FROM DETERRENCE AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TO WAR: 
THE 1971 CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA

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This study will try to demarcate the reasons for India and Pakistan shifting from policies of coercive diplomacy and deterrence respectively to one of war. The research puzzle that this essay examines is: Why did two countries that were trying to avoid a war in the early part of 1971 engage in full-scale military hostilities before the year was over? Indirectly, this essay also sheds light on another puzzle: Why did the Pakistani leadership, which perceived that it was unlikely to defeat India in war, launch an attack from its western wing on December 3, 1971? The position taken in this study is that the cost/benefit analysis for each country shifted in fervor of war because of the strategic interaction between the two over the course of 1971. In sum, this essay adds to the body of literature elucidating reasons coercive diplomacy and deterrence can fail.

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay will examine the interaction between India and Pakistan during their crisis over the secession of Bangla Desh (the former East Pakistan) in 1971. The starting point of this study is Schelling's thesis that most conflicts are essentially bargaining situations (Schelling, 1960: 5). In crises, this bargaining takes place within the context of the strategic interaction between the contending parties. Strategic interaction refers to situations in which the outcome for each participant "is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant(s) will make" (Schelling, 1960: 5).

The Bangla Desh Crisis has been chosen for study because it was one of the most severe and important crises in the Third World in the modern era in terms of changes brought about to the international political system and the South Asian subsystem. Before the Bangla Desh Crisis, Pakistan, while not considered India's equal, was seen as a reasonably effective counter to Indian power in the region. At the conclusion of the crisis, India was the superpower of South Asia. Pakistan was dismembered; and a new actor, Bangla Desh, entered the global system (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 1).

The research puzzle that this essay examines is: Why did two countries that were trying to avoid a war in the early part of 1971 engage in full-scale military hostilities before the year was over? Indirectly, this essay also sheds light on another puzzle: Why did the Pakistani leadership, which perceived that it was unlikely to defeat India in war, launch an attack from its western wing on December 3, 1971 - this is generally considered the triggering event of the all-out war which ensued? The position taken in

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this study is that the cost/benefit analysis for each country shifted in favour of war because of the strategic interaction between the two over the course of 1971.

Thus, this study falls within the realist school of international relations. Section II examines the development and evolution of theory in the areas of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the literature. The third section is a detailed narrative of events - the decision flow (this social science tool is discussed in greater detail at a later point) - for the Bangla Desh Crisis. The primary purpose of the decision flow is to uncover data about Pakistani and Indian behaviour in order to answer the research puzzle that is the subject-matter of this study. The fourth, and final, section summarizes the findings and delineates further areas for research.

2. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

In 1954, Kaufmann’s Requirements of Deterrence was published. It has remained the classic formulation of deterrence viewed as a strategy of crisis management. For Kaufmann, maintaining credible commitments was the primary task of any government pursuing a policy of deterrence. Three components of credibility were identified: capability, cost, and intentions. Capability was simply defined as the operational ability to inflict a large cost on the adversary. The cost had to outweigh any benefit that an adversary might expect to gain by a challenge. It was also necessary to make the adversary believe that punishment was a certainty. Kaufmann argues that an adversary would evaluate its opponent’s resolve by looking at the latter’s: past performance; pronouncements during the crisis; and, support for its commitment in public opinion. The latter was an absolutely crucial component of credibility (Kaufmann, 1954).

In 1960, one of the most influential works on deterrence was published: Schelling’s Arms and Influence. It maintained the importance of credibility. As was the case with Kaufmann, Schelling argued that an adversary would judge its opponent’s commitment by how the latter had honored its commitments in the past - that is, by the latter’s reputation. For Schelling, commitments were interdependent. The failure to defend even one would make all the others questionable. Schelling also argued that it was not necessary to be able to convince an adversary that it would be defeated in battle for deterrence to effectively function. For Schelling, it was sufficient to demonstrate that the costs of victory would be too high (Schelling, 1966).

In 1974, George and Smoke published the most comprehensive methodological treatment of deterrence involving comparative case studies with the release of Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. They posit that: “In its most general form, deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits” (George & Smoke, 1974: 11). George and Smoke outlined the basic tenets underlying deterrence from the perspective of the U.S. trying to deter an adversary from attacking a third country. They argued that: attacks could be deterred if the expected costs and risks of attacking outweigh expected benefits (C+R>B); attacks could be deterred if the estimated probability of U.S. defense, multiplied by the costs and risks that the defense
would impose, exceeds the expected benefits that would result in the event of no U.S. defense \([p(C+R)>(1-p)(B)]\); therefore, increasing the estimated probability of such intervention through the use of credible signals should be the objective of U.S. deterrence policy (George and Smoke, 1974: 59-60). Although extended deterrence is the focus in their work, the same theoretical framework underpins basic deterrence. In both types of deterrence, the strategy employs threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action that has yet to be initiated (Achen & Snidal, 1989: 151).

This can be contrasted with coercive diplomacy which is a response to an action that has already been undertaken. The abstract model of this concept is set forth in the 1971 edition of George and Simons' The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy and developed further in the 1994 edition of the book by the same name. Coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy designed to respond to an adversary who is trying to change the status quo situation in order to gain a more favorable position. According to George and Simons (1994):

"The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non compliance that will be credible and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.... It should be kept in mind that coercive diplomacy is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force to achieve the objective (p.2).... Coercive Diplomacy is an attractive strategy because it offers the defender a chance to achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less cost, with much less - if any - bloodshed, with fewer political and psychological costs, and often with less risk of unwanted escalation than is true with traditional military strategy (p. 9).

