1. Mencius’ Arguments

Mencius offers, in general, two main arguments for his theory of human nature that man is originally good. The first, which I will call a psychological argument, is stated in the Book of Mencius, 6A:6:7:\textsuperscript{1}

The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them,... Hence it is said, “Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.” Men differ

\textsuperscript{1} The argument is also stated in the Book of Mencius, 2A:6:3-7 in a slightly different way.
from one another in regard to them; - - some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount - - it is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers. 2)

The argument may be summarized in three steps. (a) All men without exception are born with four kinds of feeling of sympathy-commiseration, shame-dislike, modesty-complaisance (or declining-yielding or reverence-respect), and right-wrong (or approving-disapproving). 3) These feelings are innate or natural in that they are not due to inculcation or examples or social pressure but are "native" to man. (b) These feelings are the "seeds" or "beginnings" of good in the sense that, if fully cultivated or developed, they become four virtues, i.e., humanity (or benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (or knowledge). They are, to use Richards' words, "the minimal manifestations" or "the first and lowest signs" of virtues. 4) That is, the feeling of sympathy-commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame-dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of modesty-complaisance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right-wrong is the beginning of wisdom. 5) (c) The cultivation or development here means that the feelings should be expanded or enlarged to other areas by means of education. Men may become very different from one another in regard to virtues, but it is because they did not "carry out fully their natural powers," 6) not because they were originally born with different degrees of innate feelings. In this sense we may say that virtues "are not infused

2) Unless otherwise stated, the text quoted in this paper is from The Works of Mencius: The Chinese Classics, Vol. II, Hong Kong, 1960, trans. by James Legge.

3) I am here following Richards in using hyphens for expressing the four different feelings, for it indicates that the groups of Chinese characters "stand for units of meaning which should be taken together." J.A. Richards, Mencius on the Mind, London, 1964, p. 14.

4) Ibid., p. 68.

5) In this paper I use the words "seeds" and "beginnings" interchangeably, although, strictly speaking, they may be different from one another.

intous from without. We are certainly furnished with them." 7) Mencius thus says that if we expand "what we will not bear" (the feeling of sympathy-commiseration) to the area of "what we can bear," then there will be the virtue of humanity. If we expand "what we will not do" (the feeling of shame-dislike) to the area of "what we will do", then there will be the virtue of righteousness. 8)

All in all, the argument is based on the belief that such innate feelings are essential constituents of human nature and that they can be expanded to the realm of morality by means of education. This implies that morality can be derived from the development of human nature itself, not from, say, God's commandments or other external inducements.

Mencius' second argument, which I will call a "higher-principle" argument, is stated in the Book of Mencius, 6A:16:3:

Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes the great is a great man.... Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men.... Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him.... There is a nobility of Heaven, and there is anobility of man.... The men of antiquity cultivated their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came to them in its train. The men of the present day cultivate their nobility of Heaven in order to seek for the nobility of man, and when they have obtained that, they throw away the other; their delusion is extreme. The issue is simply this, that they must lose that nobility of man as well.

The argument starts with the principle of relative importance,

8) Ibid., 7B:31:1.
namely, that we pay our attention to different parts of our body according to their relative importance. For example, the man who takes good care of his fingers and neglects his shoulders and back is a fool. He who nourishes the small parts will become a small man; and he who nourishes the great parts will become a great man. Mencius then argues that man consists of small parts (emotional elements) and great parts (rational elements). The emotional elements embody what may be called a lower principle, or, in Mencius' own words, a nobility of man, in that, if not properly controlled by the latter, they may lead to evil. The rational elements embody what may be called a higher principle or a nobility of Heaven, in that their main function is to limit the gratification of emotion, so to speak.  

But this does not mean that man's emotional elements should be suppressed or oppressed by the rational elements. This is both impossible and undesirable. First of all, as explained in the psychological argument, there are within emotional elements the four kinds of natural and moral feelings as well as other desires for wealth, food, sex, and etc. Secondly, these desires are neutral in the sense that while they are not the beginnings of good for themselves, they need not be obstacles to the development of the four feelings. This was well expressed in Mencius' reply to King Hsuan of Ch'i: "If your Majesty love wealths, let your people enjoy the same... If your Majesty love sex, let your people enjoy the same, and what difficulty will there be for you to become the true king of the empire?" On the contrary, man's emotional elements, if properly guided, may become, in Creel's words, the "surest guarantors of moral conduct."

