

# Unification and Security on the Korean Peninsula\*

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## I. Introduction

The division of Korea was a product of the Allied victory in World War II. Whether partition was a "finished" product of the Allied powers or a temporary military demarcation line, as the documents literally suggest,<sup>(1)</sup> is still subject to debate. Likewise, whether "temporary" or "permanent" division was the price for Korean independence is yet unknown.

The founding of the Republic of Korea in the south was the result of the futility of direct negotiations between the two occupying nations. The breakdown of negotiations ultimately resulted in the division of Korea into two separate political entities along the 38th parallel, thus depriving the Korean people of the opportunity for independence under a single government.

In 1946, the United States brought the Korean question to the United Nations, and the General

Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by the United States providing for Korean independence. However, North Korea's refusal to let the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea perform the function of "the right to travel, observe, and consult throughout Korea," led to a total impasse. In 1948 the United Nations recognized the Republic of Korea (ROK) "as the only validly elected, lawful government in Korea."<sup>(2)</sup> On the other hand, the Korean communists in the north under the auspices of the Russian military authorities held a general election of their own and promulgated the creation of "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)" on September 9, 1948.

The Republic of Korea applied for United Nations membership on January 19, 1949 and the North Korean regime followed suit on February 10. However, due to the negative vote of the Soviet Union, no recommendation for the

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(1) Soon-Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950*, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1967, p. 1-60.

Geregrory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1968, p. 113-147.

(2) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 195(III), Dec. 12, 1948, *United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly*, Third Session, 1948, Part I, pp. 961-962.

*Yearbook of U.N.*, 1948-49, p. 288.

admission of the Republic of Korea could be made to the General Assembly by the Security Council.<sup>(3)</sup> All subsequent efforts to obtain membership in the United Nations were rebuffed by the Soviet Union, the most recent being in August 1975.<sup>(4)</sup> North Korea's application for admission to the United Nations was not even considered by the United Nations.

These actions demonstrate that both parties had a great interest in seeking membership in the United Nations from their inception, which might be regarded as a sign of their susceptibility to the international environment. The existence of two rival regimes in Korea was the direct result of the antagonism between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russian authorities took the initiative in withdrawing its troops from North Korea in 1948, which was followed by the American troop withdrawal from South Korea the next year, leaving behind them a seriously unbalanced military disparity between the two sides. By 1949, North Korea possessed a formidable military strength, whereas South Korea had only nominal military forces, numerically outnumbered and poorly equipped with mostly outdated individual firearms.

The North Korean communist regime decided to capitalize on this military vacuum, which had developed in South Korea and fulfill its ambition of a communist unification through military

means. Leaving the newly established regimes to face each other alone with their unrestrained antagonism towards each other resulted in the intensification of hostilities and in the course of time, the Korean War which began on June 25, 1950. The United Nations not only helped the Republic of Korea to meet the resultant crisis<sup>(5)</sup> but also made great contributions to solidifying the foundations of the Republic.

The reckless military venture of North Korean communists has certainly made the tragic national division more acutely felt in the minds of all Koreans. The two sides of Korea have become more estranged than ever from one another due to the bitter animosities which developed during the war.

The bloody Korean War came to a halt on July 27, 1953, with the signing of an armistice agreement between the United Nations Command on one side, and the North Korean and Communist Chinese forces on the other. Armed hostilities were now over and an unstable peace set in their place in the name of the armistice. The only difference that existed after the conflict was the replacement of the 38th parallel by the 155-mile long military demarcation line.

In order to bring about stability the Korean peninsula, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953.<sup>(6)</sup> This treaty is considered as a warning to the Communists that the United

(3) *United Nations Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Vol. 1., New York, 1955, p. 169.

(4) *United Nations Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Supp. No. 1, Vol. 1, 1958, p. 87; *The Japan Times*, Aug. 8, 1975.

(5) Security Council rescued Korea from emergence with the following resolutions: The Requestment of the Cessation of Hostilities in Korea(S/1501) on June 25, 1950; The Creation and Operation of the Unified Command(S/1588) on July 7, 1950; The Relief and Support of the Civilian People of Korea(S/1655) on July 31, 1950.

Fernand van Langenhove, *La Crise du System de Securite Collective des Nations Unies*, 1946-1957, La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1958, p. 76.

(6) The treaty came into force on November 17, 1954. There were two major purposes of the pact: (1) prevention of the renewal of Communist aggression in Korea; (2) assurance of

States would act in case of renewed aggression against the Republic of Korea. Thus the Mutual Defense Treaty became the cornerstone of Korea's security network along with the pledge of the sixteen nations which helped Korea during the war.

On the other hand, North Korea tried to keep economic, military and political ties with both the communist giants and other socialist countries. In 1961, for instance, North Korea was successful in bringing about treaties of mutual aid and cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as Communist China. Therefore both North and South Korea have Mutual Defense Treaties with their giant allies so that the situation in the Korean peninsula is regarded as strategically important by China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, in order to preserve their power leverage for political stability in East Asia and the Pacific regions.

Accordingly the Korean issue has become very complex because unification is not the primary question pending between both Koreas that is of primary importance but instead the political attitudes of the four powers. However, having the complex interests of these powers bound by either political ideology or the pragmatic policies, the tense atmosphere in Korea will persist in and further culminate the threat of war in these regions, considering the Pyongyang regime's intension to actively engage in provocative action in order to instigate the anti-status quo.

In the context of security, it is important to keep in mind that Korea went through a full-

scale armed conflict by an unprovoked and unwarranted aggression by North Korea. This bitter experience alone was sufficient to sow mutual distrust, creating a highly unstable state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula. Since the Panmunjom armistice agreement, North-South relations have been characterized by a quasi-state of war with occasional border clashes and heightening of tensions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), aggravated by North Korea's armed provocations, espionage infiltrations and activities and attempts to implement guerrilla type subversions in clear violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1953. Incidents along the 155-mile long military demarcation line are indicative of heightening tensions in Korea as there are over one million heavy armed men along this line.

This paper will illustrate the reunification policies of North and South Korea, including the new tensions on the peninsula and the security policy of the Republic of Korea.

## II. Early Progress and Disillusionment

The division of Korea does not signify a mere partition of the land. It signifies the existence of two entirely different political systems in two parts of a divided Korea, free democracy in the Republic of Korea and communist proletarian dictatorship in North Korea. They respectively represent extremely antagonistic ideologies, with entirely different historical views and value systems. Political reunification of a divided Korea, therefore, will be possible only when a choice between the two systems is made possible.

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America's concern for Korea's security by means of a formal commitment. Under Article IV of the treaty, each nation declares that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective control, or hereafter recognized one of the parties is lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea*, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 5.

