

A PSYCHOCULTURAL APPROACH TO KOREAN BUREAUCRACY

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INTRODUCTION

This study assumes that the sociopsychological heritage of political culture conditions Korean ideals, norms, and behavior by patterning the national collective consciousness into historically recurrent modes of elite/mass relations.

The Korean political culture has been and still is molded by historic residues of the heritage of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and by a high degree of ethnic homogeneity that, evidently, disposition most Koreans, especially the masses, to a submissive authoritarian political psychology that tends to legitimize the moral authority of the upper strata.

The Korean political-self is acquired, we argue, through the functionally interrelated causation of five environmental dimensions: Asian setting; Oriental philosophies; homogeneous national culture; centralized, hierarchical elitist regime; and a submissive authoritarian national personality. From this dimensional causal model, we will identify characteristics of both authority and hierarchy that exemplify modal Korean political attitudes and behavior patterns (i.e., submission to authority, a desire for a powerful leadership, and the subservience of the individual to the state.)

We contend that the Korean political psychol-

ogy is based on the hypothetical existence of authoritarian submissive values in both the Korean elites and masses. We outline the ways in which the historic modalities of the Korean political psychology channel ideational and behavioral patterns of contemporary Korean administration and politics.

1. CULTURAL APPARATUS OF KOREAN POLITICS

Korean bureaucracy bears the historic stamp of Korean political psychology in its assumptions, and its policy applications which are consistent with the traditional values of Koreans.

From historical and sociopsychological standpoints, Korean political culture has been characterized by two salient factors: (1) A "submissive" authoritarian culture deeply affected by Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism; and (2) A high degree of cultural homogeneity--ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional. Authoritarian submissiveness implies the Koreans' high sensitivity to authority-support in both governmental and social life. Cultural homogeneity, implying absence of "natural" cleavages, has tended to inhibit not only the fragmentation of power but also diversification of political interests.

Since the second World War, Western patterns of pluralistic thought and behavior have had a

significant impact on Korea's public policy making. Yet the submissive "political self" of Korean people does not favor the pluralist ideal of group participation in decision making.

To present this thesis, we will set forth a model of collective consciousness which incorporates Korean social processes as intrinsic to individual Korean social understanding. To conceive of social factors as intrinsic to individual mentality, a theory of mind is indispensable. C. Wright Mills points out that "without a formulation of mind which permits social determinants a role in reflection, assertions on the larger historical level carry less intellectual weight."⁽¹⁾

Here we intend to analyze the nature of the "Korean mind" by a psychocultural approach. This approach makes use of terms such as "political culture," "political psychology," "political behavior," and is a contextual approach combining individual psychology and the collective consciousness in a synthesis of macro-micro analysis.⁽²⁾

G. A. Almond views the concept of political culture as a particular pattern of orientation to political actions,⁽³⁾ while Sidney Verba views it as a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation

in which political action takes place."⁽⁴⁾

Lucian Pye defines the concept as follows:

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.⁽⁵⁾

In sum, the concept of political culture has been developed to reduce the gap between micro and macro analysis of political behavior, and thus to explain the individual's political behavior in terms of a collective consciousness.⁽⁶⁾

This approach assumes that political culture conditions political ideals or norms and political behavior; and it blends the complex subtleties of individual psychology and the level of the social aggregate.⁽⁷⁾

This view may proceed from the "field view" of behavior proposed by the psychologist Kurt Lewin. Lewin used a simple formula to state the proposition that "behavior is a function of the person and his psychological environment": $B = F(P, E)$

A person's behavior (B) is determined by both the external environment (E) and the internal personal environment (P).⁽⁸⁾

M.B. Smith pointed out that a political behav-

(1) C. Wright Mills, "The Culture Apparatus," in *Power, Politics and People*, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 424.

(2) Pye views as an analogy from economics. Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science," in L. Schneider and C. Bonjean, eds., *The Ideas of Culture in the Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 72.

