Toward Equity for Women in Korea's Development Plans

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I. Introduction

The rapidity of Korea's economic development over the past two decades has created extreme stress within its society and engendered great confusion over appropriate or acceptable sex roles. The leap into economic modernity has been made by large-scale adoption of Western or Japanese economic and industrial patterns. Men tend to

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imitate the West in their public life, but to continue to expect traditional behavior in their private lives which are characterized by sex-segregation and hierarchical relationships. Where economic necessity has brought women into the modern labor force, generally at the lower end of the employment scale, they have been tolerated by categorizing and treating them as girls, and hence without even female adult status. Generally, these workers are forced, by social pressure if not by actual contract, to resign upon marriage.

Such labor turnover becomes uneconomic as the demand for skilled workers increases. Low pay, occupational segregation, poor working conditions, long hours, and lack of promotion characterize jobs available to the young woman and clearly contribute to high labor turnover. The work-place is left behind without regret as soon as the young woman marries. However, the lower the family is on the income scale, the more likely that the wife must continue to earn some sort of income. Certain sectors and some specific jobs within modern industry are open to married women, but most women join the informal sector where their work may or may not be reflected in governmental statistics.

Historically, women in Korea, as in all subsistence economies, worked very hard on farms or in the market. One reason for the outmigration of rural young women is the hard life of their mothers. Market work has also been family centered so that a woman's commercial activities have not been seen as contradictory to her private role. The many wealthy Korean women today who work in industry or trade are not a direct challenge to basic cultural values precisely because most such work is seen as an extension of the family and its hierarchical authority rather than in competition with it.

In the modern sector of Korea, highly trained professionals are still in short supply so that qualified women are accepted by universities and, to a lesser degree, by the government. In addition to considerable strains at the workplace, they remain socially isolated from their male colleagues. In Korea's extremely sex-segregated society, the exchanging of professional information over meals, especially at the kiseang houses, is forbidden to women.
In effect, Korea's public life—its men and its economy and its educational system—has moved rapidly into a Westernized mode. But the country seems intent upon preserving the myth, if not the reality, of the traditional private life. Women who attempt to follow behavior outside the prescribed roles are severely criticized. Lonely women seeking social outlets in dance halls, or bored women speculating in real estate, are ridiculed by the press and called "problem women" by men generally. Yet, given the modern influences of goods and the media, women cannot be expected to remain unchanged. Unless there are socially acceptable avenues of change, women will seek the unacceptable, imitating their version of the modern women, borrowing often the worst of Western culture.

These dislocations within society caused by rapid economic development have often brought a religious-cultural reaction. Unable or unwilling to redirect economic development because of the need to feed and clothe the citizens, conservative male forces have often identified the "liberated" woman as a symbol of societal discontent. The mullahs in Iran are a case in point. Such scape-goating ignores the underlying tension between Western and traditional values and creates new oppression for women. It seems obvious, therefore, that women's economic contributions to development and women's roles in society cannot in reality be separated. Nor can the fundamental tensions be ignored between the equity provisions of the Korean constitution and the hierarchical strictures of Confucianism. The report that follows will begin with a section on the cultural context of the modern Korean woman. The economic chapter will first discuss labor force participation and raise questions over the validity of present data. A second section will review working conditions in modern industry emphasizing the psychological as well as physical inadequacies. The education will consider equity issues in the formal school system. This will be followed by a discussion of non-formal educational and training courses offered by women's organizations, labor groups, and university extensions and the influence of the media in changing or re-enforcing stereotypes of women's roles. The conclusion brings together the various suggestions appearing.
throughout the report and compares their efficacy for ensuring that
Korean women become full-fledged partners in their country's
development.

II. Cultural Context

There is no doubt that an inquiry into women's potential
contributions to national development was timely. The deep concern
over the changing roles of women in this rapidly modernizing country
pervaded all sectors and levels of society, a reflection that change is
touching women at every level and so affecting their family relations-
ships as well as their own aspirations.

Five clusters of issues which stand out from my interviews need
to be explored briefly in order to set the rest of this report into the
cultural context of Korea today: the distance between public and
private spheres, the roles of middle-class women, the issue of legal
rights, the non-status of unmarried women, and the relationship
between boy preference and total population.

1. Public-Private Spheres

In most countries, both values and roles change dramatically
between public and private spheres of life. As in the United States,
women are presumed to be the keeper of the private sphere, and
upholder of morality. Public conduct is generally judged less harshly
than private as when commenting on a criminal, saying he is a good
family man.

In Korea, the distance between public and private morality has
always been great, while the segregation of women in the private
sphere has been extreme. In 1977 a group of women in Korea
authored a fascinating book which documents traditional female
behavior as expected in the Yi dynasty and analyzes "the responses
of women to trends and ideas that render some aspects of that tradi-
tion inoperable in present-day Korean society." This landmark
volume is entitled: *Virtues in Conflict: Tradition and the Korean
Woman Today.*(1) The tone of the book is set in the first paragraph

(1) Sandra Mattielli
of the preface.

Women are treated as men's inferiors in almost every society in the world. Confucian society is no exception. On the contrary, Confucianism is an extreme example of a social creed that sharply separates the domestic sphere from the public and subordinates the female to the male. Stressing male descent as the most important element of social organization, Confucianism has little to say about women; they are assigned status and duties that carry meaning only in relation to men. Women are pressed into the Confucian stereotype of daughter-in-law, wife, and mother. Their role performance is judged by their degree of compliance and social submission—the standards of womanly virtue.

The difficult economic situation in Korea during the 1940s and 1950s required many women to work alongside their husband for family survival, an effort clearly acceptable within the traditional society. One presently wealthy businesswoman spoke of her flight from Seoul to Pusan "on the last train" in 1950 where she sold recycled cement paperbags in the market to support her family. Her husband found a high status job as director in a classmate's company; of course, the assets were in the occupied part of the country so that no money was available for salaries.

Such flexibility within the boundaries of traditional values is typical of Asia. Studies of Vietnamese refugees indicate that women adjust more quickly than men since any job is acceptable if the goal is family support. Men, on the other hand, are immobilized by status considerations. Essentially, as long as businesswomen work within family enterprises, they remain in the private sphere. Their social life continues to be confined to other women. Only one woman was reported to be a frequent golf player even though this sport is now considered the epitome of modern life. Indeed, playing golf has become so time-consuming and expensive that most links are reserved on the weekends for men only.

In a society such as that of Korea where the public-private spheres are so distinct, women are not expected to function in both.
Normally, women stay within the private sphere. The exceptional woman who chooses a public career, even at a women’s university, seldom marries and if she does, seldom has children. This was typical of the United States in the 1920s; today in Korea this remains true of the older generation, but is being widely challenged by young professionals.

2. Woman’s Place

Modern life has made the private sphere obligation less time-consuming for wives of the increasingly wealthy middle class. The press has widely reported the mischief of the “problem women” from this class. Most notorious are the women who speculate in real estate and make a great deal of money: the “pok puin” or fortune wives are both envied and ridiculed. Another sensational story reported well-dressed women surreptitiously visiting dance halls in late afternoons to meet chauffeurs or students. Professional women were somewhat concerned that the wide publicity given such activities might endanger their own limited acceptance by the male establishment. Professional men, on the other hand, wondered how to channel the dissatisfaction they observed in their own wives. The psychological costs of this dissatisfaction are reflecting in the growing number of women treated at Seoul National University Hospital for hysterical neurosis, the predominant psychological illness for women. Between 1970-73, 75.6% of the cases of hysterical neurosis were female. Analyzing these trends, Rhi Bou-Young points to the generational differences pre and post independence.

The women of the older generation were taught that a woman should be modest and willing to endure the sacrifice of her own personal desires to the good of the family. Now she . . . becomes skeptical of her traditional way of life. The younger woman has been influenced to feel she has the right to be as active as a man, and then suddenly, after marriage, she discovers that the man still lives in a very conservative world.(2)

(2) Bou-Yong Rhi, p. 131.
As this illustrates, the problems of women in Korea today are caused by the tremendous tensions created by the growing disparity between traditional norms and modern expectations which has resulted from the rapidity of industrialization. In any modernizing society, women are increasingly left with total household and childcare responsibilities. In addition, poor women, rural or urban, must work for cash or kind to support the family. As income differentiation becomes more extreme, women from the wealthier groups, whose household and childcare responsibilities are taken over by servants, have generally organized a vast array of community activities designed to alleviate the suffering of the less advantaged. These services provide a humanitarian layer between the alienated individual and the wheels of modern bureaucracy and industry; their organizers are lavished with public praise. Indeed, in the United States today there is much concern over who will provide such services as more and more middle-class women accept paid employment. The question asked in Korea was why Korean women have not undertaken these charitable roles.

The reasons seem obvious. Traditionally, only lineage counts in Korea. The years of foreign domination, combined with neo-Confucianism, have obscured any broader concern for community of nation. A woman was taught that her future lay within the man's family where she was an outsider. Wives were not even listed in ancestral roles until they were dead. Thus a woman had to work within the clan for recognition. (3) Even within the contemporary nuclear family, the wishes of the clan dominate. Hence, there is no wider community with which to identify.

Secondly, women under Confucianism have no public life. Even if a woman goes into the community to work, who will give her recognition? And since men dominate all the networks through which she would have to work to get anything done, how would she succeed? How is she to meet on an equal footing people who might help her? How is she to learn how to work in the community?

Thirdly, even today, social interaction between unrelated women,

(3) Martina Deuchler
much less between women and men, is almost non-existent. How can one expect a woman to devote her life to the abstract principle of society when she is in fact barred from that very grouping? Even in villages there seems some question whether the sense of community exists outside clan lineages. Such factionalism may well explain the variations of village response to such self-improvement movements as the *saemaul undong*.

All pressures in Korea restrict women to an invisible harem. It may not be as severe as in some Arab countries, but the sex segregation is all-pervasive. Modern educated families have begun to eat out in groups with their children in the coffee shops of Western hotels. But on the whole, women and men are required to travel in different spheres.

One response to this issue is to suggest that courses be given in use of leisure or for community service. Chija Kim Cheong comments that “urban women tend to be too selfish, individualistic, and have no community service at all. Therefore, education for women should be re-oriented so as to train women to have group experiences and community feeling through which they learn how to help each other, how to cooperate, and how to practice democracy.”(4) Such courses would develop a sense of cooperation that has been stunted by the segregated, even competitive nature of the clan-based lifestyle.

Such proscription seems irrelevant until there is a fundamental recognition by Korean men of the insidious sexual inequalities which pervade Korean society. Even when women work together for community benefit, their efforts go unsupported and generally unrecognized. For example, Soon Young Yoon reports on the Su-Dong project which is often cited as a model for the Saemaul movement. In fact, women started organizing to build a bridge before that movement began. They have continued to play a strong leadership role through formal and informal networks, including a variety of women’s clubs, one entirely of women whose husbands are working in Saudi Arabia. Yet for all this activity, there has never been an

(4) Chija Kim Cheong
office provided in the *myun* building for any of the women leaders.\(^{(5)}\)

Another village, Sanbuk, has been the recipient of assistance from the Community Development Foundation/Save the Children Foundation. The village recently built a center for the village elderly to meet and gossip. There are two sitting rooms in addition to a shop and small living quarters which is rented out to support the center. Despite the existence of more female than male elderly in Sanbuk, and despite women's participation in all the community development activities, the center is only for men: two rooms, all day, all the time.\(^{(6)}\)

It is no wonder then that many Korean women take the view the Confucian ethics were purposefully designed "as a means of oppressing and restraining women."\(^{(7)}\) Problem women are not the first to rebel against the system. Indeed, some scholars believe that shamanism represents an attempt by women to preserve some of their former power when the Yi dynasty began to enforce neo-Confucianism. Whether or not the evolution of shamanistic rituals was a conscious search for power, today shamanism and Confucianism ritually express fundamental oppositions between woman and man and between household and lineage.\(^{(8)}\)

3. **Women under the Law**

Given the cultural inequities imbedded in traditional values, it is not surprising to learn that women are not equal before the law. Further, given the integral relationship between Confucianism and women's status, it is also not surprising to find that historically women who sought more equality also sought Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestantism.\(^{(9)}\)\(^{(10)}\) This sympathy among such religious groups, including the Young Women's Christian Association, for women's needs has continued in contemporary Korea. Almost all the programs set up to assist women in industry or to educate women

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\(^{(5)}\) Soon-Young Yoon, 1977b.
\(^{(6)}\) Site visit, 8 July 1980.
\(^{(7)}\) Kyung-Sook Bae
\(^{(8)}\) Griffin Dix and Soon-Young Yoon, 1977a, p. 42.
\(^{(9)}\) Yong-Ock Park
\(^{(10)}\) Kyung-Sook Bae
were run by Christian-based groups.

What is perhaps surprising is that Article 9 in the Korean Constitution guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law, regardless of sex, religion or social status. Historians tell us that when the Yi dynasty adopted neo-Confucianism as the basis of society, it took two hundred years for the reality to approximate the decree. Once again Korea has adopted an imported set of values which are more symbolic than real, but which indicate the desired goal.