Under these circumstances, choice between the two systems is an impossibility. The North Korean communists who have a population of 15.5 million<sup>(7)</sup> under their control have no intention of dropping their wild idea of achieving communist unification, whereas the 33.7 million Koreans living in the Republic of Korea would never accept life in a communist system.

The Republic of Korean government, in the past, has traditionally endorsed the reunification formula which called for a free all-Korea election held under United Nations observation where representation would be in direct proportion to the indigenous population of Korea. However, this reunification formula was unacceptable to the North Korean communists, who saw no chance of winning such an election.

In his commemorative address marking the 25th anniversary of the country's liberation from Japanese rule on August 15, 1970, President Park Chung-Hee explicitly proposed some joint effort through which the two sides could institutionalize peace on the peninsula. During this speech, which was the outgrowth of the Republic's decision to initiate a dialogue with the North, President Park called for "peaceful competition in good faith." between the two systems in Korea, and suggested that he was going to initiate a dialogue with North Korea by declaring that he would take "drastic measures" to remove man-made barriers between the two sides of Korea, if the North Korean communists "drop their scheme to communize the southern half of the country by force and stop military provocations."<sup>(8)</sup>

Although Park's proposal was rejected by

Pyongyang,<sup>(9)</sup> North Korea's Premier Kim Il-Sung in August, 1971, expressed an interest in meeting with all political parties in South Korea including the Democratic Republican Party.<sup>(10)</sup> On August 12, 1971, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposed a humanitarian dialogue between the Red Cross societies of the two sides of Korea on ways to alleviate the suffering of the millions of Koreans who have had family members living on the other side of the divided country for more than a quarter century.<sup>(11)</sup> Both Red Cross societies entered a new era of inter-Korean relations when the humanitarian talks began in the fall of 1971. The proposed method to mitigate conditions of this long disunion was to be accomplished by instituting a family reunion programs, to be set up by the mutual consent of the two rival governments. After nearly a year of negotiations between the representatives from the Red Cross societies in Seoul and Pyongyang, both sides agreed to discuss the substantive issues of the proposal. The Red Cross talks were held alternately in Pyongyang and Seoul on seven occasions. The results of these talks brought no concrete rewards except to reinforce the mutual conviction that obstacles to unification were insurmountable and the differing interests irreconcilable.

From the beginning of the dialogue, Pyongyang stressed a "political revolutionary" approach to the solution of the Korean question, whereas, Seoul advocated a gradual step-by-step approach, favoring non-political issues such as humanitarian matters, and gradually negotiating later more difficult political issues on the basis of mutual

(7) *The Military Balance, 1974-1975*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974, p. 56.

(8) *The Korea Times*, August 16, 1970.

(9) *Rodong Shinmun*(Pyongyang), August 22, 1970.

(10) *Rodong Shinmun*, August 7, 1971.

(11) *The Korea Times*, August 13, 1971.

trust and a non-hostile relationship. The North Korean Red Cross Society proposed that free travel of relatives and friends separate from each other be included in the discussion, and also provided that free correspondence between separated family members, relatives and friends be considered in the talks.<sup>(12)</sup> Pyongyang, however, has insisted that "free visits" not only between separated families but also between separated relatives and friends be allowed,<sup>(13)</sup> and that dispersed families should be given free transit between South and North Korea even before family members can be confirmed alive and their location determined.<sup>(14)</sup>

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross has argued that it is not reasonable for separated families to travel between the South and North with no restrictions before their family members have been identified and located.<sup>(15)</sup> Seoul could not accept the principle of unrestricted "free visits," travel and communication between South and North Korea for a variety of reasons. First, unrestricted free travel and communication could give North Korean agents opportunities to disturb political-economic stability and possibility to overthrow the South Korean government. Second, North Korea has organized a well-trained subversive organizations, the majority of whose members originally came from the south and are currently involved in underground activities there. Thus, unrestricted free travel and communication would not reveal the agents of these organizations, and furthermore would facilitate

their clandestine activities to overthrow the South's government.<sup>(16)</sup>

In May 1972, President Park Chung-Hee directed Lee Hu-Rak, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to go secretly to Pyongyang for talks with Kim Il-Sung and other leading figures of the North Korean communist regime, including Kim Young-Joo, younger brother of Kim Il-Sung and director of the powerful organizational guidance department of North Korean Worker's Party, Park Sung-Chul, North Korea's Second Deputy Premier. Lee's mission was to explore the possibilities of a political dialogue between the two sides of Korea and his secret Pyongyang visit in May led to the announcement of the historic South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972,<sup>(17)</sup> which created the North and the South Coordinating Committee. The main goals of this Committee were to improve relations between the North and the South, to undertake joint programs in various fields, and to settle national unification problems by peaceful means.<sup>(18)</sup>

According to the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, the following principles for Korean unification were agreed upon by the two sides:

1. Unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subjected to external imposition or interference.
2. Unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.
3. As a homogeneous people, a great national

(12) *The Pyongyang Times*, August 21, 1971.

(13) *The Pyongyang Times*, January 15, 1972.

(14) *The Korea Times*, January 11, 1972.

(15) *Ibid.*

(16) *The Journal of Korean Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (January 1972), pp. 44-45.

(17) *South-North Dialogue in Korea* (The Public Relations Association of Korea, Seoul, Korea), No. 005 (July 1974), p. 23.

(18) *South-North Dialogue in Korea*, No. 001 (July 1973).

unity shall first be sought, transcending differences in ideologies, and systems.<sup>(19)</sup>

The official inauguration of the South-North Coordinating Committee on November 30, 1972, was preceded by the adoption of the "Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee" on November 4, of the same year.

The agreement provided, in Article 1, that the South-North Coordinating Committee would deal with the questions of the (1) independent and peaceful unification of the country on the basis of agreed principles, (2) exchanges between political parties and social organizations as well as individuals, (3) exchange and cooperation in economics, cultural and social fields, (4) mitigation of tension and prevention of military accidents and (5) pursuit of joint steps in overseas activities. The agreement also provided that the Committee, be composed of five members from the ministerial and vice ministerial rank from each side, who would have, at its apparatuses, an Executive Council and a Joint Secretariat and would create five subcommittees, political, military, economic, cultural and diplomatic, within the framework of the Committee, when the Committee deemed it necessary. It was also agreed that the Committee would convene every two to three months in Seoul and Pyongyang respectively and the Executive Council every month in Panmunjom.<sup>(20)</sup>

The South-North Coordinating Committee, thereafter, convened three times, twice in Seoul and

once in Pyongyang during the period November 1972-June 1973. There also were three rounds of Executive Council meetings at Panmunjom in March, April and May 1973. The political dialogue at the Coordinating Committee, however, began to break down early in 1973. The Republic of Korea proposed, at the second Coordinating Committee meeting in March 1973, that the Committee begin its work, first in the economic and socio-cultural fields, by creating economic and socio-cultural subcommittees prior to others and enforcing a wide range of exchanges and cooperation in those fields, as a means first to foster an atmosphere of trust and understanding between the two sides. North Korea, however, flatly rejected this and put forward the following counterproposal at the end of the same meeting.

