Some Negative Aspects of Bureaucratic Behavior in Korea*

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1. Introduction

This paper is based on the previous papers which covered the following aspects of negative bureaucratic behavior in Korea:

1. Concept of Negative Bureaucratic Behavior, by Professor Jae-Dong Kim
2. History of Legal Fight Against Negative Bureaucratic Behavior in Yi Dynasty, by Professor Dong-Suh Park
3. Negative Bureaucratic Behavior and Development-Revenue Raising Agency: Cases of National Tax Office, by Professor Sintaek Kang
4. Negative Bureaucratic Behavior and Development-Revenue Spending Agencies: Cases of Construction, by Professor Wha-Joon Rhee
5. Negative Bureaucratic Behavior and Development-Regulatory Agencies: Cases of...

6. Administrative Measures for Controlling Negative Bureaucratic Behavior: The Center-Corruption Campaign of the Korean Government, by Professor Suck-Hong Oh

In the following section, we will briefly describe the initial research objectives with a slightly modified conceptual framework for the derivation of the conclusion, and then present a summary and conclusion with the emphasis on the possible causes and impacts of corruption as well as on the effectiveness of the controlling measures against those negative bureaucratic behavior.

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2. A Conceptual Framework for the Derivation of Summary and Conclusion

2.1. Research Objectives of the Project

The objectives and scope of the research on negative bureaucratic behavior were initially set forth as follows:

(1) Each country team would select certain historical period to describe historical evolution of the concept of negative bureaucratic behavior, causes and incidences of those behaviors, and some legal fights against those behaviors. The historical study was intended to provide a background and perspective within which the present-day situation might be seen.

(2) In order to provide a working definition on “negative bureaucratic behavior,” it was felt necessary to differentiate between the social and legal norms and to determine whether the two are in accordance. It was expected that in many instances the two norms might be incongruent. The assumption behind this approach was that the discrepancies between the two norms would be important causes of negative bureaucratic behavior.

(3) In order to provide empirical data on negative bureaucratic behavior for the analysis and evaluation of the causes and impacts of those behaviors, three types of government agencies were selected: 1) Revenue raising agencies; 2) Revenue spending agencies; and 3) Regulatory agencies.

The emphasis here was on the behavioral, procedural, and structural patterns of the phenomena rather than on the individual actors or personality type. One of the intriguing questions was whether the corruption hinders or facilitates the developmental goals of government.

(4) Current administrative measures for controlling negative bureaucratic behavior were included in this study to evaluate the effectiveness of those measures.

(5) It was expected that some conclusion and policy recommendations could be drawn from the above studies.

In the course of our research, we found that the above problems are rather very evasive and elusive raising more complicated issues.

For example, the question of congruence or incongruence between the social and legal norms seems to cover more than one aspect: original understanding of the question was to find out any discrepancy or accordance between the two norms as the criteria of bureaucratic conduct in general. However, there seems to be more important aspect; namely, the norms as criteria or standards for the services, regulations, promotion, and creation of governmental activities may differ between those formally provided by the laws and those expected by the people and society. Furthermore, sometimes, the norms provided and expected are both very unrealistic viewed from the standpoint of prevailing conditions or situations of the society. In addition, there are externally expected and prescribed norms and internalized norms of the individual bureaucrats.

The actual occurrences and instances of negative bureaucratic behavior can also be analyzed in terms of area, scope, level, method, process, recurrence and multiplier effects, etc.

Similarly, causes of negative bureaucratic behavior can range from the individual psychological idiosyncracies to the characteristics of a particular bureaucracy and surrounding sociocultural features of the time and place.

The most elusive of all was the question of the relationship between the negative bureaucratic behavior and development. It was almost impossible to establish any positive relationships with our case reports, and we may later conclude that the national economic development in Korea was possible “in spite of” pervasive
negative bureaucratic behavior.

The effectiveness of control may come from at least three sources: variation of clarity, scope, intensity, severity of the norms themselves; suppression of the current rate of negative bureaucratic behavior without changing the norms and situation; and removal of deviation-causing structural factors and situations.

Such a proliferation of the questions presented us with an impossible task to be tackled within the scope of study as initially set forth. Therefore, we felt it necessary to have a wider and yet compact theoretical perspective to properly understand the phenomena, causes, and control measures of negative bureaucratic behavior.

2.2. A Modified Conceptual Framework

In order to sensibly handle our complicated problem of negative bureaucratic behavior, we will compress the issues raised above into two big categories:

1) Role behavior performances of the bureaucrats, and

2) Social integration and control. The two are of course not mutually exclusives; rather they are closely interrelated.

2.2.1. Individual Factors and Social Factors

To speak in a very simplified manner, the phenomena of negative bureaucratic behaviors are understood, explained, and predicted either by some characteristic attributes of the public officials or by the situations surrounding the individual officials and the bureaucracy.

The approach which emphasizes the individual factors for the understanding, explanation, prediction, and remedial measures of negative bureaucratic behavior may take an extreme form in which the differences of socio-cultural environment and situations are disregarded and only the differences in individual psychological properties or dispositions are considered theoretically significant. In other words, the individual factor analysis in its extreme form may assume that "the situational variance is reduced to zero," and may insist that in order to prevent the negative bureaucratic behavior, the attitudes, ideologies, values, motives and beliefs of the public officials must be changed.

On the other hand, the approach which emphasizes the social factors may assume that the individuals who have similar social backgrounds will behave alike when put into similar situations, and assume that individual differences are negligible. In other words, this approach may assume that "the individual variance can be reduced to zero", and consider only the sociocultural environments and situations as significant factors of negative bureaucratic behavior.

In most of the approaches, however, the above two sets of factors are combined. The "role" concept is a very convenient one to link the individual characteristics with the situational features.

