

North Korea's Foreign Policy Behaviors toward the United States: Constructive Entanglements in Historical Factors Since the 1970s

Seongryeol Kim

A commonplace assumption among scholars in the North Korean studies was that North Korea is “evil” or a country threatening the international community. Instead, this research argues that North Korea's aggressive approaches with nuclear weapons to the United States were not originally intended in the 1970s. Unlike the conventional wisdom of U.S.-North Korea relations, this research analyzes the origin of North Korea's rapprochement toward the United States, and it became the aggressive approach through constructive entanglements in historical factors in the Northeast Asia region. It demonstrates that the U.S.'s indifference to the acute security anxieties caused by exogenous factors associated with the end of the Cold War led to North Korea's adoption of an asymmetrical deterrence posture in its foreign policy toward the United States. It also suggests that bilateral and multilateral dialogues are needed to resolve and normalize the relations between the United States and North Korea.

Keywords North Korea and the United States relations, constructive entanglements, mismatch interests and practices, bilateral and multilateral dialogues.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear issues have been an unsolved problem for 30 years between the United States and North Korea. Both countries have been trying to reach an agreement on the solution to the problem. However, deals that were made by the two countries in the last three decades have either failed or been inactivated. After the 1994 Agreed Framework was abrogated in 2002, the development of North Korea's nuclear program advanced from producing plutonium to enriching uranium, which is a second - potentially easier - route to the manufacture of atomic weapons (Federation of American Scientists, 2021). Having nuclear weapons for the North Korean government is a means of guaranteeing its national security, regime survival, and economic development. Even though the United States and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have imposed economic

Seongryeol Kim is Visiting Scholar at the National Institute for Unification Education and the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University.

Article Received: 15-11-2022 Revised: 15-12-2023 Accepted: 04-05-2023

© 2023 Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University ISSN 1226-8550 Print/ ISSN 2765-1800 Online

sanctions on North Korea, the country continues to promote its nuclear capabilities by undertaking aggressive military actions, including nuclear and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests.

The U.S. government perceives North Korea's aggressive actions as threats to its mainland as well as to the international community, including its alliance partners in East Asia. Military countermeasures take place whenever either side undertakes military operations, and tensions increasingly have become escalated in the region. In 2017, both countries reached an apex of tensions that raised the specter of war. For instance, on September 3, North Korea conducted its sixth underground nuclear test. Reported to be a hydrogen bomb, it was much stronger than previous tests (Lee, 2017). Furthermore, in the same year, North Korea fired 23 missiles. The last missile, which was fired in November, reached higher and farther than any previous missiles.

The United States and South Korea responded immediately to these aggressive actions, albeit with different strategies. The Trump administration considered carrying out a 'bloody nose strategy' focused on destroying long-range missiles and nuclear weapons facilities. This strategy was to be deployed only if economic sanctions failed. Meanwhile, the South Korean government was considering a 'decapitation strategy' aimed at 'taking out' the current North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. This strategy had been in place since the beginning of Park Geun-hye's administration. The continuation of this pattern of aggressive nuclear and missile testing by North Korea followed by countermeasures taken by the U.S. and South Korea raised global fears about the potential outbreak of a second Korean War.

In the North Korean studies field, some scholars analyzed the scale of the damages that would ensue or compared military capabilities if a second nuclear strike would be needed. A commonplace assumption among these analysts was that North Korea is "evil" or a country threatening the international community. Scholars of North Korea also contributed to the general tendency to demonize the leaders of North Korea and its presumptively war-prone military elites (Cochran and McKinzie, 2005).

Then, this research asks one fundamental question: what historical factors show where the two countries constructively entangled, and from those points, how the trust-building has been failed between Pyongyang and Washington? Based on this question, the research argues that North Korea's aggressive approaches with nuclear weapons to the United States were not originally intended in the 1970s. Unlike the conventional wisdom of U.S.-North Korea relations, which only focuses on North Korea's intentions of developing nuclear weapons and violating the NPT regime and destabilizing the regional security in the Asia-Pacific region, this research analyzes the origin of North Korea's rapprochement toward the United States, and later on, it became the aggressive approach through constructive entanglements in historical factors in the northeast region. This is also a historical analysis that traces historical factors, including international environment changes, which presumably highly influenced North Korea's foreign policy changes toward the United States. This study's hypothesis is the failure of diplomatic approaches with the White House and Congress during the Cold War led the country to start to have an aggressive way to reach negotiations with the United States in the era of the Post-Cold War. This research explores North Korea's diplomatic efforts to reach negotiations with the United States by investigating historical factors since the

1970s.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Threat to the NPT Regime and Regional Security

By the beginning of the 1990s, the United States had already demonstrated its leadership in building a democratic world (Christopher, 1995, p. 8). The major challenges that the United States faced in this effort were the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of arms control agreements. Warren Christopher, a former U.S. secretary of state, emphasized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction following the dissolution of the Soviet Union would pose the most pressing threat to the security of the United States and its allies (Christopher, 1995, p. 22). Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, by the mid-1990s, the U.S. had achieved the goal of stabilizing the NPT regime by eliminating the Soviet-era nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The CTR program made provisions for U.S. scientists and engineers to work with their counterparts in these three countries to arrange for the decommissioning and removal of nuclear warheads and related facilities (Hecker, 2021, p. 14). Nevertheless, the U.S. government remained concerned about the viability of the NPT regime due to advances in technology and the diffusion of expertise that has put nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems within reach of a growing number of nations, including North Korea. Based on intelligence findings of nuclear weapons-related activities, the U.S. government assessed North Korea to have the potential to ignite a destabilizing nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia and thereby to undermine global proliferation controls.

Given these assumptions about underlying 'real' intentions, the issue of how to interpret North Korea's foreign policy behavior – and negotiating techniques, in particular – is a major concern for proponents of the alternative explanations. Scott Snyder (2000) made an influential contribution to the conceptualization of this issue by proposing what many Americans found to be a persuasive cultural interpretation of North Korean negotiating behavior. This interpretation introduced 'brinkmanship' and 'crisis diplomacy' as terms of art to characterize North Korea's efforts to set the stage for negotiations with the United States by threatening to withdraw from the NPT regime and refusing inspections by the IAEA. According to Snyder, brinkmanship as practiced by North Korea entails deploying such tactics as making unconditional demands, blustering, bluffing, threatening, and even walking out of negotiations. In his view, these 'unorthodox' negotiating stratagems are deployed by North Korea explicitly to induce a sense of crisis as a means of gaining its objectives illegitimately by forcing changes in the counterpart's behavior (Snyder, 2000, p. 69). Subsequently, the characterization of North Korean negotiating behavior by reference to these terms became a canonical usage among leading experts in foreign affairs. As 'just so' cultural interpretations, however, Snyder's descriptions of North Korea's diplomatic 'bag of tricks' do not render a definitive conclusion about underlying intent. What they do convey is a conviction that North Koreans are not forthright, reliable negotiators.