Women in Korea have been lobbying to change the Civil Code to reflect the equality guaranteed in the constitution. A campaign started in 1954 and led by Lee Tai Young, Korea’s first woman lawyer, culminated in the Civil Code of 1960 which knocked down perhaps half “the great wall blocking the path of women.” A second effort, in 1977, was coordinated by the National Association of Women; the subsequent change in the law revised another 20% of the inequities, leaving the most intractable issues yet to be solved. To get these issues out of the path in front of women will take a bulldozer, according to Lee Tai Young.\(^{(1)}\)

These remaining legal barriers to women’s equality revolve around the head of family system whereby males of any age have greater authority, rights to property, and control of dependents than do women of any age. Thus, a widow cannot make decisions for her minor son. Further, men have total control over off-spring, legitimate or illegitimate, residing with him or not.\(^{(2)}\) In divorce, women have no rights over their children even when they are the innocent party. These traditions are rooted in the lineage dominance of Korean life and require a profound change of attitude among men before the Code will be altered.

A Supreme Court case decided early in 1980 illustrates the confusions of women’s contemporary roles. A man deserted his concubine and her children. She sued for right of support and won. Now an American feminist might feel that decision was vindication.

\(^{(1)}\) Interview, 2 July 1980.

\(^{(2)}\) Two actual court cases showing women’s powerlessness are reviewed in Hesung Koh.
for the concubine. Korean feminists feel it is a step backwards. They point to other cases where legal wives cannot keep their children or cannot get child support because the laws state clearly that married women have no rights. Yet, under Korean law adultery is a crime; thus an adulterous woman gets more protection from the law than an innocent wife.

The intricacies and inequities of Korean family law led Lee Tai Young to establish free legal aid to the poor through the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations. Founded in 1956, the center currently handles about nine thousand cases a year. About one-third of the persons seeking counselling are men. Most of the cases relate to domestic affairs with divorce, the issue in about 36% of the cases. Because women with common-law marriages run a 60% chance of being deserted, the center sponsors free wedding ceremonies, replete with borrowed wedding dress, make-up for the bride, and theater tickets in lieu of a honeymoon. In rural Sanbuk, the community center was similarly used for thirty weddings a year. Clearly the legal rights of women in unregistered marriages is yet another issue which must be raised in contemporary Korea.

4. The Non-Status of Unmarried Women

While married women still lack equity under law, unmarried women barely exist. Although status can be negotiated, in general unmarried women are considered girls and treated as little more than servants. Such low private status has allowed young unmarried women to be given equally low public status when they work. This has translated into low wages and poor working conditions. Both society and the women themselves would appear to view this period of working in the modern sector as temporary, a transition from school to marriage. Thus 82% of all women in the modern labor force in 1973 were between the ages of 18 and 29. Even more revealing are the statistics which show that 88.4% of all women clerical workers were under twenty-four, as were 64.2% of all women in manufacturing.

(13) Sonia Strawn
Given the working conditions in many factories, it is understandable that young women would prefer not to work after marriage. But work in offices and banks is not so arduous. Do women really want to stop their work? A recent survey in the Gumi industrial complex showed that one-third of the female workers wanted to continue to work after marriage.\(^{(14)}\) A fact-finding survey done by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions among its members gave the following answers about working after marriage:

35.99\% of the working women surveyed said "we are currently on the job even after marriage," and 6.45\% said, "it will be hard to continue work even if we want, in view of circumstance of company." And 18.78\% said, "we will continue to work," 1.10\% said, "we will move to other working places where married persons are accepted," and 37.56\% said, "we will quit job."\(^{(15)}\)

This survey, then, shows over two-thirds of these women either expect to continue working after marriage or are already working and married.

In 1976 women at the Choheung Bank struck against the "marriage memorandum" which they had been required to sign and in which they promised to resign upon marriage. One leader of this strike said that the men were against married women because it was harder for them to send the married women off on errands.\(^{(16)}\) The union was not very eager about this strike either, but the women prevailed. But for a time it was a cause celebre. Rival banks took advertisements in the newspapers against this attack on tradition. USAID, to its credit, moved its account into the Choheung Bank in support of women's rights.\(^{(17)}\) Yet today, of the 2,000 women employed in the bank, only 83 are married.

Why do women resign? A major factor seems to be the language.

Speech behavior reflects social stratification and has variously been

\(^{(14)}\) Bok-Nam Yoon
\(^{(15)}\) Federation of Korean Trade Unions, Survey II, p. 50.
\(^{(16)}\) Interview, Han-Soon Lee, 28 June 1980.
\(^{(17)}\) Soon-Young Yoon, 1979a, p. 5.
described as having five, or three, or continuous levels. Speech patterns reflect superior/inferior relationships and are an outward facade of power. Deferential language is used, for example, "between two strangers or between men speaking to other men's wives" and "indicates distance and/or discomfort based on status ambiguity." (18) Men tend to use familiar forms between themselves. The blunt forms are used between children but also between classmates, a fact which underlines the exclusivity of these school-based networks discussed in the education section below. Women, on the other hand, traditionally do not use familiar language among themselves. Generally, they address their husbands in a more deferential level than he uses to them, although some claim that this unequal pattern was adopted from the Japanese and replaced equal forms of address.

Women workers, both in industry and in offices, complain about the language men use when speaking to them. It is readily apparent that according to tradition, men should use the deferential forms to a married woman. This would require differentiated speech in the workplace between married and unmarried women. Or it might mean that women workers would be accorded the same familiar style that is used among the men. Yet that automatically endangers the separation between public and private spheres, and subtly questions the virtue of the woman. No wonder many women prefer to see women stop working as soon as they marry.

Such attitudes are not confined to working class men. There was ambiguity in response to the question of address to married secretaries at the university. Even more revealing was a discussion which took place in July 1980 at the Korea Development Institute. For many years the only positions at KDI open to women college graduates were secretarial. Recently, women as well as men have been appointed as research assistants. Several senior researchers suggested that unlike the men who were hired as research assistants for an indefinite time, women research assistants should be given only yearly contracts. This precaution was necessary, according to a Harvard PhD, so that the women could be let go when they married. This

(18) C. Paul Dredge
suggestion was turned down by the KDI faculty, but just barely.

Fundamental to widespread employment of married women in modern sector industry, then, is the re-education of men. It is in the modern sector that strangers meet. Presumably the status and language issues do not arise in family-owned businesses because women are accorded family status and within the family tend to leave dealings with strangers to men of the family. But in the modern sector women are clearly unwilling to be treated as girl servants. As skill levels rise, this put-down will become even more intolerable. It would seem wise for the government to take the lead in changing language and treatment of its female staff by encouraging an equitable language style not only in its own offices, but through radio and television, school texts, newspapers, and magazines. In short, an equity campaign is needed.

5. Boy Preference and Population Issues

Given the low status of women, married or unmarried, as reflected in the neo-Confucian traditions, it follows that parents may weep at the birth of a daughter. Boys are the only children that count. Girls can only gain lineage status as mothers of sons. It was always the woman's fault if she were sonless. So strong was the pressure for sons, that a number of rituals and beliefs were invoked to predict or ensure that a woman would bear sons. While these practices may not be in current use, the overwhelming need for a woman to have a son is reflected in modern fertility studies. In most developing countries, the persistence of large family size among poor is attributed to the economic utility of the children, especially in helping the mother in her multifold tasks. On the contrary, a recent study done by Cho Hyung for the Korean Women's Institute of Ewha Women's University found economic utility placing last of nine reasons given for having children.

It is surprising to note that the economic utility of children as an income or labor source and as the means of security for old age turned out to be least important among the sampled women. Accord-

(19) Jae-Ho Cha, Bom-Mo Chung and Sung-Jin Lee
(20) Irene Tinker, 1975.
ing to the data, women think that they must have children primarily because it is their responsibility to beget agents for family (husband's) succession and because it is the natural of course expected of marriage. This implies that they have children to comply with their duty rather than with personal needs.\textsuperscript{(21)} The study also shows that both women in general and family planning workers tend to continue having children until they have a son. Sawon Hong calls this belief not a boy preference, but a boy necessity. She found that 58.2\% of the women in her rural study would allow their husbands to have a concubine to bear a son for the lineage, while only 17.3\% would oppose such a solution.\textsuperscript{(22)}

This fundamental cultural compulsion may help to explain the findings of an earlier study by Lee Hyo-Chai and Cho Hyoung entitled "Fertility and Women's Labor Force Participation in Korea." Again it is conventional wisdom that working women will have fewer children, though in fact, this relationship has been proved unpredictable worldwide. Indeed, women with large families may have a more compelling need to work to help support their children. Further, many types of work are not seen as incompatible with child-care, particularly in rural areas. Thus the major findings of this study report that while women in urban areas tend to have a lower fertility than rural women, in both case and "contrary to what has been expected, there appeared a mild, but positive relationship between fertility and women's labor force participation."\textsuperscript{(23)}

The only variable which consistently affects birth rates, educational attainment, was again found in this study. In Korea, the greatest impact, however, was secondary school education while in most developing countries the correlation is with primary levels. It is important to recognize that most of the Korean women in the labor force have attended secondary school. A recent survey by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions indicates that of the number sampled, 69.56\% were high school graduates, 13.27\% middle school graduates,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{(21)} Hyo Cho
\item \textsuperscript{(22)} Sawon Hong, p. 82.
\item \textsuperscript{(23)} Hyo-Chai Lee and Hyong Cho, p. 21.
\end{itemize}
3.23% high school drop-outs, 1.57% junior college graduates, leaving only 7.04% who stopped with graduation from primary school. Present governmental projections of making secondary school compulsory may be seen as an encouragement to lowered fertility. Perhaps a more important step would be to work positively toward an improved status of women in Korea.

One final demographic point should be noted. In the total population, men outnumber women: the 1975 census figures counted 17,461,244 men to 17,245,376 women. Males outnumber women in every cohort below forty years of age when the balance reverses, partly due no doubt to the war deaths. This percentage of women in the society of 49.69% is only slightly higher than the average of 49.27% females in all developing countries in 1980. Developed countries, on the other hand, record women making up 51.64% of the total population. In all countries, it is a genetic fact that 4 to 6 more males are born per hundred births. Also true is the fact that women tend to live longer than men; in Korea, life expectancy is 67 for women, 63 of men. The differences between developed and developing countries seem to lie in neglect of female babies and girls, and in the greater mortality at childbirth. As Korea continues to modernize rapidly, the sex ratios should change. Korean practices of home births makes difficult the collection of accurate statistics on birthrates and on mortality of mother or child. Is the best intervention to ensure greater longevity of females in Korea a health issue or a cultural one?

III. Employment

Early projections for the Fifth Five Year Plan period (1982-86) anticipated a shift from labor surplus to labor scarcity as the Korean economy continued to grow. Subsequent declines on the export market may slow development and allow more time to upgrade the labor force in order to match skills required in the machinery and electronics industries. Noting that the rate of female economic activity in 1979 was reported by the National Bureau of Statistics to be 42.2

(24) FKTU Survey II, p. 11.
percent, as contrasted to 75 percent for males, the planners assumed a pool of married women, both rural and urban, available for labor force participation if appropriate incentives and education were offered.

The future increase in the participation rate is likely to come from among urban married women. To utilize this potential source of labor supply, adequate labor market policies should be established.\(^{(25)}\)

—Korea Development Institute

(\text{T}he majority of female employees belong to the agricultural sector, and so are latently unemployed. In order to encourage the economic activity of female work force, we must see that they have a basic grounding in employment and a healthy attitude towards work, through job education and career guidance even in their school education.\(^{(26)}\)

—Korean Education Development Institute

1. What Is Work

Labor force participation rates in Korea are based on the percentage of the population over 14 working for money or engaged in a family business or farm at least fifteen hours a week. Such a definition of work is more likely to capture women’s work in the informal sector than statistics which are limited to participation in the modern sector. For instance, an official of the U.S. Department of Labor testified that only five percent of the women in Africa worked!\(^{(27)}\)—meaning that only this number was employed in industry but ignoring, among others, the 80 hours per week rural women work on subsistence agriculture.

It is doubtful if any country collects complete information about

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(26) "The Long-Term Prospect for Educational Development," Draft, March 1980, p. 41. This language was softened in the final report, but is included here to illustrate the underlying basis of the original author.

(27) Irene Tinker, 1976, p. 23.
their citizens. The current debate in the United States over the 1980 Census is only the most recent instance in which U.S. statistics have been questioned. Looking at income reported by the poor in American cities, the National Institute for Mental Health decided a study was needed to ascertain the psychological problems of people forced to live on so little money. What they found was a vast array of labor exchange, petty enterprises, and illegal activity. Clearly no one wished to pay income tax on such activities as baby-sitting, fixing cars, painting houses, catering, selling baked goods or ceramics or art work.

