

Gricean Circle from the Perspective of the *said* and its Limitations

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Kim, Jeong Yoon. 2007. Gricean Circle from the Perspective of the *said* and its Limitations. *SNU Working Papers in English Linguistics and Language* 6, 35-53. This paper purports to review the previous attempts to dissolve Gricean Circle by revising the notion of *what is said* and their limitations. Because the circularity was poised between *what is said* and *what is implicated*, some of recent efforts have been concentrated to transform the one horn, *what is said*, to be exempt from the regressive logic. Recanati (2001) and Carston (2002), the most prominent among them, garner some successes upon the task, but are exposed to logical circularity either within *what is said* or between *what is communicated* and *what is said*. More promising approach seems to befall Bach's (2001) proposal of *proposition radical*.

Keywords: semantic-pragmatic interface, *what is said*, explicature, proposition radical, Availability Principle, Gricean Circle

1. Introduction

A recent debate about semantics/pragmatics interface is about repositioning *what is said* of an utterance. It has returned to the attention of many scholars by emergence of explicature, an intermediate domain that exists in between that of implicature and logical form of a sentence. The rise of explicature put the traditional categorization of utterance into *what is said* and conversational implicature into question. Many operations that once belonged to *what is said* have transferred to that of explicature in framework of many pragmatists. Consequently, reconfiguring the arena of *what is said* has become a pivotal issue.

Strengthening the significance of such taxonomic issue is its import to the problem of Gricean circle. After Levinson's (2000) discovery, it is now widely believed that within Grice's (1989) system "no implicature can be computed unless something has been said" (Recanati 2006) while *what is said* takes its input from pragmatic inference. It is not only a

theory-internal problem indigenous to Grice's framework, but also one for truth-conditional as well. How well the circle is treated with is closely related to what standard one has established in demarcating *what is said* and what is more than said.

One popular approach to eliminate one horn of the dilemma is to widen the concept of *what is said* to contain contextual elements believed to incur Gricean Circle. Were contextually processed part of utterances proper (now usually addressed as *explicature*) essentially something said by the speaker, then circularity vanishes because the context is something within *what is said*, not external element the *said* content should refer to for determination of meaning. This is the route taken by Recanati (2001) and Carston (2002) to nullify Gricean Circle.

In this thesis, I will point out Recanati's and Carston's expansionist approach for *what is said* suffers from indigenous problem of their own despite successes in neutralizing Gricean Circle. Prior to the critical review, their own perspectives will be presented (section 2). Then their problematic construction of pragmatic-semantic interface in spite of some strengths will be illuminated with a focus on another type of circularity (section 3). Conclusion will briefly summarize the rationale of criticism.

2. Previous studies

2.1 Grice's notion of what is said and Levinson's accusation for Grice's circle

Grice's now classic description on *what is said* draws from his complex notion of 'utterer's meaning' (Grice 1989). His complicated philosophical framework can be succinctly summarized by the following (Bach 1994, Levinson 2000):

- (1) U said that p by uttering x iff:
 - a. x conventionally ("timelessly") means p
 - b. UM-intended M-intension (Meaning-intention) is an intention that is necessary for the speaker's attempt to produce a certain belief in the addressee by his very utterance.
 - c. p = the conventional meaning of x minus any conventional implicatures.

(i.e. that any conventional aspects of meaning that 'indicate' but do not contribute to 'what is said')

Pragmatists generally agree that Grice's notion of '*what is said*' is mapping semantic representation onto truth conditional content of utterance, though under the condition that speaker should intend it to be conveyed to the hearer. Another important point for *what is said* is that, for full identification of *what is said* one would need to know (a) the identity of the referents, (b) the time of utterance, and (c) the meaning on the particular occasion on the particular occasion of utterance, of the phrase uttered (Grice *ibid.*). In other words, reference assignment and indexical resolutions and disambiguation is typical prerequisite for determining *what is said*. These prerequisites must be satisfied before production of conversational implicature, which is taken account of as below:

(2) Conversational Implicature

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that P has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that Q, provided that:

- a. He has to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims. Or at least the Cooperative Principle.
- b. The supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, Q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in these terms) consistent with this presumption.
- c. The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition in b is required.

