A New Era for Korea-Japan Cooperation:

With Focus on the Situation of the Korean Peninsula*

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I. Introduction

The Republic of Korea and Japan are situated cheek by jowl, separated only by the narrow stretch of the Korea Strait. In 1965 the two countries normalized formal diplomatic relations, ending a period of unfortunate relations. Yet, each has persistency tended to regard the other as a "remote next-door neighbor."

This feeling of remoteness in spite of their geographical proximity is a residual reflection of their unfortunate past marked by Japanese colonial occupation of Korea for 36 years More recently it may be also attributed to apparent differences between the peoples of the nations in their views and perceptions toward each other.

Even after their relations were normalized two decades after Korea's liberation, quite a few thorny, and sometimes controversial, bilateral issues cropped up. These included the issue of the continental shelf; the abduction of Kim Dae-Jung; the attempted assassination of the late President Park Chung Hee and killing of Mrs. Park by Moon Se-Kwang, a

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Korean exp .triate from Japan; the fishery issue; and the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan. More recently, there has arisen a controversy because some of the Japanese hi tory textbooks were rewritten to tome down Japan's armed aggression of Korea and China. Further, Korea's steep trade deficit with Japan remains a major pending issue.

All these issues, adding to an already awkward atmosphere, make it difficult for the two neighb ring countries to attain a genuine rapprochement. Faced with a plethora of knotty bila eral problems none of the Japanese prime ministers in the past seemed to be able to brir g himself to pay an official visit to Korea.

Then a t rning point came with the visit to the Republic of Korea of Japanese Prime Minister Y suhiro Nakasone on January 11 and 12 this year, the first such visit ever made by ar incumbent Japanese prime minister. His summit talks with Korean President Chun Doo Hwan resolved once and for all the drawn-out issue of economic cooperation involving K orea's request for Japanese long-term, low-interest loans. Thus Prime minister Nakasone's official visit to Korea-Japan collaboration. In short, putting an end to their less than n rmal relationship, Korea and Japan made a fresh start "toward developing a new dim nsion of friendly and good neighborly relations" (as noted in Section 7 of the Joint Comm unique announced after the Korea-Japan summit meeting).

As indic ted in mass media articles on Nakasone's trip to Korea, it is strongly believed that Korea-Japan cooperation hereafter will constitute a crucial part of the Japan-U.S. strategy of countering the growing Soviet military muscle in this region of the world. Apparently it was in this strategic context that the Japanese archipelago was referred to as "unsink ble aircraft carrier". Under the circunstances the unfolding new era of Korea-Japan coop ration is expected to carry a large clout in times of "eventualities" in the Far East. More er, Prime Minister Nakasone's whirlwind visit to Korea and his subsequent trip to the United States on January 17 through the 21 reaffirm the readiness of the United Sta es and Japan, under their mutual defense treaty, to "share the role in preserving peace and stability in the Far East" (as cited in Section 8 of the U.S.-Japan joint Communiq e).

During h s U.S. trip Prime Minister Nakasone assured U.S. President Ronald Reagan that Japan would "abide by the Joint Suzuki-Reagan Communique." This assurance was taken to m an that Japan will, within an appropriate scope, assume an increased share in the financi l burden of maintaining the U.S. armed forces in Japan. This is in view of the U.S. role i guarding the West Pacific and Korea, preserving peace and stability in Asia,

as well as defending the Middle East. Viewed in this context, it is quite easy to perceive the idea behind Nakasone's quick decision to visit Korea and resolve the issue of Korea-Japan economic cooperation before his U.S. trip Nakasone Clearly Confirmed the close Japan-U.S. relationship as treaty bound allies the relationship that includes military affairs.

On the other hand, the United States and Korea are close allies also bound by a bilateral mutual defense treaty. It may well be said that in addition to the broad arrangement of the Japan-U.S. security alliance on the one hand and the Korea-U.S. defense alliance on the other, the beginning of close Korea-Japan economic cooperation will give a major boost to the U.S.-Japan-Korea endeavors to preserve peace and security in the Far East.

The purpose of this paper is to review the current situation in Northteast Asia, especially the issue between South and North Korea, and to discuss how close Korea-Japan cooperation will contribute to peace and prosperity in Asia.

II. Overview of the Northeast Asian Situation

The early 1970s saw the rise of an East-West detente mood that basically reflected the hopes of the United States and the Soviet Union for peaceful coexistence and evolution of cooperative relations. After the mid-1970s, however, the international situation began to relapse into tensions due mainly to the re-emergence of distrust and confrontational relations between the two major powers. The situation since then has been often described even as a "new cold war."

Responsible for the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet rolations is the continuing Soviet military buildup aimed at gaining military superiority over the United States and the Soviet expansionist ventures in many parts of the world.

Such Soviet military buildup and expansionist policy struck a sharp contrast with the substantia U.S. relaxation of military armament and the U.S. military disengagement from Asia and other parts of the world under the principle and spirit of its detente policy toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States came to reconsider its detente policy and resist the Soviet expansionist policy. Especially alarming and disquieting to the United States were the Soviet backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in January 1979 that expanded the Soviet influence over the whole of Indochina, the Soviet armed incursion into Afghanistan in December 1979, and Moscow's repression of *the Solidarity* (labor union) movement in Poland.

Confronted with these disturbing developments, the United States began revising its

policy tow ırd the Soviet Union in the latter part of the Carter Administration. With the inaugurati n of the Reagan Administration, the United States assumed an even tougher stance aga nst the Soviet Union. President Reagan's hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union has been underscored by his strong resolve to restore and maintain the U.S. military super ority over the Soviets. He believes that the United States should make no unilateral concessions in matters of peaceful existence, cooperation, and arms control negotiatior s with the Soviet Union. He is determined to maintain the position of strength to halt the Soviet expansion.