Anthropologists in Nepal studied eight villages to record minutely what women and men do every day throughout an entire year. In this way, seasonal variations are accounted for, something quite difficult in annual census-taking. Overall, the study found that women in these villages did 49 percent of total economically productive activity while the men did 51 percent. This figure should be compared to the official census statistics for the entire country, which is of course predominantly rural, where they indicate that only 36 percent of women are economically active. Further, the village women studied carried a “work-burden” of 10.26 hours a day as compared with a “work-burden” of 6.62 hours for men. “Work-burden” is here defined as productive activity plus household activity. Productive activity includes all work related to producing, drying, selling, and storing of food, animal husbandry, hunting, gathering of fuel or food, and working for wages. Household activity includes childcare, food preparation, household tasks, and water collection.

What this shows is that women in Nepal, like women almost everywhere, work longer hours than men. The problem is in the definition of work. In Korea, planners are assuming that women recorded as economically inactive are available for paid labor. The

(28) For a detailed discussion of this issue of the informal sector, see Irene Tinker, 1979.
Activity by 16-Hour Day: 4 a.m. to 8 p.m.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productive work</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productive work</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, including leisure</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>53.23%</td>
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The question that must be addressed is whether the unrecorded work is essential to the family. If so, is the woman really free for alternative work? Can a woman earn enough to pay someone else to do those tasks?

*Korean women: rural*. Korean official statistics do capture a fairly sizable part of women’s activity in the rural areas because they include women who work fifteen hours a week on the family farm. There are two problems with these categories: seasonality and the definition of work. Below we first look at the government statistics, then compare them to studies done in specific villages.

According to the official labor force participation statistics in Korea, 75 percent of all men over fourteen years of age have been economically active over the past decade, whether they are rural or urban, while there are differences in the rate of female participation between rural and urban women. Furthermore, the participation of women in both categories has gone up since 1970, from 48.2 percent to 54 percent in rural areas and from 29.8 percent to 35.6 percent in urban areas.

**Economically Active Population 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Active</th>
<th>Total Women Active</th>
<th>Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total popula-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total active-1970</td>
<td>18,253</td>
<td>10,199</td>
<td>3,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>24,024</td>
<td>13,932</td>
<td>5,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm households-</td>
<td>8,540</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>2,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,734</td>
<td>5,585</td>
<td>2,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1978</td>
<td>9,713</td>
<td>5,001</td>
<td>1,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-farm</td>
<td>15,290</td>
<td>8,347</td>
<td>2,835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook 1979
It may seem strange that during a period of farm modernization, women's work in rural areas increases. A major reason for this phenomenon is the whole-sale migration of young women and men from the countryside and the widespread movement of men, temporarily or permanently, to town or city to seek paid employment. KDI estimates that total employment in the agricultural sector will decline from 36.7 percent to 29.1 percent over the period of 1981-86 indicating a continued outflow of labor from rural areas.\(^\text{(30)}\) What these statistics do not show is who is left behind: the older women. Compulsory primary schooling and family planning have reduced the number of children around to help in agricultural chores. Further, the demands of the *saemaul undong* have increased the work day of women as well as men.\(^\text{(31)}\) There are indications that women of higher status who had not previously worked in the fields are now being pressed to do so.\(^\text{(32)}\)

A comparison of the changing inputs from men and women on the farm is given in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unpaid Unpaid</th>
<th>Paid Temporary</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-m</td>
<td>1,132.39</td>
<td>171.71</td>
<td>95.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-women</td>
<td>589.03</td>
<td>82.56</td>
<td>56.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-m</td>
<td>834.10</td>
<td>163.54</td>
<td>63.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-women</td>
<td>473.29</td>
<td>90.22</td>
<td>41.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Statistical Year Book 1979

What this table shows is a decline of farm labor in all categories for men and in the unpaid categories for women. The only increase is in the number of women receiving pay for temporary agricultural

\(^{\text{(30)}}\) KDI Working Paper 8003, p. 112.
\(^{\text{(31)}}\) Kyung-Kyoon Chung
\(^{\text{(32)}}\) Hyo-Chae Lee and Chu-Suk Kim, p. 153. See also Yoon Soon Young, 1977, pp. 38-40.
work, a trend that may reflect the monetization of agriculture and the consequent decline of labor exchange.

While these statistics show interesting trends, one should avoid the thought that they reflect reality. Even a decade ago, a study of one hundred rural households showed that women were working 13 hours a day. (33) A more recent survey indicated that 77 percent of the women in Dongmyun were engaged in work in addition to regular domestic activities.

Of the 80 women, over half are involved in farming. Another 20% of the women are raising small animals, such as sheep, pigs, chickens and ducks. Approximately 6% work as wage laborers, by the day, at such activities as farm labor, sales clerk and community projects which occasionally pay wages. Sixteen percent (16%) run small grocery stores and tea shops, nearly always located in or close by their homes. Two women make knitted goods for sale and one woman works as a teacher in the local primary school. (34)

The study notes that most of the women do not work full-time and so do not receive any benefits from the labor law. Further, the farm workers are seasonal. It is problematical how many of these women were counted in the census. Yet the idea that women should work is reflected by the fact that in the survey 94 percent of the women thought wives should add to family income and half of those not now working said they would like to work.

In addition to these income-producing activities, there is a wide range of income-substituting activities usually carried on by the subsistence family and more often by the woman than the man. Market gardens, food processing, and the fetching of water and fuel-wood are all time-consuming occupations which fall outside normal statistical data gathering. While gardening continues to be a leisure activity in developed countries, the other subsistence activities mentioned are


(34) Carol Rice; p. 23.
expected to disappear as the economy modernizes.

Providing such amenities was part of the goals of the Saemaul Undong movement which was created to bring rural life and income closer to that in urban areas. Judged solely on income statistics, this effort has been successful, with rural family income for a slightly larger family almost the same as that for an urban family. While not detracting from the contribution of Saemaul Undong or other community development programs, researchers find that some 30 percent of the population remains poor and largely untouched. It is likely that this core poverty group consists of a disproportionate number of women, especially women-headed households. In the U.S., for instance, while one in seven families are headed by women, nearly half, 49 percent, of all poor families were women-headed in 1978. Worldwide, one household in three is supported by a woman; the proportion is greater among the poorest families. Under Korean law a woman cannot legally be head of household, but a recent survey found 5 percent of households dependent on female income, a figure undoubtedly too low.

To what extent have services been brought to the rural areas? Nation-wide statistics show an impressive increase in the availability of safe water to 62 percent of the population in 1970. Nonetheless, only 36 percent of the rural areas had access to safe water. Korea embarked on a massive reforestation program after the Korean War. Fines were instituted for cutting trees, and coal was promoted for household use. As a result, the consumption of traditional fuels has been reduced almost to half. Yet the poorest farm households continue to use wood for fuel, a figure undoubtedly increasing as the energy crisis continues.

(35) Urban-rural family income has stabilized since 1974 according to figures from the Economic Planning Bureau, but rural families contain 5.5 persons versus 4.6 in urban areas.

(36) Vincent S.R. Brandt and Ji Woong Cheong, Chapter 6.


(38) Mayra Buvinic and Nadia H Yousef.

(39) Korean Human Development Center, p. 5.


(41) For background on the household energy crisis worldwide, see Irene Tinker, 1980b.
Evidence would suggest, then, that most rural women are fully occupied with agricultural work and household survival activities. A 1975 study found that women worked 5.5 hours in the paddy fields and 8 hours nearer the house, for a 13.5 hour day. (42) As younger women continue to migrate to the city, older women must work even harder. It would seem unlikely that these young women would return in any large numbers to raise their children in the rural areas. As a result, any pool of rural women available for work in factories seems already to have vanished.

*Korean women: urban.* The statistics and the literature agree that young women in modern sector activities such as factories or banks resign upon marriage. Above we noted the growing desire of women to continue to work at the same jobs after marriage. These women know what the statistics do not reveal: that poor women return to work after marriage. Writing of young women living in the resettlement area of Saemaeul in Sanggaedong outside Seoul, Chung Cha-Whan notes:

One hundred percent of the girls quit their jobs when they marry, even though their husbands-to-be may be jobless, incomeless, loafers; even more so, if the husbands are loafers . . . Why? . . . No woman can remain working in the same place after she marries; the more so as the kind of work comes down to the manual level. The point is that a factory or any kind of business organization has no structure which treats married women differently from unmarried girls . . . the co-workers themselves are reluctant to change their relational attitudes toward married female workers. Such a woman may become a nuisance if she insists on getting different treatment in her place of work just because she is a married woman . . .

That is not to say, however, that married women as a rule remain jobless long after their marriages. Whether their husbands are wage-earners or jobless loafers, the wives at-

(42) Marion Ruth Misch and Joseph B. Margolin
tempt to re-enter the working world to earn money, but in a different occupation from that of their single days. They usually launch into the market as peddlers or shopskeepers. Although such occupations are in most cases less efficient in earning income than are factory jobs, they are more “relevant to married women, even though the social status of a commercial woman may be lower than that of a factory technician.”

It should be noted that the form and permanence of these marriages is irrelevant. 68 percent of the marriages had been “love” marriages, and most were co-residing without benefit of a marriage ceremony.

Official statistics indicate that only 35.6 percent of women over fourteen are economically active. Examination of age of workers reveals clear patterns by occupation. Factory and clerical workers typically quit upon marriage and do not return to this occupation. Professional women follow the expected M curve which indicates an in-out-in pattern of working which reflects the childbearing years. Women in sales, however, flatten that variation, perhaps because many of these jobs are family-owned.

It is questionable whether these statistics capture the reality of modern urban life in Korea. A glimpse of such reality is revealed in the Saemaul study. In this community are 748 houses and 1,351 households; most houses include two families, that of the landlord and that of the tenant. Most of the couples are between 20 and 40, recently arrived, and transient. Most had lived in one or two other urban communities since leaving the rural areas. The usual contract period for room rental in Korea is six months, after which rents may be raised, thus encouraging mobility. Normal census-taking under such fluid circumstances is extremely difficult.

In this densely populated area are 225 shops ranging from comics libraries to restaurants, from grocery stores to fortune tellers. This means that more than one-third of the houses have a shop attached. Most shopowners exist on tiny profit margins, hardly more secure

(43) Cha-Whan Chung, 1977, pp. 103-104.
than the shopless peddlers who trade mostly in foodstuffs. Other subsistence jobs include work on house construction or on the public works programs which the government set up for the unemployed. Chung describes these projects as more for income than utility, and notes the discrepancy between the 1974 daily wages for men, 820 won or $2.05, and for women, 530 won. Women and girls also do piece work for the export market. Known as the "bond industry," the women are recruited to work at home by an agent woman who acts for a downtown dealer. The type of work includes knitting, sewing, and making wigs and false eyelashes. In 1974, the extremely low wages went from 120 to 400 won a day and yet there were more seekers than jobs. In addition, 21 families had no employable males 19-60 years or females 19-50 and so were entitled to two large bags of American flour each month.

Two types of jobs certainly are not included in official statistics: those of the kye money-lending circle, and those relating to the bar hostess/prostitute. The kye is the Korean version of the widespread phenomenon of revolving credit groups whereby each member contributes periodically to a fund which goes to each member in turn. In this manner, a larger amount of cash is available to one member than she might be able to save. In Saemaul, the kye money was most often loaned to shopkeepers at a monthly interest of between 5 and 7 percent.\(^{44}\)

Bar hostesses are in fact waitresses in working class drinking houses where cheap food and liquor are served. One young woman interviewed said in 1976 that she was supposed to receive $16.53 a month, but in the four months she had worked, she had not been paid. However, she received room and board and had the right to use a private room to entertain men sexually if she so desired, making between $6 and $8 for the night.\(^{45}\)

Chung provides a sad and insightful case study of Ms. Sung, the Orphan, as she starts as a housemaid at eight years old and then shifts to hardworking rural wife, to prostitute, to bar hostess, to

\(^{44}\) Cha-Whan Chung, 1977, Chapters II and III.\(^{45}\) Barbara R. Mintz, pp. 183-184.
mistress, to entertainer, to tent bar owner, to kitchen maid.

In all her life of 37 years she has never been registered in the official record as a citizen or even as a human being. She does not have a residential registration number, the equivalent of a social security number in Korea.\(^{(46)}\)

It seems unlikely that any of Ms. Sung's many jobs were recorded as work.

Seventy percent of the households in Saemaul, then, follow what might be described as an urban subsistence pattern. Both men and women, married or not, alternate periods of joblessness with periods of partial employment. Only 30 percent of the working adults held salaried jobs, and most of these were at the bottom of the income scale: barbers and hairdressers, sales clerks, janitors, maids, guards, waiters and waitress, factory workers. Is this 30 percent comparable to the official female urban labor force participation rate of 35.4 percent?