(3) Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 18, August, 1956, pp. 391-99. See also G. A. Almond and G. Bringham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 50 ff.

(4) Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

(5) *International Encyclopedia of Social Science*, Vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan Co., and The Free Press, 1961), p. 218.

(6) For the macro-micro problems in political behavior analysis, i. e., the fallacy of extrapolation from micro to macro phenomena and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, see pye, "Culture and Political Science," p. 70.

(7) Pye and Verba, pp. 6-8.

(8) William F. Stone, *The Psychology of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 49. Cited

ior is a joint resultant of one's individual personality and of his external cultural milieu.⁽⁹⁾ With this intellectual framework the present study of Korean political psychology proceeds upon both psychohistorical and psychocultural levels analyzing the interrelationships between Korea's historical dialectic and the contemporary personality and political behavior of the Korean people.

Personality, in general, refers to "organized, stable internal predispositions which an individual brings to a situation"; and these dispositions orient his behavior.⁽¹⁰⁾ Allport states that "personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."⁽¹¹⁾

An empirically useful personality theory, therefore, must delimit the situational specificity of individual behavior and the transaction pattern between internal personality constructs and external situational determinants.⁽¹²⁾ "In political psychology," as Knutson points out, "it has become a truism that personality, in some unspecified way, affects political beliefs and political activity."⁽¹³⁾ Some current correlational

studies have significantly predicted relevant attitudes, beliefs, and behavior from psychological variables, providing some empirical evidence for the consistency of political personality traits over time.⁽¹⁴⁾

Particularly in the field of political socialization, the view that personality is a stable, consistent attribute that shapes an individual's political behavior, has great heuristic appeal. Lewis Froman develops a conceptual scheme concerning political socialization which deals with the interrelationships of such variables as environment, personality, and behavior.⁽¹⁵⁾

Fred Greenstein urges a constructive, systematic approach to the study of personality and politics: "There is a need for systematic inquiry into personality and politics because politics abounds if we have an account of the personal psychological variables..."⁽¹⁶⁾ He criticizes the major objections to the study of personality and politics such as the thesis that social character "cancels out" personality character.⁽¹⁷⁾

Dawson and Prewitt distinguish the difference between indirect and direct political learning,⁽¹⁸⁾ while Almond analyzes the difference between "manifest" and "latent" socialization.⁽¹⁹⁾ Knutson

from Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York: Harper, 1951).

- (9) M. Brewster Smith, "Political Attitudes," in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), Figure 1, p. 76.
- (10) For definitions of personality, see Jeanne N. Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," in *Handbook of Political Psychology*, pp. 29-38.
- (11) G.W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York: Holt, 1937), p. 48.
- (12) Knutson, p. 30.
- (13) *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- (14) *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- (15) Lewis A. Froman, "Personality and Political Socialization," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1961, p. 351.
- (16) Fred Greenstein, "Personality and politics," *Journal of Social Issues* (July 1968), p. 13.
- (17) Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 3, September 1967, pp. 630-31.
- (18) R. E. Dawson and K. Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).
- (19) G. A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.) *The politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 28. See also Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 261-74.

presents a model which seeks to explain the linkages between personality and politics. The linking process is viewed as a four-level interaction: Level I: Basic personality needs→Level II: Ideosyncratic belief system↔Level III: Social-cultural learning(formal and situational)-experimental factors(informal)→Level IV: Political ideology and political activity.⁽²⁰⁾

Political action(or political ideals) is the joint product of personality needs stimulated by a social-cultural system. Basic personality demands can change both: ideosyncratic belief systems (regarding self, others, and causality) and social-cultural system(regarding values, roles, beliefs, and situational-experimental factors). The social-cultural organic influence is in turn, a political output. Personality thus shapes politics, while politics shapes personality.

