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**Master's Thesis of**

**Local Governance  
and ODA Project Performance:  
- Focusing on KOICA's Forestry and Afforestation  
Projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -**

**지역 거버넌스와 ODA사업 성과:  
KOICA의 우즈베키스탄 및 키르기스스탄  
‘산림 및 조림 사업’을 중심으로**

**February 2023**

**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University  
International Cooperation**

**Seoran Eum**

**Local Governance  
and ODA Project Performance:  
- Focusing on KOICA's Forestry and Afforestation  
Projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -**

**Thesis Adviser Tae Kyoon KIM**

**Submitting a master's thesis of  
International Cooperation**

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**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University  
International Cooperation**

**Seoran Eum**

**Confirming the master's thesis written by  
Seoran Eum  
February 2023**

Chair	<u>Chong Sup KIM</u>	(Seal)
Vice Chair	<u>Se Mee YOON</u>	(Seal)
Examiner	<u>Tae Kyoon KIM</u>	(Seal)

# **Abstract**

## **Local Governance and ODA Project Performance: - Focusing on KOICA's Forestry and Afforestation Projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan –**

**Seoran Eum**

International Cooperation Major  
Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University

This study analyzes KOICA's forestry and afforestation projects focusing on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to investigate the correlation between local governance and ODA performance. Good governance has been recognized as a crucial factor in ensuring the performance of aid projects in developing countries. Typically, there has been much discussion around the issue of how the degree of decentralization and empowerment of local governance affects the performance of an ODA project. Therefore, this paper will examine how different patterns of local governance influence an ODA project's performance when donor countries implement similar projects in different countries.

In doing so, this study uses the decentralized local governance framework composed of political, administrative, and financial decentralization and empowerment proposed by Boex and Yilmaz (2010) as an assessment tool for local governance. In addition, the Korea International Cooperation Agency's (KOICA) 'forest and afforestation project' conducted in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was evaluated using the OECD/DAC criteria endorsed by KOICA. Accordingly, this paper determines what factors of local governance influence ODA performance according to relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

According to the results of the study, the criteria for clearly contrasting the ODA performance between the two countries were 'relevance', 'efficiency', and 'sustainability'. The high gap in ODA performance was caused mainly by local governance in the dimensions of political decentralization and empowerment. To be specific, the local political power structure influenced ODA achievement.

With these findings, this study supports the idea that local political power

structure influences ODA performance. However, in reality, the donor country cannot enforce the formation of local governance because its transformation corresponds to the sovereignty of the recipient country. Accordingly, donor countries should investigate the local governance of recipient countries intensely when conducting feasibility studies and analyze potential risks of political structure at the local level before implementing an ODA project. Given the circumstances, if donors take account of local governance in recipient countries, they could get high achievement of ODA projects.

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**Keyword:** Good Local Governance, Decentralized Local Governance, Decentralization and Empowerment, ODA Project, ODA Performance, KOICA, Forest and Afforestation Project, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan.

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# **Chapter 1. Introduction**

## **1.1. Background**

Global inequality remains a hot issue. Although extreme poverty rates have drastically reduced since the 1800s, the inequality between and within countries is much higher than before. Still, the billions of people live below the poverty line (Collier 2008). There have been global debates about what factors cause global inequality and how it can be reduced. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the Third World criticized the westernized liberal development model for worsening inequality (Potter et al., 2018). However, in the 1990s, donor countries and aid development agencies found that the extractive economic and political institutions of recipient countries were responsible for failed nations. In other words, extractive institutions kept poor countries poorer and at a low level of economic growth and growth rates (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Donors and aid agencies insisted that inequality was not the result of aid itself, but by the poor or weak governance systems of the recipients.

Multilateral and bilateral donors have started to pay attention to the governance systems of recipients. Good governance, and especially local governance with a decentralized public administration and democratic system, is a key component of aid performance. The lack of capacity of local governments influences on the level of ownership and accountability when implementing aid projects. That is, the more decentralized the local governance system of the recipient, the better aid performance.

Not surprisingly, constructing a good governance system has been a top

priority in developing countries over the last three decades. Central Asian countries are no exception to that rule. Since gaining independence from the USSR in the 1990s, they have made efforts to build new institutional structures and governance away from the Soviet legacy. However, Central Asia is unable to rid itself of the traditional Soviet system of a single ruling party in a strong centralized government. Their government system is not post-Soviet, but rather Neo-Soviet (Merry 2004). As a result, Central Asian States have fully formed mechanisms of an authoritarian regime of the existing Soviet rule. Only Kyrgyzstan has undergone two civil demonstrations—the *Tulip Revolution* and the *People's April Revolution*—to introduce a more democratic political and economic system. Consequently, the local governance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is different even though they are located in the same Central Asia.

Despite the distinct local governance systems in the two countries, there has been very little research that has set out to analyze similar case studies organized by the same donor that considers the association between local governance and aid performance. As both countries are transitional and developing countries, it is worthwhile not only to identify strong empirical evidence for the relationship between local governance and aid performance but also to gain insight into ODA policies in terms of local governance. Therefore, this research examines the relationship between local governance and aid performance regarding similar projects conducted by the same donor agency, KOICA, targeting two countries—Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In doing so, first, this paper chooses the framework of decentralized local governance provided by Boex and Yilmaz (2010). Using this framework, it is able



to compare three dimensions of the local governance systems in the two countries—political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization and empowerment—and their components. Second, this study selects similar forestry and afforestation projects conducted by KOICA in both countries. Each end-of-evaluation report uses OECD/DAC criteria as of 2017—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. Thus, it also compares two aid projects using the OECD/DAC’s five criteria. Third, this research proposes a matrix using the two analytic tools—the framework of decentralized local governance and OECD/DAC criteria—in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Finally, it explores which dimensions and factors are more likely to affect aid performance.

## **1.2. Research Aims and Research Question**

This research aims to carry out empirical research on the relationship between governance and aid achievement with specific case studies. It compares similar ‘forestry and afforestation projects’ conducted by KOICA in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, against the background of different patterns of local governance. While both countries inherited a totalitarian political and administrative system with a Soviet and administrative-command approach, after three decades, their public administration reform, regulatory and legal frameworks, and the structure of central and local executive bodies have developed in different ways.

Uzbekistan has systematically evolved to transit to a strong authoritarian government, making the role of local governance limited and weak. This highly centralized local system has prevented the streamlining of aid projects and has had further impact. In comparison, Kyrgyzstan has made efforts to transit to a more

democratic government so that the local government has its own power and is independent of the central government. The decentralized local system has enhanced the process and impact of aid projects. Despite this distinction between the local governance systems in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, there has been little empirical research analyzing the relationship between local governance and aid performance targeted at the two countries. Therefore, this research proves a relationship between the components of the decentralized local system and aid performance.

On top of that, this research provides insight into ODA policies regarding the local governance system. Most developing countries have highly centralized local systems that are burdensome to the processes and management of ODA projects. By analyzing these two cases, this study contributes lessons for policymakers, private actors, and NGOs to make use of when they design ODA policies or implement aid projects in the recipient countries. To sum up, this research demonstrates how different local governance systems influence aid performance with specific comparative case studies. The research question is: How do the different local governance systems result in opposite aid performance in ‘forestry and afforestation projects’ in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan? And, which local governance dimensions or components influenced the aid performance?

## **Chapter 2. Literature Review**

### **2.1. Governance, Good Governance, and Local Governance**

‘Governance’ is a multifaceted concept. Although the terminology of ‘governance’ has no clear-cut boundaries, it is widely exercised in various political, economic, and administrative contexts. Different international organizations, such as OECD, UNDP, and World Bank, define governance in slightly different ways (Weiss 2000). Also, the concept of governance refers to both the formal—rule of law, election systems, and institutions—and the informal—political culture, media, opinions—relationship (Wilson 2000). However, there is a consensus that governance is not limited to government, but is broader than government (Rhodes 1997; Gaudin 1999; Pierre 2000; Kjaer 2004; Smith 2007). That is, it includes the government process as well as civil society or nongovernment actors. Consequently, governance is the process where governments interact with civil communities, society, and citizens. This interaction reflects the way of the process between societies or organizations and made use of its functions in a timely manner (John et al., 2003).

The concept of ‘Governance’ links with the further question as to what ‘Good Governance’ is. ‘Good Governance’ means the good quality of a country’s governance system. It ranges widely from economic liberalism to political pluralism, social development with rule of law, administrative accountability, and public sector reforms (Agere 2000). According to the World Bank, it entails six clusters:

government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption; voice and accountability; and political stability and the absence of violence (Kaufmann et al., 1999). In addition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggests five principles of good governance: legitimacy and voice; direction; performance; accountability; and fairness (John et al., 2003). Furthermore, the Council of Europe suggests 12 principles of good governance: fair conduct of elections; representation; and participation; responsiveness; efficiency and effectiveness; openness and transparency; rule of law; ethical conduct; competence and capacity; innovation and openness to change; sustainability and long-term orientation; sound financial management; human rights; cultural diversity and social cohesion; and accountability (The Council of Europe 2022). Therefore, good governance requires essential elements of democracy. It can be achieved in democratic political and economic systems, such as in democratic institutions—an effective executive; an independent judiciary; and a functioning legislature; a high level of accountability or transparency in public policy-making; effective participation; and rule of law (Santiso 2001).

The issue of ‘Good governance’ induces different levels of government and civil society at the local level. Considering civil society, good governance depends on the capacity of local government and an effective local governance system (Wilson 2000). Indeed, in most developing countries, local governance is highly centralized, limiting citizens’ power and influence. This phenomenon led to a transition from a central to a decentralized system and the transformation from representative to participating democratic systems (Alqooti 2020). Accordingly, local governance surged as a key factor for enhancing good governance in

developing countries.

Along with participation, 'Local Governance' is a crucial point for strengthening the transparency and accountability of good governance. Local governance is defined as the process of collective action at the local level, covering the formal structure of local government, governmental hierarchies, informal norms, networks, communities, neighborhood associations, and citizens (Shah 2006). Local governance is more reliant on the relationship between central and local relations based on decentralization. The ideal decentralized system ensures all levels of public services are based on citizen or voter preferences. Especially with respect to fragile states, decentralized local governance has the potential benefits of efficient public service delivery, increased legitimacy, a reduction of regional inequities, avoiding power monopoly, and constructing democratic management (Brinkerhoff and Ronald 2009). Therefore, good local governance allows residents to make their own decisions, such as on tax, expenditure, and regulation at the lower levels of government.