1. That the two sides discuss, prior to other problems, the conclusion of a peace treaty, featuring (1) a ban on the arms race, (2) withdrawal of all foreign troops, (3) reduction of forces, and (4) a ban on arms imports.
2. That the five subcommittee of the Coordinating Committee be created all at once.
3. That a "South-North political conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations" be convoked to settle the question of unification.<sup>(21)</sup>

The three-point proposal was an indication of changes in the attitude of North Korea on the dialogue in the direction of stalemating its progress. Each of the three items listed above had its own trap to make further progress in the talks impossible.

(19) *The New York Times*, July 5, 1972.

(20) *South-North Dialogue in Korea*, No. 005, p. 30.

(21) *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31, 62.

ROK proposals:

A) In Economic Field.

- 1) Exchange of businessmen and goods.
- 2) Exchange of scientific technologies.
- 3) Joint development of natural resources,
- 4) Exchange of trade fairs.
- 5) Exchange of resident business firms.

The divergent position taken by each side resulted in no progress at the subsequent meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee held in Seoul on June 12, 1973, which was the last meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee as such and the stalemate was aggravated when Kim Young-Joo, Co-chairman from North Korea, issued a statement on August 28, 1973, in which he refused to negotiate with Lee Hu-Rak, his counterpart on the South-North Coordinating Committee, on the grounds that he had plotted the abduction from Japan of Kim Dae-Jung, ex-presidential nominee of the New Democratic Party, an opposition party in South Korea.<sup>(22)</sup> In the strict sense of the negotiations between the South and the North, Kim Young-Joo's refusal seemed somewhat inadequate because the case itself had little direct relationship to the dialogue.

However, this view leads one to a totally misleading conclusion which is apparent upon a closer examination of the August 28 statement. At a special press conference the following day Lee charged that Kim Young-Joo had been insincere in the dialogue and in fact, had never attended the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee (on the grounds that he was ill). He further stated that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency had not been involved in the Kim Dae-Jung affair.<sup>(23)</sup> Lee Hu-Rak, who resigned as Director of the Republic of Korea

Central Intelligence Agency on December 3, 1973, also resigned as Co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on the Seoul side for health reasons. Vice-chairman Chang Key-Young was named to act as acting Co-chairman for Seoul in the meantime.

The North Korean statement of August 28 carried the message that North Korea: (1) wanted unilaterally to cut off the dialogue, (2) wanted to have the dialogue kept closed for the time being until certain conditions of their own were met, and (3) wanted to force changes in the channel of the dialogue, including the reorganization of the Coordinating Committee, on their own terms.

Why did the dialogue come to an end? The ROK reasoning can be summarized as follows: first, North Korea's pursuit of a "South Korean revolution through violent means" for an eventual Communist takeover of South Korea; second, the profound impact of South-North Korean dialogue on North Korean society. The ROK contends that North Korean leaders came to the conclusion that the dialogue was not necessarily going to create a favorable climate for revolution in South Korea, and that it did not produce a favorable impact on North Korean society. Furthermore, the North Korean leaders apparently had decided that the present course of the dialogue did not conform with the objectives of their unification policy and in fact might be a

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B) In Socio-Cultural Fields.

- 1) People-to-people exchanges, and exchanges between social organizations.
- 2) Exchanges in academic and cultural fields.
- 3) Exchanges in films and theatrical arts.
- 4) Joint researches in the archaeology and the national history.
- 5) Joint research for preservation of common language.
- 6) Exchange of resident correspondents.
- 7) Communications exchange, including mails, telephones and telegrams.
- 8) Exchanges in tourist fields.

(22) *The New York Times*, August 29, 1973.

(23) *The Korea Times*, August 31, 1973.

waterhed for the unification policies of the South. Thus, the ROK concluded that the North Korea had decided to suspend the dialogue.<sup>(24)</sup>

On the other hand, North Korea explained its position on why the dialogue failed to make progress. According to official North Korean sources, the basic obstacles to the dialogue and reunification were as follows:

The United States keeps occupying South Korea, interferes in the internal affairs of Korea, and obstructs overtly and covertly the dialogue between the Koreans, using its dominant position in South Korea.<sup>(25)</sup>

Thus, North Korea blamed the United States for "plotting to perpetuate the division of Korea and hamper her reunification."<sup>(26)</sup>

North Korea takes a "political-military-revolutionary" approach to reunification that is viewed as liberation of the South Korean people from "American imperialism and feudal oppression and exploitation" while the ROK, recognizing "power realities" in Korea, takes a gradual, functional and step-by-step approach to the reunification issue.

On November 15, 1973, the Republic of Korea formally proposed to North Korea that the two sides resume the interrupted dialogue immediately. North Korea half-heartedly responded, and, as a result, the two sides now began two-way contacts at Panmunjom, one the Vice-chairmen's Meetings of the Coordinating Committee and the other "contact" between delegates on the two sides at the Red Cross talks. The purpose of

the two-way Panmunjom contacts was to normalize the two avenues of the interrupted South-North dialogue, the Coordinating Committee meetings and the full-dress Red Cross talks. However, little progress has been achieved so far in the Panmunjom contacts to achieve anything close to a full resumption of the dialogue.

On July 9, 1975, the Republic of Korea proposed to North Korea that the long-overdue plenary session of the South-North Coordinating Committee be convened "unconditionally" in Pyongyang before August 15. Seoul emphasized that all problems arising between the two sides of the divided Korean peninsula should be settled within the framework of the inter-Korean body as was agreed upon in the South-North Joint Communiqué issued July 4, 1972. Seoul also proposed that Pyongyang's demand for convening either a "grand national congress" or a "North-South political conference" was an "all-too-ambiguous idea indicating a hodgepodge mass rally-type assembly."<sup>(27)</sup> But North Korea rejected this proposal through the hot line telephone between Pyongyang and Seoul on July 13, 1975.<sup>(28)</sup> So the prospects for such a dialogue are not bright.

### III. Roots of the Deadlock

What is the genuine cause of the deadlock in the South-North dialogue? The dialogue between the two sides of divided Korea is committed eventually to the unification of the country and it was emphatically declared so in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué and, quite under-

(24) *South-North Dialogue in Korea, A perspective of the Dialogue*, No. 003 (December 1973), pp. 8-18.

(25) *Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea*, 1973, pp. 37-46.

Young C. Kim, "North Korea's Reunification Policy: A Magnificent Obsession?" *The Journal of Korean Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (January, 1974), pp. 15-24.

(26) *Memorandum...*, p. 46.