*Women's work.* We have argued that poor women, rural or urban, work long hours at both income-producing and income-substituting roles. Further, many of the productive roles go unrecorded because of seasonal or intermittent work patterns, urban mobility, or illegality. There is yet another reason why women's work is not recorded: the woman may not wish to admit that she works, or her husband may not wish to acknowledge that his wife works. Chung writes that "commercially active ... mothers try to underestimate their abilities to others, particularly to their sons and daughters, not to mention their husbands."\(^{(47)}\) This deference is explained in terms of the traditional ethic in which a woman may live with only one man while a man is encouraged to engage many women. So it is essential to maintain the pretext of the husband's superiority, even to denying productive work.

Another manifestation of this traditional deference pattern may be seen in relationship to housework and childcare. Rice found that

\(^{46}\) Cha-Whan Chung, 1977, Appendix A.

\(^{47}\) Cha-Whan Chung, 1977, p. 132.
women in Dongmyun said they wanted to work but that they would need more help from their husbands. Even here, men were thought to be willing to help more with the children and with cleaning the house and the yard, but cooking, laundry, and shopping were strictly women’s work.\(^{(48)}\)

This highly differentiated role structure helps explain why many rural families send a female member along with a young man who goes to the city to work or study. Chung found the grandmothers or sisters likely to be sent as housekeepers even for mature young men.

The more capable the wife is of earning a livelihood, the more strict and fastidious the husband is to maintain the traditional sex role differentiation . . . Actually, it is usually the wife who does not want her husband to mix into women-folks’s works rather than the husband himself . . . They feel insulted when they discover their husbands taking part in their housekeeping chores.

In this sense, a woman’s outside job is a supplement to, not a substitute for, her inside work of housekeeping. In other words, women have added another role to their traditional one in the division of family labor, whereas men have preserved the same role throughout modernization.\(^{(49)}\)

Such attitudes typify the middle-aged adults, but Chung did observe some generational changes in attitudes about familial roles. Due to the urban migration, many women can no longer aspire to the “queenly” mother-in-law role: either her son has moved to the city, leaving her behind, or her son lives in a tiny room with no space for an extended family. Serving the mother-in-law has traditionally been a major responsibility of the daughter-in-law. Change in this relationship allows more time for both women which they can utilize for more productive work or for leisure.

Our data show that urban women have continued to work after

\(^{(48)}\) Carol Rice, p. 31.
\(^{(49)}\) Cha-Whan Chung, p. 87.
marriage, earning income compatible with family needs. As these needs change, so will the patterns of work, with more urban women continuing in the modern sector and perhaps with their husbands helping a bit around the house. But older women are unlikely to change. They have just completed their phase as a daughter-in-law and feel bereft as their chance to play mother-in-law fades away. Since Korean women traditionally were described in relationship to someone else or to some place, and never as an individual, such older women suffer an identity crisis as well as what is called in the United States the "empty nest syndrome." Since Korean women do not expect companionship from their husbands, they must seek new companions and new activities. In rural areas, they may join new associations or simply work harder on the farm. Solutions are more elusive for urban woman who often become severely depressed. \(^{(50)}\)

Some take up the socially acceptable studies of calligraphy or flower arranging; others, the socially questionable pursuits of drinking or dancing. Even in the resettlement community there are "problem women." \(^{(51)}\)

2. Modern Sector Employment of Women

The economic "miracle" in Korea, as in sister states of Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, is based on the availability of literate and inexpensive female labor. Tax concessions, reasonable government services and infrastructure, have of course supported the entry into these countries of multinational corporations since most of the product of these new factories is for the export market. Governments see these labor-intensive industries as a necessary phase in the modernization process. Already these countries are being challenged by others trying to emulate their development: Sri Lanka and Indonesia have set aside free tax zones. As development proceeds and wages rise, the character of the industry in the first wave countries is changing. To stay competitive, Korea is emphasizing industries requiring high skills and more capital. Such industries, having invested in labor force training, will certainly respond to many of the

\(^{(50)}\) Hesung Koh
\(^{(51)}\) Cha-Whan Chung, p. 122-123.
current complaints of labor with more alacrity. What is described below may be a passing phase, but it is unlikely to change as dramatically in the next decade as in the past one.

Until recently, there has been a labor surplus in these rapidly developing countries. Young women able to obtain a job in the factories generally considered themselves lucky. Yet international humanitarian groups raise charges of exploitation. Which is right? As usual, the answer is both, and also inbetween. The United Nations Secretariat for the World Conference of the Decade for Women carefully stated the issue:

The Governments of host countries seem to view such enterprises, for the most part, as short-term solutions for the need to create employment, but for development in the long run the Governments prefer industries that will engage highly skilled workers. If these long-term plans become a reality, female labour-intensive manufacturing can only be a temporary phase of industrialization in developing countries. (52)

In more colorful language, an astute observer of these trends writes in a study prepared for ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission of Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations):

In some ways, the rapid entry of female into the work force created a paradox: work was a liberation from the “shackles” of feudalism and the confines of the home, while industrialization introduced female workers to new kinds of exploitation. In the countryside, the girls’ fate would have been unpaid family workers, doing farm chores and taking care of children. For city girls, nothing was as appealing as the prospects of their own incomes, even if these were pooled together in one family fund. Girls initially rushed for industrial jobs to help a family survive, send a brother through school, save for a marriage dowry, or have extra money to

spend on cloths. Few anticipated the low wages, job insecurities and long hours demanded of them; the glitter of being a factory girl soon faded. (53)

In order to consider more closely the problems which young women encounter in the workplace, it will be useful first to review some of the characteristics of the workforce. We will then discuss the various issues raised by the women about their conditions of work. These problems will be grouped into physical, monetary, and psychological issues; after a brief review of each problem area, possible alternative strategies will be suggested.

Female labor force characteristics

The bulk of the Korean women’s industrial labor force is employed in textile plants. Other large consumers of female labor are electronics and food-processing factories, banking, and the communications industry. This labor force is overwhelmingly young. National statistics in 1973 report 82.8 percent of the entire employed female labor force to be between 18 and 29 years old. Clerical workers were younger than those working in manufacturing; 88.4 percent of the clerical workers were under 24, while only 64.2 percent of the industrial workers were that young. (54) Two recent sample surveys of women workers done by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions reverse that finding: the differences may be due to different categorization. In 1977, the FKTU surveyed 18,675 women employed in the manufacturing sector; in 1978 the FKTU surveyed 5,352 women employed in the non-manufacturing sector. They found that women in manufacturing began working at an earlier age, that is at 18.1 years, while those in non-manufacturing began at 20.9 years. Overall, women in manufacturing were younger. The largest age group working in the non-manufacturing sector were between 25 and 27 years old; this accounted for 21.14 percent of the sample.

It follows that women in non-manufacturing had a higher educational status:

(53) Soon Young Yoon, 1979b.
(54) Hyo-Chae Lee and Chu-Suk Kim
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Non-Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior college graduates</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>69.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school graduates</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school graduates</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school drop-outs</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The youthfulness of women in manufacturing is reflected in their marital status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Non-Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>60.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married living alone</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>36.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures clearly show that the problem of labor force turnover caused by marriage is largely a problem in industries where most women are younger and less well educated than their counterparts in the non-manufacturing sector. \(^{(55)}\)

The Labor Office reported in 1978 on this high labor turnover:

### Rates of Attrition in Korean Industry, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Work</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than one year</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 years</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 10 years</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FKTU surveys disaggregated the figures for consecutive service periods between the two groups and found that while 79.4\%

\(^{(55)}\) FKTU Survey II, chapter 3.
of the women in manufacturing had worked less than five years, the figure was only 51.1% for women employed in non-manufacturing jobs. Indeed, 15.62% had worked consecutively between five and seven years; 15.04% between seven and ten years, 9.68% between ten and fifteen years and 7.67% had worked at least twenty years. Further, the FKTU survey found 70.76% of white collar workers had never switched jobs. Since the influx into this sector happened within the last decade, employment in the non-manufacturing sector would seem to be increasingly stable.

Government statistics taken in 1978 do not show any change in work patterns for clerical women, however. They continue to show youthful employment in both the manufacturing and clerical sectors but the greatest number of women in Manufacturing span the 15-25 years while clerical women are predominantly between 20 and 25 years old.

Women in the professional sector are the only ones showing the expected “M” curve with bulges in the 20-25 year category and again at 35-40. Both the agriculture and sales sectors are dominated by older women over 35, but the bulge is larger among agricultural women. In the service sector the employment level is relatively flat throughout.

All sectors show an influx of workers but the fastest growing group is clerical which has increased almost fourfold while manufacturing has tripled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Women (in 000)</th>
<th>Agriculture/Fisheries</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Professions</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,578</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5,143</td>
<td>2,285</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As compiled by the Korean Human Development Center, p. 4.

This increase in working women has been overwhelmingly at the lower end of the scale. Thus, the percentage of women working at specialized, managerial, or technical jobs has fallen between 1969 and 1976 even though the numbers of women in these jobs in-
creased. (56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One final point needs to be made about labor force participation: its seasonality. This variation is reflected in official statistics for agriculture, daily work and in self-managed employment. The fluidity of the figures begs for a more careful study of women’s work and illustrates clearly why only microstudies can capture women’s work. The Economic Planning Board shows a yearly increase in female agricultural work from 1969 to 1976. In 1977, however, it would appear that the date of collection changed.

**Number of Women Employed, Agriculture/Fisheries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>2253</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>3291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While seasonal employment in agriculture is easy to explain, it is unclear if all the variation in the following table is due to agricultural work. These tables appear in the FKTU Survey I and are used to emphasize the fact that 16 per cent of the total female employment in 1976 was temporary or daily, reflecting great job insecurity. (57)

**Composition Ratio of Women Workers by Rank, Type of Employment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-employment</th>
<th>Family-owned</th>
<th>Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Physical issues.** The sweatshop image of manufacturing is a reality in many industries in Korea. Hours are long, noise and dingi-

(56) FKTU Survey I, p. 22.
(57) FKTU Survey I, pp. 16 and 26-27.
ness abound. But there are wide variations.

Case studies of young women in Seoul working as seamstresses of folding boxes in a confectionary factory revealed a working day of at least twelve hours, with some time off for lunch. Most have Sundays off. Overall statistics show that the hours worked per day fell from a 10.3 hours in the previous year to 8.75 hours this year as a result of the depressed export market. Since workers are theoretically paid time and a half for overtime, the reduced hours represents a severe drop in take-home pay. The League of Women Voters surveyed factory women in early 1980 and found that those with very low wages were unhappy about the reduced day; women with slightly higher income valued the additional leisure. Women in this survey worked 9.7 hours a day. (58)

The FKTU surveys noted that while women in the non-manufacturing sectors worked generally 8-10 hours a day, women in manufacturing work longer. It comments that working time is relatively short in foreign organizations with 66.7% of those employed working only eight hours. Not surprisingly, the survey found that ‘working time spanning more than 10 hours generated discontent.’ (59)

In addition to long working days, working women in Korea have few days off. The FKTU surveys found that 80.9% of the women working on the railroad did not even have one day off per month.

### Women’s Regular Days Off

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day Off</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Non-Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One day a week</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>59.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in 10 days</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in 2 weeks</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>13.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted however, that since shifts change on Sundays, the “day off” may only be part of a day two out of three shifts.

In manufacturing, 64.2% of the women are required to stand as

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(58) Interview with Sun-Joo Oh, head of the International Committee, 9 July 1980.
(59) FKTU Survey II, p. 22.
they work; 25.6% only sit. Not surprisingly, these figures are reversed for women in the non-manufacturing sector: 62.39% are required to sit, 6.76% keep standing, and 30.4% alternate positions.

One peculiar day off is written into the Korean labor law: a menstrual day. I doubt any woman would have put such a day into law. What women would like her period to be common knowledge, particularly in a country that considers blood, whether from pregnancy or menstruation unclean?

In industry 25.2% of the women surveyed said they in fact took menstrual leave while 44.6% of those in other jobs did so, according to the FKTU surveys. Only 1.86% of those women surveyed said bashfulness kept them from applying. However, interviews suggested that some employees simply paid women an extra working day a month rather than granting menstrual leave that would interrupt working schedules somewhat unpredictably. In at least one instance, a worker who took menstrual leave was considered to have interrupted her work and so was docked three days pay.

Physical conditions in factories vary from unimaginable squalor to pristine air-conditioned surroundings, from crowded shelf-like workspace of seamstresses to scientifically designed assembly lines. Asked whether the work environment was more or less endurable, barely half of the women, or 51.78% in industry said yes, versus 62.3% in white collar occupations.

Hot, crowded workspaces, with little lighting and no windows seems typical of the older shops. Women especially resent having to return home dirty and smelly. A shower and changing rooms on the premises seems a small request. Yet when one notes the low level of water and waste disposal service available in the city, such a request becomes a fairly expensive installation for marginal factories.

