THE GLOBAL STANDARDS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN KOREA: EVALUATING THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMPLE MAJORITY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS*

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The paper discusses the voting rule of simple majority as a global standard and fundamental principle of democratic politics and evaluates the current Korean presidential-electoral system applying this principle. In a democratic political system, anybody with certain qualifications can become a political leader. Such qualifications can be represented in part by the condition that democratic political leaders must win at least a certain level of public support, usually measured through elections. For example, if there are two presidential candidates in a democratic society, the candidate getting more votes in an election acquires the position (the principle of simple majority).

The importance of electoral rules can be easily figured out when referring to Kenneth Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" and William H. Riker's claim on "politics as a manipulation." It is well known that under different electoral rules electoral outcomes can be quite different even with the voters of the same preference. This implies that voters could elect a candidate not preferred by the majority. I contend that the current Korean presidential-electoral system is highly likely to allow voters to elect a candidate without the support of a simple majority because the system is based on the electoral rule of plurality. Therefore, I examine other electoral systems that could fix the problem, and suggest to adopt the run-off system, which appears to be the best alternative to replace the current plurality system.

By adopting the run-off system in the Korean presidential-electoral system, the following positive effects are expected: 1) weakening political regionalism, 2) promoting policy competition and power transition among major parties, 3) developing a two-party system in the long run, and ultimately, 4) increasing the political stability in Korean politics. This study shows that the run-off system is more democratic theoretically than the current plurality rule for electing president under the existing multi-party system. I argue that the benefits derived from adopting more democratic electoral rules will exceed the costs of implementing one more ballot in the presidential elections ultimately, which can be supported indirectly by the run-off practices of French and Russian presidential elections. We must notice that the typical practices of democracy are elections to choose public representatives. So we don't have to be afraid of implementing one more ballot cast for democratic citizens. With the possible effects, Korean democratic consolidation would be enhanced to meet the global standards of democratic politics.

The paper discusses the voting rule of simple majority as a global standard and fundamental principle of democratic politics and evaluates the current Korean presidential-electoral system applying the principle. It is well known that under different electoral rules electoral outcomes can be quite different even when voters have similar preferences. Thus, it is possible that voters can elect a candidate not preferred by a majority. I contend that the current Korean presidential-electoral system is highly likely to allow voters to elect a candidate without the support of a simple majority because the system is

based on the electoral rule of plurality. Therefore, I examine other electoral systems that could fix the problem, and suggest adoption of the run-off system, which appears to be the best alternative to replace the current plurality system.

1. WHY ELECTORAL SYSTEM MATTERS?: A GENERIC IMPOSSIBILITY PROBLEM IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

In a democratic society, it is a very significant puzzle who will become the political leader of the society. Regardless of time and region, throughout the world history, this puzzle has been discussed as an essential agenda item to determine the foundation of a society. However, it becomes an even more important issue in a democratic society due to the characteristics of civil democracy mainly because almost everybody beyond a certain age is eligible to cast a vote to elect the leader of the society. The mass public engage in electing its political leader in a democratic society under the principle of universal suffrage in contrast to a system of monarchy or dictatorship where only a few people have influencing power in the selection of its political leader.

Consequently, in civil democratic societies, scholars and politicians have continuously debated over how to fairly aggregate all the votes cast by the mass public. However, Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" theoretically implies that it is very difficult to design such a nice democratic electoral system. In his seminal book *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1963), Kenneth Arrow proves systemically that it is impossible to satisfy simultaneously all five basic conditions necessary in any democratic method of aggregating individual preferences over specific alternatives[1] into the preference of the total society.

The five conditions could be interpreted as global or universal standards of fair decision-making in democratic politics. The five conditions are:[2]

1) Condition C (Collective Rationality; Rationality Assumption): If a society as whole prefers *a* to *b* and *b* to *c*, then the society prefers *a* to *c*.

2) Condition U (Universal Admissibility): Each individual in the society may adopt any complete and transitive preference ordering over the available alternatives.

3) Condition P (Pareto Optimality or Unanimity): If every individual of the society prefers *a* to *b* (or is indifferent between them)), the society preference must reflect a preference for *a* over *b* (or an indifference between them).