Accordir gly, the United States resumed the development and production of MX missiles, Bl bomber , and neutron bombs, which had been all canceled under the Carter Administration. The United States is also pushing ahead with its plan to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Europe. Furthermore, the United States has been closing ranks with its al ies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), Japan and Korea, and even with Mainland China in an effort to deter the growing threat of the Soviet expansioni m. The Soviet Union reacted strongly to these moves and U.S.-Soviet relations began to d eteriorate rapidly, rekindling the U.S.-Soviet arms race.

Howeve the death of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party chief, in November 1982 seem d to provide an opportunity to ease both tensions and the arms race between the two su perpowers. In fact, upon the emergence of the new Soviet leadership, president Reagan ma de several moves apparently to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. On November 23, 1982, ıe announced his decision to lift the ban on exports to the Soviet Union of American quipment to be used for the construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline. The ban h ıd been imposed to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, among other things. On November 17, 1982, a U.S.-Soviet trade meeting was held for the first time in four ye rs.

In the a ısence of any signs that the Soviet Union will ease its military buildup and expansioni t policy, however, the United States continues to take a cautious, and in some sense confi ontational, approach toward its relations with the post-Brezhnev Soviet Union. In effect, t ıe United States has made it explicit that its tough policy toward the Soviet Union will not change unless and until the Kremlin alters its present policy.

Soviet e onomic and military burdens have ballooned with its support for the Vietnamese forces in K ampuchea and with the troubleridden Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan that has b en going on for over three years, in addition to its support for East Europe,

Cuba, and several African countries. At the same time such Soviet expansionist ventures have caused increasing uneasiness and strong reaction in the United States, Mainland China, and numerous other countries of the world.

On the top of its hefty military burden, worsened by Western economic sanctions, the Soviet Union is also saddled with difficult and complex problems posed by an internal foodgrain shortage, economic stagnation, dissident movements, the problems of minorities, and the process of establishing a new Kremlin leadership. Given these circumstances, it may be quite possible that the new Soviet leadership headed by Yuri V. Andropov, who became the Communist Party chief after Brezhnev's death, will relax the Soviet arms buildup and its expansionist policy at least in part and seek improved relations with the United States.

The United States is also faced with high unemployment, continuing inflation and unfavorable balance of payments, which all tend to constrain President Reagan's plan to substantially boost defense spending. Moreover, the U.S. Congress is largely opposed to the planned production and deployment of MX missiles, and the U.S. plan to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles in West Europe has met some opposition in some of these Europe countries, which mainly reflects concern about the consequences of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race in the area. For this reason, the Reagan Administration may try as much as possible to induce the Soviet Union to modify its policy so as to improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thus there are ample reasons to presume that the two superpowers will find it both necessary and desirable to improve their relations. Even so, however, the process of such improvement will be gradual.

The massive Soviet military buildup and expansionism made not only the United States but also Communist China increasingly wary and edgy. This largely explains the normalization of relations between the Unites States and Mainland China on January 1, 1979.

However, President Reagan's decision to sell modern U.S. military equipment and weapons to Taiwan arouse strong reaction on the part of Communist China. Mainland China also seemed to be disappointed because the United Stated did not offer as much economic and technical assistance as Peking expected and was thus of little help in promoting its modernization program. As a result, the Sino-U.S. relationship has cooled since 1982.

In a move to capitalize on this deveolpemnt, Brezhnev, in a speech he delivered in Tashkent is March 1982, called for a Sino-Soviet talks on the border issue wiuhout precon-

ditions, cl iming that the USSR is no threat to Communist China and has never endorsed a two-Chi ia concept. The first round of such Sino-Soviet talks was held in Peking on October 5 through 22, 1982, opening a new period of "Sino-Soviet dialogue: The emergence of Andropov as the new Soviet leader has brought no basic change in Soviet foreign policy.On the other hand, Communist China modified its West-leaning stance to pursue a more inde pendent line. Communist China's Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited 11 African countries o emphasize China's alignment with the Third World.

When U .S. Secretary of State George Schultz visited Peking seeking to improve Sino-U.S. relat ons, Communist China made no concession in principle on the issue involving Taiwan. Mainland China, however, appeared to be more eager than the Soviet Union about imp oving Sino-Soviet relation. It is notable in this regard that on the eve of the second ro nd of the Sino-Soviet talks held between their deputy foreign ministers in Moscow o 1 March 1, the Peking regime gave some signs of a flexible posture.

But, ne dless to say, a substantial improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship will not be easy t come by. As conditions for improved Sino-Soviet relations, Communist China demands 1) a reduction in the Soviet troops deployed along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongo ia, (2) an end to the Soviet support for the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, and (3) a pullout of the Soviet troops from Afganistan, none of which the Soviets find readily ac eptable.

Yet all these issues are Soviet burdens which the Kremlin may want to unload. And there are some signs that the Soviet Union is searching for possible acceptable ways to do so. As it turned out during the first round of the Sino-Soviet talks, China regarded the Kamp uchean situation as the most crucial issue and made a fivepoint proposal aimed at resolvi g it. This proposal, which Vietnam rejected in the joint communique issued after the last three nation Indochinese talks, is certain to become a critical subject at the second ro nd of the Sino-Soviet talks.

As for the Soviet troops deployed on the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia, their numbers are estim ted to total some 450,000, although China refers to them as "a million Soviet troops po sed in the Far East." The three conditions Communist China put forth are not really abs olute preconditions to improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Rather, Peking's attitude i flexible enough to suggest that it would be sufficient if the Soviet Union would do someth ing to prove its sincerity. This may be because Mainland China regards its improved with the Soviet Union as crucial not simply to its security but to its economic

development as well.

That Communist China elicited its interest in improving Sino-Soviet relations when President Reagan determined to go ahead with the sales of U.S. weaponry to Taiwan suggested the importance the Peking regime attaches to the issue of Taiwan. Nonetheless, during Schultz's trip to Peking. the Communist Chinese leaders showed no less deep interest in the transfer of U.S. high technology than in the solution of the Taiwan issue.

