

Why South Korea is interested in Rwanda: Korean Perspectives on Good Governance

Joonhwa Cho

There is some speculation as to the incentive South Korea has in pursuing cooperation with its recipient country, Rwanda. This relates to the fact that Rwanda has been consistently and repeatedly selected as a priority African aid recipient state, though there is a consensus that it is more advantageous for a donor country to support a recipient country with a large population or with rich natural resources. This does not fit the profile of Rwanda, which is land-locked and relatively small in population. This article chiefly argues that South Korea as a latecomer donor needs the recipient of Rwanda which would nicely complete a development project to meet the required outcomes. Such recipient's attitude is being interpreted as a good governance among the Korean policy-makers.

Keywords South Korea, North Korea, Rwanda, Good Governance, Politics of Development, Korea-Africa Relations

INTRODUCTION

In the field of International Relations, Development Studies and Regional Studies, it is a popular topic to investigate why certain donors are likely to support certain recipients. Regarding this question, it is generally assumed that philanthropy between states operates on the premise that a recipient country is populous, with ample untapped resources, and good prospects which aid will help a donor country (Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011; Easterly, 2008). However, there is no further empirical research about the reason why South Korea is likely to support a certain recipient country, particularly in Africa.

Regarding the interactions between the African continent and South Korea, it is widely agreed that South Korea's initial diplomatic efforts in Africa were driven by rivalry with North Korea in the United Nations(UN) over the issue of Korea (Koh,

Joonhwa Cho is a Research Fellow of Asia-Africa Center at Seoul National University Asia Center and an Adjunct Lecturer at the Division of African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea. E-mail: jh_cho@snu.ac.kr

Article Received: 10-05-2023 Revised: 15-06-2023 Accepted: 23-06-2023

Table 1. Country Partnership Strategies (CPS)

1 st CPS (2011-2015)	2 nd CPS (2016-2020)	3 rd CPS (2021-2025)
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, Senega, Tanzania	Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique, Senegal, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania	Ethiopia, Ghana, Egypt, Rwanda, Senega, Tanzania, Uganda

Source: Author's modification.

1984; Lee, 1999; Lee, 2011; Han, 2013; Kim, 2015; Yang, 2015, Cho, 2019). It was a main diplomatic goal for both Koreas to gain support for legitimacy in Korean peninsular, as the emergence of the newly independent African countries came about, in the international community. In 1991, since both South Korea and North Korea had joined the UN, South Korea's interest in Africa significantly lessened. However, since the 2000s, South Korea has been re-interested in Africa. In 2006, South Korea's President Roh visited African nations for the first time in 24 years and announced the Korea Initiative Africa Development (KIAD) in Nigeria. Since then, South Korea has been steadily increasing its financial commitment to Africa.

According to the article 11, Framework Act on International Development Cooperation, South Korea has aimed to allocate more than 70% of the budget on a preferential basis towards selected Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) in order to effectively operate ODA with respect to ensuring they fulfil the requirements of CPS in terms of the 'selection' process and 'focus' of the initiative. Indeed, Rwanda has been selected as CPS in a series since South Korea launched CPS in 2011 as seen Table 1.

Having said that, there are no further studies regarding the motivation why South is interested in supporting Rwanda. In order to do this research, the author investigates the origin of historical relations between South Korea and Rwanda based on the primary resource from the diplomatic archives. It reflects that an issue of development cooperation was always agenda to exchange for a political mission. Regarding today's relationship, the author did mainly interview those who were in charge of this issue from the ministerial level in Seoul and to the field level in Rwanda through fieldwork. Interviews were conducted in an open-ended manner and took an hour on average. In particular, due to the fact that the interviewee accepted the interview on the condition of anonymity, the author anonymously cited them.¹ As a result, this paper argues that South Korea as a latecomer donor needs a good recipient who may follow and complete its projects nicely and timely. In this respect, Rwanda is a good partner for South Korea to have high-guarantee outcomes. This research would contribute that the donor's domestic-bureaucratic reason would be a factor why the donor country would be preferable to certain recipient countries. Furthermore, it highlights that policy-makers unintentionally provide room for to a degree complicit in supporting authoritarian rule, overlooking or interpreting the nature of the recipient's attitude as good governance.

¹ Primary resources such as archived telegraphs and interviews were re-cited from the author's PhD thesis (Cho, 2019).