In these sweatshops the conditions lead to failing eyesight, hearing impairment, and respiratory diseases. Even in new modern plants the machinery may cause backaches if it was sized for adult American men but run by young small Korean women. Yet in the trade union survey, the white-collar workers expressed more dissatisfaction about their working environment than did blue-collar workers. They found
that 62.3% of the women in manufacturing found "the environment is more or less endurable," as to 51.78% of those in non-manufacturing pursuits. (60)

*Monetary issues.* Working women in Korea are paid only 46% of the wages paid to men. In the United States, overall, all working women receive only 59% of the amount received by all working men. In Korea, this is the result of policy: women are paid less for the same work in addition to being segregated occupationally. In the U.S., the wages for the same job are the same, but women are both occupationally segregated into the lower paying jobs, and women have tended to stop work during childbearing years, then reenter the labor force at the bottom once again.

On the whole, women in industry received even less than the average 46%. This is probably due to the youthfulness of the women in the labor force which results in their position at the bottom. Women are seldom trained on the job since they are not expected to remain long at the job.

**Monthly Wages by Sex**

**Showing Women's Wages as a Percent of Men's (1978)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All industry</td>
<td>145,933</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>130,256</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>70,618</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>128,534</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55,849</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>240,160</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>96,441</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As compiled by the Korean Human Development Center, p. 4.

The extent of occupational segregation and its relationship to wages is clear when the 1978 total average earnings in manufacturing of 95,157 won is compared with the total average earnings in textiles of 69,839 won. (61)

(60) FKTU Survey II, p. 25
(61) Korean Statistical Yearbook, 1979, Table 35.
In the FKTU surveys, 92.7% of the women in manufacturing received less than 40,000 won per month in basic wages. Only 12.65% of the women in non-manufacturing jobs received less than 40,000 won in basic wages, while 77.74% received between 41,000 and 100,000 won per month. Thus are the low wage scales in industry emphasized.\(^{(62)}\)

It is important to note that these latter figures were in basic wages. While variation of the figures quoted from the government and from the FKTU is largely explained by the complicated system of bonuses and allowances which can add significantly to the income, the FKTU gives the following figures for women in white collar jobs:\(^{(63)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Bonus (in Won)</th>
<th>% of Women Surveyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10,000</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000-15,000</td>
<td>16.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,000-30,000</td>
<td>25.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31,000-45,000</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existence of this extra-pay system plus the variation of overtime creates anxiety among women workers. They feel they not only cannot anticipate the amount in their paycheck, but they cannot be sure they are paid fairly. Low basic wages are frequently explained as the flip side of the prohibition against firing permanent workers: a reduction in fixed costs is quickly possible within the Confucian ethic of paternalism.\(^{(64)}\) Yet we have noted that women factory workers are in fact fired on marriage while one-quarter of the female labor force has only temporary status. Such a rationalization, therefore, clearly does not apply to female workers.

Overall low wages for women are frequently justified in terms of

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\(^{(62)}\) FKTU Survey II, pp. 16-17  
\(^{(63)}\) FKTU Survey II, p. 20.  
\(^{(64)}\) Young-Ki Park, pp. 14-16.
the motivation of the workers themselves. A 1976 survey by Keun Soo Lee found that the major reason female factory workers gave for migrating to urban areas was to acquire an education or skills. Yet the figures indicating the need for money were divided into two categories: poverty at home and employment to earn money. Together, these answers total 39.6%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction with family</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty at home</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like to live in the city</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acquire education and/or skills</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment to earn money</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N =400)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Low wages are also justified by suggesting that women only work before marriage or work after marriage to support the family. Somehow that is seen as different from men. Clearly the vast majority of people work because they need money on which to live. The FKTU survey notes that "the impoverishment among the masses, which surfaced in the course of industrialization, and uncertainty concerning old-age life has increased the need for additional income sources. Hence an increasing number of women began to seek jobs. Yet (i)the enterprises and the society are still hanging on the traditional concept of male preference against female. Thus the female contri-

(65) As quoted in Soo Kon Kim, 1978, pp. 24-25.
bution is not valued much, and sexual discrimination is taken for granted."

Rather than penalizing women’s sense of social responsibility with low wages, the government should consider paying them more. Worldwide statistics show that the money women earn is generally used to feed and support the family, while men use money for drink, entertainment, or such purchases as a bike, radio, or TV. In Korean villages, money earned by women goes to the family rather than to male rituals. Most Korean working women try to send money home to help their families and to save for marriage; only 9.23% said their income was primarily for private use.

Psychological issues. Underlying all the complaints about working conditions seems to be the overwhelming need that young women have to be treated as human beings. Much of their dissatisfaction comes from the language used when conversing with them, a point discussed above. Poor physical conditions and low wages reenforce the feeling by women workers that they are merely a cog in the national machinery. Even the trade unions are seen as male dominated and unresponsive. There were no elected female labor leaders until 1972. Further, trade unions are not permitted in many of the foreign-owned industries in the free trade zones.

The provision, or lack of provision, of dormitories is also considered a problem. Many women complain of rooms with sleeping shelves where girls must rotate by shifts. Such housing is not free, though the fees are low. A woman bus conductor said the company required her to stay in the dormitory when she is off duty: the house mother checked on them every three hours! Only on Sundays could she leave, to go to church or visit her family.

Many women interviewed said they preferred to rent a room with other working women. Although space in these cramped rooms, often

(66) FKTU Survey I, pp. 13-34.
(67) For example, see Ingrid Palmer or Irene Tinker, 1979.
(68) Griffin Dix.
(69) FKTU Survey II.
(70) FKTU Survey II, pp. 31 and 40.
(72) Barbara Mintz, p. 175.
built behind the landlord's house, is hardly larger than in the
dormitories, at least one can pick one's own companions. In or out
of the dormitory, most women eat from street vendors in the city
though the factories must provide cafeteria food in the industrial
parks. Workers on shifts complained of the difficulty of finding food
at odd hours. It would seem that some attention to housing for
female factory workers which was unconnected to the employer
should be encouraged.

The lack of promotional opportunities for women either at the
factories or in clerical positions tends to become a self-fulfilling
prophecy for the myth that women do not care about their work.
Han Soon Lee surveyed 400 women bank employees in ten banks in
Seoul and found that the major cause for their dissatisfaction was
the sense that their occupation had no future.\(^{(33)}\)

One unexpected result of treating young women as temporary
workers is that they may feel they have little to lose if they protest.
Yoon noted several instances where factory girls were more trouble-
some than boys.\(^{(44)}\) Women are also beginning to push their trade
union male colleagues into actions which benefit the women them-
selves, such as the suspension of the marriage memorandum.

One problem with trade union activity on behalf of women is the
cultural attitudes embedded in protectionist regulations around the
world. While women in the United States now reject such laws as
creating inequality, it should be noted that the Department of
Labor's Women's Bureau was one of the last women's institutions
to support the Equal Rights Amendment. The introduction to the
FKTU's second survey illustrates the Korean view:

(73) Han-Soon Lee, p. 2.
(74) Soon Young Yoon, 1979b, p. 17.
... (W)omen face restrictions in physiological, physical and social terms. Therefore, female labor force cannot be treated in terms as equal as male labor force, and hence, cannot be subject to indiscriminate conditions in working time, working environment, leave and other working conditions.

The fact that the female labor force should be protected leaves no question, if we recognize the unique social function of women who are the mother of new labor force.

In other words, the labor force of women who have maternity right should be protected for the sake of healthy growth of future society.\(^{(75)}\)

The question of maternity leave and daycare, which such protection implies, are generally moot since large industry does not employ married women. There is evidence that such trends are only perpetuated by regulations requiring the employer to provide daycare centers or grant long maternity leave. If the government supports such provisions, then the government should subsidize them. Otherwise, employers will not hire women because they become more expensive than men. Or they will flout the law, which is the case today in Korea. Small industry, sales, and self-employment enterprises are almost impossible to monitor to provide the services written in the labor laws.

So exemplary are present labor laws that some observers argue they are more often used to punish enemies than improve labor conditions since everyone breaks the regulations. Others suggest that the labor laws merely spell out desirable goals for the future and so should not be used as a measure of contemporary conditions. Both views accept the fact that the laws are not today implemented.

Whatever the reasons for adopting the present labor laws, it behooves the government to consider whether they are not internally inconsistent as well as contradictory to other goals of the government. As we have noted above, it is difficult to argue both for equality and special provisions for women. The concerns expressed in

\(^{(75)}\) FKTU Survey II, pp. 2-3.
the trade union document are hardly in keeping with their own lack of support for change in the poor working conditions and low wages of women. In the factory or on the farm, most poor women work longer and more strenuous hours than men. Only where actual physical strength is imperative, are women unable to compete with men.

Further, unlimited maternity leave goes directly against the projected two-child family. Many developing countries have begun to discriminate against families with many children: Singapore stops family allowance and reduces access to housing for large families. On the other hand, countries with low birthrates, such as those in Eastern Europe, offer long maternity leave provisions and guarantee the same job on return in the hope that women will choose to have more children.

As long as the current labor laws are official, workers will of course try to enforce them. However, the FKTU survey found that only 5.7% of the white-collar workers felt that they knew the legal provisions well. Interestingly, however, women with lower educational backgrounds were more aware of the law than those with more education. This is explained as relating to "the self-defense mechanism among the workers with low educational background." (76)

The trade union survey, noting that only 2.29% of the white-collar workers would seek counsel with the trade unions, calls for an institutional counselling system for the women workers. (77) In fact, a variety of groups have been active in offering services to working women. In the chapter on education, we review several types of training programs undertaken by women's organizations. Alternative trade union groups such as the Urban Industrial Mission and the Young Christian Workers have provided counselling in the context of union organizing. Still other groups target factory workers for counselling on a broad range of issues.

For example, the Chungnam National University developed a Legal Aid Center for industrial workers. In addition to concerns over

(76) FKTU Survey II, p. 47.
(77) FKTU Survey II, p. 46.
labor conditions and payment of allowances, workers sought advice on renting homes or borrowing money, and asked questions about collective bargaining.\(^{(78)}\) The Business and Professional Women's Club in Taegu offered telephone counselling and found that only 10% of their inquiries concerned job-related problems. About a quarter of the callers were worried about sexual problems, while another quarter asked about "life problems."\(^{(79)}\)

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the unrecorded work which women do in relation to family survival. Most of the emphasis has been on work that in modern societies enters the modern sector as services and individual activities become more specialized. A woman carrying water from a common well is not working, according to most economists; but a man laying a water-pipe is, of course, employed. Gathering firewood is again seldom considered work, but buying and selling wood or coal or kerosene is classified as work. Increasingly, such work is referred to as income-substituting.

In addition to these survival activities, there is another range of activities which someone must do for family survival; these pertain to what some theorists call reproductive activities: the bearing, care, and feeding of the future work force. Such an attitude clearly underlies most of the male commentary on female labor force participation in Korea. To them, the ideal is of the woman at home caring for the children and serving the husband. We have seen how far from reality such a vision is for most workers, male or female. Reality for the poor is everyone working as best they can. Worldwide, the poor spend very little time on day care, they cannot afford the time. Babies are hung on tree branches as mother works.\(^{(80)}\) Siblings, especially the girls, early assume child-tending roles, a fact which contributes to low school attendance by girls in most less developed countries. Or kids run wild in the streets of cities as they do in many Latin American metropoles.

\(^{(78)}\) Legal Aid Center
\(^{(79)}\) Business and Professional Women's Club
\(^{(80)}\) Newland, p. 23.
In Korea, married women change jobs, out of the factory, not only to avoid the language issue, but also to find jobs more consistent with this societal vision of women’s roles. Women who work, except perhaps the highly educated ones, are still hiding this fact; men who offer to help around the house won’t admit it to their peers. But if Korea really wishes to draw more married women into the industrial workforce, the issue of reproductive activities cannot be ignored.

The second section of this chapter has reviewed the participation of women in the modern labor force and discussed the physical, monetary and psychological issues relating to their limited, but growing, commitment to this sector. The widespread use of unskilled female workers is seen as part of the short-term strategy for labor-intensive industry. As industries turn to products which require a skilled labor force to manufacture, workers will need more education and/or training. Korea is already well along on the road to educating its populace. The issues relating to female education are discussed in the following chapter.

IV. Education

Issues of education for females are best considered in terms of the delivery system, that is whether we are concerned with formal education in schools and colleges, with non-formal education offered by a great variety of organizations, with indirect education through the media or with socialization through traditional institutions. However, the underlying problem with all four categories is the lack of a clear answer to the question: education for what? It is not surprising that in a rapidly changing society the signals given girls and women by these different systems are often in conflict. This confusion may be more destabilizing in Korea than in many other countries for two reasons: the extreme rapidity of change, and the authority patterns which permeate the society.

1. Formal Education

The implementation of compulsory education at the primary level
over the last decade and the projected extension of compulsory attendance at middle school during the Fifth Five Year Plan has benefitted girls more than boys since previous school attendance by girls was a lower percentage of peer group than boys. The more recent equalizing of middle and high schools by replacing entrance examinations with geographical zones and lottery has leveled girls’ opportunities as well as boys’. The strain on girls’ schools at these levels to maintain any standards has been more severe, however, because the expansion of girls’ enrollment has been faster (Table A).