Several researchers have provided a local governance framework for comparative research. Initially, many studies focused on government structure or frameworks at the local level with specific comparative research across countries (Bowman and William 1983; Goldsmith 1992; Lidstrom 1998; Caulfield and Helge 2002; Slack 2004). For example, Slack (2004) suggests four models of governmental structure at the local level: two-tier governments, one-tier governments, voluntary cooperation, and special purpose districts and their adaptation. However, this was limited to analyzing the relationship between government and public society. Since recognizing this limitation, there has been a transformation from a government to a

governance system. Several researchers consider local governance as a governmental structure involving existing public and private sectors (Rhodes 1997; Goss 2006; Lutz and Wolf 2004; Shah 2006). For example, Shah (2006) summarizes five analytical local government models: traditional fiscal federalism; new public management (NPM); public choice; new institutional economics (NIE); and network forms of local governance and the proposed citizen-centered governance model.

Additionally, most researchers accentuate decentralization with a local governance model for capacity building in developing countries (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009; Kumar et al., 2015; Atisa et al., 2020). Decentralization has surged as a remedy for a highly centralized government tapping into inefficient basic service delivery and development. Although it was not always a versatile panacea for developing countries (Bardhan et al., 2007), in most cases, it turned out to be a remarkable solution for empowering citizens' abilities and encouraging development.

The attempt to classify types of decentralization was based on empirical cases comparing local electoral systems, constitutions, economic policies, fiscal discretion, a form of parties, and external interventions (Bardhan et al., 2007). Schneider (2003) suggests decentralization concept and detail indicators with political, administrative, and fiscal pillars. Kent and Schroeder (2010) also illustrate decentralization according to three dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. They point out that recipient countries do not move at the same pace or direction in these three dimensions. For this reason, they suggest four types of common combination models in developing countries with these three dimensions. Furthermore, Boex and Yilmaz (2010) employ Kent and Schroeder's model (2010) to adapt the local public sector. They enumerate each component of the three

dimensions of decentralized local governance which enable development agencies to evaluate projects and activities in detail.

Authors and researchers have employed Boex and Yilmaz's framework for analyzing a decentralized local government impacting on various fields and countries. Using this framework, Boex, Yilmaz, and Benjamin (2015) examine case studies in Sierra Leone. Likewise, Venugopal and Yilmaz (2010) analyze the case study of decentralized local government system in Tanzania. Also, Boex and Simatupang (2015) made use of local governance institutions comparative assessment (LoGICA) tools and developed a model which added two additional pillars—functions and participation—targeting six countries—Cambodia, Mozambique, India, the Philippines, Tanzania, and Indonesia. Furthermore, Hidayat (2017) combines Boex and Yilmaz's framework (2010) with the local governance barometer framework to analyze the impact of the Indonesian government in health and education sectors.

I believe that Boex and Yilmaz's assessment tool is relevant for comparing local governance systems in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. First, this analytic tool is able to capture the diverse forms of the decentralized local governance system in developing countries. Several decentralized local governance models have been depicted as universal and normative models. But, it also embraces the various circumstances of the existing local governance system in recipient countries. Second, this approach allows a comparison of which dimensions and their specific components of local governance influence the performance of similar aid projects. It could explore why the results of similar aid projects in two countries are contrasting.

## **2.2. Local Governance in Developing Countries, Economic Growth, and Aid Performance**

In theory, donors provide developing countries with a good local governance framework which was related to a decentralized governance system—efficient and effective administration—in a democratic way. Not only did developed countries make considerable efforts toward the development of local governance themselves (Kuhlmann 2010; Wollmann 2012), but they also took part in the trend toward decentralization in the last decades (UCLG 2019). Most developing countries, however, still had strong central government authority so local governments delivered their services at a minimum level. The constitutions and laws strengthened the decentralized structure of local government. Their functions were limited when allocating expenditure or financing tax as well as making decisions. Also, there was little autonomy in composing members of the municipal assembly or district councils because the central governments superficially delegated its power to local levels. Little power of self-determination led to inefficiencies and severe corruption in developing countries. Overall, lower-tier governments in developing countries were mostly weak and were not able to enhance the quality of life of residents and development.

Not surprisingly, donor agencies paid attention to the local governance in recipient countries. First, the literature considered good local governance as a decentralized governance system. Decentralization was referred to not only as the distribution of power from the upper to the lower levels of government, but also to the empowerment of people's preferences based on local entities (Jamie and Serdar,



2010). From this perspective, the achievement of decentralized local governance relied on whether local officials and institutions could respond quickly and effectively to deal with public needs. Also, it depended on whether or not the local government had discretion from the central government.

Second, earlier research was not clear on the correlation between good governance and economic growth. Some researchers argue that good governance is not a robust enough attribute to explain effective growth and development (Aron 2000; Rodrik 2008). In addition, Andrews (2010) suggests that advanced countries with democratic governments are less growth than poor countries from 2000 to 2006. In contrast, other researchers have insisted that good governance—especially, institutional structure—determined long-run economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008; Aidt 2009). Decentralized local governance could make more space to implement pro-poor policies and to be responsive to the needs of local residents (Crook 2003; Smoke 2003). According to the UCLG (2019), the local government was recognized as a facilitator in the adoption of the Global Agenda, SDGs, making the development a huge achievement. At the same time, in the third party opinion, decentralized local governance argued that welfare states were not a universal model. Rather, many transitional countries had settled at different degrees of local autonomy depending on their circumstances, which led to inconsistent development levels and outcomes (Silva 2020).

Although there was an inconsistency in the literature concerning the relationship between good governance and economic growth, there was a clear opinion that aid performance is more likely to be guaranteed under the good governance system. Good governance provides a high possibility of success in aid

projects or programs (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Dollar and Burnside (2000) also claim that aid was highly effective in producing growth if the developing countries had a good political and economic policy environment.

Third, in-depth studies have been conducted targeting one country's local governance system. Earlier researchers studied the transition of decentralized local governance or analyzed the before and after effects on economic growth after intervening good governance reforming programs targeting one country. For example, Rees and Farhad (2013) examine decentralized local governance in the context of diverse countries, like Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Tanzania. Other researchers explore local governance in Indonesia, Uganda, Ghana, Turkey, and Bolivia (Hill 2014; Abraham 2014; Asante 2007; Ayhan 2021; Nijenhuis 2002). They mostly focus on the transformation of the structure of the local government system within one country. However, attention was rarely paid to comparative studies using specific aid projects to figure out the relationship between local governance and aid performance.

## **Chapter3. Research Methodology**

### **3.1. Research Design**

This paper aims to determine the relationship between decentralized local governance and the performance of aid projects. As mentioned earlier, the research target area is Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In so doing, this paper will scrutinize the local governance system and public participation in the two countries in line with the assessment tool suggested by Boex and Yilmaz (2010). Using this framework, a comparison of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can reveal their contrasting local governance systems. On top of that, the end-of-evaluation reports analyze the project's performance by adopting OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. These two measurements will provide a detailed analysis of the aid projects of KOICA's forestry and afforestation projects under different conditions of local governance.

### **3.2. Research Methodology**

This paper attempts to indicate a relationship between local governance and aid performance through comparative methods. As mentioned earlier, this paper targets two Central Asian countries because Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan each have established different patterns of local governance. While initially the level of development in each country was similar after independence from the Soviet Union,

their local governance systems developed in opposite ways. This situation resulted in contrasting outcomes of aid projects. This research identifies that the same donor (KOICA) conducts similar afforestation aid projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but, aid outcomes and results were different. For this reason, by using a comparative approach, it is possible to examine patterns of similarities and differences across the cases (Ragin et al., 2011). There is no doubt that this study is appropriate for a comparative method.

Moreover, to compare the same projects in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, qualitative research is the best way to analyze case studies. A qualitative method is especially appropriate when researchers build a proper representation through an in-depth study of social phenomena (Ibid.). Also, it discloses crucial features of a case and explains the key relationships among the features (Ibid.). This paper unravels how a decentralized local governance system affects the achievement of aid projects using the detailed framework of in-depth study. To thoroughly evaluate the decentralized local governance and aid performance, it uses the framework of Boex and Yilmaz (2010) and OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. OECD (2010) provides five criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability—in 2010, and added further ‘coherence’ criteria in 2019 (OECDa 2019). Considering that the ‘forestry and afforestation projects’ finished in 2017 and 2015, respectively, this paper uses the five OECD/DAC criteria released in 2010. Thus, qualitative research is well suited to studying the aid performance of ‘forestry and afforestation projects’ with similar conditions, timelines, and work processes.

### **3.3 Case Selection: Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan**

#### *The background of Uzbekistan*

Uzbekistan has established one of the strongest repressive authoritarian governments in Central Asia. Islam Karimov, the former president of Uzbekistan, maintained his power for 25 years without huge demonstrations. During the Soviet era, he was a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR. After the demise of the Soviet Regime, he immediately declared the independence of Uzbek SSR and became a leader of Uzbekistan. At the time, there were voices advocating a common identity, and dependence on Russia (Melvin 2000). Under these circumstances, he was able to create his single system of power with a strong nationalism, and he forged a strong centralized administration to control all the regions (Ibid., 30). He suppressed opposition and religious groups, especially Islam, using nationalism. Accordingly, he created a single powerful political system and monopolized power in Uzbekistan.

With the consolidation of his strong political position, he was successfully re-elected three times until his natural death in 2016. His regime sought to maintain the existing Soviet system as much as possible (Ibid.). He delayed liberalization and sought to establish the Soviet system arrangement in Uzbekistan. Democratic institutions were ostensibly established, but they all lacked powers to check and balance presidential power. Indeed, all institutions were subordinated to Karimov's regime. For the political and administrative system, only one party, the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), worked properly to consolidate the presidency. This strong presidency settlement resulted in unanimous voting or over

90 percent of voting in parliament. Besides, executive power enjoyed absolute power combined with legislative and judicial power. Furthermore, the government thoroughly censored the media. The freedom of associations or campaigns was extremely limited as well.

A local government was not an exception to the authoritarian transition. President Karimov had a legal right to appoint the regional governor (*Hokim*), which ensured the president's control over the regions (*Viloyat*) (Ibid., 32). Given that fact, the hierarchical system of executive power led to pseudo-local councils. The removal of potential opposition of regional governors further consolidated Karimov's power. In addition, he revised the system of Mahalla, a basic unit of the local organization in towns and cities. He strengthened this traditional structure of Uzbek society, making it possible to monitor and control people's lives in every town (Kim 2020). In summary, the local government was extremely weakened in that the political mechanism of Uzbekistan developed authoritarianism and Soviet-style monopolization in civil society.

### *The background of Kyrgyzstan*

On the other hand, the political organization of Kyrgyzstan developed in a different way. As of 2022, Kyrgyzstan had been through three demonstrations for fraudulent elections in 2005, 2010, and 2020. Not surprisingly, it is the only democratic transitional country within the context of abundant authoritarian governments in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Askar Akaev was appointed as the first president of Kyrgyzstan in October 1990. He strived to adopt marketization and democratization, supporting the development of private

interest and property based on civil society (Anderson 1999). In turn, Kyrgyzstan was the first country to enter the WTO of Central Asian countries. Although Akaev could not entirely remove the existing Soviet-dominated political system with a powerful executive presidency, he made efforts to distribute powers to parliament, *Zhogorku Kenesh*, for checks and balances, and guaranteed political, economic, and civil rights, and freedom of the media. In addition, based on the nomadic lifestyle of Kyrgyz society, the political-administrative structure was constructed in a very flexible way. The historically rooted nomadic system allows people in aristocracy to develop based on families or clans and tribal association (Ibid.).

