Phenomenology of Feeling in Husserl and Levinas*

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Husserl conceives of his transcendental phenomenology as the most radical form of rationalism — indeed, as the culmination of the rationalism of Western philosophy. One might hardly expect that as a rationalist Husserl could have any interest in problems of feeling. One might believe that, as the most radical form of rationalism, his phenomenology cannot be concerned with feeling, but exclusively with reason. Contrary to this way of understanding his phenomenology, however, in some of his lectures and unpublished manuscripts he does engage himself with the phenomenology

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of feeling. It is his basic conviction that his phenomenology, be it a descriptive phenomenology or a transcendental phenomenology, has to develop a phenomenology of feeling as a necessary component, for a phenomenology of feeling is essential for grounding such philosophical disciplines as ethics, theory of value, aesthetics, etc.

Husserl’s interest in phenomenology of feeling is not something that can be observed only in his later phenomenology. He already attempts to develop a phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations,\(^1\) in the general context of the theory of intentionality found in the Fifth Investigation. In sections 1-14 of the V. Logical Investigation, Husserl establishes the concept of intentionality as the property of consciousness to be directed toward something objective, and he considers the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience to be one of the general rules guiding intentional analysis in general. According to this assumption, the intentional experience that Husserl calls an act should not be confused with non-intentional experience, which would belong to another genus. In section 15 of the V. Logical Investigation, he therefore asks, as the title of the section shows, “whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts” (Hua XIX/1, 86).

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If one reads section 15 of the V. Logical Investigation, one might get the impression that Husserl is very confident about the results of his analysis. For example, with respect to the distinction between intentional feelings and non-intentional feelings, he gives his readers the following advice: “Our distinction should constantly be kept in mind and fruitfully applied in analysing all complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-acts” (LI, 574). However, Husserl was not as confident about the results of his analysis as one might suppose. It is not by accident that in dealing with some objections to and difficulties concerning his positions, he sometimes employs such expression as “seems” (LI, 570, 573).

After the publication of Logical Investigations, Husserl revisits his phenomenology of feeling in this work and realizes that it is highly problematic. As we shall see below, its limitations are due above all to the fact that its development is guided by some problematic assumptions. After the publication of Logical Investigations, he examines these basic assumptions, revises the phenomenology of feeling presented there, and attempts to develop a new phenomenology of feeling. There are basic differences between Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the earlier work and the new phenomenology of feeling he subsequently developed in lectures and unpublished manuscripts, since the basic assumptions that guide the development of both types of phenomenology are totally different.

In Levinas’s phenomenology of the face, one can find yet another phenomenology of feeling and it too has a connection to Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations. Here it is a matter of the phenomenology of enjoyment Levinas develops as a part of his...
phenomenology of the face. As will be discussed below, Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment can be regarded as a kind of phenomenology of feeling, and it is, first of all, the theory of intentionality and phenomenology of feeling in Husserl’s Logical Investigations that Levinas criticizes in developing his own phenomenology of enjoyment. It is Levinas’s implicit claim that Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the Investigations is highly problematic, since it is developed on the basis of weak assumptions, such as the assumption that representational intentionality has an absolute priority against non-representational intentionality. Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations and Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment as a kind of phenomenology of feeling in Totality and Infinity\(^2\) are fundamentally different, since the basic assumptions that guide the development of the former are not the same as those that guide the development of the latter.

One of the aims of this paper is accordingly to clarify the relationship that obtains between Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations, Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment and the phenomenology of feeling that Husserl developed after the publication of the Logical Investigations. But another aim of this paper is to promote a possible phenomenological dialogue between Husserl and Levinas concerning the issues pertaining to a phenomenology of feeling. This kind of twofold work will enable us to identify an appropriate direction for the further development of a phenomenology of feeling. Thus, in section 1, I will sketch out the basic character of the phenomenology of feeling in

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2) E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). This work will be referred to with the abbreviation TI.
Logical Investigations. The discussion in section 1 will form the starting point and at the same time the frame of reference for the entire subsequent discussion in this paper. Thereafter, in section 2, focusing on the relation between Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations and Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment, I will deal with some basic characteristics of the latter. In section 3, focusing on the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations and after its publication, I will delineate the basic characteristics of Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after the Logical Investigations. In my discussion of these three types of phenomenology of feeling in section 1-3, I will focus on some basic assumptions that guide the development of each type of phenomenology of feeling. Although Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment in Totality and Infinity and Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after Logical Investigations are both products of a critical engagement with Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations, in my view, the latter is better than the former in many respects. In section 4, I will therefore make an attempt to criticize Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after Logical Investigations. In section 5, I will briefly deal with the possibility of a dialogue between Husserl and Levinas concerning issues of phenomenology of feeling.

1. **Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations**

In section 15 of V. Logical Investigation, where Husserl attempts to develop a phenomenology of feeling, he asks, as the titles of the two
subsections of that section show, the following two questions: 1) are there intentional feelings; and 2) if there are non-intentional feelings in addition to intentional feelings, is it possible to make a distinction between intentional feelings and non-intentional feelings? Husserl gives a positive answer to both questions. He maintains that he comes to this conclusion through a careful phenomenological analysis of the matters themselves, namely, of the various kinds of feeling. However, as discussed on another occasion,\(^3\) in my view, it is not through a careful phenomenological analysis of the matters themselves, but rather with the help of some assumptions that Husserl comes to that conclusion. The assumptions that guide the development of the phenomenology of feeling in section 15 of the V. Logical Investigation are nothing other than the assumptions that guide the development of the phenomenological theory of intentionality in general there. Below, I will both deal with these assumptions and attempt to clarify the basic character of phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations.

The first assumption that guides the development of the phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations is that intentional experience is strictly to be distinguished from non-intentional experience. The phenomenological analysis of intentionality as a whole in the V. Logical Investigation is guided by this assumption. In the fourteen sections that precede section 15 on the phenomenology of feeling, Husserl attempts to show, using the intentionality of a perception of a thing as a model, that there is a strict distinction between intentional experience and non-intentional experience;

a perception is an intentional experience, since it is directed toward something objective in the world — for example, a tree in the street or a desk in my office — whereas sensation is not an intentional experience, but a non-intentional one, since as a mere mental state of an experiencing subject, it is not directed to anything objective in the world. Although a concrete experience of a perception as an intentional experience cannot exist if it is not founded on sensation as a non-intentional experience, the two kinds of experience should not be confused. Intentional experience belongs to a totally different genus from non-intentional experience, and from a descriptive point of view, there is no unity of genus between them.

