A Study on the Approach of Korea Reunification Through the Four-way Peace Talk

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I. The Korean Peninsula as an Issue

1) Introduction

Nobody raises an opposition about Korean reunification that it would be the result from solving the problem about the Korean peninsula.

A central meaning of the problem on the Korean peninsula, international political idiom, is an outbreak of grave situation resulted from the partition of Korea. Thus, the problem will exist continuously as long as Korea stays in the partition if a content and a characteristic about it make change a little according to time and situation.

To settle the problem about the Korean peninsula Korea should set up an exact goal of Korean reunification, develop a policy to be necessary for reaching the goal and seek for integration and arrangement of a strategy and a policy at one time.

2) Problem Structure of the Korean Peninsula

On the other hand, in fact, the structure of the problem is formed not to be able to

achieve reunification only with just relative position between South and North Korea as to intention to reunify and every capability — on policy, military and economy — which is necessary for reunification.

First, any side of South and North Korea doesn’t make independent capability ready to absorb or collapse the opposite party all at once.

Second, South and North Korea suggest ostensibly the peaceful or step-by-step reunification plan in formal, however the circumstance at present is rather remote from mutual cooperative practice in due to fundamental disagreement and distrust about the opposite device or intention. Particularly, the North Korean regime swore a revolution of South Korea through the Labor party rules so that the confederation, so-called peaceful reunification method which the North proposed, cannot but being interpreted just on a level of the strategy to the South. Of course, there are promise and agreement between South and North Korea in the meantime such as in the early 70s, the South-North Joint Communiqué and in the 90s, the South-North Fundamental Mutual Agreement to be interpreted as a previous phase of reunification, however, we are at a state mate not to practice reciprocally even that.

Third, it is another important problem that both have an enthusiasm about reunification if there is a difference in a degree between both sides. A serious matter is a characteristic of the very enthusiasm of which innocence has turned into hostility because of the antagonism between the right and the lift on the process of partition and the Korean War of historical incident. By means of these factors, our case is different from that of Germany receiving a natural result from the post-war settlement by the victor nations, therefore, the determined factor of partition in Germany was not an internal complication. Seemingly, the enthusiasm is a factor to press for reunification mutually but rather an impediment to prevent it in reality by reason of a hostile one.

Fourth, we cannot almost expect internal and external capacity of Korea, such as Ostpolitik, originated from Willy Brandt. In fact, Ostpolitik insisted by Willy Brandt intensified NATO, particularly the U.S. at that time. Since that, the U.S. made an
atmosphere of a détente completely with the Soviet Union and adopted German policy, Ostpolitik in the framework of a détente. The policy of a détente conducted to the environment of German unification ultimately through the Helsinki Conference in 1975. However, internal-external capacity of Korea, that is, geopolitical location and economic capacity, cannot be compared with that of West Germany.

Fifth, it makes difficult reunification that the interests about the Korean reunification and the process of it are not arranged yet among the big four—the United States, China, Russia and Japan-around Korea.

2. The Four-Way Peace Talk and Reunification Process

1) Basic Characteristic of the Four-Way Peace Talk

In a position of Korea, at least, it is possible to crystallize a multilateral security system as a system managing reunification process of South and North Korea. The four-way peace talk proceeding now would be a rudimentary form to construct a multilateral security system too.

By the way, what an important question in building a multilateral security system is that how each country, participating in the multilateral security system, recognize it in accordance with their own calculation. Of course it includes its own universal meaning, not related with whether Korea suggested the four-way peace talk or whatever a motivation to take part in is.

A multilateral security system is premised on the status quo, that is to say, it aims usually not to reorient status quo but to maintain and recognize it mutually. Of course it is a fact that the multilateral security system in hypothesis of military confrontation—NATO, Warsaw Alliance—existed under the Cold War, a showdown between the West and the East. However, as we face the era of the post Cold War that a military confrontation on the basis of ideology was finished, it will be a common
understanding that a multilateral security system must be a crisis management system premised the status quo.

Therefore, as regarded the four-way peace talk as a start of a multilateral security system, it is another problem that through the talk, Korea will seek for reunification on the basis of destruction of the status quo. Anyway, it is worth while to make the most of the four-way peace talk positively by pathway for reunification in a position of South Korea. Of course, it must absolutely not and is impossible for South Korea to expose its intention and measure of reunification from the early stage of the talk.