As shown in Table B, the percentage of girls in primary school has gone from 95% in 1966 of all girls aged 6-11 years, to 104.7% in 1979. Figures over 100 of cohort in primary school has been typical since 1970 and presumably indicates a significant number of over-aged children still attending primary school. Had this phenomenon only represented a “catch-up” phase, then the percentage should have begun to drop. Since this has not happened, the likely explanation is irregular schooling combined with rigorous promotion standards which require a significant number of students to repeat grades.

The rapid increase in female enrollment in middle schools is also clear from Table B, going from 32.9% in 1966 to 87.5% in 1979. Almost as rapid has been the increasing female enrollment in high schools where the figures at 19.6% in 1966 are growing to 49% in 1979. In sheer numbers, the increase in female enrollment in middle schools went from 373,091 in 1966 to 1,102,831; in high school from 155,146 in 1966 to 649,362 in 1979.

This rapid expansion of girls’ schooling has impacted on the family and the school system and has raised the expectations of the girls themselves. Each of these points is discussed below.

Impact on the family. We have noted above the long hours worked by women on subsistence farms. Children, especially girls, were expected to help the mother. There is no question that compulsory primary and middle school education has resulted in more work for rural women. This in turn has provided a negative image of women’s work for the daughters and encouraged them to migrate to factories or urban areas. One might expect the required schooling of children to
Table A: School Enrollment 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary School (6-11 yrs)</th>
<th>Middle School (12-14 yrs)</th>
<th>High School (15-17 yrs)</th>
<th>College (18-21 yrs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>5,454,318</td>
<td>2,614,357</td>
<td>2,755,019</td>
<td>3,651,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrolled</td>
<td>5,640,712</td>
<td>2,394,620</td>
<td>1,565,355</td>
<td>508,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male-population</td>
<td>2,839,032</td>
<td>1,354,155</td>
<td>1,430,131</td>
<td>1,890,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-enrolled</td>
<td>2,902,258</td>
<td>1,291,789</td>
<td>915,993</td>
<td>381,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female-population</td>
<td>2,615,286</td>
<td>1,260,202</td>
<td>1,324,888</td>
<td>1,760,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-enrolled</td>
<td>2,738,454</td>
<td>1,102,831</td>
<td>644,362</td>
<td>123,355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics provided by the Economic Planning Bureau, July 10, 1980

Table B: Enrollment Rate by Age (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary School (6-11 yrs)</th>
<th>Middle School (12-14 yrs)</th>
<th>High School (15-17 yrs)</th>
<th>College (18-21 yrs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics provided by the Economic Planning Bureau, July 10, 1980
have a fertility impact since the economic value of children is reduced as they engage in unproductive education. However, the long-term economic benefits of children, especially sons continue to be a motivating force for having more children than the governmental norm of two. In 1979 the average number of children was reported to be 4.2 per family. (81) Further, the need which the mother has for help may explain the irregular attendance at primary school indicated above. (82)

Impact on the school system. Current modernization and expansion of the formal school system has not meant much change in the prevailing sex segregation above primary levels. As in the States, the separate and equal concept fails because where there is separation, there are status differences and so separate is not equal. The impact of leveling has apparently reduced girls’ education to a lower common denominator than for boys. Further, science and mathematics are less stressed. Many girls’ high schools do not teach physics or chemistry, relying on biology as the only science course. Girls have neither been encouraged nor tried to enter the new technical high schools to study other than commercial subjects, and few girls dare to attend men’s colleges, even if they qualify. Indeed, the percentage of girls in agricultural schools has fallen from 6.17% in 1975 to 5.38% in 1979. Similarly, the percentage of girls in technical high schools which was a tiny .95% in 1975 has been reduced to a miniscule .57%. In commercial high schools, females were 60% of the enrollment in 1975 and 67% in 1979 (Table C).

Cultural constraints to educational opportunities. Underlying the low enrollment of girls in technical and agricultural high schools—despite the important and growing role of women in both sectors—is the fundamental attitude toward women in Korea as discussed above. Yet the educational establishment writes reports and plans the future as if cultural influences were non-existent. In a paper on equality of educational opportunity in Korea, a senior researcher at the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) wrote in July 1980 that

(81) Sawon Hong, p. 6.
“there has been no significant inequality between sex.” (83) Similarly, the official Government of Korea publication *Education in Korea, 1979-1980* makes no mention whatsoever of differences in educational practices for women and for men despite the sex-segregated school system which itself is unmentioned. The only reference to curriculum variation by sex refers to physical exercise. (84)

On the other hand, the long-term planning document of the KEDI has a few tables showing sex differences in enrollment and subjects studied. But even these tables obfuscate the differences by including Home Economics with Physical Sciences and Nursing with Medicine. This information itself, which appeared in the draft, was omitted in the final publication. Also omitted was the comment that in 1977 there were 56 women’s colleges but that co-education is increasing. The final report includes a table which only shows the nation-wide percentages of women enrolled in all institutions of higher education; this percentage increased from 12.2% in 1975 to 20% in 1978. (85)

These government documents once again reflect the underlying schizophrenia between the public-modern sphere and the private-traditional sphere. They ignore the fact that the more female educa-

Table C: Enrollment in Vocational High Schools 1975 & 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>42,011</td>
<td>39,418</td>
<td>2,593</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>50,340</td>
<td>47,632</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>123,571</td>
<td>122,395</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>183,374</td>
<td>182,326</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<td>20,430</td>
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Statistics provided by the Economic Planning Bureau, July 10, 1980

(83) Chong-Jae Lee
(84) Republic of Korea, Ministry of Education
(85) Chong-Jae Lee et al.
tion resembles that of men, the greater the expectation of women to equal job opportunities. Nearly 40% of the work force is female, yet only 1.8% of them work in their specialized field. Role stereotypes are so pervasive, especially for girls with only middle or high school education, that such expectations are bound to lead to frustration. This continues to be true in the United States, as summed up in the question asked of qualified women but not of men: “Can she type?” A favorite poster in the United States featured that question under a picture of Golda Meir when she was Prime Minister of Israel.

These stereotypes affect the education available to women even in college. Ewha Woman’s University has a Department of Home Economics, but not one of Economics. Women are admitted in large numbers to the Music and Art Department. This raises the issue of college entrance subject quotas. To what extent are these quotas meant to relate to manpower needs? Is it simply assumed that most female graduates will never work?

Cultural constraints also impede women professionals no matter whether they attend a co-educational or sex-segregated college. For men the key to life-long success is in gaining entrance to the college of your choice. Since it is practically impossible to flunk out despite poor grades or student strikes, getting in is the key. College classmates provide a network of “gentlemen” for life-long social and career activity and contacts. These networks do not exist for women. First, women in Korea are never part of the public/social scene, and generally private social contacts are based on family and clan. Secondly, women in Korea seldom have positions of power except in family businesses or in women’s universities.

The unwillingness of faculty to flunk students means that the bright student, female or male, has no incentive and little regard for excellence. And why this unwillingness? Is it related to the need of at least private universities to maintain enrollment? Do professors really worry about the costs of education to the student? Is it true

(86) Korean Human Development Center
that the actions of the student, if illegal, will be ascribed to the professor? If so, are women demanding equity as potentially as disruptive as students demanding governmental reform? How do these concerns impact on the level of education of men or women?

The fact that education counts more at the high school level makes the inferior education for girls at that level more of a barrier than if university education were given greater value. Yet Korean women with foreign degrees of excellent standard still lack network contacts and so cannot function easily within the professional life of Korea. The bar to social contacts further discourages highly educated Korean women from remaining in the country.

The distance between occupational expectations of girls and the opportunities available to them is a universal problem. It is exacerbated in Korea by the rapid expansion of the school system and by the mixed messages the system itself reflects. Not only is there tracking by sex, but it would seem that the compulsory morals course reiterates outworn Confucian ideals. It follows that textbooks undoubtedly reflect occupational segregation by sex, with the dominant role for women being seen in the home. Thus there is a growing gap between curriculum and reality, between what is expected and what is. Even in college, the Korean curriculum is centrally controlled; adaptations are prohibited. The only flexibility is in research institutes which now number over 500. These characteristics of the Korean education system could be turned to an advantage for women. Institutes could be encouraged to explore roles and responsibilities of men and women in the future Korea; curricula could be changed to reflect these new roles and to foster the attitudes that permit them.

2. Non-formal Education

Adult education is a continuing need in any modern complex society whether or not there is universal primary or secondary education. Indeed, adult education is often thought of as offering school curricula to adults. Increasingly, there is pressure to make education
outside the formal system more useful, more relevant to the various
skills needed by adults in the modern world in their multiple roles at
work, at home, or in the community. Such education is particularly
crucial for women since they are less likely to have been prepared by
their traditional upbringing to cope with the demands of modern life.
In Korea, where the ideal of woman is still one who devotes herself
to the family in the home, little thought has been given to the train-
ing necessary to function as worker, wife, mother, or citizen in a
modern Korea. Skills training where it exists has tended to remain
highly stereotyped.

*Education in factories.* Young women working in factories have
in the past been drawn from the rural areas where educational
opportunities were minimal. Thus many companies have offered
middle and high school courses as part of fringe benefits for their
workers. A recent survey of female workers by The League of
Women Voters found that the less educated young women desired
education more. Responding to such wishes, one showcase textile
plant has actually built a school on its campus-like facility. Other
companies allow released time to attend classes in town. However,
a recent survey of women workers in Gumi raises questions about
educational priorities.

This survey was carried out in 1978 by the Institute for Com-
munity Education of Keimyung University in the Gumi industrial
complex. The small town of Gumi had a population of 24,000 in
1972, of which 7,000 were classed as workers before the complex was
developed. By 1978 there were 39,000 workers in the area, of which
62% were female. 90% of these women were migrants; 27% were
under eighteen years old. These statistics reflect an expected pattern.
What is unusual is that 68.5% of the women workers are graduates
of junior high school while 24% have completed high school or
above. While 10% of the respondents expressed an interest in further
formal education, most preferred instruction and counselling "to help
them utilize their leisure time, solve their problems which confront
them in every-day life, and prepare them for future marriage and
family life.”

A second important point coming out of this survey is the fact that 32% of the women want to continue working after marriage; 17% would even continue after having children. Another 11% would like to return to work after their children are grown. Thus 43% of all women workers reject the idea that marriage is automatically a bar to working. Further, the adult education courses offered by the Institute for Community Education were extended in the second session to wives of male workers on the grounds that they “are in fact potential employees.” These aspirations run counter to the expectations of their employers.

*Education as workers.* The concept of education in Korea carries with it the connotation of the expert informing the student. Rote learning is a problem throughout the formal system and is much greater a barrier in non-formal education. In the Gumi survey, it was found that the respondents “expected lectures given by well-known university professors rather than discussions and group activities led by local leaders and resource persons.” The Institute for Community Education therefore scheduled lectures but added individual counseling.

The Institute of Labour and Management of Sogang University attempts to utilize participation techniques in their classes, though they find it difficult to retrain the teachers. However, Basil Price agrees that this change is necessary if the worker education goals of the ILO are to be met:

(a) endeavor to establish a democratic value system;
(b) develop a social consciousness; and
(c) supply the various types of knowledge and techniques needed by labor unions for successful accomplishment of their goals.

He further quotes Pope John Paul I who suggests that contemporary society requires as much effort into morals and ethics as

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(87) Bok-Nam Yoon, p. 193.
(88) Bok-Nam Yoon, pp. 196-7.
(89) Bok-Nam Yoon, p. 196.
has been put into the ascendancy of technology. Price concludes, then, that education for workers must emphasize humanization of life.\textsuperscript{(90)}

\textit{Education as women.} This view that workers need training in self-realization and then in organization in order to expand and control their own unions is reflected in several programs such as those offered to workers in the factories by the Young Christian Workers, the Career Christian Academy, or the Urban Industrial Mission. These are in contrast to the courses offered at Sogang which are for union leaders, along with businessmen and government officials who deal with unions. Because the most exploited worker is female, such courses are generally directed at women. They seem to start with the lowly position of women in the Korean society: thus they question cultural norms and appear to have a patina of Christian belief which values souls equally. Descriptions of their meetings sound very much like the consciousness-raising sessions of early U.S. women's liberation: women are people; it is all right to express desires for oneself; it is not necessary to be unquestionably subservient to everyone else: father, husband, employer. Such courses would seem to be in line with the goal of democratic participation whether in the factory or the society. Instead, both factory owners and the government find such training threatening and respond accordingly, firing the workers, arresting teachers.

