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The central political and social issues facing Koreans in Japan today are strongly influenced by the deeply subjective feelings developed between Japanese and Koreans long before the defeat of Japan in 1945. The political and legal difficulties resulting from the subsequent reestablishment of an independent Korean state in my judgment cannot be settled without some necessary modernization of the concept of citizenship as distinct from that of ethnic identity. Both Japanese and Koreans have great difficulty at arriving at such a distinction due to certain cultural-historical continuities evident in both countries. These continuities must be examined psychologically as well as sociologically for a fuller understanding of the social forces at work.

Similar problems related to citizenship do not arise at present in the United States. Indeed, as a result of the heavy influx of new immigrants we now have more Korean-American residents than there are Koreans in Japan. However, as is well known, the legal and social situation as well as the class background of the new Korean immigrants has been completely different from that obtaining during the Korean migration to Japan. The current situation in Japan is also due to the different social and legal structures generally placed on ethnic minorities in the two countries.

In our volume (Lee and De Vos 1984) we discussed at some length the historical circumstances leading to the continuing social degradation yet being suffered by Koreans who migrated, or were constrained to migrate to Japan during the period of colonial occupation of Korea. The completely voluntary

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in-migration into the United States is developing into a very different pattern of Korean ethnic continuity, relatively free of the social, legal and political issues yet to be resolved in Japan.

The present situation of Koreans in Japan bears some resemblance to the problems faced by noncitizen migrant laborers in contemporary Europe. Socially, to put it bluntly, Koreans in Japan continue to be treated in racist terms, as are certain, but not other, segments of European migrant labor. In France, for example, Arab and Senegalese workers are the focus of attitudes more racially discriminatory than those expressed toward Spanish and Portuguese workers. Under given circumstances, Turks in Germany; Moroccans, Turks, Sicilians in Belgium, can become citizens, but at the same time are not readily accorded social acceptance. One of the problems we shall shortly address in examining the situation of Koreans in Japan is this issue of social acceptance. Whether in the United States, Europe or Japan it is an issue not readily resolved simply by legal means. Legal acceptance is however a necessary step on the road to social acceptance.

As I shall presently discuss, one must also note that the maintenance of a separate ethnic identity on the part of particular ethnic minorities is not simply a reaction to social discrimination, but results from other emotional needs of a positive nature. Nor is the maintenance of a separate ethnic identity preventing further social assimilation simply due to some form of material or political advantage to be achieved by an ethnic movement as is recently suggested by some social scientists (eg. Glazer and Moynihan 1974). It is also incumbent upon social scientists to use a psychocultural analysis to reexamine and analyze in detail what Daniel Bell (in Glazer and Moynihan 1974) has simply summarized as "primordial feelings." The ingredients of so called "primordial feelings", or emotional attitudes that can be found in the Korean residents of Japan, cannot be left unanalyzed simply because a sociological framework by itself is not equipped to deal with psychological forms of analysis.

Be it a question of ethnic minority status in Japan, France, Germany or the
United States, in our terminology, we must understand how ethnicity is a complex combination of both "expressive" and "instrumental" motivations that operate within any conflict-ridden, changing social structure.

Let us therefore in this paper attempt to examine another dynamic dimension to what has already been essayed about the processes of economic and social exploitation of minorities operative in Japan as elsewhere. Utilizing a dual psychocultural framework of analysis I shall present some inferences from our research findings about some intrapersonal and interpersonal psychological processes operative in a Japanese as well as a Korean ethnic identity that are having continual consequences for interethnic relations in contemporary Japan.

Some historical notes

Intellectuals among the colonized Koreans in 1919 were moved by the possibilities of national self-determination. Aware of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire into independent countries based on ethnicity, Koreans were aware too of the effects of the Russian Revolution and the independence of the Balkan states freed from Imperial Russian domination. But the Wilsonian efforts, successful in parts of Europe, were not to be extended to Asia. Rather, there was the brutal suppression of the Korean uprising of 1919 by the Imperial Japanese who were bent upon "Japanization" of Koreans, both in Japan itself and Korea. The message of international Communism was quickly espoused by many Koreans as well as by some Japanese intellectuals. A general nationalist Japanese fear of such a spread, as we have documented (Lee and De Vos 1981), found fanatical and hysterical expression in the massacre of Koreans in Japan following the Kanto earthquake in 1923.

The colonial period is over. The international political climate is now such that there is no acceptable political ideology under which any modern state today can suppress its minorities without drawing upon itself some form of international sanctions. This pressure is operative in Japan as elsewhere. Members of the court and legislators are aware of the questioning attitudes of other Asian
governments about Japanese conduct toward aliens. Such observation from the outside is observable as influencing ameliorative trends in Japanese law. Internally as well, the diet and the courts have become responsive to active groups using confrontation techniques (see De Vos 1984).

In American cities, a style of ethnic voting has found new political power. No such possibility yet exists in Japan; the Koreans are relatively too small a force, and their general lack of accorded citizenship is a severe handicap. Although Koreans recognize that some form of solidarity is necessary, they remain presently split by irreconcilable political differences. The Japanese labor movement, in its emphasis on class conflict, tends to ignore the fact that the Koreans comprise interest groups with more than class-specific considerations at stake.