It is clear that implicature is calculated out from *what is said*, the proposition expressed by truth-conditional content of the utterance. It is in itself dependent on **reference assignment**, **indexical resolution** and **disambiguation**. While his notion of saying does not preclude non-verbal action of communicating, as the notion of 'making as if to say' implies that communicational acts other than explicitly stating p can be regarded as saying p. But 'build-up' view from said content as input to those implied by it is clear.

On the description of *what is said* by Grice, Levinson (2000) is against the concept of previously given *what is said* that is simply semantically defined as an input to further implicature. A clear-cut division between semantics and pragmatics is implausible because pragmatics intervenes from first phase of *what is said*, those of disambiguation and reference resolution. It leads to a circularity that, even though any inference stipulated to arise after disambiguation and reference fixing is given by literal expression in Grice's system, they are but to be given by inferring process that has but to depend on outer-utterance context:

(3) Disambiguation

- a. The view could be improved by the addition of a plant out there.
- b. The view could be destroyed by the addition of a plant out there.

(4) Reference fixing

- a. The ham sandwich is a nuisance.
- b. The customer who ordered ham sandwich is a nuisance.

(Levinson 2000)

For (3), It is hard not to think Gricean maxim of Relevance (Grice 1989) not to intervene in selection of preferred readings. Example (4), for similar reasons, requires intervention of inference from contextual elements to settle what deictic expressions denote. As long as we adopt Grice's view that *what is said* is inseparable from what the speaker wanted to convey by the utterance, the consequence is inevitable.

Now, inference intervening into disambiguation poses a circularity to Grice's demarcation between *what is said* and what is implicated: Grice's account on implicature made it dependent on a prior determination of the 'said' through an inference chain. The said, in turn, depends on disambiguation, indexical resolution and reference fixing. But each of these processes also substantially depended on inference chain from what is contextually implicated. Thus a paradoxical position befalls *what is said* as determiner as well as determinee of what is implicated. This Levinson calls 'Gricean Circle.'

2.2 Expansion of what is said: Recanati (2001) and Carston (2002)

Some theorists in perimeter of the Relevance school propose an expansion of *what is said* to meet the challenge of Gricean Circle. Among them the most prominent are Recanati (2001) and Carston (2002). While the former attempts to dissolve entire circle problem by merging implicature into *what is said*, the latter tries to keep two separate and independent processes respectively for implicature and explicature.

A key notion that summarizes Recanati's claim is **Availability Principle**. As unfolded below, what the principles state is that *what is said* cannot be grasped by any counter-intuitional formal definition, for no matter what necessary and sufficient standard is given, our commonsense understanding of *what is said* always surpasses it. It is because our intuition dictates (Recanati 1989: 312) that *what is said* must be interlinked with the speaker's intention to convey what he/she wants to deliver by that utterance.

(5) Availability Principle (Recanati 1989)

In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of an utterance meaning is part of *what is said*, that is, in making a decision concerning *what is said*, we should always try to preserve our pre-historic intuition on the matter.

Recanati defends such view of insurmountable intuition by refuting previously accepted system of pragmatic output from semantic input. For example, assume there exists a question answer pair:

- (6) Who did go to Paris?
- (7) Everybody went to Paris.

According to the traditional view, what is literally said by the syntactic representation of (7) is that everybody in the world went to Paris even though this is clearly not what the speaker means. Then a proponent of this analysis has only to assume that what the speaker says is different from what he means, i.e., that he speaks nonliterally, as in metaphors. This assumes a counter-intuitive understanding of *what is said*, and

independent principle to secure the commonly shared pretheoretical grasp on *what is said* comes to be called for. Once the principle is admitted without further appeal to higher-order logical primitive to justify itself, it guarantees the course of such intuition (Recanati 1989).

