

# Administrative Changes and Elite

## Dynamics: \* The Changes of the Patterns of Elite Mobilization and Integration in Korea

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### **I. Introduction**

#### **A. The Purpose of the Study**

One of the dominant characteristics of the contemporary world is rapid social change: changes in value orientation of the population, explosion of knowledge, galloping technology, environmental turbulences, expansion of international interaction, etc. In a modern society, problems arising out of rapid social change are coped with not only

through policies adopted by the government but also through actions taken by private institutions. But in developing countries, such problems are primarily the burden of the government. Therefore, how to increase the adaptation capacity of the government—that is, the problem-solving capacity of the government—is the most fundamental problem confronting developing countries.

In order for a government to meet these problems, it must expand its capacity for policy making and its ability to implement these policies,

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as well as making administrative structural-functional changes.<sup>(1)</sup> That is, the government should recruit new elites armed with new perspectives and knowledge who are oriented toward development and who are capable in problem solving.

Although the recruitment of new elites into governmental organizations in order to increase their adaptive capacities, this recruitment is not easy: not only is the resistance of the bureaucrats strong, but it is also difficult to identify development-oriented elites.<sup>(2)</sup> The pattern of interaction, and the mode of conflict between elite groups both inside and outside governmental organizations differ in their situations, and from country to country. Thus, the study of elite dynamics in developing countries must pay attention to social structural conditions in which elites could be fostered; administrative functional changes leading to new policies which must be created and executed by elites not in the government bureaucracy; changes in norms; behavior prevailing both inside and outside government organizations; and the changes in the doctrines of power elites. When studying Korean development in terms of administrative changes and elite dynamics, special emphasis was given to

the structural differentiations under which new elite groups could emerge and grow; the behavioral patterns of elite groups outside government organization changes of the power elites and changes of administrative function; changes of behavioral patterns of elites within the government bureaucracy; and the relationship between attitudes of newly recruited elites and administrative development.

## B. Major Concepts

Generally, elites are defined as those who participate in and exercise influence on the decision-making process.<sup>(3)</sup> In any society, there are three types of elite groups: power elite groups, task elite groups, and socio-sectoral elite groups.

*Power elites* are those who have power to make decisions which relate to the society's national goals and social values. Power elites are those in the core of the central government, those on the top of the party in power, and those who participate in setting national goals and in making decisions of major policies along with the chief executive of the central government.<sup>(4)</sup>

*Task elites* are those holding the responsibility

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- (1) In homogeneity society, the same structures perform uniform functions wherever they may be formed. However, in transitional society, resulting from overlapping of institutions and great social heterogeneity, results in striking incongruence between formally prescribed institutions and actual informal behavior.

"Under these circumstances, institutional or structural analysis is likely to produce disappointing results." F. W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

For these reasons, I would like to analyze the change of composing units of government organization and their attitudes as well as structural change of administrative system.

- (2) Development oriented elites are defined here as those who have positive attitudes toward change and future orientations. See Hahn-Been Lee, *Korea: Time, Change, and Administration* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), pp. 10-21.
- (3) See Carl Beck and James Malloy, *Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 203.

Also see H.D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets, What, When, How* (New York: Peter Smith, 1950), p. 3.

For the changes in elite structure, see Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1940), pp. 86-96.

- (4) Hahn-Been Lee, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2.

of administrative decision making, directing, and controlling the administrative function for effective and efficient implementation of the policies. Their positions are at the executive level of central government.

*Socio-sectoral elites* are those who play influential roles in the governmental decision making process. They are leading members of industry, business and finance, educational and research institutions, mass communication agencies, and other professional interest groups,

Government policies and their implementation are affected by the changes in the composition of elites who take part in the policy making and implementation processes.

While the changes of the composition of government elites are affected by elite mobilization patterns in a society, these patterns represent the future direction of policies and the capacity for implementation of these policies by a government.

*Mobility* as used here is a concept which implies vertical mobilization of elites within an organization, as well as horizontal mobilization among the different groups within a social system. In traditional society, horizontal mobility is almost impossible because of the lack of opportunities to foster elites outside the government bureaucracy. However, elites emerging in the course of structural differentiation of a social system could have the opportunity to move from private sectors to government organizations. In this sense, then, mobility implies both vertical and horizontal mobilization

of elites in a society.

## II. Elite Dynamics and National Development

### A. Differentiation and Integration of Social System

Development of a social system is considered as the differentiation of its sub-system and effective integration. Differentiation of the social structure implies the process where social sub-systems undergoing differentiation develop internally new organizational units, and major social and cultural activities are released from the traditional ascriptive ties, while sub-systems and social institutions are still interdependent and mutually complementary under the increment of differentiation<sup>(5)</sup>. If this definition is accepted, then there must be the question of what sub-system should take over the role of integration. As one of the four major functions of the social system described by Parsons<sup>(6)</sup>, the function of integration may be assumed here to be a function of the government in development countries. The four functions include maintaining, recognizing, integrating and promoting the activities of the population. The major characteristics of the traditional society are formalism and functional overlaps, but in a transitional society, structural-functional differentiation begins. In general, as further differentiation goes past a certain level, there emerges in various sub-system, capable elites who have new behavioral norms which give rise

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(5) S.N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (June 1964), pp. 376-377.