ORIGIN OF KOREA-RWANDA RELATIONS: ONE KOREA POLICY

Initial movement: competition with North Korea

South Korea's well-established diplomatic relations with Rwanda are actually the product of many efforts and much negotiation. Indeed, though South Korea initially approached the Rwandan government to establish diplomatic ties in 1963, this offer was only accepted in 1972. This was principally because of competition from North Korea's own dealings with Rwanda. To reach this stage, both the South Korean and Rwandan governments had to negotiate for 7 years or so in terms of what South Korea could offer in exchange for their partnership. For instance, while the Korean government annually dispatched a delegation, they committed to modernize the postal facilities in Rwanda (around 50,000 USD) in 1972 and to construct 10 elementary schools (around 100,000 USD) in 1973 in exchange for Rwanda's commitment to supporting South Korea (Eastern Africa Bureau, 1973a). However, when Rwanda voted against South Korea in the WHO in 1973, diplomatic relations between Rwanda and South Korea became worse. Regarding this issue, the Korean foreign ministry telegraphed with a reply, as below:

“Regardless of Rwandan pressure from China...it needed to invite the foreign minister to deal with this...if the Rwandan government grants support for the South Korean stance on the stationing of UN troops on the Korean peninsula at the next UN General Assembly, above projects [10 elementary schools] would be provided for” (African Bureau, 1973).

In July 1973, during a meeting with foreign minister Nsekarije Aloys of the Juvénal Habyarimana administration, the Korean ambassador discussed the issue of North Korea at the UN and expressed a desire to continue the economic cooperation previously discussed. The ambassador also sent a message to the headquarters indicating an interest in a school project by sending 2 doctors and 2 agro-technicians. However, the Korean foreign ministry replied that any aid project should be considered in exchange for expected support (Eastern Africa Bureau, 1973b). In 1974, the Korean embassy stated that their only course of action was to persist in advancing aid initiatives, as described in the situation outlined below (Eastern Africa Bureau, 1973b);

“There is nothing mentioned about Korean aid, except donating 4 ambulances in June 1970 and 50,000 USD for the modernization of the postal facility in August 1972. In particular, since the embassy was originally established in Kigali in August 1972, the Rwandan government has had great expectations of our country [South Korea]. However, now that the issue of the construction of elementary schools has stopped, we seem to have fallen short of their expectations because there was no continuation of this aid project. Meanwhile, the North Korean regime dispatched a group of gymnasts they have been teaching for six months since last year [1974], along with the commitment to the construction of the Young Men's Hall in Kigali.”

In 1975, the Korean embassy reported the upcoming good-will delegation to corroborate the situation, attaching an assistance list and explaining the situation as: “If we engage

with negotiations, having the guarantee of support in the UN in exchange for providing aid, it is assumed that it will always remain at a standstill. Because this has not been realised in the form of any commitment for years from the Rwandan view, and they would not readily trust us before seeing the concrete proof of launching aid projects. [In other words], if there is no interest in investing in 'aid', all diplomatic negotiations would come to an 'inconclusive' [and one-sided] result" (Eastern Africa Bureau, 1973b).

In the meeting between the Korean head of mission and the Rwandan foreign minister, the head of mission emphasised that "diplomacy is 'give and take' and thus it respects a mutual understanding [which is] that your country should be assisting in fulfilling our [South Korea] political interests," by expressing that "you have the advantage of receiving aid from both North and South Korea by maintaining your neutral stance." The Rwandan foreign minister apologized for the harsh decision towards a friendly nation and stated that Rwanda had supported South Korea's position at the UN on several occasions in the past and did not want to cut ties. The Korean ambassador to Rwanda reported his interpretation of the Rwandan perspective as follows: 1) Rwanda had already fulfilled its obligations in exchange for aid through its support at the UN, 2) Rwanda was not an untrustworthy country, 3) Rwanda's actions were not dictated by its constitution, and 4) Rwanda was not taking sides in the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism (Eastern Africa Bureau, 1973b).

However, shortly thereafter, diplomatic relations between South Korea and Rwanda were suspended from 1975 to 1987. This was due to the closure of the South Korean embassy in Rwanda in response to Rwanda's decision to vote in favour of North Korea in 1974. Closing the Korean embassy in Kigali became a hot diplomatic issue at that time. From the Korean point of view, the Rwandan government did not seem to appreciate South Korea's efforts through development assistance. Meanwhile, Rwandan government was not able to accept the closure of South Korean embassy without any discussion with Rwandan government in advance as an 'unnatural action'.

As a result, the Rwandan foreign minister recognized North Korea as the only legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula and made a tour of China and North Korea in March 1980.