Direct consequence of the principle is that fine-tuned efforts to distinguish what sentence says and what speaker says but the sentence does not- at least directly- is no more required. Once the intuition dictates that some content is within intuitional grasp of speaker, the principle discerns it as a part of *what is said*. In this fashion, many supra-sentential levels of meaning are included within the said part of utterance: expansions of incomplete propositions, enrichment of skeletal Logical Forms and even conventionally admitted tokens of conversational implicature are not differentiated in this respect.

One corollary from the one-size-fits-all notion of *what is said* is that the very cause that spawned Gricean circle has vanished. The circle at least needs contrast between prior-implicature and post-implicature processes, and mutual inferential chain between the two. Recanati's solution, however, undermines it first by incorporating much of implicature (if not all) into *what is said* and negating the contrast, and second by positioning intuition than inference as prime mechanism in the operation. He summarized the view in the following scheme: (Recanati 1989).




Figure 1. Recanati's framework¹⁾

- 1) The figure needs caution :First, Recanati describes the horizontal relationship between what is communicated and both *what is said* and Conversational implicature as 'over and above' one, analogous to that of 'constituency,' without further specification Second, relation between the two vertically present levels is not specified at all but they concern the direction of singly pragmatic processing. Third, the 'conversational implicature' are more of communicational addendum, not generally recalled conversational implicature.

For the second horn of the approach, Carston (2002) is unique in that she couples the notion of extended notion of *what is said* with the claim for modularity in meaning-deriving process of an utterance. For her the semantics and pragmatics are two independent, non-interchangeable modules. And semantics proper is all the more so because it is also closed, unlike pragmatics, to knowledge on outer world. The claim is best summarized by her Principle of Functional Independence:

(8) Principle of Functional Independence (Carston 2002)

Conversational implicatures are functionally independent of *what is said*: this means in particular that they do not entail, and are not entailed by, *what is said*. When an alleged implicature does not meet this condition, it must be considered as *what is said*.

Carston argues that cancellability and calculability, traditionally adopted measures to screen implicatures (Grice 1989)²⁾ is not sufficient to solely establish implicature, for results of disambiguation and reference assignment are also calculable and cancellable. So if implicature is to be distinguished from mere explicature, it must be further qualified by other process, functionally independent from that determining explicature, no matter whether it be operation of maxim of Relevance or mutual negotiation between interlocutors. If not, the meaning-deriving (typically, conventional implicatures of scalar, connective and conditional items) route should be identified with that of explicature; there is no need to maintain distinct ontological status for those that cannot be distinguished from tokens of mere disambiguation and indexical saturations in their mechanism of derivation. Occam's razor stands opposed to that.

From this three interim conclusions are derived: First, her concept of *what is said* encompasses all items that cannot prove themselves as derivatively distinct from contextual expansion of lexical items. Second, explicatures are pragmatic but only in different sense than implicatures are pragmatic (they do not involve non-conventional inference). Third, implicatures thus strictly considered as functionally independent from

2) The testing tools for implicature have been considered as: cancellability, calculability, and non-detachability and, for some, nonconventionality (Grice, *ibid.*)

explicatures cannot intervene in determining explicature, and vice versa for explicatures.

The last point is worth noticing. Although it is true for Carston that pragmatics contribute both to explicature and implicature, that the two processes are mutually insulated, parallelly-operating automata. Then, while the difficulty in explaining the independent emergence of implicature regardless of explicature persists, the account enjoys a clear advantage in resolving Gricean circle, for the circle this time also loses its ground by being denied of a sequential order that one is fed into another: Figure 2. represents this understanding of Carston:




Figure 2. Carston's Framework³⁾

Thus, Carston's claim can be summarized as avoidance of the circle by (a) acknowledging status of input for semantic (extra-pragmatic) items for implicature, but (b) confining inferential items related to truth condition in narrow sense to explicature. Then *what is said*, roughly graspable as combination of skeletal semantics and explicature as a whole, is immune to Gricean circle.

Also not to be missed is implicit role of intuition in drawing functional

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independence principle. The description on *functional independence principle* presupposes a specific connotation of entailment. The typical example of conventional implicatures, subsumed under explicature in Carston's framework, is only entailed by *what is said* if the maxim of quantity and relevance is in action. This in turn presupposes mutual agreement on speaker's intention on utterance, which in turn is identical with what Recanati's Availability Principle presupposes.