2. GEOPOLITICS OF KOREA

The geographic setting of the Korean peninsula encouraged historic interconnectedness with China and Japan and helped to form the East Asian cultural zone which links their destinies together. East Asian psychology also reflects the heritage of oriental philosophy whose cultural residues not only psychological but also sociopolitical.

The establishment of the ancient three Korean kingdom states(*Silla*, *Paekche*, *Koguryo*) imposed as a model with the Chinese bureaucratic system on a clan and tribal society which was basically aristocratic. The patterns of Korean society, i.e., family structure and religious thought, were also based on Chinese models. The traditional ruling elite of Korea looked, for instance, to Chinese bureaucrats as cultural mentors and, therefore, a great many administrative institutions of early

Korea were molded after those of China. In many cases, both their structure and functions were very similar. The ranks of government officials and the titles of the various ministries and boards of government were essentially the same. Innovations in government and religion required at skill and learning comparable to Chinese competency.⁽²¹⁾

Chinese was the official language for government and education until the early twentieth century, and became a major part of upper-class education. Particularly, the Confucian system of ethics and government, embodied in the "Confucian Classics," had a great impact on Korean society and government.

In sum, the geopolitical factor of East Asian societies allowed Chinese culture to play a dominant part in Korean politics for many centuries. Nevertheless, the extremely high degree of sinification of the Korean political culture did not exclude, to some extent, the "Koreanization" of the Chinese culture. The undeniable fact that the two different ethnic origins, i.e., different language systems could not but start out with a different Korean reaction to the Chinese influence. Thus Sinification and Koreanization proceeded together over many centuries in the Korean peninsula.

3. KOREAN PATTERN OF CONFUCIAN IDEALS, AUTHORITY AND PERSONALITY

Confucianism as an established state ideology existed until the early twentieth century. Even today, family relationships, political attitudes, ways of problem solving and many other aspects of Korean life reveal the imprint of the Confu-

(20) Hutson, p. 40.

(21) Ian Woo Keun, *The History of Korea*(Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970), p. 52.

cian tradition.⁽²²⁾ As an unchallenged, uninterrupted sociopolitical ideology of historic Korea, Confucianism was a single greatest influence in the Korean political culture and provided the view of the universe in which Korean society and politics operated.

Confucian precepts represented by Confucian Classics were major objects of study by traditional Korean scholars and were valued for both their practical governmental wisdom and their philosophy of life in general. The "formalities" of early Korean bureaucracy were based on Chinese Confucian models.

Particularly Chu Hsi Confucianism strongly appealed to *Ko-yo* scholar-officials as it was not abstract or speculative metaphysics but rather practical, moral, and educational in its institutional applications and in its emphasis on formalities of ceremony, etiquette, ranks and hierarchical social structure.

Chu Hsi Confucianism offered an ideological/cultural rationale for a centralized bureaucracy and an elitist intellectual political conservatism. In short, Confucianism became the official creed of the government. This development was a remarkable event in Korean history. As a state ideology Confucianism was the chief intellectual framework of thought throughout entire *Yi* Dynasty.

With extreme literalism, the doctrines of Chu Hsi Confucianism advocated a centralized benevolent form of monarchy as the only legitimate form of moral government and thus contributed

greatly to the foundation of a highly centralized autocracy. At various times during this Dynasty, various schools of *Yi* Confucianism had controversies over divergent views on the nature of rules governing ethics and the practice and strategy of administration.⁽²³⁾

The school of *Li* (also known as the *Songni Hakpa*, the "natural-law" school) provided the Confucian political system, moral authority, and ethical legitimacy. Government had a final authority that could represent the Supreme Ultimate (*Li*) truth in the real world. And naturally, government had Benevolence (*In*), the highest virtue and the supreme quality of *Li*. The "final cause" of politics belonged to the authoritative monarch.

The School of Rites (*Ye Hakpa*) emphasized an unusual degree of strictness in formal ritualism which became the most striking characteristic of the *Yi* social system, i.e., highly complex court ceremonies, official and personal behavior. The observance of *Ye*, rites or etiquette and ceremony had a significant impact both on the social conduct of the Korean people and on the development of Korean politics and administration.