However, Akaev failed to sustain an initial democratic movement. In the late 1990s, the authoritarian system was rejuvenated. He reinforced his presidential power by revising legal constitutions, oppressing opposition parties, generating rampant corruption, and manipulating elections. He replaced the bicameral system with a unicameral parliament as well as a voting system (Pelkmans 2005). As could be expected, hypocritical authorities tried to seize the local administration and created a strong central dependency at the local level. As a result, a huge upheaval occurred in 2005, the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’.

Starting from the provincial movement in Jalal-Abad, regarded as the second capital of Kyrgyzstan, thousands of protesters, led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, demanded the resignation of Akaev (Ibid.). This movement spread to other cities, including Osh. After a popular uprising and protest led by civil society, the Akaev regime was ousted. Bakiyev from the south region became the new president and Felix Kulov from the north region was appointed as the prime minister (Otunbayeva 2005). Ironically, Bakiyev’s was a more authoritarian government than Akaev’s

regime was before. He appointed his family members and clans to major positions as well as changing the constitution, which led to the looting of the electoral ballot. This patronal presidentialism led to the loss of his political status, triggering the second revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the so-called '*Roza revolution*' or '*the People's April Revolution*.'

In 2010, the democratic opposition and civil society groups demanded Bakiyev's resignation. In doing so, the democratic opposition utilized the informal institution, *Kurultai*, which are composed of rural and small-town ethnic people rooted in a cultural base (Collins 2011). After toppling the Bakiyev regime, the Kyrgyz people did not want to repeat their mistakes and adopted a parliamentary system to limit the powers of the presidency. The new constitution approved a semi-presidential system with strong parliamentary features (Ibid.). Considering the third democratic protest in 2020, Kyrgyzstan still has a long way to go toward stable democratic governance. But, no one can deny that it is the only country where an authoritarian regime could not sustain consolidating power in Kyrgyzstan

### **3.4. Data Collection**

In order to compare two similar aid projects with opposite decentralized local governance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, this paper provided the background on the governance, local governance, and the relationship between governance and aid performance. To collect reliable data, resources came from journals, online books, and articles using Google Scholar, Springer, and Jstor. Materials were gathered using the keywords: governance, a local governance model in Central Asia, a relationship between local governance and aid performance, decentralization, Uzbekistan,



Kyrgyzstan, and so on.

The primary sources of this paper were KOICA's evaluation papers related to forestry and afforestation projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation papers indicated the opposite aid outcomes, despite similar forestry development projects. Documents included an overview of projects, process and performance evaluations, evaluation forms and results, opinions of partner countries, and survey sheets for projects. These sources guaranteed reliable information about both Central Asian countries.

In addition, the second resources were reports and documents published by the government and related institutions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. This paper also provided additional materials, such as newspapers and magazines published in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These resources could bring reliable information on aid projects with respect to the partner's viewpoint. Thus, the evaluation of the project could consider not only the donor's viewpoint but also the perspective of the recipient, which gives further validity and credibility to this research.

### **3.5. Data Analysis**

#### **3.5.1. The framework of decentralized local governance**

This paper approached the local governance using the framework suggested by Boex and Yilmaz (2010), who adopted Kent and Schroeder (2010)'s assessment tools which measured the decentralization of governance in three dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal. They further developed Kent and Schroeder's model (2010) at the local governance level and enumerated the components of each

dimension in great detail. For this reason, this framework could be used to research a variety of circumstances of local governance in developing countries. Moreover, using this approach, it was possible to thoroughly compare the decentralized local governance of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

**Table 1.** An Advanced Framework for Assessing Decentralized Local Governance

<b>Political Decentralization and Empowerment</b>
Local political power structure
Structure and quality of local electoral systems
Nature of political party systems
Local political participation and accountability
<b>Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment</b>
Regulatory power and planning of local physical space
Local public finance management(PFM) and procurement
Local human resource administration
Efficient and equitable local service delivery
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>
Expenditure assignment
Revenue assignment and local revenue administration
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers
Subnational borrowing/debt

*Source: Table from Boex and Yilmaz (2010)*

Table 1 provides a summary of the components of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization and empowerment. To be specific, firstly, the political decentralization and empowerment dimension consists of four components. To begin with, the political power structure was one factor. It depicts the institutional arrangement of balancing powers of executive, legislative, and judicial authorities at the local level. The authors suggest that the political local governance system was

very strong if it had a strong local executive and council—the head of executives were directly elected and selected by the local council—the existence of a council manager system, such as a motion of no confidence, an oversight function, and a local commissioner system. Next, election laws and systems were also considered if they were more responsive to the residents' preferences through election and term system of the head of executive and local council or election process without manipulation. Furthermore, if a competitive local-level political party system was established, there was a strong political decentralization and empowerment local governance system. That is, the political party systems based on local candidates would promote local residents rather than the interests of national political parties. Finally, local participation and accountability were the last component. When the channels, such as a referendum, term limits, decisions on the local budget, and recall elections were institutionalized and operated well at the local level, local participation and accountability were highly achieved.

Secondly, administrative or regulatory decentralization and empowerment were also defined as four elements. In the first place, regulatory powers of local government, including local economic development and use of local physical space, were one element. The local powers had a strong regulatory power for local physical space if the local government had the discretion to change or enforce regulations in relation to local physical space and development, like land use planning and management, construction permission, and traffic control. In the second place, local public finance management and procurement were related to administrative decentralization and empowerment. When local governments could manage their finances without the national treasury or discretionary authority of procurement

contracts, local governance had a strong power to finance and procure. In third place, the decision of local human resources was important to administrate services to the local residents. If the local government controlled its local employment decisions such as staff payment, numbers, layoffs, recognition, appointments, and the right to adjust salaries, the local had a strong capacity to deal with local human resources. In the last place, the efficient and equitable administration of local public services referred to an autonomous administrative area. The local government had its own capacity to administer local services when it had regulatory authority over local delivery services: such as education, public health, and social or environmental protection.

Lastly, fiscal decentralization and empowerment were composed of four pillars: expenditure assignments, distribution of revenues, an intergovernmental transfer system, and local government borrowing and debts. To start with, the discretion of the expenditure assignment depends on the extent of the capacity to make their own budget in the provision of local public services, including a citizen monitoring process for overseeing the local government budget. This budget could be either financed by own local sources or intergovernmental transfers funded by the central government. There was no doubt that the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government were clearly delineated. Next, the local government had fiscal empowerment with respect to the acumen of local revenue assignments. The local governments had a great degree of discretion in using their own revenues and funds when they could collect taxes, fees, and rent at the local level as well as creating funds with local priorities, without reliance on central authorities. Furthermore, intergovernmental fiscal transfers could bring stability to local

government finance. The intergovernmental transfer system was weak if the transfer of resources between the central and local government was abandoned or *de facto* highly restricted, such as with ear-marked transfers. Finally, the borrowing and debt ability were the last elements of fiscal decentralization and empowerment. The local governments had weak power to deal with borrowing or debt when borrowing or debt was prohibited or controlled by the central government without precise rules or regulations (Appendix 1).

### 3.5.2. The OECD/DAC criteria of aid evaluation

Both end-of-project evaluations conducted by KOICA in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were studied using the evaluation tools of the OECD/DAC criteria. As of 2017, OECD/DAC evaluated projects with five criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability.

**Table 2.** DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance

<b>Relevance</b>	To extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipients and donor
<b>Effectiveness</b>	A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
<b>Efficiency</b>	Efficiency measures the outputs in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.
<b>Impact</b>	The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms

	of trade and financial conditions.
<b>Sustainability</b>	Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

*Sources: OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria (2000)*

Table 2 shows a detailed explanation of each criterion. Although the critics denounced these criteria for being too broad and abstract to evaluate aid projects thoroughly, they gave donors and international development organizations a direction for evaluating development performance. With no exception, KOICA also deployed OECD/DAC criteria in their evaluation system and evaluated their projects with five principles.


Consequently, KOICA's end-of-evaluation reports targeting two countries were evaluated according to these five elements. Using this framework, this study compares the aid performance of the two countries using total scores in each criterion. With these detailed criteria in mind, this paper investigates why the two countries achieved opposite performances or results in similar aid projects.

## Chapter 4. The Case of Uzbekistan

### 4.1. The Structure of Uzbekistan: Authoritarian and Highly Centralized Local Governance System.

The local political empowerment in the local government in Uzbekistan implemented a centralized and hierarchical system. In Uzbekistan, the structure of local government consisted of local administrations (*Hokimiyat*) and local councils from regions, districts, or cities. Also, there were self-governments or sub-district level governance institutions including villages, a community of residents of a particular territory (*Mahallas*), a rural settlement of an ethnic group—Kara-Kalpak, Kazakh or Tatar (*kishlaks or auls*) (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001).

**Figure 1.** The Structure of Central and Local Level in Uzbekistan



Source: Revised from Bektemirov and Rahimov (2002) by Seoran

### *Political decentralization and empowerment*

The overall local political power structure was highly weak. All local authority was dependent on the state administration and the president. The heads of local administration and local councils, known as *hokims*, were appointed by the central authority, relying especially on loyalty to the president (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001; Peter et al. 2004; Urinboyev 2018). The reason was that the Uzbekistan president could appoint and dismiss *hokims*. That is, the local governors were subordinated to dual responsibilities of the central and presidential power. Likewise, the local councils in Uzbekistan were weak and exercised limited discretion. Though they were elected freely by citizens and had a recall vote according to the law, in practice, the local councils rarely exercised these legal rights. The reason is that reviews of legislation, budgets, and reports of local councils were approved by the *hokims* (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001, 480). Namely, the function of the local councils was symbolic and took a strongly passive approach to carrying out the will of the citizens. Predictably, the council management system was highly centralized to the head of territorial administrations who monitored the operations of all department heads and local administrative employees. The independence of judicial power was only granted by law. *Mahallas*, a distinctive feature of Uzbekistan compared to other Central Asian countries, were taken for granted for operating and being permitted as the local self-government. Still, their function was fully dependent on local administrative bodies. Their lack of capacity to demand or have oversight of local administrations impeded the effective monitoring of *hokims* and the central government. Rather, *Mahallas* played the role of a surveillance system in consolidating presidential power in every city and village (Urinboyev 2018).



