Soviet Policy Toward Korea

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I. Introduction

This paper consists of two parts. Part I is devoted to a brief analysis of the major considerations that have shaped Soviet policy toward Korea in recent years.** Part II is a “thinkpiece,” designed to identify the conditions and circumstances under which a significant change might occur in Soviet policy and to assess the likelihood of such a change. To understand possible changes in Soviet policy, the following analyses were performed:

1) identification of those aspects or segments of the external environment that are relevant in my judgment, and to which I believe the Soviets also attach significance;

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almost immobile one, with the same or an even more intensive degree as its predecessor.

Without incurring the risk of being blamed for projecting one’s own personal wishful thinking into the objective analysis of the subject, one can hardly anticipate that the next Soviet leadership will be likely to take any initiative in a bold attempt to break the ice, say, in the form of a sudden return of the Northern Islands to Japan. Should such a thing take place in the future, it would be not under Brezhneve’s successor, but under Brezhnev’s successor’s successors in the 1990s.
2) discernment of the major trends in each segment of the external setting for the period 1980-85;

3) assessment of the degree of Soviet flexibility toward South Korea. The term flexibility is used in this paper to refer to the tendency to pursue a policy favorable to or consistent with South Korean interests.

II. Recent Soviet Policy toward Korea

From the Soviet perspective, national interest is best served by preventing the establishment of hegemonic influence in East Asia by other powers. This general conception underlies, and fundamentally shapes, Soviet policy toward Korea.

At a more concrete level, Soviet policy toward Korea seems to reflect the following characteristics:

1) No development in or around Korea should be allowed to bring about a major deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations which might adversely affect Soviet interests elsewhere. In particular, a severe confrontation carrying the risk of military action should be avoided.

2) The course of Japan’s domestic or foreign policies should not be affected in a way injurious to Soviet interests. In Moscow’s eyes, it would be prudent not to encourage or provide a pretext for Japan to increase her military capabilities sharply, and especially to develop nuclear weapons. Nor should Japan be stimulated to move toward closer alignment with China or to undertake more intimate defense cooperation with the U.S. Finally, Japan’s economic cooperation with the Soviet Union should not be jeopardized.

3) No development regarding Korea should lend support to China’s anti-Soviet programs, domestic or foreign. More specific, Chinese influence in Korea should not be enhanced. Above all, Peking should not be allowed to establish predominant influence over North Korea.

A number of Western analysts claim to see some indications that the Soviet Union may be contemplating application of the German formula to the Korean peninsula. The evidence cited in-
cludes private comments of Soviet scholars and Soviet grants of entry visas for South Korean nationals to participate in international conferences held in the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet Union may consider the North Korean formula for unification unrealistic and while Soviet analysts may accept the division of Korea as a fact and expect the division to continue for an indefinite period, it is important to point out that the Soviet government has never advocated a German formula. Nor has it made any serious diplomatic effort to promote the formula in regard to Korea. Moscow remains unresponsive, for example, to a call for direct talks with South Korean governmental representatives.

Whatever one’s judgment about the alleged Soviet inclination to adopt the German formula, it is not difficult to discern the existence of powerful constraints on Soviet flexibility. One is North Korea’s persistent admonitions. The Soviet government does not want to antagonize Pyongyang by taking actions which might undermine North Korea’s position on a matter the latter considers vital.

Another constraint is the PRC, which would undoubtedly seek to exploit the situation to the USSR’s disadvantage by accusing it of “betrayal.” Moscow is highly sensitive to North Korea’s ties with the Chinese and feels inhibited from taking actions that might result in increased intimacy between these two countries.