On the other hand, Mencius was well aware that man's emotional nature does not always become "the surest guarantors of moral

9) Here the word "emotion" is used in a wider sense, including the four innate feelings as well as other desires for wealth, food, sex, and so forth.
10) Book of Mencius, 6A:1561.
conduct" because of evil external influences such as unqualified teachers, inhumane governments, corrupt society, and so forth. It can easily be frustrated or overpowered by evil circumstances.

Fortunately, man has, Mencius argues, a rational nature as well as an emotional nature; and whenever he is in danger of being defeated by evil powers, he wants to and tries to follow a higher principle inherent in his rational nature. What man should do therefore is to let this higher principle prevail, control, govern, regulate, or direct the lower principle inherent in his emotional nature. For the neglect of the higher principle will inevitably lead to the "loss" of the lower. The ancient sages, for example, diligently cultivated the nobler part or a nobility of Heaven, and the inferior part or a nobility of man "naturally followed." 13 Today people are concerned with the cultivation of the nobility of Heaven. Mencius exclaims, only to seek the nobility of man; and once they surely lose the nobility of man as well. If we build up the nobler part of our nature, the inferior part can never take it away.

Mencius thus believes that there is a difference rather than an inherent opposition between emotion and reason. Man's emotional nature is only a lower principle of morality, but it is still a principle we cannot and should not do away with. 14 But this does not make man originally good. Man is originally good because he has within himself a higher principle of reason as well as a lower principle of emotion. This is why man wants to or tries to follow a higher principle whenever he is in danger of being defeated by evil powers. To use Legge's words, man is originally good, not because he is a "creature of appetites and passions," but because he is "lifted up into a higher circle of intelligence.

13) Book of Mencius, 6A:15:4. (Chan's translation)
14) Perhaps this is why Cheng argues that, unlike Kantian ethics, Confucian ethics "need not be a matter of strict rationality." In Confucian ethics "the feeling of inclination which are rooted in the subject-nature of self enter into morality and indeed create or shape both an understanding of good and a will to fulfill good," Chung-ying Cheng, "Dialectic of Confucian Morality and Metaphysics of Man," Philosophy East and West, 21, April 1971, p. 118.
2. A general examination of Mencius' arguments

Here I will make only a few general remarks on the question whether Mencius has proved his thesis that man is originally good; a more thorough examination will be given in the final section, where I will compare Mencius' arguments with those of Kant.

The psychological argument is based on our *de facto* feelings, and so has some psychological appeal. But it obviously falls short of showing that there are sufficient grounds to accept his thesis rather than other theories of human nature. (a) It is not clear at all whether man is born with originally good seeds, evil seeds, both of them, or neither of them. Our daily experience seems to substantiate a "middle position," i.e., that man is neither good nor evil, or that man is good as much as evil, or that man is partly good and partly evil, rather than an extreme position that man is entirely good or evil. (b) Mencius offers no inductive support for his thesis. He simply speculates on human nature on the basis of his own subjective opinion. It must be noted that his reasoning is neither inductive, and as a result, his argument, if it is an argument at all, is purely an arbitrary one. 16) Richards comments on this point:

... it is no part of Mencius' purpose to analyse, justify or discuss them (four feelings and four virtues) in general. The casuistry of them, the discussion of particular examples, is a main part of his work and all psychological argumentation may be regarded as an apology to enforce them... Since all men know them and accept them, his task is only to encourage men's energies to flow into

16) Strictly speaking, no philosopher offers any inductive or deductive account of human nature. But this problem is more pertinent to Mencius who, unlike other moralists, professes to offer his theory of human nature as a description, not a prescription.
their development. 17)

(c) Mencius observes several human actions which are closely related to the feelings of sympathy-commiseration or of shame-dislike, and then generalizes that all men have these feelings. But this is a case of "hasty generalization." Furthermore, even if we suppose that we know the general nature of man, good or evil, this knowledge is so general that it can give us no insight into determining why a particular person, Dick or Jane, ought to act freely in a certain way. In short, Mencius cannot avoid the charge of hasty generalization, and even if we accept his generalization, he cannot avoid the charge of "hasty particularization."