Koreans in Japan: Some Psychocultural Considerations

Much observable human behavior is rational in the sense that individuals seek personal advantage, either individually or collectively as members of a group. Such “instrumental” motives are well understood and are usually fully considered as part of economic or sociological theory. What is less well considered is how or why an individual’s motives remain unconscious and irrational or are guided by deeply felt emotions. Presently observed group and individual behavior, therefore, remains “expressive” of past social vicissitudes, as well as present social problems as I shall presently illustrate in an analysis of why and how a separate Korean minority status is strongly maintained in Japanese society.

The recent past history of relations between Korea and Japan have been difficult due to the political and social ascendancy practiced toward Korea by a more rapidly modernizing Japanese state. In 1910 the Japanese formally annexed Korea and in making it a part of the Japanese Empire gradually sought to repress and finally exterminate not only Korean culture but a Korean social identity. Not only in those Koreans brought to the Japanese mainland as cheap
labor, but throughout the Korean homeland itself the Japanese systematically fostered their own language and the Shinto religion.

It is not my purpose to examine this period of history, rather what I shall turn to is why and how a Korean ethnic identity persists among the ethnic Koreans remaining in postcolonial Japan. This is a group which persists in most instances with no remaining cultural traits, with perhaps the exception of food habits. In examining this group I shall reiterate the more general contentions forwarded in our volume, “Ethnic Identity” (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1982e).

Basically, whether in Japan or in the United States with its history of an incorporation of immigrants from most regions of the earth, issues of continuing ethnicity depend upon attitudes of acceptance or debasement expressed by members of the host society as well as what I consider “sacred”, if not religious, motives for ethnic persistence related to subjective needs for group continuity that persist or are even enhanced as a response to social derogation.

Why is it not sufficient in the Korean instance to consider the basic processes still at work maintaining ethnic continuity to be simply the aftermath of a recent history of colonialism and class exploitation? We have well documented the history of Korean exploitation, especially in Chapter 2 of our volume, “Koreans in Japan (Lee and De Vos 1981). Koreans provided cheap labor for Japanese capitalists who, emulating Western colonial powers, annexed Korea and, as part of the resources thus acquired, reduced the illiterate masses of Koreans to economic thralldom.

This Marxist form of analysis leaves out much that may be unique in the given historical circumstance. For example, basic differences exist in how exploitation can be structured in Japanese culture that psychologically supported caste-like segregation as compared with cultures organized by class segregation. A class society exploiting its own depressed occupational segments does not operate in quite the same manner as a colonial society or a racially segmented society.
In caste situations especially, other psychological processes besides simple instrumental exploitation are at work. These create a true difference in the historical aftermath. Stratification in a caste society endures even after the economic advantages of exploiting a particular group have come to be outweighed by the manifest disadvantages, economic and social, of maintaining a segregated society.

It is therefore important to understand that the present social degradation of Koreans is not simply a result of "class exploitation", despite all the features of economic exploitation one can readily document. It is equally important to consider the plight of Koreans in Japan historically as a reaction to racist-caste thinking of a type peculiar culturally to the Japanese as they interrelate with individuals socialized in a "Korean" psychocultural milieu.

Koreans in Japan have responded to their present conditions by an ethnic consolidation not dissimilar in some modes of social adaptation to those that have been occurring in the black American population. In each instance, group members have come to recognize that their submerged, exploited condition occurs within a racist society. Many Koreans are ambivalent about simply espousing a Marxist explanation for their own plight, although marxist militancy has indeed been a most active force through which a good number of both Koreans and members of a former pariah caste, the so called Burakumin (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966m) have sought redress from social injustice in Japan. A Marxist explanation does not explain fully the Japanese inability to socially accept neither the Korean people nor their own ex-untouchable Burakumin, despite the historically different circumstances creating these two groups.

The racism that has affected northwestern European states has much in common with the situation in Japan, despite independent cultural-historical origins. True class attitudes in Europe and Japan, however, are different in intensity and structure. The Japanese are not alienated by class differences in a manner true for Europeans (De Vos 1975j).

Much more can be said on this plane of discourse—but this is not my purpose.
Japanese Citizenship and Korean Ethnic Identity

I have had another theoretical task in mind: namely, a more psychocultural examination of the development and continuity of a conflictful ethnic identity of Koreans in Japan. Why and how does such an ethnic identity develop? How do the social attitudes of the majority and the ethnic minority toward one another interact to create and maintain social conflict? What forms of psychological and social accommodation can and do occur? In Japan, what prevents the ready accordance of citizenship to those who are not ethnically Japanese, be they Korean or European? In complex modern states, even Japan, is it not likely that a process of cultural if not social assimilation is inevitable?

The Japanese treatment of Koreans is an extreme instance of an unwillingness to grant citizenship even after several generations of residence. Of the large modern industrial states, Japan comes closest to maintaining a pretense that it represents a single ethnic constituency. Yet one may point that this is a misconception if one considers that at least four percent of the inhabitants of Japan hold some form of minority status (De Vos and Wetherall 1975m). Over 2 million former outcasts are technically accorded citizenship, but are still considered socially “different.” Their situation is at least not legally ambiguous. Koreans, aliens or naturalized, are the largest group who self-consciously consider themselves not to be Japanese in origin. Can someone maintain their separate ethnic integrity and yet become a Japanese citizen? That is the question.