The structure and quality of local electoral systems were also highly weak. The local administrators and councils served a limited term of five years, but they were not fully democratically elected. The president had absolute power to appoint or dismiss *hokims* of the region approved by the pseudo-councils (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). According to the law on “elections to the provincial, district and city councils of people’s disputes” in 2003, local council elections were freely and directly conducted through a secret ballot. However, the nomination of council candidates depended on *hokims*, resulting in the *de facto* manipulation of elections (Peter et al., 2004). On top of that, according to the law on No ARU-89 in 2007, deleting the approval of a relevant council for nominating the regional governors or *hokims*, the president had absolute power without the consent of local councils when appointing or dismissing regional governors and *hokims* (Akramov 2021).

The political party system construed by local authorities was non-existent. It was far away from the local-level political party system. The party system was *de facto* one-ruling system, preventing inclusive and competitive local elections. The local candidates were not able to promote the local interest issues and benefits as they were highly subordinate to national political parties.

As expected, local participation and accountability were highly weak. Although *Hokim* held regular office hours for citizens who wanted to submit proposals or complaints, there was an absence of the law of local referenda (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2002 ,480). Local referenda and public hearings were not widely used and infrequent. There were no channels for residents to participate in the local budget report at the local level. By the same token, access to government information was also closed. Although *Mahallas* were allowed to operate at the local

level, they were restricted by the local, and central government, resulting in little influence on local decisions and issues.

To conclude, political decentralization and empowerment of local governance in Uzbekistan were highly weak. The local political structure system was highly centralized because the local government executive branch enjoyed absolute power over the *hokims*, and local councilors and local communities (*Mahallas*) were not independently able to supervise executive bodies (Appendix 2).

#### *Administrative decentralization and empowerment*

The regulatory power and planning of physical space at the local level were highly weak. According to the Law on Local Public Administration, the local councils had a functional right to approve and amend laws or regulations affecting their jurisdiction (Lexa 1999). They *de facto* covered social, economic, and land planning and management approval, budgetary reports, and taxation (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001, 489). However, the *hokim* supervised social, economic, and cultural activities. He or she also took measures regarding the ordinance of public order and crime prevention, ensuring the safety of citizens. Local councils were highly subordinated to *hokims*, and *hokims* were bound by the legislation of presidential decrees or orders. Likewise, the ‘Law on Community Self-government’ in 1993 and 1999 (Lexb 1993) stated that residents could decide local issues regarding their interests. Citizens had been granted by law to gather citizens of settlements *mahallas* in the villages, *kishlaks*, and *auls*, as well as those of *mahallas* within cities, *kishlaks*, or *auls* (Article 7). By law, these self-government communities were independent of central state authorities and enjoyed the rights of

legal entities. In truth, however, the law was barely complied with in effect. (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001, 486).

The local public finance management and procurement (PFM) systems were also highly weak. The independent local government division conducted the monitoring of local budget finance (Ibid.). However, ministries also monitored local budget finance. This dual supervision of a financial management system required them to engage with the central administration's power over a budgetary organization, including educational, health, or social spheres. The local government had a right to utilize budget and tax by law, but, had little autonomy due to a centrally determined finance process. In addition, *Mahalla* also had a theoretical right to organize and decide on voluntary financial collection and to organize their own local funds and to receive funds from local budgets (Peter et al. 2004, 57). In reality, it fully resorted to the budget allocation process of high-level authorities (Urinboyev 2018). There was no particular system or participatory body for citizen's budget monitoring. That is, local governments were subordinated to central governments and severely limited in their ability to manage their own finances and to procure functions.

The local government had highly weak discretion over local human resources management and employment. The local government only had rights to administer and manage employment. The nomination of local servants and members were subject to the *hokim* who was appointed by the central government. For example, the ministries recruited or laid off school principals approved by *hokim*, whom the president selected (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001, 489). Moreover, local servants' salaries were controlled by highly centralized budgets. Even the leader,

secretary, and workers of *Mahalla* received their salaries not from the local but from the central base (Peter et al., 2004, 57).

It is clear that the local ability to provide efficient and equitable local service delivery was highly weak. Locally-delivered public services, including health and education, were partially allowed to provide public health and education. The local government had the right to maintain or renovate healthcare services, while finance for healthcare services was controlled by the central budget (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). In the same way, education was limited because the locals only had the right to maintain the educational institution, whereas the Ministry of Education controlled teachers' payments. With regard to tasks of environmental and social protection, these were controlled by the central government (Urinboyev 2018). Channels to assess citizen satisfaction were non-existent. There was a lack of performance reports which represented citizen satisfaction with local government service (Ibid.). The local organization faced challenges with regard to evaluating the performance and effectiveness of the projects due to the authoritarian central government. Not surprisingly, there were no existing laws for the local government to respond to the residents' feedback.

Therefore, administrative decentralization and empowerment were highly weak. The autonomy of local administration was only found when researching the law. In reality, the central government controlled local decisions in terms of regulation, management, and procurement. Without exception, human resources were also highly restricted (Appendix 2).

### *Fiscal decentralization and empowerment*

Local governments in Uzbekistan had little discretion over spending the budget. Uzbekistan enacted the ‘Law on Local Budget’ in 2013 which took effect in 2014 (Lex 2013c). According to the law of Article 7, the local government had a right to establish its local taxes and payments following legislation. However, without upper-level approval, the local governments had trouble distributing their budgets. That is, there was little power to administrate own local sources. The budgets of regions and cities were allocated within the limits of the adopted state budget (Article 21). The local organizations and recipients financed from local budgets were also approved by the Ministry of Finance (Articles 32 and 34). Moreover, there were neither clear boundaries between nor details of the roles at local and central levels.

The discretion of local government was highly weak and confined to central budgets. Although the law indicates local autonomy when using local taxes, fees, duties, and other payments (Article 18), the local governments had no independent power to establish tax rates or collect revenues (Urinboyev 2018, 4). The approval of the central government highly restricted local funds. The proportion of revenues from local taxes was also small, which led to limited capacity to assign revenues at the local level.

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers were highly weak. The fiscal transfer between the local governments was allowed by law. Transfer inefficiencies, however, were rampant among all local entities. The number of transfers from central to local government was insufficient to meet the local needs, leading to the bribery or corruption of local entities. Commonly, fiscal transfers were ear-marked for specific


and designated purposes and approved by the Ministry of Finance.

Local government borrowing or debt was non-existent and forbidden. According to Article 24 of the Law on Local Budget, local budget deficits were not allowed. Additionally, all local expenditures had to be approved by the Central government and borrowing from other capital market sources forbidden (Peter et al., 2004, 19).

In sum, fiscal decentralization and empowerment of local government in Uzbekistan were highly weak. As a result, the fiscal dimension was highly controlled by the central government (Appendix 2).

## 4.2. Aid Project for Greenery of the Territory Attached to Navoi Free Industrial Economic Zone (Navoi FEZ)

**Figure 2.** Project Overview and the Structure of Project Implementation in Central and Local Level (Uzbekistan)



*Source: Revised Figure from KOICA (2019) by Seoran*

KOICA implemented an aid project for the Greenery of the Territory Attached to Navoi FEZ in Uzbekistan from 2013 to 2017. The project aimed to

implement an afforestation project that could reduce airborne sands and dust caused by the desert and improve the environment and conditions of residents in Navoi (KOICA 2019). In doing this, KOICA established tree nursery facilities, afforestation land (135ha), a ‘Korea-Uzbekistan Friendship Forest’, and provided technical support and training programs for policymakers and experts (Ibid.). Figure 2 shows a detailed project overview and the major stakeholders of project implementation divided by central and local level.

As mentioned earlier, the performance of the aid project for Greenery of the Territory attached to the Navoi Free Industrial Economic Zone was evaluated using the criteria of OECD DAC with relevance, efficiency, effectiveness/impact, and sustainability. Each criterion was calculated with detailed scores: relevance (2.7 out of 4), efficiency (3.3 out of 4), effectiveness (2 out of 4), and sustainability (2 out of 4). The total score was 10 out of 16, which was evaluated as partially successful. Among the criteria, the efficiency criterion was evaluated with the highest score, whereas effectiveness and sustainability received only half of the total score. This part investigated which dimensions and components of local governance were likely to cause the low outcomes of the aid projects.

**Table 3.** The Relationship between Local Governance and OECD Criteria in Uzbekistan

Local Governance	OECD Criteria	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
<b>Political Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Highly Weak	Local political power structure	√		√	N/A	√
Highly Weak	Structure and quality of local electoral systems	√		√	N/A	√
None	Nature of political party systems				N/A	
Highly Weak	Local political participation and accountability				N/A	
<b>Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Highly Weak	Regulatory power and planning of local physical space				N/A	
Highly Weak	Local PFM and procurement			√	N/A	√
Highly Weak	Local Human resource administration			√	N/A	√
Highly Weak	Efficient and equitable local service delivery	√			N/A	
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Highly Weak	Expenditure assignment	√		√	N/A	√
Highly Weak	Revenue Assignment and Local Revenue Administration				N/A	
Highly Weak	Inter-governmental Fiscal Transfers				N/A	
None	Subnational Borrowing/Debt				N/A	
<b>Evaluation Total Score 10/16</b>		<b>2.7/4</b>	<b>3.3/4</b>	<b>2/4</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>2/4</b>

Source: Table by Seoran.



## *Relevance*

Considering the relevance criteria, Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea were consistent in their national strategies. This project was aligned with the national development strategy of Uzbekistan in forestry policy. Uzbekistan strongly requested for this project to be implemented with the aim to create forest spaces in desert areas to improve people's environmental conditions in Navoi as well as to attract enterprises. At the same time, this project was related to the country program strategy (CPS) of Korea targeting Uzbekistan and the strategy of KOICA. Also, the aim and contents of the project were relevant because it aimed to solve the airborne dust problem by afforesting a large area of barren land (135 ha) and enhancing the living conditions of residents.

The project, however, underestimated the implementation structure and budget plan by not considering the climate and irrigation system facilities of the selected location. The project was situated in an area with a desert climate where it rarely rained in summer. In other words, an irrigation system was a prerequisite for implementing and maintaining the project. However, at an early stage, the budget planning did not consider the water management system.

In addition, the precondition of the local governance system was barely considered. Firstly, the highly weak local political structure and electoral system in Uzbekistan caused a colossal burden in dealing with the irrigation system and post-management of the project. The Navoi mayor and vice mayor were highly subordinate to the central government. The irrigation system was indispensable to the project to provide water to create and nurture the forests. The Navoi mayor, the vice mayor, and the Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) in Navoi did not

have the discretion to manage the water supply. The water supply power belonged to the central authorities (Ibid.). The mayor of Navoi constantly insisted that the water supply was under the charge of the central government. As a result, the project would not have been successful if the central government had not intended to implement a water system in line with the operation of the seedling system, the standard of the sapling, and the local workforce (Ibid., 43).

Secondly, the local government was highly weak in efficient and equitable local service delivery. There were not enough channels to gather the demands of citizens. The central authorities thoroughly embedded policy with a top-down approach. In this regard, this project did not mull over the local community's demands in Navoi FEZ. According to the results from interviews with the project's participants, the project's rating was controversial. For this reason, the scope of targeted people who could access the FEA area was unspecified and nonconsensual between Uzbekistan Central Forest Service (UCFS) and Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) (Ibid., 42).