4) Condition I (Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives): If alternatives *a* and *b* stand in a particular relationship to one another in each group member's preferences, and this relationship does not change, then neither may the society preference between *a* and *b*. This is true even if individual preferences over other (irrelevant) available alternatives change.

5) Condition D (Nondictatorship): There is no distinguished individual in the society whose own preferences dictate the society preference, independent of the other individuals of the society.

Numerous studies since Arrow's have tried to refine the five basic conditions with hopes of finding a theoretical "possibility" for democratic and fair decision-making rule.

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[1] In election for example, running candidates are specific alternatives.
[2] The summary is borrowed from Shepsle and Bonchek (1997: 64-5).

However, the essence of Arrow's logic has yet to be negated.[3] According to his study, a dictator can rule even when four of the five conditions are satisfied. Here, a dictator is defined as a person who is able to enforce his decision over the entire society although the other members of the society do not agree with his decision. The possible existence of a dictator, thus, verifies that the society is not democratic.

In theory, according to the democratic decision-making, if 49 students prefer going on a picnic while only one student does not, then the students should go on the picnic.[4] But Arrow's study shows that they may not go to picnic even when applying democratic decision-making. Hence in an extreme case, his theorem implies that an unpopular candidate could be elected as the winner even without the majority support of votes.

Quite similar to the Arrow, William H. Riker presents how easily political decision-making can be manipulated. As the title of his book, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986), denotes, his study reveals the many features of politics open to political manipulation. Let's examine the key point of his arguments by setting up a simple example.

Suppose the democratic government of South Korea tries to decide its national policy of reunification by referendum, and also assume that there are three types of voters each with varying order of preference orderings over three possible alternatives as follows.[5]

1) Those who favor SQ (25% of total voters): SQ > RA > GR
2) Those who favor RA (30%): RA > GR > SQ
3) Those who favor GR (45%): GR > SQ >RA
   SQ: Status Quo
   RA: Reunification by Absorbing North Korea
   GR: Gradual Reunification
   [The inequality sign denotes that the left-hand-side alternative is preferred to the right-hand-side alternative.]

Those who favor status quo do not want reunification, yet if they have to choose between the two alternatives of reunification, the German model is preferred to the gradual reunification. Those who favor the RA model prefer reunification by absorbing North Korea to gradual reunification for the sake of rapid process, and they prefer either type of reunification to status quo. Those who favor gradual reunification are worried about possible negative effects of the process of absorbing North Korea, so they rather prefer status quo to the RA model. The question still remains which voting procedure will result in the choice of a particular reunification policy.

If we adopt a plurality system (winner-takes-all) where the alternative with the most votes is selected among the three alternatives, gradual reunification will be the national policy of South Korea. However, in reality, there are lots of different voting methods available. Let's suppose that we adopt a run-off system where the two top alternatives in the first voting, after eliminating the other alternative, are put in a final referendum.

[3]Sen, 1977 and 1982; Tullock, 1967; Plot, 1973 and 1976; Satterthwaite, 1975.

[4]We need three or more alternatives to get the result as the Arrows' theorem assumes.

[5]The author referring to the reality approximately composes this imaginary example. We may have other types and various distributions of voters, which the paper does not cover. Using the example, I only intend to show that we may have different outcomes according to different electoral systems under an identical distribution of voters. I assume, for the convenience of analysis, that voters are not indifferent between two alternatives and that all voters turn out.

Then, the winner will be the absorption model with a vote share of 55% because those who favor status quo will vote for the model in the final referendum. The status quo may also become the winner if the government holds a primary referendum between the two alternatives of reunification (RA and GR).[6] Therefore, any alternative can be the national reunification policy of Korea under different voting schemes. This phenomenon, called the "Paradox of Voting" by Condorcet, occurs because there exists a cyclical preference ordering for the entire society such that RA > GR > SQ > RA.

The above example illustrates how voting results vary according to voting method (Gibbard, 1973). Thus Riker shows that agenda setting such as selecting a voting scheme is the essence of political decision-making. If a political leader prefers the absorption model, the leader might manipulate the national policy by managing to adopt the run-off system. Of course, reality is more complicated than the example. But still even within reality, a powerful leader can produce a specific political outcome through the technique of agenda setting. In an extreme case, a leader can even derive an alternative disliked by most of voters, which is a dictatorship. Therefore, citizens in a democratic society should watch over their leaders and check whether they do something against the voters' will. Democratic citizens must realize that politics often has a hidden method of manipulation. Political scientists should help them understand the manipulative tools of politics.

2. THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMPLE MAJORITY

Political scientists have studied how a democratic voting system can be secured. However, the studies of Arrow's and Riker's imply that it is not easy to obtain an absolutely democratic voting rule. In his another study, *Liberalism against Populism* (1982), Riker concludes that only one voting system satisfies the fundamental democratic conditions[7] delineated by himself. This democratic case occurs when the rule of simple majority is applied to select the winner between two alternatives. However, there are lots of cases with more than two alternatives, which makes it a demanding job to implement a truly democratic voting system. We can presume that the final process of selecting a winner can be democratic with only two finalists left through a proper process of leaving out the other alternatives.[8]

The principle of simple majority requires the final winner to get more than 50% of effective votes. For example, let's suppose there are two candidates, A and B, and 100 eligible voters of whom 41 voters for A, 40 for B, and 19 voters abstain. Then, the winner should be A according to the principle because A has the support of simple majority (41 out of 81). If there are only two available alternatives, then it is not very difficult to keep this principle. However problems occur when there are more than two alternatives. If

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[6]Besides the voting methods mentioned here, there are many different ways. If we adopt a Borda Count system by assigning 0 point for the best alternative, 1 for the second best, and 2 for the worst, then gradual reunification will be the winner.

[7]Monotonicity: the condition such that the social preference for an alternative cannot be decreased if individuals' preference for the same alternative increases. Undifferentiatedness (Anonymity): the condition not allowing privilege for specific voters, e.g., assigning two votes for some while the others have only one vote each. Neutrality: the condition not discriminating available alternatives, e.g., the decision rule in the US jury system.

[8]Of course, as discussed in the previous section, manipulative agenda-setting is possible in the process of reducing alternatives.

there is an alternative C, as in the example of the previous section, then there are three pairwise combinations: A-B, B-C, and A-C. In this case, we must notice that some agenda-setting or manipulative arrangement can be mobilized to elect B or C as the final winner. Consequently, it is quite possible for a candidate or alternative without the support of simple majority to be the winner especially under the voting rule of plurality.

The US presidential-electoral system has institutionalized the principle of simple majority with the Electoral College system. It requires a candidate to secure the simple majority of electoral votes to enter the White House. Of course, it is possible that a loser in the primary election can have more support than the winner of the final election.[9] Nevertheless, the US system preserves well the minimum requirement of the democratic principle of simple majority, preventing relatively unpopular candidates from being elected.

In a democratic political system, even those without special qualifications can become political leaders. If a political leader claims to be the only candidate with political leadership and does not allow the people to evaluate, she/he is not a democratic leader but a dictator. What kind of qualification is necessary for a candidate to become a democratic leader? With respect to elections, the qualification can be represented by the condition that democratic political leaders must receive at least a certain level of public support, the simple majority, at the final stage of election. The US presidential-electoral system shows the point adequately.

3. THE KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL REGIONALISM

Does the Korean presidential-electoral system reflect the principle of simple majority properly? Unfortunately, the answer is no. Most of people agree with the conjecture that the former president Roh Tae Woo would not have been elected at the 13th presidential election if the opposition bloc had avoided the split between the two candidates Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. In the 1987 presidential election, Roh Tae Woo had a vote share of 36.6% whereas Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung received 28.0% and 27.1% respectively. Another candidate Kim Jong Pil had a vote share of 8.1%. The problem is that the support for the winner was just above 1/3 of the total popular votes. In an extreme case, it is possible that the remaining 63.4% may not have wanted to let Roh elected. And as Table 1 shows, the former president Kim Young Sam was elected with a vote share of 42% in the 1992 presidential election, and Kim Dae Jung received 40.3% in the 1997 presidential election. In these two elections, it is also possible that about 60% of voters may not have wanted to let them elected. If it is so, it means the majority opinions might have been ignored due to the electoral system of plurality. These cases show that the Korean presidents elected under the plurality rule may represent a minority with a majority denying them. For an imaginary illustration, if voters' support for five candidates is evenly distributed approximately, then a candidate with around 20% of total

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[9]With regard to popular votes not Electoral College, the US also has the problem of simple majority. For example, Bill Clinton didn't get the simple majority of popular votes in the 1992 presidential election because of the Ross Perot effect. In a sense, the Electoral College system is a voting scheme to keep up with the principle of simple majority formally.

