Law and Directed Social Change in the New Nation-States and the World Public Order*

Suk Joe Kim**

A persistent question for all who are concerned with implementing policy in changing societies, the analysis of the interaction between authoritative decision ("law") and social change must become ever more urgent in this era of "modernization," revolution, and cumulative crises. The functions of authoritative decision in society vary to some extent with the nature of the social system and the goals of the society, but, in general, the authoritative decision serves both as a mechanism of social conservation and of social change. The political system can be thought of as a process whereby the perspectives—identifications, demands, and expectations—of the members of society are articulated, aggregated and promoted into authoritative decisions. The process of authoritative decision provides the context of relative stability within which these functions can interact. The constitutive process is authoritative power exercised to provide an institutional framework for decision and to allocate indispensable functions; "constitutional law" is the framework of basic rules for participating in the political process promoted, prescribed, invoked, applied, appraised, and terminated in the constitutive process. When there is widespread acceptance of and conformity to these fundamental norms and decisions, and common expectation about social behavior, there is a basis for authoritative social control and authoritative social change. "Social development" presupposes the effective operation of the authoritative decision process that directs social change toward a prescribed goal, if the contingency of social revolution is excluded from the concept. The "rule of law" also constitutes an alternative basis of social control to rule by a military-administrative regime.

* In writing this paper, I am indebted to Professor Myres S. McDougal and Professor Harold D. Lasswell of Yale Law School, who exerted a profound influence upon my intellectual growth.

** Lecturer in law of Seoul National University Law School and Full-time Researcher for the Law Institute of S.N.U.
or a monopolistic party that coerces conformity.\(^{(1)}\)

This paper is a provisional sketch of a framework of inquiry for law and directed social change in the context of the world social process. Given the enormous scope of task it is perhaps unnecessary to say more by way of disclaimer than to underscore the words "provisional sketch." And it is primarily submitted to the circle of legal science which, in the face of the unprecedented and apparently uncontrollable changes in our society, has been stubbornly concerned with the art of "interpretation" of the imported statutes and codes.

I. National Social Process in Developing States and World Social Process

Any student of the world social process can observe the emerging system of world order from the bipolar system of world organization that has dominated the last two decades.

One of the most salient features of this period is the increasing number of participants, especially the emergence of numerous territorial communities in the world social process in which the most active and important participants are nation-states. Most of them have been granted recognition as sovereign states, and 30–40 units are struggling to be born. The total impact of the expansion of participation and interaction goes beyond the fact that the national decision-makers and decision-units in those entities participating in the world social process are conditioned by their own national social processes. The direction, intensity and mood of social changes in the developing units vitally affect their policies projected into the international arena, eliciting various responses from the Old Powers and changing the patterns of the existing world system of national communities. On the other hand, the process of changes in those entities are conditioned by international environment. For example, the perspectives and policies of the existing world elite about what kind of a world order is preferred to be established to replace the classical international system are to have far reaching constitutive consequences in the society and polity of the new participants.

The perspectives of new participants have disclosed their support for, or rejection of, established myths in world arena varying in the direction and intensity. For instance, they are not unaware of the fact that many customary international prescriptions own their origin wholly to decisions or acts of great Powers. Their different expectations and demands of common interests have raised the question "why the new participants in a greatly expanded system should step obediently into the old clothes of an international order measured to fit the interest of

West.” (2) Outstanding indices have been found in conflicting claims to the extent of the control over ocean resources and to the regulation of capital flowing over the national boundaries. The elite of world community should in turn take into consideration such a new set of perspectives. From the point of view of inclusive policies of world community, the expectation of the active participants in the contemporary world social process is that international decisions involving the political and economic development in new nation-states are of the greater value consequences along with the maintenance of minimum order and the prescribing and applying of rules and procedures for the conduct of international relations. This is not to say that the active participants in the world power process have already projected comprehensive policies to meet the changes in the predisposition of participants and in the environment resulting from the “sudden and unprecedented expansion of international relation, both as to the human communites that participate and as to the interests involved.” (3) A discovery of a new conception of common interests only poses the question as to what extent traditional doctrines and procedure of international law clarify and implement the interest and they require change. (4)

The proliferation of the new participants also affects the pattern in which all participants interact. Expansion of interaction has rendered decisional situations more heterogeneous and complicated. Well celebrated are the impacts of mass participation of new members as “juridically equal” entities in universally organized arena such as the United Nations. The new states have not fallen behind the old Powers in establishing regional organizations, although they are less durable and tend to be more concerned with deference value process than welfare value process. In bilateral arena, the search for a more honorable and mutually beneficial modality by which a new state interacts with former “mother” states has been instable and tortuous. The process of “nationbuilding” is to a great extent affected by the patterns of the maintenance or cessation of interaction with the former colonialist state. Expectation of violence has been relatively high in the arena where new nation-states interact. The vested interests of the former


(3) Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, p. 156(1957).

(4) Lasswell, op.cit. supra note 2, at 2.
colonial powers may be at stake in some arenas, or the elite of a new nation-state may undergo profound anxieties in their search for individual and national identity and integrity. The high degree of uncertainty in such an arena may also be accounted for by a relatively low degree of value accumulation and institutional adjustment in one, some or all participants. Decision-makers may often have to face unanticipated precipitating events without any contingency plan. Those events may not allow them considerable time for a more rational response, and decisions are often expected to have high value consequences. Thus decisional situations in which the elites of developing nation-states interact may tend to be “crisis-like.”

One of the characteristics of the world social process since World War II is the constant flow of wealth from the richer nation-states to the poorer. The victorious superpowers came to be concerned with the minimum level of base value to sustain the social process in a defeated Power or destroyed ally partly because of the competitive power consideration. With the emergence of new nation-states it has gone beyond a temporary assistance for the purpose of reconstruction or defense. The giving of aid is not confined to wealth or means of violence, it includes other values needed for development such as skill, enlightenment and well-being. There is abundant evidence that perspectives of the giving of aid on the part of the industrialized states have gone beyond their expectation and demand of the preservation and expansion of their spheres of influence and the universal realizability of their myths and doctrines of social organization generated by political considerations and conditions in the contending systems of world order. For the first time in history, man has attempted to quantify the amount of food necessary to maintain well-being of world community members. The prolonged verbal discussions on the quantum of violence to maintain world minimum order are well known. The consideration of base values for developmental world social process is to include all values. The elites of the advanced industrial states have realized that the giving of aid to a developing state is not so much an occasion to fill power vacuums to consolidate the institutions of transnational order as a burdensome liability. It may well have been brought to their focus of attention that world public order can be strained by the weakness of new states which, despite the legal recognition of new sovereignties by other states, lack the level of accumulation of base values and development of institutions necessary for a sovereign territorial community process. Can we say that the recent trend in the world social process has been to generate the perspectives of authority in favor of a capable Power aiding those who are less well off?
The strategies by which the participants in the world social process manipulate their base values to affect outcomes have also been vitally affected by the expanded participation, interaction, strategical objectives and finally the heterogenous subjectivities of the targets.

The communication between the world elites is always conscious of the numerous audience. The giving and receiving of aid for the purpose of development has broadened the objectives of the inter-elites communication between the donor and recipient states. The personnel and facilities required for such interactions go beyond the category the maintenance of communication channel or military alliance. In order to face the challenges and opportunities of assistance programs, various skill groups of specialists on social development have come into existence in transnational arena. Here, the role of an economist, symbol specialist or specialist on violence is of greater value consequences than that of a classic diplomat. Through contact with many non-Western cultures, power positions in a vertical domestic plane has become more important as bases of diplomacy than skills and respect in a horizontal transnational plane.

The elites and masses in developing areas have become the targets of the global ideological strategies of world elites. The peoples of the former colonial countries desperately need respectable and widely acceptable interpretations of their past suffering, current backwardness and bright future.\(^5\) The most long-range and comprehensive ideological campaign by superpowers is to suggest the “developmental model.” Hundreds of gallons of ink have been spilled over to inculcate them in how to “modernize” themselves and their society in order to join “free world,” how to develop “state capitalism” for an expedited transition to socialism under “peaceful coexistence,”\(^6\) or to join the world peasants’ revolution to encircle cities of world.\(^7\) One of the significant consequences is that a power proclaiming itself a model to be emulated has become sensitively conscious of its self-image projected into the perspectives of the broadest audience in global history. Despite that such a Power itself includes various types of people and displays diverse behaviors in the international arena, the image held by any person is oversimplified, and serves both “to highlight presumed model tendencies and to contrast these with the characteristics of other nations.”\(^7\)

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The counter-ideological strategies against a rival are processed so as to repeatedly strike at these factors by magnifying its negative image. Thus the process of the making of American “China policy” may have been affected by the expectation of a comefitive “model” demonstrated by China as the first and major Asian nation to oust imperialists and install its own regime.”(8) A fascinating impact of the assembling process for ideological propaganda upon the basic community policy in domestic arena can be seen when the subjective matters of ideological communication involve the stereotyped image of the self held by others. “Racial integration” in the United States or the “Great Proletarian Revolution” in China may be outstanding indices, save that each has its own audience. In terms of the inclusive policies of the world community, one relevant question is to what extent the unprecedented expansion of ideological communication has increased the well-informed segments of the world population. This question is related to the hypothesis that “benign images of the world and a desire for cooperative involvement in it will more frequently be found among the well-informed rather than among the poorly-informed.”(9) The next question is: what are the total long range structural effects of the ideological communication upon the predispositions and perspectives of the self? A propagandist often has tendency to be persuaded by his own propaganda. The identification with the alleged goal varies with the frequency and intensity with which it is inculcated. What are the impacts of the narcissistic image of humanitarian, altruistic self reflected on the pond of the perspectives of the “underdeveloped” People upon foreign decision-making process? Or what are responses to the distorted image of the self?

The world community expectation proscribes the use of military strategy, particularly by a powerful nation against small one. But the flow of arms from the industrialized state to developing states has been a stable feature of the world social process. From the point of view of a superpower, to have a friendly military trained by its personnel and equipped with its arms in a developing body politic, in which a viable political organization hardly exists, creates vital conditions for the exercising of its influence. In connection with modernization, a writer pays tribute to the role of military: it may able to play “a key role in promoting mobility while maintaining stability, in facilitating change while preventing chaos.”(10) The expectation of a

(9) Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, at 84.
superpower that military assistance to the states within its sphere of influence bordering on its rival is vital to its global military strategy will persist. On the part of the elites in developing nations, the demands for arms will never cease, thanks partly to the expectation that a modern army is one of the classic attributes of a sovereign state or is necessary to maintain the control system of a military plutocracy in some areas. There has not been any conspicuous trend toward an inclusive policy to regulate the flow of arms beyond the boundaries of nation-states. But is such an expectation that any disparity in arms is to be balanced by a new delivery by the other side not being generated among superpowers? What are the impacts of the constant flow of the informations relating to the reactionary and corrupted military muddling with the plutocrats and annually staging coup d'état, or such an unsavory military conflict in which both combatants fight with arms supplied by the same power?

The elite of an aid-giving state has found that the use of economic strategy such as the deferment of a loan or cessation of aid can be as coercive as the employment of collective violence. It has often manipulated its control over values relevant to effective operation in the wealth process in order to attain the exclusive interests by offering aid to a regime which is not prepared for its effective use or by cutting off sorely needed assistance from capable a elite. It may be efficacious as temporary expedients; but frequent use based on competitive political consideration can generate bitterness and anger on the part of the target. On the other hand economic strategy can be used indulgently, for example, for the purpose of the renewal of a strained partnership or the reconciliation of national animosities. From the point of view of the world community, is the community expectation crystallizing any principles that provide guide of assembling and processing of economic strategy?

"Principle of multilateralism" asserts that "every advanced nation has a duty to contribute its share of the cost." "Principle of self-help" asserts that the elite of an aid-griving state acting in le décadement funtionell accept the capability and commitment of the recipient to development as criteria of assistance.