The higher-principle argument also fails because it is based on an unwarranted assumption that man has two different principles. (a) It is an unwarranted assumption because Mencius does not even endeavor to prove that there are such principles. Furthermore, even if we accept such principles, it does not follow that all human action is solely controlled by them. Besides or over such principles, there may very well be other principles, such as survival, teleology, purposiveness, or whatever. (b) Mencius' characterization of man as having both an emotional nature is undoubtedly dualistic, and this dualism seems to undermine the validity of Mencius' universal characterization of human nature as entirely good. (c) Mencius does not down grade man's emotional nature as something diametrically opposed to morality. To be sure, it is something less than a higher moral principle, but, as I mentioned before, it is still a principle to guide man's action. This means that, since man can follow either of the two principles, Mencius must show exactly why man should freely follow a higher principle rather than follow a lower principle. It is not enough to say that there are two different principles; Mencius still must prove that, as far as morality is concerned, the world governed by a higher principle does or should control the world governed by a lower

17) Richards, op. cit., p. 69.
principle, and that man ought to live as a member of the former world, despite the fact that he can also live as a member of the latter.

3. Kant's Arguments

In the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant wants to show that a categorical imperative is a universal and necessary moral principle, and he offers two different kinds of arguments. He starts with an assumption that our ordinary moral discourse is meaningful and, in addition, that our ordinary moral judgments are usually true. He then asks what are the conditions that must hold if this claim is to be justified, and this is what he calls an "analytical argument." By addressing those who share his basic moral convictions about what is right and what is wrong, about who is to be praised or blamed, in the first chapter of the *Foundations* Kant attempts to lead us, by an analytical argument, from our ordinary moral judgments to a philosophical statement of the first principle of morality, namely, a categorical imperative. By addressing those who grant the meaningfulness of our ordinary moral discourse but may embrace principles other than a categorical imperative, in the second chapter of the *Foundations* Kant attempts to formulate, still by an analytical argument, the principle in many different ways. In the third and final chapter of the *Foundations* Kant attempts to derive the supreme moral principle from pure practical reason itself, and this is what he calls

18) If we define morality by the idea of the predominance of a higher principle, this objection does not hold. But Mencius' ethics is not "definitional."

19) Mencius' analogy of water, mentioned in his reply to his opponent Kao Tzu, who argues that human nature is neither good nor evil, makes fairly good sense. He says that man's original nature is good just as water flows downward, although it can become evil in the same way that water can be forced to flow upward by some artificial means. *Book of Mencius*, 6A:2:2-3. But an analogy is not a proof. It is but a figure understood only within its context. Furthermore, the same analogy can successfully be used to show the thesis that human nature is originally evil.
a "synthetical argument." 20)

The analytical arguments roughly run as follows: According to Kant, nothing in the world is absolutely good except a good will; a good will alone is good without qualification. All "gifts of nature" or "gifts of fortune" are also good, but "without the principle of a good will they can become extremely bad," 21) In addition, a good will is good, not for what it accomplishes, but for what it intends. Even if it could not achieve anything, it would still "sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself." 22) In short, it is good "only because of its willing, i.e., it is good in itself." 23) And this good will "dwell in the natural sound understanding" of all rational beings. 24)

The concept of a good will, says Kant, is "contained" in the concept of duty. And the analysis of the concept of duty shows that actions are morally worthy (a) if they are done from a sense of duty, not from inclination, and/or (b) if they are done not only in accordance with duty but for the sake of duty. But to act for the sake of duty is to act out of respect for the laws; the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effort which is expected from it, but rather in the following the law itself. And this law, which can "determine the will without reference to the expected result" 25) and thus demand a universal conformity of all actions, takes the following form: "Would I be content that my maxim should hold as a universal law for

20) The words "analytical" and "synthetical" should not be confused with "analytic judgment" and "synthetic judgment." According to Kant, an analytical argument is done by a mere analysis of the concept occurring in the argument; a synthetical argument is done by a critical examination of pure practical reason itself. For this difference I use the words "analytical" and "synthetical" rather than "analytic" and "synthetic."