According to North Korean sources, the reliance on brinkmanship involving the threat of developing a nuclear weapons program was intended solely as a stratagem to deter “the United States’ strategy of eliminating the regime”(Kim Bong-ho, 2004, pp. 148-158). Behind the scenes, the leadership in Pyongyang calculated each step of the negotiating process and assessed the costs and benefits of conducting crisis diplomacy for the security of their regime. In short, the negotiating behavior was intentionally managed by the leadership in Pyongyang to defend the regime. This approach to negotiations was modeled on the guerrilla tactics Kim Il Sung deployed in Manchuria in fighting the Japanese colonial forces. In the mid-1990s, negotiations also were guided by the military-first policy’s objective of enhancing domestic solidarity – the unity of the public, the military, and the party – to overcome the looming economic and political crisis (Chun, 2009). In this regard, the threat of developing a nuclear weapons program as a brinkmanship tactic in its diplomacy served North Korea well in deterring external threats, securing the regime, and minimizing public complaints. Given its consistency with Kim Jong Il’s military-first policy, however, suspicions were raised about North Korea’s diplomatic behavior. Was it really just bluffing as an expression of what some observers term the ‘tyranny of the weak’ or was it a cover for the development of nuclear weapons to ensure the regime’s survival and autonomy, and eventually to transform North Korea into a strong and prosperous country. Just as Japan had sought to develop nuclear weapons during WWII, and South Korea had attempted the same in the mid-1970s, it seemed likely that North Korea’s definition of a “strong and prosperous country” would include the possession of nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 196-197).

From the perspective of U.S. negotiators, then, brinkmanship behavior was little more than a means of covering up bad faith in the negotiating process. Bruce Klingner, a former CIA analyst, gives his take on this issue by describing North Korea’s approach to negotiations as “deny, deceive, and delay” (Klingner, 2012). Like many of his colleagues in the U.S. national security establishment, Klingner believes North Koreans participate in negotiations solely to gain concessions. According to this interpretation, the goal of negotiations for North Korea is not to reach agreements, but merely to gain time to pursue their nefarious objectives and to deflect attention away from these objectives. Hence, in a play on President Reagan’s famous dictum about dealing with the Soviet Union, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s stance toward dealing with China – “distrust and verify” – effectively always has been applied to North Korea’s foreign policy behavior as well.

North Korea as a Nuclear Weapons State

While it was far-fetched to assert that North Korea already possessed nuclear weapons at the beginning of the 1990s(Albrecht, 2003), nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems have been developed since the collapse of the Agreed Framework in late 2002. It is hypocritical to single out North Korea as a violator of the NPT when there are three other known violators who are excused from opprobrium. Nonetheless, North Korea’s claim in November 2019 that it has become a full-fledged nuclear state casts a retrospective shadow on all previous and potentially even future denuclearization

negotiations. For some, it even calls into question whether North Korea ever sincerely sought détente with the U.S. As has been argued previously, however, there were rational grounds for North Korea to seek detente with the U.S. in connections with the geopolitical shift caused by the U.S.-China détente in the early 1970s and the same argument applies to the early 1990s given the momentous changes that transpired in North Korea's national security environment.

Reading intentions backwards from the post-2002 context in which North Korea developed a nuclear deterrence is not the interpretation advanced in this research project, but it is an accepted position – at a minimum, from a worst-case scenario perspective – among those who offer alternative interpretations. Which interpretation is more defensible based on the empirical evidence of the actual track record of negotiations since the first high-level U.S.-North Korea meeting in 1991? This question is roundly disputed. The answer depends on discerning North Korea's long-range strategic intentions and on an assessment of how those intentions might be modified through 'diplomatic entanglement'. From the perspective of the alternative explanations of North Korea's foreign policy behavior, however, diplomacy to advance peace and denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is a fool's errand. In this view, North Korea's sole intention is to coerce the U.S. into recognizing its nuclear status and to stop obstructing its plans to reunify the Korean peninsula by military means. Hence diplomatic inducements such as an end of war declaration or a lifting of economic sanctions are ultimately pointless since these measures merely play into the hands of a bad faith actor like North Korea. This has become a politically charged debate in late 2021, as South Korea prepares to inaugurate a new presidential administration in March 2022.

The hawk engagement approach (Cha, 2002) that has governed U.S. policy toward North Korea since the George W. Bush administration emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the Agreed Framework. This approach is focused on building a 'coalition for punishment' as exemplified by the maximum pressure sanctions regime. It draws on lessons learned from what many U.S. analysts view as the farcical diplomacy of 'peace and denuclearization' promoted by progressive administrations in South Korea. The primary lesson learned is that it results only in providing North Korea with opportunities for extortion. The concept of negotiating in good faith with North Korea, in this view, is the very definition of insanity. It is a losing game that ends up benefiting only North Korea. What sealed this interpretation for many was the evidence uncovered in the early summer of 2002 of North Korea's clandestine experimentation with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) technologies that violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agreed Framework. This was viewed as a retrospective confirmation that the Clinton administration had made a serious strategic miscalculation in 1994 by effectively rewarding North Korea for its refusal to comply with international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Today, there are far more compelling reasons to be skeptical about the potential for a successful denuclearization of North Korea. It now has a sizeable nuclear arsenal composed not only of atomic bombs fueled by plutonium or highly enriched uranium but likely also hydrogen bombs at least ten times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki(Hecker, Serbin, and Carlin, 2018). North Korea's

nuclear capabilities can serve for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. Also, the current North Korean regime has described its ‘national nuclear forces’ as a powerful and reliable war deterrent. Howell (2020) has called it “Nuclear Ideology,” which is embedded in North Korea’s national ideology of Juche. Juche could serve as a rationale for the regime to legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons in terms of its domestic audience (Howell, 2020, p. 1055). Once North Korea has reinforced the regime’s domestic legitimacy by the development of nuclear deterrence, it can catalyze this domestic legitimation to justify its right to existence and invoke international sovereignty norms by framing its WMD development as a legitimate means of deterring external threats to its national security (Howell, 2020, p. 1056).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Scholars in the field of North Korea Studies analyze North Korea’s foreign policy behavior generally assume that by the early 1990s – if not earlier – efforts were well underway in North Korea to realize its presumptive, long-term goal of becoming a nuclear-weapons-possessing state. In seeking to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program, North Korea was seen as posing a direct challenge to the U.S.’s role as the ultimate guarantor of the NPT regime. There is a further assumption underlying these explanations that North Korea is hell-bent on launching a second brutal assault on South Korea – in line with the ethos of its military-first policy – to realize its longstanding goal of the reunification of the Korean peninsula by force should the opportunity be afforded. These three intertwined components of the most prevalent alternative explanations of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior account for the branding of North Korea as a rogue state that poses a dire and imminent threat to South Korea, undermines security in the Indo-Pacific region, and ultimately plays a destabilizing role in the international community writ large.