Another pattern of economic strategy has been employed by the elite of new nation-states that have effective control over base values relevant to operation of a private wealth organization of a capital sending-state. The strategical objectives may not go beyond a wider sharing of wealth produced by the private organization, but sometimes power is applied to expropriate

the assets. The intensity of response of the capital-sending state to expropriation varies with the
mount of the deprived assets and expectation of power the elite of the expropriating state can
rally to support its decision, the degree of stability of the rule, the degree to which its power
is self-conditioned and its relation with other Powers. The spokesmen of the nationalistic elite
assert the normative doctrine of convulsion theory. But the inclusive policies crystallize expecta-
tion that secures capital from expropriation without “reasonable” compensation, rather for the
maintenance of capital flow than for the interests of the expropriated. On the other hand,
excessive retaliation is also impermissible. (12) Note that the joint economic boycott has become
a recurring pattern of economic strategy manipulated by authoritative decision-makers of the
world power process.

Contact and diffusion of different cultures have posed problems of the eccentric frame of
reference to base values manipulated, that is, the different expectation of I:D ratio perceived
by the strategist and the target. A revolutionary elite or a new independent nation-state may
prefer deference value to welfare value. A moral principle-oriented elite may regard adjustment
of shared expectation as a betrayal to the principle. In a military arena, the elite of a develop-
ing nation often finds that the use of different rules of game is more advantageous to face
a superior adversary. When the base values are processed toward a target, the problems is the
degree to which value consequences are perceived as “important” by the target, that is, the
“predictability” of its response to the strategy——its endurability of deprivation or inducibility
to indulgence. Karl Deutsch writes:

The Western world has been surprised that its “rule of law” seems to be rejected by large
numbers of people outside the West, despite the obvious benefits of predictability which it
seemed to bring to them......They may have rejected the Western style “rule of law” quite
often because it did not predict their future, or because it predicts for them a future of
poverty, insecurity, subordination... (13)

The coming few decades may be empirically characterized as an era of social revolution.
New emerging elites of various culture, personality, class and interest will be introduced
into varying level of situational crisis. Is world community expectation crystallizing inclusive
policies of global strategies as to the complementary objectives, the right to revolution

(12) Consider, for instance the new classic expropriation case Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964) and its repercussions. See Han Key Lee, The Expropriation of Foreign
(13) Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 113(1962).
and maintenance of minimum world order? But, at the present moment, it can be said that the trend has been toward a common perception of base values to be manipulated in world arena, thanks to such factors as expansion of enlightenment and intensification of interaction.

A most comprehensive description of structural changes in the world social process includes analysis of the process of expansion of participants, and interactions (preoutcome), the expanded world social process (outcome) and its net effects on the process in post-outcome arena. We are concerned here with changes in decisional phases in outcome arena.

The gigantic changes in the whole phases of social process can be described in terms of the seven component functions of outcome phase. The emergence of myriad new participants, the conflicts and diffusion of their myths, the expansion, diversification and heterogenization of situation, quantitatively and qualitatively unprecedented base values at disposal and strategies to affect outcome have vitally changed and developed the theoretical categorization of the functions of the world social process. Much of the international prescriptions of colonial relations or characteristic of the house laws of the family of Christian nations may have been terminated, or only procedures are used to handle different contents of claims. And the trend has been also toward reappraisal and termination of classic cold policies. The process of prescription of customary international law has been characterized as “complications,” the “instability,” “the extreme slowness and defects of the old process by which law developed.” (14) This point can be explained as a consequence of the high increase in the volume of the flow of interactions and the diminishing homogeneity of participants and their perspectives making it difficult to identify customary behaviors. A most economical and scientific approach to observe and identify customary behavior may inquire into state practices in universal and organized arenas, particularly in the United Nations. Its existence, with the myth of universality and juridical equality, provides “a very clear, very concentrated, focal point for state practice.” (15) The United Nations, especially the General Assembly, has promulgated and impressive quantum of prescriptions, save that most of them are merely putative, communicating egalitarian and humanitarian myths of the community. There is no doubt that it is prompt in responding to precipitating events relevant to world community, suitable for a comprehensive and contextual exploration of the events and policies, adherent to the basic community goal values and effective in promulgative com-

(14) note 3.
munications to the audience thanks to the perspectives of the targets about its authority. But the total socio-psychological impacts of each prescriptive communication is to be empirically investigated.

Some industrialized states have promulgated “consortium” prescriptions to give aid to the less well off states. Are the prescriptive criteria being liberalized in term of the amount, and/or conditions, including a quid pro quo, for aid? A relevant question in application process of such a prescription is the degree to which the agencies of a recipient state (including private wealth organizations) are capable to represent the inclusive interests of their national community and to be responsive to their constituencies.

In a bilateral or sometimes in a multilateral treaty prescribing process in which a developing state is a prescriber, doctrinal community policy is concerned with the base values at the disposal of the participant. Can we say that the community expectation is crystallizing such a doctrine as the “principle of assessing the value positions of the parties” in the process of claims to the content of the prescription?

The intelligence function of the world social process related to the developing nations has been specialized to the gathering, analyzing and projecting of information relevant to “modernization” of those societies and politics, the role of “developed” states in the modernizing process and the emerging nation-states and world order. The bulk of the task has been done by the scholars and policy-advisors of the developed nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United Nations and other specialized international organizations have also been accumulating impressive descriptive data. As far as general informations and knowledges are concerned, they are widely disseminated rather than withheld, due partly to the fact that they are part of the content of ideological communication directed at the developing nations as well as at the domain of the developing states themselves. One of the fantastic effects of the researches on development of the new nation-states is the development of research skill itself. The comprehe-

(16) The system-bound character of positivistic social science, the basis of “modernization theories,” has been described in a variety of ways, including “parochialism,” “ethnocentrism,” “provincialism,” etc. For a brilliant criticism of positivist social science, see Syng Ek Moon, The Theses Against Positivist Political Science in Some Contemporary Political Writings (Ph.D. dissertation, The Florida Univ.: 1968). Irving Louis Horowitz, for example, would go so far as to use the phrase “sociological imperialism.” Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills, p. 35(1965).
nsiveness and cotextuality of the intellectual task demand the mobilization of all scientific disciplines, and the cross-cultural study requires comparative methods mostly borrowed from anthropology and sociology. Hence the trend in the contents of information has been toward empirical description as far as "academic" works are concerned. This is not to say that they are free of doctrinal taints, or that the bulk of "news" to which the rank-and-file are exposed are not prescriptive. Most of the "theories" on development are recommendative, directly or indirectly aimed at the authoritative decision-makers of the aid-giving state. It is quite natural for the elite of a developing nation-state, having been victimized by western colonialism and exposed for a considerable period of time to such counter-ideological communication as "imperialism" or "neo-colonialism," to look askance at the "theories" recommended by the enlightened scholars to their powerful policy-makers.(17) The role of the influential participants in the intelligence function includes the promotion function. Since "foreign aid has no lobbyists," moral leaders of the Earth and symbol specialists committing themselves to the development goal have almost exclusively performed the function. Any promotional strategist must focus on finding or fabricating a set of symbols of enough inclusivity to attract, concentrate, and manipulate the base values of the world community for the purpose of development. If we can say that the principle of capability(17) or the principle of world community responsibility(18) is burgeoning in the expectation of the world community, promotional strategies must focus on how to transform the principle into international prescription. A most relevant question here is again the capability and responsibility of the "have-nots" to articulate and aggregate their interests to make favorable doctrines prescriptive. (18a)

The doctrinal ambiguity and relative exclusivity of development policy has made invocation and application unstable and complicated. In most cases, invoker are the elite of developing nation-states, pointing out the deviation of the aid-giving states from the alleged shared expectation to the authoritative decisionmakers of the letter, or bringing the precipitating events to the focus of attention of the decision-makers. The latent, direct target of the invocatory strategy may not always be the elite of the aid-giving state. When the objective of invocation is to make the respect value of the elite subject to possible deprivation, invocation may be made in

(17) Lasswell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4.
(18a) C. do Visscher expresses a pessimistic view on this matter: the transition from State to international morality will never take place by way of a mere spatial broadening of the present moral attitudes of men. Theory and Reality in Public International Law, p. 95.
organized international arena. Since the control over the base values and strategies relevant to development has largely remained in the hands of the elite of the aid-giving states, the invocatory claims to the conformity to the alleged national community policy are likely to be of greater global value consequences.

A most sanguine view of the development trend by any national decision-maker of a superpower, or of new nation-states, or the participants in the appraising function of the world social process cannot fail to perceive a widening gap between goal and trend of events. The trend in events in the new societies and polities has not been toward viable democracy, nor expedited transition from "state capitalism" to socialism, nor the glorious fatherland the new elite dreamt of. But the process of value accumulation and institutional development is on-going. Can we say that the quantum and speed of accumulation, the intensity and speed of institutional adjustment is not lagging too far behind both the rising expectations and demands of population and the changing events in world arena?

II. The projection of the Shape of World to come

The sketch of the current features of the world social process relevant to value accumulation and institutional development in the developing states provides grounds for scanning the contour of the trend in the future.

The attainment of maximum shaping and widest sharing of value is intimately bound up with the development of technology and science. Despite their spectacular success, the course of the diffusion of science and technology and science from the originating centers has been marked by its slowness. The enlarged outputs in a locality thanks to the introduction of new means of production has led the economic interests of that locality to search for translocal markets. Hence a new pattern of alignment between the elite and wealthy of the locality emerged:

At some stage in the spread of these economic activities, power institutions entered the picture. Seeing the local market diminish, local producers turned to politics in order to exclude foreign competitors and to protect their local positions, or strong competing manufacturers equally interested in translocal trade and raw materials, turned to politics in the hope of obtaining exclusive market.\(^{19}\)

However, when the local elite is not powerful enough to provide the local manufacturing interests with a shield against a superior translocal competitor, the wealth process in the locality

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is “vertically” integrated into the translocal wealth process. One of the most salient features in
the course of such interactions is the trend toward the decreasing in the degree to which the
distribution index of values in both world arena and in the locality and the trend toward the
increasing in the degree to which wealth value is agglutinative.

Yet such a phenomena is not a novel one. History abounds in evidence that whenever a super
power and the possession of a technologically advanced culture coincides an imperium is likely
to emerge. Viewed in a “high, time-free perspective embracing whole millenia of historical
world-forms,” there appear “world-city” and “province” as the transition process “from Culture
to Civilization” is accomplished. From these periods onward, the ever fatalistic Spengler
maintains:

The great intellectual decisions take place no longer all over the world where not a hamlet is
too small to be unimportant, but in three or four world-cities that have absorbed into themselves
the whole content of History, while the old wide landscape of the Culture, become merely provin-
cial, serves only to feed the cities with what remains of its higher mankind... In place of a world,
there is a city a point in which the whole life of broad regions is collecting while the rest drains
up.\(^{(20)}\)

When its power was at its crest, and its civilization diffused, the center of the imperium was
entroned at the apex of the pyramid of the value distribution index of the imperial
body; the subcenters at the middle; the peripheral areas at the bottom. In many civiliza-
tions, “barbarian” groups never shared the advanced civilization; on the contrary, they
used to be permanently relegated into castes and dependent peoples.\(^{(21)}\) But in view of the
complicated and fluid balancing relation in the contemporary world situation, this anecdotal
generalization only emphasizes the distinctiveness of the current conditioning factors and the
uncertainty of their constellation in projecting the shape of the world to come. First, we can
think of the spectacular advance of science and technology, thanks to accelerated effects of base
values in industrialized countries in contrast to the slowness of their flow into developing
entities.

Now the gap is so great that the main thrust of advancing technology have little immediate
relevance for countries just beginning to enter the state of constant innovation... The effort to
introduce the most advanced forms of technology can lead to inefficiencies, to highly irrational uses

\(^{(20)}\) Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (Helmut Werner ed.), p. 26(1928).
\(^{(21)}\) Lasswell, *World Organization and Society, in The Policy Science*, p. 102, 106 (Lerner & Lasswell
ed. 1951).
When this factor is related to respect values, the problems become more complex.

The next factor is the prevalence of egalitarian and humanitarian myths. The articulated participants in the world social process, almost without exception, pay now at least lip service to human dignity.

Thirdly, one must note the ever-shrinking Earth thanks to the spectacular increase in speed and volume of the flow of information and transportation, in the intensity of interactions in world arena, and finally in the expectation of interdependency among the world community members.

Now we can pose here the fundamental question relevant to projection of the future: what are the total impacts of the culminating events upon the expectation of existing world public order......the current patterns of value distribution, and of basic value institutions, which are sought to be protected by severe sanction.