2.2.2. Role Role Behavior Performances

A role is a set of behaviors which an individual is expected to perform by other members of the group, organization, or society. The process in which an individual acquires his particular role is depicted as follows:

First, the members of the collectives perceive the role behaviors of a particular person which are required for the functioning of that collective.

Second, these expectations are sent to the person in the form of information together with an attempt at influence.

Third, the person perceives the expected role and role sending by other members of the group or organization.

Fourth, the person performs his role behavior by complying with the expected behavior. Sometimes, he may resist the sent role, and there may arise some "side effects."

If a person takes his role-behavior without any conflict as described above, there would be no negative bureaucratic behavior or graft and corruption and anomaly. Therefore, one of the important sources of negative bureaucratic behavior may be found in the situation in which the role conflicts of public officials are aggravated.

Such a role conflict may arise from one of the following situations:

First, incompatible or inconsistent expectations held by one of the members of the group may cause a role conflict. If the superiors, colleagues, and clients of the administrative organizations are in a state of confusing value system, their expectations may very well be inconsistent and incompatible.

Second, two or more members of the group may be setting inconsistent expectations. The situation is very similar to the above, except that there are involved two or more role senders.

Third, when a person holds two or more roles, there may be conflicts among those roles. In a transitional societies, the role of a person as a member of the primary group and the role of the person as a member of the secondary group are very often in a conflict situation.

Fourth, the role conflict may also arise from the conflict between the role a person has to perform and the value system held by the person himself.

In fact, the problems of negative bureaucratic behavior and social anomalies are those of informal systems which hinder the orderly operation of formal administrative and political systems.

Since the administrative anomalies as informal systems develop due to the peculiar interrelationships among the members of the group, it is necessary to change this pattern of relationships in order to control the negative bureaucratic behavior. Such a change comes from the change of attitudes and value system of the role senders as well as those of role-person himself. This is again the issue of person and situation.

Who should change first? The government officials, or the members of the society at large? In Korea, we may reasonably conclude that the change must come first from the government officials. The perception and consciousness pattern and manner of role interpretation of the public officials must be changed first. Because, viewed at the societal level, government is the leading sector of the society with enough power of resource mobilization and allocation and power to enforce a particular system of reward and punishment. Moreover, it is easier to change the context of knowledge and structure of consciousness of few public officials rather than the great number of the general public.

2.2.3. Social Integration and Control

We are not immediately interested with the study of society itself, but some mechanism of social control must be understood in order to handle the problem of negative bureaucratic behavior. At the societal-level analysis, our problem becomes that of controlling deviation rates of the society. Of course, we will not be dealing with all kinds of deviations.

In order to focus our attention on the sources, occurrences, and controlling mechanisms of deviation, we will adopt the idea of social collectives as defined by Jerald Hage (1972.) According to him,

A Social collective exists when
(1) there are inputs
(2) distributed among individuals
(3) who do different acts
(4) which are integrated
(5) and who share certain attitudes
(6) and the results are certain performances and/or outputs
(7) that occur in certain places and at certain times.

We can conceptualize that the above elements contain several dimensions. For our analysis, the important dimensions are knowledges, cognitions, values, powers, rewards and rights. The cognitions and values may be a part of other dimensions, but we separated them out for our purpose.

A combination of these dimensions with the elements which define a social collective provides us with a useful typology of social concepts which are meaningfully interrelated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Dimensions (Quantity)</th>
<th>Social Resources (Level of expenditure)</th>
<th>Social Structure (Degree of distribution)</th>
<th>Integration Processes (Rate of control)</th>
<th>Social Performances (Amount of effectiveness)</th>
<th>Social Outputs (Resource production)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Omitted</td>
<td>Degree of complexity</td>
<td>Rate of communication</td>
<td>Amount of institutional change</td>
<td>Omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of identity</td>
<td>Rate of consciousness</td>
<td>Amount of self-awareness</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of Shared value</td>
<td>Rate of legitimacy</td>
<td>Amount of commitment</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of Centralization</td>
<td>Rate of coercion</td>
<td>Amount of growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of stratification</td>
<td>Rate of consensus/conflict</td>
<td>Amount of efficiency</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of normative equality</td>
<td>Rate of conformity/deviance</td>
<td>Amount of membership Participation</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>Arrangements</td>
<td>Articulations</td>
<td>Adequacies</td>
<td>Accumulations</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*These two rows of concepts are added by the present writer.

The above typology suggests various sources and possible impacts of deviation as well as several controlling measures against deviation.

Our research on the negative bureaucratic behavior started with the conception of incongruities between the social and legal norms of a particular society. These incongruities may come from the inconsistency and incompatibility of the various dimensions of the social structures. In other words, some inconsistencies or incompatibilities of the social structures can be the sources of normative confusion as well as actual occurrences of negative bureaucratic behavior. For example, high degree of social differentiation (complexity), low degree of social identity, low degree of shared values among the members of the society, low degree of concentration of effective power, high degree of skewed social stratification with unequal distribution of national income, and low degree of normative equality among various sectors of the society, etc., may lead to very ambiguous norms and low rate of conformity to the established norms of the society.

We are also concerned with the possible impacts of negative bureaucratic behavior. This can be evaluated in terms of social performances, and the above typology warns us not to
interpret the concept of “development” too narrowly. The negative bureaucratic behavior may have contributed to a certain dimension of effectiveness, but not to all the dimensions of social performances.

Finally, we can readily see that there are several mechanisms of social integration and control. In other words, rates of conformity/deviance can be controlled by the processes of communication, societal consciousness, legitimacy builder, and coercion. It is easier to understand the increased need for higher rate of communication in a society where there are high degree of structural differentiation and specialization. Conflicts and deviation arising from some adjustments among the existing and newly emerged occupations and social positions can partly be resolved through mutual interaction and communication.