A final constraint is Soviet perceptions of U.S. intentions toward Korea: notably, the degree of U.S. support for South Korea and America’s evolving relations with North Korea. Here the troop withdrawal issue weighs heavily. The initial announcement in the spring of 1977 of President Jimmy Carter’s decision to pull out American ground forces apparently came as a surprise to Soviet analysts. Despite Carter’s campaign promises, they seem to have believed that the international ramifications involved would prevent any new administration from significantly reducing U.S. forces, at least without a quid pro quo. Moreover, they found it incomprehensible that the U.S. would unilaterally give up the powerful leverage it enjoys with respect to both Koreas and to other powers because of its military presence. For these reasons, they have remained skeptical
that the Carter Administration would actually implement the force withdrawal plan as initially announced, and they have argued that if the U.S. does so, it would not carry out withdrawal in such a manner as to jeopardize South Korea’s security or to bring about a disequilibrium in the balance of power in the region. At the same time, what Moscow sees as instability and uncertainty in U.S. policy toward South Korea during the past several years has contributed to Soviet caution in considering the German formula. Paradoxically, the following proposition generally appears to hold: the greater the perceived degree and steadiness of American support for South Korea, the easier it would be for the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of improving relations with South Korea. Only a perception that U.S. abandonment of South Korea was imminent might provide the Soviet Union with more incentive to enter into negotiations with South Korea and to establish its presence in South Korea.

The Soviet government’s caution or “inflexibility,” however, is not merely the product of these various constraints. It derives at least as much, and probably more, from the fact that Moscow perceives no clear advantages that would accrue from behaving otherwise and that would offset the possible disadvantages entailed. Whatever Soviet analysts may say in private conversations, the Soviet government’s public stance effectively sets the limits of permissible Soviet actions.

However, while Moscow is unshakably determined to ensure the survival of North Korea as an independent socialist country, the Soviet Union also has a major stake in preventing a war in Korea. Consequently, the Soviet Union has sought in recent years a relaxation of tension and, above all, tranquility on the Korean peninsula.

III. Soviet Policy toward Korea for 1980-1985

1. The Nature of External Factors Shaping Soviet Policy

In the pages to follow a number of “bivariate” propositions will be presented. Each proposition is an oversimplification of reality. Each is considered by a policy maker along with other relevant
propositions in the context of a situational exigency occasioning a
decision. Each proposition here is assumed to operate only under a
set of contingent conditions, some of which are specified in an
explanatory note accompanying the proposition. All these pro-
positions—at least those which the policy makers consider pertinent in a
given situation—are inter-related. It is only for analytic purposes that
they are presented in the form of a simple bivariate relationship.

1) North Korea-South Korea Relations

The closer the two Koreas move toward accepting a modus
vivendi, the greater Soviet flexibility becomes toward South Korea.

If North Korea itself moves closer to recognizing a divided Ko-
rea, the Soviet Union will feel less constrained in her dealings with
South Korea. One major condition here is that rapprochement be-
tween South and North Korea will not occur in the framework of,
or as part of, U.S.-PRC-Japan cooperation. Any arrangement be-
tween the two Koreas that might be perceived as signifying North
Korea's increasing intimacy with an anti-Soviet coalition would not
lead to a Soviet policy friendly to either Korea.

2) U.S.-PRC-Japan Relations

The greater the perceived threat from any one, two, or all three
countries, the greater the Soviet support for North Korea becomes,
reducing Soviet flexibility toward South Korea.

This consideration is of vital importance to the Soviet Union.
Any developments that might strengthen the cooperative relationship,
whether economic, political, or military, between any two and
especially among the three would be viewed as a threat to the Soviet
Union. The Soviets have shown keen sensitivity to the possibility of
military cooperation among the three countries and would view a
significant movement toward such cooperation as constituting a grave
threat to Soviet interests. For some time they have been voicing
anxiety over this matter. For example, the Soviet press for the period
April-September 1979 indicated a high level of Soviet concern. This
concern was intensified by Secretary Brown's recent "consultations"
with Chinese officials in Peking and the subsequent U.S. position on
the question of transfer of military technology and equipment.
A review of Soviet policy during the period August 1978-December 1979 generally indicates a higher level of Soviet support for North Korea than for the preceding year. One can recall several events during this period which were not in the Soviet interest: the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Amity came in mid-1978, followed by the announcement of U.S.-PRC normalization at the end of the year. We can also recall that the beginning of the year 1979 saw Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, Teng’s visit to the U.S., and Chinese military action against Vietnam.

As military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan becomes closer, the Soviet Union will give North Korea a greater level of support. Soviet considerations in this case might not be just to alleviate North Korea’s concern, but to increase its influence over North Korea, thereby acquiring greater leverage vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan.

3) U.S.-North Korea Relations

The closer U.S.-North Korea relations become, the greater becomes Soviet flexibility and incentive for developing ties with South Korea.