The stability of a public order can be most cursorily described in terms of authority and control. It varies with the intensity of perspectives of the participants(both elite and mass) in the political process to sustain the status quo. We are aware that one of the coming syndromes of disruption of social order is the rise in intensity and frequency of utopian symbol manipulation. Is there any, or can we identify any utopia gaining momentum in translocal arena? A convenient clue to the question is the signs that utopian symbol specialists use. The classic European Marxism as a revolutionary utopia is withering away although it will continue to function as ideology in the European “Socialist Camp” in discernible future. In most of the recent revolutions, the symbols of identification have tended to be relatively parochialized. A number of small centers of revolution are created, and the extent of diffusion is localized. Perhaps, the most significant feature of the trend relevant to the revolutionary symbols of identification can be characterized as the coincidence of the two most influential and sentimental symbols in the world revolution of our time. The reference here, of course, is to the class line going along with the boundaries of the nation-states, the under class being peasantry rather than proletariat. It is pertinent here to bear in mind that four-fifths of the people in the world still live in village, and the control over 75 per cent of resource capabilities remains in the hand of 25 percent of world population that are almost exclusively in North America and Europe.

(22) Pye, op.cit., at 12.
The gap is also "geometrically" increasing.\(^{(23)}\)

The intensity of perspectives to sustain a public order is also a function of the expectation of the pattern of value distribution in a social process. Historical materialism asserts that the mode of production conditions the pattern of distribution; the control system of a society is stable when "policies relating to value shaping and sharing are in the same hand."\(^{(24)}\) In many peasant landlord societies, the protected feature of public order is that the regime is dominated by a land-owning class, helping the landlords to extract rent from the peasantry. They use political police and specialists in violence to keep the peasants on the land, their burden of rent rising with the increase in population. Or where mercantile interests undermined the agrarian order, the landlord-plutocrats' control over the instrument of violence maintains the public order while the peasants are paying for the initial accumulation of base values necessary for industrialization.

The rise of value expectation and demand varies with the increase in the communication and interaction with urban areas (local or translocal) where the degree of value actualization is relatively high. Translocal interaction with a culture with a highly advanced technology brings to gap between value demanded and value realized to the focus of attention of the peasants and counter-elites. The universalization tendency of modern education can also ironically be a factor in undermining the stability of public order. One of the characteristics of the enlightenment process in developing nations is the emergence of a large number of lumpen intellectuals. Sooner or later most or some of them may find posts of one sort or another, but the relevant point here as to the stability of social order is that their value positions do not conform to their value demanded and expected. The lumpen intellectual, "an extremely suspicious man" "because he has read a lot,"\(^{(25)}\) is the potential source of recruitment of the counterelite. Hence any western advisor cannot fail to give warning against the over-production of university trained students without a future.

Bearing in mind these conditioning factors, we turn to the task of cursory projection of their future impacts upon the shape of world public order.

The possibilities of total annihilation of man or complete segregation of "haves" and "have-

\(^{(23)}\) Note, for example, the Lorenz curve that gives an overall picture of the low degree of wealth value distribution-index. See Deutsch, op. cit., at 240.


\(^{(25)}\) The czarist police dossier characterized Gorky as such.
not" are excluded here. Theoretical model of changes in a public order holds a continuum, from minimal changes in the present pattern of value distribution and basic institution to total disruption of the present public order.

First we can think of the continuation of the present pattern with minor changes. Actually history shows that the glory of an imperium lasts in the "mirage of immortality" even for centuries without sharing its advanced civilization with the relegated "barbarians." In this contingency, the present structure of world castes will be perpetuated; the dependent people will become more and more subjugated to the centers and subcenters of world civilization. More miserable plight of deprivation will girdle the Earth with "population explosion." A low level of wellbeing may cause a sudden fell in population rise. The world elite and wealthy will attempt to bail out the local elite by piecemeal realization of value-demand and expectation of the masses. But "tranquility" will be punctuated by desperation. The following description of cyclical changes in mood of the peasants is indicative:

During many years...even generation...the countryside may seem solid, obedient, unchanging. Then suddenly an epidemic of peasant (or slave) rebellions surges against the manor or the agent in residence, burning, pillaging, and destroying. Startled landlords and urbanites listen in shocked disbelief to the outrages perpetrated by the "childlike" peasant whom they "know so well," and whom they have often been able to "bring to their senses" with the aid of foreign or urban armies.\(^{(27)}\)

C. E. Black predicts ten to fifteen revolutions a year for foreseeable future in the less developed societies, in addition to the many forms of domestic strife in the societies that are more developed.\(^{(28)}\)

The second contingency is the emergence of a new world revolutionary crisis. Since our hypothesis is that the degree of the susceptibility to the inculcation of utopia varies inversely with the intensity to sustain public order, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries will be in the reactionary camp in this picture of revolutionary warfare. So far, the most comprehensive, as well as controversial, utopian strategy was advocated by Lin Piao in his tribute to the "People's War." He perceives the emerging pictures of world features as division between warring camps of the rural poor and the rich cities of the west, the former protactedly

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encircling and finally conquering the latter. The content of this kind of political myth is, of course, to be determined by its function in the world political process rather than the matter of fact of which it purports to describe. The relevant question here is whether the revolutionary myth is comprehensive enough, and appears “scientific” enough to seize upon currents already present in developing societies and to give them expression. This utopia is what we may call “restriction by functional differentiation” in that it rejects the initial world revolutionary pattern of Communism in the name of new key symbols, the “peoples” in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Bolshevik Revolution was “betrayed” in that the “modern revisionists” are the winners, not the people. Since it does not articulately formulate the procedures by which a local counterelite takes over power through social revolution (Note that not every country in the world has a vast territory to make a “Long March,” or a jungle to entrenched.), or how the revolutionary peasant states align with one another to impose the “protracted” encirclement on the West, its main focus is on miranda aspects. Although it does not provide unequivocal and effective symbols of identification (for example, by excluding the West as a whole, it appears to be contrary to the tradition of Marxism paying verbal tribute to the common humanity., it does express a conspicuous current of collective mood of the “underdeveloped” and “have-nots.” The mechanics of colonialism planted the seeds of disturbing doubt about the worth of the self. Colonialism is not simply content to impose its rule upon the present and future of a dominated people; it turns to the past of the oppressed, and distorts, disfigures and destroy it in order to convince the natives that colonialism came to lighten their darkness. Hence, it was with the greatest delight that they discovered that there was nothing to be ashamed of in the past, but rather dignity, glory and solemnity. But the formal withdrawal of colonialism has not ended their crisis of identity. The pervasive imperial civilization in the world arena with its ubiquitous influence is impinging upon them, directly or indirectly driving them to follow the same path it passed through scores of years of even centuries ago. So an African nationalist exhorts:

Come, then, comrade, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, as long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed with the desire to catch up with Europe......Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature.

(29) Lasswell & Kaplan, op. cit., p. 283.
(31) Ibid. at 252—3.
The elites and masses in developing nations now live a time of unprecedented changes in whole phases of the social process...the people themselves, the values they seek, institutions, and resource environment. Since one of the most significant "causes" of social change in a traditional society has been its interaction with a technically advanced culture, it may be said that the process of political socialization takes the form of acculturation to the culture. This culture transformation invariably involves personality reorientation with the following well-known sequences of acceptance or rejection of novelty:

Individuals in culture A, after non-attention and rejection, idealize culture B, and either desert A or seek to revolutionize it. At a later phase of partial incorporation of myth and technique from B, B becomes a target of active rejection. Ultimately a complex blend of elements from A and B becomes relatively stable and acceptable.\(^{(30)}\)

In case of total acceptance, a member of the acculturated groups becomes a more or less marginal man, overwhelmed by the imperial prestige of world civilization, being fascinated by the beauties of advanced science and technology, and desperately attempting to solve all anxieties and personal insecurities in surrendering himself to the ever-stretching shadow of the imperial glory. The attitude of rejection varies from the call for the total fall of the West to a philosophical exhortation of creativity. While the former groups is likely to be smug in their island of "civization," the latter groups attempt to create and manipulate symbols and myths in the search for personal and national identity. The efficacy of those symbols and myths as revolutionary utopia and ideology depends upon the extent to which they seize upon the image of man current in: developing nations "in whom men of all walks of life are able to recognize in decisive clarity something that seems right, something they want, they need to be."\(^{(33)}\)

We are aware that the future *strum und drang* in developing nations does not so much depend upon the subculture of the Westernkzed, what Pye calls "island of stability,"\(^{(34)}\) but upon the interaction between the innovators of symbols and myths and the masses, for..."the scene is set for the prophet, for the ideological reformer."\(^{(35)}\) Fortunate is the one who is able and gifted to present so grand a political myth (including the image of the self) as to arouse enthusiasm among the masses. However, this is the beginning of the long tunnel, at the end of

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\(^{(34)}\) Pye, op. cit., p. 289—90.

which a dim light can hardly be seen. For a *homo religiosus*, the crisis of ego integrity is a life-long and chronic crisis, in addition to his early identity crisis.

Although aware of the relativity of all the various life styles which have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life style against all physical and economic threats. For he knows that an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history; and that for him all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes.\(^{280}\)

Since the style of ego integrity is developed by their culture, in a sense, the peoples in changing societies as a group undergo a long and chronic identity and integrity crisis caused by the diffusion of world culture. Hence any respectable and widely accepted symbols and myths should be related to the acceptance of one’s one and only culture and nation as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitution. It is not anachronistic adherence to the past, to the parochial culture; it means a new, a different love of one’s parents, culture and nation,

But the crucial question relating to the interaction between a great ideological leader and the masses has yet to be answered, for such social myths require to a great extent self-righteousness, and he is likely to be seduced by the fact that

all people, because of their common undercurrent anxieties.....feel an intense need for a rejuvenation of trust which will give new meaning to their limited and perverted exercise of will conscience, reason, and identity.\(^{281}\)

The sense of mission, of righteousness and appropriateness of his policies, without which there can be no effective political socialization and true leadership, has negative effects upon the predisposition and perspectives of the masses, from the need for dignity and suffering of which his rebellion allegedly starts, The disturbing crisis of an ideological emerges when he must recognize what his inculcation has done to the expectation, demand, identification, and predisposition of the masses. But before he begins to doubt, “the best of them will fall asleep at the Gethsemane; the worst will accept the new faith only as a sanction for anarchic or destructiveness or political guile.\(^{282}\)

However, this is not to justify the role of the world elite as “a collectived Metternich” against social revolution initiated by these ideological leaders and countermasses. History abounds with

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\(^{281}\) *Ibid.* at 262.

\(^{282}\) *Ibid.*
evidence that “feeble and decadent societies do not undergo revolution, that revolutions are, perversely, a sign of strength and youth in societies.”(39) The more or less open societies of our epoch have passed through a civil war or a period of revolutionary violence in which certain features of the old public order were destroyed. This destruction, the violent break with the past, made it possible for the social struggle to continue within a democratic framework.(40) A society, after revolution, emerges often stronger in some respects from the conquered fever, immunized in this way or that from attacks that might be more serious.(41) Without apologizing so much for violence, one must recognize in historical perspectives that in some situation the longrun costs of moderation are likely to be fearful as, or more fearful than, the costs of revolutionary violence. Thanks to competitive political considerations and conditions, the trend in the policies of the world elite for local revolutions has been toward intervention to maintain its value position in the locality where the revolution takes place and in world arena. Experience shows that the intervention of a superpower in a social revolution prolongs and translocalizes, or even globalizes the local revolutionary crisis unless the revolution is immediately “pacified” and the old public order is restored. Of course, the “peace” here refers to quite different subjectivities when the participant in the aborted revolution is landlord and effendi, or peasant. It is pertinent to note the hypothesis that a revolutionary crisis varies in intensity and frequency with the degree to which a rule is tyrannical.