In examining the current social and personal problems of Koreans in Japan, it is obvious that the larger issue includes the basic problem of what it means to be “Japanese” as well as what it means to be “Korean.” Korean and Japanese cultures are related by more than a languages of common origin and by geographic proximity. What first came to be the “Japanese” population, whether nobles or commoners, was a blended population drawn from the Korean peninsula as well as from agricultural communities already located within the Japanese islands. Despite recent archaeological and linguistic findings, many modern Japanese still cling to a firm conviction of biological genetic uniqueness. Until the end of World War II, their sense of origin was embedded in an official
mythology that affirmed an autochthonous origin, teaching that the Japanese race was descended from indigenous gods.

The problem of Korean minority status in Japan is still rooted in a deep-seated social conviction that the “Japanese” are and should remain ethnically homogeneous. The Japanese still pride themselves on their uniqueness and resist the idea of assimilating or accommodating any ethnic minority fully within their concept of citizenship that remains almost identical with a concept of racial purity. For this same reason bigoted Japanese continue to insist the former outcaste Burakumin are of alien origin.

Admittedly, none of the large pluralistic states of the world have achieved even their present level of ethnic accommodation without accompanying social tensions. But the Japanese have as yet not overcome the implicit pattern of secondary nationality accorded to Koreans dating from before World War II, when Imperial Japan sought to absorb the Korean peninsula and, with some ambivalence, to assimilate its inhabitants. Koreans in Japan are still under constraint to use Japanese names and to deny their origins to obtain even marginal acceptability as “Japanese” citizens. In effect, many Japanese would not mind that Koreans “pass” and assimilate by becoming totally invisible.

But this form of assimilation is impossible. It overlooks the continuing pull exerted by an inner sense of Korean integrity as well as by Korean counterreactions to discriminatory attitudes. Indeed, this same persistence of a historical sense of social identity is found among the former outcasts who proudly insist on not “passing” as ordinary Japanese. Instead they openly assert their membership in a historically despised group.

Koreans today, both at home and in Japan, to attain internal harmony often have recourse to labeling the Japanese collectively as the enemy. It is easier to deflect hatred onto all Japanese rather than to distinguish those who are indeed prejudiced from those who are accepting and potentially helpful. Hence Koreans sometimes behave with anger and hostility toward all Japanese, irrespective of their personal guilt or innocence. This reciprocal stereotypic
attitude of hatred contributes to acts of animosity on both sides.

Most Korean groups exercise particularly heavy sanctions against group members who take Japanese citizenship. Since the Japanese also reject them, naturalized citizens of Korean origin have set up their own group, the Seiwa Society, a name that can be roughly translated as "the realization of harmony." Naturalization is a form of avoiding 'passing' by openly acknowledging one's Korean background and at the same time asserting one's Japanese citizenship. Finding themselves in a fairly precarious position and generally isolated, naturalized Korean-Japanese hope to make their position more acceptable or tolerated by others. Will it become possible? Let now examine some of the features of Korean ethnic identity that make accommodation difficult.

The Maintenance of a Korean Identity

The Korean minority in Japan examined psychoculturally are presented with a numbers of dilemmas in resolving who they are, and to whom they owe their loyalty. The first of these is whether or not to "pass". How this decision is made illustrates my major contention: it is made today not on the basis of instrumental expediency, but on the basis of expressive feelings of belonging as well as on problems of social non acceptance.

Dilemmas of Achievement Motivation in Minority Koreans

Instrumentally based definitions of social, occupational, economic and political success or achievement are found in every society. In any pluralistic urban society that still emphasizes the ascendancy of one ethnic group over another, the achievement of social success may well induce one to disguise one's minority status origins. In our volume (Chapter 12, Lee and De Vos 1981m) we note several examples of why and how some Koreans have changed behavior and disguised their background to obtain success, especially in the less carefully monitored world of entertainment. The term "passing" first used by light
skinned American black is a universal phenomenon found in any hierarchical setting in which background may disadvantage the individual. This is practiced in any social setting in which some form of escape from community surveillance is possible. The complex urban environment makes some form of passing possible in modern societies. The problem however is more difficult in a caste setting such as Japan in which intermarriage is vigilantly interdicted socially if not legally.

To be known as of Korean background today is to court failure through ostracism. Intermarriage is extremely rare with other than Burakumin outcastes. Even an entertainer of Korean background remains an anomaly. Some Koreans naturally find it expedient to attempt to maintain a disguised background, but here expressive needs become counterpoised; they cannot maintain affective ties with family or friends from the Korean community. Among those Koreans who choose not to pass there is continual ambivalence if not hostility toward those who attempt it. There is sometimes some insistence that passing Koreans maintain covert contacts or signs of allegiance.

Frustration of a need for achievement for a minority person within contemporary Japanese society has had five predictable results. First, there is political dissidence, some of it legal and non violent, some of its illegal and even violent.

In our volume (Lee and De Vos 1981) we discuss briefly the history of various forms of social protest, including violent political radicalism, past and present. Koreans have been motivated to take a wide variety of means to redress their social plight. It must be noted in this context, however, that religious sects still vie with political groups as a basis for ultimate ideological commitment. From the Japanese perspective Koreans have been and continue to be feared as a source of political and social unrest.