On the other hand, it is necessary to gaze steadily the point that the four-way the peace talk consists of South and North Korea, as parties about reunification problem, and the U.S. and China, as directly related countries with the partition resulted from the Korean War. This talk may be a valid frame to be able to pursue South Korea’s intention and method for reunification.

2) Necessity of Reunification

Although the four-way peace talk seeks after the usual objective, the status quo, demanded from present multilateral security system, from where are the reason and the necessity raised that South Korea should pursue the objective of reunification through the four-way peace talk as possible as it can be?

First, the post Cold War is a period when a national issue is erupting tremendously patched up for the moment in the Cold War. Including former Yugoslavia, now, a national problem rises as an assignment to ought to settle, not as an object of management. Therefore, we don’t think that only the Korean peninsula may take shelter from a periodic demand like this. It is impossible to patch up a national problem, and would be a timely judgement that a makeshift of a national problem may give more misfortune to related persons or parties than a rational settlement. The heritage from the Cold War must be arranged with cessation of it.

Second, the Korean peninsula suffers from the national problem perverted most
seriously in the East Asian, with a evaluation as a powder magazine extremely sensible all over the world. Thus, reunification of the Korean peninsula means the arrangement of the big factor raised the tension of the Cold War highly. The settlement of the problem on the Korean peninsula can be an inevitable process for the security in the East Asia and international relationship.

Third, the North Korean regime ought to be terminated of which system didn’t have any legitimacy as political power from the period of the Cold War and, in addition, is invalid in the post Cold War.

In spite of the most important problem, there are a historical incident on the relationship of South and North Korea, not evoking much controversy or almost forgotten. That is, the Republic of Korea was approved as only legitimate government by the UN resolution, while North Korea was defined as an invader at the Korean War. The North Korean regime is still included in the Arms Export Countries prescribed by the U.S.

Ideology on which the North Korean regime has stood was collapsed completely, and the regime was ruined into the system not be available to support its people. Therefore, now it depends on a matter of time whether the North Korean system collapses, besides whether it is true or not. It is natural for the system or the regime which is illegal from the birth with no ideology to depend on and cannot maintain the nation any longer to be liquidated in the name of the national community.

Forth, a struggle between the same nationals caused by partition becomes a heavy obstacle to subsistence and progress of the national in the world reiterating a change of situation under the globalization.

South and North Korea have lost the competitive power on account of exorbitant military expenses in the period of economic war (in case of North Korea, the competitive power may be no worth to be mentioned). Also, it is a grand loss for the parties and international economy in fact that investment and exchange has blockaded within the very close and convenient region. Antagonism resulted from the partition has a meaning more than just a separation of the national capacity. In addition, if the
economic crisis from December in 1997 extends over a long period of time in South Korea, it can but progress toward security crisis in the hostile state of the partition. Therefore, keeping a mission in ones mind, Korea must perform the affairs with positive attitude and swift behavior on the pathway of reunification. Of course, it is a basic principle to intend political settlement by negotiation for the problem of the Korean peninsula, but there is no reason to restrict the range of selection as a change of situation.

3) Peculiarity of the Korean problem

Before discussing a multilateral security system, we need to consider a characteristic of the problem of the Korean peninsula when we intend a goal of reunification through a multilateral security system. After examining the characteristic closely we can find out the answer about the way for reunification in Korea.

In a method of reunification, if political settlement is the most valid one that South Korea can choose, it seems to be meaningful to compare Korean problem with German's. The reason is that Germany settled the partition politically, contrary to Yemen or Vietnam. Above all, Germany is different from Korea in various aspects. Germany played a role as a leading country in Europe so far from the 19th century at least in the aspect of geographical location and industrial capacity. The expansion of Germany was historically resulted from overall reorganization of European system, and both world wars occurred through this process. Thus, the victor nations from both world wars compelled the military incompetence and the altercation of geopolitical position to Germany as the method of the post-war problem. In this way, because the process of partition in Germany is different completely from in Korea after the world war II, we can conjecture enough that just as the process of partition is different, as the process of reunification is different, too.

Kim Hak Jun, the professor, has prescribed German partition as an international model. It was the result from the post-war control to intercept the military prosperity
systematically, therefore the line of partition existed in Germany was a compromise line of the interest between the U.S. and former USSR included in the Allied Nations at that time. Finally, German unification was accomplished under the atmosphere of conciliation between the U.S. and former Soviet Union, in detail, when the Soviet Union, while Gorbachev in power, abdicated his capability and volition as a super-power nation and conceded German unification in accordance with the crisis of system.