Total withdrawal of full, friendly contact from a territorial community group may lead the isolated group to delusions about what the rest of world is doing and thinking, and increase the general anxiety level of everyone through lack of reassuring contact. On the other hand, overcommitment, overpresence, and intervention of a world power, with its concomitant technically advanced culture, generates resentment, bitterness and expectation of deprivation of respect values on the part of the locality, and may lead the local elite to total rejection of the Power as an entity.

we considered the most violent contingency in which, in order to maintain its value position and public order, the world elite relies upon police actions to pacify local revolutions without admitting new and rising participants to a larger share of values. The authoritive decision-

(39) Brinton, op. cit., supra note 8.
(40) This point is the main theme of Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (1966).
(41) See supra note 8.
makers of the most influential nation-states, acting as le dedoulment funtionell, are not unaware of the following proposition relating to constitutive process:

Systems of public order destroy themselves when they rely to an exaggerated degree upon one policy among the set of policies upon which the protection and fulfillment of the system depends.\(^{(42)}\)

If a most sanguine observer cannot fail to recognize the unmistakable trend that the world elite is more and more relying upon negative sanctions, while sharing of value cannot meet the rising expectation and demand to a substantial extent, he also cannot fail to notice the increasing appraisal of the inherited policies. Can we say that world community expectation is crystallizing the strategy policy that the task of decisionmakers in world arena is to guide the local revolutions to successful development at a relatively moderate human and resources cost, and to the maintenance of world minimum order? Is a world power supporting the status quo generating expectation that it would be better off by staying out of a local revolution than by belling with the hounds of the awakened multitudes, and especially the awakened intellectuals of Asia, Africa and Latin America and running with hares of the old ruling class? Is still another Power, claiming itself as the champion of revolution, generating expectation that any social revolution, if it is going to be a revolution at all, can be made only by indigenous social movement and the muddling with it is of little value consequence? Are any new criteria emerging for the formulation and elaboration of inclusive interests of world community during a local revolutionary crisis? The principles of “non-intervention in domestic affairs” are far from novel; but one of the most challenging intellectual tasks of the contemporary specialists on international authoritative language is to revise and complete these principles and procedures to meet exigencies of a changing world.

Thirdly, we can think of the contingency in which constellation of conditioning factors is more favorable to the realization of our goal, world public order of human dignity. It is pertinent here to recall the following statement:

The genuine champion of human dignity must be completely sensitive to tremendous continuing discrepancies, when the world as a whole is concerned, between his goals and actual achievement. The productive facilities of the globe, and now of outer space, have just begun to be tapped, and wide disparities in the distribution among peoples’ existing values must shock the conscience of us all.\(^{(43)}\)

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Through the procedure of empirical specification we are able to ascribe operational indices to the conspicuous features of the contemporary world social process in order to discern the contour of trends rather toward, than away from, the realization of the basic goal. Whether we perceive the process of development as a temporary wave that runs high in our day, only to subside as new shore lines are cut; or as an expedited phases in a permanent sharing of value assets between the relatively well-off and the relatively less well-off communities within world community, we must go along with the expectation that a stable flow of wealth, skill, enlightenment and other values into a developing unit, at least for the developmental period, is almost a sine qua non for the attainment of approximation toward a self-sustaining level of value accumulation and institutional development. And no nation-state alone has control over enough base-values to meet these demands and expectations.\(^{(44)}\)

It can be said that the impacts of competitive political consideration and condition upon aid process has been decreasing, or the capital-sending states are likely to be more approximate toward clarification of their valid interests. The receiving states are more prepared to make effective use of the assistance received. Such inefficiencies in administration process, as "amateurishness" or "indiscriminate basis," have been modified. But diminishing interest in competition may lessen the quantum of flow of aid. In many corners of the world, criticism and reappraisal of the practices of aid in bilateral arena can be heard. Senator Fulbright of the United States, among others, focuses on the impacts upon deference value of a recipient state and its feedback effects upon the subjectivities of aid-giving state:

Charity corrodes both the rich and the poor, breeding an exaggerated sense of authority of the part of the donor and destructive loss of self-esteem on the part of the recipient. There is an inescapable element of charity and paternalism in bilateral aid……, it fosters cranky dependency or simple anger on the part of recipient and of self-righteous frustration on the part of donor…….\(^{(45)}\)

Then he advocate principle of responsibility that asserts transformation of aid, through intern-
alization, "from private charity to community responsibility, from a dubious instrument of national policy to a stable program for international development." Whether this is realizable depends upon changes in the expectation of the aid-giving states about such a policy. There have been attempts to internationalize the aid process, for example, International Development Association which provides long-term loans at low interest rates. However, a scanning of the trend in the expectation of the active aid-giving states will disclose the fact that contributions to international agencies cannot be increased to a substantial amount unless the contributor has effective control over their aid-policies. It is obvious that an inclusive authority in charge of aid process is preferable. But any scientific observer should take into account the time element, that is, the time lag between the need for flow of capital and generation of favorable expectation to such an inclusive authority. If we focus not on the procedural component of the principle, but on "responsibility" and capability, we can say that world community is generating expectations that, given the common interest in value optimizationalization on a world scale, every participant is under an obligation to contribute to the development of all, and especially of the most disadvantaged; and that the obligation is positively correlated with available assets. Percent of gross national production has been introduced as criteria for the assessment of capability. For the genuine implementation of principle of capability, percent of per capita income is more rational criteria.

The question is, in the final analysis, whether a transition is underway toward a world public order including aid process sustained by threat and use of severe sanction. Thanks to increasing interdependency and interaction, the trend in constellation of conditioning factors has been toward the fostering of expectations that the "haves" will be better off by giving aid to the less well-off, and deviation from the expectation will be met by severe, rather than mild, deprivation. It is a time-honored strategy of the ruling class to adopt affirmative policies that would enable its members to maintain a large part of their value position by the tactic of admitting new and rising elements to a larger share. The expectation of nation-states and members of the world community about the degree to which they affect others and are affected by others has reached the breaking point, although still less intense than the equivalent among national community members, at which the value position of world elect can be best maintained or better off by providing less well-off for sanguine expectation of future and a high

(46) Ibid., at 223.
degree of value realization to generate perspectives that they would be better off by sustaining present features of public order rather than disrupting it. In the long run, in the words of former President Johnson, “the wealthy cannot survive as island of abundance in a world of hunger, sickness and despair.” Another consequence of the proliferation of new participants and the high degree of interdependency is egalitarian and humanitarian myth that runs high in our time. Every active participant in the world social process employs at least verbal homage to equality and dignity of human being as the ultimate symbol of identification. But no one is to be deluded by these rosy factors into the belief that the present trend is toward approxiamtion of the basic goal value. It can be predicted that the intensity of the giving of aid is likely to be more affected by crisis level than by expectation of indulgence......a stable development in a recipient state. An Oriental proverb says: No mother gives milk to a quite child. If turbulence occurs in a body politic within the sphere of its influence, a world power will first handle the situation in “police terms,” then attempt to win the “minds and hearts of the people,” if one is willing to use the ill-doomed words. The historical question is the degree to which a Power possessed of capability is able to articulate its valid interests. This point is related to the fact that latent predisposition in the body politic sets limit on what is sought to be done and how. It is to be noted that, in most of the capital sending-states, the degree to which the elite is responsive to its constituency is relatively high. Hence, assuming that the elite has fully committed itself to the valid interests, a relevant question is ideological strategy relating to aid process aimed at the rank-and-file. For instance, we are aware that it is very hard to separate genuine humanism from a sense of charity; or that the flattering of ego is much effective to convince one to support for such a seemingly remote goal. But this is the very cause, especially when it is related to the search for exclusive interests in aid process, that corrodes congeniality and respect between the participants, of which effects certainly will feed back upon the constituencies.

III. Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision and Directed Social Change

We have sketched the problems of social development in the broad context of the world social process. Now we turn to the situs where the development is supposedly taking place.

A. Goal Model for Social Development

We may say that “modernization” in our time is the critical increase in the speed, intensity
and scope of change in social process that has occurred partly as a result of the explosive proliferation of science and technology in recent centuries. A new pattern of value shaping and sharing emerges; a certain level of value accumulation is required for a self-sustained, effective operation of social process; and historically evolved institutions are adapted to rapidly changing functions. Hence the effects of the modernization process are structural changes in predispositions of population, resource capabilities, and institutions.

We can define a goal model of social change terminal states of which differ from one another in fundamental characteristics. Through the clarification of goal, the discovery of salient trends, the analysis of conditioning factors, the projection of future contingencies, and the invention and commitment to alternative policies, social change can be directed toward the preferred model. The asserted goal must be explicit, empirical, widely acceptable to the active participants in social change and in aid process, and conform to the world community expectation. Such a goal and subgoals are likely to be achieved at different tempos in different sectors of a nation and in various nations. Comparative study of social change discerns a set of uniform functions to be served in the developing process, by different societies with different histories, traditions and institutions. The prescribed goal model is also to function as an ideological symbol; thus the components, contrary to the function, must be excluded from the definition. Efforts should be made to avoid implying that the goal is equivalent to “Westernization” or “catching up.” It not only sets definite stages of development which is expected to be impossible to attain at some discernible future, but also is likely to elicit predispositional elements, latent in a developing body politic, not favorable to the asserted goal. The active participants in the process of social change are aware that they are lagging behind industrialized states by scores of years, or in many cases one or two centuries, if their goal is to achieve another Europe or North America.

If we want to turn Africa into a new......Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us.\(^{47}\)

Their acceptance of this fact encourages expectations that western societies are not the best all possible societies. The elite and masses in a former colonial state have not been impressed when the former mother country introduces an economic model which she has not been able to realize at home. They are also aware that no one in the west, especially a symbol specialist,

\(^{47}\) Fanon. *op. cit.*, p. 255
is enthusiastic to see a reflection, even in ideal one, of his society and his thought with which from time to time he feels sickened. The western specialists on transequilibrium symbols often seek for an escape in the Orient only find an imitation, often a misfit, of themselves, and then turn to its past which has ceased to exist.

The basic goal must be empirically specified into subgoals that differ in time span, extending from long-range through middle range to immediate periods. In inventing, evaluating and committing to value maximizing policies to be related to the basic goal through operational indibles, one relevant principle is gradualism. Ignoring current predisposition in the body politic is not only self-defeating, but also contrary to the goal the policies supposedly seek to attain. The pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or from his privacy, to break him and kill him. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the more "acculturated" have tended to be replaced by the less; the leaders as they become more aspiring lose touch with their people. Hence,

the caravan should not be stretched out, for in that case each line will hardly see those who precede it; and men who no longer recognize each other meet less and less together, and talk to each other less and less.\textsuperscript{(48)}

This is not to say that developers in transitional societies should be idle in bringing changes in environment to their focus of attention. The elites of the transitional nations must remind themselves of the failure of their ancestors to estimate the significance of the then present for the future. Transnational trends and prospects must be kept in view if favorable opportunities are to be seized and adverse circumstances nullified. In empirically specifying less long range, and more particular, objectives in the context of immediate policy urgencies, the principle of contextuality is relevant. To put it in military terms, victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole. We must keep policy questions related to the assets and liabilities in a particular context; but the exigencies are not to cut off the minimum level of the contextuality of the policy to the basic goal.

The scientific investigator or developer must define the social changes which he assumes to be the goal model. It serves as a departing point for research to describe the flow of outcome events during any selected period. An inclusive preference model prescribes

\textsuperscript{(48) Ibid.}
(1) a pattern of participation in value shaping and sharing and
(2) a pattern of basic institutional structure.

After the current value model and institutional pattern is characterized in view of the preferred model, the basic goal may be evaluated and reconsidered. By clarifying the preferred pattern of value institution as widespread participation in all values and modern institutional form, it becomes possible to pinpoint the level of value accumulation that is required to achieve the goal. From the point of view of the world community, the theoretical model holds that:

at some discernible future every nation on the globe will achieve a minimum threshold sufficient enough to support a self-sustaining level of accumulation of values in modern institutional forms.\(^{49}\)

By the idea of "self-sustaining growth" we mean that "the preferred model, once established, can perpetuate itself as a system of public and civic order."\(^{50}\) It is possible to describe empirically the dimensions of the preferred system of public and civic order.

B. Directed Social Change and Authoritative Decision

Social change is a process in which participants seek to maximize net value outcomes by employing institutions, and affecting resources. Changes always take place in the entire context of social process, and participants respond continuously to the changing environment in different direction and with varying degree of intensity. Their responses in turn feed back upon the social process. We cannot speak of the "dominant factors" or "causes" of social change; but rather we speak of the interdetermination of a set of variables each of which is correlated with the others.\(^{51}\) It may be possible to identify some of the initiating factors of change in a particular context. But the more important questions are concerned with tracing repercussions of change once it is initiated throughout the entire social process, including feedback effects and the "backwash" of modification of the original direction, intensity and scope of change.\(^{52}\)

In a sense, social process is endless interactions among the members of a society influencing and being influenced. It is possible to direct the pattern of future interaction toward the preferred level of value accumulation and institutional forms by affecting the policies (projected goal values and practices) of the community members. The participants in the social process can be influenced toward the preferred change by, for instance, a moral or religious leader.