Accordingly, beginning in the immediate post-Cold War era and continuing up to the present, national security analysts, pundits, and mainstream media outlets in the United States consistently have depicted North Korea as posing a unique existential threat to the U.S. national interest both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. Legitimate concerns about North Korea’s violations of human rights have provided further grist for the mill. As a result, for the U.S. and its allies, North Korea has become thoroughly stigmatized as a uniquely malignant force that exacerbates regional conflicts and undermines world peace. As the sole superpower in the unipolar system that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States inevitably has played the leading role in the efforts to constrain North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. The rise of China and Russia’s resurgence of influence in recent years have imposed limits on the U.S.’s capacity to play this role, but the perception of North Korea in the U.S. – as well as in South Korea and elsewhere in the West to a lesser extent – is still largely refracted through this residual post-Cold War prism.

North Korea's Foreign Policies of Indeterminacy and Entanglement

In a recent article on 'principled negotiation' as explained by Roger Fisher and William Ury (2014) in their influential book, *Getting to Yes*, John Delury (2021) asks if it is even possible in the context of U.S.-North Korea relations. Clearly, there are two competing schools of interpretation of North Korea's foreign policy behavior. In an intriguing formulation of this hermeneutical challenge, Delury improbably draws on the language of literary theory. For the purposes of this study, he characterized the alternative explanations of North Korea's foreign policy behavior as the 'comedic school' while the interpretation offered in this research project is described as the 'tragic school'. The question is whether the tragicomedy of U.S.-North Korea relations can be transcended in a way that would make principled negotiation feasible. This question ultimately is beyond the scope of this research project, but Delury suggests two principles of interpretation that help to contextualize it: namely indeterminacy and entanglement.

In presenting an empathetic perspective on North Korea's foreign policy behavior, this project has attempted to raise doubts about the predetermined outcome of diplomatic efforts to transform U.S.-North Korea relations from hostility to amity. Of course, ardent advocates of engagement can be as unduly certain of their interpretations as are the skeptics of engagement. The point of engaging in empathy is to legitimate a degree of ambiguity about political motivations, desired end states, and all those factors that make it difficult to achieve principled negotiation. To draw on the insights of Fisher and Ury, as outlined by Delury, the objective is to separate the problem from people, identify mutual gains, invent new options, and stick to objective criteria. Obviously, the achievement of this objective requires taking an empathetic perspective as well toward those who advocate alternative explanations of North Korea's foreign policy behavior. The oft-quoted dictum that North Korea is one of the U.S. most long-running failures of the U.S. intelligence agencies underscores the need to respect the principle of indeterminacy.

The second principle of entanglement also ultimately relates to the practice of empathy in analyzing human behavior and its situational imperatives. Empathy is like the scant cup of water that usually is sufficient to prime the pump that gives access to the wellspring of human motivations. Without investing a requisite minimum amount of trust in an unfolding relationship, however, it is impossible to plumb the intentions underlying human behavior even assuming that the trust may be judged unwarranted after a verification process.

In this context, the cultural interpretations of negotiating behavior can obfuscate as much as they reveal about the intersubjectivity of intrinsically hostile negotiating partners. Snyder (pp. 66-67) cites *kibun* (기분) or 'good feeling', *kojip* (고집) or 'stubbornness', and *punūigi* (분위기) or 'atmosphere' to characterize the negotiating style of North Koreans. Arguably, the use of this terminology tends to define North Koreans as 'the Other' which undercuts the need to foster intersubjectivity in pursuit of a mutual accommodation through negotiations. After all, there is nothing uniquely *Korean* about these characteristics, but they may be made to seem so by strategic use of Korean terms. In a fundamental sense, entanglement highlights the critical need to bracket hostile sentiments in the pursuit of principled negotiation. Ironically, there is a Korean term

that can be usefully cited in this context. This term is *nunch'i* (눈치), which lacks a direct English equivalent since it typically doesn't have a behavioral equivalent either. Literally, *nunch'i* means to 'read eyes' to know how to act in each situation, especially how to treat other people appropriately based on your relationships and relative positions. It has been characterized as the 'social grease' that keeps social interaction running smoothly. There's a faint echo of it in the English term 'tact' but it functions on steroids in the Korean context. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to conceal underlying sentiments from Korean counterparts as their *nunch'i* antennae are picking up signals constantly.

Grabbling with the realist challenges underscored by the principle of indeterminacy and the constructivist opportunities afforded by the principle of entanglement is a potential way out of the stalemate between the comedic and tragic interpretations of North Korean diplomatic behavior. Discerning North Korea's long-range strategic intentions in a clear-eyed way is surely a legitimate realist imperative but making a constructivist assessment of how those intentions might be modified through 'diplomatic entanglement' is equally imperative if the goal is to realize peace between the U.S. and North Korea.

To define constructive entanglements, I adopted the situational model from Hudson's article(1989). According to Hudson, Hermann, and Eric, a state's foreign policy behavior is a way of influencing other entities as well as a way of communicating with others. "As a form of communication foreign policy behavior can be divided into the attributes of any communicative act - who, does what, to whom, and how" (p. 124). In the model, the actor (i.e., the 'who') is the entity defining the problem. The attributes




Figure 1. The situational model seeks to explain what the actor's behavior will be in response to a problem using information on the actor's relationship to the other entities occupying roles in a type of situation defined by the problem (See Hudson's article page 121).

of communication can be explained by four behavior properties as follows: 1) *recipient* designates the entity the actor addresses (i.e., 'to whom'); 2) *affect* is the actor's manifest feelings of approval or disapproval (i.e., 'does or expresses what'); 3) *commitment* indicates the actor's resolve to seek a solution to a problem; and 4) *instruments* consist of the skills and resources of statecraft that the actor deploys to solve a problem (i.e., 'how') (Kim, 2022, p. 102).

The model explained above can be used to analyze North Korea's foreign policy toward the United States. In this case, the actor is North Korea, and the source of the foreign policy problem is the United States. The subject is North Korea and its people. The facilitator may be either South Korea or China, but it is uncertain how deeply South Korea is engaged in the relationship between the actor and the source of the problem. There is no potential facilitator involved in this problem.

MISMATCH OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES IN U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

Miscalculation of the Nixon Doctrine in the 1970s

The core foreign policy problem North Korea has grappled with from its inception is the struggle to overcome the opposition of the U.S. and other Great Powers to the political self-determination, unity, and development of the Korean nation. This is a problem North Korea shares with other post-colonial countries that gained their independence in the mid-20th century. The division the U.S. imposed on the Korean nation in tandem with its 'liberation' from colonial rule in 1945, however, added a relatively unique dimension. The anachronistic Cold War origins of the unresolved division of the Korean nation is another unique dimension.