(6) T. Parsons indicated four major subsystems of a social system and its relative functions: adaptation function of economic system, goal setting and goal attainment function of political system, tension management and latent pattern maintenance of recreation and education systems, and the integration function. I assume here that a function of government could be the integration function. T. Parsons and N.J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 10-53.

Also, for the integration function of the administrative system, see E.S. Wengert, "The Study of Public Administration," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 36 (1942), p. 314.

to new institutions organized to solve problems in the major areas of the social environment. Thus, the differentiation process is assumed to be a process of setting up new norms or building institutions which could meet new social demands.<sup>(7)</sup>

Normative reorganization is required for successful differentiation, and this should be followed by separating facilities from ascriptive ties and providing opportunities to achieve functional differentiation; absorbing the differentiated units into the aggregate structure of the higher level; upgrading the norms which will regulate differentiated units to the higher and universal level; and expanding value orientations to justify the functionally differentiated units<sup>(8)</sup>. That is, successful differentiation is followed by effective integration.

As the result of successful differentiation and effective integration, we can see the emergence and growth of various social organizations in which elites are fostered. At the later development stages, they are involved in competitions and conflicts for sake of personal interests. But this competition and conflict is, essentially, required because of its reconciliatory or coordinative function, which could bring about significant influence on consistent development and growth.<sup>(9)</sup>

The reconciliatory or coordinative functions for integrating elites involved in conflicts vary with the type of social system—that is, whether it is an open or a closed social system. Under the closed system, conflicts are repressed and accumu-

lated, so they become more serious, usually bringing about social frustrations that will deepen social disintegration and instability. But under the open system, elites are allowed to express hostile contentions and public opinions, and questions are therefore opened for reconciliation making it possible to examine or change existing norms.

From the foregoing point of view, conflicts are interpreted as playing an integrative role or a role of social disintegration and instability, according to the type of social system<sup>(10)</sup>. In this sense, flexible systems are rather desirable in order to make it possible for elites from a variety of social sectors to have access to the center of the power mechanism, and their competing interests and ideas are likely to be reconciled without serious conflicts<sup>(11)</sup>.

Now we have come to see elite dynamics in the context of assumptions discussed above. Government bureaucracy in a traditional society was the monolithic organization which exercises most of the social functions, such as authoritative value allocation, the exercise of power, and control. Therefore, only elites at the top level of the bureaucratic hierarchy monopolized the power to execute these functions, and it is quite natural that vertical elite mobility within the organization was dominant with few exceptions. Elite mobilization, in terms of vertical and horizontal mobility, was relatively restricted.

The basis of recruitment, however, changed

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(7) S.N. Eisenstadt, "Institutionalization and Change," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No.2, April 1964, p.238.

(8) Talcott Parsons, "Some Conditions on the Theory of Social Change," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 26, No.3, 1961, pp.235-251.

(9) S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization, Protest and Change*(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966), pp.49-50.

(10) Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflicts*(New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 151-157.

Ralph Dahrendorf, "Toward Theory of Social Conflicts," *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. V., No. 2, June 1958, pp.179-183.

(11) David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), p.67.

gradually and diversified in the process of social differentiation as the society moved to the transitional stage. And thus, channels and organizations open to elites also multiplied, and routes and opportunities for recruitment by professional and social groups opened to those who were capable<sup>(12)</sup>.

For these reasons, in a transitional society, the opportunity to become a member of an elite group, and the growth of elites, became greater in proportion to the degree of differentiation of the social system. Unfortunately, however, the heritage of bureaucratic behavior patterns which prevailed in the traditional society, which was respected more than the others in terms of social prestige, remained unchanged. These, too, were the prevailing attitudes of the newly emerged elites in the sub-systems, the so-called socio-sectoral elites.

There are strong motives for socio-sectoral elites to seek the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities and to participate in governmental policy-making mechanisms or in centers of political mechanisms in order to realize their ideas or their power-oriented motives. On the other hand, there are other factors affecting and accelerating elites' power motives, which are found in groups primarily large-scale business organizations or professional interest groups. These organizations and interest groups have strong motives to put their members into responsible positions in the policy-making mechanism to promote their group's own interests.

Due to these factors, the tendency for elites to seek power in the transitional society is as strong

as in the traditional society. Consequently, it seems inevitable that conflict would arise between the professional bureaucratic elites and socio-sectoral elites. The direction and speed of development largely depends on the degree of the integration of developmental forces and resolution of the conflicts between elite groups.

## **B. Administrative Integration and the Patterns of Development**

It has been described that the pattern of elite mobility in developing countries, as well as in developed ones, is characterized by increasing mobility, multi-directional mobility, and accessibility even to top level executive positions of government organizations. Elite mobility, however, in the transitional society, especially horizontal mobility, largely depends on the orientation of doctrines and policies of the power and task elites in the government bureaucracy. National goals and policies for nation-building, and socio-economic policies, are crucially affected by the value orientations of elites at the top levels of government<sup>(13)</sup>. The behavior and attitudes of the leading members of a bureaucracy are regulated by and obliged to confirm the doctrines. In other words, priority of policies, behavior patterns and cohesiveness of elites within the government organization, and horizontal mobility of socio-sectoral elites toward government, are also greatly affected by the doctrines. Thus, the future of programs can be predicted by the doctrines<sup>(14)</sup>.

Therefore, it may be said that administrative

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(12) Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), pp. 42-69, 222-223.