There are no inner conflict between German nationals and no war between west and east Germany, thus German case takes on the characteristic of international model not only in the process of partition but also in that of unification. However, Korea who was under Japanese domination was different from Germany in that there wasn’t any agreement on Korean partition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Once the stationary troops of the U.S. and the Soviet Union made an entry into Korea fixing the boundary on the 38th parallel, but there existed no agreement between them that the Korean peninsula would be divided into two countries. As viewed on the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, they learned to make a tardy agreement about a problem of the Korean peninsula. Korean political groups set forth their view about the Joint Commission of the American and Soviet Commands in Korea and engaged in political activity under the U.S. and the Soviet military government, too. It was another question whether the period of activity was short or long and they had a political freedom or were cramped down on. Therefore, Korean partition was provoked from the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to an extent, but from inner conflict -national conflict- above all. The present partition in Korea was given rise from the Korean War brought about with extreme development of inter-national conflict. As viewed under such a context, Korean partition is close to national disrupting model rather than international model.
4) Peculiarity of the North Korean Regime

The North Korean regime is different definitely from East Germany in that North Korea received unique position from international society through the Korean War. North Korean regime signed the truce agreement after waged the war against 15 UN member countries under the UN flag.

Today it seems to be a fact that how the North regime sustains is related with the existence of China which is more powerful wirepuller over the North geopolitically and maintains socialism intact. Also, it is another reason in maintaining the North that China has protected it as a buffer zone against the U.S.

However, we can find more significant background about the unique position under international political situation in that in actuality, the North Korean regime is the signatory of the truce agreement opposite to the united status. This unique position of the North appears to stand out conspicuously under the post Cold War that main enemy against the U.S. vanished. The North Korean regime takes advantage of the truce agreement in excluding the effective infiltration from the U.S., as a super power and integrating inhabitants into the name of subjectivity or ‘Juche’, which is drawn a veil over a showdown against the U.S.

In the direct or indirect contact with the U.S. including the four-way peace talk, it is related with the international political position of North Korea that he asserts the peace agreement and persists the U.S. troops pullout in South Korea, so to speak, under a containment tactics against the South.

Therefore, South Korea should consider unique characteristic about the problem of the Korean peninsula as well as universality of a multilateral security system in building various multilateral security system.

On the other hand, we must keep in mind that while the plan of German partition by interests-concerned countries existed, the plan of unification by them didn’t. In case of the Korean peninsula, as there wasn’t the partition planning by related countries, there will be no unification planning by them, absolutely. Eventually, the
subject of reunification is the ROK and a reunification is to be assignment given to Korea and none other.

3. Reorientation of Conception

1) Reunification Costs

It is necessary for the South Korea to keep pace with aggressive strategy and peaceful policy simultaneously and continuously. So to speak, with the closed-door strategy accelerating the collapse of the North regime, conciliating strategy in open-door should be run parallel politically.

As of now, it is difficult to consent to a soft-landing theory insisted by the North regime, occupying dominant theory. The theory is raised from apprehension about utter disorganization resulted from sudden collapse of the North system, economic burden beyond the South's capacity and military aggression caused by despair of the North Korea. Through a soft-landing theory, we expect gradational mutation of the North system. However, the North system is crumbling, the system mutation during the breakdown process becomes a factor to accelerate its collapse and eventually means completion of the collapse.

On the point of view, China is distinguished from North Korea. China accomplished extreme experiment from the culture revolution to revolutionary openness through wide-shifting of leader and power from domination by Mao Tse-Tung. In addition, by defining revolutionary openness as socialistic market economy, China displayed flexibility on idea without injuring ideological principle ostensibly.

North Korea, hereditary regime, has claimed the reign on his last injunctions since the death of Kim Il-Sung. In the hereditary regime, nobody can either expect ideological application or social capacity to make a resolute experiment like China, thus the system mutation on the regime is the synonym with a collapse.
It is worth of investigating more positive standard than passive one on reunification costs. In short, reunification costs are a question beyond economic capacity of only South Korea whenever Korea reunifies. The later reunification is, the higher expenses needed are. The next article is the view of Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, an expert about the Korean peninsula.