Husserl maintains that a clear distinction between intentional experience and non-intentional experience is observable not only in the sphere of cognition, but also in the sphere of feeling. On the one side, there is a group of feelings that are directed to external things and can therefore be called intentional experiences. For example, when I feel that a flower in the garden is beautiful, my feeling is an intentional experience, since it is directed to the beautiful flower in the garden. On the other side, there is a group of feelings that could not be classified as intentional experiences, since they are only subjective mental states of the subject and are not directed to things in the world. Husserl gives as examples of a non-intentional feeling various kinds of sensual feelings such as a pain that one feels when one is hurt in some part of one’s body. According to Husserl, non-intentional feelings serve as buildingblocks for intentional feelings, just as in the sphere of cognition, a sensation as a non-intentional experience functions as a buildingblock for a perception as an intentional experience.

The second assumption that guides the development of the phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations is that representational intentionality has an absolute priority against non-representational
intentionality. According to this assumption, non-representational intentionality cannot exist if it is not founded on representational intentionality. For example, an intentional willing that is striving to achieve something is impossible if it is not founded on the intentionality that is directed toward something. Intentional feeling as a non-representational intentionality is no exception. For me to have the intentional feeling that the flower in the garden is beautiful, I must already be perceiving the flower in the garden. A concrete intentionality of feeling consists of two different intentionalities — namely, the representational intentionality that is directed to the flower in the garden, and the intentionality of feeling that is directed to the beautiful flower in the garden. The intentional objects of the two intentionalities are different: the object of the representational intentionality is the flower in the garden insofar as it is something in the world and is perceived as such, whereas the intentional object of the intentionality of feeling is the beautiful flower in the garden insofar as it is beautiful. The two kinds of intentionality should be clearly distinguished from one another. Since the representational intentionality founds the intentionality of feeling, Husserl calls the former the primary intention and the latter a secondary intention.

The third assumption that guides the development of phenomenology of feeling in Logical Investigations is that there is a realm of pure representation that does not contain any kind of non-representational experience whatsoever among its constitutive moments. Pure representation

4) The term Vorstellung has, of course, been translated into English in many ways; here I speak of “representational” intentionality — rather than using, for example, the term ‘presentation’, or referring to “objectifying” or “objectivating” acts — in order to facilitate the dialogue with Levinas, where the word “representation” is used.
in the third assumption should not be confused with the representation mentioned in the second assumption, i.e., that of the absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality. The representing mentioned in the second assumption as the foundation of non-representational intentionality is a representing that does not contain any kinds of non-representational intentionality among its constitutive moments, although it can, of course, include various kinds of non-representational non-intentional experience—such as sensual feelings or sensual drives and instincts—among its components. For this reason, the representation mentioned in the second assumption can also be called a pure representation in a certain sense, since it is free from non-representational intentionality. In fact, in a passage from the lectures on “Basic Problems of Ethics” from 1908/09, Husserl does talk about pure representation in this sense: “We can talk about a pure understanding or a pure intellect insofar as the acts that can be subsumed under this title — for example, perceptions, representations, judgments, instances of deeming likely or deeming possible, doubt — are thinkable without any participation of acts of feeling. At the very least, one can say that in their immanent essence or content, intellective acts contain nothing of evaluating acts at all...” (Hua XXVIII, 252) Pure representation in this context is thus something that can be gained by an abstraction that removes any kind of non-representational intentionality from a concrete non-representational intentional experience.

However, the pure representation mentioned in the third assumption is not the same as the pure representation mentioned in the second assumption. In contrast to the latter, it should not contain any kind of non-representational experience at all, be it intentional or non-intentional. It is totally free from any kind of non-representational experience. For this
reason, it can be called a pure representation in a stricter sense than the representation mentioned in the second assumption. Let’s suppose that an act of perception is a pure representation in the sense of the third assumption. In this case, it is supposed to be a perception that contains only sensation and the abstract layer of the intentionality of perception, and nothing more, as its constitutive moments. Like the representation mentioned in the second assumption, it does not contain any kind of non-representational intentional experience, such as intentional feeling or intentional willing. However, unlike the representation mentioned in the second assumption, it should not contain any kind of non-representational non-intentional experience either, which would thereby exclude experience such as non-intentional feelings or non-intentional drives and instincts that might be closely connected with sensation as its foundation. If a pure representation in this sense really exists, then the second assumption of the absolute priority of representation against non-representational intentionality could be radicalized and reformulated in this way: a pure representation has an absolute priority not only against non-representational intentional experience, but also against non-representational non-intentional experience.

The development of the phenomenology of feeling in the V. Logical Investigation is in fact partly guided by this third assumption, i.e., by the assumption of the existence of pure representation in the strict sense. For example, Husserl considers representation to have an absolute priority not only against intentional feeling, but also against the non-intentional feeling that he calls feeling-sensation: “... a sensation of pleasure attaches to the [representation], a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling-subject, and also as an objective property ...” (LI, 574). Husserl does not consider the possibility that
representation itself might be founded on feeling-sensation as a non-intentional feeling that is closely connected with sensation. But recognizing that he has indeed assumed the existence of pure representation — an assumption that plays its own role in the development of a phenomenology of feeling in the V. Logical Investigation — is necessary for understanding not only Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment, but also Husserl’s new phenomenology of feeling after the publication of the Logical Investigations.

2. Phenomenology of enjoyment in Totality and Infinity

Levinas’s phenomenology of the face attempts to analyze the structure of the movement of transcendence from the plane of totality to that of infinity. Logically, such transcendence presupposes the interiority of an ego that is absolutely separated from infinity as exteriority. Infinity as an exteriority cannot be conceived of if there is not an interiority that is separated absolutely from it. The transcendence that is the main theme of a phenomenology of the face is precisely the transcendence from interiority as an absolute separation to infinity as an exteriority. Levinas calls the interiority that is absolutely separated from exteriority inner life, psychism, or egoism. The ego of inner life as egoism takes care only of itself and knows nothing about the Other as an infinity. The phenomenology of enjoyment as a part of the phenomenology of the face therefore aims to clarify the structure of egoism as an interiority that is absolutely separated from infinity.