The concept of “coercion” need not to be elaborated. When there are high rate of conflict and deviation, police and military forces are employed in the ultimate.

Many societies are busy engaged in the task of building up the legitimacy of the elite group so that the elite’s goals and means are justified in the eyes of the public. This kind of legitimacy-building is also an important aspect of social integration and control, thereby reducing the rate of conflict and deviance.

Societal Consciousness. However, the concept of societal consciousness warrants a special attention, because we consider it as a very important mechanism of social integration and control, and because we will later incorporate the idea in our policy recommendations.

According to Amitai Etzioni, “the concept of societal consciousness refers to the generalized capacity of a societal actor to be aware and not to an individual awareness of societal processes. In part, societal consciousness is an aggregation of the members’ consciousness, especially the active members; in part, it involves the institutionalization of awareness on the collective level…” (Etzioni, 1968).

The central theme of Etzioni is that a societal actor who possesses greater capacity to be aware of social environment, self, and controlling overlayers are more active.

To be aware of something is to see the objects under certain context and to identify them within the greater frame of reference. Therefore, the consciousness means not only the generalized capacity to be aware but also the capacity to recall wider context. And thus, to make the societal actors to be more conscious is to make them perceive social objects within a broader societal context.

Etzioni arranges the components of consciousness in the following order:

- consciousness of the environment including other actors
- consciousness of acting self
- consciousness of controlling overlayers

The actor who is aware of only the environment may not be aware of self, but the one who is aware of self is also aware of his environment. Likewise, the actor who can be aware of his controlling overlay can be aware of both his environment and self. Thus, the consciousness of the controlling overlay is the most extensive. The concept of “rate of consciousness” is a word we coined for the expression of such an extent of societal consciousness.

As we stated above, the higher the rate and greater the extent of consciousness of the actor is, the more active he becomes. Because, he is now able to have greater variety of alternatives of action and can act in accordance with the value system of his own, free from the pressure of society and structural constraints.

If an actor is to be truly active, his consciousness should be able to enhance the degree
of self-identity and be linked with the value system. In other words, an increase in the rate of consciousness must lead to a commitment to attain certain values and goals.

Since more conscious actor is more aware of alternatives and constraints, his response can be more creative. Therefore, the important function of consciousness is to guide the actions. Here lies the possibility of societal consciousness leading to innovation and self-transformation of the actors. If a social collective has a capacity for self-transformation, it can be safely assumed that it also has the capacity to control deviant behaviors to a significant degree.

**Feedback Processes** The causes, impacts, and control of these negative bureaucratic behavior can be interpreted in terms of systems analysis, especially, the concept of feedback processes. The definition of system analysis is a set of variables that articulate together in such a way that via feedback of information the set of variables changes such that either one or more variables is maintained within narrow limits, a homeostatic process, or the entire set of variables moves to a new set of scores, a moving equilibrium process. (Hage, 1972)

There are three kinds of feedback processes in which we can relate various concepts of the typology presented above for the analysis of deviation. For each of the feedback processes, we can specify the signal variables and action variables. The three kinds of feedback processes can be diagrammed as follows:

**Control Feedback Process.** Some conflict and deviation in any society is inevitable, but when the rate gets too high, it is generally met by an attempt to reduce its occurrence. As we have seen above, for the control feedback process, the signal variables are rate of conflict and rate of deviance, and the action variables are rates of communication, coercion, consciousness and legitimacy. Every society should be able to increase consensus and conformity and decrease conflict and deviation.

**Adjustment Feedback Process.** Social conflict and deviation can also be regulated by adjusting the priorities of social inputs. Here the signal variable are the outputs and the action variables are the inputs.

**Adaptation Feedback Process.** Conflict or deviance rates in a social collective can be lowered by changing its distribution of cognitions, values, powers, rewards, and rights, etc. This is an adaptive process. The signal variables in the adaptive process are those related to performances such as institutional change, gro-
with awareness, commitment, efficiency, and membership participation, and the action variables are those related to the structural domain of the society such as complexity, identity, shared values, centralization, stratification, and normative equality.

As shown above, each feedback process relates different action and signal variables of the system. Each of the above three information feedback processes implies a varying degree of social change. Control in this sense is the smallest social change and shortest duration, adjustment implies a more permanent alteration in the allocation of resources, and adaptive feedback is the most fundamental social change.

The whole conceptual scheme described above for social integration and control can be summarized from the standpoint of controlling negative bureaucratic behavior as follows. Namely, the occurrences of negative bureaucratic behavior will be minimal and such behaviors will be effectively controlled: if social resources are mobilized and allocated under the just and fairly well integrated systems of values; if social structures are malleable with flexibility and normative equality; if the control measures are judiciously exercised; if social performances lead to innovation, commitment, awareness, growth, efficiency, and membership participation; and if the social outputs are produced in the greatest amount in various sectors of the society.

The latter portion of our conceptual framework incorporated a rather enlarged version of social control and integration in order to employ it in our analysis of Korean administrative measures against negative bureaucratic behavior because the current Korean measures are very inclusive.

3. Historical Legacy and Lessons

Modern-day Korea is ideologically and constitutionally not a bureaucratic state, and the Yi-Dynasty (1392-1910 A.D.) was undisputable example of the centralized bureaucratic state. And yet, we are surprised to see the striking similarities between those states, especially in the causes and impacts of negative bureaucratic behavior as well as in the measures and effectiveness of the control against those behaviors. The reason for this is because Yi-Dynasty left some legacies behind.

During Yi-Dynasty, the negative bureaucratic behaviors were not effectively controlled due to strong loyalty to the primary groups and weak external controls on the political and administrative processes. During the early two hundred years after the founding of the dynasty in 1392, the various mechanisms for anti-corruption control were functioning relatively well, because the officials were thoroughly indoctrinated by Confucianism for self-restraint and rectitude, and the internal controls by personnel management were relatively effective.