As a consequence, Rwanda began to strengthen its ties with North Korea. According to South Korea's telegraphs (Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau, 1977), North Korea opened their embassy in Kigali in August 1975 and President Habyarimana made visits to North Korea in 1978 and 1983. In addition, the North Korean foreign minister, deputy-prime minister, and the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly visited Rwanda in 1980, 1982, and 1984 respectively. This increase in personnel exchanges was accompanied by greater economic cooperation, including the dispatch of a gymnastics group in 1974, the construction of the Young Men's Meeting Hall (completed in 1980), the dispatch of agricultural workers in 1975, and the construction of a 150 km road in 1976. There were also agreements signed, such as the economic technology agreement in 1974, the aeronautical agreement in 1979, and the establishment of a friendship association in 1978.

In the early 1980s, the Rwandan government overtures to reconciliation to South Korea. The Korean ambassador to Sierra Leon reported that "while North Korea gave aid to us [Rwanda], the relationship with South Korea drifted apart, however we are

not against South Korea” in 1977 (Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau, 1977). Furthermore, The United State (US) also helped for Rwanda to normalise ties with South Korea. Through telegraphs, both South Korean and Rwandan foreign ministers discussed economic assistance in exchange for improving relations. The Rwandan foreign minister suggested for South Korea to promote economic cooperation at the level of private sector first and then relations at the level of government would be naturally improved by establishing an embassy (Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau, 1977). Responding to this, the Korean minister expressed that they cannot accept excessive economic cooperation that the Rwandan government requested in exchange for improving relations and opening an embassy (Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau, 1977). From South Korea’s perspective, the priority seems to enhance diplomatic relations before focusing on economic collaboration. In particular, South Korea adopted a cautious approach towards Rwanda, while the Rwandan foreign minister repeatedly urged South Korea to take the lead in improving relations.

The formal process of improving relations began in October 1986 when the Rwandan foreign minister invited the Korean foreign minister to New York and requested the dispatch of an inspection team for the agricultural and medical sectors. The primary reason for this change of heart was believed to be the establishment of a textile factory by a Korean company in July 1982. This necessitated the resolution of diplomatic relations to enable the company to train Rwandans and apply for a loan from the Korean government to expand the factory. Additionally, since North Korea’s promises of economic collaboration were not being fulfilled, Rwanda accepted this economic proposal (Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau, 1977). In November 1986, the Korean government sent a negotiation team to Rwanda with the primary objectives of understanding the Rwandan government’s needs and assessing the potential benefits of providing 200,000 USD in aid. Ultimately, the team determined that there was no tangible advantage to improving relations through excessive assistance. Having said that, in this report, it is important to note that they also observed that Rwanda made efforts to obtain aid in a transparent and legitimate manner and used it efficiently (Western Africa Bureau, 1986a; Western Africa Bureau, 1986b), which is still recognized by Korean aid policy-makers today.

Rwanda Genocide

Apart from official historical documents about the Korean embassy, which was reopened in September 1987 and closed again in November 1990, there are no archived records of diplomatic telegraphs. In response to the Rwandan genocide, South Korea’s actions were limited to a donation of 100,000 USD by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to the UN on July 26, 1994 for refugee relief (The Hankyoreh, 1994b). Later, on August 2, 1994, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA) announced support for Rwandan refugees in the form of medicine and medical supplies worth 100,000 USD to treat 50,000 cholera patients (The Hankyoreh, 1994a).

Charitable efforts towards Rwanda were primarily driven by private organizations such as Korean UNICEF and Good Neighbors (The Chosun Il-bo, 1995, 1996). However, a reader of The Hankyoreh expressed concern that more attention should

be given to providing aid to North Korea before helping Rwandans and suggested that “it would have been better if there had been 2 collection boxes for both Rwandan and North Korean people” (Chang, 1997). These Korean contributions and sentiments were not documented in a white paper; instead, the Rwandan genocide was briefly analyzed as an ethnic conflict in white papers (MOFA, 1996: 95, 1997: 110, 1998: 101).

CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH RWANDA: ICT DIPLOMACY

The resumption of diplomatic relations was evident when Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs planned a trip to Korea in October 2005. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement indicating that the two ministers discussed various topics of mutual interest, including methods to improve cooperation between the two nations and collaboration on the global stage. In particular, in response to Rwanda’s desire to emulate Korea’s economic growth and request for increased cooperation, including sharing Korea’s experiences in economic development, Minister Ban stated that he would work to gradually increase Korea’s aid to Rwanda, along with agreements such as investment guarantees and cooperation in economic and social development (MOFAT, 2005c).