Lastly, the lack of capacity for expenditure assignment inhibited the payment of electricity bills for supplying the water. Only the central government had a right to solve the budget problems regarding the electricity utility fees. The locals could not afford to cover the expense of water from their budget system, which meant an inability to assign expenditure.

### *Efficiency*

The efficiency criterion was evaluated as having the highest scores among other criteria. This is because the project satisfied the demands of cost-efficiency and

operational efficiency. Although it was difficult to reach the base data for evaluation for a rigorous level of analysis due to scarcity, it was properly implemented within the planned budget and work plan or time frame. The high scores of efficiency relate to a project's budget execution and adequate workforce input.

However, limitations still remained. The project did not efficiently achieve its targeted output and outcome per input. If the follow-up project had not been planned, the long-term outcome that included improvement of the environment for companies and living residents in Navoi through afforestation, and intermediate-term outcome that covered the reduction of dust, a tree survival rate in afforestation land (135ha) and improvement of seedling production would not have been achieved (Ibid., 15). To sum up, despite the high score ratings in efficiency, according to the report, the project was not implemented efficiently due to the failure of output per input.

At the beginning stages of the project process, the initial responsibilities belonged to the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Forestry. During the implementation, however, the project was taken over by the Navoi local government. The Navoi local government had insufficient political power to cover this work and lacked the capacity for finance and expenditure to manage the nursery system and afforestation land. Besides, the Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) faced difficulties dealing with the budget problems of the irrigation system, causing a majority of dead trees in 2017 (Ibid., 98).

### *Effectiveness/Impact*

The effectiveness of the project was notably unsuccessful and rated under

satisfactory in the short and middle-term outcomes. The disappointing results were caused by the mere consideration of a pre-feasibility study, overlooking the potential risk—permanent irrigation system—aligned with a lack of local government capacity.

To be specific, the highly weak local political power structure and quality of the local electoral system propelled the poor results of short- and middle-term outcomes: the success of the afforestation land; the sustainability of the irrigation system; protection and management of the afforestation land; the establishment of a Korea–Uzbekistan Friendship Forest; a sustainable nursery system; improvement of the living environment; and the enhancement of labor capacity. The local government passed the buck to the central government for the responsibility of electricity bills due to a lack of capacity to handle the local budget. While the central government had the power to utilize the supply of water, the local government and Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) implemented this project (Ibid.). These dual authorities disturbed the sustainability of irrigation system, causing the project's poor outcomes and output. Local government and URFO consistently expressed their difficulties in handling the irrigation system problem, so the project could only succeed once the central government solved the problem. That is, they had limited discretion to implement projects and local matters.

In addition, the highly weak local public financial management and procurement and expenditure assignment power meant ineffective project management and operation dealing with the irrigation problem. The Navoi local government suggested that the project could be implemented if the nearby Zarafshan river could pump into the afforestation land. This irrigation system was at a cost of

300 thousand dollars. However, the Navoi local government needed help to cover these fees with its own local budget and block to allocate expenditure to this project.

Furthermore, the local government was highly weak in local human resource administration. The head of the Navoi local government was replaced due to the pressure of central power. At the same time, the head of the Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) was replaced five times. As a result, the local governor, who was unable to exclude the central power, interrupted the consistent process of the project. Also, it was necessary to take into consideration the securing of employees and a management system to develop and manage a permanent water irrigation system, to protect and manage afforestation land (135ha), to establish the Korea–Uzbekistan Friendship Forest, and to sustain a nursery establishment. But, there was insufficient discretion to maintain the workforce in terms of appointing and paying local employees. Even the officials in URFO changed three or four times as part-time contract workers (Ibid., 79), blurring the project's short and middle outcomes.

The impact was constrained because the results of afforestation were not accomplished in the short- and middle-term outcomes. The long-term impact was limited at this stage in that the afforestation land was not nurtured. Thus, the end-of-evaluation reports were not calculated at all.

### *Sustainability*

The sustainability of this project was evaluated with very low scores, as the lack of recipient ownership led to the low possibility of self-development after the end of the project and a lack of capacity maintenance.

At first, this project was propelled by a strong request from the central government in Uzbekistan. With profound interest encouraged, the recipient's ownership was expected to be utmost. However, the recipient authority changed from the Uzbekistan Central Forest Service (UCFS) to the Uzbekistan Regional Forest Office (URFO) and Navoi local government (Ibid., 59). The problem was that the local government in Navoi had highly weak political and electoral power discretion. Additionally, the local financial system and human resources were also highly weak. Although the mayor of Navoi stated that he could set the budget for the irrigation system, these pledges were useless when the central government appointed another person as mayor.

To make matters worse, the highly weak management of local human resources mattered severely. After the end of the project, only ten employees were left to administer the nursery and afforestation land. It was doubtful that ten workers were enough to manage the afforestation and nursery facilities after the end of the project.


Budget planning for the irrigation system was also ambiguous. The lack of capacity for local PFM and expenditure rights prevented consistency and self-regulating projects. UCFS and the central governmental officials did not provide clear answers regarding whether or not the follow-up management systems were established (Ibid., 61).

## Chapter 5. The Case of Kyrgyzstan

### 5.1. The Structure of Kyrgyzstan: Partially Decentralized Local Governance System

The local political empowerment in local government in Kyrgyzstan employed a decentralized transitional system. In Kyrgyzstan, the structure of local government consisted of local administrations (Governor or *Akim*) and local councils (*Kenesh*) on four levels: oblasts (regions), rayons (districts), cities and villages (*Ayil Okhmotu* or *Ayil Bashchy*) or towns (Shambetova et al., 2009). That is, local self-government presided over by *Keneshs* at all levels.

**Figure 3.** The Structure of Central and Local Level in Kyrgyzstan



Source: Revised Figure from INTRAC (2011) by Seoran

### *Political decentralization and empowerment*

In Kyrgyzstan, the local government was still not fully decentralized, and its local political power structure was strong. Notably, the political instability of 2010 shaped revolutionary institutional reforms through constitutional changes (Liebert 2017). The democratic movement in 2010—the *Second Tulip Revolution*—had strengthened more decentralized and competitive local regimes and developed civil society (Mootz and Marat 2010). As a result, this decentralized shift at the local level ensured that the local political structure was more independent of the central government through the revised constitution. According to the ‘Law on the self-local government,’ the head of the administration (*Akim*) was directly elected and selected by local council members. Local council members could include the chairman and deputies, and they had a right to a vote of no confidence against the local state administration (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002). The local council commissioners were formed from the council members and served the local department chairs in various fields—economic, social, and cultural development (Ibid.). Local communities were widely allowed and operated well. *Aiyl Okmotu*, the local community in a rural area or the local self-government system, had its own jurisdiction of village or town councils, local budget, programs, and maintenance of all facilities and rural services (Ibid.). Yet, independence of judiciary power from local governments wasn't fully operated. In 2011, the locals adopted a new judicial system for increased transparency and independent civil society oversight. Although local courts were granted their independence by law, trust in the judicial system was extremely low due to rampant corruption (Collins 2012).

The structure and quality of electoral systems at the local level were highly



strong. The head of executive (*Akim* or mayor) was directly elected and served his or her term for four years. Although the president had the right to nominate candidates, he or she could not be dismissed or appointed without the consent of the local council (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002). Also, the local council was directly and freely elected by the population of the corresponding administrative–territorial unit and endowed with the authority to resolve issues of local importance. At the same time, *Ayil Okhmotu*, at the village level, was also elected directly based on population or the deputy of *Ayil Kenesh* by secret ballot. After the turbulence of 2010, a fraudulent election was strictly prohibited, making it possible for the implementation of an election process without manipulation.

The nature of political party systems was highly strong and solid. The role of national parties depended on the local-level political party system. The attempt to weaken presidential power and strengthen parliamentary functions contributed to several newly emerging local parties based on the region, leading to inclusive and competitive local elections. Some local parties prevailed over the most popular parties in some contests. For example, sixteen local parties enlisted in Bishkek’s election, and five were represented in the parliament in 2012 (Mootz and Marat 2010).

Local political participation and accountability were highly strong. According to the law on Election Commissions to Conduct Elections and Referenda in the Kyrgyz Republic, the local level had the power to conduct referenda on the respective territory. According to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, citizens had the right to receive and access information possessed by all tiers of governmental officials, including local government (Article 33). Citizens also had the right to

participate in the national and local budget process (Article 52) and to submit their complaints (Nogoibaeva 2014). For this reason, the local community could engage in local issues using various participation methods, such as through the Institute of Ombudsmen, public advisory boards, budget hearings, and citizen report cards that collect citizen satisfaction surveys (Kasymova and Schachter 2014). Even if access was limited due to public awareness of these opportunities and a lack of understanding of governmental decisions, the government allowed residents to monitor and access public information.

All in all, political decentralization and empowerment were highly strong despite some limitations in practice —corruption and public awareness. Notably, after the political turmoil of 2010, Kyrgyzstan had been propelled toward a decentralized movement of the local political structure system (Appendix 3).

#### *Administrative decentralization and empowerment*

The regulatory power of local governance was highly strong. According to the law on ‘Local Self-government’ of 2011, local councils and administration were entitled to have the power to approve regulations and laws for their local communities as well as to ensure conditions for local physical culture and space (Article 3). They covered the registration of citizens, healthcare, properties, and a collection of taxes, fees, and insurance (Article 20). The *Kenesh*, local representatives, had their own regulatory power and planning of local issues. The *Ayil Okumotu* is also responsible for local contributions regarding roads, education, and infrastructures (Siegel 2021). In other words, local issues could determine the scope of local government.

The local government had a highly strong ability to handle local public finance management and procurement guaranteed by the law. The local budget process and finance system were independent of the budgetary process of the central government (Conway 2008). The law on ‘Local Self-government’ of 2011 ensured that the local government exercised the form, approval, and execution of local budgets (Article 10). Their audit was monitored by the Chamber of Accounts (AC), the Supreme Audit Institution, which was independent from the central and local government (PEFA 2021). Also, the local self-government reported budget execution reports every second year and were required to publish the summary of the budget reports for citizens. The budget hearing was undertaken through an openly public and mandated process (Ibid.).

In contrast, the local government had a weak power to handle human resources to appoint and maintain council personnel. Although the local council had the power of approval of or hiring staff, and administrating them, the levels and wages of officials were limited and depended on the support of the national government (USAID 2004).

Similarly, the efficiency and equitability of local service delivery was weak. The local had the authority to maintain and construct healthcare centers at the local budgets’ expense (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002). In the same way, locals supervised the local schools, institutions in the field of education, and teacher’s wages. The central government supported teacher’s salaries only when the local lacked its own resources (Ibid.). In contrast, the social protection and environmental services were vulnerable to administrating local power. Its function was highly dependent on the central budget. The local government provided the channels to assess resident

satisfaction through citizen report cards, while there was no particular regulation for the government when officials failed to accept local people's comments on the budget allocation and regulation was no guarantee that they would accept people's concerns (Kasymova and Schachter 2014).