However, a series of foreign invasions and internal conflicts and feuds disturbed the stability of the dynasty. Under a continuous instability and unrest of the society and the monarchy, various provisions for fiscal management and compensation for the public officials became unrealistic and unreasonable. Many bureaucrats were also demoralized.

Moreover, there was no effective popular control over the government since even a nominal popular participation was not allowed and the level of education of the general public was very low. Under the situation, the negative bureaucratic behaviors became aggravated and chronic.

3.1. Causes of Negative Bureaucratic Behavior

Professor Bark attributes to the following factors the major causes of negative bureaucratic
behavior in the Yi-Dynasty (Bark, 1976).

(1) The bureaucrats were dominated by the “familism” of the time. The Confucian doctrine *per se* did not teach the primacy of the family, but the emphasis on the filial piety tended to foster the family-centered mode of thinking.

(2) Quite often, lower degree of sense of national loyalty and responsibility of the officials prevailed.

(3) The egal norms for the conduct of public officials were too idealistic, setting too high standards.

(4) Governmental power over the people and economy were too strong under the system of rather weak checks and balances of the governmental power. No popular control of bureaucracy except violent or insurrection.

(5) Internal control of bureaucracy relied mainly on the personnel administration and Confucian doctrine which were not effective under the social unrest and lack of strong leadership and exemplary conduct of the ruler.

(6) There were enough room for arbitrary and disorderly fiscal management, with very low and inadequate level of compensation for the officials.

(7) Foreign invasions thoroughly upset the stability and order of the society leaving deep scars.

### 3.2. Control Measures Against Negative Bureaucratic Behavior

There were several control mechanisms against negative bureaucratic behavior in the Yi Dynasty.

(1) Three Councils (Sam-sa). These were King’s surveillance Office, Remonstrance Office, and Office of Royal Counsellors. The high ranking officials of these councils were given very strong power, and their status was guaranteed. The official duties of these council members were to discuss any faults of the King and present remonstrances to him. They were also empowered to veto any government act which was considered against the “principle”. Especially, King’s surveillance officers could inspect and investigate the wrongdoings of the bureaucrats.

(2) Historiographer, or King’s History Writer. The historiographer of Yi Dynasty recorded in detail the daily activities of the King and important historical facts of the dynasty, and the incumbent King was not permitted to open and read the records. The records were for the posterity. The system was supposed to control King’s misconducts because the King should always remember that his acts and achievements were to be evaluated later on the historical context.

(3) Provincial Governor. Provincial governors acted as the inspectors of local magistrates.

(4) King’s Secret Mission, or Royal Inspector. This was a very peculiar institution in the Yi Dynasty. King selected highly qualified young officials as his secret inspectors and dispatched them to the provinces to inspect local administration on the spot. This secret mission was called *Amhaeng-Osa*. He was generally plainclothed and disguised his status and mission.

This system appeared around 1509 A.D. The secret inspector carried certain instruments to measure and certificate for transportation. He visited and secretly inspected local situation and then suddenly appeared later in the office of local magistrates officially to declare formal inspection. He had the power to examine the official documents and the stocks in the government warehouse, and had the power to dismiss wrongful officials on the spot.

(5) Criminal Code. Among other provisions, it provided that the corrupt officials should never be reinstated to a public office.

(6) Personnel Law and Other Measures. There were provided for a joint responsibility systems.
Those who recommended "corrupt" officials to the government would also be dismissed; and the offspring of the corrupt officials were permanently barred and disqualified from taking civil service examinations. Personnel law also regulated the number of servants and acreage of land holdings in order to prevent extravagance.

A kind of nepotism and a kind of patronage were prevented through a system of "mutual avoidance" which prohibited the same members of a family from taking office in the same ministry or provincial government. Also, no one was allowed to serve as the governor of his own native province.

A rotation system allowed the provincial governors to serve only one year of term at a province, and the local magistrates could serve maximum five years at a county.

There was an absorbing system, a kind of terminal accounting and auditing system. All the officials were required to present all the financial accounts at the termination of their official duty. After an audit, a certificate of absolution was issued.

In spite of those rational mechanisms in Yi Dynasty, the corruption was not effectively curbed when there was a lack of determination on the part of the top leadership. To a greater extent, the system relied on the personal will and determination of the ruler and his ministers.

3.3 Effectiveness of Legal Fights

Various control measures against negative bureaucratic behavior in Yi Dynasty relied chiefly on the pre-condition of self-control and self-restraint of the officials. And the strong will of the ruler and the exemplary conduct of the top echelon of the bureaucracy were the main forces underlying the effectiveness of the formal control measures. As such, the system was very effective when the circumstances were conducive for such self-restraint, but, it was utterly ineffective under the social instability, economic dislocation, and lack of determination on the part of the ruling elite of the time.

In spite of disorganization of the state-controlled economic system and land-holding system during social instability and pervasive bureaucratic corruption, there did not develop some strong merchant class or commercial sectors because the artisans and merchants were socially despised. On the whole, the base for external control was weak.

As we stated at the beginning of this section, we find many striking similarities between the causes and measures of control on bureaucracy adopted by Yi Dynasty and those of modern Korean government.

Social unrest, normative ambiguity of the officials, disorderly management of national budget, low pay, highly arbitrary exercise of power, excessive power of the government, collapse of internal control mechanisms, and the weak external controls are more or less similar causes of negative bureaucratic behavior in both cases.

As to the control measures, the council system, device of "Almanacs", special inspection and constant audit, continuous exhortations on personal virtues and rectitudes, joint responsibility system and other devices of personnel management, strong personal will of the chief executive, and lack of strong external controls are also found in both cases.