(27) *The Korea Herald*, July 10, 1975.

(28) *The Korea Times*, July 14, 1975.



standably, the basic positions of the two sides at the talks respectively are expressions of their unification policies. It is clear that the Republic of Korea proposed the dialogue with North Korea in the hope that it would eventually prove to be instrumental in achieving the kind of reunification of the country that she pursued. It is likewise clear that North Korean communists accepted the Republic of Korea's offer in the belief that they would be able to capitalize on the dialogue in trying to achieve reunification of the country on their own terms. Differences in the basic positions of the two sides at the dialogue, therefore, had to arise basically from differences in the objective of their respective unification policies.

The Republic of Korea's objectives in the dialogue fully conform with the objectives of her unification policy. This unification policy calls for the institutionalization of an interim process in which the two vastly different systems in the two sides of Korea could experiment accommodations and assimilations between themselves through the implementation of a series of confidence-building measures to provide eventual realization of peaceful unification. Thus the Republic of Korea sees the dialogue as an instrument to usher in that interim process in the thorny relations between the two sides of Korea.<sup>(29)</sup>

The primary task of an effort to achieve reunification is to overcome the vast differences that have come to exist between the two systems, in the two divided parts of Korea as a result of a generation of national division: ideological antagonism; appalling damages, both in human lives and property, caused by a war instigated by North Korea in the early 1950's; North Korea's continued military provocations

and subversive activities against the Republic of Korea after the armistice of 1953; differences between the open society of the Republic of Korea and the closed society of North Korea; and, most important of all, North Korea's increasingly intensified campaign to sow in the minds of Koreans the feeling of enmity and hatred against other Koreans, under the veil of "class antagonism," were the factors that, combined altogether, have torn the two sides of Korea wider and wider apart as time went on.

The intensified North Korean guerrilla activities in 1968, in the meantime, raised the question of peace in Korea. Institutionalization of peace in Korea thus became the primary objective that the Republic of Korea desired to achieve through the dialogue with the North Korean communists. The Republic of Korea believed that cultivation of the foundations of a stable and lasting peace in Korea would be the cornerstone in the process of mutual accommodations and assimilation which would eventually lead to the realization of a peaceful reunification of the country.

The objectives that the Republic of Korea wanted to achieve through the dialogue with North Korea were fourfold:

1. Prevention of recurrence of war—war of any kind, including guerrilla war and brushfire war as well as full-scale war.
2. Stabilization of a lasting peace in Korea—institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between the two different systems, as an interim measure pending unification of the country.
3. Implementation of exchanges and cooperation, on a gradually expanded scale, between the two systems in order to restore mutual trust and promote mutual accommodations and assimilations.

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(29) *South-North Dialogue in Korea*, No. 005, p. 33.

4. Full restoration of the sense of national identity and achievement of peaceful reunification with the rehabilitated national homogeneity as its foundation.<sup>(30)</sup>

On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung-Hee of the Republic of Korea declared that these four objectives were, in effect, the objectives of the new unification policy of the Republic of Korea, "the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification," which was proclaimed on the same day. President Park's statement is as follows:

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all means. The South and the North should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communiqué dated July 4, 1972.
4. We shall not oppose North Korea's participation with us in international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tensions and the furtherance of international cooperation.
5. We shall not object to our admittance into the United Nations together with North Korea, if the majority of the member states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hindrance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a member,

we shall not be opposed to North Korea also being invited at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation on the "Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of Korea is invited to participate.

6. The Republic of Korea will open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from ours to open theirs likewise to us.<sup>(31)</sup>

In this statement South Korea placed top priority on the maintenance of peace in the Korean peninsula. The "ultimate objective" of the Republic was confirmed to be to "continue to exert unswerving effort" to achieve unification. However, President Park concluded that there would still be a considerable length of time before unification was finally achieved, and urged the North Korean communists to accept certain mutually acceptable interim measures, hoping that they would eventually lead to the realization of unification itself. But Pyongyang refused these proposals on the grounds that they would perpetuate the division of Korea, and Kim Il-Sung made a counterproposal on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak's official visit to Pyongyang on June 23, 1973. Kim's unification program called for the South:

1. To accept North's five point proposal of March, 1973.<sup>(32)</sup>
2. To realize many-sided collaboration and

(30) *ibid.*, p. 35.

(31) *The Korea Times*, June 24, 1973.

(32) *The Korea Times*, March 17, 1973.

Five-point proposal were:

- 1) Stop reinforcement of military build-up and the armament races;
- 2) Withdraw all foreign troops including United States forces;
- 3) Reduce army strength in both the North and the South to 100,000 men or less and drastically reduce rearmaments;
- 4) Discontinue the introduction of all weapons, combat equipment and war supplies from foreign countries;

interchanges between the North and the South;

3. To convene a great national assembly composed of the representatives of people from all walks of life and the representatives of political parties and social organizations in the North and the South to discuss and solve the reunification question;
4. To institute a North-South confederation under the single name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo;
5. Not to enter the United Nations separately. If the North and the South want to enter the United Nations before unification, they should enter as one state at least under the name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo.<sup>(33)</sup>

The common point in the two proposals was the recognition of the necessity of "many-sided collaborations and interchanges" between Seoul and Pyongyang. Regardless of the motives behind the proposals and counterproposal between the two antagonists, each tended to assume that the other's proposal was designed to "trick" and instigate diplomatic offensives against the other, the effect being to stalemate the Korean dialogues.

A bold reaffirmation of the new peace-oriented unification policy of the Republic of Korea came on January 18, 1974, when at his New Year Press Conference, President Park proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the two sides of Korea. The proposed South-North non-aggression agreement would call for pledges by the two sides: (1) to denounce aggression against each other, (2) to stop interfering in the internal affairs of each other, and

(3) to maintain the effect of the armistice agreement in force under whatever circumstances.<sup>(34)</sup>

President Park viewed the North Korean proposal for a 'peace treaty' as an attempt to destroy the existing armistice structure in Korea, featuring, among others, withdrawal of the United Nations forces. "It is all too evident that the North Korean 'peace treaty' proposals were aimed at unilateral disarmament of the Republic of Korea, as part of a scheme to create a favorable condition for an armed attack against the Republic of Korea to achieve a communist takeover of the southern half of Korea by force," the President declared.<sup>(35)</sup>

North Korea broke eight days of silence on January 26, 1974, to flatly turn down the offer of a South-North non-aggression agreement. By refusing to accept the offer of a non-aggression accord, North Korea showed it was not interested in institutionalizing peace in Korea and that North Korea's so-called 'peace treaty' proposal was only a diversion. In an editorial in the *Rodong Shinmun*, North Korea rejected the offer of a non-aggression accord on the grounds that "while talking of peace, it says nothing about the termination of the 'strong-arm occupation of South Korea by the forces of the American imperialist aggressors.'"<sup>(36)</sup>

The North Korean version of 'peace' in Korea is a slogan designed solely to serve the cause of communizing the entire Korean peninsula and the hidden purpose of North Korea's so-called 'peace treaty' is to get the United Nations

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- 5) Conclude a peace agreement guaranteeing that above points would be fulfilled and that neither the North nor the South would use arms against the other.