If the specter of German-style unification expenses is terrifying to some South Korean policymakers, they tremble before a chimera. Any number of careful studies have pointed out that the bulk of western German transfers to the new federal states since 1990 have been for social welfare payments, not investment. In eastern Germany, between politically popular but overgenerous wage increases, which priced a large portion of the GDR work force out of the job market, and an extravagant, newly installed social insurance apparatus, which paid qualifying beneficiaries on the established GDR scale. There is no reason for these particular expenses to be replicated elsewhere—especially not in the ROK, which for better or worse still lacks most of the adornments of a full-fledged welfare state. Moreover, Korean reunification will yield benefits as well as costs.

In the short run, reunification with a poorer partner could help relieve South Korea's incipient labor shortage, reduce pressures on wages and other production costs, and enhance Korea's international competitiveness. While South Korean workers may not relish that short-term prospect, a fusion of the two Korean work forces could increase purchasing power and living standards for the great majority in both the North and the South. Over the long run, as northern Korea's infrastructure and industrial capacity are renovated, all of Korea could experience dynamic supply-side effects. The flip side of North Korea's current infrastructural obsolescence—of the likely need to scrap almost all the North's current production facilities—is the coming opportunity to replace decrepit plants with state-of-the-art equipment embodying the latest technology.

As in postwar Japan and West Germany, wholesale reconstruction of an industrial base can bring unexpected economic advantages: it can lower production costs, stimulate work force stills, dramatically raise productivity, and lay the foundations for sustained economic growth. Those advantages accrued not only to Japan and West Germany, but also to the economies with which they were integrated. While the analogy is inexact, the modernization of the North Korean economy could offer enormous spillover benefits for southern Korea. Nor would the benefits be limited to
Korean nationals. Success in that venture would strengthen the framework for prosperity throughout northeast Asia and the Pacific; it would spur international economic development through favorable investment opportunities, an expanded domestic market, and improved quality of exportable goods and services.

Apprehensions expressed in some circles in Russia and China about being crowded out by the economic reconstruction of a united Korea are almost certainly misplaced. The global capital market is enormous and rapidly growing: in 1995 alone it financed over $1.2 trillion in international borrowing and facilitated an almost $300 billion flow of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the boom in domestic demand that would follow reunification would likely offer wide-ranging and lucrative business opportunities to all the Pacific powers. One of the most intriguing economic implications of a successful reunification involves integration of the Chinese, Russian, and Korean markets. To date, juche economics, or North Korean central planning, has effectively precluded the development of infrastructural or commercial links between the North and nearby areas of China and Russia. With a southern-style business climate in northern Korea, a significant growth triangle could at last establish itself in the three countries.

Korea's reunification can be likened to a gigantic investment project. If the rate of return for that project is high, the costs will take care of themselves. While achieving and maintaining the necessary rates of return will not be easy, it is surely not the hopeless task that some in Seoul think. With prudent and coordinated preparations by the ROK and its allies, the chances that reunification will be an economic success— even if it takes place on very short notice—can be greatly increased.

A question on reunification can be neither performed too early as the state of affairs in South Korea nor delayed forever. It cannot help being too easygoing attitude that we will settle the assignment of reunification remained unsolved problem for a half century without any suffer and cost. Reunification should be regarded as a M & A rather than an annexation. To handle the North Korean system dishonored already, international order system on Northeast Asia pours all its energies in politic, military and economy. Thus, not puzzling over reunification on account of economic costs, political burden and military horror, but South Korea should have a positive and aggressive attitude on the view of settlement of national issue, building of a new economic zone and creation of a new political order on northeast Asia.
2) Military Intimidation

On the other hand, South Korea should have a drastic attitude and prepare thoroughly against military provocative intimidation. At present, the North Korean regime uses military menace for a continuance of the system, therefore South Korea must contrive a proper measure to neutralize its menace actively not complying with military intimidation.

4. Aggressive Strategy and Peaceful Policy

1) Policy Amendment to the North

A core embedded in aggressive strategy and peaceful policy that South Korea utilizes should involve as followed: consensus among the big four around the Korean peninsula about the fact that the problem of the Korean peninsula is caused by North Korea eventually, incapacitating assertion of North Korea and improving the relative position of South Korea, national consensus on the problem of North Korea, South Korea’s measure and prior consultation with the big four in an emergency.

Take an examination about more concrete measures.