Consequently, the administrative decentralization and empowerment was quite controversy. The administration decentralization in the component of regulatory and planning, and local PFM was highly strong, whereas it in human resource management and local service delivery was weak (Appendix 3).

#### *Fiscal decentralization and empowerment*

Local governments in Kyrgyzstan had the strong ability to manage their own expenditure and to assign revenue. According to the law on 'Local Self-government' outlined in 2011, the local authorities had a right to independent local budgeting and the ability to raise funds for their policies (Article 10). The local authorities had their own financial and economic basis via tax and non-tax sources of income or payments. (Article 61) Kyrgyz's local councils (*Kenesh*) had approval power for the local budget and report on its execution (Article 31), and *Ayil Okumotu* could also develop a draft local budget and execute it after approval of the *Kenesh* (Article 47). Also, local authorities could enjoy the benefit of conditional intergovernmental transfers delegated by the central government (OECD/UCLG 2016). However, there are several limitations to the boundaries between different local levels and with central authorities. The legislation of local self-government was still ambiguous and unclear due to functions overlapping with central authorities.

In contrast, the local government's revenue assignment and administration

was highly weak. The local budget was an independent budgetary system to the central authorities so that the local government had the right to collect taxes and levy tax rates on its territory, ensured by law. The local governments, however, were not allowed to introduce new taxes and were limited to imposing tax rates for some taxes (OECD/UCLG 2016). The reason is that national legislation, such as Tax Code, imposed uniform tax rates to all levels of government (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002; World Bank 2014; Moldogaziev 2012). That is, the central government approved revenues and controlled expenditure of local budgets. In addition, the budget system prohibited them from fulfilling their core functions to use funds and extra-budgetary funds. The proportion of revenues and expenditures was also controlled by national legislation. This was less than 10 percent of local expenditure, which led to inefficiency of local autonomy and creditworthiness (World Bank 2014).


In the same way, the intergovernmental transfer system was highly weak. The local government allowed the use of transfers by law. But, this was not enough to fulfill the local needs due to mismatch or unplanned transfer expenditure (Ibid.). The intergovernmental transfers were usually conditional, which limited the discretion for using local services.

Similarly, the subnational borrowing or debt was weak. Borrowing from the central government was allowed by law. Local government was also permitted to access financial markets and municipal banks if the local *Kenesh* and Ministry of Finance consented (Siegel 2021). The central government, however, imposed restrictions on its percentages and levels. For example, local debt was restricted to 20 percent of the previous debt obligation of the local government's yearly revenue. (OECD/UCLG 2016).

In summary, the local government of financial decentralization and empowerment in Kyrgyzstan was highly weak or weak (Appendix 3).

## 5.2. The Project for Strengthening Forestry Preservation Capacity of the Kyrgyz Republic

**Figure 3.** Project Overview and the Structure of Project Implementation in Central and Local Level (Kyrgyzstan)



*Source: Revised Figure from KOICA (2017) by Seoran*

KOICA implemented the ‘Project for Strengthening Forestry Preservation Capacity of the Kyrgyz Republic’ from 2010 to 2015. The project aimed to establish a foundation for capacity building of forestry preservation in Kyrgyz (KOICA 2017). In doing so, KOICA renovated existing forestry buildings in Frunze and Jalal-Abad, constructed research center and nursery facilities in Bishkek and Jalal-Abad, dispatched experts, and provided a training program for policymakers and experts (Ibid.). Figure 4 shows a detailed project overview and the major stakeholders of project implementation divided according to the central and local levels in

Kyrgyzstan.

KOICA evaluated this project using the five criteria of OECD/DAC: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. According to the end-of-project evaluation report, scores were calculated with two methods: grade (0–5) and percentile (0–100) (Ibid., 22). This paper calculated total scores using the grade range by arithmetic mean for easy comparison. Each criterion was calculated for subsequent scores: relevance (4.6 out of 5), efficiency (4.7 out of 5), effectiveness (4.7 out of 5), impact (5 out of 5), and sustainability (4.5 out of 5). The total score was 23.4 out of 25, which was evaluated as highly successful. Among the criteria, the impact criterion was evaluated with the highest scores. While sustainability received the lowest score, it was still high. In this part, this study uncovered which components of local governance were likely to lead to successful outcomes of aid projects.

**Table 4.** The Relationship between Local Governance and OECD Criteria in Kyrgyzstan

Local Governance	OECD Criteria	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
<b>Political Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Strong	Local political power structure	v	v	v	v	v
Highly Strong	Structure and quality of local electoral systems					
Highly Strong	Nature of political party systems					
Highly Strong	Local political participation and accountability		v	v	v	v
<b>Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Highly Strong	Regulatory power and planning of local physical space					
Highly Strong	Local PFM and procurement					
Weak	Local Human resource administration					
Weak	Efficient and equitable local service delivery					
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>						
Strong	Expenditure assignment			v		
Highly Weak	Revenue Assignment and Local Revenue Administration					
Highly Weak	Inter-governmental Fiscal Transfers					
Weak	Subnational Borrowing/Debt					
<b>Evaluation Total Score</b>		<b>23.4/25</b>	<b>4.6/5</b>	<b>4.7/5</b>	<b>4.7/5</b>	<b>5/5</b>
						<b>4.5/5</b>

Source: Table by Seoran.



## *Relevance*

The project was relevant to the National Action Plan (NAP), which consisted of 7 targets and 25 action plans, including forestry development in Kyrgyzstan from 2006 to 2015. Included in the 25 action plans were the expansion of the forest area, the protection and resilience of forest, and the foundation for promoting forest products. Along with Kyrgyz's demand for forest development, this was highly related to KOICA's ODA strategies for 'Climate Change and Green Growth' and the Korea Forest Service's strategies for international forest cooperation (KOICA 2017).

The recipient, the State Agency of Environment Protection and Forestry (SAEPF), requested a facility cultivation nursery system instead of soil cultivation. In response to this request, KOICA built two facility cultivation nurseries in Bishkek and Jalal-Abad, which led to an original-revised plan (Ibid., 24). Moreover, Kyrgyz strongly requested environmental pest control using the natural enemies of cicada moths, and efficiencies of pest control were very low. In response, the projects were revised using eco-friendly chemical drugs, which led to more than 85 percent of pest control efficiency.

Although the project was revised at the initial stage and was buffered owing to the political turmoil of 2010, the revised version of the project's content, time frame, and budget was highly relevant to the aim of strengthening capacity building for forestry protection. It was appropriate to adapt the detailed content to Kyrgyz's environmental circumstances and to distribute works at the central and local levels (Ibid.).

In this part, the project well considered local governance in the implementation structure and budget plan. After the turbulence of 2010, Kyrgyz accelerated the

decentralized local system. As a result, in the forestry part, the central authorities, the State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry (SAEPF), distributed power to the Territorial Division of Environmental Protection and the Development of Forestry Ecosystems (TDEPDFE) and the local forest agencies where the project was being implemented (Asyl 2012). That is, autonomous local entities could apply for the Frunze forest agency, Jalal-Abad forest agency, and Issyk-Ata forest agency. According to the project agreement, the project office had not only already been established in SAEPF, but also its regional base office in Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, Issyk-Ata (GKR 2012). The SAEPF provided sufficient financial and human resources to implement the project at a local level. To sum up, the decentralized local political power structure made it easier to adapt the revised plan, which led to the high relevance scores of the KOICA project.

### *Efficiency*

The budget increase at the beginning stage was due to SAEPF's request to change to Korean vinyl greenhouse cultivation, but the revised budget and workforce fulfilled the project and completed work within the deadline (KOICA 2017, 26). The majority of resources were distributed to hardware, such as building renovation and provision of equipment and materials, rather than software. On top of that, due to the absence of a KOICA office in Kyrgyzstan, the efficiency of project implementation and management was low at the beginning. Nevertheless, as the projects were implemented, cooperation among KOICA, PMC, SAEPF, and local forest agencies efficiently divided project implementation and management.

Next, considering technical efficiency, the workforce dispatched from PMC was composed of highly experienced experts in the forestry field. At the same time, eco-friendly pests and disease control were successfully employed, which led to more than 80 percent of pest control efficiency in the combat of forest pests and diseases in walnut and pistachio trees (Ibid., 27).

The existing central–local structure of the forestry department and increased discretion of local political power structure directly contributed to the efficient work, even though the KOICA office did not settle down at the time. The SAEFP distributed its power to local forestry agencies in Frunze, Jalal-Abad, and Issyk-Ata. According to the protocol of measurements for the role of SAEFP, SAEFP could permit and give licenses for those activities in the Frunze Forestry and Jalal-Abad Forestry (GKR 2012). As mentioned earlier, these forestry own autonomy for forest management, such as control and monitoring forestry actions, at regional and local levels, which led to more efficient cooperation with KOICA and PMC conducting project implementation and management.

In addition, allowing local political participation contributed to the high efficiency level. *Leskhoz*, which are local-level forest management entities, while still not entirely independent, had their rights guaranteed with regard to several forestry works: submitting proposals on forest activities, implementing forest use and activities, constructing related facilities, allocating forest units, and managing lease agreements (Asyl 2012, 18). Allowing the local-based community system, *leskhoz*, promoted to active participation in this project, leading to excellent efficiency.

## *Effectiveness*

The effectiveness of the project was highly achieved above the planned output, notwithstanding the political upheaval of delaying more than a year (KOICA 2017, 27). Despite these difficulties, the project's expected outcomes or output were almost entirely fulfilled. Two research centers in Frunze and Jalal-Abad for pest control and seed storage were renovated and upgraded for better research. Equipment and facilities for seed research and nursery, such as computers, were all provided. Also, the vinyl sapling nursery system was successfully built. Korean experts were dispatched for protecting, implementing and transferring technology. At the same time, twenty-eight Kyrgyz experts and senior officers were invited and trained in Korea three times.

To be specific, the new research center for the sustainable management of natural resources and qualification upgrading at the Frunze forest agency in Bishkek was established and carried out studies of more than 5,000 forest species with seventeen root systems. As a result, a foundation for more than eighty percent of seedling and sapling mass production was established. Also, pest control efficiency increased more than eighty percent, increasing forest production.