This is a challenging project since the ups and downs in the efforts to normalize U.S.-North Korea relations over the last half-century metaphorically might be characterized as 'diplomatic bipolar disorder'. Taking a cue from First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju use of a literary metaphor to characterize the nuclear negotiations in 1994, North Korea can be said to have maintained a Baroque-like *basso continuo* in its foreign policy behavior since the 1970s, as evidenced by its dogged commitment to the normalization of its bilateral relations with the U.S. ("the caravan moves on"), despite those who constantly were working against this outcome ('barking dogs'). By contrast, the U.S. marches to a different drummer with a penchant for a Jazz-like staccato and syncopation as each incoming presidential administration strikes a new chord in its North Korea policy. The result has been a very nonlinear diplomatic process in which time often seems to run backward in violation of the laws of physics. 'Back to the Future' generally has been the guiding principle for each incoming U.S. administration's North Korea policy review.¹

¹ In a presentation on the topic "Is There a Diplomatic Way Forward with North Korea?" April 22, 2021, Bob Carlin – who participated in most of the North Korea-related policy reviews conducted during his 30-odd-year career working as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government – quipped

Ironically, however, the positive potential of this fundamental mismatch of diplomatic practices cannot be exaggerated. While it causes a repetitive pattern of 'highs' and 'lows', the mismatch also points to a way forward if its symptoms are managed properly. Namely, North Korea's seemingly single-minded focus on its bilateral relationship with the U.S. is a powerful indicator of the feasibility of achieving a diplomatic resolution of the endemic conflict on the Korean peninsula. We can even sketch the general outlines of that resolution based on an analysis of the 'bipolar symptoms' highlighted in this research project.

First, North Korea got off on the wrong foot with the U.S. in the early 1970s by demanding the complete withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea, without first making a realpolitik calculation of its feasibility in terms of the existing geopolitical environment. This misstep was based on an erroneous assumption that the Nixon Doctrine amounted to a total retreat by the U.S. from the Cold War policies embodied in the Truman Doctrine (Kim Eun Seo, 2017). While the Nixon Doctrine did represent a shift from an ideological to a transactional stance toward relations with China and the Soviet Union, its primary objective was to preclude U.S. involvement in future Vietnam-type quagmires by not putting boots on the ground in far-off lands in the first place. In this respect, it did not signal a new policy in terms of fundamental geopolitical objectives, as Nixon explained to a critic who feared it would lead to a total American withdrawal from Asia:

[T]he Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for getting America out [of] Asia, but one that provided the only sound basis for America's staying in and continuing to play a responsible role in helping the non-Communist nations and neutrals as well as our Asian allies to defend their independence (Gannon, 2008).

Clearly, given this interpretation of the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine, North Korea was not positioned to become one of its beneficiaries. As deterrence on the Korean peninsula was judged by the U.S. to be stable, which is still largely the case today, the U.S. troop deployment in South Korea has not posed the risk of developing into a quagmire-like outcome as was the case in Vietnam.

Still, the possibility of forcing a troop withdrawal from South Korea remained a live issue at least until the final phase of the Carter presidency in the late 1970s. There were reasonable grounds for envisioning a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea as a possible outcome. For one thing, the U.S. seemed certain to make good on its commitment to withdraw its troops from Taiwan. Moreover, Kissinger had suggested in his conversation with Zhou that all U.S. troops would be pulled out of South Korea as well as Taiwan before the end of Nixon's second term. Also, Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea – albeit for different, mainly moral reasons – became widely known as early as May 1975. True to his moral convictions, Carter picked up the baton to orchestrate the implementation of this commitment shortly after entering the White House in 1977 (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 68-86). In the end,

that the only memorable review that immediately comes to mind was the one former secretary of defense William J. Perry conducted as part of the Perry Process in 1998.

though, the universal opposition of the U.S. national security establishment frustrated Carter's efforts. Nearly all South Koreans also opposed the troop withdrawal, thanks at least in part to Park Chong-hee's manipulative use of the 'North Korea card'. Carter's failure to achieve his goal reflected the near impossibility of overcoming the strategic logic of the U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula in that era. From the national security establishment's perspective, the Cold War was still on, and "South Korea was still a frontline state against a terrifying, more-Stalinist-than-Stalin totalitarianism" (Kelly, 2019).

A second erroneous assumption was the failure of the North Korean leadership to appreciate how much public sentiment in South Korea had become aligned with the U.S.'s Cold War logic. The broad-gauged pushback in South Korea against Carter's proposed withdrawal of U.S. troops clearly was exploited – if not engineered – by the Park Chung-hee regime specifically to justify its imposition of the repressive Yushin constitution, as Kim Dae-jung had suggested during his visit to the U.S. State Department in February 1972. All the same, Park was able to play the 'North Korea card' successfully at critical junctures during his regime's eighteen-year tenure by fanning the security anxieties felt by most South Koreans at the time. Even those who opposed the regime generally bought into this politically motivated fearmongering over the threat of a potential second North Korean invasion.

A Period of Fundamental Recalibrations

The decade of the 1980s was a period of fundamental recalibrations for North Korea, politically, economically, and even ideologically. First, North Korea carried out two terrorist incidents in the 1980s that were related directly or indirectly to its competition with South Korea for national legitimacy. Second, Kim Il Sung made two official visits to Moscow – in May 1984 and October 1986 – both to seek military and economic assistance and to conduct a firsthand assessment of the likely future political course of the Soviet Union. Third, the Sino-Soviet split was exploited to get Beijing to play a more active role in North Korea's outreach efforts toward the U.S. Fourth, beginning in the early 1980s, North Korea undertook its most important diplomatic initiatives toward both the U.S. and South Korea in over a decade.

The first terrorist incident was the unsuccessful attempt in October 1983 to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar). This incident was focused on the domestic dimension of the competition for national legitimacy. Its goal was to facilitate peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula by releasing the 'revolutionary impetus' in South Korea from the constraints of the Park/Chun military dictatorship. This 'release' would fulfill one of the two preconditions for national reunification immediately and lay the groundwork for the eventual achievement of the other precondition, which was the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. The second incident was the bombing of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in October 1987, which was discussed above (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 220-221). This incident also was focused primarily on the competition for national legitimacy (Wingfield, 2013). The specific objective was to block South Korea from enhancing its international standing as the sole host of the 1988 Olympic Games. When its act of

desperation failed to block or downgrade South Korea's 'coming out party', North Korea tried to one-up South Korea the following year by pouring \$4 billion into hosting the 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students (Waxman, 2018).

