MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO THE KOREAN PROBLEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE KEDO AND FOUR PARTY TALKS

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to compare the performances of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) and Four Party Talks (FPT) which represent the recent multilateral approaches to the Korean problems. When we evaluate the outcomes of these two multilateral efforts, the KEDO project has so far been moderately successful, while the FPT has so far produced nothing but to talk. What factors are responsible for the different performances of these two organs? One of the major factors includes the different degree of US commitment to these two organs. The Clinton Administration has shown a much stronger commitment to KEDO than to FPT since the country has more immediate concern with the former than with the latter. Another important factor is the nature of organizational goals assumed by the multilateral organs. The major goal of KEDO is a practical one which includes the provision of the light water reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea, while FPT is dealing with a very contentious political issue related to the national security of the two Korean governments. A final factor is North Korea's strategy of dealing with these two organs. North Korea has shown very cooperative attitudes toward the KEDO, but has intentionally attempted to ignore the agenda of FPT.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) Explain the evolution of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) and FPT (Four-Party Talks); (2) Investigate important factors that explain the difference in outcomes of these two multilateral approaches; and (3) Discuss their implications for the future resolution between the two Koreas. Since the end of the Cold War, bilateral and multilateral approaches have been adopted for the purpose of overcoming the problems surrounding North Korea's nuclear and missile development program, present armistice regime, and food shortage. The merits of the bilateral approach are evidenced by the success of recent North-South summit talks. However, this comes after eight years of disappointing progress made between the two Koreas since the high-level talks in 1992. Although South Korean attempts to install a new round of bilateral North-South talks has yet to materialize, representatives of the two Korean governments frequently met in multilateral settings, such as the KEDO and FPT. In 1995, KEDO was created as an international consortium that provides light water nuclear reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea. A year later, FPT was jointly proposed by South Korean President Kim Young-sam and the United States President William Jefferson Clinton, inviting North Korea and China for the purpose of transforming the current armistice regime into a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. In studying these two multilateral efforts, we argue that the KEDO has been more successful than the FPT. The reasons as to why

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there is an effectual difference between the two organizations will be the major topic of this paper.

Since the close of the Cold War, multilateral talks have been a popular way of creating a post-Cold War international political economic system. WTO is a prime example in this regard. Following the wave of multilateralism at the global and regional level, new multilateral frameworks, including the Tuman River Area Development (TRAD) Project, KEDO, and the FPT, were created to address economic and security issues in the Korean peninsula. These multilateral approaches were especially important for South Korea, since previous bilateral talks between the two Koreas ended in a stalemate. As four and five years have passed since the FPT and KEDO was launched in 1996 and 1995 respectively, it is necessary to evaluate their performance and to explore their prospects in the wake of a successful inter-Korean summit meeting. Because the tasks assumed by the FPT and KEDO are crucial in creating a new secure order, the prospects of these two multilateral approaches have very profound implications for the future of the Korean peninsula.

International relations scholars as well as Korean specialists have made outstanding theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of multilateral practices, both in the Koreas and the world in general. A deeper look into their research, however, reveals that systematic comparisons and evaluations of different multilateral approaches to the resolution of the Korean security issues are still in want. This paper intends to fill the gap with a systematic comparative analysis of the FPT and KEDO.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO)

This section tries to understand why bilateral attempts to solve the North Korean nuclear problem failed to materialize prior to the creation of KEDO in 1995. In addition, this section also analyzes the 1994 Geneva Agreement between North Korea and the United States, which has provided a basis for the establishment of KEDO.