A different approach to stimulating women to consider their own intrinsic value was undertaken by the Korean Women's Institute of Ewha Woman's University. Starting first with the introduction of women's studies as part of the university curriculum, a group of faculty set up the Leadership Training Center to offer non-formal education to poor urban and rural community leaders. In December 1978, forty-four women from six provinces came to the Ewha campus for four days of consciousness-raising non-formal education. In early January a second session was offered to women from urban poor and factory workers' communities. In addition to the training sessions which utilized audio-visual aids, the participants were provided with

\textsuperscript{(90)} Basil Price, p. 31.
both theoretical and practical educational materials for them to distribute at home. (91)

An earlier phase of educating women for their modern existence involves instruction in their new legal rights under the constitution and subsequent amendments. Many women's organizations worked under the leadership of Dr. Lee Tae-yung, Korea's first woman lawyer, for a revision in the civil code which led to the Family Law of 1977. There continues to be much dissatisfaction with several provisions of that law; other sections give women new rights. Dr. Lee's organization, the Korean Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, along with the YMCA and the Korean League of Women Voters, supports counselling programs and outreach to inform women of these rights.

These consciousness-raising courses, each somewhat different, were nonetheless the only type of activity which I encountered which attempts to meet head-on the fundamental issue I was asked to address: the role of women in modern Korea. The establishment is clearly uneasy about such inquiry.

Skills training. Throughout the world, the Young Women's Christian Association has had a special concern for the young working woman. In Korea, the YWCA has been involved in many of the types of educational programs described above. As unskilled girls flocked to Seoul, the YWCA began job training. Its first effort was to train girls for the domestic service. This program was so outstanding that requests for the trainees far outnumbered available women; as a result, members of the YWCA are given preference for employing the trained women. Demand continues to be high for domestics so that they now can charge by the hour, and often clean several apartments during a week. One labor economist observed that the domestic sector was the only one in Korea where hourly wages were a reality!

In 1978, the YWCA began a project to train women in the non-traditional occupations of tile-laying, wall-papering, and painting, in addition to its on-going training programs in dressmaking, knitting,

(91) Soon-Young Yoon, 1979a, pp. 56-58.
and beauty culture. These non-traditional occupations were selected after a 1975 survey of job opportunities and a review of current training programs. Although technically government training programs are open to all, no special efforts had been made to encourage women to attend. However, the expanding economy had already brought women into these three fields, but since they were untrained, they were paid as assistants even when doing the same work. The YWCA found the pay discrepancies vast:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>male</th>
<th>female</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tile-laying</td>
<td>$16/da</td>
<td>$4/da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall-papering</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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Because it was recognized that the young disadvantaged women accepted for training would need psychological support of a strong peer group, the project provided dormitories for the trainees.\(^{(92)}\)

To date, 362 women have completed these training courses. One-half of all women were married; their income is somewhat less than that of comparably trained women because most go home early. Nonetheless, their average income is now $200/month, and one woman actually made $1,200 in one month. The success of this program has encouraged the YWCA to expand its offerings. They already have courses on watch-repairing and picture framing. An innovative program is planned for Cheju where women will be trained to build improved on dol, build masonry homes and walls, and grow tangerines and oranges.\(^{(93)}\)

3. Media and Women

Television is a powerful tool in any country, the more so in a centrally controlled country such as Korea. The three Korean channels compete, however, with the English language Armed Forces channel. Perhaps for that reason their summer (1980) programming


\(^{(93)}\) "Better Jobs for Women" project proposal; interviews with YWCA national president Inshil Soon (Julie Moon) and national executive director Soon-Yang Park.
included many U.S. films dubbed in Korean along with extensive coverage of the Miss Universe contest. Korean features ranged from historical dramas to modern comedies. It would seem, therefore, that there is a wide variety of role models from which young Korean women may choose.

I was surprised that neither the women’s organizations nor professors had considered monitoring television or radio to understand the dominant messages about women’s roles and status, through language used or roles portrayed. In the United States, such monitoring revealed a series of stereotypes which women found degrading and so successfully agitated for change. Nor had anyone analyzed the language used in the various programs as to hierarchical level. The perception of pattern seemed to depend on the viewer. Thus an educated woman complained to me that many programs portray the wife as inferior to the husband through the forms of address. She noted that such practice was not traditional among Koreans, but rather the result of the Japanese occupation. Several older women found the modern forms of egalitarian address jarring.\(^{(94)}\)

Clearly, then, there is no governmental policy with regard to language or role-portrayal on radio or television. It would be quite easy to foster democratic language usage, encourage non-traditional occupations for women by according such work higher status. Children’s programs are a particularly fertile place where new ideas can be planted. Sesame Street is a widely acclaimed children’s TV program in the U.S.; many youngsters have learned to read by watching this program; the attitudes learned are perhaps even more important than literacy, and are very carefully controlled.

Children’s picture books in the U.S. have been closely reviewed by women’s groups; to encourage bias-free publications, several women’s presses were established. Similarly, text books have been revised under pressure from women’s organizations. In both cases, early books would show boys playing ball or climbing trees, while girls were pictured playing with dolls or falling down. Adults who

\(^{(94)}\) C. Paul Drudge, also Hyo-Jae Lee, et al.
worked were always male, while women were shown as mothers or school teachers. Today you will see a woman doctor or a male nurse; girls and boys will be shown swimming, or iceskating, or playing with toys.

Language has also been an issue in the United States. Because there is no neutral singular, "he" or "man" have been used generically. The problem was and is that many people then think only male. Thus, a chairman almost always was a man; manpower statistics ignore women's work. Since language is an expression of culture, American women have pushed hard to develop unbiased words such as airplane attendant instead of steward and stewardness. But the problem in English is not nearly as delimiting as in Korea. Nor is the issue in Korea merely one between women and men. Status considerations determine social levels more accurately than does income differentiation. As Korea strives for a democratic society, its language must be revised so that all forms of communication, from government memoranda to television programs, will reflect equality.

4. Education for What?

Education, representing modern life, is presented to females with a minimum of sexual stereotypes. Yet biases exist: in textbooks, in the lack of science courses in girls' schools, or in the lack of an economics curriculum at women's colleges. But the overarching problem for women at whatever level of education is the persistence of cultural biases about when and where women should work. The major issues facing Korean women today were briefly presented in chapter two. Fundamentally, women are educated in a modern mode for a life still permeated by Confucianism.

The tensions created by this conflict are readily apparent in Korea today. Women are seeking their own solutions, from leading strikes to speculating in real estate to marrying foreigners. This modern-traditional conflict is less critical to most Korean men since, to a point, they have the best of both worlds. But as young men begin to think, as opposed to memorizing, the underlying tensions between the value systems represented by these divergent cultures
become increasingly apparent. Again this conflict does not manifest itself solely in sexual role segregation. It impinges on loyalties to lineage and clan, affects the attitudes to family-owned businesses, influences wage-rates and the structure of bonuses, and questions the present system of employment by connection.

The dangers are manifest when a society tries to segregate modern and traditional, public and private, male and female. Within the last two years we have seen the convulsions attendant upon the purging of foreign influences in Iran and Cambodia. It would seem that groups in both countries felt that with modernization they were losing control over their own destiny. The more they feared international manipulation, the more they tried to emphasize their roots and culture. In Cambodia, this took the form of back to the farm, for women's traditional role in Southeast Asia is relatively equitable. But resurgent Islam in Iran re imposed Arab strictures on purdah. In Korea, anti-Western reaction could easily take the Iranian form.

Thus the successful adaptation of cultural streams in Korea is as much a woman’s problem as it is a governmental one, and vice versa. To date, the government has taken the view that there is no conflict between the heritage of a hierarchical, sex-segregated ethic and the egalitarian views espoused in the Constitution or the labor laws and reflected in compulsory education. As long as the new ethics are confined to the public sphere while Confucianism holds sway in the private, many Koreans continue to see no conflict.

Yet the industrial system is itself more traditional than modern (95) (See Edward S. Mason, et al., *The Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, 1945-1975*: Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1980); Confucian practices pervade labor negotiations. Perhaps part of the success of Korea’s industries lies in such adaptation of traditional practices rather than in wholesale imitation of other systems. Today in the United States, many business school professors are studying the Japanese industrial system to see why it works better than the present U.S. model. If such adaptations work in industry, would not a national debate on modernizing the role of women be more effec-

(95) Mason
tive than the current compartmentalizing of the issues while ignoring the fundamental conflicts?

Perhaps the major contribution to development theory by the women-in-development movement is its emphasis on localized programming based upon cultural variances. While worldwide studies have shown that women everywhere, at all socio-economic levels and under all governmental systems, are less advantaged than comparable men, reality varies from place to place, and so too must the solutions.

The women's movement in the United States is seen by many as a model to be emulated; they overlook how thoroughly its values are bound up in American culture. Throughout its brief history, America has stressed individualism. The recent equity revolution in the U.S. resulted from the recognition that the mythical individual who succeeded by his own wisdom and hard work was not only always male, but also a white Protestant. Indeed, American culture is often referred to as WASP: white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant.

The contemporary women's movement in the U.S. had its stirrings in the civil rights activities and the anti-war movement. Both movements were led by males who were as likely to exploit women as any other men. Women's roles in these movements were either secretarial or sexual. Thus, when the generation of "flower children" began to urge everyone to "do you own thing," women asked why that should not also apply to them. In consequence, the American women's movement has been inward-looking and has emphasized individual self-growth and equality of opportunity to education and employment. At first it was rightly seen as antithetical to marriage and motherhood. While today choice for women is emphasized, the movement still lacks an emphasis on social responsibility—whether to family or nation. In that, it continues to reflect American society with its current re-emphasis on WASP values, laissez faire, and capitalism.

The scholars at the Korean Women's Institute at the Ewha Woman's University seem very much aware of the dangers of uncritical adoption of Western theories, whether drawn from economics
or psychology. Noting the important roles played by women in pre-Yi dynasty Korea, the study team called for more historical research. The team also noted the force of sex-segregation in contemporary Korean society and "felt it would be critical to begin new research on the effects of sex-segregation in child-rearing, personality formation, or impact on a women's movement, but not necessarily with an integrationist, sex-implicated bias." (96) This questioning of Western "solutions" was reiterated in the recognition of the social role of both men and women whose "psycho-social well-being is dependent on maintaining the group's homeostasis, not individual self-assertion." (97)

In other words, these Korean women scholars are calling for research into the appropriate role for women in Korea who partake of both the Confucian and Western offerings. They justly complain that much available research funding is too restricted because "the definition of the problems and theoretical paradigms have appeared too pre-packaged, too hurriedly for anyone to reflect on their applicability in Asia." (98)

Education in many countries is the distillation of cultural wisdom which elders wish to hand down to the young. By importing the Western system of education without adaptation, Korea, like most developing countries, has created conflict between the value system inherent in Western scientific thought and that handed down in the society. What is different in Korea is the speed with which education has been made available to all its youth. Thus the adaptations between modern and traditional are not confined to an elite, but are rather being felt throughout the nation. The criticality of the issue "education for what" requires a more thoughtful governmental response than simply adding a course on morals to the curriculum.

V. Review and Recommendations

Certain underlying themes have appeared and reappeared

(96) Yoon, 1979a, p. 7.
(97) Yoon, 1979a, p. 9.
throughout this report. Foremost of such themes is the inseparability of women's issues from their context in society and development. When the U.S. and the UN first began programming for women, in response to the pressures engendered by a 1973 amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, they tended to develop separate women's programs. These were seen as pilot projects and as a mechanism for developing female leaders. Unfortunately, the peripheral existence of these separate programs only further illustrated the marginality of women in the development process. Income-producing activities were set up for women with more a "welfare" mentality than an economic one. Thus, one Sahelian country could encourage women to enlarge their beer-making while at the same time subsidizing the importing of European beer. Or handicraft activities were added in Africa to land redistribution schemes where land was given to the men, although the women farm it. With the profits going directly to men, no one should have been surprised at the low productivity as women sought ways for their own income.

In development terms, Korea's major interest in women would appear to be focused on women in factories. Yet by seeing women solely in these terms, they have made assumptions and projections about female labor force availability which are likely to be incorrect. In rural Korea, the focus of activities concerning women have stemmed from family planning programs. Once again, by considering women outside the cultural context, population reduction rates are not what were expected.

Consideration of Korean cultural heritage is imperative because of the restrictive roles assigned to women by the neo-Confucian ethic that continues to prevail in Korea. Looking at the appropriate roles for women in contemporary Korea is indeed a revolutionary activity, but then, so is the modernization process. In the last two decades, there has been radical change in both rural and urban Korea. But the changes have been uneven, more public than private, affecting economic activity much more than role responsibilities. Like tectonic plates, shifting and creating pressure for an earthquake, Confucianism and modernization are putting stress upon the society.
Since many of the overt symbols of modernization, the Constitution and the labor laws, are imitative rather than adaptive, there is no obvious pattern for the future. These two great traditions need to seek an equilibrium, both giving slightly, or the resultant pressures will indeed devastate the society.

There is urgent need to open up debate on this tension between traditions, to evaluate the direction of present trends of development, and to seek a more adaptive future. This is a woman's need and a national need.

Recommendation 1. Institutes should be encouraged on every campus to discuss contemporary values and societal roles.

While equity is a clear goal, its expression should be based on Korean heritage, not imported models.