Both terrorist incidents utterly failed to achieve their stated goals. Moreover, as is often the case, history was a stern teacher. All that North Korea garnered from these desperate acts was a degraded international standing – the U.S. added North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism after the 1987 incident – and a powerful refutation of its misguided, idealist belief in the prospects for achieving national reunification by harnessing a real but only marginal revolutionary spirit in South Korea. If anything, the incidents undercut the credibility of North Korea's peace proposal in South Korea. North Korea's deeds seemed to contradict its words, even among those struggling against the Chun regime's repression. The North Korean leadership appears to have gotten the message, however, as these were the final acts of terrorism aimed at realizing an imaginary nationalist dream carried out by North Korea.

By contrast, Kim Il Sung's trips to Moscow were successful in rehabilitating North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union after two decades of cool ties. As the visit in 1984 occurred prior to the advent of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the atmospherics were congenial and Kim Il Sung was able to obtain major commitments of economic and military assistance. As an added benefit, given the Sino-Soviet split, seeing Kim Il Sung making headway with the Soviet Union led Beijing to make greater efforts to enhance its own relations with Pyongyang. The commitments made in 1984 were reaffirmed during the 1986 visit to Moscow. While Gorbachev already had reservations about Kim's unique ideology and personality cult, he had been in power for only a year and a half by that time, and his liberalizing reforms had not fully kicked in yet. "As a result of Kim Il Sung's diplomacy and the intensification of the Cold War in the early years of the Reagan presidency, cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang flourished in many fields in the mid-1980s" (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, p. 125).

In this same timeframe, U.S.-China relations were improving rapidly following a visit to Beijing by President Ronald Reagan in April 1984. This gave the Chinese leverage with the U.S. that they used to lend strong support to North Korea's three-way talks proposal, which was an unprecedented call for talks exclusively between the U.S. and the two Koreas. Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Communist party, also urged Reagan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Only three days after Reagan's visit, Hu arrived in Pyongyang for an eight-day official visit. North Korea mustered a massive crowd of two million people to give Hu "the greatest welcome in Korean history" (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, p. 121). This was a dramatic example of North Korea's default balancing act between Beijing and Moscow in the decades prior to the 1990s. Of course, due primarily to the constraints the U.S.'s maximum pressure policy has imposed on North Korea's other relationships, the salience of China in North Korea's foreign policy has increased exponentially over the last decade or so.

In any case, long before the maximum pressure policy became a dominating factor in its web of relationships, North Korea had begun to court both the U.S. and South Korea on its own initiative. Pyongyang asked Beijing to pass its message to Washington affirming its willingness to participate in three-way talks (i.e., Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington). This was the first time Pyongyang had ever proposed to accept Seoul – its

competitor for national legitimacy – as a full-fledged partner in a dialogue with the U.S. Subsequently, the formula of three-way talks became the basic format for North Korea's diplomacy on issues related to peacemaking on the Korean peninsula for the rest of the decade and even into the early 1990s. Once again, by using the Beijing channel, North Korea was trying to link its diplomatic efforts to the budding relationship between China and the U.S. since the *détente* in 1971. Inexplicably, the Rangoon bombing occurred just one day after Beijing had conveyed this conciliatory message to the U.S. at Pyongyang's behest.

Ultimately, even though the results were mixed at best, a series of thirty-four dialogues were conducted between American and North Korean diplomats between late December 1988 and September 1993. As a result, North Korea achieved its long-sought goal of opening a mutually authorized, direct channel for conducting diplomatic business with the U.S. This outcome would not be possible, however, if North Korea and South Korea simultaneously had not begun engaging in intensive bilateral dialogues under the *Nordpolitik* policy. In short, the outcome of these two parallel, bilateral diplomatic dialogues hinged on a carefully coordinated initiative between South Korea and the U.S. More tellingly, as was the case in 2018 as well, Seoul took the lead and Washington followed. While the U.S. had divided Korea on its own initiative in 1945, in the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, North Korea and South Korea agreed formally to assert the right to determine the future of the Korean peninsula on their own. They also have reaffirmed this right of political self-determination in all their subsequent bilateral agreements. Once the denuclearization issue began to dominate the dialogue on the future of the Korean peninsula, however, satisfying this requirement of recognizing the primacy of their right to self-determination became more challenging.

Bilateral Disfunction of The Agreed Framework in 1994

The developments surrounding the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994, its troubled implementation over the ensuing eight years, and its eventual collapse in 2002 provide a case study of the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of diplomatic balancing act. In the first instance, it was a bilateral deal between the U.S. and North Korea. This was problematic in terms of domestic politics for both the U.S. and South Korea. In actuality, of course, it was a *de facto* multilateral deal since South Korea, Japan and (later) the EU provided most of the funding required to implement the U.S.'s commitments to North Korea. The establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 by the United States, South Korea, and Japan essentially codified the multilateral dimensions of the deal. Of course, the multilateral dimensions of the Agreed Framework did not cause the U.S. any pause when it decided unilaterally to end the deal in October 2002.

Involving the other parties in the U.S.'s 'bilateral' deal entailed disadvantages but was advantageous overall. In terms of disadvantages, the main issue was that it made the implementation process lengthier and more complicated. This not only led to delays in meeting deadlines but also to a growing distrust by the North Koreans that probably contributed to hedging behavior involving HEU. Ironically, though, the extended timeframe for implementation gave the U.S. "time to adapt the 'single issue'

Agreed Framework to realities both domestic and international that required a more comprehensive deal” (Martin, 2002, p. 65). This eight-year time-out from the full-blown practice of coercive diplomacy created an opportunity to explore confidence-building measures aimed at facilitating a more complete transformation in North Korea’s relationships with the outside world. Who knows if South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’ would have been possible without this moment of ‘peace in the feud’?(Kwon, 2020, pp. 1-14). Without the benefit of time, the collateral dialogues, such as the Four Party Talks, negotiations on missile moratoriums, discussions of MIA recovery operations, etc. might not have developed either.

What is undeniable is that the Agreed Framework was deemed a necessary diplomatic project in 1994 by the Clinton administration – albeit reluctantly because of the anticipated blowback from domestic political rivals – since the available coercive alternatives entailed unacceptable risks to the U.S. and its regional allies, especially South Korea and Japan. Moreover, the diplomats who had been engaged in dialogues with North Koreans for nearly a decade by that time, understood that it would open the door to negotiations on related concerns apart from nuclear weapons. They knew as well that it would forestall North Korea’s desperate resort to military provocations as a means of assuaging its security concerns. None of these related concerns evaporated into thin air in 2002 when the George W. Bush administration decided precipitously² to abrogate the Agreed Framework in October 2002. On the contrary, they have re-emerged repeatedly in subsequent decades, proving once again the essential truth of William Faulkner’s dictum: “The past isn’t over. It isn’t even past”(Faulkner, 1951). At the end of the day, the hostility borne of half a century of antagonism is not easily dispelled, or just explained away. The challenge is to overcome what Paik Nak-chung, the eminent South Korean scholar and activist, has called the division system:

These are two divided states within one nation, two highly organized but separate systems engaged every day in maintaining the status quo and enhancing their own status. Those who most vociferously rail against the other side are the true patriots, the ones most rewarded by the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang. Those who try to bridge the gap between the two Koreas are the most vulnerable – for decades the surest ticket to jail and personal oblivion in the South was to praise the North, and prison awaits anyone who in the North praises the South, even today. International forces also reinforce the Korean division: Korea is a central nation in the postwar world system, one of the critical pivots, nodal points, and arenas wherein the structure of world politics was formed and sustained, made, and remade(Paik, 2011).