4. Causes of Negative Bureaucratic Behavior

We may be able to reconstruct and recount neither a comprehensive list of the causes of present day negative bureaucratic behaviors nor the whole process of their occurrences merely based on our limited case studies of three types
of agencies. Nor do we have conclusive evidences to establish some definite cause-effect relationships.

Our modest aim here is to describe the general pattern of the causes of negative bureaucratic behavior focusing our attention around the concepts of role behavior performance and conflict. The highlights of our description can be summarized as follows. Namely, since 1945 Korean society experienced unprecedented social unrest and rapid social change accompanied by the collapse of the old established value system and confusion in the new value systems. This led to some disorderly conduct of daily life and business practices of the people.

On the other hand, the characteristics of the bureaucratic system were such that the system was operating under the unrealistic legal provisions, inadequate compensation of the public personnel and inadequate expenditures for office maintenance, peculiar inter-personal ties of superiors and subordinates, and excessive governmental power over the other sectors of the society.

The above social and administrative situations were not conducive to rational decision-making. In the process, some negative bureaucratic behaviors occurred as an expediency to maneuver out of difficult situations. Such a seemingly harmless corruption had the multiplier effects of its own leading towards an institutionalized pattern coupled with inadequate control measures.

These are the gist of the processes we had generally encountered until the year of 1975. The year 1975 should be remembered because the Korean government started an all-out campaign against social anomalies including graft and corruption of the public officials. The patterns to be described below are those generally found before the year 1975.

### 4.1. Social Disorder and Confusion of Value System

The description below is not purporting to give the impression that the Korean society is operating under the chaos. It is rather intended to show how we have been able to establish law and order out of difficult times of the past, although the experiences have left some lasting side-effects. If the chaotic situations continued, the society would have already collapsed. Therefore the following description should be understood in this light.

#### 4.1.1. Social Unrest

Korea was liberated in 1945 from thirty-five years of Japanese imperialistic rule and wartime control. All of sudden in 1945 everything became free, and chaos was created. The country was divided into north and south under foreign occupations. There followed bloody ideological conflicts among the people and the communist agitation created a constant state of strife. During the Japanese period, the economic power and experiences were in the hands of Japanese and the government was managed by the Japanese. There were few Koreans who had been trained in the art of public administration.

When the national government was established in 1918, Korean people had to start almost everything from scratch. They had to create a new order of resource mobilization and allocation, social structure, and mechanism of social control and coordination. When a kind of new order was emerging, North Korea invaded the South in 1950 and the whole country was literally devastated under three years of unprecedented inhumane war of brothers and big powers. These were enough to bring social unrest, and the people's urgent daily concern was individual survival and welfare of the family. The wartime experiences left many
imprint in the minds of the people.

4.1.2. Rapid Social Change

In the meantime, we saw the growth of bureaucracy and military. The newly emerged bureaucracy inherited many of the Japanese way of control and ancient mode of authoritarianism. Newly fabricated bureaucracy became the arbiter of resource allocation as well as social control. Later, the enormous tasks of economic development were entrusted with this bureaucracy.

During 1950’s, there were excessive social investments in higher education creating lots of positions and unemployment. Some of them found their employment in the government with over-qualifications. In the later periods of our development, such a potential for structural differentiation, professionalization, and specialization became our valuable asset. During 1960’s, there were great popular movements, urbanization, and dynamic movements among various strata of the society.

4.1.3. Confusion of Value System

The consequences and after-effects of the unhappy experiences of social unrest and bewildering pace of social changes were enough to change people’s value systems and consciousness. Many people became restless, seeking after a quick return of investment of efforts and easy money. Mammonism prevailed. Many social critics characterized the mood of the time by such words as up-sided values, unprincipled lifestyle, lack of guilty feeling, expediency of means, lack of self-control, hoarding and unnecessary accumulation, materialism, loss of justice, a sense of the sense of equity and justice, selfishness, laxity of moral fabric, etc. In short, there was a breakdown of traditional virtues, including personal rectitude, self-control and restraint, and respect for the social order, and under development of new ethics appropriate for a newly urbanized and industrialized society.

Clear examples of business anomalies or irregularities arising from the demise of established social morality can be found in our case studies. In our case of national tax office, we noted that the abnormal business accounts of a night club in a famous hotel and the indulgences of the manager led to a series of corruption. The manager spent the money of the company for his own personal indulgence and pleasure and later claimed that he gave all the money to the tax and health officers of the district. In another case, the irregular bookkeeping practices led to the completion of bribery, loan, and manager’s own personal use. The remaining cases also show that the associations of big and small businessmen and retailers were regularly paying tributes to the public officials to buy favors and cultivate “friendly” relationships to ease strict applications of the government regulations. After all, the business community as an important dimension of administrative environment was not beyond reproach.

4.2. Characteristics of the Bureaucratic System

Typical negative bureaucratic behavior in Korea has been a function of highly centralized bureaucratic power, rapid social change, unrealistic rules and procedures pertaining regulation, creation, service, and promotion activities of the government, and lower level of development of private sector and the meekness of the general public.

4.2.1. Normative Ambiguity and Unrealistic Laws

Our research stated with an assumption that a significant portion of negative bureaucratic behaviors would be the results of normative ambiguity arising from the incongruities between the legal norms and social norms.
Indeed, we were able to find some discrepancies between legally prescribed criteria of official conducts and the prevailing social mores. However, the legal norm of conduct was clear enough against bribery, arbitrary exercise of official power and infringement of rights of the people. What we consider more critical is the discrepancy of the gap between the social reality and the law: intended to regulate, create, promote, or serve that same reality. This is the problem of legal formalism. Legal formalism is a reaction or consequence of the inability on the part of legislature to enact realistic laws. The legislature is handicapped by amorphous interest groups, weak political party and inconsistent electorate.