While in China in early February, Schultz held an unscheduled meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping. They agreed to discuss details for an exchange of visits of defense specialists in the fields of military education, medicine and logistics. This in effect opened the way for Sino-U.S. cooperation in military affairs. Underlying such an agreement was China's desire to tap sophisticated American technology needed to implement its armed forces modernization program. But, in this, the Peking regime is acting prudently so as not to provoke the Soviet Union.

The main purpose of Schultz's China trip seemed to be prevent further slippage in Sino-Soviet relations. Further moves toward improving Sino-U.S. relations are expected to come when Zhao Ziyang pays a visit to the United States, most likely within this year, and also when President Reagan visits China, possibly next year, in return for Zhao's U.S. trip.

U.S.-China relations are bound to be affected oneway or another by U.S.-Soviet relations, including the arms control negotiations. It also should be noted that strategic relations between the United States and Mainland China depend much on what political interests they seek and what concessions they make in dealing with related international issues, including the question of the Korean peninsula. In this sense, the way the issue of the Korean peninsula is handled will have a great deal to do with the future course of U.S.-China relations, and vice versa.

Even though Moscow seeks to improve its relations with Washington, the fact remains that the USSR regards the United States as its primary adversary and will therefore continue to make every effort to prevent a close Sino-U.S. alignment against the Soviet Union and, for the same reason, will try to attain a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

Communist China is also likely to be interested in doing some fence mending with the Soviet Union in order to reduce the threat and adverse pressure of a hostile Soviet Union, at least until China achieves the status of a big power through its present and future socialist modernization programs. Thus, prospects are fairly high for an easing of hostile

relations between China and the Soviet Union.

U.S.-Japan security cooperation began to receive a major impetus with the inauguration of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone who has made it clear that he intends to augment Japan's defense capabilities as part of the U.S.'s overall defense strategy against the Soviet Union. Such a move, which would increase Japan's role in the preservation of security in Northeast Asia, is essentially aimed at coping with the looming Soviet menace to Japan. This may, however, make the Soviets increasingly edgy. Aware of this, Japan is expected to exert greater efforts to alleviate the Soviet reaction and develop cooperative relations with the Soviet Union so as to minimize the Soviet menace as well as to promote Japan's economic interests.

The Soviet Union can be expected to increase its pressure on Japan to change its anti-Soviet policy. The Soviets will very likely step up its diplomatic activity aimed at weakening the U.S.-Japan security alliance, while at the same time offering Japan opportunities for some economic gains.

In sum, there are several possibilities. U.S.-Soviet relations will likely continue to be characterized by competition and confrontation, but the severity of such confrontation may be mitigated. While U.S.-China relations will be basically cooperative, their joint anti-Soviet stance may weaken. The Sino-Soviet feud can be hardly expected to be resolved, but their relations are likely to improve, if only partly.

All this points to an easing, rather than hardening, of big power relations concerning Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, if tensions on the Korean peninsula increase, it would raise the possibility of a renewed war that would very likely involve the big powers. Highly noteworthy in this regard is a recent report made by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger. The report disclosed that over the post decade and a half the Soviet Union has tripled the size of its Far East air force, increased its land forces to 50 divisions, and now has about one third of its 330 SS 20 intermidiate-rang missiles trained on Asia. Moreover, the report went on, the Soviet Pacific fleet of more than 500 warships, including submarines, is capable of blockading major seaports in the region. It further noted that the Soviet Union backs a scheme to communize the entire Korean peninsula, and in case of that eventuality would attempt to seize control of Mainland China, isolate or neutralize Japan, and break up Sino-U.S. rapport. This means, Weinberger added, that a renewed North Korean invasion of South Korea would inevitably lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. What emerges from all this is that the threat of the Soviet

expansion in Asia has increased substantially and that the possibility of North Korea launching an attack on the South by miscalculation is becoming ever greater, as both Communist China and the Soviet Union find themselves increasingly less capable of restraining North Korea from recklessly provoking South Korea.

III. The Current Situation on the Korea Peninsula

Almost three decades have elapsed since the Korean War, touched off by North Korea's armed invasion of South Korea,was brought to a halt with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953. Since then an uneasy peace has been maintained on the Korean peninsula. Mutual distrust and enmity continue to characterize the division of the peninsula, with North Korea remaining the world's most closed society.

The cold war prevailing over the Korean peninsula involves the potential danger of actual war as the confrontation between North and South Korea continues. Troops north and south of *the Demilitarized Zone*(*DMZ*) total more than 1.5million, making the peninsula the world's most militarized area. Should war break out, the repercussions will be far-reaching, involving virtually all major countries in the Asian and Pacific region.

North Korea, long engaged in a massive military buildup, now has over 800,000 men in the regular armed forces out of a total population of 19 million, ready to attack the South at the first opportunity. South Korea has a population of 39 million, but only some 600,000 regular troops. A contingent of 39,000 U.S. troops is stationed in the South to help maintain the military balance between the South and the North and thus to deter recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula.

Under the circumstances, it is only too obvious that a weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea would tempt North Korea to invade the South. Korea, although its military modernization and expansion program was begun in 1979, spends only 6 percent of its Gross National Product(GNP) for defense purposes. In contrast, North Korea's military outlay amounts to 15-20 percent of its GNP.

The current projections call for South Korea to eliminate the gap in the military balance with North Korea in the latter half of the 1980s. North Korea, however, is expected to continue boosting its military strength to maintain a military edge over South Korea. North Korea has already doubled the quantity major weapons for its regular armed forces and is producing tanks similar to the Soviet T62. It has activated 20 commando brigades and other similar units which are being trained both for a frontal attack on South Korea

across the DMZ and for infiltration into the South's rear area by sea and air. In addition, North Korea has reorganized and strengthened militia units consisting of an estimated 4 million men. It also has over 700 warplanes, twice the number of South Korea's, and more than 500 naval vessels, enough to blockade major South Korean ports.