George and Simons identify three types of coercive diplomacy. Type A is to persuade an opponent to stop short of a goal. Type B is to persuade an opponent to undo an action. Type C is to persuade an opponent to make changes in government. This takes the concept of coercive diplomacy to its outer limits because it blurs the line between offensive and defensive uses of strategy. When Type C coercive diplomacy policy is being pursued, it is rarely successful in achieving its objective because the demands are very ambitious (George and Simons, 1994: 8-9).

Thus, in both deterrence and coercive diplomacy, the specific decisions that states make during a crisis are important in underscoring their resolve to uphold commitments. This is the equivalent of what Jervis terms "signals." Signals are intended to influence the receiver's beliefs. They are not inherently credible. Examples of signals include military maneuvers, diplomatic notes, nuclear alerts, breaking diplomatic relations, sending naval cruisers to a region, dismantling weapons, dispatching military forces to allied territory, and increasing the defense budget (Jervis, 1970). Through specific decisions, the two sides try to signal each other. If a state is not perceived to have the capability to enforce its commitments, however, signals are likely to be ignored.

The above literature informs the analysis of the Indo-Pakistani crisis presented below. Specifically, this study will try to demarcate the reasons for India and Pakistan
shifting from policies of coercive diplomacy and deterrence respectively to one of war. This entails delineating why the leadership in each country perceived that war was the best option despite the signals coming from the other side. Thus, in sum, this essay adds to the body of literature elucidating reasons coercive diplomacy and deterrence can fail.

3. DECISION FLOW OF THE BANGLA DESH CRISIS

Before proceeding, a discussion of the social science concept of crisis is in order. A crisis that is viewed from the perspective of an individual state is a foreign policy crisis. This can be differentiated from an international crisis in which crisis is viewed from the international system perspective. In this study, specific decisions made by India and Pakistan are the focus of inquiry. Therefore, the foreign policy crisis perspective is being used because it is the state that, within systemic constraints, decides the specific strategy that it will follow in a crisis situation.

The definition of crisis used in this study is that of Brecher, which underpins the International Crisis Behaviour (I.C.B.) Project. Brecher defines a crisis as occurring when there is a change in a state’s internal or external environment leading to three necessary and sufficient conditions among a state’s decision-makers: 1) a perception of a threat to basic values; 2) a perception of finite time in which to respond to the threat; and, 3) a perception of high probability (or, at minimum, a significant increase in the likelihood) of war before a resolution of the threat (For further clarification, see: Brecher with Geist, 1980). This can be compared to the most widely accepted definition of crisis from the state perspective - that of Charles F. Hermann. A foreign policy crisis, according to Hermann, is a situation that: 1) threatens high-priority goals; 2) leaves a short time for response; and, 3) surprises members of the decision-making body (Hermann, 1969: 414). Brecher’s definition builds upon, but differs significantly from, Hermann’s definition.

Brecher’s definition is considered superior for several reasons. First, decision-makers often are not surprised by situational changes - e.g., the building of the Berlin Wall and the closing of the Straits of Tiran did not surprise American and Israeli decision-makers respectively - but crisis situations developed afterwards. Further research led Hermann to conclude that surprise was not a necessary condition for crisis. Second, Brecher’s use of finite time for response is more valid than short time; some crises have lasted several months or years. The time for response cannot be delayed indefinitely but it does not have to be short. Third, Brecher’s definition allows foreign policy crises to originate from within the domestic environment of a crisis actor (Brecher with Geist, 1980: 1-5). In sum, Brecher’s definition appears to be more valid and reliable. Thus, Brecher’s definition is being used.

As noted, an integral part of the I.C.B. Project’s methodology used in case studies - the “decision flow” - will be utilized in this study. The decision flow constructed in this section is based on Brecher’s model of crisis (this model underpins the I.C.B. Project). Brecher’s model of crisis has three stages (or periods). Initially, there is the
pre-crisis period \((t_1)\). This period begins with an event (or cluster of events) which leads to a conspicuous increase in the perception of value threat by the senior decision-maker(s) of the state under inquiry. The pre-crisis period is followed by the crisis period \((t_2)\) which also begins with a trigger event or cluster of events. This leads to the perception by the state's decision-maker(s) of all three conditions necessary for a crisis: a greatly increased perceived threat to basic values; an awareness that decisions are being made under time constraints; and an image of a high probability of war at some point before the issue is resolved. (The "crisis period" should not be confused with the "crisis." The "crisis period" is one of three periods that make up a "crisis.") This is followed by the post-crisis period \((t_3)\) which commences with an observable decline in one or more of the three perceptual conditions necessary for crisis. A foreign policy crisis terminates when the three conditions have returned to non-crisis norms. The decision flow is a structured narrative of events which examines the background of decisions and the interaction of the main actors from the beginning of the pre-crisis period to the termination of the post-crisis period (Brecher with Geist: 1-29).

Brecher's model, due to its dynamic nature, is particularly well-suited for the analysis of crisis situations. First, it allows the scholar to gage the credibility of the commitments, of each of the actors involved, from the start of a crisis to its conclusion. This makes it possible to ascertain whether a state which followed an aggressive policy and initiated a crisis was actually attempting to start a war or merely attempting to change the status quo through other means (such as aggressive signalling). Second, the effects of signalling can be delineated. Thus, a detailed decision flow will outline whether the signals of a state were properly received by the other side and whether attempts at deception were successful or not. Finally, crises are dynamic events and the strategic interaction between two parties can lead to an adjustment of the cost/benefit analysis. The decision-flow can delineate these adjustments. In terms of the Bangla Desh Crisis, a decision flow based on his model will illuminate the reasons why India and Pakistan went to war in 1971.

A. BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

Prior to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Pakistan had been able to maintain a military balance in South Asia by becoming America's most important ally in the region. Due to the commencement of American and Western aid to India after that war, however, the strategic balance in the region had shifted steadily in favour of India. The termination of American military aid to the region in the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War also affected Pakistan more than India. The Indians, because of their earlier and closer relationship with the Soviet Union, were less reliant on American military assistance.

Throughout the Bangla Desh Crisis, India had greater human, geographic, economic, and military resources. Arguably, Pakistan held a slight edge in diplomatic resources because of its closer relationship to the United States and China although India enjoyed quite close relations with the Soviet Union. Neither side had nuclear weapons, though
India was far more advanced in nuclear technology. (For more detailed information on the capability of Pakistan and India, please consult I.C.B. datasets available from McGill University, the University of Maryland, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research). Therefore, in terms of capability, India was relatively stronger than Pakistan during the Bangla Desh Crisis. Thus, it is not surprising that the former attempted to use a strategy of coercive diplomacy while the latter tried to follow a policy of deterrence.

The root causes of the Bangla Desh Crisis lay within Pakistan itself. The army and the federal government was dominated by West Pakistanis. It was in this environment of frustration that the leader of the East Pakistan-based Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (known as Mujib), articulated his party’s Six Point Plan in early 1966. Its main points were as follows: 1) the legislature was to be federal and parliamentary with representation based upon population (changing the old system of equal representation of the two wings that had arisen in the 1950's); 2) defense and foreign affairs were the only areas of responsibility to be allotted to the federal government; 3) either there were to be two separate currencies for the two wings or a federal reserve system would have to be established which would prevent the flight of capital from one to the other; 4) the federating units were to be responsible for fiscal policy and providing revenue to the federal government for defense and foreign affairs; 5) the regional governments could negotiate foreign trade and maintain foreign reserve earnings; and, 6) the federating units were to be empowered to maintain a militia or a para-military force for security (White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, 1971, Appendix C). The Awami League was seeking the perquisites of office which the West Pakistani elite had denied to the Bengali elite. The Six Point Plan was designed to gain the vote of the frustrated East Pakistani electorate (Ball, 1974: 4).

The immediate background to the crisis was provided by the results of the general elections in Pakistan which were held on December 7, 1970. Due to pressure from East Pakistan, the military government had replaced the system of parity in parliament to one where the eastern wing was allotted 169 out of 313 total seats. Islamabad, under the leadership of General Yahya Khan, had been led to believe by its intelligence services that there would be no clear-cut winner. However, the Awami League, running on its Six Point platform, won 160 seats (and seven more in subsequent elections for women) (Mascarenhas, 1971: 61-62). The Awami League’s absolute majority opened up the possibility of an implementation of the Six Point Plan in its entirety - a situation that Islamabad had not foreseen. In the immediate post-election period, however, Islamabad was unclear about the substance of the Six Point Plan and had not thought through the consequences of its implementation (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 63). Thus, although the military had misgivings, there still was not a perception of crisis in mid-December.

The Martial Law Administration was primarily interested in moderating the degree of change so that the army would be able to maintain an important position for itself; and Pakistan’s unity would be safeguarded. In pursuing these objectives, Islamabad sought to bring about negotiations on the broad outlines of the constitution before the first sitting of the National Assembly. Thus, the army tried at various times to bring
about discussions between the Awami League on the one hand and, on the other, itself and/or political parties based in the West - especially the Pakistan People’s Party (P.P.P. - which ran on a platform of “1000 years war with India” and “Islamic Socialism”) which won 88 out of 144 seats in West Pakistan. Yahya visited Dhaka from January 12-14, 1971 in order to hold meetings with Mujib. For Islamabad, the start of the crisis - that is, the commencement of the pre-crisis period - can be directly traced to those mid-January meetings (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 58-59, 125-133).

B. DECISION FLOW

a. Pakistan’s Pre-Crisis Period (mid-January to April 9)

Two factors triggered the pre-crisis period for Islamabad. First, Islamabad began to realize that the Awami League’s assumption of power raised the possibility of serious consequences for the army: enforced expansion and promotion of (East Pakistani) Bengalis in the officer corps to eliminate inequities; an accommodative stance toward India; limits on defense spending; and a reduced stature for the military with the expansion of the provincial militias specified in the Six Points. Thus, after more than a decade of martial law, the spectre of political interference in the military was raised (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 65-66).

Second, the assurances given by Mujib proved insufficient in allaying the concerns of the army. At a meeting held on January 14 between government and the Awami League officials, Mujib promised: not to base the constitution rigidly on the Six Points; to meet with West Pakistani leaders several days before the first sitting of the National Assembly in order to incorporate their ideas into a draft constitution; not to dismiss anyone from West Pakistan in the civil or military bureaucracy; and to make Yahya the next “elected” President of Pakistan. Government officials, however, had built up a latent skepticism toward Mujib and intimated that the Awami League could force a constitution through the National Assembly regardless of assurances given in the privacy of meetings. Thus, Yahya specifically pressed Mujib to work closely with the P.P.P.. Mujib, however, would not make any specific commitments in this regard (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 35-36).

Islamabad, however, did not move against the Awami League at this point. This might have been because of the promises Mujib had made to protect West Pakistani and army interests. It seems that the government was willing to let the situation develop before deciding what course of action to follow (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 65-66). Thus, on February 13, Yahya announced that the National Assembly would meet on March 3 in Dhaka (Mujib’s preferred location) (Ayoob & Subrahmanyam, 1972: 104).

Shortly thereafter, however, the public debate between the Awami League and the P.P.P. became acrimonious. On February 15, Mujib declared that the Six Points were public property not susceptible to adjustment. The same day, P.P.P. leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made it clear that, unless there were prior negotiations on the constitution, his party would boycott the National Assembly. On February 17, Bhutto declared that
there was no room to negotiate with the Awami League and added that a National Assembly meeting in Dhaka would be a “slaughter house” for him (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 74-80). It seems that, at this point, the situation had developed sufficiently for Islamabad to choose its next course of action.