Close U.S.-North Korea relations could come about in two alternative contexts: estrangement between the U.S. and South Korea, or friendly relations between the two countries. A major stipulation here is that such a movement toward close relations between the U.S. and North Korea be perceived to have occurred as a coordinated effort between the U.S. and South Korea.

Soviet analysts have shown sensitivity to any signs of potential relations between the U.S. and North Korea. Their scenarios involving gradual but steady development of ties between the two countries are intriguing and remarkably similar to those entertained by Western analysts.

4) U.S.-South Korean Relations

The greater the tensions or estrangement between the U.S. and South Korea, the greater becomes Soviet flexibility towards South Korea.

The Soviets perceive U.S.-South Korean ties to be very close, and
feel that any ties with South Korea would not appreciably weaken U.S. influence in South Korea. Hence, there is no incentive for the Soviet Union to antagonize the North Koreans. In their estimate the advantages to be derived do not outweigh the costs, especially that of alienating North Korea.

A high level of tensions between the U.S. and South Korea provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity and incentive to attempt to establish a foothold in South Korea and to extend its influence. The cost of alienating North Korea may be perceived to outweigh anticipated advantages.

5) PRC-North Korea Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies inversely with the degree of equidistance which North Korean policy represents in relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC.

The Soviet Union wants to maintain its influence over North Korea in order to prevent North Korea from aligning herself with the PRC. This would serve Soviet interests in many ways. Soviet influence over North Korea provides the Soviet Union with leverage in her relations with the U.S., Japan, and the PRC. It is consistent with her policy of isolating the PRC. North Korea would be prevented from being drawn into an anti-Soviet alliance and from providing strategic advantages for such an alliance.

If North Korea appears to move closer to the PRC, the Soviet Union will feel compelled to increase its efforts for North Korea, with her flexibility toward South Korea reduced. However, there is a limit to how close North Korea could safely lean toward the PRC. If the movement toward closer relations between the PRC and North Korea is perceived to pass a point of no return, the Soviets might use their South Korean card to North Korea's disadvantage. The Soviet Union's flexibility toward South Korea is constrained by other factors as well, e.g., the notion of proletarian internationalism and socialist solidarity, and adverse reactions among the Third World countries.

Soviet specialists both inside and outside the government profess not to be concerned with a possible development of closer Chinese-North Korean relations. They see North Korea attempting conscienc-
tiously to maintain equidistance—with considerable success. The
grounds for the Soviets' optimism in this regard are as follows: North
Korea is dependent on the Soviet Union for sophisticated weapons
and for economic assistance. Secondly, the effectiveness of North
Korea's diplomatic activities around the world depends on Soviet
support. Third, the North Koreans do not trust the Chinese, and they
do not want to rely entirely on one country.

6) PRC-South Korea Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies directly with the
degree of Chinese flexibility vis-à-vis South Korea.

This proposition presupposes substantial improvement in the rela-
tions between the two Koreas. Otherwise, Chinese flexibility would
not be forthcoming. The Soviets are sensitive to any signs of con-
tact between the PRC and South Korea and assume secret contacts
are underway. They have gone so far as to issue a warning that
South Korean ties with the PRC would be detrimental to South Ko-
rean interests and would adversely affect potential Soviet-South Ko-
rean ties. It is evident that the Soviets are discouraging the South
Koreans from developing ties with the PRC. However, Chinese
flexibility toward South Korea, if it occurs, is likely to bring about
the corresponding Soviet flexibility. The Soviet desire to contain
Chinese influence would be operative, but at the same time the Soviet
Union would feel free to demonstrate its flexibility toward South
Korea, for it would no longer need to fear Chinese charges of Soviet
betrayal of socialist North Korea.

The Chinese have been swift in publicly condemning the Soviets
for a series of decisions like allowing the entry of South Korean
nationals into the Soviet Union.

Under the condition envisaged in Proposition 1, signs of Chinese
flexibility—if it ever occurs—would likely provoke public Soviet
condemnation of Chinese actions. It is instructive to recall the
charges that the Soviet media made last year. While voicing their
opposition to the proposal for a tripartite conference, the Soviet
media contended that the PRC was supporting the proposal. The
PRC was also portrayed in the Soviet media as being in favor of the
U.S. military presence in South Korea.