In the meantime, Communist China gave North Korea 50 Soviet MIG21-type fighter aircraft in 1982 as part of its military assistance. North Korea has requested Moscow to provide modern Soviet weaponry, including MIG23 fighter planes. Whether the Kremlin concurs this time or not, the Soviet role in assisting North Korea militarily as well as economically will continue to be as crucial as that played by Communist China. However, it is quite obvious that neither Communist China nor the Soviet Union, much less the United States and Japan, wants to see a renewed war on the Korean peninsula, because the stakes are too high.

On the other hand, while caught in a severe economic bind, Kim Il-sung, the North Korean Communist chieftain, is attempting to make his eldest son, Kim Chong-il, the successor in the face of opposition by "old-time" cadres in the North Korean hierarchy. The 1980s is likely to see one change or another in the policy of the North Korean regime. Its persistently monolithic Communist rule and Stalinist economic policy have resulted in growing political unrest and economic stagnation. One cannot rule out the possibility of the Pyongyang regime undertaking a reckless military adventure against South Korea to seek a way out of its critical status. This possibility poses a constant threat to the security of the people in South Korea.

North Korea has already suspended dialogue unilaterally with South Korea. While turning a deaf ear to the South's repeated offer to resume dialogue for peaceful unification, North Korea continues to dwell on its formula for unification calling for the establishment of a so-called Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo(Koryo being the ancient name for Korea). The North Korean formula calls for, among other things, participation in the "confederation" by representatives of the existing South's and North's political organizations on an equal footing. Yet, North Korea refuses to recognize the very existence of the South Korean government. For example, North Korea insists that the Korean Armistice Agreement must be replaced with a peace treaty which in turn, they say, must be negotiated between and signed by only North Korea and the United States. This is meant simply to exclude South Korea, a party directly involved, and instead deal with a third party in negotiating a treaty on the Koran peninsula. This utterly absurd demand typi-

cally illustrates how actual North Korean behavior contradicts its claim of the "self-reliance" of the Korean people, a claim that has become a propaganda cliche.

Tactics involved in the North Korean formula are closely reminiscent of those employed by Communists after World War II. North Korea demands that its proposed "confederal body" be participated in by an equal number of representatives from the North and the South. Implicit in this demand is North Korea's tactic to have its monolithic regime's representatives break up the representatives of the pluralistic society in South Korea and thus eventually take over the system.

South Korea's unification formula is practical and realistic in every respect. It calls for a phased, step by step approach to unification by resolving problems that are most feasible, while dissipating distrust that has been hardened by war. The formula proposes to permit separated families in the North and the South to visit each other and, to initiate economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides so as to pave the way for a solution to the political and military problems which are more difficult to deal with. In addition to these proposals, the late South Korean President Park Chung Hee offered to conclude a South-North non-aggression agreement. Moreover, supporting the concept of the United States and Japan recognizing the North Korean regime on condition that the Soviet Union and Communist China recognize the South Korean Government, he also proposed that South and North Korea simultaneously join the United Nations.

kim Il-sung has accepted none of these proposals, claiming that these are merely "a scheme to perpetuate the existence of two Koreas". Instead, riding on the coat-tails of the Soviet Union and Communist China, he has been maneuvering to upstage South Korea by attempting to deal directly with the United States and Japan.

South Korea's earnest desire to promote peaceful, democratic unification was further underscored by the statement made by South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan in a policy speech delivered to the National Assembly in January 1983. President Chun emphasized that South Korea's realistic unification formula is intended to solve the pressing problem of removing national misfortune and suffering caused by the territorial division and that unification should be dealt with as the most crucial problem that will determine the future of the Korean people.

As long as any efforts to achieve peaceful unification are motivated by and based on genuine concern about the interests of all Koreans in both the North and the South, there can be no reason to refuse an inter-Korean dialogue without any preconditions and

transce ıding ideological and institutional differences.

Soutl Korea's formula for national reconciliation and democratic unification not only represe ıts the ardent desire of all Koreans to attain peaceful reunification, but also is compre ıensive enough to accommodate some of the North Korean regime's proposals. In short, i offers to resume dialogue leading to peaceful, democratic unification.

This formula proposes, among other things, that South and North form a Consultative Confere ıce to formulate a constitution of a unified country and that the two sides of Korea c ɔnclude a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations. This Basic Relations Formula calls fo South and North Korea to:

—Main ain relations based on the principle of equality and reciprocity pending unification.

—Precl de the use of armed force and the threat of violence, and settleinter-Korean problems through dialogue.

—Recog ıize each other's political order and social institutions and abide by non-interference in eac h other's internal affairs.

—Facili ate free travel between the two Sides for reunion of separated families.

—Progr ssively open their societies to each other through various forms of exchange and coope ıtion (in the fields of trade, trans Portations, communications, postal service, sports academic pursuits, culture, new gathering and reporting, technology, and environme ıtal preservation).

—Respe t each other's bilateral multiteral treaties and agreements concluded with third countr es, and consult with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Korean penins ıla as a whole.

—Set up a resident liason mission in Seoul and Pyongyang, furthermore, South Korea propos d to hold a meeting of high-level delegates from the South and the North to discuss the approaches to unification broached by both sides.

In con rast, North Korth at one time suggested a South-North dialogue of the prime ministers in the hopes of advancing its own aims by taking advantage of political and social co fusion in the South at the time. But as South Korea restored its political and social sta ɔility with the birth of the Fifth Republic, North Korea took no time to unilaterallly bre ık off the working-level preparatory meetings and has since produced nothing but threa l-bare propaganda tirades.

More s ɔecifically, the Pyongyang regime demands the withdrawal of the U.S. troops which ar stationed in South Korea as a war deterrent force under the South Korea-U.S.

mutual de ence treaty. It also asserts that the present government in South Korea be removed a ıd the South's National Security Law and other stipulations for law and order be revoke . These ridiculous demands are part of preconditions North Korea attaches to a unification dialogue. The North insists that it can accept no other unification formula than its o vn calling for the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo. Yet, it ev n rejects the South's proposal to resume dialogue to discuss various issues including he North's unification formula.