First, above all South Korea must incapacitate the North’s assertion of concluding the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. It is difficult to overcome the problem with a countermeasure of the South government against it, at present time. To settle the problem, we should begin to discuss from the UN resolution through which UN determined the North Korea as an invader during the continuance of the Korean War, in 1950.

A participation of the UN forces in the Korean War is an international behavior on police affairs that the UN ought to do as a chastisement to invader according to the UN resolution. Just as a policeman must not to conclude a peace agreement with a
criminal, as the U.S. never conclude an agreement with Iraq determined as an invader by the UN because it attacked Kuwait. Nevertheless, the North’s assertion explains its unique international position on international relation obtained by the Korean War as saying above. Why the North’s maneuver raises a criticism at least in the world is originated in that international society has permitted an unique position of the North regime and coped with its menace tepidly.

South Korea who has coped with North Korea by weak policy and diplomacy is to blame for behavior of North Korea commanding an overt policy through the U.S. channel excluded South Korea, persisting in concluding the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. Above all, South Korea’s policy to the North has always stayed in inferior situation logically to that of North Korea to the South, because South Korea was bent on accomplishing a short-term goal on each occasion without being aware of history of South and North relationship. South Korea abdicated too easily the UN resolution in 1948 (that South Korea was determined as the only legitimate government), another resolution in 1950 (that North Korea was defined as an invader) according to a change of international situation, in addition, with getting no cost from North Korea. This is the main point that South Korea lift an impression on international society that he has practiced more inconsistent policy to the North, besides getting public opinion separated in the policy to the North. Since South Korea relinquished its advantage too easily and kept silent, North Korea’s persistence, the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty, has persuaded international society to an extent.

The South government left the circumstances without any refutation in which the conference between the U.S. and the North, started from the New York conference in the early 90s and continued to the Geneva conference on account of a nuclear problem, developed into a political conference between both sides. Deviated considerably from the original goal of the conference, just reversal of secession from NPT, the U.S. behaved against the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, pledging publicly the promise such like not using the armed force to the North and so on. Although South Korea had to apply the brake from the first New York conference or
demand a benefit in return according to the change of situation, but he took no measures against it. Today, reality of South-North Korea relationship is resulted from the advancement of the subsequent situation since that.

In case of the four-way peace talk, as soon as North Korea declared invalidity of the armistice agreement and threatened in DMZ, South Korea could but took a desperate measure, the very four-way peace talk, against the incident in a great hurry rather than suggested preemptive conception prior to the North. Without amendment of the fundamental flaw on the policy to the North or diplomacy of the South government, South Korea may nothing but defend in the four-way talk let alone reunification.

Therefore, not arguing for and against agenda selection over the U.S.-North Korea peace agreement from the early stage of the four-way talk, but South Korea and the U.S. have to declare clearly. That is to say, if it is too natural, the U.S. needs to reject preemptively in public that a peace agreement conclusion between the U.S. and North Korea never exists. Also, South Korea must demand strongly the observance of South-North Korea fundamental agreement not suggesting the South-North Korea peace treaty to North Korea instead of the U.S. In position of South Korea who was a victim by southward invasion from the North, we are satisfied only with demand of the observance of the South-North Korea fundamental agreement fixing on inviolability. It is not reasonable to suggest a peace treaty to an assailant and it is just to stimulate a pride of North Korea.

Now, the purpose of North Korea to improve the relation between the U.S. and himself with tenacity lies in the existence of the system by taking advantage of the U.S. Therefore, instead of resolute and direct refusal to his main assertion, South Korea and the U.S. should command carrots-sticks strategy receiving other insistence from North Korea. Although the tactics may raises complaint of North Korea temporarily, it might be difficult to refuse the conference itself in a long term.

A basic dynamo of the policy that the North regime has affected the South is a military menace. It is a fact that the North regime has produced the intended effect
through military affairs which occupies the most part of a problem on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is a big problem in a will of reunification that South Korea complies with North Korea concentrating on military forces. To forestall in reunification, it is necessary for South Korea to have a certain ascendancy over military power of North Korea. In relevance to it, the South government needs to recollect what the policy to the Soviet Union of President Reagan contributed to its collapse.

On the view of armament, the core factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union is the Starwars plan and an attempt of deploying an intermediate nuclear in Germany by the U.S. The Soviet Union who had already reached a limitation of military growth with economic difficulty didn’t find out the countermeasure against two plans and began to abdicate a military showdown.