Enjoyment is closely related to the needs that a human being has as a living being. As a living being, an ego has various kinds of needs and
strives to fulfill them. A need can be fulfilled by a certain kind of objects in the world. For example, the need to eat is fulfilled by food, and the need to breathe is fulfilled by fresh air. Enjoyment concretely means the process of fulfilling various kinds of needs. It would be impossible for an ego that does not have any kind of need to enjoy something. “Happiness is made up not of an absence of needs, whose tyranny and imposed character one denounces, but of the satisfaction of all needs. For the privation of need is not just a privation, but is privation in a being that knows the surplus of happiness, privation in a being gratified. Happiness is accomplishment: it exists in a soul satisfied and not in a soul that has extirpated its needs, a castrated soul” (TI, 115).

If a need is fulfilled, the ego of the need can have the feeling of satisfaction and pleasure: if this is not the case, it will have the feeling of dissatisfaction and displeasure. The essence of enjoyment as the process of fulfilling various kinds of needs is satisfaction or dissatisfaction as feeling, it be positive feeling such as happiness or pleasure, or negative feeling such as unhappiness or displeasure. With the remark “to take satisfaction, which is the very meaning of pleasure” (TI, 134), Levinas also considers feeling to be the essence of enjoyment. Thus Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment could be considered to be a kind of phenomenology of feeling.

Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment as a phenomenology of feeling is the product of his critical engagement with Husserl’s phenomenology of intentionality in Logical Investigations and, more specifically, with the latter’s phenomenology of feeling in this work. In developing his phenomenology of enjoyment, Levinas puts into question two of the basic assumptions that guide the development of Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the V. Logical Investigation — namely, the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience and the
assumption of the absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality. Levinas explicitly denies the validity of the assumption of the absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality, considering it to be “an obsession” (TI, 122) that dominates the Logical Investigations and returns in all of Husserl’s subsequent works. In developing a phenomenology of enjoyment and a phenomenology of the face in general, he attacks this assumption in various passages. Levinas also denies the validity of the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience, not explicitly but implicitly. One cannot find a passage in Levinas’s work where he explicitly deals with this assumption, but a close examination of Levinas’s works nevertheless reveals that he does not share this assumption with the Husserl of the Logical Investigations. But in contrast to these two assumptions, he does not put into question the assumption of the existence of a pure representation. This assumption indeed seems in its turn to be his own “obsession” that guides the whole analysis of his phenomenology of feeling and phenomenology of the face in general. In my view, as will be discussed in section 4 below, Levinas’s attitude toward this assumption has caused some significant difficulties for his phenomenology of enjoyment. For this reason, in the discussion of Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment in this section, I will not focus on this assumption, but instead on the other two as I attempt to delineate the basic character of Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment.

Just what is Levinas’s attitude toward the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience? As the title “Enjoyment and Representation” of the chapter in Totality and Infinity that deals with the structure of enjoyment shows, Levinas attempts to clarify the structure of enjoyment by comparing it with the structure of representation that he
considers to be a central theme of Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl’s “Auffassung-Inhalt” scheme, the object of a representational intentionality — for example, the apple on the table — is something that exists as a three-dimensional object in a perceptual world that consists of infinitely many perceptual things. According to the form-content scheme, perception transforms the pregiven sensible material into a perceptual thing. Of course, the same apple as a perceptual thing can serve as material for another act and be transformed into a natural scientific object. In this case, it can have the same ontological status as other objects of natural scientific research, such as molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. These are the ways that the apple is experienced as an object of representational intentionality.

However, the same apple can be experienced in an entirely different way. If we focus on the apple as we eat it to still hunger, we realize that it is not experienced as a perceptual thing among other perceptual things in the perceptual world, but rather as something that is devoid of the forms of perceptual things such as the structure of three-dimensional space or objective time. It is something that is experienced, but it is not experienced in the same way in which perceptual things are experienced. In contrast to the apple as a perceptual thing, Levinas calls something like the apple as it is experienced in this other way, devoid of the forms of perceptual things, an element. “The element has no forms containing it; it is content without form” (TI, 131). The element is something that is formless and indeterminate, it is something like the apeiron. As something formless and indeterminate, it also lacks the form of substance and property and could be called neither a substance nor a property, for it is an entity that exists prior to the distinction between substance and property. In fact, one should not even say “something” to designate the element, for “something” cannot be thought about without some kind of form. In contrast to the perceptual
world, the world of elements can be called “an inside-out world” (TI, 132).

The way in which the element is experienced by us is called enjoyment. Enjoyment in this context means concretely sensible enjoyment as the process of fulfilling various kinds of sensible needs. As will be discussed in section 4 below, in addition to sensible enjoyment, there are various other kinds of enjoyment corresponding to various kinds of life. In order to characterize sensible enjoyment as the immediate way of experiencing the elements, Levinas uses the metaphor of “bathing”: “Through the home our relation with space as distance and extension is substituted for the simple ‘bathing in the element.’ But the adequate relation with the element is precisely bathing” (TI, 132). As something in which we are bathing, the element is experienced by us as something to which we cannot take any distance. It is experienced as something immediate, as something without distance. We bathe in the world of elements, and while bathing in this world, we enjoy elements and experience various kinds of feeling such as happiness and pleasure or pain and displeasure.