(13) Hahn-Been Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-35.

Also, see Hahn-Been Lee, "Developmental Time, Development Entrepreneur and Leadership in Developing Countries," D. Waldo (ed.), *Temporal Dimensions of Development Orientation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 80-193.

(14) M.J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.) (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), pp. 108-109.

functions tend to vary with the goals which are set up. For example, when the administrative function is perceived to be that of maintaining legal order, the problem of legality is the dominant index for the administration. On the other hand, if the administration is perceived as a tool for achieving socio-economic development goals, effectiveness in administration and problem solving capacities are the main functions of the public administration, and there will follow functional expansion<sup>(15)</sup>.

It is easily understood that whether efficiency or effectiveness is emphasized in the process of goal attainment, expansion of administrative functions will inevitably follow. The expansion may be illustrated as follows: creations and increments of new policies and new programs for the goals and plans results in reform and innovation in existing organizations, or the establishment of new institutions, so as to provide effective and efficient achievement of the goals.

As a result of these functional expansions of the administration, the opportunity for newly emerged elites to be recruited into bureaucratic organizations significantly increases. However, if task elites in the policy-making mechanism of the existing bureaucracy have a strong inclination to maintain homogeneity, or to have high aspirations to monopolize higher positions, the opportunities for newly emerged elites to move from private sectors to government organizations are crucially confined.<sup>(16)</sup>

Thus, horizontal mobility may be affected by both doctrines and policy orientations of power and task elite groups, and the degree to which they are included to maintain compositional

homogeneity of their elite group.

Through this brief discussion it is shown that horizontal mobility is closely related to social differentiation, to motives of socio-sectoral elites toward government organizations, and to the need of social groups to participate in the government decision making process, while the government's integration forces of sectoral elites into government organizations is determined by the doctrines and goals of power elites, and the policies and program orientations of task elites.

In light of the assumptions presented in the preceding discussions, societies in the developing countries could be classified into four types by the characteristics of mobilization forces of socio-sectoral elites and integration forces into administrative systems. The four types are as follows:

Types of Society in Terms of Mobility and Integration		
Mobilization forces \ Integration forces	Low	High
	I	II
	High	IV

**Society Type I:** This is the society which is at a stage prior to social differentiation. It is not expected that elites will be found emerged in private sectors. Therefore, mobilization forces, if any, are quite weak. The major administrative function is to keep law and order, and control. Neither socio-economic development goals, nor new policies for development, are formulated. Therefore, the demand for new elites is quite low. This is the traditional society prior to breaking through the traditional ties.

**Society Type II:** This is the so-called "trans-

(15) Dong-suh Park, "Introduction to Public Administrative Theory in Korea," *Korean Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 5, No.1(G.S.P.A. Seoul National Univ., 1967), pp.52-53.

(16) Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development," *Political Development and Social Change*, Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable(eds.)(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp.334-336.

itional society." Under rapid societal differentiation, various elite groups emerge. These elites, grown through various societal sectors, still have strong power-oriented motives which were heritages from the traditional society. In addition, groups also have strong needs to make their demands heard in the policy mechanism. Therefore, horizontal mobilization forces are very strong while there is still strong resistance to socio-sectoral elites participating in the decision-making mechanisms. The reasons are because of the policy orientations of power elites, task elites whose major concerns are still law and order, and task elites which assert their ascriptive and homogeneity ties. Therefore, conflict between bureaucratic elites and socio-sectoral elites became inevitable, and were the cause of societal instabilities.

**Society Type III:** This is another sort of transitional society. The characteristics of this society are found in the fact that power elites and task elites with highly developmental orientations have strong motives for socio-economic development. They set up developmental goals and try to make policies and programs, and to implement them for goal attainment. However, these societies lack new elites with the ability to carry out the policies and programs, due to less differentiation of the social system and fewer opportunities to raise able intellectuals.

**Society Type IV:** In this society, vertical and horizontal mobilities are identical. Both strong mobilization forces and strong forces integrating into government are harmonized. In view of the characteristics of the society, it is expected to provide effective and efficient policies and programs, and to be able to implement them to achieve the developmental goals. This type of society is expected to realize rapid growth under political stability. The elites, however, should have development orientations, or be extremely able to execute their developmental goals. On this assumption, this

society can promote faster development with elite dynamics.

### III. The Emergence, Growth and Mobilization of Elites in Korea

After liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Korea was confronted with rapid changes in the form of political, social and economic turbulence. In fact, Korean history after her liberation could be labeled elite dynamics coping with and managing these changes in the context of environmental turbulence.

During the period from 1945 to 1967, there were three political regimes: the First Republic, Syngman Rhee's regime, from August 1945 to April 1960; the Second Republic, Chang Myun's regime, from May 1960 to May 1961 (including three months of provisional government immediately after the student revolution in April 1960); and the Third Republic, Chung-Hee Park's regime, after the military coup d'etat in 1961 and the general election of 1963. (Military government controlled the nation from May 1961 to the eve of the general election in 1963.)

The main focus of the Syngman Rhee regime was nation building, and national goals were national reunification and economic rehabilitation. During the Korean war from 1950 to 1953, most Korean industry and economic facilities were destroyed. Therefore, Syngman Rhee's regime concentrated its energy on reconstruction of the destroyed economic facilities, while the behavioral patterns of the people were rapidly changing under the inflow of western culture. Although the people's aspiration levels to government were increasing incrementally, the government could not adequately meet these demands because of the lack of developmental visions and programs, and because of a scarcity of capable elites armed with

managerial skills and developmental orientations. This failure to meet the demand was primarily due to a lack of organizations which could supply socio-sectoral elites, and to a lack of integral forces in the government.