On March 1, a message was read out over Pakistan radio which announced that the National Assembly was being postponed sine die. It appears that the reinforcement of Pakistani troops in the eastern wing had begun a few days earlier. The scale of the Bengali reaction to the announcement on March 1 and the inability of the military authorities in the East to contain it came as a surprise to the decision-makers in Islamabad. Hostility, long simmering, was unleashed at an unprecedented level against people from the western wing and non-Bengali Urdu-speaking “Biharis” who had settled as refugees in East Pakistan after partition. Units of the Pakistani army in the East became increasingly constrained in their movements and in their procurement of supplies.

Despite the occurrence of these events, there was an initial perception in Islamabad that only a lack of will or mismanagement could account for the difficulties of the military authorities in the East (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 91-95). Within days, however, government leaders perceived that they would have to act quickly before the army’s position deteriorated further. Thus, on March 6, Yahya personally announced that the National Assembly’s first meeting had been rescheduled for March 25. The Awami League leadership did not move to secession at this time. Mujib, during a March 7 speech at the Dhaka racetrack, stated that the Awami League would participate in the National Assembly provided there was an immediate “transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people” (Dawn, Karachi, March 8, 1971).

It was announced on March 9 that Yahya would visit East Pakistan in the near future so that preparations could be made for the meeting of the National Assembly. It seems that the army intended to use these discussions, between March 15 and March 25, either to bring about a split between different elements in the Awami League or to win time to complete preparations for military action against the Awami League and its supporters. After much deliberation, a draft proclamation was drawn up by the government team on March 19 to serve as the basis of further negotiations. It was agreed on March 22 that the National Assembly again should be postponed so that a final version of the proclamation could be prepared (Jackson, 1975: 30). At this point, Islamabad still was willing to give serious consideration to a political resolution of the crisis.

The turning point toward a military solution came on March 23, “Pakistan Day,” which had been renamed “Resistance Day” by the Awami League. On this day there were demands for independence at demonstrations and parades throughout East Pakistan. The Awami League met with government representatives to discuss amendments to the presidential draft proclamation which they wanted made. The draft proclamation, as amended by the Awami League, referred to Pakistan as a “confederation.” Such an arrangement had never been intimated before. As government representatives pointed out, a confederation is in essence an agreement between two sovereign states. This, in fact, violated the first point of the Awami League’s own Six Point Plan (White Paper
on the Crisis in East Pakistan, 1971, Chapter 3 and Appendix E). Unless preemptive action were taken, the military command feared that, at best, the forces in East Pakistan would become prisoners in their cantonments before being forced to leave; or, at worst, the troops in the East would have to fight a civil war while lacking resupply capability against Bengali police, troops, and guerrillas. Thus, on March 23, the army high command decided to take military action against what was termed a rebellion (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 122-123, 132-133).

The army set March 25 as the date on which it would take military action in the East. In the month that Pakistani troops had been reinforced in the eastern wing, their numbers had doubled from 20,000 to 40,000. In order not to arouse suspicion, the military continued to negotiate with the Awami League on and after March 23. Yahya, as planned, suddenly left Dhaka on March 25 without explanation. After Yahya landed in Karachi, West Pakistani units of the army moved against the Bengali police, the East Pakistan Rifles, the East Bengal Regiment, and the para-military ansars. Units of the army also were mobilized against students, opposition newspapers, and foreign journalists (who were deported on March 27) (Mascarenhas, 1971: 110-120). The actions of the Pakistani army on March 25 marked the beginning of an attempt to impose a military solution on East Pakistan.

Most of the Awami League leadership started fleeing to Calcutta from March 25 onwards (Mujib stayed behind and was arrested the next morning). About 20,000 Bengalis belonging to the military, para-military and police also managed to cross the border. The General Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Awami League, Tajuddin Ahmed, declared the independence of Bangla Desh on April 10 from Calcutta. With Indian assistance, a Provisional Government-in-Exile was set up in Calcutta on April 14 with Ahmed as Prime Minister. India also helped set up the rudiments of a military structure under a former officer in the Pakistani army, Colonel A.G. Osmani. This military force was known as the Mukti Fauj (People’s Army). Thus, from mid-April onwards, the East Pakistanis in the forefront of the Bangla Desh struggle were politically and militarily organizing themselves with Indian assistance to confront the Government of Pakistan (Jackson, 1975: 40, 55-56).

b. Pakistan’s Crisis Period (April 10 to December 3)

Bangla Desh’s independence declaration was an internal verbal challenge to the military regime, triggering the crisis period for Pakistan’s decision-makers. The creation of the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile and the Mukti Fauj greatly increased their perceived threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. In mid-April, it would have been possible to traverse the length of East Pakistan without encountering any central government authorities. Thus, there was pressure on government forces to retake control of the eastern wing as quickly as possible in order to limit any support the Government-in-Exile and the Mukti Fauj might be able to garner in the province. The creation of the Mukti Fauj also led to the perception that the central government was going to face not only disparate guerrilla bands, assisted on occasion by Indian Border
Security Forces, but prolonged guerrilla warfare against Bengalis being trained and
given material support by the Government of India. This was unprecedented. There
also was a perception of a significant increase in - if not a high probability of - war
with India. In March 1970, Indian Border Security Forces adjacent to East Pakistan had
been reinforced and Indian armed forces had been sent to West Bengal. According to
the Indian government, this had been done to counter political terrorist activity in the
region. There was a perception among Pakistani officials, however, that these troop
movements were part of a military buildup for offensive action in East Pakistan if the
opportunity were to present itself (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 142-162). Thus, April 10
marked Pakistan’s entry into the crisis period of the Bangla Desh Crisis.