North K orea proposed a joint conference of 100 politicians from the South and the North 50 rom each side. But in making this offer, North Korea unilaterally singled out 50 persons who it said could represent the South at the proposed joint meeting. Not surprisingl r, these 50 delegates named by North Korea to represent South Korea were pro-Pyongyang leftists including Choi Dock-shin, and Choi Hong-hee, and even some fictitious persons.

While a serting that inter- Korean issues must be resolved by Koreans themselves, North Korea not merely refuses to re-open a dialouge with the South but is attempting to conclude a pe ıce treaty with the United States to the exclusion of South Korea, the idea being to is olate the South and promote the North's design to eventually Communize all Korea.

The dup icity of the North Korean regime can be seen from the fact that according to the United Nations Command (UNC), North Korea has committed a total of more than 50,000 vio ations of the Armistice Agreement between the time of the conclusion of the Agreement and the end of 1982. The latest compilation (covering the 1965-1982 period) shows that North Korea's major provocations committed in violation of the Armistice Agreement amounted to 5 cases in 1965;5 in 1966;10 in 1967;15 in 1968;7 in 1969;6 in 1970;7 in 1971;4 in 1973;8 in 1973;15 in 1974;11 in 1975;5 in 1976;3 in 1977;3 in 1978;1 in 979;9 in 1980;4 in 1981; and 5 in 1982.

Unlike p evious years, Kim Il-sung's New Year statement for 1983 was devoted entirely to North K orea's internal policy matters such as the direction for construction of a socialist state. Nort ı Korea is a monolithic Communist society ruled absolutely by the Workers (Communis :) Party, which constantly tries to keep the North Korean people loyal to it. Since Kim Chong-il emerged as the heir-apparent to his father, Kim Il-sung, the head of the Comm ı nist monolith, the junior Kim has been identified with the authorities of the Workers P rty. Therefore, when the North Korean regime claims that its people's loyalty

to the party has increased, it implies that Kim Chong-il's position for the succession has been strengthened. Although the junior Kim has been groomed as the successor for many years, his status as such was formalized in October 1980 at the Sixth Congress of the Workers Party. This meeting emphasized the need for absolute loyalty of the people to the "Party center" which refers to Kim Chong-il. Kim Ilsung's New Year message for 1981 stressed that "the entire people and the party members unite firmly around the Central Committee of the Workers Party," the obvious euphemism for Kim Chong-il. Similar statements, though couched in varying phrases, were repeated in Kim Il-sung's New Year messages for 1982 and 1983.

The North Korea Workers Party's abiding objective is to communize the entire Korean peninsula. Accordingly, Kim Il-sung almost invariably proffers "the method of struggle" to achieve that goal in his New Year statements. In the statement for 1980, he said that "we extend our enthusiastic support for and encouragement to the patriotic struggle for justice by the people in South Korea". His 1981 statement called for "waging of a national struggle to establish *the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo*". The same was repeated in his statement for 1982. However, no mention was made to that effect or of the question of unification in that particular statement. But this was not because of any basic change in the North Korean strategy toward South Korea. It simply reflected a tactical retreat due to the fluid situation inside the North and abroad. In fact, the "Unification Party Broadcasting Station", which North Korea claims exists in the South but is actually North Korea's black propaganda organ set up in the North, kept harping on such rallable-rousing cliches as "anti-American struggle" and "struggle for democratization (Communist) revolution".

North Korea is also stepping up summit diplomacy with the focus on promoting its "anti-imperialistic and self-reliant lines" in conjunction with nonaligned nations. Pyongyang is especially anxious to enhance the international image of Kim Chong-il, the heir-apparent. Thus the New Year message of Kim Il-sung states that all-out efforts must be concentrated on socialist economic construction while consolidating the scheme to have Kim Chong-il take over. North Korea flexibly operates its military and anti-Republic of Korea policies to suit shifting circumstances.

When North Korea was invited on February 1 to send observers to Team Spirit '83 (Republic of Korea-United States joint military exercises), it refused the invitation and used the exercise as the excuse for declaring a state of semi-war. Not only the regular

armed forces but the Workers Red Guard, the Youth Guard, the People's Constabulary and other militia units were ordered into combat readiness.

North Korea called U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz's visit to Korea "a warmonger's journey of aggression." Moscow asserted that the Schultz visit was "Part of attempts to work out a world strategy for the American imperialists." *Radio Pyongyang* said Secretary Schultz visited Korea "carrying with him the fire for war." In its February 9 edition, *the Rodong Shinmun* (*Workers Daily*) commented that the purpose of the visit was to do "the field work to formulate a triangular military alliance among America, Japan and South Korea." calling Team Spirit an "American imperialistic war scheme," North Korea is striving to reinforce a warlike atmosphere within its borders. The aim is to strengthen unity among various sectors of society by turning popular attention away from the hereditary succession scheme and other internal issues, while drumming up support in the nonaligned bloc for the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea.

Moscow's hardline reaction to Team Spirit appears to be intended to forestall the emergence of a triangular relationship to counter the Soviet military buildup in East Asia. It is possibly also intended to woo North Korea away from Peking to forge a closer tie with them. Although China actively supports the North Korean stand against Team Spirit '83 and the shift into a semi-war state, the Chinese media only once quoted a news report from Pyongyang about the Schultz visit.

North Korea also criticized the visit of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan to Seoul. On February 10, the day before the prime minister's arrival in Korea, *the Rodong Shinmun* published an article which said: "The sudden visit of Nakasone to Korea forces us to enhance our vigilance against the stepped-up move to form a triangular military alliance involving the Japanese reactionaries and South Korea." The North Korean *Central News Agency* issued a statement on January 13 denouncing such an alliance, followed by a salvo of similar accusations by the North Korean Professional Union (on January 15) and many other social organizations.