That is, both North Korea and South Korea are still struggling to free themselves from the legacy of a symbiotic relationship designed not to bring about reunification but to perpetuate division. The unfinished objective of the Agreed Framework was to initiate

² Fred Carriere (personal communication) says Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly’s instructions allegedly were changed while he was already in mid-flight on his way to Pyongyang in October 2002. The ‘bold approach’ he was expected to outline during his visit was replaced by a curt, sharply worded message written by hardliners about an alleged HEU program. Kelly also was instructed to repeat this message verbatim every time North Koreans asked for further clarifications.

a process that would resolve any legitimate concerns about the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In a more comprehensive perspective, however, the fundamental challenge is to create the diplomatic space for the two Koreas to find their own answer to the Korean Question. The Korea Peace Initiative (KPI), which was launched by South Korean President Moon Jae-in following his inauguration in May 2017, focuses on the critical importance of proactive diplomacy that entails facilitating inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. dialogue, as well as cooperation with China, Japan, and Russia (Moon and Delury, 2019). Based on the findings of this research, the strategies encompassed in the KPI – peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding – are best understood as basic components of proactive diplomacy (Hanania, 2020; Jasper, 2021). As such, if they are true to the anti-status quo impulse, the policies should be effective in “overcoming the stalled odyssey to peace in Korea” and in the process make a substantive contribution toward ending the division system (Moon, 2021).

Some insights into the causes of this ‘stalled odyssey’ can be gleaned from the report on a recent virtual Track II discussion on North Korea and the international system (Daniels, 2021). Hosted by The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), the participants in this discussion included scholars and former officials from the U.S., China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan. The most telling of the takeaways detailed in the report is the lack of a consensus among the five parties on how to work cooperatively on North Korea-related diplomacy even when they are grappling with compelling shared objectives such as denuclearization. This reflects the growing strategic distrust among the five parties represented in this Track II discussion – especially, the U.S. and China – which is being manifested in various other contexts as well.

Their disagreements are especially apparent in their respective positions on the most effective ways to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Each party has its own organizing principles and narratives that are deeply entangled in issues of domestic political legitimacy. This results in clashes that stymie multilateral cooperation on North Korea. It spills over even into their conversations on core issues such as the envisioned long-term outcomes of the peace process on the Korean peninsula. Ironically, though, the geostrategic competition between the two major facilitator/aggravator actors – the U.S. and China – is reinforcing their pre-existing commitment to preserving the status quo on the Korean peninsula, unless North Korea ‘rocks the boat’. Just as the U.S. and China favored the stability of the division system on the Korean peninsula over the uncertainties of reunification in the era of détente beginning in the 1970s, due to their shared geostrategic competition with the Soviet Union, they still remain essentially committed to the status quo even though today they are the parties embroiled in a geostrategic competition. The shrimp's back gets broken either way (Beal, 2021).

The report offered several policy recommendations that are consistent with the findings of this study. The first is that all countries should find “pragmatic channels of communication” (Daniels, 2021). Specifically, both bilateral and multilateral dialogues are recommended, based on what has worked in the past, especially dialogues with North Korea by the U.S. and South Korea both separately and jointly. The challenge, in this case, will be to overcome the wariness North Korea has shown for further meetings with either Seoul or Washington since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit. The only viable strategy requires the ratcheting back of the so-called maximum pressure strategy that

relies on intertwined economic, political, and (implicit) military coercion. Excessive reliance on coercive diplomacy has served only to escalate tensions, rather than generate positive outcomes, primarily because it reduces the space for dialogue (Woo, 2015).

The critical importance of dialogue can be highlighted by reaffirming the previous commitments to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula made by the relevant parties, including the Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula of the April 2018 inter-Korean summit meeting in Panmunjom (Panmunjom 2018), the Joint Statement of the June 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held in Singapore (White House 2018), the Joint Declaration of September 2018 North-South summit meeting in Pyongyang (Pyongyang 2018), and the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing (National Committee on North Korea 2005). By doing so, the parties are able to demonstrate a sincere resolve to bind themselves to future behavior consistent with these agreements and to make it clear that they do not have 'cheap lips' as the Korean idiom characterizes those who make unreliable promises. The achievement of strategic foreign policy goals also depends upon the coordination of all bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives.

CONCLUSION

Over the last two decades, the period inaugurated by the first North-South summit in 2000, South Korea has tried both reciprocal and reconciliatory approaches toward North Korea. Even though North Korea has responded with reciprocal cooperation at times, it has never totally ceased to engage in provocations. This shows that a moderate and cooperation-oriented approach by South Korea in isolation cannot compel North Korea to adhere consistently to a pattern of absolute reciprocity. For example, in the most provocative act aimed at South Korea since it helped to launch the unprecedented series of summit meetings between North Korea and the U.S. in early 2018, North Korea blew up the inter-Korean liaison office building located just north of the DMZ in June 2020. While it is easy to understand why North Korea is considered an ingrate for engaging in such provocations, its ostensible ingrate behavior cannot be fully understood if viewed solely through the lens of the North-South bilateral relationship. Rather, it is necessary to factor in the impact of the U.S.-South Korea bilateral relationship – the fact that the U.S. did not permit South Korea to make good on the commitments it had made in Panmunjom – amounts to adding a kind of multilateral dimension that is required to provides the full context (Kim, 2020).

What all these observations taken together clearly establish is that the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula is predictably achievable, in the long run, if a tit-for-tat process of denuclearization is pursued in tandem with confidence building measures designed to foster non-hostile relations among all the actors in the Northeast Asian region. The transformation of U.S.-North Korea relations from hostility to amity is a fluid process that was launched out of geopolitical naivete half a century ago in the early 1970s. It was accelerated, not aborted, in a quasi-neorealist modality by North Korea's resort in the mid-2000s to a nuclear deterrence strategy toward the U.S. As this change in diplomatic strategy by North Korea was adopted in response to the collapse

of the Agreed Framework, the U.S. and North Korea are jointly responsible for the dangerous brinkmanship associated with the subsequent U.S.-North Korea relations. Interventions by the other regional actors with major equities in realizing the peace – notably South Korea and China – are indispensable to the achievement of an active peace on the Korean peninsula.