Throughout April, Pakistan tried to secure military commitments from China in the
event of an Indo-Pakistani war. On April 13, the Government of Pakistan published a
letter in which Chou En-lai assured Yahya that: “should the Indian expansionists dare
to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as
always, firmly support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to
safeguard state sovereignty and national independence.” However, according to
authoritative sources (including a former member of the Pakistani Foreign Service),
there was one part of the letter which was not made public in which Chou wrote: “the
question of East Pakistan should be settled according to the wishes of the people of
East Pakistan.” Islamabad suppressed this sentence in order to give the impression that
Pakistan would have China’s unqualified support in any future conflict with India.
Thus, Pakistan was following a policy of deterrence very early in the crisis vis-a-vis
India. Islamabad was trying to signal to India that the military costs of invading East
Pakistan would be higher than was actually the case. By mid-April, however, the core
group in the Yahya Khan government did not expect Chinese military intervention in
the event of a war with India and acted accordingly thereafter (Sisson & Rose, 1990:
250-251).

The Government of Pakistan tried to restore the territorial status quo ante in East
Pakistan throughout the crisis. By late April, Pakistani troops had recaptured almost all
of the province and there was a perception among Pakistani decision-makers that the
crisis was diminishing. When Cox’s Bazar was retaken on May 10, it marked the
reestablishment of Pakistani control over the eastern wing. For most of the time under
consideration in this study, the Government of Pakistan would be able to maintain
relatively tight control of the urban areas and a tenuous grip over almost all of the East

From the March 25 crackdown onwards, Islamabad tried to secure international
recognition that what was happening in East Pakistan was a matter strictly within
Pakistan’s domestic jurisdiction. Starting in late March, Islamabad issued a hail of
protests against “interference” by India in the “internal affairs” of Pakistan. This was
intended as a deterring move toward New Delhi. If there was to be a war with India,
the Pakistanis wanted New Delhi to be branded the aggressor. This would increase the
likelihood of India facing the sanctions of the international community if it did invade.
Most countries, including the U.S., Soviet Union, and China had publicly or privately
expressed the view by late April that the situation in East Pakistan must be regarded as
the internal affair of Pakistan despite the fact that there were over 500,000 refugees in India by that time (Jackson, 1975: 39-43).

c. India's Pre-Crisis Period (late April to late July)

After March 25, there was mounting public pressure in India for immediate military intervention but Indira Gandhi's government did not wish to commit the country to a military course of action at that time. The Chief of Army Staff, General Manekshaw, advanced three reasons why India should not undertake action in late March: 1) while Tibetan passes were still open, India ran a greater than normal risk of temporarily losing territory to the Chinese; 2) the campaign would have to end by the monsoon season (which usually starts in mid-June), otherwise the Indian army would be impeded; and 3) India did not have sufficient numerical superiority on the East Pakistan border for immediate action. Therefore, the Indian army would have to wait until mid-October for the ground to dry in East Pakistan after the monsoon. The mountain passes between India and China usually did not receive snowfall before November. It was shortly after March 25 that India started formulating plans to re-equip, re-train, and transfer its forces from the Chinese border to positions close to East Pakistan in case it was decided that military action was feasible at some future date (Singh, 1980: 16-29).

Early in April, the Indian government decided to: 1) register refugees from East Pakistan as foreigners; and 2) have the majority of refugees settled in camps close to the India-East Pakistan border. In previous exchanges of population with Pakistan, refugees coming to India had been given the status of citizens. The reason for the Indian decision was that, unlike previous refugees, the majority of refugees coming to India in late March 1971 were Muslim (Jackson, 1975: 146-147). This decision had a profound impact on the unfolding of the crisis.

The situation developed into a crisis for India by late April. By this time, a greatly increasing proportion of the refugees entering India were Hindu. Islamabad had placed much of the blame for East Pakistan's problems on its Hindu population. New Delhi, after mid-April, became increasingly concerned that Islamabad intended to expel much of the Hindu population from East Pakistan. India's decision-makers perceived such an expulsion would have a dramatic effect on India's politics, society, and economy. Indian decision-makers, furthermore, perceived an increasing military threat because they thought Pakistan might retaliate against India's assistance to the Bengalis (Chopra, 1973: 94).

Throughout India's pre-crisis and crisis periods, one of New Delhi's major objectives was to bring about a negotiated political settlement between the Government of Pakistan and the Awami League. In order to do this, India wanted to raise the costs to Islamabad of imposing a settlement on East Pakistan rather than negotiating. Until late May, India's primary strategy was to try to persuade external powers to bring pressure to bear on Islamabad to partake in such negotiations. Thus, India's policy of coercive diplomacy began quite early in the crisis. The Indians recognized that their
strategy probably would not be successful. New Delhi, however, was not ready to act on its own at this point (Sisson and Rose, 1990: 151-152).

The continued flight of refugees from East Pakistan was placing a tremendous burden on the Indian economy and exacerbating social tensions. According to the Indian Labour and Rehabilitation Minister, the number of refugees in India increased from 1,251,544 on May 1 to 3,435,243 on May 21. New Delhi became increasingly dissatisfied with the support India was receiving from the international community in June. By the end of June, India made four decisions. First, all refugees, including the very quickly escalating number of Bengali Hindus, were to be returned. Previously, Hindu refugees had been allowed to stay in India. Second, India would support a transfer of power in Pakistan to the moderate elements of the Awami League. Whether this transfer took place within a Pakistani federation or in an independent state did not concern Indian decision-makers. Third, force would be used to achieve Indian objectives. Initially, the force to be used was to be indirect, namely, giving increased support to the Bangla Desh fighters. If necessary, direct Indian intervention would occur at an appropriate time if the Bengali guerrillas could not bring about an acceptable solution on their own. Thus, the leadership in New Delhi had more clearly articulated its policy of coercive diplomacy to itself. Fourth, India would make greater efforts to mobilize international public opinion in support of Indian objectives (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 152, 184, 206). For India, the costs of continuing with a non-military option were increasing rapidly.