Only a few enclaves which could foster elites were formed both within and outside the government organizations. These elites so fostered, however, played significant roles in Korea's development during the later period. In light of our development models, this period could be equated with "Society I."

Chang Myun's regime of the Second Republic was expected to meet adequately the people's aspirations, and to bring about social stability. However, this regime was unable to integrate developmental forces, and failed to settle social instabilities by government response. Of course, this regime was given only a short period of time to stabilize the society, even though many development plans and programs were devised and presented.

Park's military regime after the coup d'etat in May 1961 concentrated all of its energies to bring about social stability. It also attempted to devise future development plans through a five-year economic development program during this period, and tried to recruit socio-sectoral elites and management-oriented military elites into the government organizations to execute this five-year development plan.

At the 1963 general election, Park's regime was given the opportunity to carry out the development plans and programs. Socio-sectoral elites fostered during the latter period of the First Republic and the management-oriented military elites played significant roles in implementing these plans and programs. Social differentiation was in fact prompted by the successful execution of the first five-year economic development plan, and this in turn provided the opportunity to further foster

socio-sectoral elites and diffuse them all over the society. In the context of our developmental model, this period could be interpreted as "Society IV."

Through this brief and general outline of Korean political, economic and social changes, and the responses of government to these changes, we could find that there were some changes in the patterns of elite dynamics in the process of social differentiation and government roles as presented in Chapter II.

In Chapter III, main emphasis will be given to discovering the emergence, growth and mobilization of elites in the context of Korean societal differentiations. In Chapter IV, the principal focus will be on the analysis of changes of the doctrines and policies of each regime, and integration of socio-sectoral elites into the respective governments.

Finally, by the cross-combination of the facts found as a result of the above analysis, several hypotheses can be drawn out to show the validity of the developmental models presented in Chapter II.

## A. Research Design and Method

### 1. *The scope of the study*

The scope of this study was confined to economic aspects that is, the changes in national goals in terms of economic development, changes in economic development policies and programs, changes in the governmental structures to execute these policies and programs, changes in composition of bureaucrats to implement these policies and programs, the emergence and growth of elite groups in the various socio-economic sectors and their mobilization toward government organizations, etc.

This study also covers the thirteen years from 1955 to 1967, including three political regimes in Korea—that is, the Syngman Rhee regime, the



Chang Myun regime, and the Chung-Hee Park regime. For convenience in comparing subject matter, Syngman Rhee's regime is represented as the First Period, Chang Myun's regime as the Second, and Chung-Hee Park's the Third. First, the main focus of this study was on elites outside of government organizations whose activities and major concerns were closely related to the economic policy of each regime's government, and to the task elites of the government bureaucracy whose responsibilities were principally involved with economic policy making and its implementation. These served primarily as bureau directors, vice ministers, and ministers.

Second, government organizations were those related to economic affairs, such as the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Construction, the Council for National Economy and Science, and the Office of the Secretary for Economic Affairs to the President.

## 2. The research method

First, doctrines and major policies of the regimes were systematically analyzed with government documents. For data collection and analysis for socio-sectoral elites, three daily newspapers were selected among the ten newspapers available in the capital area according to criteria set out for the research, and each of the three has particular characteristics, such as critical, neutral and pro-governmental traditions. In addition to the three, one of the major daily economic newspapers, neutral in terms of its characteristics; four major monthly journals for public affairs; two official government monthly journals; and one monthly congressional journal were selected.

Second, in order to collect and analyze data for the task elites participating in policy formulation and decision making, personnel card files reserved

at the respective ministries and departments, and their statements of personal history were accessed and mobilized.

Through analysis of the newspapers and journals, it was possible to discover and screen the socio-sectoral elites and articles in which their attitudes and basic motives and actions toward the government's economic policy are presented.

Third, analysis of the personnel card files and their statement of personal history showed a great deal of understanding of the recruitment process, prior positions they held, and their policy orientations.

Fourth, in order to obtain data for policy changes, the recruitment process, basic motives for power, and dynamics within and without the government bureaucracy, questionnaires were distributed to task elites recruited from socio-sectoral groups, to those promoted from within the bureaucracy, to those retired from professional civil service, and to those retired from civil service who had held a responsible position in a socio-sectoral group before recruitment to the government. The questionnaire was supplemented with interviews.

Finally, in an effort to measure the validity of this study, each analysis was paralleled with a significant statistical test in sampling survey methods.