21) Ak. 394. Kant's text quoted in this paper is Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1959, trans. by Lewis White Beck. But it will be signified by the original Akademie edition numbers.

22) Ibid., Ak. 394.

23) Ibid., Ak. 397.

24) Ibid., Ak. 397.

25) Ibid., Ak. 402.
myself as well as for others?" or "Can I will that my maxim become a universal law?" What is important here is that we cannot draw this universal law by generalizing some examples of moral actions given to us in experience. Furthermore, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all. It follows that "all moral concepts have their seat and origin entirely a priori in reason.""27)

Now to show that a categorical imperative is possible (justified), Kant continues, we have to show that the principles on which it commands are valid and binding for all rational beings. The imperative of skill and prudence presents no problem, for it involves an analytic proposition, i.e., that any rational agent who wills an end necessarily wills the means to that end as well. But the imperative of morality (categorical imperative) cannot be justified in this way, for, as we have already seen, "we cannot show with certainty by any example that the will is here determined by the law alone without any other incentives."28) In order to justify it we have to show that man as a rational agent would necessarily and freely act in a certain way, and this cannot be done by an analytical argument.

Kant's synthetical argument, roughly runs as follows: All rational beings have a will, and a will can act in two different ways. It can act without being forced by something other than itself, namely, by a law of freedom, or it can act, as in the case of irrational beings, only so far as it is forced by something other than itself, namely, by a law of necessity. Now since the law of freedom must be self-imposed, not other imposed, freedom is identical with autonomy. And since autonomy is the principle of morality, as Kant has already proved in the previous chapters of the Foundations, a free will is a will under moral laws.

But here arises a problem of "vicious circle." We argue that one must suppose himself free because he is under moral laws, and then argue that one must be under moral laws because he has supposed

26) Ibid., Ak. 403.
27) Ibid., Ak. 411.
28) Ibid., Ak. 419.
that he is free. The solution of this problem lies in the "doctrine of two standpoints" which was explicated in the Critique of Pure Reason. To be brief, we must suppose that man belongs to two different words—a sensible world which is given to senses and an intelligible world which can be conceived but can never be known. When man regards himself as belonging exclusively to the sensible world, he is completely subject to the law of cause and effect. But when he regards himself as belonging exclusively to the intelligible world, he is subject to the laws which "have their grounds in reason alone" and his actions are entirely free.

But the concept of freedom, without which there can be no moral judgments, is, Kant continues, only an "idea of reason" whose "objective reality in itself is doubtful" in the sense that it always produces "unconditional concepts which go beyond sense and can have no empirical example."29 This means that there can be no full explanation of the concept of freedom and this, in turn, means that there can be no full explanation of morality either.

4. A comparative study of Mencius and Kant

In order to show the invalidity of Mencius' theory of human nature, in this final section I will make reference to Kant's efforts to justify his own "science of morality." Kant talks relatively little about human nature, except in one chapter of the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. So, it seems safe to conclude that he does not advocate any theory of human nature. In fact, he says that we cannot sensibly discuss human nature as such, for such a discussion

29) Ibid., Ak, 458.
30) One might argue that the "rational human being" to whom Kant's ethics is addressed is a kind of characterization of human nature. But I say he does not advocate any theory of human nature simply because he does not base his discussion of man on the goodness or evil of human nature, as it has been done in Chinese philosophy.
cannot be fully based on experience. All we can talk about is human "predispositions" toward good and human "propensities" toward evil.

Nevertheless, our reference to Kant will be very useful for the following reasons. In the Foundations Kant tries to justify the universality and necessity of a categorical imperative, in a way similar to that in which Mencius tries to justify the universality of his theory of human nature. As I explained elsewhere, their arguments have many similarities and, more importantly, have the same logical form or structure, although what they want to prove are very different from one another. Kant's efforts to provide an apodictic justification for a categorical imperative will therefore shed some light on our understanding exactly what Mencius' arguments are, in what manner they are offered, and on what assumptions, if any, they are based. I will thus compare Mencius' psychological argument with Kant's analytical arguments, and this will show that Mencius' theory of human nature, which claims to be universal, must be justified, if at all, by some nonempirical arguments. I will then compare Mencius' higher principle argument with Kant's synthetical argument and hope to show that Mencius has failed to provide the justification for the universality of his theory of human nature, in the same way that Kant has failed. Of course, Kant's failure itself does not prove Mencius' failure, but it will show that there are sufficient grounds to conclude that Mencius' arguments are doomed to failure.