7) Japanese-South Korea Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies inversely with the degree of defense cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

From the Soviet perspective any developments which might stimulate or facilitate increments in Japan’s military capabilities would not be in the Soviets’ interest. The Soviets are concerned with the implications of Japan’s role in expanding South Korea’s defense industry and particularly with the perceived American and Japanese attempts to draw South Korea deeply into the anti-Soviet military strategy. Soviet analysts are, of course, aware of the constitutional and political constraints operating on Japan’s defense establishment, but are extraordinarily sensitive to recent trends in Japanese defense debates and to the growing signs of active U.S.-Japanese military cooperation. Soviet analysts have followed with concern the growing exchange of defense officials (both civilian and uniformed personnel) between South Korea and Japan. Soviet sensitivity in this regard is more acute than otherwise because of growing U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and the continued presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea. From their perspective, anything that might enhance the military capability of Japan and particularly the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union would be a matter of great concern.

8) Japan-North Korea Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies directly with the strength of politico-economic ties between Japan and North Korea.

The condition here is that closer relations between Japan and North Korea do not occur at the expense of close Japan-South Korean relations. When accompanied by a significant deterioration in Japan’s relations with South Korea, Japan’s pursuit of closer relations with North Korea would not be conducive to Soviet flexibility.

As Soviet analysts see it, the Japanese government is not about to jeopardize its close relation with South Korea. At best, Japan will move gradually toward a more equidistant policy.

9) Japan-Soviet Union Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies with developments
in political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Close relations between the Soviet Union and Japan would lessen the level of Soviet concern with Japan's relations with other countries and could conceivably result in greater flexibility toward South Korea.

10) PRC-Soviet Union Relations

The higher the degree of antagonism between the Soviet Union and the PRC, the greater the Soviet sensitivity of North Korean interests, reducing Soviet flexibility toward South Korea.

A significant rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the PRC might not necessarily result in flexibility on the part of either power towards South Korea.

11) U.S.-Soviet Union Relations

Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies inversely with the degree of antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

An antagonism grows, the Soviet desire to increase its influence over North Korea will grow. This in turn results in greater Soviet sensitivity to North Korean interests. The Soviets might seek greater influence over North Korea under the circumstances so as to insure and demonstrate their capacity to cause certain developments in Korea detrimental to the U.S. and to actually exercise such an influence in the event of war in Europe. The opening of a second front would pin down U.S. forces in Asia.

Friendly relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would not necessarily bring about Soviet flexibility toward South Korea, though the Soviet Union would be inhibited from undertaking overly hostile actions against South Korea either directly or through a proxy.

The extent to which Soviet relations with the U.S. function as a constraint on Soviet hostile action against South Korea varies inversely with the degree of the perceived superiority vis-à-vis the U.S. in correlation of forces.

12) Soviet Union-Eastern Europe Relations

The greater the perceived threat to Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, the greater Soviet interest becomes in maintaining stability
in the Korean peninsula. This would not result in Soviet flexibility toward South Korea as Soviet sensitivity to North Korean interests would increase.

13) Soviet Union-Western Europe Relations
The greater the level of tensions between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, the greater become Soviet incentives to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula.
This proposition holds true provided that a war with the U.S. is not considered imminent.

14) U.S.-Western Europe Relations
Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies inversely with the degree of solidarity and friendship in U.S.-Western Europe relations.
The Soviets are extremely sensitive to developments that might affect U.S.-Western Europe relations and would encourage any development that would weaken the strength of U.S.-Western Europe relations.

15) North Korea-Soviet Union Relations
A. Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies with the perceived degree of North Korea's dependence on the Soviet Union.
B. Soviet flexibility toward South Korea varies with the level of estrangement between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

Propositions A and B assert that Soviet flexibility would become greater in either of two circumstances: severe deterioration of her relations with North Korea or heavy dependence of North Korea on the Soviet Union. The Soviets are not pleased with North Korean attitudes toward the Indochina conflict, the Afghan crisis, or North Korea's stance on "dominationism." The more clearcut acts of deviation, particularly those indicating alignment with the PRC, would test Soviet tolerance and bring about Soviet counter-measures including Soviet dealings with South Korea.

A sharp rise in North Korea's dependence on the Soviet Union following a domestic crisis would lessen the Soviets' sensitivity to North Korea's wishes, e.g., severe economic difficulties or major political instability caused by President Kim's demise.