The following year, Minister Ban became the first Korean cabinet member to pay tribute to genocide victims at the Gisozi Genocide Memorial and paid a visit to President Paul Kagame (MOFAT, 2006h). During their meeting, when Ban commented on the cleanliness of the road from the airport, Kagame stated that they were following Korea’s example and pointed to an English copy of the Saemaul Undong Movement on his desk (Y. Park, 2015). In addition to donating 10,000 USD to survivors of the Rwandan genocide in 2008 (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2008), Ban believed that Rwanda was enthusiastic about Saemaul Undong (Ban, 2013; J. Nam, 2017b). This was enough for Korean high officials to take notice of Rwanda’s positive attitude towards Saemaul Undong, despite controversy in Korea. Similarly, UN Secretary-General Ban continued to emphasize its applicability as a new model for developing countries, especially during the Park administration.

Summit Diplomacy in Korea

A significant event occurred when Korea and Rwanda held their first-ever summit in Seoul on May 31st, 2008. At this summit, the Blue House stated that the two nations agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation for human resources development and advancement of Rwanda’s IT industry, as well as international issues (CheongWaDae, 2008). In particular, Kagame expressed that Rwanda had long been interested in Korea’s development experience and saw the Republic as a role model for Rwanda’s development. He requested active support from the Korean government and businesses in building an IT-based economy, a project that the Rwandan government is vigorously pursuing (Knaup, 2010). During his visit, Kagame visited the Ubiquitous Dream Hall and met with the president of KT (Korean Telecom) (The New Times, 2008; MOFAT, 2008d), which had begun business in Rwanda by establishing Wibro networking in 2007. (Kwon, 2015).

In November 2011, President Kagame visited Korea again to attend the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan. In his speech, he stated that it was relevant to have this conversation in Korea, which had moved from being an aid-recipient country to an industrial nation supporting others' development in the last half-century (Paul, 2011; Tumwebaze, 2011). During their summit meeting, President Lee expressed interest and support for Korean companies' involvement in Rwanda's energy development and infrastructure construction and hoped to contribute to cultivating high-quality human resources by supporting the construction of the Kicukiro Technology Training Centre. In response, President Kagame expressed appreciation and stated that Rwanda was trying to become an IT and economic hub in East Africa following Korea's example (Lee, 2011).

In view of "Korea hosting the equivalent of the Olympic Games in the field of development assistance" (Voice of America, 2011) in referring to associated officials, Korean media outlets reported on ministerial press releases that announced Korea's intention to proactively establish new norms in development assistance and share its development experience with the world during the Busan HLF-4 (MOFAT, 2011b; Lee, 2011). President Kagame's praise for Korea's success story was widely reported, with coverage consistently mentioning his admiration for Korea and Rwanda's efforts to model itself after Korea. He was also introduced as a great leader who had worked to stabilize politics, achieve a high annual growth rate of over 6%, and combat corruption, earning him the nickname 'African Park Chung Hee' (Lee, 2011; Nam, 2017a). During his visits to Hyundai Heavy Industries and KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency) (KISA, 2011a, 2011b), he expressed his hope that Korea's economic and business leaders would contribute to East Africa's development through Rwanda and stated that Korea's growth model was a source of hope and challenge for the people of Rwanda (Yun, 2011). It was also reported that Rwanda felt encouraged when looking at Korea's progress (Kim, 2011).

Since then, the presidents of these two countries have developed a strong relationship over time. The Foreign Minister visited Rwanda in January 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations (MOFAT, 2013), where they discussed investment: regional, international, and development cooperation (MINAFFET, 2013). This led to the establishment of substantial legal frameworks, with Rwanda being identified as a priority partner for Korea. Korean companies have been investing in various sectors, particularly the ICT sector. With KT (Korea Telecom)'s involvement in Rwanda's ICT sector becoming more established, Kagame has stepped up his ICT diplomacy efforts towards South Korea since 2014. While co-chairing The ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, he gave a speech in which he expressed his commitment to the Smart Africa Initiative and the goal of creating a future that is sustainable, inclusive, and secure for future generations (Kagame, 2014a). During a summit with President Park, they discussed cooperation in various areas, including politics and the economy. President Park reportedly remarked on Kagame's fondness for Korea and his strong interest in Korea's development experience, stating that Korea believed in and wanted to support Rwanda's vision of becoming an IT hub (Kagame, 2014b; Mugisha, 2014; KOTRA, 2014; Yoon, 2014; S. Park, 2014). This suggested an invitation for President Park to visit Rwanda. This led to an invitation for President Park

to visit Rwanda. Additionally, President Kagame held meetings with KT CEOs to discuss ICT cooperation (Dusabemungu, 2014), and expressed his gratitude for KT's role in supporting the growth of ICT in Rwanda through the provision of 4G network services, as well as his determination to provide full support in the implementation of these services (Kagame, 2014b).

