, accompanied by strong criticism. Many netizens responded to the scenes with sarcastic comments, such as "Am I in China already?", "Amazing! (WTF)" and "Taiwan's already part of the PRC"; others gave satirical answers such as "Yeah! You are in China now." Other netizens angrily criticized the waving of Five-starred Red Flags as "intended to break up the country, overthrow the national constitution."

The meeting went ahead despite the frosty reception from Taiwanese people and the opposition of the Sunflower Movement. The Mainland Affairs Council and the TAOSC agreed on projects to establish smooth contacts and administrative affairs across the strait and to regularize cross-strait ministerial visits and meetings. Mainland spouses responded positively to the outcome of the meeting, which included facilitating visits to and from relatives on the mainland. It was also seen to be aimed at making the legal system for cross-strait marriages, which still entailed various complex procedures, more efficient. Zhang's visit, coming amid the deepening anti-PRC sentiment in Taiwan, felt as welcome as a that of a hometown relative. One mainland spouse said it seemed like a blood relative had come to comfort a new bride at the house of her in-laws. To mainland spouses, the Sunflower Movement's protests against Zhang were a source of shame.

Case 3. Organization B, June 28, 2014

A: Both sides of the strait are one family. We welcome Zhang Zhijun. Savage acts of violence like throwing paint and burning the Five-starred Red Flag need to be strongly condemned.

B: Those violent individuals are bastards, borne by their mother [China] but not educated by her. And then they behave like that when their mother comes to meet them! They have no character, they're unreasonable, they're not even worth talking about.

C: You can criticize them, but don't talk so emotionally. We mainland spouse sisters are very dignified people.

These mainland spouses were very angry and were venting their feelings to each other. The heads of the organization, while fully sympathizing with this frustration, had resolved that opposing opinions could also be voiced in a democratic society, and that they should absolutely not respond emotionally. But the emotional scars from the failure to welcome "someone from the hometown" remained deep for mainland spouses, and they began searching for ways to overcome them and make their voices heard once again for the November local elections.

The strategies now chosen by mainland spouses to enter Taiwanese political society were, firstly, to support political parties with relatively friendly stances towards them. This meant not individual expressions of intent to support but collective organization action to support parties in ways such as establishing supporter alliances among new residents. On November 1, 2014, for example, mainland spouse organizations gathered at the Kuomintang Party headquarters to establish one such supporters' association. The association supported Kuomintang candidates in various ways including civic participation in Taiwan, volunteer work, and performances. Some mainland spouses joined political parties and provided support in their home constituencies. Mainland spouse Congming (50s) joined the Kuomintang women's association, recruited a mainland spouse volunteer team, and took charge of campaigning in A District. Mainland spouses acted this way because the Kuomintang had made its policies favorable towards them, and future candidates had also promised to do the same, prompting the spouses to express their support.

Approximately one-third of all mainland spouses—some 100,000 people—had permanent Taiwanese residency status. It cannot be said that all of them supported the Kuomintang, but in Taipei, where support for the party was strong, they had many opportunities to encounter it, and because the DPP had previously criticized mainland spouses extensively, they had come to view the Kuomintang as friendlier towards them. Moreover, the Kuomintang manifesto's promises before the local elections proved seductive to mainland spouses hurt by Taiwan's growing anti-Chinese sentiment. Pledges to take a hard line against the Sunflower Movement, push through the CSSTA, which, the party said, the DPP was stopping, and allow the peaceful development of cross-strait relations met with a positive reaction from mainland spouses.

Secondly, mainland spouses formed their own political parties or entered political society. As of 2019, some 20 mainland spouse parties are

registered with local departments for civil affairs in Taiwan. But only a handful of these are active, and they have yet to produce any candidates. One exception, however, is that of a mainland spouse elected to the position of village head (里長),[19] running without affiliation in Taipei in 2018. Elected head of Datong Village in Beitou District, Shuang (40s, originally from Guangdong Province) was only able to stand in village head elections more than 20 years after arriving in Taiwan due to a regulation—abolished in 2016—that made citizens wait 10 years after acquiring permanent residence before holding public office. Her election signifies how mainland spouses are already acquiring influence in Taiwanese society.