Looked at psychologically as well as socially, the social protest of Koreans in Japan displays a broad spectrum of adjustment patterns ranging from infantile destructiveness rationalized as social purpose, to mature espousal of a political cause deriving from a sense of common humanity and compassion.
Second, there are various forms of innovative social or business behavior some of it leading to individualistically achieved professional and even business success of a high order, even without the assistance of others, in the heavily group oriented Japanese society.

Third, there is goal oriented criminal activity. The Japanese criminal underworld contains many relatively successful Koreans, but even here, there is a great deal of disguise and passing practiced. According to some well informed police close to seventy percent of the Japanese organized underworld is comprised of individuals of outcaste or Korean origin.

Fourth, many Koreans, especially the youth manifest unresolved difficulties in applying themselves to future plans. Goals become immediate rather than long term. They give up interest in the future from an early age. In some yet unpublished results Sakai (n.d.) notes how youthful Koreans refuse to create fantasy stories involving future consequences. These results are in direct contrast to other findings using the same test of fantasy with immigrant Koreans in the United States (De Vos 1983) who are optimistic about the future and sustain themselves through present frustrations. There is evidence that the rate of delinquency among Korean youth has been seven times that found among ordinary Japanese (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966).

In our empirical work in the field of delinquency in Japan (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1969d; De Vos 1980m; Wagatsuma and De Vos 1984j) not only did we document the uncommonly high rate of delinquency among Korean youth, but the background of discontented and broken families resulting from the atmosphere of social degradation experienced by Koreans living in marginal slums. The indirect as well as direct effects of social disparagement have consequences for family life. Delinquent behavior is not simply instrumental but comes to reflect damaged parental authority due to alcoholism. There is much evidence of personal self disparagement and lack of confidence in one’s abilities. There is a sense of emotional as well as economic deprivation. What is evident is that the Korean family in Japan has been vulnerable to several
generations of social disparagement.

Fifth, one notes cases of social and psychological withdrawal. The choice among these modes of reaction are not dissimilar to those practiced by American blacks in the United States. Early on they give up hope and enter lives of quiet despair. Alcoholism is one avenue through which such despair is manifest.

Some Koreans in Japan find it difficult to use their group identity as a means of countering moments of individual doubt about ability. Frequently the minority individual cannot depend on a sense of confidence drawn from past experience. Unfortunately he comes instead to share the prejudice directed at his group in a form of self hate.

Questions of Personal Responsibility and the Acceptance of Official Authority

Part of being socialized into a responsible membership in any society is the internalizing of a moral code. In addition to proscriptions of behavior, a moral code is put in terms of assuming obligations for repayment to parents, responsibility to the group, and loyalty to the nation. Some of the Korean minority remain ambivalent about being governed in good conscience by standards and proscriptions to which they, as "innately inferior" to Japanese, are not assumed to be capable of adhering.

Animosity and resentment over discrimination in one sense frees the individual from assuming the internalized standards of the majority. One dilemma of identity for a Korean has to do with whether he feels he should attempt to meet the social obligations assumed by ordinary Japanese. For some Koreans, maintaining a Korean identity can even suggest maintaining an antagonistic posture that condones illegal or deviant marginal activity. For them to become "Japanese" is to assume a degraded role and to accept as valid the deprecatory attitudes direct toward Koreans. Such an individual is caught in a dilemma of integrity. He is caught by possible conscious or unconscious prejudices internalized as part of living marginal to the larger, hostile society. One resolution of such
a conflict is to resist passing, because to pass implies acceptance of Japanese judgments about his own people and their past.

To be a Korean in Japan is to come in conflict with the well-defined system of social hierarchy operative in Japanese society. One is placed “outside” and is subordinated without any compensatory reward. Koreans are not brought in to “belong”. They are not treated in a positive sense with the paternalistic care that subordinates Japanese, to whom a sustaining hope is one of the payments of allegiance. Since the emotional gratification that makes power or control relationships tolerable is not forthcoming, Koreans can only resent subordination. Exercise of dominance and submission between Japanese and Koreans remains strictly instrumental, with none of the emotional lubrication that reduces friction. It is harder for the Koreans to tolerate subordinate status and to view the Japanese as exercising his authority legitimately with constraint and concern for the subordinate. He feels much more put upon. Koreans tend to be very sensitive to the negative aspects of social control in their interpersonal relationships. They are not apt to create illusions of gratitude for benevolence received. Government or personal authority is perceived as exercised for the benefit of those in power rather than for benevolent purposes.

However, Koreans remain Confucianists within their own families. They expect the exercise of paternal authority. They avow male dominance in the family as part of the value of family life. Compared with Japanese, however, authority is more apt to be reinforced by physical punishment. Also, by and large we note that Korean women in Japan are less long-suffering and constrained by submissive role-behavior than are Japanese women. Although seen ideally as dutiful and responsible, they are also perceived as capable of aggressive even violent, remonstration. Korean women allocated to lower social status are less concerned with maintaining status through the seemingly submissive role-behavior expected of high-status Japanese women.