Pakistan approached the United Nations in June to seek assistance in the repatriation of refugees. India became concerned at this time, however, about the political implications of a U.N. role. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin, allegedly blamed the liberation movement for the problem of displaced persons. The Indians were concerned that Yahya might use the U.N. as a shield. Yahya probably wanted cooperation with the U.N. for this reason (Jackson, 1975: 51-61). A U.N. presence would probably increase the costs and risks of any potential Indian incursion into East Pakistan. This can be viewed as another attempt at deterrence by the Pakistanis.

The major development in July was the Sino-American rapprochement which largely was due to the efforts of the Pakistanis. On July 15, President Nixon announced he would visit China at some point before May 1972. The rapprochement signalled the coming together of Pakistan's closest allies.

Shortly thereafter, New Delhi began to think that it was very likely that Indian military forces would have to be used in East Pakistan to bring the crisis to a conclusion. The Indian leaders, themselves, felt that Pakistani decision-makers would view the rapprochement as having a deterrent effect on India. Furthermore, the U.S.-China rapprochement was viewed by India as greatly diminishing the possibility of the U.S. serving as a mediator in the East Pakistan crisis. It was thought in New Delhi that the Chinese would induce the U.S. to maintain American support of Pakistan. From India's perspective, American pressure was essential to make the Pakistanis move in a direction favourable to India (Jackson, 1975: 65). Thus, from
New Delhi’s point-of-view, the international community was not imposing sufficient costs on the Pakistan for the latter’s policies in its eastern wing.

**d. India’s Crisis Period (late July to December 3)**

The crisis period for Indian decision-makers commenced in late July. The Sino-American rapprochement symbolized the likely failure of India’s coercive diplomacy policy of forcing Pakistan to come to terms with the Awami League through international pressure. At this time, there were 7 million refugees, the vast majority of them Hindu. Thus, the political, social, economic, and military threat faced by India because of the refugees had increased dramatically since late April. In order to avert this multi-faceted threat, India had to act within a finite period of time before the situation exploded. The Mukti Bahini (it changed its name from the Mukti Fauj in mid-July to mark the advent of the navy and the air force) had done well in its monsoon offensive but it had become obvious that the Pakistani army could not be defeated by the guerrillas alone. There was an increasing perception among Indian decision-makers that India probably would have to go to war before the crisis resolved itself (Chopra, 1973: 81-94). Thus, late July marks the beginning of the crisis period for India.

Islamabad’s actions had dramatically raised the costs for India of a non-military resolution of the crisis. Pakistan did try to signal that it would receive help from China and the United States in the event of war, thereby, increasing the costs to India of a military resolution. As will be discussed below, however, New Delhi recognized these signals as attempts at deception by Pakistan. Thus, the deterring effects that Islamabad hoped for did not materialize.

It was also in late July that the New Delhi assessed the extent to which India could politically, territorially, and economically expand through a war with Pakistan before the costs outweighed the benefits. There was a perception among decision-makers that, in the case of war in East Pakistan, victory would be relatively easy for India and humiliating for Pakistan. There was a perception that China and the United States would definitely not intervene to support the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. A victory in East Pakistan was viewed as increasing India’s political-diplomatic status. India would be the undisputed dominant power in the region. Indira Gandhi wanted India to be seen as an Asian power and not just a South Asian power.

The Indians also concluded that the costs probably outweighed the benefits of trying to inflict an overwhelming military defeat on the Pakistani army based in the western wing. There was no perception that a war in West Pakistan would be easy. New Delhi was not certain that China would stay out of a war if Pakistan’s forces were being badly beaten in West Pakistan. Furthermore, India also was not sure how the United States would react if Pakistani forces were being routed in the western wing. Pakistan was a northern tier state and a member of C.E.N.T.O.. For these reasons, New Delhi decided to fight basically a defensive war on its western front designed to gain a few strategic points in Kashmir. This was thought to be the best way to keep outside powers from coming to the aid of Pakistan (Chopra, 1973: 96-101, 146-147).
Pakistan attempted to secure U.N. intervention to help defuse the crisis in July. On July 19, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant sent an aide memoire to New Delhi and Islamabad asking to have United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) “representatives” stationed along the Indo-East Pakistani border. If only “representatives” (as opposed to “observers”) were sent, then an initiative of the Security Council was not required. On July 20, the Secretary-General asked the Security Council to reach an agreement as to what measures should be taken to relieve the situation. U Thant’s initiatives were immediately welcomed in Pakistan.

The Indian Foreign Minister officially rejected U Thant’s proposal on August 3 stating that “representatives” alone could not create “the necessary feeling of confidence among the refugees but would only create a facade of action as a cover up for the continuation of present policies of the military rulers of Pakistan, and further aggravate the suffering of the people of Bangla Desh” (Singh et al., 1971-72, 1: 660-663). Less charitably, the Indians might have been convinced that the U.N. might see the support being given to the secessionist movement by New Delhi. Furthermore, if the Security Council agreed on steps to be taken to defuse the situation on the subcontinent, India would have to defy the Security Council if New Delhi decided that Indian interests were best served by war (Jackson, 1975: 68-69). Thus, the potential costs to India of U.N. involvement were very high.