In China, *the People's Daily* quoted on January 12 a Japanese newspaper editorial as having said: "Economic cooperation (between the Republic of Korea and Japan) will block the path to genuine friendship between North Korea and Japan. Nakasone merely wants to take a souvenir from Seoul as a gift to America to facilitate his own visit to Washington." By publishing such a quote, Peking indirectly supports the North Korean

allegation on this topic.

In contrast, the Soviet Union showed a much sharper sensitivity to the matter. *Radio Moscow* continually broadcast comments, including quotes from *the Tass News Agency* (January 11), *the Izvetsia* (January 10 and 15) and *the Pravda* (January 12). *Tass* asserted that "the confrontation strategy of Korea, the United States and Japan runs the risk of adding a new source of instability in the regional situation." This is indicative of Moscow's uneasiness over the development.

In the United States, Congress is due to soon consider a five-year military reinforcement program costing $1.553 trillion including $238 billion for the fiscal 1984 defense budget (up 10 percent from 1983). Preliminary to this, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger submitted the annual defense report to Congress and General John W. vessey Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent with it a military posture report which, among other things, calls on the United States and its Free World allies to strengthen the deterrent against the rapidly expanding Soviet military might.

With its continuing military buildup, North Korea now has the capability not only to blockade major South Korean ports but also to cut off the South's vital sealanes, in addition to mounting land offensives. The above-mentioned U.S. military report points out that it is urgent to rectify the continuing inadequacy of the stockpile of war material in the Republic of Korea. It states that such a step to beef up the military preparedness in the Republic and effective American logistical and naval and air support in an emergency is indispensable to the defense of the Korean peninsula.

The basic U.S. strategy is to: (1) strengthen the military power of the United States and that of the collective defense stystem in combination with its allies; (2) maintain the forward deployment of U.S. forces in conjunction with its allies in Korea, Japan, Western Europe and so forth in order to reinforce the collective defense posture; and (3) to secure emergency air and sea lift capabilities to flexibly cope with unforeseen contingencies.

In principle, the United States depends heavily on the self-defense capabilities of its allies to safeguard the security of Asia and the pacific. To bolster allied defenses, America has deployed a division of ground forces and a limited tactical air force in Korea and a marine unit, a tactical air force and an aircraft carrier and auxiliary vessels in Japan. America emphasizes the importance of a stronger self-defense of Japan and military cooperation among the three countries of Korea, the U.S. and Japan presumably because Washington pursues an effective strategy to deal with exigencies in this region.

General Edward C. Meyer, the U.S. army chief of staff, told a press conference in Seoul during a visit to Korea that the "nuclear option" would be open in the worst cast of a North Korean invasion of the South. He noted that North Korea had shown "no signs of slowing down" its military buildup efforts. Commenting on General Meyer's revelation, *the Chosun Ilbo's* editorial, a national daily published in Seoul, stated on January 25 that this reconfirms the unswerving U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic, imparting a greater sense of security to the Korean people. The paper said North Korea should be aware of the possibility of nuclear holocaust in the event of a renewed war on the Korean peninsula and abandon its illusions and fantasies about reinvading the South, if it wants to preserve its population and territory intact.

Recently, the U.S. Department of State revised its guideline for the conduct of American diplomats to allow limited contact with their North Korean counterparts. This seems to be somewhat related to the U.S. decision not to oppose a $18.6million loan by the United Nations Development Fund to North Korea. The Republic of Korea government warned that this should not result in an "encouragement of North Kora."

In a February 28 edition, *the Joong-ang Ilbo*, a national daily published in Seoul, said the "smile strategy" of the U.S. should lead to energetic efforts to induce China, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to come to terms with the Republic of Korea. But the paper warned that such a tactic could encourage North Korea and give it a higher international standing, thereby complicating the Republic's foreign policy operations. It said the Republic's other friends are likely to follow the suit of the United States in readjusting their policies toward North Korea. For instance, the paper noted, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe now advocates expanding exchanges with North Korean politicians. Accordingly, attention must be paid to the psychologically destabilizing effects that such a minor shift in U.S. policy can have on the stability and balance of the Korean peninsula since the situation on the peninsula is peculiarly fragile. *The Dong-a Ilbo*, also a national paper based in Seoul, said in an editorial on February 28 that care must be taken not to let the change in the American attitude toward North Korea threaten stability on the Korean peninsula.

It has been revealed that the United States recently informed Japan that it would take a "forward-looking approach" to North Korea with a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to cross recognition. In this regard, Washington emphasized that the new policy will not lead to the recognition of North Korea and that its main purpose is to prompt

North Kore: to take part in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. It is thus generally understood that t ıe modified policy is a "very limited measure". Many believe, however, that Washington s decision to seek contact with Pyongyang is partly aimed at inducing China and the Sov iet Union to agree to cross recognition and open contact with the Repulbic of Korea, whil: also promoting the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nati ons. North Korea, however is adamantly opposed to both cross recognition and simultaneou: entry into the U.N. and both China and the Soviet Union support the Pyongyang stance. Accordingly, rapid progress along such lines is least likely.

Japan alre ady conducts considerable exchanges of people and foods with North Korea. Foreign Mir ister Abe said before the Diet that Tokyo would pursue a forward-looking policy on ex changes with North Korea. This statement is apparently an echo of Washington's decisio ı to seek contact with Pyongyang.

IV. Issues in Korea-Japan Relations

The visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to Seoul has been acclaimed not only by the Korean peop e themselves but also by Western countries, especially the U.S., as an effective step tov ard rebuilding Korea-Japan relations. Presdient Chun Doo Hwan and Prime Minister Nal asone settled the pending issue of bilateral economic cooperation and exchanged frar k views on the situation on the Korean peninsula and future Korean-Japanese relations. Th e joint communique issued after two summit talks defined the prime minister's visit to Seou as a "major milestone" in the development of friendly bilateral cooperation and said the two countries would endeavor to develop a higher level of neighborly and friendly rela ions in a spirit of mutual trust, reciprocity and equality.