Koreans, finding themselves in a subordinate status, do not typically use long-range, devious, submissive tactics. They are more apt to lose patience,
letting superiors know directly their true feelings or attitudes. This sometimes contributes to a confrontational atmosphere that disconcerts Japanese. To summarize, Koreans are more apt to seek autonomy than to express loyalty. They are more apt to be perceived by Japanese as aggressive if not insubordinate.

We did not find the same fierce sense of loyalty and the same intensive superior-subordinate relationship developed in Koreans as in Japanese. Koreans are not likely to subordinate themselves to group causes with the same degree of long-range altruism we sometimes find in the Japanese. Although Koreans can work together to mutual purpose, in many respects they seem much more individualistic than the Japanese and they define their goals in individual rather than collective terms.

There is considerable evidence that the modern occupational structures developed in Japanese industry are of relatively recent date, and that the concept of lifelong attachment to particular companies, either by workers or management, has been strengthened since the earlier period of industrialization at the turn of the century. Whatever the merits of the argument against direct structural continuity with the premodern past, the point is that Japanese society still had latent within it a potentially strong pattern of group loyalty that could be revised and developed by Japanese industry. It is questionable whether the psychological characteristics of people comfortable in the kind of life-career pattern are to be found with equal frequency or intensity among Koreans. Whatever the actuality, the Japanese for their part do not perceive Koreans as potentially loyal subordinates who will dedicate themselves to company enterprises. This perception may be in part a matter of prejudice, but it may also be based on the Korean’s sense of individualism, which prevents him from making emotional commitments of the type implicitly expected by Japanese.

Japanese are age-graded within organizations to avoid competition. There is a similar sense of age-grading in Koreans; informally at least, it is also apparent in interpersonal relationships. Koreans, however, are less obviously concerned with meticulous attention to deference behavior in their relationships both
outside and inside the group. They are more easily relaxed in groups of mixed status. Minority Koreans have a greater sense of unpredictability about the possible behavior of others. Japanese are apt to be working within institutional and personal networks so binding that the individual’s behavior is highly predictable. In this sense, Japanese can afford to trust each other in their group operations, whereas Koreans are not as bound and hence, not as predictable.

In contrast, there are many instances of Koreans coming together under crisis situations of political protest. But we note that these situations are not so much examples of instrumental cooperation as they are emotional expressions of an aroused sense of identity. It is when this sense of belonging is actualized that Koreans respond by concerted action. Japanese, as part of their collective identity, can apply a steady, cooperative intensity toward the long-range maintenance of economic and political relationships and thereby are very often successful in the accomplishment of mutual ends.

In summary, Koreans in Japan expect to reach their own occupational goals without the assistance of a group. For them, group goals are not a substitute for individual accomplishment. They therefore tend to be more individualistically competitive than cooperative. Nevertheless, there is among them vehement support for Korean accomplishments and pride in those of their membership who attain some prominence, especially when they do so in competition with Japanese. There is, for example, a highly developed sense of Korean competitiveness in sports.

Politically, much can be said about the factionalization within the Korean ethnic group in Japan. Not only is there distrust of other factions but there is distrust by members of a group of the aims and advantages taken by their leaders. Many Koreans are suspicious that their leadership functions for selfish benefit. What is the ordinary individual to do in these circumstances? An individual may feel that as a Korean he should assume responsibility within some available organization, but he may not find his convictions to be well represented. There are many reasons why it is easier for Koreans in Japan to unite in expressive
ad hoc protests than to pursue sustained, affirmative programs of action.

**Affiliation vs. Isolation**

A sense of belonging can be expressed through one’s identity with a group. It is a means of finding one’s harmonious place in an entity large than oneself. The need for affiliation, however, can also be directed more toward the satisfaction to be gained from intimacy and close contact between specific individuals, either in bonds of friendship or in heterosexual attachments.

Being alone, isolated or alienated, is intolerable for most human beings. Total social isolation without face-to-face contacts and communication afforded by some form of group membership or intimate personal contact is a difficult state to maintain. Marginality and apartness are sources of inner agony and tension. General ethnic group membership may supply the forms of contact and affiliation necessary for day-to-day living. But some individuals may feel such a strong need for personal autonomy and independence that they find themselves capable of doing without sustained social contact. They search out their own goals and are willing to become distant and uncommitted to others. For Koreans in Japan, resolving the need for affiliation is related to whether or not an individual chooses to pass, leaving his own family and childhood friendships behind in seeking an individual route to social mobility in Japanese society.

Individuals who seek to leave a group are subject to various forms of sanctioning. The principal threat, of course, is that of ostracism and rejection. A group that in turn feels rejected by a former member can become even physically destructive toward a perceived deserter or traitor. For some, the threat of isolation or of aggressive rejection can be a very heavy sanction that keeps them within the group.