The outstanding achievement of effectiveness was spurred on by project management with the mutual confidence of Kyrgyz's central and local government. In this regard, the decentralized local political power structure and local participation positively impacted the streamlining of these projects. As mentioned earlier, the distribution of power to regional and local functions, *leskhoz*, contributed to achieving targeted outcomes and achievement in this project in the same way. In the forestry section, the functions of local

entities included forest use regulation, execution of arrangements of protection of forests from pest, and forest reproduction (reforestation and afforestation). Also, forestry works were only implemented by workers of *leskhoz* aligned with forest management projects and work plans (Long 2018). Local authorities could be involved in the organization of the joint actions of the state forest management bodies. These decentralized functions made PMC effective measures counter to the unintentional risk and taking measures (KOICA 2017, 29)

Also, the autonomy of expenditure assignment contributed to the high achievement of effectiveness. At the regional level, the NFEPDES had its own budget funded by Local Funds for Environmental Protection and Development of the Forestry Sector (LFEPDFS). Likewise, *leskhoz* also had some freedom with regard to public finance management, such as developing annual work plans (Asyl 2012, 19) despite this being bound by and limited to top-down targets and financial resources within the fixed National Action Plan (NAP). Each *leskhoz* planned its own detailed annual plan regarding the previous year's work plan, its own inventory, and project review. The budgetary process and expenditure assignment contributed to the review and monitoring of the projects every year. The data was collected effectively and participant surveys were carried out successfully. This discretion of expenditure made easier streamline of establishing research center and repair work activities in Bishkek and Jalal-Abad.

### *Impact*

There was an enormous impact on policy and system in Kyrgyzstan. The SAEPF

intended to continue and expand these projects to eight regions with their own local budgets. To continue this project, Kyrgyz established a new research center for the sustainable management of natural resources and qualification upgrading at the Frunze Forest Agency. From this project, Kyrgyz became highly interested in Korean forestry technology and raised the perception of Korea as an advanced country in the forestry field. As was foreseeable, in order to produce high quality sapling production using the Korean greenhouse nursery system, policymakers and researchers received training at the Frunze forestry agency.

In this part, more decentralized local political power structure and local political participation and accountability led high scores of impact criterion. SAEPF not only has regional divisions of Environmental Protection and the Development of Forestry Ecosystems (TDEPDFE) in Chui-Bishkek, Osh, Issky-kul, Talas, Jalal-Abad, Naryn, and Batken, but also 42 local forest entities (*leskhoz*) (Asyl 2012). Each has its own rights and functions guaranteed by the law and NAP. Even though the local system was not entirely independent from the central, their roles and actions were divided between them. This existing decentralized political structure made it possible to expand the additional Korean nursery system to eight further areas.

### *Sustainability*

The *sustainability* of the project was evaluated with high scores. The discretion of local political structure paved the way for the expansion and post-management of this project. The SAEPF wanted to expand to construct additional Korean vinyl greenhouses

for the nurseries in the eight regions (KOICA 2017, 31). They evaluated that the advanced greenhouse using Korean technology was possible for mass production of saplings with very low costs and was versatile for adaptation to every region of Kyrgyzstan (Ibid., 30). As expected, the discretion of local political participation was able to maintain the projects even after the project was over. In addition to the vigorous interests of SAEPF, the prerequisite territorial division and subdivisions were expected to easily sustain the project by themselves. A decentralized local system in the forestry field led to the expansion of the same project to other areas.

## Chapter 6. Results and Implications

Table 5 shows the comprehensive matrix with two assessment tools: the local governance and OECD criteria. Firstly, local governance between the two countries was notably contrasted according to four elements of political decentralization and empowerment (local political power structure, structure and quality of local electoral systems, nature of political party systems, and local political participation and accountability), two elements of administrative decentralization and empowerment (regulatory power and planning of local physical space, local public finance management, and procurement), and one element of fiscal decentralization and empowerment (expenditure assignment).

Moreover, KOICA rated the forestry and afforestation project in both countries using ODCD/DAC criteria. Among the criteria, the huge gap between countries was relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability. The previous chapter marked each criterion related with local governance dimensions and elements. For example, low scores of effectiveness in Uzbekistan were associated with the highly weak local political power structure, highly weak structure and quality of local electoral systems, highly weak local PFM and procurement, highly weak local human resource administration, and highly weak expenditure assignment.

Furthermore, the contrasting part between two countries was marked with a yellow color box in the matrix. Concerning the relevance criteria, Uzbekistan received low



scores due to highly weak local political power structure. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan achieved high scores as highly strong local political power structure. In other words, the opposite local political power structure matters big gap of relevance criterion. In the same way, in the effectiveness part, differences in the local political structure, and expenditure assignment caused the contrasting effectiveness scores. In the sustainability part, local power structures led to a huge gap in sustainability scores.

To sum up, the overall ODA performance was commonly related to the local political power structure. That is, the strong local political power structure contributed to the high level of ODA performance.

**Table 5.** Comparison between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with Local Governance and OECD/DAC criteria

Uzbekistan							Kyrgyzstan					
Sustainability	Impact	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Relevance	Local Governance	OECD Criteria	Local Governance	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability
2/4	N/A	2/4	3.3/4	2.7/4	Total 10/16		Total 23.4/25	4.6/5	4.7/5	4.7/5	5/5	4.5/5
Political Decentralization and Empowerment												
✓	N/A	✓		✓	Highly Weak	Local political power structure	Strong	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	N/A	✓		✓	Highly Weak	Structure and quality of local electoral systems	Highly Strong					
	N/A				None	Nature of political party systems	Highly Strong					
	N/A				Highly Weak	Local political participation and accountability	Highly Strong		✓	✓	✓	✓
Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment												
	N/A				Highly Weak	Regulatory power and planning of local physical space	Highly Strong					
✓	N/A	✓			Highly Weak	Local PFM and procurement	Highly Strong					
✓	N/A	✓			Highly Weak	Local human resource administration	Weak					
	N/A			✓	Highly Weak	Efficient and equitable local service delivery	Weak					

Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment												
✓	N/A	✓		✓	Highly Weak	Expenditure assignment	Strong			✓		
	N/A				Highly Weak	Revenue assignment and local revenue administration	Highly Weak					
	N/A				Highly Weak	Inter-governmental fiscal transfers	Highly Weak					
	N/A				None	Subnational borrowing/debt	Weak					

## **Chapter 7. Conclusion**

This research has explained how the local governance system caused the opposite ODA performance of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan of similar projects organized by the same donor. According to the findings, the two projects achieved opposite results due to relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability criteria. Concerning the effectiveness criterion, the contrasting results were caused by the different local political power structures and expenditure assignment. Regarding the relevance and sustainability criterion, the contrasting ODA performance was mostly induced by the local political power structure. Therefore, the findings emphasize that the local governance system, especially the local political power structure is highly associated with the success of ODA performance.

Although this study includes a variety of resources, the major resources are based on an end-of-project evaluation paper published by KOICA. The project evaluation paper is a good resource in that it is analyzed in detail using OECD/DAC criteria, but their survey sample size is not large enough to obtain meaningful evaluation results. The report also pointed out that the analysis was difficult due to the lack of a database. Another limitation of this study concerns that the score rating standards were different at maximum points: four for Uzbekistan and five for Kyrgyzstan. Acknowledging these limitations, the project's performances and outcomes are obviously contradictory. Uzbekistan suspended the afforestation land project, while Kyrgyzstan expanded the Korean nursery system in seven areas.

With these research results, when ODA projects launch in recipient countries,

donors should consider the political local power structure at most, and additionally think over discretion of expenditure of the recipient. In regard to local power structure, however, in fact, the right to construct a local government system ultimately and entirely belongs to the recipient's sovereign. For this reason, there should be a more detailed analysis of the existing local governance system in recipient countries before implementing the ODA project. Regardless of the project's field, this analysis should be conducted during the pre-feasibility study. When policymakers launch new ODA projects and building policies, they should have differentiated strategies in mind to deal with different local governance systems before implementing the project.

# Appendix

## Appendix1. The Explanation of an Advanced Framework for Assessing Decentralized Local Governance

Components	Explanation
<b>Political Decentralization and Empowerment</b>	
Local political power structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head of executive was directly elected and selected by local council</li> <li>• Permitting council manager system (Motion of no confidence, oversight function etc.)</li> <li>• Independence of Judiciary Power from local administration and councils</li> <li>• Permitting and operating the system of local communities</li> </ul>
Structure and quality of local electoral systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elected the head of executive and local council directly and freely</li> <li>• Limitation of the head of executive's term</li> <li>• Conducted election process without manipulation</li> <li>• Excluding presidential power or dismiss local governor without the consent of local councils</li> </ul>
Nature of political party systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party system based on local-level</li> <li>• Allowing system of prioritizing local resident's interest to national political parties</li> <li>• Excluding one-ruling party system</li> <li>• Allowing inclusive and competitive local elections</li> </ul>
Local political participation and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing rights of local referenda</li> <li>• Allowing decision to public hearing to residents</li> <li>• Allowing the autonomy of operating Local communities, including village level.</li> <li>• Accessing to public information</li> </ul>
<b>Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment</b>	
Regulatory power and planning of local physical space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presiding regulatory power for supervising local physical space (land use planning etc.)</li> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of economic service (Construction and traffic control etc.)</li> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of social service</li> <li>• Discretion of revision or adopting regulation provision rights by law</li> </ul>
Local public finance and management(PFM) and procurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretionary authority of procurement contracts</li> <li>• Regulatory power of budget and taxation</li> <li>• Independent Monitoring system at the local level</li> <li>• Providing citizens to participation of budget monitoring</li> </ul>

Local human resource administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of employment payment level</li> <li>• Discretion of employment layoffs and appointment</li> <li>• Administering and managing employment</li> <li>• Discretion of employment's work for local residents</li> </ul>
Efficient and equitable local service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing administer and providing Public health and education</li> <li>• Allowing administer and providing social or environmental protection</li> <li>• Channels to collect citizen's satisfaction.</li> <li>• Feedback Channels for local residents to evaluate local government's policies</li> </ul>
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>	
Expenditure assignment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing budgetary provision for local public services by law.</li> <li>• Permitting to administrating own local sources</li> <li>• Capacity of utilizing intergovernmental transfers</li> <li>• Clear boundaries of the roles and responsibility among different local levels</li> </ul>
Revenue assignment and local revenue administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of collecting taxes and tax rates guaranteed by law</li> <li>• Discretion of creating local funds without intervention central government authorities</li> <li>• Constructing the majority of proportion of revenues from local taxes</li> <li>• Discretion of expenditure from local revenues</li> </ul>
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing of transfers within the inter-government by law</li> <li>• Fulfilled the amount of transfers to the local demands</li> <li>• Excluding ear-marked transfers</li> <li>• Discretion of usages of transfers to local purpose</li> </ul>
Subnational borrowing/debt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government by law</li> <li>• Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government in practice</li> <li>• Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal by law.</li> <li>• Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal in practice.</li> </ul>

*Source: Revised Table from Boex and Yilmaz (2010) by Seoran.*

## Appendix2. Level of Decentralized Local Governance in Uzbekistan

\*(4) Degree/Level - Highly Strong(4) / Strong(3) / Weak(2) / Highly Weak(1) / None (0)