Unsuccessful North-South Bilateral Approach: Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

When the two Koreas formulated the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in December 1991, it appeared that the North Korean nuclear threat would be soon eliminated. However, disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Declaration arose in February 1992 when it came into effect at the sixth prime ministers' talks held in Pyongyang. Subsequent meetings made it immediately clear that disagreement over the fundamental principle of inspection still remained: the South's "principle of reciprocity" over and against the North's "principle of simultaneous dissolution of suspicion." The North wanted to inspect all US military installations in the South even when granting the South only one site inspection (the Youngbyun site) in the North. This difference was, they claimed, due to the a difference in nuclear capacities between the two nations. The South on the other hand argued for a more reciprocal inspection by demanding that nuclear facilities in Pyongsan, Pakch'on, Suncho'n and Taecho'n, be made available as well.
A further disagreement between the North and South was how the inspections would be administered. The South argued that special inspections, along with routine inspections, were needed to completely dispel any suspicions among the two parties. Under the special inspection, sometimes referred as the “challenge inspection,” one nation would be required to permit the other to inspect a suspected area after giving a twenty-four hour notice. The North opposed this on grounds that it ran counter to Article 4 of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration, which calls for “inspection of objects which one side chooses and both sides agree on.” The South sued that same article to argue otherwise, claiming that it had a positive point: In order to effectively embody the purpose and spirit of the Joint Declaration, the other side should agree when one side selects a target for inspection.

In the end, North-South talks failed to uphold the Joint Denuclearization Declaration beyond the thirteenth meeting on December 17, 1992. In 1993, South Korean-US joint military exercises called Team Spirit provided the North an excuse for unilaterally suspending all inter-Korean talks, including those held by the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC).

**The 1994 Geneva Agreement and KEDO**

In contrast to the North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, the North Korean-US Geneva Agreed Framework of October 1994 helped diffuse potential confrontations between the Koreas. North Korea apparently lived up to its nuclear-related responsibilities under the Agreed Framework, including maintaining an IAEA-monitored freeze on its nuclear facilities and cooperating to containerize spent fuel from its 5-megawatt experimental reactor. In return for North Korea’s nuclear freeze, the US carried out its promise of providing two light-water nuclear reactors to North Korea with support from South Korea and Japan. For the purpose of managing the provision of nuclear reactors and 500,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea, an international consortium including those outside South Korea, the United States, and Japan officials referred to as KEDO was created.

Contrary to initial estimations, the KEDO has been quite successful in its operation. Its multinational composition has apparently not interfered with its ability to implement the Agreed Framework. The most significant achievement of the KEDO is being accepted by the North as a legitimate negotiating partner. The KEDO reached agreements with North Korea on issues related to supply and repayment, supplementary protocols on transportation and communication, and privileges and immunities to deal with sensitive practical issues that will arise in the course of building the reactors.

An equally significant achievement is South Korea’s increased confidence in the KEDO as a successful mechanism that can manage light-water reactors without harming Seoul’s interest. The KEDO has selected the Seoul-based Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) as the primary contractor to build the two light water reactors in North Korea. In August of 1997, the KEDO held its ground-breaking ceremony at the Kumho district of Sinpo, a port city on the eastern coast of North Korea where the KEPCO would begin its construction. KEDO personnel as well as North and South Korean officials attended the ceremony (Kim, 1998). South Korean TV broadcasting companies showed this ceremony live to their audience. The work of site grading and developing infrastructure such as roads, docking facilities and water supply at the site was nearly
completed by the summer of 1998.

KEDO also made significant progress by establishing an agreement on how the projected cost of the reactor would be shared. The South Korean government signed a loan agreement with KEDO for 3.22 billion US dollars (70 percent of the total cost) on July 2, 1999; the South Korean National Assembly ratified it on August 12, 1999; and the loan agreement came into effect on August 1999. In addition, the Japanese government finally agreed to a loan agreement with KEDO for 1 billion US dollars (about 22 percent of the total cost) on May 4, 1999, despite claiming otherwise due to a North Korean long-range missile test over Japan in August 1998; the Japanese Diet, both Lower and Upper Houses, ratified the loan agreement on June 29, 1999. The United States promised to seek sources that would provide the remaining cost of 0.38 billion US dollars, or about 8 percent of the total cost.

Ever since KEDO formally made its turnkey contract with KEPCO in 1999, its workers have started their contract work with hundreds of North Korean workers at the Kumbo construction site. Many expect that a maximum of three thousand South Korean workers will work alongside seven thousand North Korean workers for the KEDO project. If so, this will be the first large-scale foreign invested Western-style construction project in North Korea.