Table 1. The Results of Presidential Elections (1987, 1992, 1997)

year	candidate	Party	the number of votes obtained	vote share (%)
1987	Roh Tae Woo	DJP	8,282,738	36.6
	Kim Young Sam	RDP	6,337,581	28
	Kim Dae Jung	PDP	6,113,375	27.1
	Kim Jong Pil	NDRP	1,823,067	8.1
1992	Kim Young Sam	DLP	9,977,332	42
	Kim Dae Jung	DP	8,041,284	33.8
	Jeong Ju Young	RNP	3,880,067	16.3
1997	Lee Hoi Chang	GNP	9,953,718	38.7
	Kim Dae Jung	NCNP	10,326,275	40.3
	Lee In Je	NNP	4,925,591	19.2

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
Note: DJP: Democratic Justice Party
       RDP: Reunification Democratic Party
       PDP: Peace Democratic Party
       NDRP: New Democratic Republican Party
       DLP: Democratic Liberty Party
       DP: Democratic Party
       RNP: Reunification National Party
       GNP: Grand National Party
       NCNP: New Congress for New Politics
       NNP: New National Party

votes may win the election under the plurality system.[10]

If Korea has consolidated a two-party system like the US and the Great Britain, the current plurality rule may allow voters to elect a winner with the support of simple majority. Korea, however, cannot be said to have a strengthened two-party system. As shown in the 1997 presidential election and others, major politicians have organized and disorganized political parties according to their interests. So we cannot expect the development of a two-party system in Korea in the near future. It implies again that the winner of simple majority would not be available frequently under the current Korean presidential-electoral rule and the multi-party system.

What is worse, the Korean voters have shown a propensity toward strong regionalism no matter whether they like it or not. The following table summarizes the results of the 1995 Korean regional elections.

The feature of the regional elections is the number of DLP supporters dropping dramatically in Kyungsangbuk-Do (37.93%) and Taegu (16.89%). Consequently, the majority party DLP suffered a big defeat in the elections by recording the total vote share 33.23%, which is even lower than what Roh Tae Woo received in the 1987 presidential election. The DP with Kim Dae Jung's indirect endorsement won in Chullanam-Do, Chullabuk-Do, Kwangju, and the most important region Seoul. The LDC led by Kim

[10]Assume there are candidates A, B, C, D, and E with the vote shares 20.1%, 20%, 20%, 20%, and 19.9% respectively.

Table 2. The Results of the 1995 Korean Regional Elections (Mayor and Governor)

Region	DLP	DP	LDC	Major Independ.	Etc.	Total
Seoul	980,510 20.72%	2,001,559 42.29%	- -	1,589,573 33.58%	161,606 3.41%	4,733,248
Pusan	885,008 51.38%	646,095 37.51%	-	170,746 9.91%	20,489 1.19%	1,722,338
Taegu	171,753 16.89%	- -	224,818 22.10%	374,392 36.81%	246,113 24.20%	1,017,076
Inchon	342,567 41.02%	265,981 31.85%	226,542 27.13%	- -	- -	835,090
Kwangju	52,298 10.20%	460,184 89.80%	- -	- -	- -	512,482
Taejon	112,349 20.95%	58,212 10.85%	341,899 63.74%	23,913 4.46%	- -	536,373
Kyunggi	1,191,960 40.33%	873,304 29.55%	302,665 10.24%	587,896 19.89%	- -	2,955,825
Kangwon	258,004 34.06%	- -	499,567 65.94%	- -	- -	757,571
Chungchungbuk	159,863 23.29%	168,172 24.50%	250,077 36.44%	54,743 7.98%	53,476 7.79%	686,331
Chungchungnam	173,673 19.18%	117,044 12.93%	614,571 67.89%	- -	- -	905,288
Chullanam	319,000 32.89%	650,836 67.11%	- -	- -	- -	969,836
Chullabuk	277,403 26.50%	769,520 73.50%	- -	- -	- -	1,046,923
Kyungsangbuk	541,172 37.93%	- -	396,042 27.76%	489,548 34.31%	-	1,426,762
Kyungsangnam	1,150,367 64.02%	- -	646,455 35.98%	- -	- -	1,796,822
Cheju	88,849 32.53%	66,281 24.27%	- -	111,024 40.65%	6,947 2.54%	273,101
Total	6,704,776 33.23%	6,077,188 30.12%	3,502,636 17.36%	3,401,835 16.86%	488,631 2.42%	20,175,066