In the first chapter of the Foundations Kant draws, solely from our ordinary moral judgments, the concept of duty and of a universal law whose form is a categorical imperative. But in the second chapter he insists that this does not mean that we can derive the concept of duty and of a categorical imperative by generalizing examples of

31) Kant in fact talks a lot about a priori elements involved in experience. The point here is that any theory of human nature, if it is to be valid, must be based on a priori inferences rather than on inductive inferences.

moral action given to us in experience. Morality can never be based on empirical examples for the following several reasons. One, morality is not a matter of blind imitation; the most such examples can do is to encourage us to act dutifully. Two, it is because we already possess a moral principle that we can judge an action to be an example of moral action, and not the other way around. Three, most of all, “no experience can give occasion for inferring the possibility of such apodictic laws” because everything in experience is contingent or conditioned, not necessary or unconditioned. But morality must be valid with absolute necessity; it must not be merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions, Kant states:

It cannot be shown by any example (i.e., it cannot be empirically shown) whether or not there is such [a categorical] imperative; it is rather to be suspected that all imperatives which appear to be categorical may yet be hypothetical, but in a hidden way. What is worse, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all. For we cannot tell with certainty whether or not an action is done according to a will that is “determined by the law alone without any other incentives.” This means that we must derive the supreme moral principle, if it is possible at all, from pure practical reason itself; we must go beyond experience “to a critical examination of the subject, i.e., of the pure practical reason.” But such an examination brings up the question of synthetic a priori concepts, Kant says, and this will be done, by a synthetical argument, in the third chapter of the Foundations.

Now we are in a position to appreciate more fully the significance of Kant’s analytical arguments for Mencius’ psychological argument,

37) Ibid., Ak., 440.
33) Kant, op. cit., Ak., 408.
34) Strictly speaking, the demonstration of the possibility of an absolute moral law is, according to Kant, necessary “only for its explanation and not for its establishment” (Ak., 420). So the word “possibility” here should be taken as “justification.”
35) Kant, op. cit., Ak., 419.
36) Ibid., Ak., 419.
where, by appealing to our *de facto* empirical feelings, he offers an empirical justification for the universality of his theory of human nature. If Kant is correct, this sort of empirical appeal will never provide a justification for Mencius’ universal statement that all men without exception are originally good. Mencius’ argument will not establish what it purports to establish, not only because, as I mentioned before, it commits the fallacy of hasty generalization and of hasty particularization, but more fundamentally, because no contingent empirical examples can provide a justification for universal statements such as Mencius’ theory. Furthermore, we cannot even be sure that there are such examples at all because we cannot tell with certainty whether act of commiseration, for example, is performed out of the agent’s original good nature, or out of other “incentives,” or out of both.

To repeat, Mencius’ psychological argument fails because all empirical examples are contingent and are thus unable to prove or disprove any necessary and unconditional statements. This is why Mencius’ theory of human nature, which claims to be universal, must be justified, if at all, by some nonempirical arguments, and this is exactly what Mencius attempts to do in his nonempirical higher principle argument.

Kant’s synthetical argument starts with a definition of a will and quickly involves the concept of freedom because he believes that we must presuppose freedom in order to have morality in the first place. But there is a conflict or contradiction between freedom and necessity. We can abandon neither of them in favor of the other. This conflict can be resolved only if man conceives himself both as a member of a sensible or phenomenal world and as a member of an intelligible or noumenal world. As a member of the former world man is completely subject to the law of cause and effect, but as a member of the latter he is completely free. Kant states:

The moral worth is therefore his own volition as a member of the intelligible world, and it is conceived by him as an ought only in so far as he regards himself at the same time as a member of