Diplomatic relations between South Korea and Rwanda have not always been as good as they are today. In particular, the issue of economic or development cooperation has often been used as a negotiating tool to achieve political goals. Initially, South Korea sought to establish relations with Rwanda and open an embassy as a counter to North Korea. However, this was not realised due to North Korea's active engagement and Rwanda's double approach. Despite efforts to resolve the issue, the relationship remained frozen while North Korea expanded diplomatic exchanges. Eventually, the U.S. mediated the normalization of the relationship. However, the relationship was not able to be sustained due to the Rwandan genocide that occurred soon after. Since the 2000s, Rwanda has approached South Korea again, and President Paul Kagame's visit to South Korea highlights their interest in the sector of ICT.

PORTRAIT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF RWANDA FROM ASSOCIATIONS

Responses of Policy-makers in Seoul

At Office for Government Policy Coordination, those who were as responsible for the second CPS the revealed that they assessed potential countries using a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures.² Although no one would confirm this openly, there was collective concern about issues such as the governance of recipient countries, the presence of overseas Koreans and Korean businesses, trade relations, and the availability of natural resources. Based on these criteria, only a few African countries were considered attractive candidates at the time. For instance, the DRC was excluded from the 24 countries due to poor governance. However, Rwanda was selected as an example of good governance despite its lack of natural resources, and it was noted that the international community viewed them favourably.

Meanwhile, those who were associated with KOICA emphasized their role as policy implementers, differentiating themselves from policy-making agencies. Having said that, an informant³ confirmed that “to the best of my knowledge, only Rwanda was selected for development” because they achieved better results when KOICA implemented projects there, even though indicators such as the number of advanced companies, overseas Koreans, and economic relations were not higher than in other African countries. In particular, Rwanda is a practically good partner in the sense that KOICA faces to verify successful examples as shown below⁴;

² A Director General at Prime Minister's Office (October, 20, 2015, Seoul).

³ A Director at KOICA (November, 17, 2015, Seongnam)

⁴ A Director at KOICA (November, 17, 2015, Seongnam)

“First of all, our [KOICA] ultimate aim is to improve development in our partnership countries. Through this, it is a second aim that we foster friendship between our countries. However, at the government-wide level, development aid is used for one of diplomatic and economic means...As the aid policy and strategy are already decided at a governmental level, the procedure is unnatural and ineffective as we [KOICA] are implementing this in the field under unaccounted-for circumstances. KOICA’s outcome is evaluated on how well we effectively operate and how much budget we have executed [like DFID]”

Likewise, junior official who in charge of Rwanda at the head of KOICA, spoke highly of Rwanda, particularly in regards to its approach to receiving aid. Based on her work experiences, she found that other Africans did not seem to take ownership of projects, Rwandans demonstrated a strong sense of ownership and were highly involved in the process.⁵ In doing so, the informant gave the example that even the Rwandan ambassador in Seoul would participate in encouraging luncheons with Rwandan trainers. For these reasons, KOICA was able to decide to apply for pilot modalities to Rwanda such as budget support.

Responses from the Rwandan field

At the Korean Embassy to Rwanda, Senior officials in the field shared the view that Korea, as a middle-power country, has a moral obligation to support developing nations. This was particularly emphasized in relation to Africa, where it was stated that Korea should feel a greater sense of responsibility because it serves as a symbol and proof to African developing countries that their aspirations and dreams are not illusions but can be achieved in reality.⁶ It was a discourse among Korean diplomats that the Korean development program as a latecomer was not fully able to reach what Rwanda demands. Likewise, it was also a cunning strategy for the Rwandan government to assign seats at donor’s meetings based on their countries’ financial contributions, resulting in Korea being placed in the lower seats according to this order. This strategy successfully made for a participant to think of the aid budget as the Korean side did. Likewise, but slightly differently, At the senior official at the Rwanda KOICA office, replied that it is in compliance with Korea’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and Rwanda Vision 2020 which was focused on the sectors of ICT, Education and Rural Development.⁷ In doing so, they hoped that ‘the Rwandan government seemed interested in Korea’s experience through policy dialogue because it is the most up-to-date version, compared to traditional donors, although its experience is universal in some ways.’⁸

Meanwhile, for those who were in charge of the development project as a project manager and a practitioner in the field, there was a consensus that Rwanda is different from any other developing countries regarding organizing and planning skills. With a perception of good governance in Rwanda– although they avoided futile conversations

⁵ A Program Officer at KOICA (November, 02, 2015, Seongnam)

⁶ Korean Ambassador to Rwanda (April, 28, 2016, Kigali)

⁷ A Director of KOICA Rwanda Office (June, 29, 2016, Kigali)