## 3. Sampling design

Through data analysis, elites who had presented articles in response to the governments's economic policy over the period covered in this study were found to be 456 in number. Frequency distribution of their responses is as in Table 1:

**Table 1.** Number of Socio-sectoral Elites and Frequency of Response  
Unit=Number of persons

Frequency	1	2	3	4 and above	Total
Number of respondents	258	68	43	87	456

Among this population of 456 persons, 87 persons who had presented not less than four times were selected as samples. This sample size guarantees the significant level of 0.9. Total task elites recruited from outside the government organization were 256 over the three periods. Among the 256 persons, 183 could be located, questionnaires were

distributed to them, and 136 replies were received. Therefore, this return rate also guarantees a significant level of 0.9, according to sample survey methods.<sup>(17)</sup>

Positions held before recruitment from private sectors to the government organizations are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Positions Task Elites Held before Recruitment from Private Sectors  
(unit=%)

Periods	I (1/55-4/60)	II (5/60-5/61)	III (5/61-12/67)	Total
Educational Institution	14.3 (1)	27.3 (3)	32.0 (8)	27.9 (12)
Business and Industry	28.6 (2)	18.1 (2)	40.0(10)	32.5 (14)
Bank and Finance	57.1 (4)	27.3 (3)	24.0 (6)	30.3 (13)
Other	0.0 (0)	27.3 (3)	4.0 (1)	9.3 (4)
TOTAL	100.0 (7)	100.0(11)	100.0(25)	100.0 (43)

Parentheses indicate no. of persons

## B. Structural Differentiation and Growth of Elite Groups in Korea

In the analytical view of structural differentiation, the major focus was on finding the degree of socio-structural differentiation in which elites grew. Also, analysis of structural changes in the economic system has been emphasized to find out what interactions exist between socio-sectoral elites in the economic sector and task elites in government organizations dealing with economic affairs. As comparative indicators, the relative importance

of industry was selected in view of the fact that industrial structural changes, from agricultural to manufacturing, are represented by the relative importance of each industry.<sup>(18)</sup>

The data analyzed showed structural changes in industry from the First Period(1955-59) to the Second (1960-61) to the Third(1962-67), indicating that although there was little change in the ratio of the social overhead capital and services field, agriculture, forestry and fishery decreased in ratio from 44.9%(at the First Period) to 41.4% (at the Second Period) and 41.1%(at

- (17) By the central limit theorem,  $z = \frac{p-P}{\sigma_p}$  is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance unity. From the normal area table we know that when  $Z=1.645$ , it corresponds to a probability of 0.9. Thus, we may write  $P(-1.645 < \frac{p-P}{\sigma_p} < 1.645) = 0.9$ , where unbiased estimator of  $V(p)$  is  $V(p) = \frac{pq}{n-1}$ . The required sample size  $n$  for a given precision  $d$  and reliability  $z$  is obtained as follows:

$$n = \frac{Nzpq}{Nd^2 + z^2pq} \text{ where } N = \text{population No.}, z = \text{reliability}, \text{ and } d = \text{precision.}$$

See Taro Yamane, *Elementary Sampling Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp.89-99, and W.G. Cochran, *Sampling Technique* 2nd (ed.) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), pp.71-77.

- (18) W. Leontief, *Input-Output Economic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp.44-67.

the Third Period). Mining and manufacturing increased from 11.9%(First) to 14.4%(Second) to 17.3%(Third)<sup>(19)</sup>.

This trend implies that the structural change of industry had moved from the primary industry stage to the secondary industry stage. That is, economic structural changes accompanying the change from the traditional type to a modern type of industrial system brought an impact on the social system: the social system underwent rapid differentiation.

With this trend in mind, it may also be indicated that there was more social differentiation at the Third Period than the First and Second Periods. Therefore, more social organizations in the private sector had been formed and matured enough to have promoted socio-sectoral elites in their organizations during the later periods.

Perhaps more significant about elite growths are the military organizations and their contributions: the Korean army, which numbered only 114,000<sup>(20)</sup> on the eve of the Korean War(June 1950), grew to 650,000 in number by 1954 and remained at that level in the 1960s<sup>(21)</sup>. This large scale military organization contributed to the resocialization of millions of youth, and produced management-oriented capable officers. Officers were trained with highly modernized management skills in the United States, as well as at various military educational institutions supported technically by the U.S. army authority in Korea. These management-oriented elites were recruited by private-sector organizations since the 1950. Therefore, it may be said that socio-sectoral elites grew out of the 1950s.

## C. Mobilization Forces of Elites

In previous assumptions, it was indicated that the basic factor which enhances the mobilization forces of socio-sectoral elites in developing countries is their power motive, which is as strong as those of elites in a traditional society. In order to verify these hypothetical assumption, attitudes toward governmental policies were quantitatively analyzed, since it seemed that internal motives might first be expressed in the form of opinions.

With this point of view, articles presented by 456 socio-sectoral elites in major daily newspapers, journals and quarterlies, were selected and screened with criteria set up in such a way that critical, neutral and supportable attitudes toward economic policies of the government could be measured. Total articles presented and screened in light of these criteria numbered 1,002.

Among the 824 articles, 81.8% of them were closely relevant to the presented economic policy issues. Frequency distribution of these articles during the three periods are disclosed in the table below.

**Table 3.** Total Number of Articles and Degree of Interest toward Policy

Period	Total No. of Articles (A)	Articles related to policy (B)	Policy In- terest [B/A(%)]
First(1/55-4/60)	367	288	78.5
Second(5/60- 5/61)	118	98	83.1
Third (6/61-12/67)	517	438	84.5
TOTAL	1002	824	81.8

It is quite clear that the degree of interest to-

(19) Bank of Korea, *National Income Yearbook*(Seoul: 1968), pp.18-19.

(20) Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea KMAG in Peace and War*(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), p.41.