The complex linkages between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy among these regional actors – as well as the interplay between their domestic politics and their foreign policy – have become much more sharply defined, especially during the decades since the end of the global Cold War. Just as the U.S.-China détente in the early 1970s held out the promise of a new relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, as the recent NCAFP report has confirmed, the emerging signs of an effective reversal of the U.S.-China détente are threatening to undermine the final realization of that promise. Every agreement between North and South Korea, beginning with the Joint Communiqué in 1972 and continuing with the declarations issued following the five summit meetings held since 2000, has stated the fundamental principle that the reunification of the Korean nation is the sole prerogative of Koreans themselves. In fact, self-determination is a core principle of international law that is protected in the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a right of “all peoples.” In practice, however, the full implementation of inter-Korean agreements always has hinged upon the interplay of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy involving the U.S. and China in particular.

If the major regional actors do not coordinate their strategy for achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula with the efforts by the two Koreas to promote reconciliation as the foundation for eventual reunification, the most likely outcome is that neither denuclearization nor perpetual peace on the Korean peninsula will be realized. The failure of North Korea's efforts in the 1970s to establish amicable diplomatic relations with the U.S. was directly linked with the ideological rivalries of the Cold War. Similarly, the failure to achieve this objective in the post-Cold War period has been underpinned by the ‘single superpower’ mindset of the U.S. that assumes its interests automatically subsume the interests of allies and partners, misjudges the limits of U.S. agency, and fails to factor in the interests of other actors in its foreign policy decision-making.

According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, the Biden administration's plans to offer partial sanctions relief to North Korea in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization may not be politically feasible. This is due to the comprehensive nature of the U.S. sanctions on North Korea which “target not just weapons development but also human rights abuses, money laundering, weapons trade, international terrorism, and cyber operations.” At the same time, however, the report also notes that “the U.N. has documented North Korea's growing success in evading sanctions” and “China and Russia have blocked new sanctions... and have called for lifting several categories of sanctions.”³ There appears to be a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress that sanctions should not be lifted or even wavered to any significant degree unless North Korea satisfies all the issues targeted by the sanctions. Essentially,

³ Congressional Research Service 2021.

satisfying this requirement would amount to regime change, an outcome that is not supported by South Korea or the U.S.'s regional competitors.

The inter-Korean dialogue that reached its climax in the early 1990s and resulted in the historic Basic Agreements should be viewed as the founding documents of a post-Cold War international order for the East Asian region with the Korean peninsula as its pivot point. The half dozen or so declarations are additional documents that specify in greater detail the terms and conditions for the achievement of a stable peace regime on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The signatories to these diplomatic instruments, which were intended to guide future negotiations, were North Korea, South Korea, and the United States with the other major actors in Northeast Asia serving at least implicitly as witnesses. This diplomatic tool kit was expanded by other bilateral and multilateral agreements, including most notably the Agreed Framework and the agreement establishing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Taken together, all these documents constitute the functional equivalent of the agreement that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War in Europe (Helsinki Final Act 1975). They provide a guide for the conclusion of a denuclearization deal that is fully integrated into the overall inter-Korean process of reconciliation, non-aggression, and cooperation. A deal negotiated in this comprehensive way would reveal a reality still obscured in many ways (Abrahamian 2020, 15). by the lingering miasma of the Cold War:

The peninsula is one nation refracted into two states and systems. Even after 70 years, South Koreans can still look north of the DMZ and imagine not the Other, but their own lost self. This underlying spirit of identity and solidarity creates the possibility for the two sides, despite their profound differences, to come together in brotherly and sisterly love (Moon & Delury, 2019, p. 276).

The transformation of North Korea from an enemy into a security partner is a possible pathway to denuclearization in a less politically polarized world that would complement the inter-Korean dialogue (Halperin et alia, 2018). This intriguing proposal by veteran North Korea hands envisions the U.S. Forces Korea adding a 'pivot-deterrent role' between the two Koreas to their playbook on the Korean peninsula while preserving their stabilizing role in the Northeast Asia region. The resultant trilateral cooperative and collaborative security relationships on the Korean peninsula could be forged by modifying the mission of the UN Command. The advantage of this approach is that it is more politically viable for the U.S. than a traditional security alliance with North Korea, which it might demand as a *quid pro quo* for agreeing to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This security partnership would complement a comprehensive regional security framework in Northeast Asia created jointly by the U.S. and China. Ideally, it would encompass a variety of OECD-type mechanisms that could serve to implement a denuclearization deal, which might even include a regional nuclear weapons-free zone. There is broad agreement about the urgent need for a multilateral mechanism to promote dialogue among the major regional actors in Northeast Asia (Goodby and Heiskanen, 2021).

If all that is on offer for the future of the Korean peninsula is a bullying strategy based on a neorealist view of the international system as an anarchic environment,

the best that can be hoped for an endless series of petty zero-sum games in which the prospect of war could never be fully dispelled. In this logic, offers of cooperation and a willingness to make concessions would be interpreted as signs of weakness to be punished or exploited by a tougher or more reckless opponent (Blinka, 2015). On the other hand, there have been significant instances of cooperation between Pyongyang and Seoul – especially over the last two decades – and sometimes even between Pyongyang and Washington or more rarely even among Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington. There are numerous other instances that are epitomized by a well-known Korean proverb: “Sleeping in the same bed while dreaming different dreams.” Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington may not be in the same bed, but they certainly are in the same boat. A revised version of the proverb might be: “Sleeping in different beds while dreaming the same dream.”