Although the project was projected to finish by 2003, 2007 was suggested as an alternative since the project has been long delayed for several reasons including two temporary stops due to North Korea's spy submarine infiltration in the East Sea on September 1996, and its test-fire of a long-range missile over Japan in August 1998. Since the recent inter-Korean summit meeting provided a favorable environment for the project, the project is expected to finish by its new target date.

**Prospects for the KEDO**

Since the KEDO is a multilateral organization, its future depends upon the political stability of its core member states-South Korea, the United States, Japan, and North Korea. With respect to itself as an organization, however, the KEDO must sustain the financial support of South Korea, the US, and Japan to fund heavy oil shipments and the construction of light water reactors. Even though these countries agreed in 1999 to share the cost of the reactor project, they each have outstanding payments to give. Consequently, the South Korean government has long been considering an extra 3 percent electricity rate to fund the KEDO project. The US House of Representatives, on the other hand, has shown very weak support from the Clinton Administration to yearly supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea. There is some speculation that the present Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea, including the KEDO project, would be challenged by the Republican Party if they win this year's presidential election. The US failure to finance the oil delivery, or a boycott from the South Korean and Japanese government to contribute billions of dollars might jeopardize the KEDO project, which would certainly damage the whole process of implementing the Geneva Agreed Framework. Given its severe energy shortage, North Korea has a vital interest in obtaining both the oil and reactors. Therefore, it is possible that a suspension of heavy oil or nuclear reactor construction could lead North Korea to abandon its obligation under the Agreed Framework.

Incidents such as the 1996 North Korean spy submarine infiltration and the 1998 North Korean test-fire of long-range missiles suggests
that core elements of the Geneva Agreed Framework will remain vulnerable to disruption without improved North-South relations. Confidence-building processes that addresses fundamental concerns of the Korean Peninsula are necessary to complete the KEDO project. The recent inter-Korean summit meeting is a positive sign for changing fifty years of confrontational North-South relations into a one of reconciliation and cooperation.

The challenge to KEDO at a later stage is the IAEA’s special inspection of North Korea’s undeclared nuclear sites. Although North Korea promised to permit the IAEA with a special inspection at the time essential parts of the light water reactor is delivered, the outcome remains to be seen. In any case, North Korea finds itself in a lose-lose situation. If the IAEA finds that the country possesses the capability to produce several nuclear bombs, it would be under serious international pressure. On the other hand, if the North’s nuclear capability is found insignificant, the country will lose its deterrence and leverage to bargain with the US and South Korea.

THE FOUR-PARTY TALKS (FPT)

The FPT was created by the South Korean and US governments to transform the present armistice regime into a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas, the US, and China have been participants. Given Korea’s security problems prior to FPT, the Armistice agreement was instrumental in preserving the peace on the Korean Peninsula since the conclusion of the agreement in 1953 to end the Korean War. Right after the end of Cold War, however, North Korea undertook a series of unilateral actions to undermine the present armistice regime with its demand for a US-North Korean peace treaty. The current situation of the armistice regime has partly ensued from the failure of the two Koreas’ attempts to convert the armistice regime into a solid state of peace at the prime ministers’ talks during the years of 1990～1992.

Unsuccessful North-South Bilateral Approach: the 1992 Basic Agreement

It appeared that a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations occurred in 1990 when high-level bilateral talks were held at the prime ministerial level. The first meeting held in Seoul on September 1990 was a historic one in the sense that each side came to accept the other as a “legitimate” partner in negotiation for the first time. However, no substantive agreements were reach in the two subsequent meetings. At the fourth meeting held in Pyongyang on October 1991, both sides agreed to negotiate for a single text on the North-South accord on reconciliation that was to be worked out at a subsequent meeting.

It was during the fifth high-level talks in Seoul that the two sides successfully negotiated a agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchanges and cooperation (often referred to as the Basic Agreement) in December 1991. As I explained above, this historic pact was followed by the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (often referred to as the Joint Declaration) on December 31, 1991. The Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration finally came into force on February 1992, when their ratified documents were exchanged during the sixth high-level talks in Pyongyang.