Attempts to bring closer together lineage dominance as expressed in Confucianism and national needs as delineated in the Constitution should begin to address the underlying divergences of loyalty in the country. We discussed the issue of "problem women" and recognized that in Korea today, social service has neither support nor status. As long as men continue to place highest loyalties on the lineage, it is unlikely that women will "discover" voluntary activity. It is no coincidence that most socially responsible programs are run by Christians.

Only a fundamental reordering of priorities will encourage voluntary service. The Saemaul Undong developed a scheme of cooperative service which was to benefit the contributors; yet even here there are problems of coercion. How to provide rewards for social service to others requires careful analysis of rewards and penalties.

Recommendation 2. Women and men be encouraged to undertake socially useful voluntary activity. Suitable rewards should be considered such as national awards, prizes, television coverage.

A second theme concerns women's work. In the Economic chapter, we reviewed women's income-producing activities, their
efforts at income-substitution, and their role in child-bearing and home care. Women's multitudinous activities, greatly undervalued, have clearly contributed as much as men's to Korea's economic miracle. Fundamental to the debate on values is the worth assigned to different activities which women do, and hence to the worth of women themselves.

Recommendation 3. The many facets of women's work need to be studied and evaluated in terms of their economic contribution to society. Such studies should include modern and informal sector activities as well as income-substituting work and household contributions.

Women's work in the modern sector needs considerable upgrading in terms of pay, environment, and governmental policy. If women receive equal pay, then they cannot claim special protection. A few jobs may be found suitable only for one sex or the other. Such jobs should be kept at a minimum, whether it be women nurses in maternity wards or men in coal mines, and these classifications should be periodically reviewed.

Recommendation 4. Equal pay for equal work should be instituted immediately. Occupational segregation should be addressed and training programs opened for women as well as men.

Recommendation 5. Working conditions must be evaluated in terms of humane treatment as well as humane environment. Occupational hazards should be minimized and minimal benefits such as toilets and showers should be installed.

Recommendation 6. Planners should reflect on the impact their actions have on the workforce, and plan also for their transition from unskilled to skilled worker.

In a modern society, much of what women do in subsistence societies is considered income-substituting and will probably be purchased. But if that is the plan, income for poor women and men must be increased to allow for a greater degree of specialization.
Even more critical is the question of child and home care. Will men be encouraged to become equal partners in the family cooking and cleaning? This was legislated in Rumania as part of that country's campaign to increase women's fertility. Or will most cooking be done commercially and most families buy or eat out, as is typical today in urban China? Will daycare centers be attached to all industries as in the USSR? Or will some women specialize in daycare and be paid by the working mothers?

There is a wide variety of alternative solutions. What is most appropriate to Korea? Should they build on their religious heritage such as the Buddhist emphasis on the cycle of life? Life stages for women might continue the present predilection of young women to resign from the factories upon marriage. But greater efforts would have to be made to provide alternative employment or income to women during their child-bearing years and attractive re-entry provisions for older women.

To read many commentators, one might think that Korean women in fact go in and out of the work force before and after child-rearing years. This report has shown that such is not the case, and that poor women always have continued, and many other women now are continuing, to work throughout their lives.

One model that might be studied is that of the family-owned business. Many of the most successful Korean business women are working, or began their career, in family concerns. Status problems are avoided in these enterprises, while child and household care are part of the familial endeavor.

*Recommendation 7.* Alternatives to methods for providing child and home care should be explored, but consideration should be given to adaptations of the life stage pattern perhaps based on family business examples.

Education in Korea is an expression of modern culture, but the textbooks and counselling are still rooted in tradition. Similarly, the modern media often stereotype women in traditional roles.

*Recommendation 8.* Textbooks, television, and all other
media should be studied for their portrayal of values especially pertaining to women.

**Recommendation 9.** An egalitarian national language should be developed and used.

As the base for an egalitarian society, education in Korea should be equal. Despite the homogeneity of Korean culture, there are differences in the needs of youth. These variations may be based on vocations, religion, or talent. Thus some choice of major, for boys as well as girls, should be available. Art schools should be open to boys, and science schools to girls. There should be separate as well as integrated schools and colleges, in recognition that equity is not identical equality.

**Recommendation 10.** Education in Korea should provide diversity as well as excellence. All students should have the right to chose subjects and schools, consistent with the manpower needs of the country.

Korean heritage might also be incorporated into the educational system in a selective way. One scholar mentioned the time-honored custom of pupils cleaning the school. Certainly maintaining school property is a problem in modern urban areas; perhaps pupil involvement would provide a new-old solution.

Another method of ensuring basic services are rendered to a nation is through national service. The idea that all youth, or all college youth, contribute to national development has been introduced in many countries. Since the Korean Army does not draft all men, perhaps they, along with the women graduates, might contribute a year to providing basic services to the rural and urban poor.

**Recommendation 11.** The enthusiasm of youth should be captured for national development through appropriate programs that might include school maintenance or a year of national service.

In sum, if women are to become equal partners in the development of Korea, they need to have equitable treatment under laws and
in reality, Contemporary Korea is being torn by the same tensions that affect women, between a traditional hierarchical Confucianist society and a modern egalitarian industrial nation. Both value systems leave much to be desired. Korea would do well to seek adaptations of the best in each value system. Take from Confucianism the concept of intermediary instead of authority. Take from the West the idea of equity rather than atomistic equality. From Confucianism accept emphasis on an individual’s responsibilities to group needs, but relax the myopia of lineage loyalty. From nationalism, take the view of a wider social context for personal loyalties.

Only in terms of national debate can the role of Korean women in the Fifth, or any future, Five Year Plan be delineated. This report has attempted to raise certain crucial issues; the working out of solutions must be left to the many women and men in Korea who are deeply concerned with the future of their society.
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Name(s) / Position</th>
<th>Institution(s)</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Price, Basil-Chairman of the Board; Kim, Oh Sang-Professor</td>
<td>Sogang Univ. Institute for Labor Management</td>
<td>Review of female labor force participation, their problems, and the role of trade unions in Korea. Specific discussion of training courses given in trade union organizing. Discussion of major issue for female bank workers, including the marriage memorandum, equal pay and language. Noted plans for a credit union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>2 p.m.</td>
<td>Lee, Han Soon-Director of Women's Affairs; Chaung, Sang Mi-formerly worked at the American-Asian Free Labor Institute</td>
<td>Choheung Bank Bank &amp; Financial Workers Union</td>
<td>Review of research projects, both comparative and on Korea, done by associated faculty. Discussion about role of institutions in Korean education and his research on China. Dr. Koo's view of the issues concerning women in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Soon, In Shil-Board Chair; Park, Soon Yang-Secy. General; Suh, Chai Won-Program Dir.</td>
<td>Y.M.C.A.</td>
<td>Y.W.C.A. is running training programs for women for non-traditional occupations such as painting, tile laying, wallpapering as well as traditional programs for domestics and cooks. A new organization which supports members in business and is studying women in commercial activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Lee, Young Sook-President</td>
<td>Korean Bus. Women's Assoc.</td>
<td>Review of seven community development projects with emphasis on those affecting women and their economic activity. Discussion on educational policy of the university; review of projects and findings of the Women Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Moon, Chi Wook-Asst. Director; Choi, Eunja-Social Development Consultant</td>
<td>Community Development Foundation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 p.m.</td>
<td>Cha, Nakhoon-President; Yee, Chung-Won-Dean, Liberal Arts; Park, Yong Heh-Director, Research Center for Asian Women-and colleagues</td>
<td>Sookmyung Univ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>9.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Lee, Tai Young-Director</td>
<td>Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations</td>
<td>Review of legal disabilities of women under current law, and efforts to change.</td>
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<td>12 noon</td>
<td>Suh, David Kwangsun-Dean, Liberal Arts</td>
<td>Ewha Woman's Univ.</td>
<td>Discussion of the importance of practical research by university professors on such topics as appropriate technology or household energy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Interviewee's Name/Status</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Contents of Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>11 a.m.</td>
<td>Kim, Soo Kon-Director</td>
<td>K.D.I.</td>
<td>Female labor force participation in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>7 a.m.</td>
<td>Jones, Leroy-Professor</td>
<td>Boston Univ.</td>
<td>Sources of statistical data in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 a.m.</td>
<td>Kim, Yung Chung-Director, Korean Women's Inst.; Professor, Dept. of Sociology-and colleagues</td>
<td>Ewha Univ.</td>
<td>(a) Review of women's studies at Ewha</td>
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<td>(b) Discussion of outreach programs, especially Leadership Training Programs</td>
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<td>(c) Listing of major research being done and of issues for women this research addresses</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Choong Nam Spinning Co. with Mario Bognanno &amp; Choi of K.D.I. Taejon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of labor conditions and labor composition in this spinning, weaving and dyeing factory. Tour of the plant with Mr. Ahn &amp; Mr. Kwon.</td>
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<td>Discussion of the labor conditions, fringe benefits, and labor characteristics in this T.V. factory. Chief of public relations, Dae Jin Kang, was our host.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Gold Star Co., Ltd., Gumi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tour of factory and a female dormitory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>8 a.m.</td>
<td>Synn, Ilhi-President</td>
<td>Kaemyung Univ.</td>
<td>Review of major programs at the university with emphasis on innovative programs. Tour of campus, speaking with several professors working in population and in community outreach. Kaemyung conducts courses in the industrial town of Gumi for workers.</td>
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<td>Taegu</td>
<td>Slide-tape presentation of setting up the Zone and of its foreign clientele followed by discussion of labor force characteristics and problems among the foreign firms in the Free Trade Zone.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Masan Free Export Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Cheong, Ji Woong-Assoc. Prof., Community Development &amp; Nonformal Education</td>
<td>Seoul Nat’l Univ. Suwon</td>
<td>Discussion on specific needs for non-formal education in rural and urban Korea and review of present and planned programs, including the Saemaul Undong.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kim, Chija-Sr. Researcher, Social Development &amp; Nonformal Education Specialist</td>
<td>K.I.F.P.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Ragde, Ramchandra-Acing Resident Representative</td>
<td>U.N.D.P.</td>
<td>Discussion U.N.D.P. development programs in rural areas and the impact of agricultural policy on the programs.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location/Institution</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<td>3 July</td>
<td>9 a.m.</td>
<td>Pre-Congress Conference of the IVth World Conference of the World Council of Comparative Education Societies</td>
<td>Ewha Woman's Univ. Community Center</td>
<td>Review of programs for neighborhood outreach for women and for pre-primary school children.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 p.m.</td>
<td>Chung, Cha Whan- Assoc. Prof.</td>
<td>Sungshim Univ.</td>
<td>Discussed her anthropological research on women and the family in a Korean village.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 p.m.</td>
<td>Ben Krementah-Director, Korea office</td>
<td>Asia Foundation</td>
<td>Discussed several research projects concerning women which Asia Foundation has funded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>3.20 p.m.</td>
<td>Park, Choonghoon-Acting Prime Minister; Lee, S.K.-Administration Coordinator to the Prime Minister</td>
<td>S.N.U.</td>
<td>Briefing on my consultancy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Han Sang Bok-Professor of Anthropology</td>
<td>S.N.U.</td>
<td>Discussed rapid social change in his study area: mountain and coastal villages and two islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Lee, In Ho-Professor of Russian Studies</td>
<td>S.N.U.</td>
<td>Discussed her research on Korean women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>All day</td>
<td>Visited the village of Sangbuk where the CBIRD project of the Community Development Foundation has been operating for 8 years. Visit to resettlement area on the edge of Seoul where CBIRD has operated since 1974.</td>
<td>Ewha Woman's Univ. Community Center</td>
<td>On program of my study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Park, Yonkwang; Ha, Dongnam; Ahn, Hee Won</td>
<td>Economic Planning Bureau</td>
<td>Discussed Saemaul Undong and its impact on women; reviewed research on women in Korea.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Lee, Man Gap- Professor of Sociology</td>
<td>S.N.U.</td>
<td>Discussed programs for youth and for working women.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Oh, Sun Yoo- Executive Director</td>
<td>Korean League of Women Voters</td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Name and Title</td>
<td>Position or Institution</td>
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<td>7 p.m.</td>
<td>Kim, Haengja-Professor of Political Science, on leave from Ewha Univ.</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Education, Communication</td>
<td>Discussions of women's education and training.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>2 p.m. Kim, Jae Ik-Director General, Bureau of Planning, Economic Planning Bureau</td>
<td>Chairman, Subcommittee on Economics</td>
<td>Comments by Kim, Jae Ik of his major concerns relating to women in Korean economy.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3 p.m. Kang, Kyung Shik-Minister for Planning, Economic Planning Bureau</td>
<td>Asian-American Free Labor Institute</td>
<td>Discussion of my preliminary findings.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.30 p.m. George T. Curtin-Program Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of recent labor studies done by A.A.F.L.I.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>10 a.m. Rev. Cho, Sung Hyok</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of special concerns of women in factories as seen through researches by the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12.15 p.m. William Pauphe</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.A.I.D.'s programs relating to Korean women.</td>
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