REFERENCE

- Abrahamian, Andry. 2020. *Being in North Korea*. Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
- Albrecht, Robert T. 2003. “United States Foreign Policy and the North Korean Nuclear Issue.” *The Journal of International Relations* 6(1): 225-255.
- Beal, Tim. 2021. “The Continuing Korean War in the Murderous History of Bombing.” *Monthly Review* 72(8): 21-29.
- Blinka, Jan and Kříž, Zdeněk. 2015. “Security Relations Between the DPRK and South Korea After the End of the Cold War: Reciprocity or Bullying?” *Journal for Political Sciences, Modern History, International Relations, Security Studies* 18(2): 43-65.
- Choe, Sang-Hun. 2020. “North Korea Leader Had Big Economic Plans: He Admits They’ve Failed.” *The New York Times*. Aug19, 2020. Accessed March 25, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/asia/north-korea-economy-coronavirus.html>
- Cha, Victor D. 2002. “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula.” *International Security* 27(1): 40-78.
- Christopher, Warren. 1995. “America’s Leadership, America’s opportunity.” *Foreign Policy*, (98): 6-27.
- Cochran, T. & McKinzie, M. 2005. *Satellite Views of the Hermit Kingdom: New Perspective on North Korea*. Boston: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Congressional Research Service. 2021. “Diplomacy with North Korea: A Status Report.” July 30, 2021. Accessed May 12, 2022. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11415>.
- Daniels, Rorry. 2021. “Five-Party Talks on North Korea and the International System.” *National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, July 8. Accessed March 3, 2022 <https://www.ncafp.org/report-five-party-talks-on-north-korea-and-the-international-system/>.
- Delury, John. 2021. “Escaping the Tragicomedy: Is Principled Negotiation between the United States and North Korea Possible?” *Jeju Forum Journal* 21(3): 1-10.
- Faulkner, William. 1951. *Requiem for a Nun*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gills, Barry K. 1996. *Korea Verses Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy*. New York: Routledge.
- Goodby, James and Markku, Heiskanen. 2021. “Toward an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” *Asia-Pacific Leadership Network*, August 12. Accessed July 21, 2022. <https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/toward-an-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-northeast-asia>.

- Gannon, Frank. 2008. "25 July 1969: The Nixon Doctrine." *Richard Nixon Foundation*, July 24. Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2008/07/25-july-1969-the-nixon-doctrine/>.
- Hanania, Richard. 2020. "Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America's Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do about It. Cato Institute." *Policy Analysis*, (Number 884), February 18. Accessed July 11, 2022. <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-02/pa-884-updated.pdf>.
- Hecker, Siegfried S. 2021. "Cooperative Threat Reduction: Comparing the Russian Experience with DPRK Challenges." *Asia-Pacific Leadership Network*, October 12. Accessed July 23, 2022. <https://www.apln.network/analysis/special-report/ctr-comparing-the-russian-ctr-experience-with-north-korean-challenges>.
- Hecker, S.S., Serbin, E. A., and Carlin, R.L. 2018. "Total Denuclearization is an Unattainable Goal: Here's How to Reduce the North Korean Threat." *Foreign Policy*, June 25. Accessed March 23, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/25/total-denuclearization-is-an-unattainable-goal-heres-how-to-reduce-the-north-korean-threat/>
- Howell, Edward. 2020. "The juche H-bomb? North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and Regime-state Survival." *International Affairs* 96(4) : 1051-1068.
- Halperin, Morton, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, and Philip Yun. 2018. "From Enemies to Security Partners: Pathways to Denuclearization in Korea." *NAPSNet Policy Forum*, July 06. Accessed March 12, 2022. <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/from-enemies-to-security-partners-pathways-to-denuclearization-in-korea/>
- Hudson, Valerie M., Charles F. Hermann & Eric Singer. 1989. "The Situational Imperative: A Predictive Model of Foreign Policy Behavior." *Cooperation and Conflict* 24: 117-139.
- Jasper, Daniel. 2021. "It's Time for Rhetoric to Reflect Reality: North Korea Sanctions Don't Work." *NK News*, May 11.
- Joshua Berlinger. 2017. "North Korea's missile tests: What you need to know." *CNN*, December, 4. Accessed July 22, 2022. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html>
- Kim, Bong-ho. 2004. *The Military First Policy*. Pyongyang : Pyongyangch'urp'ansa.
- Kim, Eung-seo. 2017. "The Sino-DPRK Split and Origins of US-DPRK Bilateralism." *Sino-NK*, February 20. Accessed March 23, 2022. <https://sinonk.com/2017/02/20/the-sino-dprk-split-and-origins-of-us-dprk-bilateralism/>.
- Kim, Tong-hyung and Kim, Hyung-jin .2020. "North Korea Destroys Empty Liaison Office with South." *ABC News*, June 16. Accessed July 11, 2022. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nkoreas-military-threatens-reenter-demilitarized-areas-71268554>.
- Klingner, Bruce. 2012. "Deny, Deceive, and Delay-North Korea's Nuclear Negotiating Strategy." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 26(2): 1-24.
- Kwon, Heonik. 2020. *After the Korean War: An Intimate History*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Jeffrey. 2014. "Inside the Dread Box: Seeking Policy in Propaganda." *38th North*, May 21. Accessed June 23, 2022. <https://www.38north.org/2014/05/jlewis052214/>.
- Lee, Choong-koo. 2017. "The Discursive Origins and the Process of Policy Authorization of North Korea's Nuclear Buildup Discourses." *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 57(1): 155-201.
- Martin, Curtis H. 2002. "Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(1) : 51-68.
- Michelle Ye Hee Lee. 2017. "North Korea's Latest Nuclear Test was so Powerful It Reshaped the Mountain above It." *The Washington Post*, Sept 14. Accessed August 23, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/14/orth-koreas-latest-nuclear-test-was->

- so-powerful-it-reshaped-the-mountain-above-it/
- Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Kirchick. 2018. "A 'bloody nose' attack in Korea would have lasting consequences." *Brookings*, February 26. Accessed March 21, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/26/a-bloody-nose-attack-in-korea-would-have-lasting-consequences/>
- Moon, Chung-in & John Delury. 2019. *Bridging the Divide: Moon Jae-In's Korean Peace Initiative*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
- Moon, Chung-in. 2021. "Moon Jae-in's Stalled Odyssey to Peace in Korea." *The Diplomat*, July 28. Accessed July 15, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/moon-jae-ins-stalled-odyssey-to-peace-in-korea/>.
- Oberdorfer, Don and Carlin, Robert. 2014. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. New York: Basic Books.
- Paik, Nak-chung. 2011. *The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Panda, A and Narang, V. 2019. "The Hanoi Summit Was Doomed From the Start." *Foreign Affairs*, March 5. Accessed October 12, 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-03-05/hanoi-summit-was-doomed-start>.
- Snyder, Scott. 2000. "Negotiating on the Edge: Patterns in North Korea's Diplomatic Style." *World Affairs* 163(1): 3-17.
- Seo, Seung-Wook, Jung Hyo-Sik and Sarah Kim. 2019. "Proposal by Biegun in Stockholm Brushed Off." *Korea JoongAng Daily*, October 14. Accessed August 12, 2022. <https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3069058>.
- Sebastian J. Bae. 2017. "The Foolishness of Strategic Decapitation in North Korea: Plans to 'solve' the Korea issue by taking out key leaders are tragically oversimplified." *The Diplomat*, January 10. Accessed March 22, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-foolishness-of-strategic-decapitation-in-north-korea/>
- The White House. 2018. "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit." June 12. Accessed August 23, 2022. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.
- Waxman, Olivia B. 2018. "How Drama Between North and South Korea Threatened the Olympics 30 Years Ago." *New York Times*, February 8. Accessed March 24, 2022. <https://time.com/5095730/north-south-korea-olympics-history/>.