The survey so far can be adumbrated as in Table 1:

Analyst	Semantic Representation	Deictic& Reference Resolution	Minimal Proposition	Enriched Proposition	Additional Proposition
Grice 1989	"what is said"			"Implicature"	
Levinson 2000	"what is said"			-	
	"Implicature"(Pragmatic intrusion into truth conditions)				
Bach 1994	"what is said"		"explicature"		"Implicature"
Recanati 2001	"what is said"				
	-	"Explicature"			
Carston 2002	"Explicature"				"Implicature"
	"what is said"				

Table 1. Summary of coverages of interface theories

3. Critique on the expansionist views

This section will exhibit that the intuition Recanati (2001) and Carston (2002) share are actually a combination of three independent, unsubstantiated assumption. Moreover, also unavoidable is involvement with other logical circles through attempting to evade the Gricean circle.

3.1 The intuition as combination of three independent assumptions

Closer inspection on the Availability principle reveals that the intuition is a combination of three independent assumptions: (a) *what is said* must be truth-conditionally complete, (b) the content of *what is said* is readily available to consciousness (Recanati 1986, 1989, 1993) and (c) *what is said*

cannot be separated from the proposition that speaker intends to deliver by the utterance. Saving (c) aside for section 3.2., it must be noted that (a) and (b) cannot be regarded as a priori given by *what is said*.

To be true, the primary reason that Recanati and Carston extended *what is said* to enriched proposition was that they regarded that much of enrichment (including conventional implicatures) as minimally required to specify real truth condition of given utterances. The requirement, however, is only relative to what framework one employs, as we can witness from Bach (2001) that *propositional radical* can perfectly function as *what is said*. Then it is not a necessary condition to draw *what is said*.

(b), a unique condition for Recanati, is rather complex to lay a satisfactory assessment. First of all, it is not clear what he wanted to denote by the term 'available to consciousness.' If it were to mean know, we can easily refute this by giving an intuitive counterexample that a speaker utters any nonsense.

(9) Countless dreams sleep furiously.

It is hard to imagine anyone utters (9) 'knows' what is meant by it. But it is hard as well to conclude that there are nothing said if (9) are phonetically uttered. If Recanati agrees upon (9) bearing something said, then the availability cannot be identified with knowing.

Then the availability might refer to lower degree of consciousness like noticing or attending to. But it is equally disputable, for in the course of speaking and listening to one another, we generally do not consciously reflect on the semantic content of the sentences we hear or on *what is said* in their utterance. We are occupied with what we are communicating and on what is being communicated to us, not on *what is said*. Moreover, we don't have make accurate judgement about what information is semantic and what is not in order to be sensitive to semantic information. (Bach 2001) Then it is hard to ascertain what kind of availability it is.

Further question is related to whose consciousness *what is said* is available to. It is also intuitively true that *what is said*, even assuming Recanati's conception, is frequently not clearly attended or noticed by all of interlocutors in conversation settings. Then is it content that the speaker is consciously accessing what she is saying? This problem is connected to (c), the most critical condition both for Recanati and Carston.

3.2 Heavy reliance on speaker's and hearer's intention

A closer look at Availability Principle discloses that it is composed of three independent assumptions, i.e. (a) *what is said* must readily be consciously available to consciousness. Though what this 'availability to consciousness' means remain unaccounted by the principle. (b) *what is said* should be truth-evaluable (c) *what is said* is inseparably aligned with what the speaker intended to mean by it; and there certainly exists a priori consensus among conversationists on the intuition. While Functional Independence Principle stays mute on (a), it is certain that Carston's one clings heavily onto (b) and (c). While (a) is essentially a psycholinguistic pursuit and (b) is regarded as given at current study, (c) is intrinsically problematic. It is not at all natural to view what any concerned sentence says necessarily reflects speaker's intention.