A sense of intimacy is first fostered within the primary family. I have noted elsewhere (De Vos 1973j) that the Japanese family may provide a deep sense of psychological security without supplying intimate companionship to any of its members. Regardless of the priority given to direct companionate types of
intimacy and contact, the majority Japanese family continues to afford other forms of warmth and a sense of belonging for the individual. With Koreans in Japan, however, the psychological material collected thus far emphasizes a very strong sense of alienation in many youth in contrast with the more positive family concerns found in Japanese records. One may infer that many Korean family in Japan have suffered breakdown due to the unemployment and degradation of family heads. In many instances mothers have been forced to become the economic support of the family. This has undermined the dignity of the male family role. The mother does not devote as much time at home. As a consequence children experience less expressive gratification, not only in intimacy but in harmony, self-respect, and nurturance. Children become alienated rather than inspired. Many seem to do relatively poorly in school for similar reasons found to operate in some American minorities, such as among blacks or Mexican-Americans (De Vos 1980m). Individuals do not identify or internalize standards and expectations set for them by members of the external majority. Instead at times a deviant peer group becomes the principal source of affiliative gratification, discouraging acquiescence and conformity to the school as an institution. Such a peer group also can become the arena for demonstration of prowess and competence, the source of appreciative judgment from other youth.

We must also note impressionistically that Korean-Japanese youth in many instances are stronger in their disregard of family or adult authority simply because there is less gratification to be gained from interdependent family relationships. Affiliation is sought from peer group relationships that are frequently delinquency oriented and antagonistic toward social authorities, including teachers and others functioning in Japanese administrative agencies. These attitudes of protective association and antagonism toward the outside are sometimes perpetuated into adulthood.

Korean-Japanese seem to seek out individual affiliations in marriage. Although their Confucian tradition emphasizes family role patterns rather than intimate companionship, they seem today less prone to concern themselves with family
considerations. One notes that among younger Koreans, just as among younger Japanese, there is a greater desire for closeness and intimacy in the marital bond. Indeed, romantic love today in some few instances transcends the social barriers set up between Koreans and Japanese. In some, but not all instances, such marriages can compound problems of identity on the part of the Korean partner. He or she is faced with the necessity to affirm or deny Korean affiliation outside of marriage and at the same time to maintain solidarity with his or her mate. There are numerous instances of difficulties arising in mixed marriages owing to external pressures of family or internal problems of divided loyalty. In turn, mixed marriages produce children who have their own identity problems, who must decide on their principal allegiances and the principal groups from which they will seek out companions.

*Appreciation vs. Disparagement*

Ultimately, perhaps, the issue of social acceptance and dignity is the principal concern of any ethnic minority. The Japanese, themselves sensitive to appreciation or depreciation from outsiders, generally have been deprecatory and derogatory toward Koreans. They cannot accept different Korean customs; they cannot even accept Korean eating habits. The poverty to which Koreans have been historically subjected is used to classify them as inherently uncouth and uncivilized. In this respect, direct parallels to racial discrimination directed toward Mexican and black Americans in the United States are very apparent. The Japanese cannot accept some aspects of the freer interpersonal expressions, both positive and aggressive, that Koreans manifest. Freer, less restrained behavior goes against the greater degree of self-constraint exercised by the Japanese. Rigid forms of self-constraint have been particularly apparent in Japanese society from the time of the annexation of Korea through the prewar militaristic period, and it has been maintained by many into the postwar era.

It is difficult for any majority group to accord equal value to the behavioral
patterns of others who may stimulate tension in themselves. Only a very open, self-possessed individual who arrives at his own behavior out of choice rather than out of severely internalized constraints can accord acceptance to others behaving differently from himself. The Japanese have great difficulty in feeling comfortable in cultural settings other than their own. This discomfort is not limited to their contacts with Koreans but includes contacts with other peoples throughout eastern and southeastern Asia. The Japanese have been quick to disparage and derogate what is different from their own expectations. Their sense of uniqueness, their susceptibility to criticism, and their need for approval are the opposite sides of a readiness to disparage and disapprove of others.

In short, Koreans have been vulnerable to scapegoating because their behavior is thought to be not thoroughly "Japanese". Their anomalous status within Japanese society continues. The deviant behavior of some is used by many Japanese as supportive evidence to maintain a massive deprecatory attitude toward all. One need not belabor the point that Koreans are deprecated not because they eat garlic or have a higher delinquency and crime rate but because they are vulnerable objects for psychological projection and displacement.

This brings up the crucial problem that some members of a disparaged ethnic minority may be subject to self-hatred and self-disparagement. I have written at length on this topic in my discussion of self-hatred among the Japanese Burakumin (1966). No theoretical statements can better express these processes at work than the actual writings and comments we gathered from those who must deal with their own damaged self-esteem.

A particular point at issue is the fact that Japanese expect Koreans should give up their family names in order to gain better social acceptance. This expectation implies being of Korean ancestry has less value than being of a Japanese family lineage. To change one's name is to some degree to accept this implication. There is at present no consensus among Korean parents in Japan whether a child should use its Korean name in public.

Historical perspective demands some way of developing a sense of ethnicity
that takes pride in more than one heritage. Intermarriage occurs in any multi-ethnic state, raising questions of identity for the children of parents of different ethnic backgrounds. In a racist society certain ethnic groups are considered inferior. Inter-marriages between the dominant and the inferior groups are deemed contaminatory, and the children of such liaisons are identified with their less acceptable minority heritage. In situations of conflict, children faced with the need to choose between parental heritages will sometimes opt for the minority identity, seeking to protect the heritage of the demeaned parent out of a sense of honor and personal integrity. But in situations imputing nothing pejorative to either ancestry, a child will happily identify with a more complex heritage. When the school teaches the cultural history and language of both, the child acknowledge both of his ancestral backgrounds without conflict over the expediency of being one or the other.