(33) *The People's Korea*, June 27, 1973.

*The Korea Times*, June 24, 1973.

(34) *The Korea Times*, January 19, 1974.

(35) *Ibid.*

(36) *Rodong Shinmun*, January 26, 1974.

troops out of Korea and thus tear down the foundations of the precarious armistice structure which exists in Korea today.

On June 23, 1974, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the June 23 Declaration, President Park issued a special statement, in which he called on the North Korean communists to "renounce immediately their policy of communizing the whole of Korea by force and violence," and by returning to the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, "to join us in efforts to normalize the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North Coordinating Committee and to realize exchanges and cooperation" between the two sides of Korea.<sup>(37)</sup>

At the August 15, 1974, ceremony of the nation's liberation from Japanese rule, President Park presented the three principles of his unification policy:

1. Peace should be firmly established in the Korean peninsula. For this purpose, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the South and the North.
2. The South and the North should open their doors to each other and mutual trust should be restored between them. For this purpose, they should pursue rapid progress of the South-North dialogue with sincerity, and many-sided exchanges and cooperation should take place between them.
3. Based on the above foundations, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population thereby achieving the unification of the country.<sup>(38)</sup>

The response of North Korea to the proposal for free, general elections, in direct relation to the indigenous population was outright rejection.

On July 4, 1975, on the occasion of the third

anniversary of the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué, President Park made the following special statement:

North Korea should accept the authority and competence of the United Nations and they should immediately terminate their preparations for aggressive war, all acts of indirect aggression, and self-destructive acts of disgracing their own nation in international society and urge them to normalize the suspended South-North dialogue by requesting the resumption of the full-fledged meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference respectively at the earliest possible date.<sup>(39)</sup>

This statement also asked North Korea to remove the major obstacle in the way of achieving peaceful unification of the country "by accepting the Republic of Korea's proposal for a non-aggression agreement and by dropping its unrealistic unification policy which calls for achievement of a communist revolution," in the Republic of Korea as a precondition. Also North Korea should recognize the simultaneous admission of the two sides of Korea into the United Nations not necessarily as legal grounds for recognizing the division of Korea, but as a means conducive to dissolution of the state of Cold War confrontation that still remains intact between the two sides of Korea.

If North Koreans are truly interested in peaceful coexistence and unification, they do not need a peace agreement. They can bring about and forestall war simply by strictly observing the existent Armistice Agreement, but the situation is quite the opposite. As far as we know, they have violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement about 28,000 times during the past 20 years (27,552 on land and 85 on Sea).<sup>(40)</sup> Thus

(37) *The Korea Times*, June 24, 1974.

(38) *The Korea Herald*, August 16, 1974.

(39) *The Korea Times*, July 5, 1975.

(40) President Park Chung-Hee proposed "A Non-aggression Agreement" on January 18, 1974 Press

if a new agreement is really needed for the establishment of a lasting peace on the peninsula, it is very desirable that a non-aggression agreement be concluded between both sides.

#### IV. North Korea's Unification Policy

North Korea's peaceful unification formula has always rested on fulfilling a 'precondition' in advance. This precondition has insistently called for the achievement of what they call a 'South Korean revolution. The North Korean version of a South Korean revolution, in other words, calls for what they call a "People's Democratic Revolution" in the Republic of Korea through the manipulation of the North Korean communists themselves, or communist takeover of the southern half of the peninsula.

Kim Il-Sung declared at the fifth convention of the North Korean Worker's Party on November 2, 1970, that the 'precondition' for unification of the country was achievement of a 'South Korean revolution,' stating that the purpose of the "South Korean revolution was eventually to overthrow the present regime in South Korea and to establish a People's Democratic Regime in its stead."<sup>(41)</sup>

Kim Il-Sung publicly admitted it himself when he asserted that, in order to have "peaceful unification" realized, "South Korea should first (1) nationalize all plants owned by capitalists and all business firms with foreign investment, (2) forfeit all privately owned farm lands, and (3) sever her economic ties with America and Japan."<sup>(42)</sup> Therefore, Kim clearly had in mind the total communization of South Korea as a

condition for achieving what the North Korean communists call 'peaceful unification.'

The true nature of North Korea's self-styled "peaceful unification policy" was further manifested in a policy thesis of North Korea, entitled "On Mutual Relations between South Korean Revolution and Unification of Fatherland," broadcast in full over Radio Pyongyang on the very eve of the announcement of the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972.

The policy thesis also declared that unification of the country would be achieved "only on condition that the South Korean revolution is achieved in advance," adding that the "South Korean revolution" would be completed "with the accomplishment of a people's democratic revolution in South Korea." It strongly asserted that unification of the country "should be achieved under the flag of the 'people's Democratic Republic' of Korea."

It was in line with this basic stand of North Korea that Kim Il-Sung, during his speeches welcoming the Bulgarian government delegation on October 28, 1973,<sup>(43)</sup> and Algerian President Houari Boumediene on March 4, 1974, declared that "unification of the country would come about only through struggle and there would be no compromise whatsoever with the 'separatists' of South Korea."<sup>(44)</sup> Kim Il-Sung's speech at his reception in Peking on April 18, 1975, also emphasized that "if the revolution of the people occurred in South Korea, North Korea would strongly support such a revolution and we can get the territory of reunification and lose the military demarcation line."<sup>(45)</sup>

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*The Korea Times*, January 19, 1974.

(41) *Rodong Shinmun*, November 3, 1970.

(42) "Study of the Works of Kim Il-Sung," *Radio Pyongyang*, April 17, 1974.

(43) *Rodong Shinmun*, Oct. 29, 1973.

(44) *Rodong Shinmun*, March 5, 1974.

(45) *Rodong Shinmun*, April 19, 1975 and May 9, 1975.

If North Korea tries to unify Korea by subversion or by use of force in the form of supporting the anti-government movement in the South, peace in the region would be in great danger. It is worthwhile to note that Chinese Vice Premier Deng Hsiao-ping's speech made at the farewell party for Kim Il-Sung on April 26, 1975. He stated that, "China and North Korea would fight shoulder-to-shoulder no matter what storms may rise in the world. Our two sides had a thorough exchange of views and reached complete identity on further strengthening the militant friendship and great unity of our two parties, countries and peoples, on the current international situation, including the situation on the Korean peninsula."<sup>(46)</sup>

The North Korean communists proposed the South-North confederation as a step toward unification, which first appeared on August 15, 1960. They proposed that such a confederation of two systems which would enjoy complete autonomy and identity under a supreme national assembly composed of the representatives of the two governments.<sup>(47)</sup> It renewed its "Reunification-through-Confederation" proposal on June 3, 1970, March, 1973 and June 23, 1973.<sup>(48)</sup>

The confederation proposal of North Korea itself is unclear and controversial. It is, however, often used to describe a process of combining territorial communities that previously had not been directly joined into a new unit of common interest, policy and action, or the opposite

process of deconcentration of power.