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the world of sense. Kant's synthetical argument is not convincing at all. (a) The argument heavily depends on some crucial points which Kant believes he has already proved in the previous analytical arguments, and this does not square with his own declaration that the "real" justification for a categorical imperative must be made by the synthetical argument. (b) Kant's two-world view is very difficult to accept. It is indeed amazing to see that, for Kant, the conflict between freedom and natural determinism and the explanation of how a rule of autonomous reason appears to men as an imperative are only the corollaries of his distinction between appearances and things in-themselves. (c) Even if we accept his two-world view, we must further assume that the intelligible world "contains" the ground of the sensible world and also of its laws, because Kant infers from this assumption that the laws governing my will as a member of an intelligible world ought to govern my will as a member of a sensible world. But there is no reason why we should grant, at least without further explanation, the primacy of a noumenal self over the phenomenal self. (d) On Kant's own argument, we can have no knowledge of the intelligible world, for we have no acquaintance with such a world by means of experience. We have only an idea of it, and that is all. This means, as Kant himself admits, that our idea of freedom, which is derived from the idea of an intelligible world, cannot be adequately explained, and this, in turn, means that we only have a "form" of an intelligible world, i.e., the principle of autonomy and its corresponding concept (a categorical imperative).

Kant has indeed left his readers the impression that his synthetical argument would go beyond what has been said in his previous analytical arguments and provide, once and for all, an apodictic justification for a categorical imperative. But he concludes the Foundations with an apology for "the extreme limit of all moral enquiry" rather with a note of triumph: "We cannot prove freedom to be real in ourselves and in human nature." We cannot comprehend the practical uncon-
ditioned necessity of a moral imperative; all we can comprehend is its incomprehensibility. 40)

What is the bearing of our evaluation of Kant’s argument on Mencius? Let me first point out that Mencius’ and Kant’s arguments have the same logical form or structure: From the previous argument (i.e., an analytical argument for Kant and a psychological argument for Mencius) it follows that no justification (i.e., an apodictic justification of morality for Kant, and a complete justification of universal statement for Mencius) is possible by examples given to us in experience. So the justification must be made, if at all, by some nonempirical arguments. Both philosophers thus make an appeal to a nonempirical thing, namely, an intelligible world or a higher principle. According to Kant, man is a member of both worlds, but he should strive to act as a member of an intelligible world. According to Mencius, man is a follower of both principles, but he should strive to follow a higher principle.

40) *Ibid.*, Ak. 463. We can also explain Kant’s failure in terms of his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to Kant, the connection between subject and predicate terms in all synthetic judgments require a “third thing” by which the two terms can be united. In the case of ordinary synthetic empirical judgments, our experience serves as the third thing. But the matter is not so simple with synthetic a priori judgments, for we cannot justify them by appealing to experience, Kant thus concludes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that “the conditions of a possible experience in general” serves as the third thing for all synthetic a priori judgments. In a similar but arbitrary way, Kant concludes in the *Foundations* that the principle of autonomy and its corresponding categorical imperative are also synthetic a priori and that the third thing in this case is “the positive concept of freedom.” But it turns out that the third thing in which the categorical imperative is grounded is nothing but an assertion that man experiences himself both as a conditioned appearance and as an unconditioned noumenon.

41) I already said that there are many differences between Mencius’ and Kant’s arguments. In fact, most terms such as “universal” or “free” used by both philosophers do not have the same meaning. Furthermore, what they want to prove are very different from one another. But these differences will not affect my discussion, for in the following I will discuss the form of their argument, not the arguments themselves. When we deal with the form of arguments, we do not have to care
Now if my evaluation of Kant's argument (and Kant's own confession) is correct, the logical form in question has at least one counter-example, i.e., Kant's argument, and thus the form is invalid. For it is sufficient to find one counter-example in order to prove that a form is invalid. It follows that Mencius' higher-principle argument is not valid by virtue of that form, and that we shall have to find another form it possesses if we are to show it to be a valid argument.