(21) Editing Committee of Korean Military History, *The History of Korean Military*(Seoul: The Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, 1963), pp.190-191.

ward governmental policies in the socio-sectoral elites show a gradual increase in ratio in each period. Among the 456 socio-sectoral elite contributors 258 had presented articles once, 68 twice, 43 three times, and 87 four or more times during the entire period.

As mentioned above, 87 samples who had presented articles four or more times, were selected. Distribution of these 87 socio-sectoral elites over the three periods were as follows: 33 at the First; six at the Second; and 48 at the Third. Their policy interests are as shown in Table 4.

**Table 4.** Relative Intensity of Political Interest of Socio-Sectoral Elites

(Unit: persons)

Degree of Intensity	00—10	10—20	20—30	30—40	40—50	50—60	60—70	70—80	80—90	90—100	Total	Average ( $\bar{X}_i$ )
Period												
First Period (1/55—4/60)			1		1	1	4	9	6	11	33	79.4
Second Period (5/60—5/61)						1	1			4	6	83.3
Third Period (6/61—12/67)					1	1	7	5	11	23	48	86.4
Total Period			1		2	3	12	14	17	38	87	81.2

Note:  $\bar{X}_i = \frac{\sum f_{ij} x_{ij}}{N}$  where

$f_{ij}$  = Frequencies of  $j^{th}$  term in  $i^{th}$  cluster

$N$  = Total number of contributors during three regimes

$x_{ij}$  = Mean percentages of  $j^{th}$  term in  $i^{th}$  cluster

Interest of socio-sectoral elites toward government policies was very high—that is, 79.4% in the First Period, 83.3% in the Second Period, and 86.4% in the Third Period. It was also found that interest in government policies increase gradually.

Along with the trend, we should have an empirical look at what were the attitudes of 43 respondents to the questionnaire out of 108 who had been recruited to the government as a member of the task elite from socio-sectoral groups. Their responses were as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5.** Relative Intensity of Policy Interest of Task Elites transferred from Socio-Sectoral Elites

(Unit: %)

Period	First	Second	Third	Whole Period
Attitude	(1/55—4/60)	(5/60—5/61)	(6/61—12/67)	
a. Indifference to policy	28.6(2)	18.2 (2)	4.0 (1)	11.6 (5)
b. Positive opinion formation	28.6(2)	63.6 (7)	28.0 (0)	37.2(16)
c. Positive participation	28.6(2)	18.2 (2)	60.0(15)	44.2(19)
d. No response	14.3(1)		8.0 (2)	7.0 (3)
Total	100.0(7)	100.0(11)	100.0(25)	100.0(43)

Note: Number of respondents in parentheses

$\% = \frac{\text{No. of respondents to each item}}{\text{Total No. of each period}} \times 100$

Throughout the entire period(1950—1967), 11.6% of the respondents showed indifference to policy, 37.2% demonstrated the formation of opinion in an effort to make policy changes, and 44.2% of the respondents wanted to participate in the government organizations for better policy making.

By the data shown, it is difficult to demonstrate a considerable difference between the policy interests of the socio-sectoral elite and of those recruited from sectoral groups to the task elite, even though there are slight differences by 0.2% of interest to government policies, when the average policy interest 81.2% in Table 4 is compared with 81.4%(including 37.2% of positive attitude of opinion formation and 44.2% of positive attitude to participate) in Table 5.

Thus this is identical to the assumption that the power-oriented motives are still strong.

When the policy interest of task elites recruited from socio-sectoral elites is compared with the

interest of other socio-sectoral elites, the intensity of the former is significantly weaker than that of the latter in the First Period; but there was almost no significant difference in the Second and Third Periods. It seems to this writer that this relatively weak intensity of policy interest of task elites at the First Period indicates that there are other factors affecting elite recruitment from socio-sectoral groups into government organizations.

In addition, it is very significant to examine and compare the intensity of policy interest of the socio-sectoral elites from different backgrounds. Figures shown in Tables 6 and 7 will show this comparison.

Among the 87 elites screened, those in academic institutions showed higher numbers than the others, but as for intensity of policy interest, those in bigbusiness showed the highest figure, even though the differential range is not significant, as we can see in Table 7.

**Table 6. Backgrounds of Socio-Sectoral Elite Respondents**

Background	Academic Institution	Business and Industry Organization	Finance and Banking	Others	Total
No of Socio-sectoral elite	41	8	22	16	87
Percent	47.1	9.2	25.3	18.4	100.0

**Table 7. Intensity of Policy Interest with Respect to Socio-Sectoral Elites**

(Unit=persons)

Degree of intensity	00—10	10—29	20—30	30—40	40—50	50—60	60—70	70—80	80—90	90—100	Total	Average (%)
Fields												
Academic Institution					1		7	6	9	18	41	83.5
Business and Industry							1	1	1	5	8	87.5
Finance and Banking			1		1	2	3	4	5	6	22	76.8
Others						1	1	3	2	9	16	85.6
Total			1		2	3	12	14	17	38	87	81.2

See notes for Table 4

**Table 8.** Intensity of Policy Interest of Task Elites Recruited from Social Sectors

Recruited from Degree of intensity	Academic Institution	Business and Industry	Finance and Banking	Others	Total
Number recruited (A)	12	14	13	4	43
Positive response(B)	10	12	9	4	35
Percent (B/A)	83.4	85.7	69.2	100.0	81.4

The notable facts shown in Table 7 are relevant to those discovered in Table 8 when we examine the figures disclosed in the two tables.