The Sino-American rapprochement and increasing pressure from the U.N. for a role in East Pakistan provided the immediate background for the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty was concluded on August 9, 1971 at the urging of the Indians. The public “line” used by New Delhi was that Indian security faced a threat from Pakistan, the U.S., and China which required a counterforce, that is, the U.S.S.R. (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 197-198). The Indian government clearly understood that the public line used to justify the treaty had little basis in fact. New Delhi was so confident that China would not intervene that in late July (that is, before the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty), orders were sent to the army commander on the northeastern section of the Chinese frontier to transfer 3 of his 6 divisions to the East Pakistani front. There is evidence to indicate that by this time, and probably much earlier, copies of letters exchanged between Islamabad and Beijing in April in which the latter had explicitly stated that it would support Pakistan politically but not militarily had been obtained by the Indian government. Thus, the Pakistani attempt to deceive India that the costs of invading East Pakistan included taking on China was unsuccessful.

Furthermore, after Kissinger returned to Washington, he informed Indian Ambassador L.K. Jha that American commitments to assist India applied only in the case of a Chinese attack. Such circumstances, however, precluded military action initiated by India against Pakistan. Thus, New Delhi was quite aware that it, indeed, was justifying its treaty with the Soviet Union on false premises. The Indian government’s public line on the Chinese-American-Pakistani alliance, nevertheless, was accepted by most of the press, opposition leaders, and the political public (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 198).

When India approached the Soviet Union about signing the treaty in mid-1971, the Soviets were very hesitant. Moscow was under the impression that New Delhi wanted
the Soviets to intervene if India was attacked by China. The Indians had to give explicit assurances that they were not trying to gain military commitments from Moscow. Once Moscow recognized this, an agreement was quickly concluded (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 242).

New Delhi pressured Moscow to support the Indian position politically in the event of hostilities. In the meantime, New Delhi asked Moscow to provide certain military equipment that the Indian armed forces required as quickly as possible. There were several “unofficial” leaks to the press in India which implied that Moscow had verbally extended guarantees during the negotiation of the treaty to counter any possible Chinese intervention in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war (which was not true). In the U.N. Security Council, however, where India most needed the U.S.S.R., Moscow’s support for New Delhi was unflinching almost to the end of the war which was to eventually break out (Jackson, 1975: 173-174).

The signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty opened a new phase in the crisis for Islamabad. Pakistan again tried to gain U.N. intervention in East Pakistan to defuse the crisis. The Pakistani Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Agha Shahi, wrote to the President of the Security Council on August 11. Shahi proposed that the border of India and Pakistan should be visited by a “good offices” team of the Council to “defuse the tense situation there.” On August 18, India rejected the idea of U.N. “observers” or “good offices” teams being sent to the Indo-Pakistani border. The Indians were backed up in the U.N. by the Soviet Union. The Secretary-General of the U.N. was informed on August 20 by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that his country was opposed to any Security Council meeting to discuss the problems in East Pakistan (Jackson, 1975: 73-74). Thus, Pakistan’s efforts to gain U.N. intervention to deter an Indian attack were frustrated again.

The pressure on Indian decision-makers to take action increased. By September, there were between 8 and 9 million refugees in India; a tremendous financial burden. Economic development funds were being diverted to refugee assistance programs and additional taxes were being levied on the Indian population. Commodities like fuel, sugar and rice had virtually doubled in price between July and August for the ordinary Indian. Further complicating matters for the Indian government was a perceptible leftward shift in the leadership of the guerrilla movement. The potential for social unrest was great. Thus, the refugees posed problems that the Indian decision-makers would have to resolve in the not-too-distant future (Ball, 1974: 28-30). As noted, the costs imposed on New Delhi by the refugees had increased dramatically since the start of the crisis.

Although internal pressure on India to act was great because of the financial and social burden of the refugees, the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of detente with the United States. Thus, Moscow pressed India to give Islamabad a chance to negotiate with Mujib. This Soviet pressure led to the declaration by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on October 8 that India was not committed to any particular solution of the Bangla Desh Crisis so long as the elected representatives agreed to it.

Yahya missed the opportunity afforded him by the Soviet Union. The Pakistani army had started moving into forward positions on both borders before the end of
September. From this point onward, the Pakistanis wanted to dramatize the threat of war in the hopes of stimulating intervention by the major powers (as occurred during previous Indo-Pakistani wars). Thus, after a television address on October 12 by Yahya calling for mutual troop withdrawals and U.N. intervention to defuse the tense situation, the Pakistani army rapidly completed movement to the borders. Again, Pakistan was trying to continue with its policy of deterrence by demonstrating to New Delhi that the price of invading East Pakistan might be quite high if outside powers were to intervene.

The Pakistani mobilization surprised Indian decision-makers but it allowed them to mobilize their forces without looking like the aggressor. According to India’s timetable, its troops were to be mobilized a few weeks later. Indira Gandhi stated on October 14 that Swaran Singh had been misquoted when he was attributed to have said that India would accept a political solution “even within the framework of Pakistan” (Jackson, 1975: 188). Thus, India was able to circumvent the pressure from the U.S.S.R. to stop the drift towards confrontation.

On October 22, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin arrived in New Delhi for consultations. According to an official Indian source, by the time of Firyubin’s departure on October 25, the two sides were fully in accord with each other concerning the assessment of the situation. By this time New Delhi had concluded, correctly, that it could count on the “total support” of the U.S.S.R.. In early November, special shipments of arms requested by India began to arrive by air. From this point onward, Moscow’s position was one of broad support for India both publicly and privately up to and through the 1971 war (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 202).