\(^{50}\) note 2.

\(^{51}\) See Lasswell & Kaplan, *op. cit.*, xvii.

\(^{52}\) Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 494 (1951).
The developer must invent a set of strategies to get the support of the highly influential in terms of the weight, domain and scope of their influence. Social change still can be directed more effectively toward the goal model by decisions (policies involving a threat or use of severe sanction). What is implied in this assumption is not a tribute to coerciveness, but rather the rationality the expectation of the influenced as to the I:D ratio affected by the policy. Decisions relating to social change can be taken by naked power, for instance, revolutionary forces or “atomic” groups. But we are concerned here with perspectives of authority in the sense that they are made by authoritative decisionmakers and in accordance with criteria established by community expectations. By the community expectations we refer to both world and national community expectations: a local revolution may be permissible according to the world community expectation, or expropriation without “reasonable” compensation may be in accordance with the local community expectation. A decision is “authoritative” when it conforms to the expectations of both the world and the local communities about its appropriateness. An authoritative decision, by definition, involves the total process of bringing about a specified course of action. To be a decision, a policy formulated and promulgated must be applied. One reason we relate the authoritative decision to social development is the expectation of its effectiveness, a relatively high degree of conformity, on the part of those who are affected, to the goal values and practices projected by policy-makers. Hence all those “development programs” and statutes purported to facilitates modernization are not authoritative decisions in the degree that they are widely disregarded, although they may function as ideological symbols.

A fundamental question about any authoritative decision process is the role laid down for government. We speak of “governmentalization” when the state authority increases in its domain and scope. The scope of government may be such that the authoritative decision process encompasses the entire social process. Transitional societies exhibit a less integrated and coherent social process, which may be partly accounted for by the various degrees of their acculturation to the world culture. The elite committed to social development often attempts to change the predispositions latent in the body politic, resource capabilities, and value institutions by increasing the jurisdiction of government. The application of such policies are limited by the expectations and demands expressed in the social order, or mores and countermores. We are aware of such rulers as Peter the Great, Mustafa Kemal, and the more coercive Mao Tse-tung who were able to change, in the accelerated tempo and intensity, the social order through authoritative decisions. But, in many cases, the enlightened rulers as they become more idealistic come
to face stubborn resistance from the social order; their initiation for social change is “washed back,” or they lose their power bases.

An overriding assumption throughout Western political theory is that a “natural and presumably self-evident connection” exists between authoritative decision process and social process which dictates the pattern of the former be only a reflection of the characteristics of the latter. Although the two processes are affected by each other, the dynamic element is assumed to lie permanently within the social process.\(^{(53)}\) A set of functions are categorized for the effective operation of the social process. The functional categories are derived from the social and political system in which “structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent.\(^{(54)}\) This categorization is to be accepted as problematic......and therefore as a topic requiring further research.

The social process and the authoritative decision process are related through promotion function. Thus, in a sense, the entire social process can be designated as two flows of social actions: “inputs”......claims, and non-claim expectations and demands (opinions and desires) by the participants in the social process upon the authoritative decision process whose responses to them constitute “outputs.”\(^{(55)}\)

One of the significant characteristics of the political process in developing areas is the low degree of interdependencies among suboutcomes, especially intelligence, appraising and promotion functions on the one side, and prescribing, invoking, applying and termination functions on the other side. When we speak of social development directed by the authoritative decision process, a basic assumption is the effective operation of the “boundary maintenance system” between the social process and the authoritative (governmental) decision process, and among the sequential phases of the suboutcomes. In the bodies of politic in which society is relatively highly governmentized, often by the political order, headed by a charismatic ruler, the pattern of the boundary maintenance system can be characterized as the arena of intense ideological campaign, as observed in Nasser’s radio and newspaper.\(^{(56)}\) But most of the developing nations do

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\((55)\) The discussion of this circular pattern of social and governmental actions is found in most of the literature on American interest and pressure groups; see V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics Parties and Pressure Groups* (1958); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (1951); David Easton, *The Political System* (1951).

not have an integrated and coherent political process penetrating into the social process. It is useful to think of these bodies politic as possessing not a single and integrating political process but many only loosely related political processes. National political processes tend to be primarily centered in urban areas; usually they are “a phenomenon of capital cities. Assuming that the elite, committing itself to social development, has attained the crucial degree in the effective operation of the internal governmental process in terms of all its functions, perhaps the most important constitutive policy should be focused upon the modalities by which the subsocieties and subpolitics are to be integrated into the national community process, and the promotion function in the comprehensive social process.

C. Development and the Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision

The investigators of non-western politics, often dismayed by “......the gross deviation in the performance of the governmental functions from the constitutional and legal norms,”(57) tend to place stress on the effective power process, sometimes unjustifiably disregarding the importance of the authoritative decision process. It is true that a careful examination of formal governmental structures and their formal authorities would yield little of predictive value, and is uneconomical. But a scan of the constitutive codes can be one of the effective clues to identifying the basic features of the authoritative decision process in the functional sense. Similarly, a glance at enterprising, supervisory, regulative and corrective prescriptions, although it may disclose only a formal emulation of the codes of the former mother states, can be a starting point for describing the protected features of the public order. The trend analysis of the decisions of the courts and of the patterns of the claims made upon them will also disclose the fascinating trends in the social and political changes. Since our aim is to approximate the social change to the preference model through the rational and effective operation of the authoritative decision process, a careful examination of the process in a body politic is the overriding intellectual task.

The pattern of participation in value shaping and sharing and of basic value institutions may be protected by severe sanctions (public order), or mind sanctions (civic order). The distinction is functional one; hence we must identify the protected features of the public order, apart from the legislative statutes, in order to predict the direction and intensity of support for, or rejection of, the projected policies.

In the aggregate flow of the authoritative decision process, the “constitutive process,” which

(57) Almond & Coleman, op. cit., p. 52.
specializes upon the decision process itself, providing an institutional framework for decisions and allocating indispensable functions, is to be discerned.

We accept such distinctions between "traditionality" and "rationality," "diffuseness-specificity," "ascriptive achievement," and "universalism-particularism" in pattern variables as continual and problematic distinctions. Our objective is the ascertainment and recommendation of policies and strategies for shaping the constitutive process of a developing body politic as a vehicle for the direction of social change toward the preferred pattern of participation in value shaping and sharing and of basic institutions.

The concern of this part of the paper is delimited to the description of the basic features of the constitutive process characteristic of a developing body politic and to the recommendation of constitutive policies and strategies with special regard to participation.

1. Participants (with perspectives)

All participants in the social process of the national community act in the constitutive process of authoritative decision process. Included are not only the "citizens" of the state but all those who interact in the internal and external community process.

Personality

Most of the elites in developing nations, including even some of those in the traditional oligarchal bodies politic, now manifest the perspectives of social development. Many of them are recruited from the symbol specialists who are highly acculturated to the world culture.

Due to the uncertainty in the political culture, the socialization process fails to give people a clear sense of identity. As can be seen in Pye's thesis on the relevance of personality to nation building, during the period of cultural changes man of power perspectives are the most disturbed over their own sense of identity. Their political "we," which lies at the center of their political life, has been repeatedly shattered. Before a nation can develop, elite and symbol specialists must emerge who have found integrity in their quest for identity and who can hence speak in terms that can bring meaning to the masses' search for personal identity. And yet, thanks to strum und drang in social and cultural change, their identification processes are perpetually disturbed; and the crisis of their ego identity is life-long and chronic. Nasser says monologically:

Our thoughts are an effort to explore within ourselves...to discover who we are and what our

role is to be.  

Some of the elites of developing nations may have the “memories of a sunny meadow at the beginning of the road of life.” But most of them have passed through the greyish childhood of a lower middle-class-family,” or of the “childhood of darkness, hunger and dependence.” The time-honored inhibitions and colonial rule, which prevented an individual from being “what and who he thought he knew he was,” may have disappeared. But from the chaos and tension growing out of the weakening and termination of the traditional social order, and the rather ceremonialized transfer of sovereignty, emerges “the problem of what he should believe in and who he should......be or become.”

We are aware of the shadows of frustration which fall from childhood on the future political personality. A number of them have been educated in Western universities. Since it had been an established policy of the colonial Powers to bring promising young students of their colonies to the mother country to be raised as the prospective political elite of the colonies, some of them already had early political socialization from their participation in various nationalist movements. Those educational institutions may give them a sense of pride; but also may appear to them as another part of the dominant world civilization, the rising prestige of which overwhelms them and generates morbid doubts about the worth of the self. For them profound conflicts frequently arise between what they are taught and how their subconscious personalities are molded. It was not so much in the class-rooms of the universities of London or Paris, but in the shabby clubs and cafes, dingy rooming houses and tiny cluttered offices of their nationalist organizations that the colonial students were politically socialized and found some degree of personal as well as national identity and integrity.

As they have become active participants in the power process, the manifestations of their attitude toward the West have varied from the total submission to the Western authorities, to the exalting of the self by humiliating the West. It is interesting to note that the power elite more submissive to the world powers tends to be more authoritarian in its domain. In addition to the fact that, in such a case, the conditions necessary for the exercise of power usually do

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(59) Lerner quoted this phrase in The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 214.
(60) Trotsky, Mein Leben, p. 1.
not lie in the support of the masses, but its sentimental identification with the world power, Erich Fromm's on the authoritarian personality is pertinent. The power elite, whose sense of strength and identity is based on a "symbiotic subordination" to the dominant prestige of the World power and civilization, at the same time, is likely to subjugate those submitted to its authority to a symbiotic domination.

This is a state of sadomasochistic symbiosis which gives him a sense of strength and identity.

By being a part of the "big"... he becomes big; if he were alone, by himself, he would shrink to nothing. (63)

Through value deprivation or expectation of deprivation by the sidereal power he may occasionally turn to the internal arena only to find a reflection of the humiliated self. His personal insecurity may become more morbid; and his identification is withdrawn to the family or clique, often indulging in fetishistic collection of personal fortunes. On the other end of the continuum, the relish of tremendous hostilities against the West is also the manifestation of the incomplete solution of the crisis of ego identity and integrity. The rebellion grows out of the deeply-rooted expectation ex post of deprivation of deference values by the colonialist powers. The power elite, declaring total dissociation from the world power, is compelled to explain the present backwardness and postponement of the achievement of the glorious fatherland without blaming the self. Hence, the question is to forget or not to forget the past. Nasser speaks of:

The crisis of millstones... a revolution which obliges us to unite in one phalanx and forget the past, and another revolution which demands that we restore lost dignity to our moral values by not forgetting the past... (64)

The rebellion against authority demands that the self itself be an authority. The intense motivation of achievement calls for radical social change. We are aware that the history of societies records "the rise and fall of upper classes, elites, and priesthoods which in their aristocratic aspirations cultivated one the other ego values, giving true comfort and providing true progress." But then for the sake of the survival of their petty hierarchies they learned to exploit the anxieties of the masses which they at first alleviated. (65)

The fundamental assumption in the directed changes toward a society of humanity is the emergence of the elite which is composed of the individual who has found ego identity and

(64) Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, p. 44.
(65) Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 278.
integrity and is identified with the human suffering of the people. He is not a victim of masochistic subordination to the powerful, while demanding sadistic subordination from the powerless; nor is he prey to escapism from the imperial prestige of the world civilization, intensely demanding on the self petty achievement while the masses fall asleep at Gethsemane. Nor is he an aloof spiritual noble who is reluctant to join in the vicissitudes of human drama, to commit himself to the rational policies which may result in the temporary deprivation of respect values of the self. The genuine nationalism is the identity and integrity of the ego and the nation. It is a post-narcissistic love of the ego and nation which conveys a sense of world order, a productive relatedness to the world outside which permits the individual and nation to respond authentically, A man of national identity and integrity is the one who is identified with humanity and therefore transcends the narrow limits of his own society; and who is able, because of this, "to criticize his or any other society from the standpoint of reason and humanity." Hence this is the premise of the world order of humanity. We now observe the emerging of the new generation of the elite in developing nations. It does not possess the bitter memories of colonialism, nor has it experienced the thrilling drama of participating in a nationalist movement, in which current leaders often recovered from the adolescent senselessness of existence and the futility of rebellion. Its solution of identity and integrity crisis may be more complete thanks to the exhortation of national culture by the present elite, and its response to the world outside itself may be less compulsive thanks to a relatively high degree of ego security attained after independence. But we also do not fail to see the syndrome of the coming parochial or authoritarian personalities. Indeed psychopathology of world politics is directly related to the constitutive policies as to the participation. The tentative expectation is that more exposure to the mainflow of the world social process will facilitate the quest for identity and integrity of the youth of power perspective so far as he identifies himself with the humanity of his people.