The intensity of the policy interest of various groups within the socio-sectoral elites, discovered through content analysis of the articles, is compared for each of the three different political regimes in Table 9. As the figures show, those in business and industry have the most intense interest in government policies, academic elites are

next, and those in finance and banking the lowest, for all periods. When groups are compared within each period, business and industry show the highest, finance and banking next, and academics the lowest in the First Period(1955—1959). The same order goes for the Third Period(1962—1967). (Figures for the Second Period(1960—1961) are ignored here because the figures were too small to be compared.)

**Table 9.** Intensity of Policy Interest by Periods and Sectors

(Unit: %)

Period Social Sector	First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/60-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole Period
Academic Institution	76.5(13)	95.0(2)	86.1(26)	83.5(41)
Business & Industry	85.0 (2)	95.0(1)	87.0 (5)	87.5 (8)
Finance & Banking	76.7(12)	65.0(1)	76.1 (9)	76.8(22)
Others	83.3 (6)	75.0(2)	86.3 (8)	85.6(16)
Total	79.4(33)	83.3(6)	86.4(48)	81.2(87)

Note: Parentheses indicate number of persons

In view of figures in Table 9, it seems to this writer that elites of business and industry may be interpreted to be more power-oriented because of strong individual motives as well as group motives, as discussed in the preceding chapter. While, in cases of academic intellectuals, motives to convert their ideas(which mostly resulted from their beliefs, studies and research activities home and abroad during the 1950s) into policy had enhanced the intensity of their policy interests since the beginning of the 1960s.

In addition to the question of intensity, let us now take an analytical view of these articles in light of socio-sectoral elite attitudes toward policy

issues. Their articles were classified according to their attitudes, such as critical of, in support of, and neutral to governmental administrative policies, as suggested under "The research method."

The intensity of criticism is shown in Table 10. As a whole through the three periods, the degree of intensity was 52.3%, and this seemed fairly high.

In order to see the figures and trends in greater detail, comparing one with the other, we need to go further. Critical intensity was highest at the Third Period and lowest at the Second Period. Recalling the lowest intensity of policy interest at the First Period in Table 4, the critical

Table 10. Intensity of Policy Criticism in Each Period

(Unit=persons)

Intensity of criticism \ Period	00-10	10-20	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	Total	Average (%)
First Period (1/55-4/60)		3	3	6	4	8	3	2	4		33	49.5
Second Period (5/60/5/61)			4					1	1		6	43.3
Third Period (6/61-12/67)		1	5	4	7	12	10	2	7		48	55.2
Whole Period		4	12	10	11	20	13	5	12		87	52.3

See notes to Table 4

intensity of 49.5% seemed to me quite strong. This strong criticism suggests to me that critical opinions were being formed by socio-sectoral elites against the "doctrine" of power elites, which was oriented mainly toward maintaining law and order rather than socio-economic development.

In the Second Period, the intensity of policy interest of socio-sectoral elites was 84.4%, which was higher than that of the First Period, but intensity in terms of criticism was lower. The reason for this adverse trend may be that the power elites of the Second Period, even though they did have development plans and programs, did not have enough time to execute these policies.

During the Third Period, the intensity of policy interest was 86.4%, the highest, and the intensity of criticism was also the highest at 55.2%. These figures may be construed to show rising aspirations for socio-economic development, and positive actions motivated by both individual and group needs to participate in the policy conversion mechanism in the administration.

In Table 11 we examine the intensity of criticism by group background. It is difficult for us to find significant differences in intensity among some groups—academic, business, finance—but not elites of the "other" category. For example, elites from journalism and political parties showed more critical attitudes than those previously indicated.

Table 11. Intensity of Policy Criticism by Elites of Social Sectors

(Unit : persons)

Intensity of criticism \ Sectors	00-10	10-20	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	Total	Average (%)
Academic institutions		3	4	5	7	10	7	1	4		41	50.0
Business and Industry			2		3		1	1	1		8	51.3
Finance and Banking			6	3	1	5	2	2	3		22	50.5
Others		1		2		5	3	1	4		16	58.2
Total		4	12	10	11	20	13	5	12		87	52.3

See notes in Table 4

Through the above analyses, the growth of social groups, along with social differentiation and power-oriented motives of the socio-sectoral elites, were reviewed and examined in light of the theoretical assumptions.

Now we have come to the stage for review and examination of the factors involved in recruiting 43 task elites who had previously been socio-sec-

toral elites. This review and interpretation will be based on data acquired through distribution of the questionnaire.

First, it seemed to me very significant to discover what had motivated and pushed them to be recruited as a government task elite. Table 12 will help us draw some conclusions.

**Table 12.** Factors Involved in Recruitment in Each Period (Unit=%)

Factors	Period First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/60-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole Period
a. Capability recognized	57.1(4)	36.4 (4)	56.0(14)	51.1(22)
b. Recommendation by social group leader	28.6(2)	9.1 (1)	12.0 (3)	14.0 (6)
c. Recommendation of retired task elite			4.0 (1)	2.3 (1)
d. Proposal by power elite	14.3(1)	45.4 (5)	16.0 (4)	23.3(10)
e. Recommendation of party in power		9.1(1)	8.0 (2)	7.0 (3)
f. Others			4.0 (1)	2.3 (1)
Total	100.0(7)	100.0(11)	100.0(25)	100.0(43)

Note: Number of respondents in parentheses

$$\% = \frac{\text{No. of persons belonging to each category in each period}}{\text{Total no. of persons in each period}} \times 100$$

To the question, what is the major factor that made you recruited to the government? 51.1% of the respondents for the entire period replied that it was his individual capability recognized by the power elite. But it is difficult for me to believe this response on this point, because in the recruitment it seems that positive power-motivated activities were involved in view of our assumptions. As for the group push, it was incredibly weak(14%) in light of our assumptions.