Enjoyment is primarily a relation between an ego and the elements. It functions incessantly at the bottom of the soul of an ego, long before representational intentionality does its job. As such it belongs to the realm of sensibility that lacks any kind of interpretation and apperception carried out by representational intentionality. The world of elements is the sensible world that is the founding layer of perceptual world. As the Auffassung-Inhalt scheme of the Logical Investigations shows, Husserl does not call sensation intentional experience, but defines it as a non-intentional experience: he considers sensation to be a mere mental state lacking directionality. However, Levinas maintains that enjoyment as sensation is not a mere mental state, but is directed to something in the world, namely, to the elemental. For this reason, he admits that enjoyment is a kind of
intentional experience, and actually refers to “intentionality of living from ...” (TI, 129) and “intentionality of enjoyment” (TI, 127). In this context, one should not confuse the intentionality of enjoyment with “intentionality in the Husserlian sense” (TI, 122). According to Levinas, “intentionality of enjoyment” as intentionality of living from has a totally different structure than representation as Husserlian intentionality. Thus Levinas considers enjoyment, which might be defined in the Logical Investigations as a kind of non-intentional experience, to be a kind of intentional experience. He does not make a clear distinction between intentional feeling and non-intentional feeling as Husserl does in the Logical Investigations, nor does he admit the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience, an assumption that guides the development of the phenomenology of feeling and the phenomenology of intentionality in general in Logical Investigations.

In developing his phenomenology of enjoyment, Levinas also refuses to admit the assumption of the absolute priority of representation against non-representational intentionality. As mentioned above, he considers this assumption to be “an obsession” that dominates the Logical Investigations and returns in all of Husserl’s subsequent works. According to this assumption, intentionality of enjoyment as a kind of non-representational intentionality has to be founded upon representational intentionality. If this assumption is valid, then according to Levinas, I have to represent fresh air, warm weather, sunlight, etc., in advance, before I can enjoy and live from them. Without representing them in representational intentionality in advance, it would be impossible for me to enjoy and to live from them. But this description does not correspond to matters themselves, since we enjoy and live from things without representing them in advance. We can give various examples that contradict this assumption: even when one is
sleeping and does not have any kind of representational intentionality directed toward the fresh air, one can enjoy and live from it, and even a newborn baby can enjoy sleeping without having the slightest representation of the fact that it is sleeping. Thus “the sojourn of man in the world he enjoys remains irreducible and anterior to the knowledge of that world” (TI, 130). In this context, Levinas interprets the dimension of life and enjoyment as the background or horizon from which representation can come into being: “Things come to representation from a background from which they emerge and to which they return in the enjoyment we can have of them” (TI, 130). Hence, for Levinas, representation does not have an absolute priority against intentionality of enjoyment.

In fact, in developing his phenomenology of enjoyment, Levinas tends to replace the assumption of the absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality by the converse assumption, namely, by the assumption of the absolute priority of non-representational intentionality against representational intentionality. In the discussion above about the founding relation between representation and sensible enjoyment, it already turned out to be the case that enjoyment as a kind of non-representational intentionality has an absolute priority over representational intentionality. Moreover, as mentioned, sensible enjoyment is just one kind of enjoyment, and there are various kinds of enjoyment besides sensible enjoyment. But even with respect to the other kinds of enjoyment, Levinas attempts to show that every kind of enjoyment has, as a kind of non-representational intentionality, an absolute priority against representational intentionality. This attempt is made in his theory of the conversion of the object of representation into the element in enjoyment.

In developing his theory of the conversion of the object of representation into the element in enjoyment, Levinas begins with the observation that the
range of enjoyment is as wide as that of life. Since all our relations to things in the world can be called life equipped with need, they can also be characterized as enjoyment. “Enjoyment — an ultimate relation with the substantial plenitude of being, with its materiality — embraces all relations with things” (TI, 133). In this context, representation is no exception. Representation also has something to do with enjoyment, insofar as it is a kind of life that has its own need — for example, curiosity as the need to know. In the act of representation, I can suffer from or rejoice over the object of representation, depending on whether or not my curiosity is satisfied. According to Levinas, if representational objects are experienced as objects of enjoyment, they are no longer experienced as representational objects, but revert to the elemental or are “dissolved into the element” (TI, 137). “In enjoyment the things revert to their elemental qualities” (TI, 134). In enjoyment they are experienced as the elements or nutriments from which we can live. In this case, even an abstract representational object such as a mathematical object or an ideal meaning is no exception: “... all the relations with abstract notions are inverted into enjoyment” (TI, 133).5)

5) The same holds for the tools that Heidegger analyzes in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger does not analyze the structure of tools with respect to need and enjoyment, but with respect to their usage in the horizon of the world that is disclosed in advance and functions as the foundation of their experience. This is the crucial point on which Levinas criticizes Heidegger: “It is interesting to observe that Heidegger does not take the relation of enjoyment into consideration. ... Dasein in Heidegger is never hungry” (TI, 134). However, tools can be considered to be objects of intentionality of enjoyment, since I can suffer from or rejoice over handling them. “The enjoyment of a thing, be it a tool, does not consist simply in bringing this thing to the usage for which it is fabricated — the pen to the writing, the hammer to the nail to be driven in — but also in suffering or rejoicing over
The theory of the conversion of the object of representation to the element in enjoyment implies the following two points. 1) The enjoyment of a representational object in which the latter reverts to the element is a mental state that is distinctly different from the representational intentionality of the same representational object. 2) The enjoyment of a representational object is more original than, and has an absolute priority against, the representational intentionality of the same representational object, since it has an intentional relation to the element that is more original than the intentional relation to the representational object. Thus the theory of the conversion of the object of representational intentionality into the element in enjoyment makes it possible to hold the view that a non-representational intentionality such as enjoyment has an absolute priority against representational intentionality.

3. Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after Logical Investigations

After the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl carefully examined the phenomenology of feeling in the latter work and left some analyses concerning phenomenology of feeling. Typical examples are an unpublished manuscript on “Gefuhl und Urkonstitution. Lust und Affektion ...” (C 16 IV, 1932) and a manuscript with the title: “Zur Lehre von der this operation. The things that are not tools — the crust of bread, the flame in the fireplace, the cigarette — offer themselves to enjoyment. But this enjoyment accompanies every utilization of things, even in a complex enterprise where the end of a labor alone absorbs the research” (TI, 133). According to Levinas, then, in enjoyment a tool reverts to the element.
Intentionalität in universaler oder totaler Betrachtungsweise” (A VI 34, 1931). In the works written after the Logical Investigations, Husserl continues to develop the phenomenology of feeling within the general context of the phenomenology of intentionality, as it was also the case in the Logical Investigations. A closer examination of Husserl’s works written after the publication of the latter text reveals that Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling undergoes a tremendous change. For example, in some manuscripts, Husserl attempts to develop a phenomenology of mood, a theme that is not even mentioned in the earlier work.