⁸ A Director of KOICA Rwanda Office (June, 6, 2016, Kigali)

regarding Paul Kagame – they find the headquarters of KOICA are likely to support new modalities of projects such as budget support to Rwanda, as a special example to use Rwanda as a testing ground to gauge a new approach's success.⁹ Due to this, even before announcing the 2013 CPS, they knew that Rwanda was selected as the CPS in 2013 because there were no difficulties to operate the project in the sense of KOICA's preferences.¹⁰ KOICA ODA specialist, said that KOICA appreciates Rwanda's proven decisive implementation, which demonstrates the will of counterparts and cost-effectiveness regarding implementation.¹¹ From the point of KOICA's view, this reason would play a role in investigating a new project, and implementing a new modalities. In fact, in Rwanda KOICA implemented its first case of budget support, which is recognised as most Western donors' preferred approach at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper investigates why South Korea is interested in Rwanda. To answer this question, the paper traces the trajectory of diplomatic relations through archived diplomatic telegraphs and draws a portrait of Rwanda among those who are associated, from policy-makers to practitioners in the field.

This paper looks back over historical relations between South Korea and Rwanda. It argues that economic cooperation was always on the agenda, for South Korea to exchange diplomatic commitment with African countries. Likewise, in the early stages, South Korea initially proposed to establish diplomatic relations and engage in economic cooperation and grant aid towards Rwanda in return for diplomatic commitments such as a supporting voting at the UN (MOFA, 1991: 189). As seen archived in telegraphs, economic cooperation was discussed in exchange for political commitments. In this situation, economic cooperation was always a part of South Korea's diplomatic strategy against North Korea in order for Rwanda to support South Korea. Rwanda, on the other hand, appeared to leverage this competition to secure a larger amount of economic development. Rwanda's commitment to North Korea did not yield the expected results, and with the possibility of private sector investment from South Korea, Rwanda began shifting their focus towards South Korea. However, this was not long-lasting due to the Rwanda Genocide. Based on revealed telegraphs, economic or development cooperation was always on the agenda during the diplomatic meetings in exchange for political goals.

In the early 2000s, Rwanda's diplomatic relations with South Korea were re-built with President Paul Kagame's praise for Korea's development and its ICT sector. As well as the interest of the prominent political figure, new light was shed on Rwanda due to good governance. This paper argues that as a latecomer donor, South Korea needed a partner who was reliable and would help proceed and complete development projects according to their plan. For Korean policy-makers, good governance among Korean policy-makers meant the attitude of the recipient country seeing the possibility of the

⁹ KOICA ODA specialist (May, 6, 2016, Kigali)

¹⁰ KOICA ODA Specialist (May, 6, 2016, Kigali)

¹¹ KOICA ODA specialist (May, 6, 2016, Kigali)

project's success in terms of implementing a new version of modalities. In this situation, Rwanda was seen as being a suitable partner for South Korea to proceed in development projects and to launch a new program for projects. This led to Rwanda being selected in a row as a recipient for Korean aid under the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), with officials viewing Rwanda as a positive recipient due to its willingness to conduct development projects with guaranteed positive results. This paper contributes to answering why South Korea is likely to support to Rwanda, compared to other African countries. As South Korea has become a new player in Africa, it is important to know their motivation in the historical context as well as in perspectives on good governance.

REFERENCES

Government Documents

- Eastern Africa Bureau. 1973a. Telegraph. Korea's aid to Rwanda (grant) (한국의 대르완다 원조(무상원조). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul. 8691.
- Eastern Africa Bureau. 1973b. Telegraph. Plan for invitation for Nsekaliye Aloys, Foreign Minister of Rwanda(Nsekaliye, Aloys 르완다 외무장관 방한 초청계획). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul. 8132.
- African Bureau. 1973. Telegraph. A special envoy visits Rwanda, 27 -30 March 1973(특별사절단 루안다 방문,1973.3.27-30). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul.5897
- Eastern Africa Bureau and Western Africa Bureau.1977. Telegraph. Negotiation of Normalization relations with Rwanda, 1977-86 (루완다와의 국교정상화 교섭, 1977-86). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul.23157
- Western Africa Bureau 1986a. Telegraph. Foreign Minister Lee won kyung foreign minister visits Africa(이원경 외무장관 아프리카 순방, 1986.7.30-8.17.전3권). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul.23385.
- Western Africa Bureau. 1986b. Operations-level negotiating team visits Rwanda, November 17, 1986 (실무협력 조사단 루안다 방문, 1986.11.17-21). Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Seoul. 24114.
- MOFA. 1996. *The Diplomatic White Paper 1995* (1995 외교백서). Seoul: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- MOFA. 1997. *The Diplomatic White Paper 1996*(1996 외교백서). Seoul: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- MOFA. 1998. *The Diplomatic White Paper 1997*(1997 외교백서). Seoul: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Others