First to be reminded is that saying something does not entail meaning it. While the root of identification of *what is said* with what the speaker intended to mean by the utterance can be found in Grice's definition of Utterer's meaning (Grice 1989), Grice did not attempt to identify sentential meaning and utterer's meaning. Bach (2001) lucidly points out that it is entirely possible to say what the sentence says while meaning another (like in euphemism), or not to say what the sentence says while exactly meaning it (like at ironies). As well possible is speaker not meaning what he says (as in antinomies), or not saying what he means (slips of tongue.) Thus, it would be just to state that *what is said* is separable from speaker's communicational intention: communicational meaning cannot sprawl only from what the sentence says.

Moreover, there exist intuitive counter-examples to the set of intuition, as described by Hawley (2002) in expansion of Bach (2001). Four cases of independent mixture of whether one means what one says, and whether one says what one means:

(10) *what is said* not needed to derive *what is said* means

Suppose Kim and Lee is having a discussion in the presence of a 5 year old child. Suddenly, Lee lowers her voice to a whisper and says that the child is naughty. Kim does not hear what Lee says. Still, he reasons that Lee has implicated that she does not want the child to understand because Lee has violated the

conversational maxim of Manner, "avoid obscurity of expression." What was said was not needed in this reasoning. Lee could have said anything but Kim would have reached the same meaning.

- (11) What speakers mean only part of what is syntactically present Nathan and June are discussing the weather in places they have been. Nathan starts to say "In Amarillo, Texas, it's hot and dusty." However, a car alarm goes off as Nathan says, and Nathan only says "In Amarillo, Texas..." Plausibly, Nathan's utterance does not express an explicature, but still conversationally implicates that Nathan has been in Amarillo.
- (12) What speakers mean is unrelated to what is syntactically present Roy is sitting in his office at the wall. Emilia walks in and starts asking Roy questions about a lecture they both attended. After answering each question briefly and truthfully, Roy closes his mouth and looks at Emilia. Emilia gets the message that Roy is not interested in conversing at that moment. He succeeds in meaning that he is not interested in the subject, but his comments on the lecture are unrelated to the meaning.
- (13) Speaker's meaning comes to exist even though there is nothing said.

(a telephone conversation)

Sally: What did you end up doing last night?

Jack: Oh, we went to that new movie. Why didn't you come? Did you have a fight with your husband again?

(Pause. Sally says nothing)

Jack: Well, I hope you work things out somehow.

Clearly Sally succeeds in delivering a meaning that she had a fight with her husband by not saying it.

(Hawley 2002)

These examples evince that necessary interlock between speaker's intention and sentential conveyance does not exist. (10) and (11) indicate upon probable but not inevitable connection between the two, (12) upon only indirect linking, and most powerfully, (13) upon wholly random coincidence between the two. Had *what is said* been necessarily connected with what speaker means through the utterance, they should not be possible at all.

The counterexamples above render workings of intuition that the two

expansionists rely so heavily on rather counterintuitive, which is against the very merit that the intuition-based explication had targeted on. Then it is clear that stipulation of necessary conditionality between what speaker intended to mean and *what is said* by sentence would rather be discarded.

3.3 Circle II : internal circularity within Carston

More critical than that of previous flaw is that Carston's attempts are exposed to new circles of her own. Carston's one is one that takes places because the causes that brought Gricean Circle into being is *internalized* within the said content Recanati's circle comes from higher-order category of what is communicated incorporating *what is said*.

To recall, Carston's notion of *what is said* included contextually supplemented information to resolve truth condition that is grasped without mediation of inference mechanism employing communicative relevance. In other words, her judgement of functional dependence of *what is said* on contextually determined explicature regards the latter as integral part of the said content: If pragmatics cannot pin down explicature, we cannot ensure what the sentence says; and if explicature is invariably caught, it is doubtlessly necessary that *what is said* had arranged that. In this way the account is not immune from a new circularity within *what is said* for it depends on what Recanati calls *Minimalist principle* as the following:

(14) **Minimalist Principle** (Recanati 2002)

A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of *what is said* if and only if its determination is necessary for the utterance to express it.