Most of the changes in Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling can be traced back to a change in his attitude toward the basic assumptions guiding the development of a phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations. In contrast to Levinas, who does not doubt the validity of the assumption of the existence of a pure representation, Husserl puts all three assumptions into question.

In developing a phenomenology of feeling after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl no longer considers the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional and non-intentional experience to be valid. If we take a look at the genetic structure of the stream of conscious life, we will understand why Husserl has to change his attitude toward this assumption. The stream of conscious life consists of various layers of transcendental genesis — for example, the philosophical and scientific layer of transcendental genesis with a philosophical-scientific world; the pre-scientific layer of transcendental genesis with a pre-scientific world; the perceptual layer of transcendental genesis with a perceptual world; the

6) See the manuscripts M III 3 II 1 (1900-1914), A VI 26 (1921-1931), and A VI 34 (1931).
sensible layer of transcendental genesis with a sensible world, etc. If we take away from the stream of conscious life all the layers of transcendental genesis that contain any kind of representational intentionality, there remains a layer of transcendental genesis that consists only of various kinds of instincts and drives. Husserl attempts to show the existence of such a layer of transcendental genesis with the example of the transcendental genesis of a baby that has just been born. Even though such a baby does not have any kind of representational intentionality of food as a means to still hunger, it has an instinctive need for it. As a way the ego can be affected from the world, this primitive affection is not representation, but instinct as “a way of blindly striving for something without having any representation of its aim” (C 16 IV, 11).

The essence of instincts and drives lies in the fact that they strive to be fulfilled by the things that can satisfy them, and as such, they are always accompanied by various kinds of feeling. As long as they are not satisfied, they are accompanied by the feeling of lack and pain, and in order to escape from this kind of negative state, they seek fulfillment, in which case they are accompanied by the feeling of fulfillment and happiness. “Drives are drives away from the unpleasant and toward the pleasant” (“Der Trieb ist Trieb von einem Unangenehmen weg, zu einem Angenehmen hin” — M III 3 III 1 II, 40). The feeling, might it be the feeling of happiness and pleasure, might it be the feeling of pain and displeasure, is the other side of instinct and drive. For this reason, the drive-behavior that aims to satisfy instinct and drive can be considered to be a process of “releasing the drive-feeling” (“Entladung von Triebgefühlen” — M III 3 III 1 II, 40).

In Logical Investigations, the feeling that is interwoven with instincts and drives on the primitive level of transcendental genesis is not defined as an intentional feeling, but rather as a non-intentional feeling or feeling-
sensation (Gefühlempfindung), since it is not founded on any kind of representational intentionality. However, one cannot deny that it is directed toward the things in the world that can satisfy the intentionality of instinct and drive that is interwoven with it, and for this reason, it can be called an intentional feeling. In fact, in an unpublished manuscript, Husserl considers feeling, whether active or passive, to be a kind of intentional experience. “Just as representation is a ‘consciousness [of]’, so is feeling a consciousness [of], first passive feeling and then active feeling. In the sphere of knowledge, each layer constitutes new objectivities. The constituted is something that is thought of in anticipation and can then be grasped as an object. ... Feeling is also a consciousness of, and, like every kind of consciousness, is an act of constitution” (M III 3 III 1 II, 38). Moreover, in other unpublished manuscripts, Husserl engages himself with the analysis of the structure of mood. According to the definition offered in Logical Investigations, mood cannot be called an intentional feeling, since it is not primarily directed to things in the world and in many cases it is not founded on representational intentionality. In his later works, however, Husserl does admit that mood is a kind of intentional feeling, since it is directed to horizons and to the world as the universal horizon of all horizons. He no longer clings to the assumption of a clear distinction between intentional feeling and non-intentional feeling as was the case in the Logical Investigations.

Husserl’s attitude in Logical Investigations toward the assumption of an absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality is so firm that, as mentioned above, Levinas calls it “an obsession” that dominates not only the Logical Investigations, but Husserl’s subsequent works as well. However, Husserl’s own attitude toward this assumption actually changes radically. Already in a passage
from the lecture course on “Basic Problems of Ethics” from 1908, he talks about “the problematic relation between intellect and feeling” (Hua XXVIII, 251) and attempts to reexamine this assumption. In order to clarify the problematic relation between cognition and feeling, he investigates the general relationship obtaining among different kinds of mental acts such as cognition, feeling, and will. With a fresh look at the relationship among them, he realizes that in the stream of conscious life, the three kinds of act are not isolated from each other, but are interwoven with each other in much more complicated ways than they are supposed to be in Logical Investigations. “Such diverse interwinings — such various forms of conjoining and interpenetration within the action — pertain, in various degrees of complexity, to the act-life of the naive I that is given over to the intentional objects and hence latent for itself” (Hua VIII, 102). Clarifying the complicated ways in which the various kinds of act are interwoven with each other, Husserl is forced to revise the assumption that representational intentionality has an absolute priority against non-representational intentionality. As a consequence, he no longer claims that representation has an absolute priority against feeling.

In Logical Investigations Husserl had already realized that representation and feeling are interwoven with one another, but he took into consideration only the possibility that representation unidirectionally founds feeling. “Whether we turn with pleasure to something, or whether its unpleasantness repels us, an object is [represented]. But we do not merely have a [representation], with an added feeling associatively tacked on to it, and not intrinsically related to it, but pleasure or distaste direct themselves to the [represented] object, and could not exist without such a direction” (LI, 570). In the works written after the Logical Investigations, he admits without reservation that such a possibility actually exists. However, in contrast to the
analysis in Logical Investigations, he also admits the possibility that a feeling that is founded upon a representational intentionality can found another representational intentionality. In order to show that such a possibility really exists, he takes into consideration the fact that a person’s aesthetic enjoyment of an artwork changes into a theoretical observation of the same work when considered from the standpoint of history of art. In this example, the theoretical act of an art historian cannot be there if it is not founded on the aesthetic act of enjoying the artwork as a kind of non-representational act. For this reason, one can say that the former is founded on the latter in the same sense in which the non-representational act of feeling the beauty of a flower is founded on the act of representing the same flower as a thing in the world, as is the case in the Logical Investigations. This example is a threat to the assumption that the representational act has an absolute priority against the non-representational act.