The overriding constitutive goal as to participation is the widest participation in the power (both effective and formal) process. Our concern with elite here is not in any sense to be eliteistic, but is a concern with political personalities conducive to the popular government.

(66) A political personality that fits this description may be late Nehru, whose over-the-life-size shadow fell upon the international as well as domestic political processes while he was alive, but whose traces can hardly be found in the basic features of Indian society in death.

This means that the policy-makers assume that economic development goes along with political development; in the process of value accumulation and institutional innovation, the overriding concern is with the responsible participation of the masses.

Subnational Communities

The national boundaries of the many African states are the legacy of the outer bound of the control areas of the colonial Powers. When Nigeria went rampaging into internecine tribal massacre, to the astonishment of the western scholars and politicians who had sentimentally admired that state as having achieved the model democratic government for Africa, the problems of incoherent and disintegrated subsocieties and subpolities under the facade of “viable” democracy were again brought to the focus of attention of the world community. If transnational extractive interest comes into the scene, its alignment with the elite of the subpolity is likely to lead to a cessation movement.

It is where different perspectives of authority are geographically segregated rather than dispersed, that we face the most difficult problems relating to the application of the constitutive policies, by the use of negative, and especially violent, sanctions. The participant in the intelligence function must investigate the image of, and attitude toward, national community and the other subsocieties held by the active members of a subsociety and their conceptions of right and wrong. He must keep the constitutive policy questions related to the goal values of those subnational communities.

Class

The direction and tempo of social change can be economically traced by investigating the pattern of class structure. The reference is to a set of social environments that affect the predispositions of each participant in the social process.

In traditional agrarian societies, one of the most characteristic feature of the power process is a prevalence of the interclique interactions. The conflict and contest for a higher power position and potential are not among representatives of various interests who seek power in order to favor these interests. Rather, they take place within the power caste, or at least among those who serve its interests. Room at the top is so limited, and competition for its occupancy is so keen, that the incumbent elite is unable to recruit itself with a minimum dissent. The annual ceremony of the coup d’état can be successful only when it leaves the current control system intact, and confines itself to the distribution of spoils among the members of the ruling

caste.

Thanks to lack of the situations in which the community members accumulate and enjoy deference values, the ideology of caste is perpetuated.

The _peasantry_, while the process of industrialization and urbanization weakens and destroys the rural communities, is without a power base for mobilizing its alignment and promoting its demands on the decision-makers. There have scarcely been such issues basic to the history of Western politics as the clash between industry and agriculture, between town and countryside. However, the increase in the interactions of the peasantry with the urban area and continuing plight of deprivation change the established myths among the rural masses, generating a new conception of their common interests and of strategies to manipulate their power potential. Indeed, the fundamental strategy of the “people’s liberation war” is aimed at the establishment of a unified system of political communication among the fragmented rural communities by the counterelite, through which utopian symbols are manipulated. Hence the relevant constitutive policy here is to generate a sanguine expectation of the future through effective operation of the national communication system without increasing the value expectation and demand of the rural masses beyond the resource capabilities and predispositions latent in the body politic.

The most significant feature of the geographical mobility in the transitional societies is the constant flow of the rural masses into the urban area. Due to the bankruptcy of the peasant economy under the pressures of population growth and commercialization and the gross disparities between the standard of living and career opportunities in the urban centers and is the villages, they are being pushed toward cities only to become slumdwellers. Since this pattern of migration is not a function of industrial development, the urban centers are unable to provide employment. The _lumpenproletariat_, although, as Marx pointed out, lacking politicalized perspectives, is predisposed to violent anomie actions. Their value expectation and demand have increased after exposure to the demonstration effects of the urban life; they are uprooted, crowded, and often unmarried. A typical violent demonstration is usually processed by politicalized students followed by the _lumpenproletariats_. This slums and ghettos are the arena of chronic tension and political agitation. Since national politics are centered in the urban centers, especially capital cities, a minor anomie action in the cities can render the mood of the whole body politic tense and unstable. Unless we are able to solve the problems of this fantastically increasing number of lumpen and quasi-lumpen proletariat, the scene is always ripe for a social-revolutionary crisis. We adhere to the well-known policy of preventing abnormal urbanization without the
concomitant industrialization by actively assisting the rural economy.

The conditions and considerations in the wealth process of developing areas are not favorable to the emergence of a local entrepreneurial class. At the early stage of industrialization transnational extractive and manufacturing interests entered the picture, in many entities aligning with the local power elite. When the rule of the local elite is not based on popular support the translocal wealth organizations become active participants in the effective power process. Although the control over the base values relevant to the effective operation of the wealth process remains in the hand of translocal extractive or manufacturing interests, an industrial working class grows out of the employment of the local people. Thus, reversing the historical sequence of developments in the West, a labor movement may become a political force before the native capitalists do. Here, the audience is conducive to the manipulation of the two most sensitive symbols of identification, nation and class. In order to prevent expropriation or redistribution of wealth, the transnational owners of enterprises may attempt to elevate the industrial workers to a privileged position by partially realizing their demands and expectations. But where local manufacturing interests producing consumer goods for domestic enjoyment, rather than raw materials for export, actively participate in the wealth process, it is in the interests of local manufacturites to raise the standard of value enjoyment of the peasantry, possibly even to advocate land reform. A conflict of interests with landowners then may result. As the influence of the local manufacturing interests increase, they demand that local power institutions enter the picture to protect their infant industries.

\textit{Interests Groups}

The reference here is to groups that are less inclusive than former categories (of communities and class), or cut across them.

\textit{Symbol Specialists}

Advanced enlightenment has been a more important asset than any other value in determining recruitment to the ranks of the power elite in many developing bodies politic. The enlightenment institutions are the recruiting grounds for the elite and coutelitite. Those with advanced enlightenment have dominated the national political scene. During their studies, the "intellectuals" are acculturated to the industrial civilization. They expect and demand a higher standard of value enjoyment and accumulation through technological progress and popular participation in government. They come to identify themselves with political myths and systems embodying these values, whether they be American free democracy, Western European democratic socialism or
Communism. Their intense demand on industrialization and realization of the society to accord more with their perspectives politicalize their practices. Nationalism is useful for both symbol manipulation (against colonialism, "neo-colonialism") and self-assurance. A politicalized local entrepreneurial class is infant or does not exist. The control over the resources relevant to the effective industrialization remains in the hand of transnational wealth organizations or local aristocrats. Under these conditions, the government appears to be the only possible major domestic source of capital, and politicalized intellectuals demand control over it from the ruling caste.

History of societies records the rise and fall of politicalized intellectuals who, at the dawn of a civilization, converted their utopian myths into social levels, seeking to transform the whole of a way life, but then the succeeding generations, as the maturing civilization has blunted their sense of incongruence between mentality and reality, became smug with withdrawn pursuit for "sophisticated" enlightenment, admiring their functionally differentiated role as "scholarexperts."

In many developing bodies politic, we observe now a process of disintellectual groups that participated in the struggle for independence. A schism occurs when those who are in power, being indulged in the exercise of authority, become dissociated from the enlightenment class. As the expediency interests become more pronounced, their image of themselves as intellectuals wanes and they become more sensitive to the predispositions of anti-realpolitik of their old comrades. This drift toward schism aggravated by competitive political conditions and considerations. The opposition, due in part to the permanent oppositionism that has run high in the political perspectives of intellectuals from the period of colonialism, becomes the magnet which draws the intellectuals.\(^{69}\) The selfrighteous and narcissitic image of the self as the representative and vanguard of the suffering nation held by nationalist revolutionaries during their struggle for independence continues to remain in their power perspectives after they took over power. Now they regard themselves and state as identical and all those who disagree with them as "enemies of the state."

when the utopia seems to be betrayed and ideology rings hollow, the symbol specialists become apathetic to the established myths. Some may withdraw to less inclusive symbols of

\(^{69}\) The origins of the inclination to oppose constituted authority seem, at first glance, easy to locate: where it was impossible to share in the responsible exercise of authority under the colonial rule, opposition was in fact the only alternative. See Shils, op.cit., *In Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, p. 217—9.
identification, and politics is likely to become the arena for opportunism. While these are prey to despotic inaction, the others have been predisposed to activistic extremism, envisaging themselves as a Robespierre, a Lenin or a Guevara.

The incorporation of the intellectuals to their societies depends to a great extent upon the establishment of an equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of intellectuals. Hence a relevant policy here is not to overproduce university graduates where caste has disappeared. But in a body politic which is dominated by the power caste, the increase in the number of symbol specialists will undermine the authoritarian rule. Where the intensity toward militarization is high and local entrepreneurial class has yet to emerge, the policy must favor the increase of university graduates.

Administrators

For any authoritative decision process, as Max Weber pointed out, The existence and continual functioning of administrative staff is vital. To paraphrase his hypothesis, a policy process can be effective only if and when policy-prescribers and policy-applicers have a common conception of interests and perspectives, not speaking of the response of those who affected by the policy. (70) Except for those who were able to organize their own counter-administration during a process of social revolution, most of the political elites took over the administrative staffs trained by colonial Powers. Pye observes contradictory impressions which the Burmese civil service offers:

it is peculiarly attached to the past and to conserving established practices and yet it is also commonly identified as the principal agent for modernizing the country (71)

Solidarity and cooperation between prescriber and applier can be maximized when the former has the control over base values relevant to the effective operation of the latter. The pattern of interaction between authoritative decision-makers and applicers vitally affects not only the decision process itself, but the culture of the body politic. This topic requires a further research. We pose the complementary goals, on the one hand, a high degree of organization (cooperation and solidarity) between politicians (prescriber) and bureaucrats is a necessary condition for an effective operation of authoritative decision process, but on the other hand an independent applier is required for practical and mythical reasons.

(71) Pye' op. cit., 213.
Specialists In Violence

The military is a most powerful participant in a body politic in which other interests groups are not so highly organized. African militaries, through a succession of coups, also demonstrated their significance as political elite. In Latin American arenas "the last step in a military career is the president of the republic" is a well-known and frequently practiced precept. At an early stage of modernization, military can be a factor for an accelerated social change. However, it is the recruiting grounds of authoritarian political personalities who are predisposed against libertarian rule. Where the military is aligned with power cast, the achievement of a popular government is permanently postponed. If the demand on militarization continues to increase, transnational power institutions enter the arenas. An excessive militarization by a body politic is to be followed in the contiguous bodies politic, even in the arena in which the expectation of violence is low.

Labor Organizations

We mentioned above the early emergence of working class in developing nations. In many African territorial communities, the union has served the dual role of representing the interests of workers vis-à-vis management and at the same time providing a structure and leadership cadres through which a comprehensive nationalist party could mobilize support for nationalist objectives. This fact politicalized the perspectives of union members; and their symbol of identification is rather African than working class. Thus the union program often includes demands for higher prides for farmers, for higher wage and salary levels for manual and clerical workers, a larger share for African merchants, nationalization or profit-squeezing of foreign corporations, and land reform of European estates. In the process of organization, powerful unions in mother countries (British Trade Union Congress and French CGT) have often given them

(73) It seems that any description of the military, the basic function of which lies in domestic politics rather than in the defense of the community, cannot help but import sarcastic tones. For instance, consider Hobsbawm's description of the "members of that curious esoteric world": Separated from the rest of society by a life (in peacetime) consisting of fancy-dress, instruction and practice, games and boredom, organized on the assumption that their members at all levels are generally rather stupid and always expendable, held together by the increasingly anomalous values of bravery, honor, contempt for and suspicion of civilians, professional armies tend almost by definition to ideological eccentricity... They are, moreover, untrained and unaccustomed to cope with unusual situations, and therefore naturally seek to assimilate them to usual ones. *How to Plot Your Takeover*, The New York Review of Books, Aug. 21, 1969, p. 14.
substantial assistance. It may account for the fact that unions in African smack of internationalism. In southeast Asia union development has been closely related to the nationalistic intellectuals who regarded them as the most "progressive" class in struggle for independence. Where industrial workers are well organized or in the process of organization, the perspectives of the community are to a great extent affected by union activities. Union may be a means of providing political socialization for a class of community members that has little opportunity to participate in nationalist parties. In a national community which is an aggregate of many only loosely related subsocieties and tribes, unions have contributed to national integration and "detrivalization." A fascinating index is development of a common communication among workers newly recruited form different vernacular communities. At an early stage, workers' communities are polyglot, and then a workers lingua franca emerges. The trend in the perspectives of unions has been parallel to those of intellectuals. The rather polticalized, comprehensive and ambiguous union goal is not to be accounted for by the interference of poltical influence, but by the low degree of industrialization and of functional differentiation.