Thirdly, some mainland spouses are making their existence known by delivering public lectures rather than entering politics. Organization B, in particular, is highly concerned about the political mobilization of mainland spouses and is distrustful of existing politicians; therefore, it does not engage actively in politics. Weiwei (30s, originally from Fujian Province), for example, gives public lectures about the circumstances of mainland spouses, in the belief that they themselves must make their issues known. In these lectures, delivered to Taiwanese university students and young people, Weiwei begins by explaining about the 6 to 4 Amendment and equality. The problem here is that those reviewing her lectures link cross-strait marriage with politics, claiming that a longer period is needed to acquire permanent residency because of the "special nature of the cross-strait relationship." More time is needed, in other words, to erase the vestiges of "[communist] China" from mainland spouses. Weiwei's assertion is that it is unfair for mainland spouses already living in Taiwan to have to wait longer than other foreign spouses to receive permanent residency. But because both the Kuomintang and the DPP see cross-strait marriage as a political issue, differing only in terms of extent, even discussing the 6 to 4 Amendment is difficult. Actually passing the amendment, of course, is even harder. According to Weiwei, even though Taiwan is a democratic country, it is difficult for mainland spouses to secure any social rights as long as their "China" labels remain.

Nonetheless, contrary to the various strategies and expectations of mainland spouses, many Taiwanese have already grown disappointed with the Kuomintang and have given their votes to the DPP and the Sunflower

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19 A village head (里長 *lizhang*) is in charge of a *li* (里 "urban village"), the urban administrative division below *qu* (區 "district").

Movement camp. Mainland spouses were very disappointed by this. The local election results indicated public sentiment ahead of the coming general election and, if DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen took power, the future of mainland spouses would look darker. Ultimately, the local election results were echoed in the general election, producing a result not at all friendly towards mainland spouses.[20]

6. Conclusion

In this article, I have used the political movements of mainland spouses to examine their strategies in response to changes in Taiwanese civil society (the Sunflower Movement). The Sunflower Movement was a process of preventing the Republic of China's Kuomintang from relying on the strength of the PRC, a merciless communist power oblivious to democratic values, to oppress Taiwan, a democratic, human rights-respecting state. In this process, because they were "Chinese," mainland spouses who supported the Chinese Kuomintang and the PRC were seen as ignorant Kuomintang supporters who should "get lost back to China." But to mainland spouses, the Sunflower Movement was different. To them, the movement was one that did not want to recognize the PRC, and its supporters classed them as foreigners from an enemy country. Because of this, there was seen to be no place for mainland spouses in the future envisaged by the Sunflower Movement. They therefore gave more support to the Kuomintang, which at least acknowledged their existence and offered a warm welcome to the delegation of Zhang Zhijun as visitors from the hometown who had come to help their in-laws as the latter grew poorer. To this end, mainland spouses employed a variety of strategies, including actually planning an anti-Sunflower Movement together with Taiwanese attempting to commemorate the mainland's May Fourth Movement, appealing to the motherland while regarding PRC politicians as people from their hometowns, and entering politics. Opposing the process of creating a state based on Taiwan consciousness, they dynamically selected, embodied, and absorbed identities

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20 Cross-strait relations have chilled rapidly since Tsai Ing-wen entered office. As of 2019, the Mainland Affairs Council has emphasized Taiwanese democracy and human rights and advanced relations with Hong Kong and Macao over those with mainland China. Mainland spouses are no longer called mainland spouses but Chinese mainland spouses. Meanwhile, the 6 to 4 Amendment was not passed by the Legislative Yuan.

as "mainlanders."

But the struggle of mainland spouses was far too weak to divert the course of change in Taiwanese civil society. Rather, the ruling DPP, which aims to create a state based on Taiwan consciousness, regards the political movements of mainland spouses with trepidation, resulting in further legal and institutional restrictions on their rights to citizenship. Mainland spouses, while continuing to hold street protests aimed at achieving absolute legal and institutional rights of citizenship within Taiwan, have at the same time turned their sights outside Taiwan and focussed on both sides of the strait, the arena of practice that they had been building. Here, "both sides of the strait" signifies not the geographical area around the Taiwan Strait nor the governments of Taiwan and the PRC in a political and diplomatic sense, but the arena of practice of mainland spouses actually living in cross-strait relationships. Mainland spouses are fighting hard within Taiwan but are now also trying to communicate once again the values they have learned from their Taiwan lives, by way of the cross-straits arena.

Let us go back to Table 1. Amid the political movements of mainland spouses, Taiwan's government and civil society were not happy about these spouses from "rising China." Their country of origin, the PRC, showed interest in mainland spouses through the TAOSC, but this did not help improve their lives within Taiwan. Why, then, could they not ask international alliances for help? Because Taiwanese civil society occupied a more progressive position than any other in Asia, and the spouses had come from undemocratic China. With its positive international reputation, the Taiwanese government and civil society employed a carrot-and-stick approach of gradually increasing welfare for mainland spouses while further restricting their legal and institutional citizenship. Nonetheless, this situation has also resulted in mainland spouses not only working in political movements within Taiwan but embodying various values outside Taiwan. In the future, I will conduct further studies of the movements of mainland spouses outside Taiwan.

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