In this context, he considers the relationship “between the aesthetic observation of an artwork and the theoretical observation of a historian of art” (Hua VIII, 101).

In the same passage from the lectures on “First Philosophy”, Husserl takes into account the change from an aesthetic enjoyment of a flower into a botanical theoretical observation of the same flower as an example that might threaten the assumption of the absolute priority of representational acts against non-representational acts. In my view, however, this example is essentially different from the example discussed above, since the aesthetic enjoyment of the flower is not a necessary precondition for the existence of the theoretical observation of the same flower carried out by a botanist. A theoretical observation of a flower is possible without any aesthetic enjoyment of it, whereas a theoretical observation of an artwork carried out by an art historian would not genuinely be possible without being able to enjoy it aesthetically in advance.
Moreover, if we take into account the relation between representation and feeling on the primitive level of transcendental genesis, the assumption of the absolute priority of representational acts against non-representational acts turns out to be completely invalid. For on this primitive level of transcendental genesis, contrary to what Husserl claims in Logical Investigations, feeling has an absolute priority against representational intentionality. “The instinctive drive” that is interwoven with feeling is “the pre-form of pre-having” (C 16 IV, 11) necessary for any kind of representational intentionality to come into being. The analysis of the structure of the primitive layer of transcendental genesis reveals that the feeling that is interwoven with instinct and drive has an absolute priority against representational intentionality. In the end, Husserl is forced to replace the assumption of the absolute priority of representation against non-representation by the converse assumption that in the order of transcendental genesis, non-representational intentionality has an absolute priority against representational intentionality.

Finally, the assumption of the existence of a pure representation is also abandoned in Husserl’s later phenomenology. Let’s consider the structure of a theoretical act of a mathematician who is attempting to solve a mathematical problem. At each moment, the theoretical act of solving the mathematical problem contains, as a part of it, an act of understanding (or misunderstanding) that is directed to the mathematical fact. However, that is not the whole story. Besides the act of understanding, the same theoretical act of solving mathematical problem also contains, as component parts, an act of will, on the one hand, since the mathematician is striving to solve the mathematical problem, and on the other hand, an act of feeling, since the mathematician feels happy or unhappy according to whether her/his will to solve the mathematical problem is satisfied or not. In this way, the act of
understanding that is directed to the mathematical fact as a constitutive component of the concrete theoretical act of solving a mathematical problem is interwoven with feeling and willing as two other constitutive components of the same theoretical act of solving the mathematical problem.

Not only the representational act of solving a mathematical problem, but also every kind of representational intentionality consists of three components — namely, the act of understanding, willing and feeling. “A tendency of striving and willing — yes, even a tendency of valuing — goes through every knowing act of judging insofar as the one who is practically directed toward truth takes it as having positive value and therefore as the aim of willing” (Hua VIII, 193). For this reason, every kind of representational intentionality has a volitional character and at the same time an emotional character. Contrary to what Husserl believes in Logical Investigations, a pure representation that does not have a volitional and emotional character cannot exist, as we can see from a passage from an unpublished manuscript: “All life is incessant striving, all satisfaction is a striving in transition. Sheer sense data — and in higher levels, sensory objects such as things — that are there for the subject, but are there as ‘value-free’ are abstractions. There can be nothing untouched by feeling, and the indifferent is merely an indeterminate stage between liking and disliking; it is neither likable nor unlikable, in the same way as an object is neither hot nor cold, neither large nor small, etc.” (“Alles Leben ist unaufhörliches Streben, alle Befriedigung ist Durchgangsstreubung. Bloße Empfindungsdaten und in höherer Stufe sinnliche Gegenstände wie Dinge, die für das Subjekt da sind, aber ‘wertfrei’ da sind, sind Abstraktionen. Es kann nichts geben, was nicht das Gemüt berührt, und das Gleichgültige ist nur ein Zwischenstadium zwischen Lust und Unlust, es ist weder lustig
noch unlustig in ähnlichen Sinn wie ein Gegenstand weder warm noch kalt ist, weder groß noch klein ist usw.” — A VI 26, 42). In the last analysis, the assumption of the existence of a pure representation turns out to be a myth. As long as the human being has curiosity as a basic instinct that incessantly guides the act of representing something,9) a pure representation entirely devoid of willing and feeling cannot exist at all.

4. Some problems with Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment

Although Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment in Totality and Infinity and Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after Logical Investigations are both developed through a critical engagement with the phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations, they are different in many respects. If we consider both types of phenomenology as a descriptive phenomenology of feeling, then, in my view, Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after Logical Investigations represents a better position than Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment.

9) In another passage from the same manuscript, Husserl talks about the role of curiosity in the process of representing something: “In a certain way, curiosity is a universal desire that pertains to any object, not through the object’s particular content — otherwise the object would invite enjoyment again and again — but only to the extent that the object is still unknown. ("Die Neugier is in gewisser Weise eine allgemeine Lust, die zu jedem Gegenstand gehört nicht durch seinen besonderen Inhalt, sonst müßte er immer wieder zum Genuß einladen, sondern nur soweit er noch unbekannt ist” — A VI 26, 62).
In criticizing Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in the Logical Investigations and developing his own phenomenology of enjoyment, Levinas shares with the later Husserl the assumption that there is no distinction between intentional and non-intentional feeling. However, with respect to the assumption of the absolute priority of representation against non-representational intentionality, Levinas holds a different view from Husserl, even though he agrees with Husserl’s position subsequent to the Logical Investigations that representational intentionality does not have an absolute priority against non-representational intentionality. In contrast to Husserl’s position after the Logical Investigations, Levinas does not doubt the validity of the assumption of the existence of a pure representation. Below, confining my remarks to issues of phenomenology of feeling that are related to the two assumptions with respect to which Levinas holds different view from Husserl, I will point out some problems with Levinas’s phenomenology of enjoyment.