These Confucian schools were, however, closely associated with *Yi* political factionalism, in which various scholars and officials quarreled over controversial questions of legitimacy, dynastic succession and court procedures.

Rival group competition for the power of government followed the division into philoso-

(22) George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 93; W. D. Reeve, *The Republic of Korea* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 4-5; Cornelius Osgood, *The Koreans and Their Culture* (New York: Ronald Press, 1951), pp. 327-30; P. C. Hahn, *The Korean Political Tradition and Law* (Seoul: Hollym Corp. Publishers, 1967) pp. 7-14; Gregory Henderson, *The Politics of Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 19-21; Key P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism," in *Journals of Asian Studies*, 18, Part I (November, 1958), pp. 81-101, Part II (February, 1959), pp. 259-76.

(23) Yang and Henderson, Part I, p. 86.

phical schools of thought and the so-called “four factions” of “four colors” (*Sasack*) persisted as the principal factions in *Yi* politics until 1910. These rivals fought the philosophical validity of each other in a long bloody factional struggle.

The effect of Confucianism on the popular psychology of the Korean people can be characterized as follows: (1) hierarchical view of life; (2) authoritarianism on the part of the ruling class; (3) a corresponding “submissiveness” on the part of the ruled; (4) a “face/or status-oriented” consciousness; and (5) the well-ordered family⁽²⁴⁾


Hierarchy and authority are the heart of Confucian ethics and represent a vertical order, not horizontal. The implicit values in Confucian politics are those of harmony, stability, and hierarchy based on absolute authority of a well-ordered hierarchy;⁽²⁵⁾ the Ultimate *Li* in politics came by the effort of benevolent ruler with the assistance of a group of elites in an ideal form of aristocratic administration. Elevated in the *Li*—the codified rules of social behavior, Confucian authority finds its perfect embodiment in the well-ordered patriarchal family, that is, the microcosm of the sociopolitical order that ideally prevails in both the state and society.

In the Confucian family, adults learn how to manage private affairs and to direct others for the common good while the young learn to obey their parents and to play their proper roles in the kinship hierarchy. The former is a model for the wise ruler while the latter is the model of properly submissive subjects. *Li* reflects the

very structural characteristics of Confucian authority. Wright states that “the *Li*, spread by fathers, village elders, and government officials, and supplemented by the discipline of ordered family life, would in turn foster social virtues: filial submission, brotherliness, right-consciousness, good faith, and loyalty.”⁽²⁶⁾ Both structurally and ideologically, Confucian authority creates controlling forces of governing power by denying the sentiment of aggression.⁽²⁷⁾ Lucian Pye points out that Confucian hierarchy was uniquely designed to repress all manifestations of this basic human aggression drive.⁽²⁸⁾

The following (Figure 1) illustrates Confucian authority and its nature of repressing human

Figure 1. Confucian Moral Authority



(24) Tae-rim Yun, *Uisik Kujosangulo bon Hangukin* (The Mental Structure of Korean people) (Seoul: Hyunamsa, 1970), pp. 125-268.

(25) Arthur F. Wright, “Values, Roles, and Personalities,” in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, ed., *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 6.

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 7.

(27) Lucian W. Pye. *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1970), preface pp. 12-16.

(28) *Ibid.*

aggression. Attitudes (or sentiments) toward authority are determined by the cosmic-ethical order. The vertical relationships (of hierarchy and authority) are reducible to the dichotomized relation between "superior" and "inferior." The King, the man, the father, the elder, the learned, the public officials constitute superior poles, contrasted to the corresponding inferiors, the subjects, the women, the children, the young, the unlearned, the private citizen. The morally "qualified" or "perfected" ones (on the top line in Figure 1) are entitled to manage the community affairs of family, society, and state. Submission is stressed and, in practice if not in theory, it takes the form of unquestioning obedience and conformity on the part of the inferior (on the bottom line in Figure 1) towards the superior. The nature of nonconfrontation between the two poles does not allow for the legitimacy of aggressive sentiments against superior authority.