- Chang, H. 1997. "Being concerned starving North Korean people before helping Rwandan refugees (르완다 난민 돕기앞서 굶주림 북한에 관심을)." The Hankyoreh, 3 July. Accessed September 1, 2018. <https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1997070300289116005&editNo=5&printCount=1&publishDate=1997-07-03&officeId=00028&pageNo=16&printNo=2921&publishType=00010>

- CheongWaDae. 2008. "Korea and Rwanda Hold their First Summit Ever." Accessed September 1, 2018. http://17cwnd.eng.pa.go.kr/pre_activity/summit/diplomacy_view.php?uno=656&board_no=E05&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=1&code=17.
- Cho, J. 2019. "South Korea's Foreign Policy towards Africa, examining the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia in comparison with China, Japan, and North Korea: Being realist with soft-romanticism." PhD dissertation, University of London.
- de la Victoire Dusabemungu, A. 2014. "President Kagame, ICT Minister visit KT Offices." IGIHE, October 30. Accessed September 2, 2018. http://en.igihe.com/spip.php?page=mv2_article&id_article=17126.
- Easterly, W. R. 2008. *Reinventing Foreign Aid*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Han, G. S. 2013. "A Methodological Reflection on African Studies in Korea and a Review for Research Topics." *Asia Review*, 3(1): 159-193.
- Kagame, P. 2014b. "President Kagame and President Park hold bilateral meeting." Accessed September 2, 2018. <http://paulkagame.com/?p=3748>.
- Kim, D. S. 2015. *A Review on the history of South Korea's foreign policy towards Africa*. Seoul: Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center. pp. 3-13.
- Kim, S. 2011. "Paul Kagame, by seeing Korea, we have hope that we can do it...Rwanda will be a role model for an African IT hub (폴 카가메 대통령 '한국보며 '우리도 할수 있다' 희망... 아프리카 IT허브 롤모델로 삼을것)". DongA Ilbo, 6 December. Accessed September 2, 2018. <http://news.donga.com/Economy/3/02/20111206/42391628/1>.
- KISA. 2011a. "President Paul Kagame visits KISA to have a look at cyber terror(폴 카가메 르완다 대통령, 2일 KISA 방문해 사이버 대응 현장 시찰)". NewsWire, December 4. Accessed September 1, 2018. <http://www.newswire.co.kr/newsRead.php?no=588375>.
- KISA. 2011b. "Rwanda wants to cooperate with KISA(르완다, KISA와 정보보호 협력확대원해)". Accessed September 1, 2018. http://www.kisa.or.kr/notice/press_View.jsp?mode=view&p_No=8&b_No=8&d_No=705.
- Knaup, H. 2010. "Interview with Rwandan President Paul Kagame: 'We Are Far from Exhausting Our Potential.'" Spiegel Online, 6 July, 2010. Accessed September 1, 2018. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-rwandan-president-paul-kagame-we-are-far-from-exhausting-our-potential-a-704894.html>.
- Koh, B. 1984. *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- KOTRA. 2014. "Korea-Rwanda Summit meeting(한-르완다 정상회담)". Accessed September 2, 2018. http://president.globalwindow.org/kz.info.ConfrDetail.do?confr_seq=98.
- Kyunghyang Shinmun. 2008. "Ban, secretary general of UN, donates to Rwanda(반기문 총장 르완다에 사재 기부)". Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 30. Accessed September 1, 2018. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=200801301852245&code=100100.
- Lancaster, C. 2007. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, S. 2011. "The summits of Korea and Rwanda agree on development and trade cooperation(한.르완다 정상 '개발.통상협력증진)". Yonhap News, 30 November. Accessed September 1, 2018. <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/11/30/0200000000A KR20111130070600001.HTML>.
- Lee, C. 2011. "Africa is a big fish." Joongang Ilbo, November 25. Accessed September 1, 2018. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2944610>.
- Lee, H. 2011. "Today is the birthday of Korea being an advanced country by joining OECD Development Assistance Committee(오늘(2009년 11월 25일 OECD 개발원조위원회 가입)은 한국이 선진국된 생일... 우리만 몰라)". Chosun Biz, November 25. Accessed September 1,