In Pyongyang, the confederation is pictured as a transitory step toward a central government. North Korea's conception of a confederation bears little resemblance to the Western political science lexicon. A confederation to North Koreans is simply an arrangement under which the two different sociopolitical systems of the South and North will remain intact and various social, cultural and economic problems (political, military and diplomatic areas were added in 1973) will be coordinated by a supreme national committee composed of delegates from the two governments. The explanation was that a confederation exists only when collaboration, defined literally, in political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural fields actually occurs.<sup>(49)</sup>

In their scheme, confederation is merely a preliminary stage in the process of creating a unitary national government for a reunited political order of Korea. As far as the elites of power are not homogeneous, heterogeneous units may not succeed in initiating such a confederation. The ideological perspectives of the two political systems are so conflicting that there cannot be said to be sufficient agreement as to the fundamental interests and the goals of the nation as a whole. Therefore their proposal for confederation is unrealistic. It is simply a variation of their tactics in their chain of revolutionary strategy.<sup>(50)</sup> To North Koreans, the fundamental obstacle to reunification is South Korea's

*The Korea Times*, April 19, 1975.

(46) *Podong Shinmun*, April 27, 1975.

*The Korea Times*, April 27, 1975.

(47) Iyung-Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea*, New York, Praeger, 1969, pp. 134-135.

(48) *The People's Korea* (Pyongyang), June 27, 1973.

*Podong Shinmun*, June 24, 1973.

*The Korea Times*, June 24, 1973.

(49) *Ibid.*, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

(50) Tong-Pil Rhee, "The Gradual Search for the Sequential Steps toward Korean Unification," *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1975), p. 45.

ties with the United States, the most convincing demonstration of which is the American military presence in South Korea.<sup>(51)</sup> This view may stem from North Korea's ideological convictions. North Korea is convinced that American 'imperialism' requires the perpetual subjugation of South Korea, that she will not withdraw her troops voluntarily and that withdrawal must be achieved through a relentless struggle based on three fronts: strengthening the North as a revolutionary base, vitalizing the revolutionary forces in the South, and increasing international solidarity against the U.S., thus promoting a favorable international environment.<sup>(52)</sup>

The deceptiveness of the North Korean peace measures is shown from still another aspect, by North Korea's vehement disapproval of a 'peaceful co-existence' between the two sides of Korea, as an interim measure before a foundation is securely laid for achievement of unification. According to a *Rodong Shinmun's* editorial on January 26, 1974, the idea of 'peaceful co-existence' was a "concept which can be applied only to relations among different nation-states." It can never be applied to the relations between the two sides of Korea since these are internal matters of one nation and one country."

It was indeed an important pronouncement of grave concern in that such an allegation of North Korea logically ruined the foundations of the North Korean proposal for a 'peace treaty' and, at the same time, denied their proposal for a 'South-North confederation' advocated by Kim Il-Sung of its logical validity.

If the relations between the two sides of Korea

were indeed 'internal matters' of 'one nation' and 'one country' as the North Koreans allege, there would also be no question about the fact that, logically speaking, it would be absolutely impossible for the two sides of Korea to conclude a peace treaty, "because a 'treaty' necessarily involves at least two 'states,' at least two 'countries.'"

On June 23, 1973, the Republic of Korea announced its Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, calling for institutionalization of peace in Korea as the foundation for a new relationship between the two sides of Korea, genuinely oriented toward a stable peace in this part of the world, and peaceful unification of the country in the long run. North Korea, however, found the June 23 Declaration of the Republic of Korea unacceptable for two major reasons:

First, North Korea had an interpretation of their own that peaceful coexistence with the Republic of Korea would eventually entail peaceful competition between the two different systems in the two sides of Korea, in order to determine which of the two systems would better serve the good of the people of Korea. North Korea could not accept this because of their lack of confidence in the viability of their economy in peaceful competition with that of the Republic of Korea.

Secondly, because the personality cult of Kim Il-Sung is heavily based on the "South Korean revolution" as its rationale, North Korea could not accept coexistence with the Republic of Korea.

(51) Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Koh, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-145.

Robert A. Scalapino & Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: The Movement*(part I), Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1972, p. 682.

(52) Motoi Tamaki, "Tension in Korean Peninsula: An Analysis on Kim Il-Sung's Road," *Chuogoron* (Tokyo), July, 1975, p. 110.

Now North Korea could neither accept the June 23 Declaration of the Republic of Korea nor allow it to be endorsed by the international community. To North Korea, the simultaneous admission into the United Nations by the two sides of Korea meant approval of peaceful coexistence between the South and North—and thus approval of the June 23 Declaration, by the international community.

North Korea at last decided to cancel the dialogue and announced so on August 28, 1973. Military provocations were resumed against the Republic of Korea. Infiltrations and infiltration attempts into the South by armed agents from North Korea began to increase sharply. Tensions in Korea are rising to a new height.

### V. The Security Policy of the Republic of Korea

In the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina, many South Koreans fear that North Korea's unpredictable Kim Il-Sung may try to emulate the success of his comrades in Hanoi. South Korea's President Park Chung-Hee says that he expects Pyongyang to attack within the next eighteen months.<sup>(53)</sup>

Even as Saigon was falling, the burly North Korean leader flew to Peking as the first step in a tour that has taken him to Rumania, Algeria and Bulgaria in an attempt to win international support for the unification of the Korean peninsula under his leadership. In Korea itself, Kim's soldiers have launched massive efforts burrow their way to the South. In recent months, the United Nations forces in Korea have discovered two elaborate tunnels running from North Korea

into the southern half of the 2.5-mile wide DMZ (one of the tunnels was 6 ft. high and 6 ft. wide),<sup>(54)</sup> complete with electric lines and narrow-gauge railways. Despite the fact that they have been caught in the act, North Korean troops are still digging along the DMZ—an obvious sign that Kim has not abandoned his dream of sending at least some men and weapons toward Seoul.