Due to the fact that Levinas does not question the validity of the assumption of the existence of a pure representation, he could not understand the essential character of representation. A representation is not an abstract and universal entity that can appear repeatedly in the same form in infinitely many egos, as Levinas often attempts to describe it. Representation as a concrete act does not consists of a pure act of representing, but also contains moments of feeling and willing as its constitutive components. As something that contains willing, representation is a kind of life that rejoices over or suffers from the things toward which it is directed. It is itself a kind of enjoyment. Representation is not something that is different from and should be opposed to enjoyment, as Levinas considers it to be. Husserl himself even characterizes the representational relation of an ego to hyletic data in the sphere of passive constitution as “an
enjoying behavior, an enjoying of behavior” (“geniessendes Verhalten, Lustgeniessen” — C 16 IV, 5).

As discussed above, through his theory of the conversion of the object of representation into the element in enjoyment, Levinas attempts to replace the assumption of the absolute priority of representational intentionality against non-representational intentionality with the converse assumption of the absolute priority of non-representational intentionality against representational intentionality. The only possible view that can be deduced from this converse assumption concerning the relation between enjoyment and representation is that enjoyment has an absolute priority against representational intentionality. This converse assumption prevents Levinas from realizing that there are types of enjoyment that are founded on representation as a kind of life and enjoyment. For example, the act of enjoying a beautiful flower as a kind of life and enjoyment is actually based on the act of representing the flower as another kind of life and enjoyment.

Moreover, the converse assumption prevents Levinas from understanding one of the essential structures of feeling. He seems to consider feeling and enjoyment to be essentially “passive.” In a passage from Totality and Infinity, contrasting feeling with representation — which should be active in its nature — Levinas talks about the “passivity of feeling” (TI, 145). In this context, one should pay attention to the fact that there are various layers of life and enjoyment that should be distinguished from each other. The theory of various layers of life implies that there are various kinds of feeling, some of which can be called active, while others can be called passive. For example, sensual feelings are called passive, whereas the feelings that are founded upon representational intentionality are active. Passive feeling does not need any special effort of the ego, whereas active feeling needs some degree of effort and concentration of the ego. Among passive feelings,
some can be more passive than others, and among active feelings, some can be more active than others.

In my view, Levinas is also partly aware that there are various layers of life and feeling that should be distinguished from each other, as is the case in a passage from Totality and Infinity where he deals with problems of aesthetic orientation. In order to understand what the aesthetic orientation dealt with in this passage means, one should note that all of our relations to various entities in the world — including representational objects and implements — are, as forms of life, accompanied by enjoyment or feeling. If in the stream of an ego’s conscious life the components of feeling come to the foreground and take over the main function, while other components such as representation or willing return to the background, the same ego will experience worldly objects as the noematic correlates of feeling and the world as a whole as a world of feeling, that is, as an aesthetic world. Levinas describes aesthetic orientation in the following way, pointing out that there are various layers of feeling and enjoyment: “The aesthetic orientation man gives to the whole of his world represents a return to enjoyment and to the elemental on a higher plane. The world of things calls for art, in which intellectual accession to being moves into enjoyment. ... Tools and implements, which themselves presuppose enjoyment, offer themselves to enjoyment in their turn. They are playthings: the fine cigarette lighter, the fine car. They are adorned by the decorative arts; they are immersed in the beautiful, where every going beyond enjoyment reverts to enjoyment” (TI, 140). In this passage, Levinas holds the view that there are various layers of enjoyment, yet in spite of his awareness that there are various layers of enjoyment, he still maintains — misguided by the converse assumption of the absolute priority of non-representational intentionality — that there is no essential difference among different layers of enjoyment,
since they are all passive and opposed to representation, which is supposed to be a kind of active intentionality.

Levinas’s theory of the conversion of the object of representation into the element in enjoyment — a theory that is closely related to the converse assumption of the absolute priority of non-representational intentionality against representational intentionality — is also highly problematic. First, as discussed above, he maintains that in enjoyment, things as objects of representation revert to the element, and he opposes things as the objects of representation to the element as the object of enjoyment. In my view, this kind of opposition between representation and enjoyment is highly problematic. Second, I am not sure if the phrase “objects of representation convert to the element” makes sense with respect to the objects of representation in general. As he defines it, the element means a pure quality that is formless and indeterminate, a two-dimensional entity that should not be confused with the surface as a part of a three-dimensional thing. Clearly it makes sense to maintain that a stone reverts to the element, which means that we meet the stone not as a thing, but as something like the element; however, it does not make sense at all to say that an abstract object as a representational object — for example, a mathematical object — reverts to the element. Third, contrary to what Levinas claims, in representational intentionality the concrete things are not enjoyed as elements, but as representational objects, just as they are given to us in representational intentionalities. The same holds not only for concrete things, but also for abstract entities such as mathematical objects or essences. For example, a mathematician who is trying to solve a mathematical problem is enjoying the mathematical truth as a mathematical entity, not as an element.

Levinas’s theory of the conversion of the object of representation into the element in enjoyment is not the result of a phenomenological analysis of
the relationship between enjoyment and representation. The converse assumption of the absolute priority of non-representational intentionality against representational intentionality is also not the result of a phenomenological analysis of the matters themselves. Rather, it should be considered to be a dogmatic premise that has nothing to do with the matters themselves. It can be regarded as a kind of obsession that returns in various stages of the development of Levinas’s phenomenology of the face.

5. Toward a phenomenological dialogue between Husserl and Levinas

As mentioned at the outset, one of the aims of this paper is to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Husserl and Levinas. Of course, the dialogue in question never actually happened between them. For this reason, the dialogue is a possible one that has to be carried out by phenomenologists after them. Levinas himself acknowledges “discovering the existent with Husserl (and Heidegger),” and does indeed attempt to develop his phenomenology of the face through a criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology; this criticism can thus be considered as part of a possible phenomenological dialogue between them. However, the above discussion of phenomenology of feeling in Husserl and Levinas reveals that as a part of this possible dialogue, Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology has some limitations — above all, because the partner in his dialogue with Husserl is only Husserl of the Logical Investigations or of those works that do not go beyond the scope of the Logical Investigations.