Other groups that affect the predispositions and perspectives of the participants in the power process must be also examined. It is well-known that rectitude institutions perform important power functions in many bodies politic. Where transnational extractive or manufacturing interests are involved, investigation will disclose that a foreign wealth organization is a most powerful participant. Racial group is especially relevant where population is racially bipolarized. If a political order is prevalent, its study amounts to the investigation of the entire effective power process of the body politic.

Generation

We attempt another conception which has relevance to the perspectives of the participants. The reference here is less biological: Where social change is rapid and extensive, the conception of participants interacting under similar situational conditions at the same period of time is useful for the examination of salient trends in the social process. The median age in most non-western states is in the low twenties. Ideas and symbols deeply felt by the current elite may have little meaning for the younger generation. Their expectation and demand may have been affected by the relatively early achievement of the present leaders. The continuity of constitutive policies is a function of the continuity of perspectives of the elite. The symbol manipulation in the transnational arena may ring hollow to a generation which has not experienced colonial rule. It may demand more value-actualization and value realization in domestic arena focusing
upon extreme change in the protected features of public order. The abnormal gap in political orientation between generations will increase expectation of violence.

2. Myths

We mentioned above (III A) the mythical aspect of the preference model. We are now concerned with the pattern of the basic political symbols current in a society with regard to that model. Historical materialism asserts that man's consciousness changes "with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations, and in his social life." But we are aware of other factors that account for the rise and fall of ideologies and utopia. Political myth for a social group is affected not only by "mode of production" and class by culture, personality and crisis level. The classic hypotheses of "idealism" and "materialism" are relevant only when they are related to a particular context. A directed social change hypothetically holds that "the political ideology of a group is, for other purposes, the starting point, the point of entry for change, not its product." As Tawney noted, the secularization of political ideology has "profound" impacts upon the perspectives of the community members. Mang traditional religions stress the importance of the smallest and most direct units of social organization as symbols of identification. The realization of an ideal society is postponed to the other world, and an ideology of caste is petrified. Since the inculcation of a utopia is perpetually prohibited, the political myths focus upon the ideal personal characteristics of the members of the castes. But as political myths have been secularized ideologies and utopia put stress on the constitutive pattern of the society and the ideal society of the future. The perspective of authority is the most economical and effective base value for a high degree of conformity of outcome of decisions to the projected goal. The general function of the political ideology is, in Mosca's word, answering "a real need in man's social nature of knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual forces, but on the basis of a moral principle." After the successive falls of charismatic leaders or in the vacuums they left, we begin to appraise "grand ideological solutions" in developing nations. Ideology of progress and humanity must be formulated and promulgated in a particular context to serve the attainment of the goal. In elaborating formula, doctrine and miranda, all factors relevant to the acceptance or rejection of the political myth must be investigated. Ideology of progress becomes operative when

(74) Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does, p. 423 (1962).
(75) Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, p. 228 (1947).
(76) Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 71 (1939).
decisions of great value consequences are accepted by elite and masses as appropriate for development. It may be phrased as *ideological authority*.

3. *Arena*

Political development is, in a sense, innovation, and adjustment of existing interaction arena to, or establishment of new interaction arena for, the changing political functions. In the process of social change, the old patterns of interaction situations weaken and are destroyed before a new pattern emerges. Due to lack of value accumulation and ineffective operation of intelligence function, transnational modal institutions which the local decision-makers perceive as most advanced have been often introduced without regard to the internal need of the society itself. The most controversial theme throughout doctrinal struggle is often what kind of a formal governmental structure should be adopted or innovated. This is not to say that the introduction of transnational authority structures are of no significant impact upon the social process. For instance, in those cases where direct rule was employed, there were drastic changes in the formal structure of government which ran far ahead of the changes in the societies at large. Where indirect rule was practiced, the formal structures of government have been inadequate to the task of guiding or controlling the pattern of change even during the post-colonial period. In view of adequacy (with particular reference to economy and structural adaptation), while *pretended* formal structure of interaction arena must be avoided, constitutive policy-makers always pay due regard to the “normative” function of the formal structure. It is pertinent to note Pye’s point that the effective operation of the social process toward nation-building depends upon “whether the traditional pattern behavior tend to reinforce and give greater substance and clarity to the modern *super structure* pattern relationships or whether they tend to undermine and disrupt the superstructure.” *(77)*

4. *Base Values*

Any value is composed of a pattern of symbols (including predispositions) and a resource pattern. In part social development is changes in predispositions and resource capabilities. Since we mentioned above a part of the problems as to the pattern of symbols and predispositions related to development, we confine ourselves here to making a point on what has continuously

*(77)* Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*. But by urging a manifest position for a specific public issues, the practices of segregating political arena from communal interaction situations must be developed. This point is, of course, related to one of the characteristics of “transitional politics;” the political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal relations. See *Ibid.*, at 16.
disturbed the genuine champions of human dignity. In many developing nations, trends in the process of social change are, at best, toward reiteration of what happened in Western Europe one or two centuries ago. We are aware of the plight of deprivation of the masses, revolutions and wars during the period of industrialization. While areas were drying up, the laboring classes worked like oxen, and the capitalists saved and accumulated like bees. Were Keynes to write the “Short view of China” today he still would prefer “the mud to fish.”

But also note his mordant phrase:

Every day that the moral problem of our age is concerned with the love of money, with habitual appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities of life,....with the social approbation of money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social appeal to the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision for the family and for the future.

Indeed the alternatives for, in Walt Rostow’s words, “the more humane processes” of capital accumulation must be invented and the responsible participants in the world social process should commit themselves to the goal.

5. Strategies

The constitutive strategic objective is the maintenance of freedom of the body politic from external dictation, and also of the integrity of the authoritative decision process from internal interference. Hence constitutive development is aimed at the national integration of loosely related subnational social processes with special regard to subnational power processes. A body politic in developing areas is often divided geographically, ethnically, nationality-wise, culturally, linguistically and/or ideologically; and the conception of appropriateness of a policy is likely to be geographically segregated, rather than dispersed. The most important strategical proposition against a divisive section of community favors

a policy of continuous moral pressure designed to divide the conscience of the local minority against itself. The result can be furthered by offering positive inducements in support of policies that hasten the social transformations that work against the order attitude.

In order to investigate support for or rejection of a policy a more effective intelligence function in the procession of strategy must be innovated. The rules and procedures for adjusting and

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(78) Keynes, *Short View of Russia*, p. 47.
(80) Rostow, *An American Policy in Asia*.
(82) Ibid., p. 231; also see Lasswell, *Legislative Policy, Conformity and Psychiatry in Psychiatry and The Law* (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1955).
reconciling conflicts between subnational communities must be crystallized and prescribed.

Ideological constitutive strategy is aimed at the inculeation of national goal by persuasion. Transemirical symbols, charisma, expectation of violence in the international arena or monumental constructions (such as dams and highways) have been important base values in the process of national integration. Among these symbol patterns transemirical symbols are operative so far as they do not impede developmental change under the name of national unity; and responsible decision-maker should abandon the antique tactic of fabricating crises to achieve internal "unity." But the establishment of the monumental constructions can be both symbolic and practical, with their imposing appearance and their dramatic effect they give the nation a sense of accomplishment and national goal, which are necessary for the effective operation of ideology of progress. The relevant resource capabilities are various means of communication. At an early stage the radio may enter the picture, and with the increasing level of literacy the newspapers and magazines follow. For the effective operation of the boundary maintenance systems the urgent problem is to establish a unified communication system, to have a common frame of reference.

6. Outcomes

The social process as a whole is an endless chain of human interactions divisible into outcomes, pre-outcomes, and post-outcomes. The various culminations show a pattern of interrelationships which can be described as a system. The outcome in the power process is decision, which is broken down conveniently into seven component phases: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination. Within a constitutive system each phase serves the equivalent function. Since the flow of collective operations passes through one (or every) outcome phase in any imaginable sequence, the interdependencies, differentiation and continuity among the component functions are relevant to the effective operation of any decision process. Through our comprehensive framework of inquiry it is possible to predict how any flow of decision outcomes will influence (and be influenced by) all other decisions. And any change in decision outcomes can be related to the more comprehensive social process.

Intelligence

The intelligence function comprises decisions as to the gathering, evaluation and dissemination of information relevant to the operation of the social process. The growth of the "nerves" of the political system is a necessary condition for political development, and it is also a function of social development. In the social process context, one of the most relevant indices to devel-
opment is the growth, range and effectiveness of internal communications among participants (individuals, groups, value institutions, communities and political systems at various levels). For any participant, development of policy process (private or public) requires a more effective use of data recalled from memory and information and more accumulation of enlightenment. Since we are concerned here with the constitutive decision unit, it means developmental changes in intelligence resource capabilities relevant to decision-making predispositions (with regard to responsiveness to new informations)......in Karl Deutsch's phrase, "a growth in the facilities of memory and recall, and thus of institutions of learning, record-keeping,......the variety and effectiveness of channels for the intake of new range of information;" and improvement in goal-seeking operations through increasing the "synchronization" of communication by the innovation of communication patterns and modification of inertia or resistance in response latent in predispositions.\(^{(83)}\)

The constitutive decisions as to intelligence function can be summarized as who is allocated what kind of a competence (mandatory, permissive, forbidden) to disseminate or withhold what kind of informations to or from whom in order to accomplish what goals. It is time-honored practice of any political elite to manipulate the flow of informations to shape socialization that generates the perspectives of authoritativeness of its rule on the part of the domain. Hence the control over the communication channels is as vital for sustaining the rule as the control over instruments of violence. Many palace revolutions in underdeveloped areas indeed start with the occupation of the instruments of communication by instruments of violence. When the news of the "revolution" begins to tap the perspectives (of the elite and masses) of the authority structure, it has almost succeeded.\(^{(84)}\)

In traditional societies, the intelligence functions are performed through the mouth-to-mouth communication systems which operate only within each of the fragmented autonomous sub-societies and communal groups. The informations flowing from the outside world are interpreted by group authorities. The enlightenment caste may disregard practical knowledge and skill as this worldly, endlessly speculating on the eternal truth or the meaning of the universe. The emergence of secular enlightenment, institutions and mass media has undermined ideology of caste. But due to weakness or nonexistence of the local entrepreneurial class and to political


\(^{(84)}\) For a recent addition to the literature on \textit{coup d'état}, see Edward Luttwack, \textit{Coup D'état: A Practical Handbook} (Knopf, 1966).
considerations of the elite, it is difficult for the newly introduced facilities of communication to function as instruments for impartial, independent and reliable operation of intelligence function. Falling short of serving as a vehicle for development of competitive politics, the communication channels often are jammed with ideological propaganda to perpetuate the current rule.

Directed social change requires expansive application of empirical research on the decision-making process. While it is almost inevitable for the elite to rely exclusively on the local intelligence functionaries for decision-making relating to the maintenance of minimum public order, transnational specialists on development independent of any political affiliation should be available for decisions relating to optimization of value shaping and sharing. This may also contribute to filling the alarmingly widening technological gap in the operations of decision structure between industrialized states and developing states due to the spectacular expansion of capacities of recall and memory and of prediction of myriad probabilities in future contingencies brought about by the computer revolution.

Promotion

That promotional phase of decision is in some ways the most distinctive mark of advanced politics has been already pointed out. Promotional authority (and effective power) is dispersed among various groups rather than concentrated; promotional interaction arena between society and polity (or elite and masses) is a two-way traffic, rather than a scene for unilateral output operations. Active promoters play a regulative role to maintain and balance interdependencies and consistency among suboutcomes of decision structure as a realistic problem solving vehicle. Hence development is in a sense creation of effective organizations participating in promotional phases of decision process.