Source: *Joongang Ilbo*, 06/29/95.
Note: Each percentage is the ratio to the total on the right hand side.
    DLP: Democratic Liberal Party
    DP: Democratic Party
    LDC: Liberal Democratic Coalition

Jong Pil won in Chungchungnam-Do, Chungchungbuk-Do, Kangwon-Do, and Taejon. The independent candidates won in Cheju-Do and Taegu. So the system of 5-4-4-2 (DLP-DP-LDC-Independents) was formed as a result of the regional elections.

With respect to total vote share in the 1995 regional elections, the DLP had 33.23%, the DP 30.12%, the LDC 17.36%, and major independents 16.86%. The distribution among the four major factions appears similar to that of the four party system before the 1990 grand coalition of the Democratic Justice Party, the Reunification Democratic Party, and the New Democratic Republican Party. What made this phenomenon? We may illustrate several causes such as the people's disappointment with major policies made by the central government, power struggle in the majority party, and major disastrous accidents that occurred in succession before the elections. The most important cause, however, is the chronic regionalism existing in the current Korean politics. The results revealed clearly that regionalism still worked very actively in Korean politics. We can identify the regional bases for the three parties without much difficulty: the DLP - Kyungsang area, the DP - Chulla area, and LDC - Chungchung area.

In addition to the regional elections, the 1996 general elections for the 15th National Assembly and the 1997 presidential election also proved that regionalism still had strong influence on Korean politics. The following tables show the results of these two elections.

Similarly to the results of the 1995 regional elections, the GNP (the Grand National Party) didn't have a big support in Kyungsangbuk-Do (34.9%) and Taegu (24.5%) in the 1996 elections as expected. But the GNP showed a preponderance in two of its regional

Table 3. The Results of the 1996 General Elections for the 15th National Assembly

Region	GNP	NCNP	UDP	LDC	Independ.	Etc.
Seoul	36.5%	35.2%	13.5%	11.3%	3.1%	0.4%
Pusan	55.8	6.4	18.8	5.5	11.7	1.8
Taegu	24.5	1.4	4	35.8	29.7	4.6
Inchon	38.2	29.5	11	14.5	5.9	1
Kwangju	7.5	86.2	2	0.8	3.4	0.1
Taejon	21.4	11.4	12.6	49.8	4.1	0.6
Kyunggi	33.2	27.4	13.9	18.6	6.6	0.2
Kwangwon	37.7	6.7	14.5	23.6	17.7	0.2
Chungchungbuk	31.5	8.9	8.9	39.4	10.9	0.4
Chungchungnam	28.9	6.1	7.9	51.2	5.5	0.3
Chullabuk	23.4	63.7	5.8	0.5	5.7	0.8
Chullanam	17.7	71	1.3	0.8	9.3	0
Kyungsangbuk	34.9	1.6	6.9	20.6	33.3	2.7
Kyungsangnam	46.5	4.2	14.7	4.7	28.7	1.1
Cheju	37.2	29.4	0	2	30.2	1.2
	34.5%	25.3%	11.2%	16.2%	11.8%	1%

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
Note: GNP: Grand National Party
        NCNP: New Congress for New Politics
        UDP: United Democratic Party
        LDC: Liberal Democratic Coalition

Table 4. The Results of the 1997 Presidential Election

	Lee Hoi Chang (GNP)	Kim Dae Jung (NCNP)	Lee In Je (NNP)
Seoul	40.9%	44.9%	12.8%
Pusan	56.3	15.3	29.8
Taegu	72.7	12.5	13.1
Inchon	36.4	38.5	23
Kwangju	1.7	97.3	0.7
Taejon	29.2	45	24.1
Ulsan	51.4	15.4	26.7
Kyunggi	36.5	39.3	23.6
Kwangwon	43.2	23.8	30.9
Chungchungbuk	30.8	37.4	29.4
Chungchungnam	23.5	48.3	26.1
Chullabuk	4.5	92.3	2.1
Chullanam	3.2	94.6	1.4
Kyungsangbuk	61.9	13.7	21.8
Kyungsangnam	56.1	11	31.3
Cheju	36.3	40.5	20.5
	38.7%	40.3%	19.2%