The Basic Agreement consists of twenty-five articles that include converting the armistice into a durable peace (Article 5), maintaining the existing military demarcation line established
by the armistice to define a zone of non-aggression (Article 11), establishing the North-South joint military commission within three months to advance various confidence-building measures and promote disarmament (Article 12), and installing direct telephone links between the military authorities to prevent accidental conflict. Nonetheless, the Basic Agreement did not materialize, as the stalemate of the North-South nuclear talks in 1992 stalled any move towards implementing the Agreement.

North Korea's Attempts for Bilateral Negotiations with the US

In the 1992 Basic Agreement, North Korea pledged to "endeavor to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North, and to abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace has been realized" (Article 5). But Pyongyang has recently issued more frequent demands for a bilateral peace treaty with the US. Moreover, they have taken a series of unilateral measures to undermine the current armistice regime: first by paralyzing the Military Armisticce Commission (MAC) by withdrawing its own delegation and pressuring China to recall its delegation from the Commission; and second by closing down the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) by expelling its Polish members from North Korea. In April 1996, North Korean authorities unilaterally declared that they would abandon their obligation to the maintenance and management of the Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone, and sent armed soldiers into the northern sector of the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom. Such unilateral acts resulted in a virtual suspension of the armistice mechanism.

In addition to North Korea's immediate challenge to the armistice regime lies a more fundamental necessity of transformation. The Cold War structure of political and ideological confrontation upon which the Korean armistice regime is based has been substantially relaxed over the past several years. South Korea normalized its relations with former opponents, including the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China. North Korea now endeavors to improve its relations with former arch-enemies, the US and Japan. This trend of reconciliation and realignment suggests that the time is ripe for terminating the state of war in Korea and introducing a more stable and durable regime of peace on the peninsula. During the years of 1993 ~ 1999, however, relations between the two Koreas, the improvement of which would be the core element of the prospective peace regime, lacked any meaningful reconciliation largely because of Pyongyang's past policy of isolating Seoul by negotiating directly with Washington.

Multilateral Approach: Four-Party Peace Talks

In April of 1996, former South Korean President Kim Young Sam and the United States President Bill Clinton jointly proposed a four-way meeting involving both North Korea and China for the purpose of achieving a durable peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula. This ran contrary to South Korea's hope to involve other nations only after reaching a resolution with the North directly. South Korea intended to deal positively with Pyongyang's attempt to destroy the Korean armistice, and to ease strained inter-Korean relations in preparation for improved US-North Korean relations. Over the long run, South Korea's overture was motivated by the need to eliminate Cold War conditions on the Korean
Peninsula and to keep pace with the post-Cold War situation around the world.

The FPT was surrounded by cautious optimism. It was expected that North Korea would proceed with the four-party peace talks, since their good or non-hostile relationship with the US was important for the regime's overall survival. Kim Jong Il's regime desperately sought the support of the US for international food aid as a means to maintain his political control at home. The North Korean military, which stepped up its demand for a United States-North Korean peace treaty, had no choice but to support the four-party peace talks under the country's worsening food shortage. The North was expected to search for bilateral negotiations with the US under the framework of the four-party peace talks.

In addition, many expected that the Chinese government would strongly support talks given that the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula is essential to China's own economic growth and political stability. Moreover, taking an active role in the FPT would help China maintain and enhance its influence in the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia as well.