Now, the problem is that in order to decide whether a is an integral part of *what is said*, one must already have a semantic analysis of the sentence uttered (Recanati 1989: 105) The argument for the finding can be given as following:

a. *Functional Independence Principle* acknowledges a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of *what is said* only if its

determination is necessary for the utterance to express (and thus is liable to the *Minimalist Principle*)

b. Then, in processing, it can decide on whether any pragmatically determined aspect *a* of the meaning of an utterance is an integral part of *what is said* only if one already knows whether the determination of *a* is necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition.

c. One knows whether determination of *a* is necessary for the utterance to express complete proposition only if one knows the meaning of complete proposition.⁴⁾

d. (Circle II) One knows whether any pragmatically determined part is necessary for complete proposition by knowing the meaning of the proposition (from c.), which in turn requires the pragmatically determined part. (from a.)

The critical chain of the argument is c, the plausibility of which comes from (another) intuition: one knows whether *A* is necessary for the meaning of *B* only if one knows what *B* means. This, I believe, is an inevitable assumption that cannot be bypassed if we decided upon accepting intuition as primary source of explanation. Once c. is adopted, the argument can be trimmed neatly: In order to distinguish part of *what is said* from what is implicated in conformity with the Minimalist principle, it must already be known what constitutes complete proposition.

Let me take an example. In order to determine *what is said* by the following utterances:

(15) It will take us some time to get there.

(16) I have had breakfast.

The time of utterance and the reference of pronominal expressions, and the identity of the speaker and hearer for (15) has to be secured for their truth conditions to be determined. But what else? Wouldn't

4) This assumption is rather given by intuition: one knows whether *A* is necessary for the meaning of *B* only if one knows what *B* means.

it necessary to assume hidden modal values for (16), for possible interpretation like 'it is necessary that some time will be taken to get the place in mind'? Or what about the possibility that (16) accosts other explicature like 'therefore I wouldn't eat more'? One must also be assured that there are no more semantic slots to be filled for her to conclude that no further contextual information is necessary. Then knowledge on part of *what is said* must be presupposed to determine explicature, which in turn is necessary to determine *what is said*. It is a type of epistemic circularity that I nominate as Circle II.

3.4 Circle III : internal circularity of Recanati

Recanati (2001) succeeds in evading circle II by not requiring part of the *said* content necessary as well as sufficient condition for the entire meaning of concerned utterances. His thesis is not immune to circularity, however, though his one is rather different: problematic is his coinage of the third level, what is communicated as depicted in figure 2. What he describes about the level is somewhat contradictory, as displayable by direct quotes as the following:

- (17) (For an utterance of 'John has three children')
What is communicated (viz. that John has exactly three children) is classically accounted for by positing a conversational implicature that combines with the proposition allegedly expressed. (viz., that John has at least three children). This proposal, however, does not pass the availability test for the speaker himself would not recognize the latter proposition as being what he has said. Not being consciously available, the proposition which the classical account takes to be literally expressed cannot be identified with what is said, if we accept the Availability Principle. (Recanati 1989: 116)
- (18) One way of understanding what is said is to consider that what is communicated consists of what is said and what is implicated, instead of being something over and above *what is said* and what is implicated. Instead of locating what is communicated at one level and *what is said* at another, I suggest that we consider "what is communicated" as simply a name for that level at which we

find both what said and what is implicated... what is said and what is implicated thus remain distinct, and are consciously available as distinct. (ibid: 109)

Here the relation between *what is said* and *what is implicated* is very hard to comprehend, though, as in excerpts above extracted from an identical paper. The most promising configuration seems that while the communicated content does not include Recanati's own conversational implicature that excludes normally accepted tokens of generalized scalar implicature like 'John has three children.' In this course, however, another logical circularity pops up in the connection between *what is said* and *what is communicated*. The argument is as follows:

a. What is communicated consists of *what is said*, as can be confirmed by the quote above. Then the meaning of what is communicated must be dependent upon the meaning of *what is said*, for it is the most plausible violation of commonsense intuition not to accept meaning of an linguistic entity, above the level of phonetic representation, does not depend in sense relation on other linguistic entity that is set up to consist in.

b. According to the Availability Principle (projecting what one means to *what is said*), *what is said* is available to consciousness only if what one means by the utterance is available to consciousness. But this is synonymous with the claim that *what is said* is available to consciousness only if what is communicated is available to the consciousness. For it is impossible to imagine situation otherwise, viz. one is conscious of what is communicated whereas not so of what one means, or vice versa.