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
Note: GNP: Grand National Party
      NCNP: National Congress for New Politics
      NNP: New National Party

bases, Pusan (55.8%) and Kyungsangnam-Do (46.5%). The NCNP with Kim Dae Jung's return to political activities won overwhelmingly in Kwangju, Chullabuk-Do and Chullanam-Do. And the LDC led by Kim Jong Pil had a dominant vote share of 49.8% and 51.2% in Taejon and Chungchungnam-Do respectively. Likewise, we can identify the regional bases for the three parties so easily and, even if we admit the existence of other causes, we cannot deny that the determinant cause of these results is the strong regionalism.

The tendency of voting based on regionalism can be seen more easily in the 1997 presidential election (Table 4). The candidate Lee Hoi Chang showed a preponderance in Pusan (56.3%), Taegu (72.7%), Ulsan (51.4%), Kyungsangbuk-Do (61.9%) and Kyungsangnam-Do (56.1%), namely, in Kyungsang area. Kim Dae Jung won especially in his well-known regional bases overwhelmingly. We cannot ignore other factors such as the people's disappointment with economic policies of Kim Young Sam's government criticized for causing so-called IMF crisis, and the rising interest in economic policies to tide over the difficult situation. Nevertheless, it is certain that Kim Dae Jung took successfully advantage of the chronic regionalism and therefore his success for presidency owed much to the strong regionalism.

If Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil had failed to agree on the cabinet system and Kim Jong Pil had also applied for presidency, the votes would have scattered according to the three candidates' different regional bases and thus Kim Dae Jung would have failed to be elected or had a lower vote share than 40%. Another feature of this election is that despite the landslides in Kwangju(97.3%), Chullanam-Do(94.6%) and Chullabuk-

Do(92.3%) by the aid of regionlism, Kim Dae Jung didn't get the support of a simple majority in the whole election. Lee Hoi Chang had the vote share of 38.7% and Kim Dae Jung got 40.3% votes. Even if the support of Kim Dae Jung in this presidential election didn't come up to a simple majority, that of around 40% was good enough for him to be president under the electoral rule of plurality in Korea.

Seeing the regionalism-prone results of elections repeatedly, major politicians can calculate their probabilities of winning presidential elections based on the propensity of the voters' political regionalism. They may try to secure only the support of voters in a specific region because they don't need broader support, such as the support of simple majority, to be the president. Then, the vicious cycle of biased regionalism for the interests of specific politicians appears repeatedly instead of a constructive political environment.

In short, under the electoral rule of plurality in Korea, we have the serious problem that it is highly likely for a candidate with a vote share around 35% to become president. The current electoral rule of plurality does not permit us to identify which candidate has the support of simple majority or which candidate is opposed by a simple majority. If political regionalism deepens more and more, politicians may think they could win the presidential election with a much lower support rate. That is, they would try to secure a certain region to challenge for the presidency.

4. HOW TO REFORM THE CURRENT KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTORAL SYSTEM

How can we achieve the true civil democracy and political development in Korea? As well as discussing lots of barriers and negative factors against the political development in Korea, we need to ask ourselves why Korean parties have been negligent in developing their policy lines. My simple answer to this question is because the development of policy lines was not necessary for Korean politicians. If Korean politicians are considered as rational actors, then they would try to achieve maximum benefits available with minimum costs. In other words, they would try to maximize their political power in the easiest way. If resorting to regionalism is more likely and easily to attract more votes than developing policy lines, they would choose surely to exploit the regionalism. Therefore it appears that Korean politicians acted rationally when resorting to regionalism in most of the recent elections.

The logic of politics was too strong to persuade Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil to retire from politics. Ethical slogans, e.g. requesting them to give more chance to their successors, did not work in the world of politics because the slogans are not objective but subjective. Political ethics or morality, as Niccolo Machiavelli suggested long time ago, is quite different from the ethics of everyday lives. There is a unique logic in politics. For example, although the bible recommends us to love our enemies or to turn the other cheek when hit, such moral behavior could actually be immoral behavior in the world of politics. Suppose a political leader always capitulates to the demand of the neighboring country. Could we regard the leader politically ethical or moral if the neighbor occupies the country finally? In this case, the leader should be evaluated as having disobeyed the political ethics of her/his professionalism and responsibility to her/his people.