16) Soviet Perception of South Korea's Domestic Situation and
Foreign Policy Orientations

The greater political instability becomes in South Korea, the less flexibility the Soviets show toward South Korea.

Soviet analysts speak of the difficulty and risks involved in dealing with an unstable or illegitimate government. They seem particularly concerned with the durability of the government with which they are dealing.

Soviet analysts generally made a positive evaluation of South Korean economic development under President Park and assessed the political stability to be rather high. At this writing, political stability is rated low.

The greater the degree of independence that South Korean foreign policy represents, the greater Soviet flexibility becomes.

As indicated in connection with U.S.-Korean relations, Soviet incentives for flexibility would grow as South Korea showed a willingness to pursue a policy at variance with U.S. strategic interests.*

2. Trends in the External Setting for Soviet Policy

Table 1 indicates the author’s judgment on the external setting for Soviet Korean policy in the midrange with specific reference to five dimensions:

1) the likelihood of a significant change in a particular bilateral relationship which has obtained in recent years;
2) the major trends which would characterize a relationship, particularly in terms of the cooperation-antagonism dimension;
3) recent developments or conditions heightening Soviet concern;
4) the major trends which are likely to heighten Soviet concern, thereby reducing the degree of Soviet policy flexibility; and
5) the developments which tend to increase Soviet flexibility.

3. Likely Soviet Policy

I shall make one assumption here. Soviet perceptions of the external environment are essentially the same as those indicated in

*All the logically conceivable bivariate relationships are not specified. One may easily multiply the number of propositions relating the interactions involving the countries in other geographical regions: South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Setting Factors</th>
<th>Likelihood of Significant Change in Recent Relationship: High, Medium, Low</th>
<th>Major Trends: Cooperative-Neutral, Antagonistic</th>
<th>Recent Developments Heightening Soviet Concern: Present, Absent</th>
<th>Developments Enhancing Soviet Flexibility</th>
<th>Developments Inhibiting Soviet Flexibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. NK-SK</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Basically Antagonistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. US-PRC</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3. PRC-Japan</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. US-Japan</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>5. US-NK</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Neutral (Reduction in Antagonism)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. US-SK</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. PRC-NK</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<td>8. PRC-SK</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Japan-SK</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Japan-NK</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Japan-SU</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. PRC-SU</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Reduction in Antagonism</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. US-SU</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. SU-E. Europe</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
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<td>15. SU-W. Europe</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. US-W. Europe</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cooperative (Reduced)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
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<td>17. Soviet Perception of SK's: Domestic Stability For, Pol. Orientation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. US-M. East</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>19. SU-M. East</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Japan-S&amp;SE Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. PRC-S&amp;SE Asia etc. (Lat. Amer., Africa)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
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</table>
section III 1. Of the external factors shaping Soviet policy in the midrange the following may move in a direction which might enhance Soviet flexibility toward South Korea:

1) the U.S. policy toward North Korea;
2) Japan’s policy toward North Korea.

In considering all the external factors, the following may contribute to conditions which would heighten Soviet anxiety, thus inhibiting Soviet flexibility toward South Korea:

1) U.S.-PRC relations
2) PRC-Japan relations
3) U.S.-Japan relations
4) Sino-Soviet relations
5) Soviet-American relations
6) U.S.-Western Europe relations

Overall, the inhibiting factors (indicated by minus signs in Table I) appear to outweigh those factors that tend to promote Soviet flexibility.

IV. Internal Setting Factors Shaping Soviet Foreign Policy

In the preceding discussion of Soviet foreign policy, the internal setting was held constant. The remainder of this paper is concerned with the impact which domestic politics, ideology and economy may have on Soviet foreign and security policies in the period 1980-1985.

1. Major Policymakers and Their Orientations

We may safely dismiss the notion of a monolithic body of elite making decisions. We may go a little further and accept the presence—to some degree—of institutional pluralism and “bureaucratic politics” of a sort. However, it should be kept in mind that policy debates occur within the officially prescribed institutional framework.

It seems that no major policy decisions could be made without the understanding of the military and defense industries. These interests are well represented within the party apparatus. Brezhnev’s policy of détente reportedly has had the approval, albeit limited, of the military-industrial complex. It is difficult to envisage those with
military and heavy industry interests in mind enthusiastically supporting a major shift in priorities in programs or a movement toward détente as Americans define it.