For example, in our case of corruption in licenting lodging house, the statutory standards were too big. If the legal stipulations were strictly interpreted and applied, most of the lodging houses would have been disqualified. This kind of legal formalism provided for the public official with very lucrative opportunities. In our case study of construction projects, the construction companies paid “kickbacks” in order to avoid strict application of building codes. In our corporate tax case, the bribery was given to reduce the amount of tax assessment because the assessed amount of tax could have been exorbitant if the letters of tax laws were strictly applied.

4.2.2. Inequate Compensation and Budget
Inadequate compensation has been the chronic problem in the Korean government. As we saw above, there had been unusually excessive social investment in education creating potential differentiation and specialization of social positions coupled with higher rate of unemployment. Thus, many formally overqualified and yet relatively incompetent personnel were attracted to the government positions. Since they had higher ranks in terms of formal education, they demanded a rank consistency in other dimensions such as wealth and prestige. However, the government finance also was small and there had been more urgent needs such as war expenditures and recovery and rehabilitation programs.

Under the circumstances, the general public was in a mood to somewhat condone petty embezzlement for supplementing the cost of living and other petty official expenses which had not been adequately provided for in the regular budget. However, this kind of embezzlement and illegal transfer of budget items become a little aggravated. Later this became illegal but generally accepted practice. In the past, many organization unit would have been unable to operate without illegal contingency funds, whatever the source of them might have been.

The fund was necessary to defray the costs of expanding office works and routine expenses for social interaction among the members of the organization.

In our case studies, we found that the bribe money received by the government officials were really used in part for office expenditures. Bribery in our corporate income tax case and kickbacks in our construction projects case are clear examples in which the portion of money was used for official purposes. This kind of practices were also found in other organizations and associations of the private sector.

The above analysis shows that under the social disorder and rapid change the public bureaucracy as a system was unable to effectively mobilize the “free-floating” resources of the economy and formally allocate them.

4.2.3. Patronage and Inter-personal Relations
Due to long tradition of family centered way of life and thinking and due to uncertain situations in times of social change, many persons developed a kind of patron-client relationships in order to secure mutual assistance
and cooperation. This was also prevailing in the government. In the past, we quite often heard the remark that a particular person was a man of certain other particular person. Patron and client had to look after each other. This kind of inter-personal relations also was the breeding ground for connivance and conspiracy for bribery and extortion.

In our case report on the kickback practices of construction projects, it is shown that the mayor of that particular city planted his most favorite subordinates in the sections of general affairs, accounting, and auditing. Those subordinates, as the clients or followers of the mayor, played key roles in the administrative processes of the city government. Without their cooperation, the mayor might not have succeeded in mobilizing the kickback monies for such a long period of time. In a way, the patron-clients were operating their own machinery of resource mobilization and allocation in exchange of the services rendered to the public. Job security and supplementary compensations were provided to those patron-clients, at least.

4.2.4. Excessive Governmental Power

It is a common knowledge that Korean government has been wielding very extensive power over the life of the people and every sector of the society. The government has been the leading force in nation-building, war, reconstruction, rehabilitation, national economic development, and even the present-day campaign against graft and corruption. We have seen that the Korean government has been exercising enormous power in the disposal of pre-war Japanese-owned properties, the disposal of national land, carrying out the war, implementation of reconstruction and rehabilitation program after the war, distribution of foreign aids, investments under the economic development plan, special loans and foreign loans to the private enterprises, and national land development programs, etc.

In the process, big enterprises were created and some of the small industries were perished. It was in these processes that some of the bribery, kickbacks, extortion, tributes, and concessions were given and taken.

The above summary description should not give an impression that the Korean government was doing nothing to carry out any regular business of the government; rather, it should be remembered that the administrative system as a whole was making gigantic efforts to achieve the goals and targets of public policies and administrative programs formulated based on the public interest.

4.3. Internalized Norms and Action Patterns

Many social critics blame the public bureaucracy for its lack of sense of public interest, loss of sense of mission, and lack of professional ethics. Such attributes might have been acquired by the individual bureaucrats during the period of social unrest and rapid changes. However, it would be very unfair to depict the whole bureaucracy as if it were a gang of crooks.

The behavior patterns of public officials should be analyzed in terms of their role behavior performances. That is, the behavior patterns can be understood in terms of internalized norms of, stimuli to, and responses of the public officials.

The most characteristic internalized norms of public officials are ascriptive rather than achievement orientation, particularism rather than universalism, status orientation and materialism. (Lee, 1977) Ascriptive, particularism, and status consciousness are the legacies of the old days. The status consciousness seems to be breeding or nurturing even the official arrogance. Material interests were not openly pursued in the past. However, it seems that the public
officials had acquired materialism during the period of unrest and change. This may be even more true because the past literati ethics have disappeared and new strata of people have been recruited to the governmental service.

In spite of all these, we may be safe to assume that the public officials also have certain degree of sense of public interest and professional ethics.

There are at least three types of stimulus situations to be public officials: Socio-cultural environments, characteristics of the bureaucratic system, and formal policy goals and administrative programs. We have already described above the salient features of the socio-cultural environments and the bureaucratic system. The most important policy goals of the government in Korea during the past thirty years have been national security, national unification, and economic development. Social welfare programs are emphasized nowadays.

Given the stimuli and internalized norms analyzed above, the public officials would respond in the following three ways. 1) faithful implementation of the policy goals according to the rules and regulations set for the implementation of the program, 2) ambitious implementation of the policy goals going around the established rules and regulations, but without intention for immediate private gain and aggrandizement, 3) nominal implementation of the policy goals with injudicious exercise of discretionary powers for the private gain and aggrandizement.

The majority of the responses may belong to the first type. And there have been numerous cases of the second type. This and national prosperity would do away with all of the social evils. On the contrary it seemed that as the "economic pie" was growing, the illegal chunks were becoming bigger. The critics attributed it to lack of effective control against negative bureaucratic behaviors and other social deviances. We do not know why, until 1975, there had been no effective control except two to three years of tight control after the military revolution of 1961.