However, he prime minister's visit to Korea did not produce much in the way of visible steps to an enduring stable relationship in the future of the two "remote next-door neighbors." Nonet ıeless, the communique came up with a new frame of reference for the perception of th e Korean situation. What may be termed the "Korean peninsula Clause" of the joint com munique noted that: (1) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to the peace and stability of East Asia, including Japan: (2) Korea and Japan w ll make common endeavors to promote peace, stability and prosperity in this region; and (3) Japan highly appreciates the efforts of the Republic of Korea to open dialogue with the North, while strengthening national defense. By virtue of the clause, in association w th the agreement on US $4 billion in economic cooperation funds, Japan has

taken a step forward in sharing "responsibilities and tasks„to secure stability on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, this was an even clearer indication that cooperative ties among the U.S., Japan and Korea in the security field are being strengthened.

The U.S. government acclaimed the diplomatic efforts of the top leaders of Korea and Japan to increase solidarity between the two East Asian nations. On the other hand, Pyongyang, Moscow and Peking claimed that the Nakasone visit to Seoul was a move to form "tripartite military alliance."

The Korean-Japanese summit in Seoul was a considerable success. But many more problems remain to be resolved if the newly forged mutual trust between the two governments is to be developed into "friendly relations broadly based in the two peoples."

Commenting on the Nakasone visit to Korea, *the Dong-a Ilbo* said in an editorial on January 5 that the Seoul-Tokyo summit should "provide a breakthrough in the accumulated issues between Korea and Japan." While noting that cooperation among Korea, Japan and the U.S. is essential to Northeast Asian regional security, the Joongang Ilbo emphasized on January 5 that such cooperation cannot be considered apart from such interrelated factors as Korea's contribution to Japanese security, the chronic deficits in Korea's trade with Japan, the nature of the tripartite relationship among Korea, the U.S. and Japan and the overall imbalance in Korean-Japanese economic relations." *The Chosun Ilbo* called the Nakasone visit "an opportunity to improve Korean-Japanese relations and said: 'It would be rational and wise for Korea to seek amity and friendly cooperation with Japan, its next-door neighbor, on an equal footing. *The Seoul Shinmun* commented that "friendly cooperation between the two countries is the cornerstone for peace and stability in Northeast Asia."

It is generally hoped in Korea that the Japanese-U.S. summit held in Washington considered the development of a American-Japanese security strategy and an increased military role for Japan totally separate from the Korea-American security strategy. Closer American-Japanese security cooperation must not lead to a crimping of Korean-American joint defense efforts. Although how the policy of increasing Tokyo's share of the defense of Japan will be implemented remains to be seen, an increased Japanse military role must never be an excuse to weaken the U.S. miltary presence in Korea.

If the developing Asian situation is characterized by a sharpening confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the tension and crisis persisting on the divided Korean peninsula are due largely to the fact that the two halves possess the characteristics of

outposts of t ıe superpowers.

Thus any ɔracticable strategy for regional security must assign top priority to the safest of the Korea ı peninsula as dictated by the actual developments of regional affairs evolving around it. If the planned increase in Tokyo's share of the burden of defense of Japan proves to bu tress the Korean-American mutual defense arrangement, this will be a very fortunate thi g, since the U.S. strategy foy security in East Asia must be anchored in Korea. In an editorial on January 21, *the Kyungyang Shinmun*, a national daily based in Seoul, comm nted that prime Minister Nakasone's proposals to bolster the defense of Japan-the con version of Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" by beefing up naval and air power, th defense of sealanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan and the blocking of the Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and Korea straits in an emergency-must be translated into action in such a way as to "support from the side the Korean-American security strategy for p eserving the safety of the Korea peninsula."

From 1965, when Korean-Janpanese relations were normalized, to 1982, the deficit in Korea's trade with Japan totaled about $24 billion. In 1982, Korea exported $3.314 billion worth ɔf goods to Japan while importing $5.350 billion worth, thus registering a deficit of ab ɔut $2 billion. This indicates that Japan should rectify her attitude toward economic relat ons with Korea.

In 1982, 63 Japanese visited North Korea, while 102 North Koreans traveled to Japan. Such exchang is expected to rise in the future.

The Chun-N akasone agreement of strengthen Korean-Japanese cooperation in economic and security n atters is expected to have major impact on neghboring countries. Naturally, the United St tes quickly expressed support. But problematic is the attitudes of China, the Soviet Uni ɔn and North Korea.

For days on end before, during and after the Nakasone visit to Seoul, *Radio Pyongyang* and *the Rodon Shinmun* vociferously charged that the formation of the "tripartite military alliance amon the U.S., Japan and South Korea is in preparation for war." *Radio Moscow* asserte l that the recent development in the trilateral relationship among Japan, the U.S. and I orea has substantially altered the balance of power in East Asia, thereby destablizing th region.

While many watched with concern for the Peking reaction to this issue, a Chinese foreign ministr spokesman issued a statment saying: "The visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to So uth Korea and the granting of a large Japanese loan to that country has

reinforced the rulership of Chun Doo Hwan. This hinders stability on the Korean peninsula and peaceful unification of Korea."

The Republic of Korea has no disire to be involved in an emotional exchange with China and the Soviet Union, although it regards North Korea differently. The reality is that the Republic hopes to improve relations with both Communist giants, with a view partly to diversifying its external trade and partly to enhancing its international prestige by attracting as many countries as possible to the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.

On the other hand, if the recent Korean-Japanese summit is to lead to a genuinely new era in the relations between the two nations, keen attention should be paid not only to the security issue but also the question of how to promote mutual understanding and psychological readjustment between the Korean and Japanese peoples and foster various forms of exchanges on the private level-prerequisite to building friendly relations between the two nations.