Indira Gandhi toured several major capitals between October 24 and November 13 to gain acceptance, if approval was not possible, for Indian policy on Bangla Desh. She tried to bring home to public opinion in the West the size of the refugee problem and the justice of India’s case. Gandhi tried to demonstrate that the Indo-Soviet Treaty did not mean that relations between India and the West would have to be impeded. The Pakistani government was unable to fully counter the effects of this trip (Kissinger, 1979: 871-872).

The Pakistanis again tried to gain military commitments from China in early November. Although the Pakistani delegation was greeted by Chou En-lai, himself, the results were disappointing. No joint communique was issued at the end of the talks on November 7. Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei reiterated the Chinese position of April 13 committing China to defend Pakistan’s ‘state sovereignty” and “national independence” (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 1972: 113-133, 167-170). This implied that the Chinese would only become involved if West Pakistan was threatened. The Pakistanis were left to put the best face on the situation.

It was widely expected that Indira Gandhi’s return on November 13 from Europe and America would be the signal for all-out war to be waged on Pakistan. Upon her return, she signalled a “military solution according to plan.” According to the Indian timetable, the all-out offensive on Dhaka was to begin on December 6. In the build-up to the invasion, after November 21, India started to capture East Pakistani territory and hold on to it rather than withdraw. On November 24, an Indian spokesman stated that,
if necessary, Indian forces would cross the border to stop Pakistan's offensive maneuvers. On November 29, the Mukti Bahini took Chaugacha and the provisional Bangla Desh government made plans to move there (Jackson, 1975: 94-102).

The Pakistani government tried to obtain an official military commitment from the U.S. on December 2 to help Pakistan if attacked. Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Raza delivered a letter from Yahya to Nixon invoking Article 1 of the 1959 bilateral agreement as the basis of U.S. aid to Pakistan. The Pakistanis had previously approached the Americans informally about American assistance. With war rapidly approaching, the Pakistanis wanted to ascertain the exact level of American commitment. The U.S. State Department pointed out that Article 1 spoke only of "appropriate action" (not specific commitments) subject to American constitutional procedures. The State Department further argued that the obligation was undertaken within a Middle East context intended to exclude an Indo-Pakistani war. Thus, the Pakistanis were not able to get the commitment they were seeking from the Americans (Kissinger, 1979: 894-895).

On December 3, the Pakistani government reacted to the increasing pressure in the East by launching an air attack from the western wing. This marked Pakistani recognition that its attempts to deter India from launching an offensive in the east had failed. Islamabad hoped to carry on a war long enough to force the international community to pay heed and possibly build up sufficient pressure from the Islamic world to stop Moscow from backing India at the U.N. (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 227-230). However, Indian troops overran Pakistani positions in the east within two weeks.

4. CONCLUSION

War became unavoidable in South Asia in 1971 because both Pakistan and India allowed the crisis to spiral out of control. Pakistan, in its attempts to regain control over its eastern wing, sent 10 million refugees into India. This dramatically increased the financial, social, economic, and political burden on the latter. In order to rectify the situation, India put tremendous military pressure on Pakistan to negotiate with the Awami League. Ultimately, despite having no delusions of defeating India, Islamabad perceived its best chance for a negotiated settlement on its own terms lay in directly engaging India in a war.

What are the limitations of the theories of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the analysis of interstate behaviour? George and Simons (1994) list some of the limits of coercive diplomacy. Their ideas are equally applicable to deterrence theory. First, there is an assumption "that the adversary will be receptive to and will correctly evaluate information that is critical to the question of whether the costs and risks of not complying will outweigh the gains to be expected from pursuing the course of action" (p. 13). Second, it is not possible "to predict whether coercive diplomacy or deterrence will be successful in a specific situation" (p. 13). This would require, at minimum, being able to measure "the magnitude of the demand(s) made on the opponent, the magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to comply, and the factor of whether the
opponent will feel the threatened punishment is sufficiently credible and potent to cause him to comply.” Operationalizing, “such specifications is such an extremely complex task that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve” (p. 14). Third, “the abstract model is only a starting point - to be sure, a useful and relevant one - to assist policy makers in considering whether a particular version of coercive diplomacy or deterrence can be designed that might be effective in a specific situation. In other words, for policy makers to make use of the abstract model, they must transform it into a specific strategy” (p. 14).

Given this, how useful are the concepts of deterrence and coercive diplomacy for analyzing crisis situations? Certainly, some of the aforementioned shortcomings of the concepts were evident during the 1971 crisis. Essentially, Pakistani deterrence failed when it could not fool New Delhi into believing that other countries would assist Islamabad and make the costs of any Indian incursion into East Pakistan very high. Thus, India did not receive signals the way that Pakistan intended. India was following Type C coercive diplomacy much of the time. For reasons discussed above, this strategy is rarely successful without a military resolution. Thus, New Delhi was not able to transform coercive diplomacy from a concept into a successful specific strategy which would allow India to achieve its objectives short of war. It also appears that each side did not properly calculate: the magnitude of demands being made on the other side; and, whether or not sufficient pressure was being brought to bear to achieve compliance from its adversary short of military hostilities.

On the other hand, the two concepts seem to have guided Pakistani and Indian policy through much of the crisis. It should be remembered that lack of reliable information and psychological predispositions are important factors in almost all real-life decision-making. Given this, there is an enhanced opportunity for unconscious, or only partly conscious, wishes and drives to influence policy. Thus, decision-makers are, at best, rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only small disjointed facets of reality. Homo Psychologicus, however, has nothing even remotely comparable to the well-developed apparatus for rational decision-making of Homo Economicus (Simon, 1985: 302). Until Homo Psychologicus is fleshed out by further research, Homo Economicus can serve as an extremely valuable, although not perfect, guide in the analysis of foreign policy crisis decision-making.

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