According to a famous definition of politics, politics is necessarily involved with

authoritative allocation of values. What does it mean being authoritative? Based on legiti-macy or naked power, authority can enforce a person to do something even though the person does not want to do it. If authority is related to matters of allocation, there is a tremendous gap between those who control and those who are controlled. Therefore, we can say that the mechanism of politics tends always to encourage people in politics to maximize their power and authority. It is a naive idea to ask politicians to be modest politically with every ethics in mind. So most journalistic criticisms on Kim Dae Jung's return to political activities did not sound adequate within the logic of politics because they usually focused on superficial and emotional opinions without considering the dif-ference between political logic and everyday ethics.

Therefore, most of the criticisms against Kim Dae Jung's return were along everyday ethics such as not to tell a lie, however, they were not political evaluations along the logic of politics. Of course, some may believe that liars cannot become good political leaders. However such logic is rather ambiguous in evaluating politicians' quality. Who knows how his return will contribute to the development of Korean politics? Such criticisms cannot be an ultimate evaluation of politicians although they may influence the evalua-tion of politicians. The final evaluation should be made in the elections with the politi-cians running as candidates.

The bad news is, as emphasized continuously, the current Korean presidential-electoral system does not allow voters to evaluate a political leader objectively whether the leader has democratic support or not. If Korea has a two-party system like the US, the current electoral system is not a problem. This is because the winner will get the support of sim-ple majority voters, and the loser will turn out not having enough support. However, this is not the case for Korea. Thus the current electoral system had better be changed to eval-uate politicians objectively and achieve a democratic political leader because Korea does not have a solid two-party system.

Then, what alternative electoral systems are available to replace the current system of plurality? The best voting rule would be the Condorcet pairwise competition theoretical-ly. This electoral rule requires all the candidates to be individually compared to one another. If there is a candidate who defeats all the other candidates in every pair competi-tion, the candidate is declared the winner (the Condorcet Winner). However, this rule is rarely introduced in the real world of electoral politics. With lots of candidates generating too many pairwise competitions, voters become confused and exhausted in the process of voting. And according to the studies of voting, the Condorcet Winner cannot be found sometimes in reality. The Borda Count is also too demanding of voters' efforts because the voters need to rank all the candidates. The Borda Count also has a generic problem in finding a candidate with the support of simple majority. (Grofman and Lijphart, 1986)

Studies of Arrow's and Riker's ascertain that it is almost impossible to elect a political leader with the support of a simple majority in one election under the current political sit-uation of Korea. And Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" reminds us to look for, not an absolute but a relatively democratic rule of voting. The best direction then will be to cre-ate a two-candidate competition at the final stage of presidential election by adopting a run-off system. By doing so, the principle of simple majority will work automatically in the final election as Riker's study proves.

We must think over the reason deeply why France and Russia have adopted the run-off system for their presidential elections. If I define a candidate who loses any head-to-head competition, the candidate can be defined a "Condorcet Loser." Note that a run-off rule

Table 5. Presidential Election in the French Fifth republic: 1965-1995

Year of Election	Candidate	Percentage of votes	
		1st Ballot	2nd Ballot
1965	De Gaulle	43.7	54.5
	Mitterrand	32.2	45.5
	Lecanuet	15.8	
1969	Pompidou	44.0	57.6
	Poher	23.4	42.4
	Duclos	21.5	
1974	Mitterrand	43.3	49.3
	Giscard d'Estaing	32.9	50.6
	Chaban-Delmas	14.6	
1981	Giscard d'Estaing	27.8	47.8
	Mitterrand	26.1	52.2
	Chirac	18.0	
1988	Mitterrand	34.1	54.0
	Chirac	19.9	46.0
	Barre	16.5	
1995	Jospin	23.3	47.4
	Chirac	20.8	52.6
	Baladur	18.6	

does never allow a "Condorcet Loser" from being elected. Unfortunately, the Korean plurality rule can elect the "Condorcet Loser" under voters' specific preference orderings, which is quite possible under current multi-party system. The French presidential-electoral system has adopted a run-off rule such that the two top candidates of plurality run at the final election if no candidate acquires the support of simple majority in the first election. Of course, it is possible theoretically that a candidate who might defeat the final winner would be dropped out in the first election. However, the run-off system is much better than the plurality rule because politicians without the support of majority can be prevented from winning the presidential election in the final round. The following table shows the results of the last six French presidential elections.