This tracks back to the query on the sense of 'availability to consciousness' in section 3.2. Thus If the property of being "available to consciousness" is identifiable to the term 'to know' then one cannot know *what is said* without knowing what is communicated. If it is not identifiable with 'knowing' then there still remains some dependency in mental process no matter whether it be of the form that *what is said* cannot be 'attended to' without what is communicated is so, or of the form that relies on 'being present on consciousness'. Thus, neutral to the term availability, the processing dependency always holds.

c. a. and b. leads into the Circle III: *what is communicated* does depend

on *what is said* in terms of meaning, while *what is said* in turn depends on what is communicated in terms of mental processing. Thus it seems that any of the other cannot be known to interlocutors without presupposed knowledge on the other. until the meaning of *what is said* is known, what is communicated is not known. And as far as what one wants to communicate as such is not present in the consciousness, what is communicated is not available to consciousness' either.

Of course Recanati can reject the Circle III by pointing the circle is not genuine they are epistemic one, not ontological. Thus it is still maintainable that while what is communicated and *what is said* presuppose each other in knowledge or mental processing chain, but not their existence itself. So if what is said is not present in either speaker's or hearer's understanding, the content of communication through it might not be available either, but what is said still can exist independent of what is communicated.

If that is the horn of dilemma that Recanati would take to evade Circle III, I cannot but admit that it is of epistemic status. But the same thing must be said of the Circle II raised by Recanati himself. It should be noted that the circle II was of the content that *what is said* cannot be known without pragmatic part of *what is said* is known, whereas pragmatic part of the said can only be determined if *what is said* is precisely known. If Recanati thinks this much of epistemic claim is enough to refute his main opponent, *Minimalist Principle*, then the same justice should be imposed upon his assertion on said-communicated distinction.

Or it might be claimed that the circle is two-pronged, the one being semantic/pragmatic while the other being epistemic. Because each kind of dependency is not of the same kind, the circle can be admitted as not housing same structure as the Gricean circle or Circle II does. Nonetheless, the interpretation that circle III is made up of two distinct levels, if sustainable by itself, does not negate that there is a mutual dependency between the two. Then the circularity to a degree cannot but be taken into the framework at least to a degree.

4. Conclusion

The Gricean circle induced by pragmatic incompleteness inherent in Grice's (1989) notion of *what is said* spawned attempts to eliminate the circularity by reestablishing the notion. Recanati (2002) resorted to intuition to argue that *what is said* engages in any intentional content utterers commit to. Carston (2001) reached similar conclusion through essential difference from implicature and explicature summarized in her *Functional Independence Principle*. Their attempts have succeeded in avoiding Gricean Circle because the widely encompassing notion of their *said* content subsumes contextual elements (pivotal in determining truth conditions at sentence level) within itself.

Despite their strength through appeasement to commonly held intuition, they are not immune to their own fallacies: They cannot but remain in groundless intuition to be revealed as an aggregate of three independent, unsubstantiated assumptions on truth-evaluability, uninterrupted availability to consciousness, and heavy reliance on speaker's (or hearer's) intention. The last is the more severe because it runs against another set of intuitive counterexamples.

Moreover, their frames are exposed to logical circles other than Grice's. Carston's one falls on the circle between pragmatically determined part of *what is said* and *what is said* proper, as Recanati's (1989) points spell out. (Circle II) Recanati's one, alternately, generates its own one between what is communicated and *what is said*. (Circle III) Recanati might attempt to escape from the circle by distinguishing conventionalized implicature and non-conventionalized one. But this attempt clearly begs its own question, calling back to intuition again.

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