2018. http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/11/25/2011112500258.html.
- Lee, H. Y. 1999. "Korea's Foreign Policy toward Africa: Reestimation and New Direction." *Korean Political Science Review*, 33(3): 371–390.
- Lee, H. 2011. "The Change of Korea's Foreign Policy toward Africa: Energy and Resource Diplomacy." *Journal of International Politics*, 16(2): 137–163.
- MOFAT. 2005. "Outcomes of the Korea-Rwanda Foreign Ministers' Talks." Accessed 1 September, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=295105&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=OK&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=650&titleNm.
- MOFAT. 2006. "Weekly Domestic/Foreign Press Briefing (H.E. Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade)." Accessed September 1, 2018. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5679/view.do?seq=298111&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=118&titleNm.
- MOFAT. 2011a. "Chairman of OECD Development Assistance Committee Confident about Success of Busan Conference." Accessed August 27, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=309883&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=Busan%20Conference&srchTp=1&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm.
- MOFAT. 2011b. "Growing Interest and Expectations around the World for the Busan HLF-4." Accessed September 1, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=310562&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=428&titleNm.
- MOFAT. 2013. "Diplomatic timetable of Jan, 2013(2013.1월 외교일지)." Accessed September 2, 2018. http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4086/view.do?seq=345496&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm.
- MINAFFET. 2013. "Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kim sung-Hwan, visits Rwanda." Accessed September 2, 2018. http://rwanda-embassy.or.kr/dboard/dboard.php?id=eng_rnews¬ice_id=&s=31&tot=112&search=&search_cond=&no=83&print_no=77&exec=view&npop=&sort=reg_date&desc=&search_cat_no.
- Mugisha, I. R. 2014. "Kagame, South Korean president discuss bilateral ties." *The New Times*, October 29. Accessed September 2, 2018. <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/182516>.
- Nam, J. 2017a. "Admitting past successes." *Joongang Ilbo*, November 23. Accessed September 1, 2018. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3041131>.
- Nam, J. 2017b. *The Challenges of Ban Ki-moon* (반기문의 도전). Seoul: Gimmyoung Publishers.
- Park, S. 2014. "President Park has summit meeting with Rwandan president to discuss economic exchange(朴대통령, 르완다 대통령과 정상회담...경제교류 논의)." *Yonhap News*, 29 October. Accessed September 2, 2018. <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2014/10/29/0505000000AKR20141029204700001.HTML>.
- Paul, K. 2011. "SPEECH BY H.E PAUL KAGAME, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, AT HIGH LEVEL FORUM ON AID EFFECTIVENESS." Accessed September 1, 2018. http://presidency.gov.rw/index.php?id=23&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=457&cHash=8de41a7225e97cd6beb2a3ca016f7037.
- Park, Y. 2015. "Rwanda seek their future through Korea (르완다, 한국에서 미래를 찾다)." *Monthly Chosun*, December. Accessed 1 September 2018. <http://m.monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=201512100025>
- The Chosun Il-bo. 1995. "Giving Chocopie to Rwandan Childern(르완다 어린이에 초코파이를)." *The Chosun Il-bo*, 4 May, 1995.

- The Chosun Il-bo. 1996. "US undersecretary of state asked to dispatch police forces to Yugoslavia(美, 한국에 보스니아 지원 요청)". 20 January, 1996.
- The Hankyoreh. 1994a. "Supporting drugs, worth up to 100 million won for Rwanda(르완다 약품 1억원 지원)". The Hankyoreh, August 2. 1994a.
- The Hankyoreh. 1994b. "Sending 100,000 USD to Rwanda(르완다에 10만달러)". The Hankyoreh, July 26. 1994b.
- Tumwebaze, P. 2011. "Kagame calls for new thinking on aid." The New Times, November 30. Accessed September 1, 2018. <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/37316>.
- Veen, A. 2011. *Maurits van der. Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Voice of America. 2011. "[Interview: Ambassador for Development Cooperation Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Busan forum will be turning point for development([인터뷰: 한국 개발협력대사] 부산세계개발원조총회 "원조개발의 새로운 전환점 만든다)". VOA, 25 November. Accessed September 1, 2018. <https://www.voakorea.com/a/forum-aid-134489363/1344869.html>.
- Yang, J. 2015. *The Changing Process of the Diplomatic Organization on the Region of the Republic of Korea: Focusing on the Effects of the Cognition on the Region*. Seoul: Yonsei University.
- Yoon, S. 2014. "President Park holds summit with Rwandan leader." KoreaNet, October 31. Accessed September 2, 2018. <http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=122551>.
- Yun, J. 2011. "Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda: Korea is a symbol of hope and challenge(폴 카가메 르완다 대통령, "원조받던 나라서 주는 나라로... 한국은 희망이자 도전의 상징"). Kookmin News, December 2. Accessed September 2, 2018. <http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0005614230&code=23111111&sid1=mis>.