The possible dialogue between Husserl and Levinas should nevertheless be promoted by phenomenologists after them. Husserl and Levinas can
both profit from this kind of dialogue. For example, the sensibility for the Other as an other in an absolute sense is a lesson that Husserl could learn from Levinas. Conversely, Levinas’s phenomenology of the face has often been blamed for the unclarity of its basic concepts. A phenomenological dialogue with Husserl could go a long way toward clarifying the basic concepts of Levinas’s phenomenology of the face.

And in fact, the discussion in this paper can already be considered to be a kind of a dialogue between Husserl and Levinas concerning the issues of the phenomenology of feeling. Each section has its place in the possible dialogue. The discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling in section 1 can be conceived of as the starting point for the dialogue between them. The discussion of Levinas’s phenomenology of feeling in section 2 can be viewed as Levinas’s criticism of and response to the Husserl of the Logical Investigations. Then the discussion of Husserl’s subsequent phenomenology of feeling in section 3 and some problems with Levinas’s phenomenology of feeling in section 4 can be regarded as Husserl’s response to and criticism of Levinas’s phenomenology of feeling. But the possible dialogue between Husserl and Levinas concerning the issues of a phenomenology of feeling should be continued further. The next step in this dialogue would be Levinas’s criticism of and response to Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling after the Logical Investigations.

The possible dialogue between them concerning the issues of phenomenology of feeling should also be continued in another direction. In this paper, I have confined my discussion of the phenomenology of feeling in Husserl and Levinas to problems of phenomenology of feeling as a descriptive phenomenology. Besides phenomenology of feeling as a descriptive phenomenology, Husserl developed phenomenology of feeling as a part of constitutive phenomenology. Likewise, Levinas developed his
phenomenology of feeling as part of a phenomenology of the face that would go beyond the scope of phenomenology of feeling as a descriptive phenomenology. The possible dialogue between Husserl and Levinas should be continued with respect to the issues of phenomenology of feeling as a part of constitutive phenomenology and as a part of phenomenology of the face.
감정의 현상학: 후설과 레비나스

이 남인

본 논문의 목표는 후설의 감정의 현상학과 레비나스의 감정의 현상학을 비교연구하면서 감정의 현상학을 매개로 후설의 현상학과 레비나스의 현상학 사이의 대화를 모색하기 위한 발판을 마련하는데 있다.

후설은 1900/1901년에 출간된『논리연구』의 다섯 번째 연구의 제15절에서 “감정의 현상학”을 발전시키고 있다. 후설은 거기서 감정현상을 분석하면서 감정의 현상학을 발전시켜 나가기 위하여 세 가지 근본전제를 가지고 들어가는데, 1) 지향적 체험과 비지향적 체험이 엄밀히 구별된다고 하는 전제, 2) 객관화적 지향성이 비객관화적 지향성에 대해 절대적인 우위를 지닌다고 하는 전제, 3) 자신의 구성 요소로서 비객관화적 체험을 전혀 포함하고 있지 않은 순수한 객관화적 지향성이 존재한다는 전제 등이 그것이다. 비록 후설이『논리연구』에서 이러한 세 가지 근본전제에 입각하여 감정의 현상학을 전개해 나가고 있음에도 불구하고 제5『논리연구』의 제15절의 내용을 자세히 검토해보면 우리는 후설이 이러한 전제를 무조건적으로 타당한 전제로 간주하고 있는 것은 아니라는 사실을 확인할 수 있다. 말하자면 후설은『논리연구』에서 전개된 감정의 현상학의 타당성에 대해서 절대적인 확신을 가지고 있었던 것이 아니다.
그런데 후설은『논리연구』의 출간 이후 이러한 세 가지 근본전제가 나름대로 문제를 지니고 있다는 사실을 깨닫게 되었다. 그리고 그에 따라 그는 이미 1910년대부터 이러한 세 가지 전제를 비판적으로 검토하면서 새로운 유형의 감정의 현상학을 전개해 나가는데, 이러한 새로운 유형의 감정의 현상학은『논리연구』에서 선보인 감정의 현상학과는 전혀 다른 모습을 보이고 있다.『논리연구』에서 등장한 감정의 현상학과는 달리 1910년대 이후에 전개된 후설의 중후기 현상학에 등장한 감정의 현상학은 후설의『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학과는 전혀 다른 모습을 보이고 있다.『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학과는 달리 1910년대 이후에 전개된 후설의 중후기 현상학에 등장한 감정의 현상학은 후설의『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학과는 전혀 다른 모습을 보이고 있다.

레비나스 역시 그의 주저『전체와 무한』에서 후설의『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학을 비판적으로 고찰하면서 나름대로의 감정의 현상학을 전개하고 있다.『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설이 그랬던 것처럼 레비나스 역시『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학을 지탱하는 근본전제를 비판하면서 자신의 감정의 현상학을 전개해 나가고 있다. 그러나 레비나스는 자신의 감정의 현상학을 전개하기에 있어서『논리연구』에 등장한 감정의 현상학을 지탱해주는 근본전제와 관련하여『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설과 다소 다른 입장을 취하고 있다. 그는『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설과 마찬가지로 1) 지향적 체험과 비지향적 체험의 구별은 불가능하다는 전제를 타당한 것으로 간주하긴 하지만『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설과는 달리 2) 객관화적 작용이 객관화적 작용에 대해 절대적인 우위를 지닌다는 전제, 3) 객관화적 지향성을 전혀 지니고 있지 않은 순수한 객관화적 작용이 존재한다는 전제 등에 입각하여 감정의 현상학을 전개하고 있다.

본 논문에서 필자는 1)『논리연구』에 나타난 감정의 현상학의 구조를 고찰하고, 이러한 감정의 현상학을 비판하면서 2) 레비나스가 전개하는 감정의 현상학의 구조를 고찰한다.
상학 및 3) 『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설이 전개하는 감정의 현상학을 검토한 후, 4) 『논리연구』의 출간 이후의 후설이 전개한 감정의 현상학의 입장에서 레비나스의 감정의 현상학이 지니고 있는 문제점을 비판적으로 검토하면서 5) 후설의 현상학과 레비나스의 현상학 사이에 비판적이며 생산적인 철학적 대화가 전개되어야 할 필요성을 언급하였다.