However, the FPT meetings of 1998~99 went against their initial expectations. Although the FPT was created by the former Kim Young-sam government, the succeeding Kim Dae-jung government initially attempted to seek North-South bilateral channels and reconciliation in a multilateral setting like the FPT. But the Kim Dae-jung government was frustrated over the outcome of the FPT during the years of 1998~99. North Korea showed little interest in the FPT itself, but took advantage of it as a venue for negotiating directly with the United States on an urgent agenda such as the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. In the Spring of 1999, North Korea and the United States concluded an agreement to solve the issue of Kum Ch'ang-ri, where North Korea has been suspected of carrying out its underground nuclear development program. The US promised to provide six hundred thousand tons of food to North Korea in return for North Korea's permission to inspect the suspected Kum Ch'ang-ri area two times. In the summer of 1999, the FPT again became the forum for US-North bilateral negotiations this time concerning the North Korean missile program. Before and after the FPT in August 1999, North Korea and the US held separate bilateral meetings and concluded an agreement which stipulated that North Korea would temporarily suspend its test-fire of long-range missiles as long as US-North Korean missile talks continued. In return, the US promised to ease their economic sanctions placed upon North Korea. It therefore turned out that the FPT was primarily a bilateral forum for US-North Korean negotiations rather than those that resolve conflict. When the August 1999 FPT stalled, no specific date for the next conference was announced.

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE KEDO AND FPT**

When we analyze and evaluate the evolution and performance of KEDO and Four Party Talks(FPT), a few similarities and differences come to view. First, both KEDO and FPT were created to resolve the new Korean security problem in the post-Cold War era, the difference being that the former came into existence a year earlier than the latter. The FPT was South Korea's response to the progress of KEDO, which was expected to improve the North Korea-United States relationship, while the North-South Korean relationship was quite deteriorated after the latter's ban on South
Korean citizens' public mourning for the death of Kim Il-Sung. In other words, South Korea's Kim Young-sam government proposed FPT to actively seek to solve the Korean problem. At that time, North Korea rejected any dialogue with South Korea and concentrated on negotiations with the U.S., which became an intermediary to persuade North Korea to participate in FPT.

Second, both North and South Korea have been major actors for creating and managing KEDO and FPT, with the United States playing the role of a patron or sponsor for these two multilateral organizations. The United States created KEDO as a way of dismantling North Korean nuclear facilities. FPT however was created to support South Korea's new initiative to transform the present armistice regime into a permanent peace regime. At that time, North Korea attempted to make a new peace treaty with the United States through North Korea-U.S. bilateral negotiation, thereby keeping South Korea away from the negotiation table.

Third, participating member countries of these two multilateral organs fully reflect the changing power configurations in and around the Korean peninsula. Outside the two Koreas, the United States was a member of these two multilateral organs while Japan and China were invited to participate only in the KEDO and FPT respectively. It is also interesting to note that Russia did not participate in the KEDO nor the FPT. On the basis of the creation and evolution of these two multilateral organs, one can argue that the United States has played a leading role in the process of resolving the Korean problems as a global hegemonic power in the post-Cold War period. On the other hand, China and Japan have played important roles at least as regional leaders in North East Asia, while Russia has thus far assumed an insignificance role during the past decade.

Finally, we find that the performances so far made by these two multilateral organs are quite different. The KEDO has been fairly successful in carrying out its mission, while the FPT has thus far produced few significant results. What are the factors responsible for the performance of these two organizations? One is the degree of US commitment to these organizations. The Clinton Administration has shown a stronger commitment to KEDO than to FPT since the first is closely related to the their global security interests, specifically that of reducing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons in the post-Cold War period. Although peace on the Korean peninsula has been a long-time security interest of the United States, it is natural that the they are much less concerned with that than with the immediate concern of the North Korean nuclear and missile problem. This validates a hypothesis suggested by international scholars who argue that the United States will hold a critical role in creating and working multilateral institutions, even at the regional level.

A second important factor that explains the performance of the KEDO and FPT is the nature of organizational goals assumed by each multilateral institution. The major goal of the KEDO is that of providing light water reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In other words, KEDO was not created to directly deal with political or security issues. On the other hand, the FPT was purposefully created to deal with the political task of transforming the present armistice regime into a peace regime.

A final factor is North Korea's strategy of dealing with these organizations. North Korea has been extremely cooperative with the KEDO because it has a definite economic interest of getting the nuclear reactors and heavy fuel oil. On the other hand, North Korea have continually ignored the FPT since they
were more interested in negotiating directly with the United States. North Korea took advantage of FPT as a bilateral forum of US-North Korean negotiations before or after the sessions of FPT. As the US was very much concerned with more urgent issues, such as the North Korean nuclear and missile problems, than with the issue of creating a peace regime, the United States permitted bilateral talks with North Korea before and after the FPT. As the FPT convened more, it became a weaker multilateral organ.