Confucian hierarchy is governed by inherited ascribed status, not by achievement. The biological fact of individual status cannot excuse him from conforming to the appropriate behavior patterns. Passivity is a virtue in the Confucian world view and since the system is monolithic, the individual's only possible response to his superior is to submit to his authority. In short, submission to authority is the cardinal virtue in Confucian system.

4. BUDDHISM AND THE KOREAN PSYCHE

Buddhism never had political influence comparable to that of the Confucian ideology. Due to its relative lack of interest in affairs of this worldly life, Buddhism exerted little influence in the area of political theory or practice in

comparison with what was exerted by the Confucian tradition. Nevertheless, Buddhism has been tremendously successful in enriching many aspects of the Korean culture.⁽²⁹⁾

The *Silla* Kingdom (673-935 A. D.), which prospered in a great period of Buddhist development, established Buddhism as the state religion and Buddhism flourished in a golden age that achieved great artistic, cultural and social development.⁽³⁰⁾ It continued as the most powerful cultural force during the *Koryo* Dynasty (935-1392 A.D.).

During this period, a number of Buddhist monasteries monopolized national wealth and political power. Toward the end of the dynasty, however, Buddhism became a more religiopolitical and economic ideology through its close ties with a decadent ruling elite and as such its influence declined as many leading Korean scholars and officials turned back to Confucianism. Buddhism was later revived by a few *Yi* Kings such as King *Saejo* and more recently the Japanese but was never again as culturally vigorous as before.

Buddhist doctrines have had many important effects on the social values of the Korean people. The role of Korean Buddhism is not merely that of a code of ethics, but as a dynamic religio-spiritual force which so penetrates the life of Koreans that the two roles cannot, in fact, be separated. Buddhism's most lasting influence on the Korean value orientation may perhaps be placed in the realm of sociopolitical perspectives rather than religious perspective.

Important, for instance, is the Buddhist concept of behavior derived from the belief that the passions of the flesh cause desires which one must learn to control. The major teachings of Buddhism stressed a "Middle Way" between the

(29) Osgood, pp. 246-49, Hahn, p. 14.

(30) Han, pp. 93-110.

extremes of asceticism and self-indulgence. Buddha proclaimed the so-called Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path.

The Four Noble Truths are: (1) Existence (life) is to suffer; (2) Suffering is created or caused by desires of the flesh and sustains an endless cycle of existence; (3) The extinction of suffering can be achieved only by the elimination of desire; (4) The elimination of desire or cravings can be achieved on the Noble Eightfold Path. The Buddhist adherent strives to perfect himself in this path which is composed of: (1) Right views; (2) right resolve; (3) right speech; (4) right action; (5) right living; (6) right effort (7) right mindedness; and (8) right concentration.⁽³¹⁾ Thus, Buddhism emphasized (1) renunciation of desires; (2) an escape from desire, and (3) a transcendence of fleshly desires and, hereby, escape from the sufferings of this life.

From the Truth and the Path, G. Murphy and L.B. Murphy summarize the Buddhist psychology as:

(1) emphasis on practical methods to transcend human desires; (2) emphasis on benevolence and compassion, both for their humanistic appeal and for their individual utility in lifting one of the cycle of suffering; (3) the creation of a spirit of brotherhood between priests and to the common people; (4) the denial of any central and persisting soul or atman.⁽³²⁾

Buddhist social ethics finds its foundation on the doctrines of "non-self" (*Anata*) and "conditioned co-arising" (*pratitya-samutpada*).⁽³³⁾ The doctrine of non-self is devoid of any permanent basis of individuality because any entity is assumed to be but a temporary combination of a multiplicity of constituent parts. According to Buddha, all phenomena, both physical and mental, exist in a state of "conditional co-arising." Thus, everything depends for its existence on everything else, meaning the mutual dependence and or the reciprocal identification of all phenomena in a world of universal causation. These doctrines provide the foundation of a collective social ethic--coexistence, cooperation, and peaceful harmony. In this sense, Buddhism allows a "relative" collectivism--the enforced submission of the individual to the general will of the state (or the people's self), governmental authority, and even an authoritarian dictatorship.