Mencius does not offer an elaborate argument as Kant does, but if he were pressed to do so, I think he would have come out with something like Kant's argument. Like Kant, Mencius also presupposes the existence of freedom. This is clear by the fact that we can indeed make no sense of his discussion of two different principles if we cannot choose either of them freely. But Mencius' attempt to resolve a conflict or contradiction between freedom and necessity, which he could have made but unfortunately did not, will ultimately be a failure in the same way that Kant fails. (a) A moral skeptic, who believes that there is no good reason to praise or blame other people morally, would not accept that man has within himself two different principles. (b) Unlike Kant, Mencius does not even offer a full explanation why it is the case that there are two different principles in all human being. He simply takes it for granted. (c) Even if he were to offer an explanation along the lines of Kant's synthetical argument, he could not have provided a justification for his theory of human nature without some prior metaphysical presuppositions like Kant's two-world view,

about the particular characteristics of the classes referred to by the terms.

We can even substitute letters for each of the terms, using the same letter to replace the same term each time it occurs and different letters to replace different terms.

42) I use the phrase "not valid by virtue of this form" because the method of counter-example "conclusively proves the invalidity of a form, but not necessarily that of particular argument..." If we merely show that an argument has a certain form, and that this form is invalid, we have not thereby proved that the argument is invalid. In order to establish conclusively the invalidity of an argument, it is necessary to show that there is no other form which it possesses by virtue of which it is valid." Wesley C. Salmon, *Logic*, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 21.
and these presuppositions would be something very hard to swallow for most "nonbelievers." (d) Finally, even if we accept his two-principle view, Mencius is further obliged to explain why we should follow freely a higher principle rather than a lower principle, just as Kant is obliged to explain why we should live as a member of a noumenal world rather than as a member of a phenomenal world.

Most theories of human nature, whether that nature be good, evil, or neutral, boast of a universality that allows no exceptions, and most philosophies of human nature, whether they be theistic, atheistic, or nontheistic, also boast of their universality. Mencius' theory of human nature and his philosophy of human nature are not an exception to this claim. But if my discussion of Ments is correct, the universality claimed by his theory of human nature is not justified, and this means that his philosophy of human nature is not justified either.
요 약

성론에 대한 孟子의 두가지 논거는 각각 그 성격을 달리한다. 첫째로 “心理的 논거”(the psychological argument)는 경험적인 인간 본래의 객관적
에 논거를 두고 있으나, Hasty Generalization 및 Hasty Particularization의
오류를 범하는 기울기에 인간의 보편적인 본성을 증명하는 뜻이다. 둘
째로 孟子의 “상위原則의 논거”(the higher-principle argument)는 모든 인
간이 가지고 있는 비경제적인 두개의 원칙에 의존하고 있으나, 인간이 구체
적으므로 이 "상위原則" 때문에 닫혀있게 하느니를 제시하는 뜻이다.
이 논문의 목적은 이들 간의 孟子의 두가지 논거를 道德律(a supreme
moral law)의 보편성과 필연성을 결합(증명)하려는 칸트의 논거와 비교할
으로서 孟子의 논기가 근본적으로 실패했음을 지적하는 것이다. 이 목적을
위하여 필자는 먼저 칸트의 논거를 요약하고, 다음에는 그 논거를 孟자의
논거와 비교해봤다.

카트는 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals에서 Categorical Imperative가 보편적이고 필연적인 도덕이라는것을 증명하기 위하여 첫째로
는 우리들의 일상적인 도덕적인 톤론은 의미가 있으며 더 나아가서 그러한
토론의 결론은 대부분 옳다는 가정에서 출발하는 Analytical Arguments와
둘째로는 우리들의 일상성을 떠나서 実験理性 그 자체로부터 도덕을 고집
이 내려는 Synthetical Arguments를 제시했다. 전자가 경험적이라면 후자
는 비경제적인 논거라고 할 수 있다.

필자는 孟子의 "心理的 논거"를 칸트의 Analytical Arguments와 비교해
서 孟子의 人性論과 보편적인 명제는 어디까지나 비경험적인 논거에 의해서
만 정당화될 수 있을음을 제시했다. 그 다음 필자는 孟子의 "상위原則의 논거
를 칸트의 Synthetical Argument와 비교함으로서, 마치 칸트의 논기가 자
유와 필연의 순환논법을 탈리하지 못함으로서 도덕윤의 보편성과 필연성을
논리적으로 증명할 수 없는것과 같이, 孟子의 논거도 인간이 예 "자유소로
우면서도 필연적으로" 어떤 원칙을 따라야 되느냐를 증명하지 못함으로서
근본적으로 실패했음을 제시했다.