Most serious of all is the fact that more than one million heavily armed, well-trained troops are arrayed on both sides of the DMZ: 625,000 in the South and 467,000 in the North.<sup>(55)</sup>

On the northern side, six to eight divisions crowd the border and there are as many positioned not far behind. A score of hardened artillery sites and hundreds of other gun positions dot the craggy hillsides. In their midst, the North Koreans have deployed Soviet-built SA-2 missiles along with modern Frog 5 and Frog 7 missiles. Although the North Koreans can boast of superior air power (578 planes against 235 South Korean planes), U.S. planes, including the three squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighters already in the South, could easily offset this advantage.<sup>(56)</sup>

The North Korean forces, combined with huge Soviet air and naval installations in Vladivostok, just 40 miles from the border, with perhaps 1.5 million Soviet and Chinese troops facing off at the Manchurian border and with a lethal U. S. nuclear arsenal on Okinawa, put the Korean peninsula at the center of what may well be the most intensively militarized region in the world. The very existence of these enormous armed forces, in conjunction with the profound antagonism

(53) *Newsweek*, June 30, 1975, p. 6.

*The Korea Times*, June 14, 1975.

(54) *Time*, June 30, 1975, p. 13.

(55) *The Military Balance 1974-1975*, p. 56.

(56) *Newsweek*, June 30, 1975, p. 7.



onism generated by three decades of division, increases the danger that any misstep could lead to war.<sup>(57)</sup> This trend in Korea is in sharp contrast with the general trend toward the relaxation of tensions between the East and the West.

As already mentioned some 30,000 violations of the Armistic Agreement have been committed by the North. Any one of these could have resulted in the decisive spark that engulfed the peninsula in renewed warfare. Among their most daring ventures were: the seizure of the U. S. S. Pueblo and its eighty-two member crew on January 23, 1968,<sup>(58)</sup> the downing of an American reconnaissance plane; the attempted assassination of President Park by a North Korean commando unit in 1968; the hijacking of a Korean Airlines passenger plane in 1959 and again in 1969; Attacks by 120 armed North Korean guerrillas in the Ulchin-Samchok area of the east coast in 1968; the second attempted assassination of President Park by a terrorist, that ended in the death of his wife at the twenty-ninth anniversary celebration of the national liberation from Japan; the North Korean gunboat attack on two Southern trawlers on the high seas off the west coast in 1974 and one year later off the east coast; the sinking by the South of a North Korean patrol boat in 1975 which was apparently engaging in smuggling and armed espionage activity in the South; the already mentioned construction of underground tunnels deep inside the southern sector of the DMZ, which presum-

ably would be used in the event of a Blitzkrieg attack or as routes for North Korean agents conducting espionage activities; the recent attempt by two North Korean agents to infiltrate through the south-western coast,<sup>(59)</sup> and the incursion into South Korean territorial waters by six North Korean boats.<sup>(60)</sup>

North Koreans would certainly like to foment subversion within South Korea in the hope of weakening and ultimately eliminating President Park. The North is most likely to test Seoul's resolve, and the strength of the American commitment, with a series of small-scale probes: infiltration through the eastern mountains, for example, or sea clashes over the five islands off the northwestern coast that are under U.N. command. The danger is that a failure by South Korean or the U.S. forces to act forcefully in the face of such moves would be bad for Seoul's morale.<sup>(61)</sup>

The North Korea's strategy and its evolution is a telling testimony concerning her supposed desire for "peaceful unification of our fatherland." North Korean tactics were: (1) An attempt to build an underground movement in the South; (2) The institution of commando type operations throughout South Korea; (3) The devising of means to carry out a Vietnam-type operation based upon political considerations and preparations.<sup>(62)</sup>

Kim Il-Sung has always emphasized that "the people in the northern half, being of the same nation, have the obligation and responsibility to

(57) *Time*, June 30, 1975, p. 14.

(58) Scalapino & Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 644.

(59) *The Korea Herald*, July 1, 1975.

(60) *The Korea Herald*, July 13, 1975.

(61) *Time*, June 30, 1975, p. 17.

(62) Professor Robert A. Scalapino's statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, May 4, 1972. Selig S. Harrison, "One Korea," *Foreign Policy*, Winter, 1974-1975, p. 42.

support and actively encourage the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle.”<sup>(63)</sup> North Korea has never changed its strategic objective of “communizing South Korea,” and “their demand is designed to bring about a military vacuum in the Republic of Korea.” Kim’s recent statement in Peking and the events in Indochina brought about sharp reactions from the Republic of Korea. In a special address to the nation, President Park Chung-Hee stated that North Korean communists are likely to be tempted to wage a revolutionary war against the Republic of Korea because they were encouraged by the Indochina debacle and warned the North Korean communists that a miscalculation on their part leading to military conflict would surely result in their “self-destruction.”<sup>(64)</sup>

Therefore, the security policy of South Korea is based on the defense of the fatherland from North Korea’s aggression. Institutionalization of peace in Korea thus has become the primary objective that the Republic of Korea desires to achieve through the dialogues with North Korea. The Republic of Korea believes that cultivation of the foundations of stable and lasting peace in Korea would be a cornerstone of the process of mutual accommodation and assimilations which would eventually lead to the realization of a peaceful reunification of the country. For this purpose a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the two sides.

If the balance of power between the North and the South in Korean peninsula should change then the North would be likely to initiate a full-

scale attack on the South immediately. For more than two decades the UNC or American troops in Korea have been an instrument for the preservation of the national security of the Republic of Korea. National security, as defined here, means nationse against direct and indirect threats from external sources to the nation’s stability.

In the case of Korea, the concept may be specifically defined as a national defense arrangement against the threat from the Communist North.

The presence of American troops in Korea is the cornerstone of national security for the South, because its function is to deter a North Korean invasion. To guard against this Washington has repeatedly tried to reaffirm its commitment to South Korea. President Ford’s trip to Seoul last November was a clear warning to the North not to test the American will. State Department, National Security Council and Pentagon officials have made trips to Seoul to assess the military situation.<sup>(65)</sup> Western experts also detect signs that North Korea’s allies in Peking and Moscow have both counseled Kim Il-Sung to proceed cautiously. Both communist superpowers evidently fear that a war in Korea would scuttle d’etente with the West and could drag them into a conflict with the U.S. that would a high potential of going nuclear.<sup>(66)</sup>

North Korea has never changed its strategic objective of communizing South Korea, and that their demand to remove the UNC is designed to bring about a military vacuum in the Republic

(63) Kim Il-Sung’s report to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker’s Party, Pyongyang, *Korean Central News Agency*, November 3, 1970.

Younghwon A. Kim, “Pyongyang’s Search for Legitimacy,” *Problems of Communism*, January-April, 1971, p. 38.

(64) *Rodong Shinmun*, April 19, 1975.  
*The Korea Times*, April 19, 1975.  
*The Korea Herald*, April 30, 1975.

(65) *Time*, June 30, 1975, p. 17.