In the first place, one must realize the difficulty of cultural exchanges between peoples with different ways of thinking. Hard-to-heal old wounds left by the 36-year Japanese colonial rule still tend to affect interaction between the two peoples. Whenever opinion polls are taken in the two countries, Korea ranks as the least liked country among Japanese, while Japan registers as the least liked country among Koreans. The tendencies among the Japanese not to regard Korea as a foreign country and the asymmetry of mutual perceptions are substantantial impediments to the growth of friendly interaction on the popular level. To be sure, there is no denying that expansion of cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan is extremely important to long-term development of the relations between the two nations.

In order to facilitate cultural exchanges, however, it will be necessary, first of all, to coolheadedly re-examine how Japan views Korea and Korea views Japan.

Japan should more clearly understand the peculiar Korean situation due to the territorial division. Seoul is only 25 miles (40Km), or 40-50 minutes, drive, from the Demilitarized Zone that separates South and North Korea. This distance is no more than that between Tokyo and Yokohama. Japanese citizens must not overlook the fact that more than 1.5 million troops are divided into two opposing camps by a narrow strip of land no wider than the distance between Tokyo and Yokohama presenting a fragile balance of power a slight tipping of which could trigger a North Korean invasion of the South. The Japanese must not gloss over the tragic reality that the people of the Republic of Korea live under

a constant thr at of the renewal of the nightmarish Korean war.

Seeking to : esume a dialogue with the North to ease tension and promote peaceful coexistence, th e Republic of Korea proposed a summit with the North. The government of the Republi : of Korea even refers to Kim Il-sung as the president of North Korea in urging him to come to the conference table to discuss all pending issues, including even the confederat on idea proposed by Pyongyang, the North persists in a negative attitude. How should w : interpret this?

On March 1 the people in the South were able to watch television news transmitted by a Peking T V station and relayed by Japan's NHK under the news exchange program of the Asian I roadcasting Union. But such an exchange between South and North Korea is still a far a way dream, even though they belong to a single ethnic family.

V. Conclusion

The Korean Japanese summit has launched a new epoch in the relationship between the two countries. The Korean peninsula clause of the joint communique by President Chun and Prime Mi ister Nakasone advocates a new security framework founded in strengthened tripartite ties mong Korea, the U.S. and Japan. The task now is to faithfully implement the terms of t ıe communique with the aims of rebuilding Korea-Japanese relations and of enhancing com non endeavors to promote stability on the Korean peninsula.

In addition o furthering political and economic cooperation, cultural exchanges should be actively pu sued so to increase mutual understanding between the two peoples and accelerated pri ate level cooperation as well. Japan, a major economic power, should take more positive ıpproaches to economic cooperation with the technological transfers to Korea, partly to red ess the Korean-Japanese trade imbalance-an essential step to genuinely improving the relationship between the two nations.

Japan shoul try to make more active contributions to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and ease inter-Korean tension, while at the same time refraining from commercial dealings-si ch as the sales of strategic goods-that would serve to strengthen the North Korean milita y capabilities, thereby increasing the danger of North Korean military adventurism.

Unless Japa regards Korea, an independent sovereign state, as a foreign country, it will be difficu t to establish neighborly relations between the two nations. Energetic measures shou d be taken to eliminate the mutual perception gap and expand cultural

exchanges between Korea and Japan.

In particular, the treatment of Koreans residing in Japan should be improved in a humanitarian spirit. This issue affords Japan a good opportunity to demonstrate domestically and externally that it is a civilized country that respects human rights. Regrettably, although it pays lip service to humanitarianism and human rights, Japan treats Korean residents in a manner that is a disgrace. It should be realized that Japan will not be qualified to discuss human rights in international forum until and unless treatment of Koreans residing in Japan is upgraded.

Japan ought to cure itself of its "security allergy" as quickly as possible. Korea does not want to rely militarily on Japan. It only wishes that by strengthening its cooperation with the United States, Japan, as a friend to the West, will sincerely endeavor to help ease tension on the Korean peninsula. It is hoped that with its vast economic power, Japan will act as a mediator for peace in Northeast Asia in dealing with the Soviet Union, the United States, North Korea, etc. Japan is asked to exert bona fide influences on the strength of its "economic card" with the goal of securing lasting peace Korean-peninsula will benefit Japan as well, Japan, as a peace-loving country, should make more positive efforts to promote the general welfare of mankind. The pledges made at the Korean-Japanese summit and those made at the Japanese-American summit should be honored as binding international agreements regardless of future changes of government it the countries involved.

In trying to develop Korean-Japanese relations in a new direction, more emphasis should be placed on cultural exchanges, in addition to promoting political and economic interaction. This is necessary to increase understanding between the two peoples on a broad basis. It should be realized that increased understanding between the two peoples is fundamental to the security of both. Korea and Japan must not remain "remote next-door neighbors" nor rated as "the least-liked country" in each other's opinion polls. To change such perceptions, opinion molders in both countries should take the lead in promoting mutual understanding with courage and perseverance and in a crusading spirit.

The Soviet union is building up military forces in the vicinity of the northern territory of Japan. The political aims of Moscow are to: (1) cause a deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations in order to improve its own relationship with Peking; (2) obstruct Japanese contributions to the security of the West; (3) facilitate the communization of the entire Korean peninsula; and (4) expand its influences in South-east Asia. In the event of war,

the Soviet strategy will be directed at gaining control of western and northeastern China, preventing Japan from participating in war in Asia and defeating the U.S.-Korean allied forces on the Korean peninsula.

By maintaining its stance as a member of the West and striving to preserve peace in Northeast Asia, Japan should be able to demonstrate its love of peace, thereby dispelling worries of other Asian countries about a possible rise of militarism in Japan as a result of its rearmament.

Once again I wish to emphasize the heavy responsibilities of journalists, scholars and other opinion leaders in both Korea and Japan to help achieve full, genuine understanding between the nations. I express my gratitude to all of you for listening to this presentation, while at the same time renewing my own sense of mission to do all I can to build a bridge of understanding between our people.

Thank you.