Components	Explanation	Uzbekistan	Degree/Level
<b>Political decentralization and empowerment</b>			
Local political power structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Head of executive was directly elected and selected by local council</li> <li>Permitting council manager system (Motion of no confidence, oversight function etc.)</li> <li>Independence of Judiciary Power from local administration and councils</li> <li>Permitting and operating the system of local communities</li> </ul>	√	Highly Weak
Structure and quality of local electoral systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Elected the head of executive and local council directly and freely</li> <li>Limitation of the head of executive's term</li> <li>Conducted election process without manipulation</li> <li>Excluding presidential power or dismiss local governor without the consent of local councils</li> </ul>	√	Highly Weak
Nature of political party systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Party system based on local-level</li> <li>Allowing system of prioritizing local resident's interest to national political parties</li> <li>Excluding one-ruling party system</li> <li>Allowing inclusive and competitive local elections</li> </ul>		None
Local political participation and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allowing rights of local referenda</li> <li>Allowing decision to public hearing to residents</li> <li>Allowing the autonomy of operating Local communities, including village level.</li> <li>Accessing to public information</li> </ul>	√	Highly Weak
<b>Administrative decentralization and empowerment</b>			
Regulatory power and planning of local physical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Presiding regulatory power for supervising local physical space (land use planning etc.)</li> </ul>		Highly Weak



space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of economic service (Construction and traffic control etc.)</li> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of social service</li> <li>• Discretion of revision or adopting regulation provision rights by law</li> </ul>	✓	
Local Public Finance Management(PFM) and procurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretionary authority of procurement contracts</li> <li>• Regulatory power of budget and taxation</li> <li>• Independent Monitoring system at the local level</li> <li>• Providing citizens to participation of budget monitoring</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
Local human resource administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of employment payment level</li> <li>• Discretion of employment layoffs and appointment</li> <li>• Administering and managing employment</li> <li>• Discretion of employment's work for local residents</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
Efficient and equitable local service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing administer and providing Public health and education</li> <li>• Allowing administer and providing social or environmental protection</li> <li>• Channels to collect citizen's satisfaction.</li> <li>• Feedback Channels for local residents to evaluate local government's policies</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
<b>Fiscal decentralization and empowerment</b>			
Expenditure assignment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing budgetary provision for local public services by law.</li> <li>• Permitting to administrating own local sources</li> <li>• Capacity of utilizing intergovernmental transfers</li> <li>• Clear boundaries of the roles and responsibility among different local levels</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
Revenue assignment and Local revenue administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of collecting taxes and tax rates guaranteed by law</li> <li>• Discretion of creating local funds without intervention central government authorities</li> <li>• Constructing the majority of proportion of revenues</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>from local taxes</li> <li>• Discretion of expenditure from local revenues</li> </ul>		
Inter-governmental transfers	fiscal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing of transfers within the inter-government by law</li> <li>• Fulfilled the amount of transfers to the local demands</li> <li>• Excluding ear-marked transfers</li> <li>• Discretion of usages of transfers to local purpose</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
Subnational borrowing/debt		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government by law</li> <li>• Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government in practice</li> <li>• Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal by law.</li> <li>• Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal in practice.</li> </ul>		None

*Source: Table by Seoran.*

### Appendix3. Level of Decentralized Local Governance in Kyrgyzstan

\*(4) Degree/Level - Highly Strong(4) / Strong(3) / Weak(2) / Highly Weak(1) / None (0)

Components		Explanation		Kyrgyzstan	Degree/Level
Political decentralization and empowerment					
Local political power structure		• Head of executive was directly elected and selected by local council	✓	Strong	
		• Permitting council manager system (Motion of no confidence, oversight function etc.)	✓		
		• Independence of Judiciary Power from local administration and councils			
		• Permitting and operating the system of local communities	✓		
Structure and quality of local electoral systems		• Elected the head of executive and local council directly and freely	✓	Highly Strong	
		• Limitation of the head of executive’s term	✓		
		• Conducted election process without manipulation	✓		
		• Excluding presidential power or dismiss local governor without the consent of local councils	✓		
Nature of political party systems		• Party system based on local-level	✓	Highly Strong	
		• Allowing system of prioritizing local resident’s interest to national political parties	✓		
		• Excluding one-ruling party system	✓		
		• Allowing inclusive and competitive local elections	✓		
Local political participation and accountability		• Allowing rights of local referenda	✓	Highly Strong	
		• Allowing decision to public hearing to residents	✓		
		• Allowing the autonomy of operating Local communities, including village level.	✓		
		• Accessing to public information	✓		
Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment					
Regulatory power and planning of local physical		• Presiding regulatory power for supervising local physical space (land use planning etc.)	✓	Highly Strong	

space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of economic service (Construction and traffic control etc.)</li> <li>• Presiding regulatory power of social service</li> <li>• Discretion of revision or adopting regulation provision rights by law</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div> <div>✓</div> <div>✓</div>	
Local Public Finance Management(PFM) and procurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretionary authority of procurement contracts</li> <li>• Regulatory power of budget and taxation</li> <li>• Independent Monitoring system at the local level</li> <li>• Providing citizens to participation of budget monitoring</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div> <div>✓</div> <div>✓</div> <div>✓</div>	Highly Strong
Local human resource administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of employment payment level</li> <li>• Discretion of employment layoffs and appointment</li> <li>• Administering and managing employment</li> <li>• Discretion of employment's work for local residents</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div> <div>✓</div>	Weak
Efficient and equitable local service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing administer and providing Public health and education</li> <li>• Allowing administer and providing social or environmental protection</li> <li>• Channels to collect citizen's satisfaction.</li> <li>• Feedback channels for local residents to evaluate local government's policies</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div> <div>✓</div>	Weak
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>			
Expenditure assignment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allowing budgetary provision for local public services by law.</li> <li>• Permitting to administrating own local sources</li> <li>• Capacity of utilizing intergovernmental transfers</li> <li>• Clear boundaries of the roles and responsibility among different local levels</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div> <div>✓</div> <div>✓</div>	Strong
Revenue assignment and Local revenue administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discretion of collecting taxes and tax rates guaranteed by law</li> <li>• Discretion of creating local funds without intervention central government authorities</li> </ul>	<div>✓</div>	Highly Weak

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Constructing the majority of proportion of revenues from local taxes</li> <li>Discretion of expenditure from local revenues</li> </ul>		
Inter-governmental transfers	fiscal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allowing of transfers within the inter-government by law</li> <li>Fulfilled the amount of transfers to the local demands</li> <li>Excluding ear-marked transfers</li> <li>Discretion of usages of transfers to local purpose</li> </ul>	✓	Highly Weak
Subnational borrowing/debt		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government by law</li> <li>Discretion of borrowing/Debt from central government in practice</li> <li>Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal by law.</li> <li>Access to borrowing from financial markets and municipal in practice.</li> </ul>	✓   ✓	Weak

*Source: Table by Seoran.*

**Appendix 4.** Summary of Local Governance Level between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

Framework	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan
<b>Political Decentralization and Empowerment</b>		
Local political power structure	Highly Weak	Strong
Structure and quality of local electoral systems	Highly Weak	Highly Strong
Nature of political party systems	None	Highly Strong
Local political participation and accountability	Highly Weak	Highly Strong
<b>Administrative Decentralization and Empowerment</b>		
Regulatory power and planning of local physical space	Highly Weak	Highly Strong
Local PFM and procurement	Highly Weak	Highly Strong
Local human resource administration	Highly Weak	Weak
Efficient and equitable local service delivery	Highly Weak	Weak
<b>Fiscal Decentralization and Empowerment</b>		
Expenditure assignment	Highly Weak	Strong
Revenue assignment and local revenue administration	Highly Weak	Highly Weak
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers	Highly Weak	Highly Weak
Subnational borrowing/debt	None	Weak

*Source: Table by Seoran.*

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## Abstract in Korean

# 지역 거버넌스와 ODA사업 성과: KOICA의 우즈베키스탄 및 키르기스스탄의 ‘산림 및 조림 사업’을 중심으로

서울대학교

국제대학원 국제협력 전공

음서란

본 연구는 지역 거버넌스와 공적개발원조(ODA)사업 성과의 상관관계를 연구하기 위해, 코이카의 ‘산림 및 조림 사업’ 프로젝트를 진행한 우즈베키스탄과 키르기스스탄 중심으로 해당 결과를 분석하였다. 개도국의 ‘굿 거버넌스’는 오래전부터 원조 프로젝트의 성과를 담보하는 주요 요소로 지적되어 왔으며, 이 중 지역 거버넌스의 자율성과 역량강화 정도에 따라 ODA사업의 성과가 얼마나 높을 수 있는지가 지적되었다. 이에 공여국이 유사한 프로젝트를 다른 국가에서 시행했을 때, 다른 지역 거버넌스가 ODA사업의 최종 성과에 어떻게 영향을 주었는지 연구해보고자 한다.

이를 위해, 본 연구는 지역 거버넌스의 분석 틀로서 Boex와 Yilmaz (2010)가 제안한 지역 거버넌스 분권화 모델을 이용하였으며, 해당

모델은 크게 정치적, 행정적, 재정적 분권화 및 권한부여로 3가지 차원에서 분석하였다. 또한, 키르기즈스탄과 우즈베키스탄에서 진행된 ‘산림 및 조림 사업’은 KOICA의 평가 기준으로 차용하고 있는 OECD/DAC 기준을 사용하였다. 이에 적절성, 효율성, 효과성, 영향력, 지속가능성을 중심으로 지역 거버넌스의 어떤 요소가 영향을 미쳤는지 연구하였다.

연구 결과에 따라, 해당 사업에서 두 국가간의 성과가 확연히 대조된 OECD 기준은 ‘적절성, 효율성, 지속가능성’ 이었다. 해당 기준에서 두 국가의 ODA사업의 성과평가 차이는 지역 거버넌스의 정치적 분권화와 권한부여 차원인 것으로 나타났다. 더 구체적으로는 지역의 정치권한 구조가 ODA 사업 성과에 영향을 미쳤다.

이러한 연구 결과들을 통해, 본 연구는 지역의 정치권한 구조가 ODA 사업에 영향력을 미친다는 점을 여실히 뒷받침하고 있다. 그러나 실제로 공여국이 수원국의 주권에 해당하는 지역 거버넌스의 형태를 강요할 수 없다는 현실적인 한계가 있다. 이에 따라서, 공여국은 ODA 사업 타당성 조사나, 사업 실행 이전에 수원국의 지역 거버넌스의 정치적 구조에 따른 잠재적인 위협을 분석해야 할 것이다. 수원국의 지역 거버넌스에 따른 접근법을 달리하였을 때, 공여국은 ODA 사업의 높은 성과를 얻을 수 있을 것이다.

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**주요어:** 굿 로컬(지역) 거버넌스, 지역 거버넌스, 분권화 및 권한부여, ODA사업, ODA 성과, KOICA, 산림 및 조림 사업, 우즈베키스탄, 키르기즈스탄  
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