CONCLUSIONS

A comparative analysis of KEDO and FPT fully demonstrates that under certain conditions, multilateral approaches have proven to be successful in many issues related to the Korean peninsula. Specifically, multilateral approaches are much more effective when dealing with practical issues rather than with political and security issues. It is also clear that support from every member country of the multilateral organization is important for progress. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that a strong commitment from the United States' strong is more important than that of other member countries.

This study strongly suggests that neither a multilateral nor bilateral approach is a panacea for resolving the Korean conflict, since both approaches have strengths as well as weaknesses. When adopting a multilateral approach certain questions must be addressed. For example, the question of who pays for the cost of carrying out a multilateral project is crucially important. Some have even warned that “the larger the number of actors involved, the less likely the resolution of the conflict.” (Moon, 1996) However, this argument does not apply to the Korean conflict, mainly because a North-South bilateral approach very often ends in a stalemate. The issue does not lie in the number of participants, but the degree of mutual trust and strategic calculations of the participants involved.

The multilateral way dealing with Korean security matters also has its strengths. As the KEDO demonstrates, this approach is preferred over a bilateral one since the former is perceived as less threatening by North Korean leaders concerned about the survival of their regime. Second, relational problems arising during the process of negotiation and implementation can best be reconciled with the help of a third party. Examples of this include the flag and spy incident, which occurred in the course of the South's rice shipment to the North in 1995. These two incidents severely damaged the trust of South Korean citizens, which became an obstacle to further North-South bilateral negotiations to bring humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Third, the two Koreas are likely to behave better in a multilateral framework than in a bilateral framework for two reasons. One obvious reason is that the two Koreas have an interest to project a good image of themselves to the international community. A second reason is that vagaries of domestic politics are less common in the making and implementation of multilateral agreements than bilateral ones. In South Korea, for example, the competition between government agencies based on their bureaucratic interests as well as the political considerations of politicians very often create an obstacle to the conclusion and implementation of bilateral agreements.

A final strength of multilateral approach to the Korean security problems is that its progress would create a foundation for the future development of the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia as
well as in the Asia-Pacific. A habit of dialogue and cooperation in connection with the resolution of the Korean conflict is likely to develop a new multilateral network which can deal similarly with regional security problems. A multilateral security network in Northeast Asia in the future can work together with the existing ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) in preventing and resolving military and security conflicts in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, the tension reductions and confidence building measures on the Korean Peninsula would contribute to developing peace and security in Northeast Asia as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.

Given these positive considerations, however, it is a point of fact that the multilateral approach is not popular in South Korea. In the name of the “Korea first” idea, or the “Koreanization of the Korean problem,” many support the bilateral approach (Moon, 1996). This preference has partly stemmed from the country’s historical experience in the past century. For example, the US ratified Japanese imperialist claims to Korea in the Taft-Katsura memorandum in 1905, while the Soviet Union and the United States divided Korea with a temporary line of demarcation after World War II. Since many South Koreans still feel that they are victims of international arrangements made by foreign powers, they oppose any intervention by foreign powers in Korean affairs. Although South Korea’s preference for a bilateral approach is understandable, it is by no means acceptable. South Koreans need to have a balanced view. That the intervention of the US and 16 other countries under the UN flag saved South Korea during the Korean War is proof that a multilateral approach is not always detrimental to the country.

In conclusion, the South Korean people and government need to combine a multilateral and bilateral approach in dealing with the security issues of the Korean peninsula in the 21st century. Certain issues like the reunion of dispersed families or social and cultural exchanges between two Koreas may be best handled through a bilateral approach. Other issue like the North Korean nuclear problem may be best handled through a multilateral approach. I believe that the multilateral and bilateral approach is complementary.

**Bibliography**