We suspect that the defect was in the faulty reward and punishment mechanisms, both public and private. The honesty did not pay.

Under the circumstances, various causes of negative bureaucratic behavior had been reinforcing each other with some multiplier effects of their own. In short, corruption itself became the major cause of corruption. Some argued that many of the otherwise accidental deviances were being transformed into an institutionalized pattern. Institutionalized corruptions would create their own system of variables gradually making inroads to the formally constituted system of administration. That would be a very serious problem.

Second type of responses has been somewhat condoned in the name of expediency under the unrealistic rules and regulations. Some of the illegal transfer of expenditure items and informal resource mobilizations belong to this type of responses. What is really condemned is the third type of response, namely, injudicious exercise of discretionary powers for the private gain and aggrandizement.

Most of the negative bureaucratic behavior cases we have studied are those committed by an injudicious exercise of discretionary powers for the private gain and aggrandizement, although some of them contain the element of ambitious but expedient implementation of the policy goals and administrative programs. As the major instrument of national economic development, the public bureaucracy was expected and complied with to achieve the targets of developmental goals without seriously being concerned with side-effects, including corruption. Most of them might have thought that when the nation
become prosperous and affluent, all the evils will go away.

4. Lack of Effective Control, Multiplier Effects, and Emergence of Institutionalized Pattern

It was an illusory anticipation that economic development and national prosperity would do away with all of the social evils.

With an increasing degree of social differentiation and occupational specializations which necessitate more of bureaucratic service, regulation, promotion, and creation, emergence of institutionalized patterns of negative bureaucratic behaviors are no longer tolerable, because they will not only destroy the moral fabric of the society but also decrease the amount of social performances and endanger the survival itself.

5. Impacts of Negative Bureaucratic Behavior on Development

5.2. Development in Spite of Negative Behavior

We cannot establish any one-to-one relationship between corruption and development; we may far-fetchedly impute some aspects of developments to negative bureaucratic behavior.

None of our case studies show that the money raised through corruption was directly and productively invested. However, the corruption might have indirectly contributed to development by allowing tax-evading merchants to grow, tax-evading and concession-buying corporations to accumulate investment capital, kickback-seeking and over-pricing officials to perform their regular businesses of the government, and bribe-taking officials to survive, etc. In other words, the corruption might have indirectly contributed to the growth of economy.

However, we have to remember that even the economic development and growth have been possible mainly because the majority of the officials were judiciously and faithfully implementing the developmental goals of the government without pursuing private gains and aggrandizement. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to evaluate the occurrences of negative bureaucratic behaviors as the inevitable side-effects of growth. We may say that social unrest, social change, and growth all leave or create the side-effects of corruption. When there is an economic growth accompanied by a kind of social pollution in terms of corruption, then the other dimenssions of social performance such as innovation, efficiency, people’s participation, commitment, and societal awareness might be decreasing. Moreover, the bureaucratic and social corruptions might distort the concentration of power, social stratification, shared values, self-identity, and normative equality.

These situations make the society very inflexible and unadaptive to changing environments.
with an increased difficulty in social integration and survival.

In short, impacts of negative bureaucratic behavior on economic development are inconclusive; however, those behaviors as side-effects of economic development are detrimental to other dimensions of social development. Therefore, we should strive toward a development which will also bring the spiritual well being of the people.

6. Effectiveness of Administrative Measures Against Negative Bureaucratic Behavior

The control efforts of Korean government against negative bureaucratic behavior gained new impetus under the name of **Suhjong-Soehsin** which can be roughly translated as "renovation of politics and administration." The term had been in use since the days of former dynasties and even in recent republics in Korea, but it gained new meaning and significance under the present government. Especially, "23 March 1975" is regarded as the date which marks the real beginning of the renovation in the earnest. The whole process is under the close supervision and direction of the President himself.

Korean government does not have an anti-graft agency as such. The ordinary law enforcement agencies are in charge of these tasks. The President is assisted by the Special Assistant and the Prime Minister to carry out the control program. The Prime minister himself is assisted by is special staff for the tasks of coordinating the government-wide efforts.

Below these two overlayers, the ordinary government machinery is employed for the renovation programs, although the police, prosecutors office, and the board of audit and inspection are given greater power, assignment, and support in order to enable them to perform more effective watch-dog functions and disciplinary and criminal procedures against designated anomalies and irregularities.

The gist of administrative measures of the **Suhjong-Soehsin** to control negative bureaucratic behavior can be presented as follows: 1) measures aimed at personnel, 2) institutional reforms, and 3) environmental clean-up.

Measures aimed at personnel include such as those of more severe disciplinary actions, a vertical joint responsibility system, continuous issuances of the directives of conduct, a record books of reward and punishment (**Suhjong-Soehsin** Almanac), prevention of re-employment, improvement of compensation, pension, and job security, and attitude development.

Institutional reforms include the revision of unrealistic rules and regulations and other administrative procedures.

Environmental clean-up programs are some rectification programs covering both private and public life-environments of the public officials.

We generally consider that the above measures have been fairly successful in markedly reducing the deviance rates. Let us evaluate why.

6.1. Reduction of Deviance Rate by Coercion-Process of Feedback Control

It seems that the Government was alarmed by the increasing rate of deviance in terms of negative bureaucratic behaviors as there were even the signs of emergence of institutionalized pattern. The state of affairs was intolerable as they were becoming obstacles to an increased amount of effectiveness in such dimensions as innovation, efficiency, and membership participation. The emergence of the institutionalized pattern of corruption became a threat to the national security and survival.

Therefore, the urgent problem of the government was to reduce the recurrent incidences
of the deiances. In other words, there was a greater need for a decreased rate of deviance and increased rate of conformity.