Among the six elections, the first round winner was defeated three times by the runner-up in the final ballot. Of course, the elected presidents are the winners of the final election. Why do French people prefer to pay the costs of holding one more election? The answer is simple: theoretically, keeping the minimum formality of democracy, that is the formal implementation of the principle of simple majority in the final stage of electing the highest government official; and practically, the more benefits estimated from electing presidents with more popularity in the final round. Korean politics had better learn from the French democratic rule of presidential election because Korea has multi-party system like France. We should be aware that political manipulation is more likely to occur in the multi-party system rather than in the two party system.

The only drawback of the run-off system is the requirement of holding an additional election if there is no winner with a simple majority in the first election. Yet, I contend

that the economic and technological capabilities of Korea can surely afford an additional presidential election. In respect of cost/benefit analysis, the run-off system may generate more benefits than the costs for additional election. Democracy with more public support can reduce unnecessary political costs mobilized to maintain authoritarian or unpopular democratic regimes. Notice that the past authoritarian regimes of Korea spent huge amount of money to hold up their popularity. Therefore, I am certain that the benefits of electing the president with the support of simple majority exceed the costs of one more presidential election.

5. PROSPECTS

By adopting a run-off system in the Korean presidential-electoral system, several positive effects are expected. First, political regionalism would be weakened. The enforcement of the principle of simple majority might block the idea that securing one region is enough to be the winner. Because currently no one region has the support of a simple majority, those who are interested in getting elected as president will try to gain multi-regional support by coalition. Then, the trend of deepening regionalism would be attenuated.

As the result, each party may seek policy lines and platforms, enabling the parties with similar policy to align with each other. The parties are likely to develop their own policy for broader public support because regional coalition is fragile or not enough to win the presidential election. The development of democratic conscience among voters will also contribute to fixing political regionalism. The voters of simple majority will refuse to support the parties pursuing regionalism under the run-off system. Therefore, the effects of regionalism would be reduced definitely under the run-off system because the winner will need much broader support of voters.

The policy competition may push the parties towards a two-party system in the long run. According to the Duverger's Law (Duverger, 1963), the run-off system is likely to promote a multi-party system as in France (Schlesinger and Schlesinger, 1990).[11] However, I am rather inclined to predict the development of a two-party system under the run-off system because of the unique environment of Korean politics. Parties without enough chance to deliver a presidency have been almost ignored in Korean politics. Therefore, the minor parties will not show up as the main characters under the run-off. Then, the run-off system may promote the emergence of a few parties that will end up two major parties capable of delivering presidency.

Finally, the policy competition encouraged by the run-off system would increase the possibility of leadership transition between/among major parties. Korean voters in previous elections were heavily dependent on political regionalism and private networks to cast their votes rather than evaluating the policies and qualification of candidates. If they have contrasting policy lines of major parties, they would try to punish or reward the incumbents.

The run-off system is more democratic theoretically than the current plurality rule for electing president under the existing Korean multi-party system. I argue that the benefits

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[11] The Duverger's Law also says that simple majority and single ballot system favor two-party system whereas proportional representation system favors multi-party system (Riker, 1982b).

derived from adopting more democratic electoral rules will exceed the costs of implementing one more ballot in the presidential elections ultimately, which can be supported indirectly by the run-off practices of French and Russian presidential elections. We must notice that the typical practices of democracy are elections to choose public representatives. So we don't have to be afraid of implementing one more ballot cast for democratic citizens

The most important reason why Korea had better adopt the run-off system is because the current plurality system promotes more and more division among the Korean people. With respect to the principle of simple majority, the current Korean presidential-electoral system is relatively undemocratic under the current situation of Korean politics, however we have the better alternative: the run-off. Korean democratic consolidation would be enhanced to meet the global standards of democratic politics by adopting the run-off system which would generate the possible positive effects illustrated above.

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