If a tenable educational policy is to be expressed within a national state, it must acknowledge that its citizenry should share in the majority culture to the point of adapting through formal education the language skills necessary to operate successfully. Conversely, no multi-ethnic state can afford to emphasize one cultural heritage as superior to another. History needs to be retaught in a more complex way. It is to be hoped that such will be the further policy of education in the Japanese system. The Japanese cannot sustain the illusion of separate origin. Their cultural heritage is interwoven with that of Korea, past and present.

The present legally anomalous of Koreans in Japan makes any assuagement of social disparagement a difficult task. Prevalent pejorative attitudes make it incumbent upon Koreans to resist assimilation. Only when their past cultural background is accorded respect and they are given the right to be of Korean background can the Korean-Japanese accept the historical fact that they are destined to function as citizens of Japan in future generations.
Conclusion: Education, Legislation and Ethnic Maintenance

The Korean language schools in Japan are steadily declining (Rohlen 1981) despite the interest in ethnic education minzoku Kyoiku on the part of some Japanese as well as many ethnically Korean educators who want to realize a more open pluralism in Japanese society. Indeed, in Osaka a public school program of after school classes are conducted by some in Korean cultural traditions. A program of this sort stimulates some self-consciousness about being ethnically Korean, but, by and large, Korean children growing up in Japan, even those being sent to special North Korean schools, are becoming culturally, if not socially, Japanese (Rohlen 1981).

Specialists in Ethnic relations (e.g. Gordon 19--) recognize this difference between "cultural" and "social" assimilation of ethnic minorities. Cultural assimilation is unavoidable. When children grow up with daily exposure to mass media and to peer group patterns of communication they become "American" or "Japanese". This "acculturation" occurs whether or not the minority individual is accorded citizenship, whether or not his group is respected or despised.

However, social assimilation without a denial or a problematic sense about one's ethnic background can only take place when there is genuine respect accorded by the majority toward those of a different background. Issues of social respect are not as yet fully resolved in the United States in regard to certain racial minorities. They are certainly not yet resolved in Japan in regard either to Burakumin or to Koreans.

Can one institutionalize either ethnic separation or acceptance of both a cultural and social nature through the schools? The maintenance of a given social identity is not that easily manipulated directly in the formal classroom for two reasons.

First, the school, in teaching the minority child or the majority child, is attempting either to support or go counter to parental attitudes. Educational
efforts to overcome majority prejudice carried on within the schools can be vitiated by continuing prejudices learned at home. One must observe that the cohesively maintained home has a stronger positive or negative educative effect than the school. Among any minority, the degree to which the home remains cohesive and the degree to which the emotional rapport between parents and children is well maintained determines the degree to which an ethnic identity is maintained with a positive sense of self that cannot be easily shaken by outside discrimination (Wagatsuma and De Vos 1984, De Vos 1978).

Second, especially in the case of a minority child, should home influence be relatively lacking due to a lack of intrafamilial closeness it is the peer group rather than a formal school program that has the strongest influence on how an ethnic identity is maintained. Some form of peer group ethnic maintenance occurs regardless of the complete loss of language and other cultural content supposedly integral to that identity.

Thus, to the degree the peer group becomes the predominant reference group, (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966 pp 225ff.), a social identity is more produced through the nature of peer group interaction both in and out of school than through effects of programs instituted by officials.

Given these limitations of school influence on the social attitudes of students I would contend that it is the more important role of the school to see to the education of the majority in regard to ethnic diversity. There is a yet to be completed task of the de-mythologizing of Japanese youth about their own supposed racial uniqueness. Such goals are in some respects even more important an educational task than seeing to the special education to be afforded Korean youngsters. In effect it is not sufficient to help Korean youth know about their ethnic background, rather, the majority should also learn about the Korean present and past, and how it has at times been intertwined with that of the Japanese nation.

Taking into account the formative effects of peer group interaction one finds as essential dilemma faced by thoughtful Koreans considering present Japanese
educational policies. Should one encourage peer group interaction between Korean and Japanese youth or should children be sent to separated facilities. Will programs of extra class time for learning about Korean history and language help preserve the content of Korean culture in Japan?

If the past American experience of Japanese Americans teaches us anything it is that family patterns and food habits may persist, but language and other specific features of a separate culture cannot be maintained in an enveloping dynamic society. The immigrant Japanese made notable efforts to preserve their separate cultural heritage in the United States. Some children, the so-called “Kibei” were sent back to Japan. Special language and culture schools were set up. The Nisei children who were sent to these schools by and large, refused to learn Japanese. They identified themselves as “Americans” culturally, but continued to associate with one another socially as “Japanese Americans.” The peer group had decided. For most there remains some prideful identity with the Japanese past, but most live in the American present. The Japanese family survived despite prejudice and rejection by a racist majority. Happily this racism is diminishing in many of the younger generation of Americans generally. A multiethnic definition of American society has replaced the concept of the “melting pot.” More generally, recently instituted “bilingual” school programs for Hispanics and other entering groups are not producing the results hoped for by those advocating them. One must conclude that school programs are relatively ineffective in reaching some students in such a way that they respond more positively to their educational opportunities.