(66) *Newsweek*, June 30, 1975, p. 7.

of Korea, The South claimed that the dissolution of the UNC would eliminate a principle party to the Armistice Agreement and virtually invalidate it. Therefore continuous operation of the United Nations Command in Korea was seen as essential and vital to national security. The recently announced proposal to the upcoming 30th General Assembly by the United States and Republic of Korea to dissolve the U.N. Command is regarded as a compromise proposal which would satisfy North Korean demands for the dissolution of the U.N. Command while, at the same time, replacing them by U.S. forces acting as a successor party capable of preserving the Armistice Agreement.<sup>(67)</sup>

According to United Nations Command calculation in 1953. North Korea committed 39 in fractions, in 1961 the number increased to 736 and jumped again in 1971 to 2,483. In 1974 the number of North Korean in fractions was placed at 4,985 and as of June 11, 1975 1,531 infractions had already been committed. To date 363 military Armistice Commission meetings have been held with the UNC requesting 95 (26%) and the North Koreans requesting the remainder.

Perhaps an examination of North Korea's policies in the defense area will give us some idea of the Korean security problems. From 1963 to 1973, the defense budget of North Korea amounted to 5.74 billion dollars vis-a-vis at the same time the South spent 2.76 billion dollars. Since the early part of the 1960's, North Korea has undertake a major program of military expansion, spending at least 30 per cent of its total budget for this purpose. A recent report listed North Korea as spending \$770 million on defense out of a \$3.5 billion gross national product in 1974 while South Korea spent \$558 million (FY 1974) out of a \$12.6 billion GNP

(1973).<sup>(68)</sup> North Korea's defense spending is probably the world's highest in proportion to the population and 13.9 per cent of GNP, and South Korea was 3.88 percent of GNP in 1973.

**Defense Budget of North-South Korea**  
(1963-1972) (unit: \$ million)

	Defense Expenditure	Military Aid	Total
South	2,757.1	2,581.0	5,338.1
North	5,740.0	795.1	6,535.1

With a people's militia numbering 1,300,000, Youth Guard of 700,000, a standing army of 470,000 equipped with modern weapons and a population of 15 million, this type of military posture makes it possible for Kim Il-Sung to declare that "North Korea constituted an impregnable bastion, with in depth fortifications sufficient to withstand even limited nuclear attacks."<sup>(69)</sup>

Therefore the people of the South fear an unprovoked attack should U.S. forces in Korea be withdrawn before the modernization of the South Korean army is successfully concluded.

The necessity for the maintenance of U.N. peace-keeping forces in Korea indeed remains undiminished in the face of increasingly bellicose maneuvers and provocations by the militant regime in the North against our Republic. Nevertheless, this Republic and the United States have notified the U.N. Security Council that they are willing to end the U.N. Command, which was established in 1950 to fight North Korean forces who invaded the South.

This decision by the Republic and the U.S. was made to avoid confrontation, in the upcoming U.N. General Assembly, between supporters of the South and the North over the problem of Korean unification, since such a confrontation

(67) *The Korea Times*, June 29, 1975.

(68) *The Military Balance*, 1974-1975, p. 56.

(69) Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

would be counter-conductive to the sustained offer to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula. In fact, the voluntary offer, on the part of the United States, to disband the U.N. Command, was a reluctant yet sacrificial move that is fully in keeping with previous U.N. resolutions, including the 1973 consensus statements, calling for the maintenance of peace and security in this area and urging both the South and the North to continue talks to expediate the peaceful unification of Korea.

North Korea is expected to demand an unconditional withdrawal of American forces from Korea this fall in the United Nations now that this Republic and the United States have agreed to voluntarily terminate the U.N. role in Korea. Pyongyang's logic, being that withdrawal of American troops from Korea will expediate the unification of Korea, might sound plausible only to those who are blind to the aggressive poise of the North against the South. As was well proven in South Vietnam, Pongyang wants to get the American war-deterrence force out of Korea to create and promote conditions favorable to the unleashing of a war of conquest against the South by military force and subversion. The militant regime in the North, while talking of "peaceful unification" abroad, is continuing to build up its military capability to attack the South including the tunneling of infiltration routes beneath the DMZ.

As Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, Commander of the U.S. forces in Korea, declared at a meeting with local business representatives on July 17, 1975, the U.S. and Korean forces stand ready to crush any aggression at the border in the event of a North Korean attack.<sup>(70)</sup> It is time that Pyongyang wake up from its anachronistic illusion that it can subjugate the Korean people

by force. We are determined to oppose communism to the end on top of the repeatedly reaffirmed commitment from the United States.<sup>(71)</sup>

## VI. Conclusion

The problems of security and unification on the Korean peninsula represent two sides of the same dilemma. Neither actor is willing to risk unification at the sacrifice of its own socio-political or economic system, while at the same time the wide gulf between the two systems suggests that it will be impossible to integrate them into a common frame work. The two parties will thus pursue policies which they believe will best protect their own interest even if such a course contributes little to the real dialogue of unification.

The Republic of Korea feels confident in its system to risk some degree of exposure and economic competition with the North. This accounts for her advocacy of a gradual step-by-step approach to the problem. She has proposed varied gradual measures to the North that were tension reducing in nature, only to have all of them rejected. The most important proposal of the South would allow for dual seating of both parties in the United Nations. The South saw such a move as another means of strengthening the forces of peace and not, as the North claims as a means of freezing the division of the country.

The North, on the other hand, is not as confident it consequently rejects any proposal which might unfavorably compare it to the South. As a result the North has engaged in a program of rapid militarization which it hopes to employ in an armed struggle with the South. In short, the North feels that the only means of implanting its system on the South is through war. To mask

(70) *The Korea Herald*, July 18, 1975.

(71) *The Korea Herald*, July 19, 1975.

its true intentions the North has proposed so-called 'peaceful measures' which it felt would be completely unacceptable to the South or would ultimately contribute to the military subversion of the South (i.e., immediate unification). On the rare occasions, when the South has accepted some Northern proposals, such as their proposal in the 1960's to exchange men and materials, the North has been forced to retreat and take a new position preventing the accomplishment of these gradual steps.

To date such activities have been frustrated by the presence of the United Nations Command in South Korea. The UNC has served the dual role of providing an actual deterrent force (troops as a signatory of the Armistice Agreement) and as a symbol of international support

for the Armistice. Should the UNC be removed and no successor named, the already dangerous situation on the peninsula would be greatly intensified. There is therefore a pressing need to preserve the military balance on the peninsula and avoid any actions which Pyongyang might interpret as a sign of an unwillingness to support the Armistice. The Republic of Korea remains dedicated to a peaceful unification of Korea despite the unwarranted, provocative acts of the Communist North.

The following months will be crucial to the preservation of peace in Northeast Asia and the upcoming debate in the United Nations General Assembly may well influence the outcome in favor of peace or a war that would threaten to involve the major nuclear powers.