The Buddhist psychology of the "escapist," the benevolent compassion and the "restraint," orientation⁽³⁴⁾ influenced the formation of "passivity" (or submissiveness) in the Korean collective consciousness.

And also, the Buddhist moral virtues--patience, compassion, serenity, and tolerance--reinforced the passive character of Korean psychology. This psychological emphasis of passive-negative attitudes towards the world evidently enhanced the authoritarianism of the Korean ruling elites

(31) Alen W. Watt, *The Way of Zen* (New York: Pantheon, 1968), p. 46. Tran T. Hung, *Buddhism and Politics in Southeast Asia*, unpublished dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1969, p. 98. Kenneth G. Clare, et al. *Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 151-53.

(32) Gardner Murphy and Lois B. Murphy, *Asian Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1918), pp. 108-109.

(33) Hung, p. 46.

(34) The Ten Wholesome Actions (of Prohibitions) of Buddhism are expressed in the negative form: (1) No taking of life; (2) No stealing; (3) No sexual misconduct; (4) No lying; (5) No slander; (6) No harsh speech; (7) No gossip; (8) No covetousness; (9) No hatred; and (10) No wrong views. The Buddhist commandments seem to imply more restraint, or negative oriented in contrast to the ideals of Western morality, i.e., Christian Ten Commandments.

and encourage it, as did Confucianism, the passive submission of their subjects.

5. TAOIST VIRTUE AND THE KOREAN PSYCHE

Introduced into ancient Korea (a little earlier than Buddhism), Taoist influence was more powerful as a philosophical force than as a religious force for Taoism is "a way," "a road," "a law of life" which requires that man adjust to nature in order to have happiness.⁽³⁵⁾


In association with early oriental (mostly Chinese) cosmology such as the *Ying-Yang* principle, Taoism asserted that man finds a relaxed and natural life only when in harmony with nature and that such harmony with nature, would promote good will with others, grant personal integrity, encourage sincerity and spontaneity.

Taoism is a naturalistic religion claiming that the best way to acquire human perfection is through the natural world which surrounds man. Such submission to the laws of nature would allegedly encourage the virtues of natural goodness, serenity, and resignation.⁽³⁶⁾ Because Taoism insists on harmony with and submission to nature, its inherent psychological drive is repression of the willingness to challenge the authority of nature. The Taoist virtue seeks to stifle human aggressive drives that might oppose natural authority.

In the relations between Taoist virtue and the Taoist psyche, human goals are but a microcosmic aspect of macrocosmic realities within the universal cosmos and since man is one small part of this unified cosmic process, Tao was seen as a way of life for every man.

Following is Figure 2 which illustrates the cosmic process of Tao which represses the aggressive human drive. Man moves up toward the upper line (line of change) egged on by desire, while his virtue moves toward the bottom line (line of stability). Tao causes all things to undergo the process of cyclic change, and functions by the way of "turning back" which

Figure 2. Transformation of Tao



means to return to the bottom line. A thing changes in an endless cycle of development and decline. The line of stability is superior to the line of change. Hence Taoist virtue favors negative action not positive action, and simplicity not complexity. By holding fast to the submissive line, one may avoid wasting energy and time in his social life. It is useless to seek the line of change where the hard/or strong prevail in motion. Taoist virtue, *Te*, is imparted by the *Tao* itself, and represents it in man. Every man is potentially endowed with the *Te*

(35) Taoism was founded by Lao-Tzu who lived about 600 B.C. in China, and the religion was a little bit older than that of Confucius or Buddha. Yu-Lan Fung, *History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 93-94.