The KGB cannot be expected to be positive toward a significant reduction of tensions leading to a modus vivendi with the U.S. The Foreign Ministry cannot successfully promote a policy inconsistent with the interests of the party apparatchiki, the military, and the KGB. The Ministry itself must contend with two opposite tendencies, reflecting contradictory interests perceived by different geographical departments.

The International Department of the Central Committee provides the most crucial input. The Department is on the whole likely to exert a restraining influence on a policy of accommodation with the U.S. The Politburo is unlikely to favor a significant departure from the policies it has hitherto followed under Brezhnev. Brezhnev's Secretariat, which plays a key role in policy making, must remain sensitive to the political complexion of the Politburo.

The dominant Soviet perception regarding the current status and prospective trends in the correlations of forces is such that the risks that the Soviets are prepared to take in pursuit of their objectives may be considerably higher than the Western analysts estimate. In sum, the fundamental hostility to the U.S. will probably continue to be an important component of Soviet foreign policy.

2. Political Succession

One of the following three types of regime could emerge when Brezhnev passes away:

1) Neo-Stalinist
2) Moderate/pragmatic
3) Another Brezhnev muddling through, doing more of the same

The first type is highly improbable. The second type is possible but not probable in the midrange. An extreme deterioration in economic performance would bring about a reduction of defense-related expenditures, but in principle the primacy of politics over economics would prevail. The assigning of greater priority to economic per-
formance would not necessarily be followed by a significant change in political and institutional arrangements. It is reasonable to assume that the political interests of the leaders would receive higher priority.

If Brezhnev’s demise occurs soon, it is likely that the so-called two-stage succession scenario will be acted out. The initial collective leadership by the old guard will be followed within a few years by the younger party leaders. During the interim period the old guard is likely to continue more of the same. The young leaders would have relied on the support of the “military-industrial complex” for their successful bid for power and would not be in a position to introduce policy representing a fundamental departure. Besides, their own power base, the manner of their recruitment and experience would not incline them to act otherwise, at least in the midrange period under consideration here. It is useful to recall that even Brezhnev with all his institutionalized power at his disposal was compelled to be deferential to his colleagues in the Politburo on major issues.

This line of interpretation finds further basis for support when the nature of two major political problems confronting Brezhnev’s successors is taken into account. The problem of China and the nationality problem in the Soviet Union are issues of enormous political sensitivity and interest. These issues would probably act as constraints on any fundamental policy change.

Different conceptions of Soviet national interest, particularly of what constitutes the most appropriate means to the ends, may be vigorously articulated within the party apparatus, but a significant policy change is not likely to occur under the forthcoming transition period. Aside from the comingling of policy debates with the power struggle, the external environment confronting the successors would not be conducive to a significant innovation or policy change.

3. Ideology and System Maintenance

I do not want to revive a perennial debate on the relative weights of national interest and ideology or on the nature of the role of ideology in shaping Soviet foreign policy. In my view, the ideology affects the perceptions the Soviets have of the reality. The Soviet
conception of national interest necessarily includes some sensitivity to ideological objectives. At times, the ideology serves more than a mere justification for Soviet actions dictated by non-ideological considerations. To the extent that the communist ideology is consistent with, if not requiring, Soviet support for the Third World and national liberation movements, to that extent the ideology serves as a constraint on the Soviets enacting contrary behavior. Even if the notion of ideology providing a guiding principle compelling Soviet external behavior is discounted, the ideology as a functional necessity for maintaining the political system must be kept in mind. It is instructive that the recent period of détente has been accompanied by calls for the intensification of ideological struggle. The system maintenance requires the sanctity of ideological orthodoxy and that in turn requires a fundamental hostility toward the U.S. The point here is that the ideology tends to inhibit the development of policies associated with the rule type II.

4. Conclusion

The most fundamental assumption underlying the analyses presented herein is that Soviet policy toward South Korea is to a significant degree a function of its policies toward other major powers.

The internal setting factors considered in the present section tend to impede the development of a significant change in Soviet foreign policy.

Thus, the relevance and weight of the external environment in shaping Soviet foreign policy remains substantially the same as was assumed in section III.