Although now North Korea has might military strength, on the view of economic power, it seems to reach a limitation of military growth. North Korea watchers estimate that the reason why the North regime is concentrating on the military showdown more and more is closely related with a limitation of enormous conventional arms. Therefore, it is necessary for South Korea to carry out a policy that the economic gap should be reflected in the military gap between South and North Korea.

2) Creation of a National Ideology

South Korea has two flaws in relation with North Korea now. One of them is ambiguity of demarcating a strategy to the North from a policy. In addition, strategies are frequently opened to the public, and severely injured by private sector because the government isn’t on the position that it can turn various strategies round its little finger. These faults should be rectified certainly.

The other is disintegration of national consensus about the policy to the North. There are several reasons about that; camouflage of pro-North influence as democratic
one under the authoritative government in the Cold War, continuous menace to the ROK's legitimacy under the disguise of national influence after the Cold War, and weakness of an organization in charge of public-peace involved democratization.

Now it is essential for South Korea to hold the command of the Korean peninsula, that is, by creating national ideology which can be adapted together, South Korea should disseminate it to both sides-South and North Korea.

A collapse of the Communist bloc resulted in extinction of competition about international ideology. Now, there are many demands upon national ideology corresponding to globalization. In the viewpoint, South Korea should oppress a closed-democracy insisted from North Korea by adopting an open-ideology as a new ideology of these days.

In the trend and the number of fugitive from North Korea, we can estimate North Korea as a solid system no more. Since South Korea become known to North society more and more through the 3rd nation, like China or Russia, new ideology can be established as a dominated one in South and North Korea when an open democracy organized theoretically is disseminated tenaciously. This may be a measure to minimize a disruption of national consensus in South society.

3) Preparation of Crisis

Finally, South Korea must study on which measures Korea should take when a sudden incident in the period of the four-way talk, that is, North Korea collapses abruptly, and organize a consultative meeting covertly with the powers of the world to discuss about which measures can be taken.

Han Sung-Ju, ex-foreign minister, laying complete collapse of North Korea, creation of two regimes within North Korea, struggle for supremacy among several military cliques, and the like, imagined several forms of intervention: first, possibility to intervene only Korean forces, second, intervention of Korean and American forces under CFC or UNC, third, the way of intervening a multinational troops comprised
other countries, let alone South Korea and the U.S., included either China or Russia, otherwise, Japan under UNC or other UN organization, forth, intervention of a multinational troops outside of the UN, finally, in case of intervening a neutralist nation.

An outbreak of the problem like this may occur in the close or the remote future. However, South Korea should research the problem deeply and consult with related nations about measures on every situation as possible as it can be.

5. Conclusion

It is necessary to approach seriously to a question of reunification. Since a characteristic of Korea partition is different completely from that of Germany, there exists a strong probability that other tragedy would be reiterated again if a question of reunification is dealt with wrong although we have already experienced an internal strife of tragedy through the Korean War. However, it is not desirable to approach passively to reunification, just observing the state of North Korea or the change around environment.

The Cold War had already finished in a view of the world. Although the Cold War system is working yet in the Korean peninsula, but the circumstance has been already altered. The United States, Russia and China who were the subjects of the Cold War ascertain a company relationship on strategy in the world issue. Military relationship between the U.S. and Japan develops step by step.

The alteration of the circumstance like this suggests a favorable chance for settlement of national problem. A national problem temporized in the Cold War rises to the surface as an assignment under the post Cold War. Now, patch-up means misfortune and settlement no other than happiness.

However, we must take precaution an impetuous settlement. In the South-North relation and the circumstance around us, South Korea should seek for integration and
arrangement of aggressive strategy and peaceful policy on the problem.

The four-way peace talk which North Korea participated in after haggling over for a long time, would be a good opportunity for South Korea. The talk, itself, plays a role to management of crisis and suggests a chance of reunification according to utilization of South Korea. The four-way peace talk, first stage of a multilateral security system, is inconsistent with the purpose of altering the status quo in that it is premised on. But, whatever the premise of the four-way talk is, the discussion on the problem of the Korean peninsula under the cooperation of the big powers suggests that South Korea can seize an opportunity of reunification in the arena of the four-way talk. Above all, it is important to maintain the four-way talk system. While keeping it, we will settle our assignment that besides incapacitating a goal of North Korea and creating a new national ideology, we have to prepare thoroughly to the collapse of North Korea.

Reference

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