(36) *Ibid.*, pp. 94-103.

in its perfection which needs to be cultivated in order to become a truly virtuous, unselfish man. The sage represents the highest stage of life at which the *Te* is revealed to its fullest extent.⁽³⁷⁾

Te is found in the interaction of anti-action (*wu-wei*) and non-struggle (*pu-cheng*) through a process of "cyclic change." Thus cyclic change is linked with the doctrine of change (*Tao Te Ching*) derived from the duality principle of the fundamental oriental philosophy: *Ying* and *Yang*.

Taoist cosmology along with Taoist forms of authority assert man's submissive (or passive) character. In brief, by resorting to submissive action (and even no-action), man is able to manage his aggressive nature, his sense of proportion, and his mode of conduct. In other words, the Taoist personality trait is submissive or passive and pessimistic. Many other beliefs of Taoism have also been molded into the Korean collective consciousness.

6. A KOREAN POLITICAL-SELF

In our psychohistorical analysis of the Korean psyche, we acknowledged the independent explanatory role of personality in Korean political life and concluded that the Korean political-self is, apparently, derivative of submissive personality dispositions, which we termed an authoritarian collective consciousness, stressing its behavioral consequences in Korean politics and bureaucracy.

The present study adopts the concept of "authoritarian personality" developed by Theodore Adorno and others,⁽³⁸⁾ which helps to explain the underlying personality dynamics of the Korean people; and we seek to find a dominant

pattern of Korean political attitudes and behaviors. The modal characteristics of the authoritarian personality are remarkably similar to the empirical realities of the Korean personality. And moreover, the principal assertion of the Adorno group that behavior is a function of deep-rooted personality characteristics, runs parallel to our hypothetical assumption. We explain Korean political behavior in terms of dominance and submission as illustrated by the following diagram model of interrelated environmental-psychological dimensionality and derivative cultural congruence.

As Figure 3 shows, the Korean political-self is acquired from the functional cultural congruence of these five causal dimensions: (1) Asian environment in time-space; (2) oriental, traditional philosophies; (3) homogeneous national culture; (4) centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy; and (5) submissive authoritarian personality.


From this dimensional conceptual scheme, we may identify a derivative Korean political-self, an aggregate of collective psychological attitudes and behavior patterns with hierarchical power/authority relationships of dominant-submissive, leader-follower dimensionality.

Succinctly put, both authority and hierarchy characterize Korean political attitudes and behavior patterns. For instance, submission to authority, a desire for a powerful leadership, subservience of the individual to the state, have long been understood to be important values of the Korean people. The Korean masses have also long been psychologically oriented toward the acceptance of elitist leadership and hierarchical institutions of control/order rather than toward

(37) D. C. Lau, *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 10-18. See also William McNaughton, "The Definition of Tao," *The Taoist Vision* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1971), p. 18.

(38) T. W. Adorno, E. Grenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

Figure 3. Dimensional Scheme of Korean Political-Self and Behavior



belief in their own individual responsibility. In brief, the pattern of authoritarian submissiveness has been and is the psychological basis of Korean political behavior.

As a summary, from our historical and psychocultural analysis and from our dimensional conceptual scheme, we may derive the following dominant patterns of Korean society and politics.

1. Submissiveness to authority;
2. Hierarchical view of life;
3. Collectivity (or Non-selfishness);

4. Passivity (or Non-participation);
5. Centralization of administration;
6. Past/tradition-oriented;
7. Ritual/formal-oriented
8. Loyalty to persons; and
9. Idealistic solutions.

The Korean political psychology is a function of these patterns of societal collective consciousness; and its behavioral implications on the historic Korean bureaucracy characterizes key patterns of Korean administration and politics.