Among the measures adopted by the government to carry out the all-out campaign against social and bureaucratic corruptions, the coercion was on the priority list. Continuous warning against negative behaviors, directives calling attention to the recurrent anomalies, heightened disciplinary actions, and criminal punishments are the indications of higher rate of coercion. In addition, the government also employed communication and legitimacy building. Educational programs are widely used for the purpose. And the bureaucrats are constantly being reminded of their duty and mission to the nation, priority of public interests, importance of eradicating social irregularities, and the important tasks for national security and survival.

Most of the coercive measures have been aimed at the public officials, as we have described above.

6.2. Removal of Deviance Inducing Situations—Processes of Adjustment and Adaptation Feedback

Adjustment here means a modification of the pattern of social resource allocation, and adaptation means a restructuring. In addition to the methods employed by the government for social integration and control (an important portion of which is of course the integration and control of the bureaucracy itself), there are some strenuous efforts for adjustment and adaptation. These efforts in the public sector appear in the form of institutional reforms. One of the important measures being taken in this field is the revision and improvement of the rules and regulation. We have seen above when we analyzed some of the causes of negative bureaucratic behaviors, that many of those behaviors arose from the temptation, opportunities, and inevitabilities under some of the discrepancies between legal provisions and social realities.

And also, inadequate compensation and shortage of office funds in many instances were the causes of corruption. Thus, the government has been trying to improve the system of resource mobilization and allocation in the public sector. At the same time, in terms of society at large, different pattern of resource allocation has been being attempted to increase social welfare and rehabilitation.

6.3. Effectiveness of the Measures

The current administrative measures taken by the Korean government seem to be producing the desired results. The effectiveness of the measures are generally attributed to the following factors.

First, the personal will and determination of the chief executive have been the most important driving forces behind the measures and movement. He even defines the movement as the programs for mental revolution of the country.

Second, the first major target of control was the reduction of deviance rates by coercive methods. With increased degree of disciplinary punishments of the corrupt officials, the results can easily be enumerated and visible to the eyes of the public. At any rate, it seems that petty corruptions have almost disappeared, except of course occasional and so-called accidental corruptions.

Third, the scope and intensity of the measures are unprecedented. The measures are aimed not merely at the integration and control of bureaucracy, but they are also aimed at the root-causes of negative bureaucratic behavior, such as the characteristics of the social structure, confused value systems, business anomalies, and the defects of the administrative system.

Fourth, most of all, the government is succee-
d in restoring some sort of credibility of its corruption-eradication programs to the public.

However, there are still unresolved problems and newly emerging ones. It is very uncertain whether the private group has really internalized and absorbed the goals of control, integration, and social restructuring. The passive moods of some public officials and escalation of the contact levels between the members of business corporations and the bureaucracy might become more serious social problems. The passive moods may demoralize the bureaucracy and the leveling-up of the contact points may lead to greater scandals in the absence of effective external controls.

7. Conclusion

During the early days of the Saemaul Movement in Korea (New Village Movement), the whole program had the difficulty of conveying the clear image of the end results. Some skeptics did not expect any marked success; they saw it as merely one of the varieties of community development programs. However, the Saemaul Movement is now regarded as very successful as the program of the government.

Like the Saemaul Movement of the earlier days, the Sukjong-Soeshin of these days seems to be somewhat vague except that the measures directly air-d at the personnel. But, this program may produce very successful results in the long run. Since the entire program of Sukjong-Soeshin is very comprehensive, it is sometimes difficult to single out anyone measure for evaluation. Anyone of the specific measures should be evaluated within the whole context. In the future when a clearer picture emerges we may be able to formulate more specific measures for recommendation. What we can do at this stage is to present some general theoretical guidelines.

Our tentative policy recommendations are premised on the assumption that any administrative program should not be judged in terms of achieving "purity." A degree of purity may not be a good criterion. What we consider as significant are the degree and capacity of control and integration. In other words, if there are clear indications of tendency towards the reduction of deviance rates and possibility of setting up a control mechanism which keeps the deviance rates at a tolerable level, we may say that the programs are successful.

First, the current measures against negative bureaucratic behaviors seem to rely too heavily on coercion. As we mentioned earlier, this method will bring quick and sure results. But in the long run, the high degree of coercion can not be sustained for a longer period of time. Moreover, as the society is being differentiated at a faster rate, there arises a greater need for communication and legitimacy building. Most of all, the whole control mechanism itself of social control should be guided by the controlling overlays of societal consciousness of the social elites. Although the current measures of administrative control puts some emphasis on the development of societal consciousness of the top echelons of the bureaucracy and business enterprises, we are very uncertain as to whether this aspect of measures is bringing any improvements or not. Development of greater awareness of variety of programs on the part of the elites is very crucial.

Second, the current administrative measures rely also too heavily on the personal will and the leadership of the chief executive. Of course, we must give big credit to his determination. However, an emphasis should be given to the development of professionalism including the professional ethics of the public officials. With the rapid growth of the economic sector, many competent young people are already attracted
by the private industries, and the government is experiencing some difficulty in recruiting specialized personnel. If the public service is not being professionalized, the government will soon encounter greater difficulties.

Third, the emphasis on personal rectitude and honesty will not bring guaranteed results in the absence of effective external control. Rewards and punishment system of the society and external control on bureaucracy should be geared to promoting personal honesty, rectitude, and dignity.

Finally, we think that the current administrative measures are very appropriate if the above mentioned factors are taken into consideration.

In the final analysis, political and social instability and disorder lead to lack of effective political and social control which lead to the widespread grift and corruption. Graft and corruption undermines social morality and values.

Vicious circle of instability, lack of effective control, high rate of deiances, and normative ambiguity should be broken by the initiative of the government. In spite of negative bureaucratic behaviors, it is the government which has the necessary resources and power to do so.

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