By a political party we mean a group formulating comprehensive issues and submitting candidates in elections. An election is a coordination of votes (units expression of support or opposition to a proposed decision) both formal and effective. This definition also serves our goal of developing competitive politics. The logic of the widest possible participation in power process is not so much sentimental as necessary for the clarification of national goal value and of a conception of common interests during the period of nation-building. Thus, we must identify political groups approximate to the genuine political party.

Political "parties" in developing areas are likely to be political orders in terms of election pattern and Weltanschaung Partei in terms of perspectives. Hence opposition parties and counter
elite tend to appear as revolutionary movements. Where the form of rule is autocracy or oligarchy, what are called "parties" are often merely the facade of power caste. For instance in South East Asia, non-communist "parties" are mainly ideological propaganda and public relations organizations for the ruler entrenched in the army, bureaucracy or mandarinate.\(^{(85)}\)

It is difficult for opposition groups to organize a responsible party because the employment capabilities remain almost exclusively within the hand of government. Joining in the opposition groups often means risking the subsistence level of well-being. While we recommend policies to assist the most democratic element in the body politic, it is assumed that competitive and persuasive politics cannot be achieved without the emergence of politicalized entrepreneurial class.

The difficulties which trade unions face are also similar. They are often controlled from above by political elite or employers. A set of regulative codes supposedly to protect the workers may be prescribed by the governments only to be disregarded, or at best, putative. The dependence of trade unions upon the political elite decreases the degree to which union leadership is responsive to its constituencies; it fails to articulate the workers' interests and to provide effective protective devices for them. The union organizers or members confront the nineteenth-century attitude of employers to trade unionism, who believe in individual or mass dismissal as the appropriate method of dealing with "agitators" and "malcontents." And both the workers and employers are aware that the urban proletariat is a privileged group in the vast pool of unemployed. The processing of coercive strategy (strike) is often spontaneous and emotional only to end up without any realization of demands and expectations. Strikes, even when successful, can quickly exhaust the base values of an infant labor movement. In order to develop independent and effective trade unions, a most important policy is to solidly institutionalize the aggregates of workers and to develop a permanent union bureaucracy whose influence is conditioned by the support of the workers.

A most distinctive mark of urban politics in our time, is "both developed" and "underdeveloped" states, is perhaps the intermittent, but continual eruptions of anomic aggregates in slum areas. While in a developed body politic they are of limited value consequences, in an underdeveloped one in which national politics are centered in urban centers, they tend to undermine to a great extent the stability of the rule. Unless we are able to solve the problems of anomic

activities beyond police "terms the political" climate in many developing nations will be perpetually cloudy. A most economical policy may suggest the development of cue-reading capabilities and channels of catharsis short of violence and organization of representatives of the aggregate to promote their interests to the decision-maker.

**Prescription and Termination**

Prescribing and termination functions as instruments of development take the lead in clarifying and repeating the aims of the body politic and the practice of justifying specific measures in these terms. Latent, diffuse, generalistic and affective norms and public policies based on customary usage are to be gradually and *amelioratively* terminated; and manifest, specific, particularistic and impartial ("affectively neutral") norms and public policies must be prescribed by functionally differentiated lawmakers.

In folk societies what is in fork to be terminated are not often prescriptions but the myth that assumes all general principles are already in existence.

By explicit legislation, the components of prescriptions are more clarified and specified in terms of norms, contingencies and sanctions. Prescriptions must keep the value at stake related to the value model with contextual reference to the comprehensive preference model. In terms of the functions of the prescriptions, it is inevitable to accept a relative prevalence of *regulative* and *enterprisory* codes where the predispositions of the effective elite are favorable for developmental change. But in a body politic where the elite intensely adheres to the petrification of the current features of public order the scope of supervisory codes must be widened to the largest extent. This assertion is based on the assumption that if democratic elements are placed outside the direct control of the government their growth will undermine the authoritarian rule. The most relevant index to characterization of the current elite with regard to development is the *power maximization postulate*, or to put it negatively, the *principle of minimum power less or risk*. Hence it is urgent to identify the most pivotal participants in the prescribing process of the body politic. We are aware that in many bodies politic the legislators in conventional sense act as "rubber stamps" for executive promotions which are in turn initiated by the ruling military clique or plutocrats. Some more lively legislatures devote most of their time and energy to trying to form, reconstitute, or bring down the cabinet; or some are approximating almost the ideal of the "constant constitutional convention," indulging themselves in writing, rewriting and terminating constitutive codes in order to allocate the spoils of palace revolution among the caste members, or to reinforce the authority instruments to protect the *status quo* from
newly emerging elements. The others still may impromptly prescribe the beauties of the coming societies only to be forgotten and disregarded before ink dries up.

In order to use prescriptions for development, we must be able to invent a set of strategies that generates expectations of process as problem solving instruments, rather than as the arena for gaining prestige or recognition.

Invocation

The invocation phase of decision is a preliminary characterization of concrete case in prescriptive terms. The basic supervisory, regulative, enterprisory, and corrective codes of developing states are emulations, or often direct translations, of the counterparts of the former mother states. If a violation is alleged the official invokers tend to look for the indices to the provisional characterization in the annotations of codes which are heavily based on the precedents and normatively ambiguous "legal theories" of the former mother state or the state from which the codes are imported. The case is put into the scope of one or another provision of the pertinent codes, rades, rather than having all relevant prescriptions to the case mobilized to characterize it with regard to the policies at stake. Thus conflicts over the appropriateness of the characterization often center around whether the case falls in the category of the provision which is alleged to be violated, or around what the practices are in the former mother state.

Non-official invokers are extremely reluctant to characterize a conflict in terms of the explicit prescriptions. They prefer to resolve it by unacknowledged customary prescriptions and informal procedures. This point can be accounted for by the expectations of the people as to the government, law and litigation. The parties at the bar often become life-long enemies. The expectations of the high cost for litigation and unfair decisions further keep the parties from invoking the codes. That the norms and contingencies of the codes are attuned to a transnational standard, rather than related to the local realities, also accounts for the prevalence of customary invocations.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the invocation function in the bodies politic in developing areas is that it is to the maximum extent utilized by the current elite to protect its power position against the counterelite and midelite. By public accusation or police arrest, the activities of the opposition groups are often characterized as a violation of the prescriptions which are alleged to embody the aims of the body politic. It is also used by the ruler (or the ruling clique) as a counter strategy against decisions which may affect his interests. Any promotional acts at various phases of decisions can be effectively countered by even an indication
of the powerful violence institutions or rectitude institutions that the promoted outcome will be contrary to the basic community policies which are alleged to exist in the prescriptive forms.

Application

The top or near top applyers are reluctant, or unable to delegate many types of application functions to applyers occupying lower positions in hierarchical structure. The governments are likely to be highly centralized, and rank-and-file applyers of ten believe that it is appropriate and safe to refer all problems that are slightly out of the routine operations to a higher authority. Celebrated is the fact that many Chief executives, often hurrying off to the scene of natural calamities, make impromptu and exceptional application-decisions on the spot to demonstrate their identification with the sufferings of the unfortunate. The worse instances of affective applications are found in the practices of the powerful seeking to avoid impartial application of prescriptions or attaining exceptional application. In many Latin American states, it is difficult to apply prescriptions to which the clergy or military are known to be opposed. Enterprising codes are frequently used to control the behavior of citizen more than that of officials. The decision-makers in the courts of Latin American states generally represent the Creoles rather than lower classes; the dispensing of “justice” means, almost without exception, that the Indian loses.\(^{(86)}\)

The applyers, especially of those states in which colonial powers established a bureaucracy, are backward looking, conservative and authoritarian in their perspectives, although they are one of the most acculturated groups. As Pye observed in the Burmese administrators, while tenaciously adherent to the present positions, they have a certain sense of nostalgia that their golden age may belong to the colonial past. The colonial governments generally generated the myth of legalism that decision-making involved only the mechanical application of the prescriptions given by them. The continued belief in a mechanistic approach to application phases of decisions has had the paradoxical effect of encouraging more authoritarian practices at one level, at another level, of limiting initiative and fostering a narrow view of one’s authority. The frustrations that this state of affairs produces have frequently made some governments, dominated by more ambitious politicians, willing to adopt practices deviating from prescriptive authorities. But in the bodies politic, where the effective power caste participates actively in

the petty details of application functions, We can observe the relation pattern between the
eruler and appliers which is approximate to Max Weber’s notion of the high degree of the
“solidarity of interests of the members of the administrative staff with their chief.”

Where the national social process is incoherent and disintegrated, the prescriptions are applied
through traditional authorities of the many communal, often ethnically and linguistically diverse,
subsoieties, and subpolities. In this arena, the most effective appliers are the elders or other
indigenous authorities. Any policy projection must take into account communication strategies
to generate a conception of common interests in the perspectives of these appliers. It is to be
noted that in some industrializing states administrative agencies have come into existence,
blurring the classic notion that only the courts adjudicate controversies. The courts, thanks to
the high value position of judges and magistrates and their identification with the myth of an
independent judiciary, may be able to function as a vehicle for encouraging stable political dev-
lopment. In some bodies politic, they have played the important role of the main restraint
upon, and responsible opposition to, the political order or dominant party.

The most important base value for the appliers is the understanding of authoritative langu-
ages and skill in how to locate a contingency in prescriptive terms. Many specialists in author-
itative languages often possess an impressive skill in justifying decisions. A glance at the
decisions of the courts often disclose references to precolonial traditions, opinions of the colo-
nial tribunals, and the entire legal tradition of the Western state which formerly ruled them.
But few of them have the skill of empirically analyzing trends and conditions relevant to clai-
ms outside authoritative rhetorics. And some of them may take into consideration the probable
political repercussions of their decision outcomes, but what almost lacks in their arriving at
decisions is policy thinking which enables them to relate the claims contextually to the more
comprehensive social process.

In transition societies the most difficult problem in applying strategy arises out of different
conceptions of right and wrong held by decision makers and those who are affected by deci-
sions. In each phase of decision process, policy questions must be kept related to the authori-
ty systems of the influenced. In Latin American political culture, military strategy has been
the last resort for resolving controversies.

Appraisal

Appraisers are specialized in decisions in which they answer the trend is toward, or against
the accomplishment of the prescribed goal, and the trend in constellation of conditioning
factors. The operation pattern of appraisal function of a body politic is a relevant index to the degree to which it is authoritarian or libertarian. In a democratic body politic, appraising of authoritative policies is performed with a wider participation, without risking severe deprivations in the open arena to which the public is accessible.

In any rational authoritative policy process, appraisal of the effectiveness of the policy is an ongoing phase of the process from the time of promotion. Authoritative decision makers frequently use the appraisal function as an instrument of ideological and diplomatic strategies to seek approximation to the goal, since they are aware that the interpretation of success or failure in the future affects the shape of things to come. Hence when appraisers are not equipped with relevant base values to the effective operation of the function, it is especially important to make a distinction between the objective assessment of trend and ideological or diplomatic propaganda.

In summarizing the analysis of outcome phases, consider Pye's hypothesis that whenever prescribing authorities (formal prescriber) are more distant and inaccessible from the general public than effective appliers, the power process of the society will be characterized by a high degree of latency; and interests will be promoted by informally organized groups seeking diffuse but particularly defined goals which will neither be broadly articulated nor claimed to be in the common interest.\(^{(88)}\)

This hypothesis illustrates the circular determination of multiple variables which affect the features of outcome phases. The formal prescriber is not responsive to the expectation, demand and identification of domain means high degree of its power pretention. Effective prescriber (ruler) increases its power by preventing the emergence of the effective promotional groups, or by controlling already existing ones. Hence autonomous interests groups promote their interests not by influencing prescribing phase of decision but by focusing on application phase. This in turn makes those groups informally organized, representing diffuse but particularistic interests. The practice of affective and exceptional application prefers an informal arena, making appliers corrupt. Since base authoritative decisions are not responsive to the perspectives of the domain, the national ideology and goal become controvertible, rather than consensual.

This "vicious circle" may prevent us from holding a sanguine view of constitutive develop-

\(^{(87)}\) Weber, op.cit., p. 383.
\(^{(88)}\) Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, p. 27.
ment. But it also gives possibilities of a wide range of policy alternatives which are pertinent in a particular context. The reference here is to the fact that we can bring about ongoing changes in the circle by focusing upon the most advantageous phase.