Irreconcilable instrumental and expressive difficulties are involved in whether or not one obtains a “Japanese” education. Although the Japanese schools have instituted instructional programs to gain social acceptance for Korean students within their public schools the problems inherent in defensively maintaining a minority identity cannot be so easily resolved by well intentional efforts on the part of some Japanese educators. For some Korean students emphasis on immediate, practical, instrumental adaptation may sacrifice pride, the validity
of being "Korean," and one's sense of self-worth. Conversely, a too rigid insistence that being "Korean" resides in objective criteria, such as language proficiency or dress, may be impractical for Koreans who plan to continue to live in Japan. Furthermore, it represents acceptance of the adversary view of those Japanese who equate Japanese ethnicity with Japanese citizenship.

This adversary position permits no latitude for maintaining self-esteem in being both a Japanese citizen and of Korean ethnic origin. In a modern, industrial state—whether it be France, the United States, or Japan—this equation of citizenship and ancestry is no longer tenable. No modern solution is possible in maintaining a narrow, defensive ethnicity through contrastive separation that diminishes or incapacitates the individual. The individual cannot adapt or adjust through systematic denial of another culture. The minority group cannot escape considerable damage from each prevention of cultural assimilation. A defensive minority identity, by its very nature, is maladaptive in a complex modern society. If Korean identity in Japan can be maintained only through attending a Korean language school, which handicaps the individual in the formal Japanese school system, then the individual becomes subject to continuous conflict, both external and internal. Conversely, if the Japanese school system derogates the assumption that it is legitimate and dignified to be Korean in ancestry, then the child perhaps has no alternative but to resist education at a cost to his sense of personal worth. The fact is that most children of Korea ancestry growing up in Japan will not speak Korean as their native tongue. They will speak Japanese. Nonetheless, there should be no need for them to renounce their heritage by denying their Korean name or by derogating their cultural tradition, a tradition in which, as citizens of Japan, they no longer participate directly.

Japan is not the United States, but they both have a dynamic nature that absorbs youth, sometimes in ways not appreciated by older generations. To me one fact is obvious; both Japanese and Koreans have to come to terms with the inevitable. Most Korean residents in Japan are going to remain. They
cannot remain as a marginal group without proper citizenship in a Japanese state that both legally and socially continues to confuse nationalism and ethnicity. To the degree that any modern state persists in this error there will persist unnecessary forms of personal and social alienation. An ethnic minority, without losing its identity can become a positive social asset rather than a source of continuing tension and conflict. The problems of the past are perhaps never fully resolved in any society, but to the degree we are cognisant of basic human rights we know minorities cannot live happily in a society that demands that citizenship precludes honoring ones progenitures by carrying their names proudly as part of ones continuing ethnic identity.

The Korean problem is part of a larger issue not yet faced by Japanese society. To become a leading industrial state with true international perspective, Japanese social structure must develop some mechanism for absorbing talented individuals from outside the traditionally mono-ethnic society. Every other modern culture reaching preeminence has found a means of assimilating foreign-born talent. The Japanese so far have found no means of crossing what is conceptually a racial as well as a cultural barrier to social assimilation. No other Asians, let alone those of European or African ancestry, can become really “Japanese”. Not only are Japanese incapable of assimilating those of obviously different physical strains but their racism is so strong that they cannot readily assimilate even those of outside origin who display no physiological differences.

Although most Koreans are physically indistinguishable from Japanese, they nevertheless continue to be considered racially distinct by Japanese. Whether they avow it openly, many Japanese consider Koreans biologically inferior to themselves. They do not consider that observable behavioral differences are due simply to differences in cultural heritage. Although intermarriage with Koreans is legally tolerated, most Japanese do not like to see it. Indeed, many express more ready acceptance of intermarriage with Caucasians if they are of suitably high social status.
The children of marriages between Korean and Japanese are called “mixed-blood” children. The same term is used for children born of a Japanese and a Caucasian, or of a Japanese and a black American. We have noted that in some surveys of the ranking of foreign groups that Koreans are rated just above Africans as among the most disliked “foreigner”. Koreans living in Japan, therefore, are faced with an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, Japanese policy advocates formal assimilation. On the other hand, many officials as well as the ordinary public continue to evidence a profound disparagement that conveys a message that Koreans can never become true Japanese.

Just as the so-called black problem in the United States is really a problem of developing a more inclusive American identity, even so the Korean problem in Japan, of much smaller proportions, is a Japanese problem related to a continuing myth of racial superiority. As long as such racism remains inherent, it is socially and legally difficult to extend the option of citizenship, at least to those who are born in Japan or to some resident aliens who would like to become Japanese. The presently operative restrictions are personally demeaning to those who seek naturalization.

The day is not yet near when a Korean-Japanese or an American-Japanese or a French-Japanese identity will be socially as well as occupationally acceptable. The concept of according full citizenship to a person who elects to preserve his foreign heritage while participating both in Japanese occupational activities and in Japanese social life is not yet clearly established in the Japanese legal mind, let alone in the common perceptions of the ordinary person in Japanese society.