Therefore, it may be a more honest interpretation to say that power-oriented elites, through "play politics," had been extended to any available channels, directly or indirectly, in view of the figures in this Table, such as "c," "d," and "e." Now, let us examine this in more detail.

During the First Period, "individual capabilities" as demonstrated by one's activities were a domi-

nant factor, and "group push" and "recommendations by the power elite" were next, respectively. These three factors should be interpreted realistically as having been caused by ascriptive or primary ties as well as individual merit or capability, if we pay careful attention to the characteristics of goal orientation and administrative behavioral patterns of the government elite.

In the Second Period, "proposal by the power elite" was the dominant factor, and "individual cause" came next. However, proposals by the power elite seem to be the outcome of recommendations by the party leaders, since the power elite was identical to the leaders of the party in power, the government being under the parliament cabinet system. Therefore, it is logical to add 9.1% of "party recommendation" to the figure of "power elite proposals."



In the Third Period, "individual capability," is shown as the dominant factor (56.0%), and "proposal by the power elite" is next. "Recommendations by party," "retired elites," and "others" should be included additionally to the figure of "power elite proposal" because core members of power elite consisted not only of top government leaders and retired elites in close contact with top executives, but also of leaders in the party in power, headed by the top executive. Therefore, 44% of the respondents may be assumed to have

been recruited through recommendation by the power and socio-sectoral elites in close contact with members of the power elites. Reviewing the figures for the whole period, it is hard to say that it is likely that socio-sectoral organization had exercised such a strong influence upon the horizontal mobility, which was expected from previous discussion of our assumptions.

In order to view factors disclosed in Table 12 in relation to the social backgrounds of respondents, we need to examine another table, 13.

**Table 13. Factors Involved in Recruitment by Social Sectors** (Unit=%)

Sectors Factors	Academic sector	Business & Industry	Finance & Banking	Others	Total
a. Capability recognized	66.7 (8)	57.2 (8)	38.5 (5)	25.0 (1)	51.1(22)
b. Recommendation by social group leader		21.5 (3)	23.1 (3)		14.0 (6)
c. Recommendation by retired elite		7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
d. Proposal by power elite	16.7 (2)	7.1 (1)	30.7 (4)	75.0 (3)	23.3(10)
e. Recommendation by party in power	16.7 (2)		7.7 (1)		7.0 (3)
f. Others		7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
Total	100.0(12)	100.0(14)	100.0(13)	100.0 (4)	100.0(43)

Note: Number of respondents in parentheses

$$\% = \frac{\text{No. of persons belonging to each factor in each sector}}{\text{Total number of persons in each sector}} \times 100$$

As shown in Table 13, the majority of those from the academic sector were recruited for their recognized capability. For task elites recruited from business and industry, too, personal capability was the dominant factor. But recommendations by the socio-sectoral leader also contributed significantly to the recruitment of those from business and industry.

Group influence was also quite strong over horizontal mobility, showing contrast with the related figures in Table 12. Group influence was also indicated in the case of finance and banking, where proposals by the power elite were higher than in any other sector. A significant proportion

of proposals by power elites was found in this sector compared to individual capability, as contrasted with other sectors.

As a whole, the list of priorities of major factors for recruitment are, in order, as follows: individual capability, proposal by a power elite, recommendation by socio-sectoral leader, etc. The group influence, as an interest group activity in the administrative process in the modern sense, was on the increase in its activities.

Now, this is the point to make an overall evaluation of the mobility forces of socio-sectoral elites, with reference to findings as interpreted from the above tables.

As illustrated in Table 14, the degree of social differentiation over the whole period was not remarkable and the social group's efforts to push their elite into the policy mechanism was also weak. During the First Period, elites were mainly promoted in organizations such as the Bank of Korea, the Industrial Bank of Korea, and the Committee of Industrial Development, which are under government control operatively<sup>(22)</sup>.

During the Second Period, elites were promoted in the same organizations as in the First Period, while there was an obvious increase of group activity to push elites of their group into the policy-making mechanism. However, these groups were political parties in opposition to the Syngman Rhee regime during the First Period.

Social differentiation, which was progressing at a very slow pace during the First and Second Pe-

riods, became accelerated during the Third Period. Therefore, industrial organizations seemed to take positive steps to push their elites into governmental economic organizations. However, elites rising up through the enclaves under government influence as well as in the private organizations seemed to have strong power motives toward the power mechanism. It seemed that mobility forces of the socio-sectoral elites originated principally from power-oriented motives. The relative intensity of mobility forces in the socio-sectoral elites toward the policy making mechanism could be indicated in the following order: strong during the First Period, stronger during the Second Period, and the strongest during the Third Period.

Through the whole period, mobility forces were relatively strong. Table 12 and 13 are summarized in Table 14.

**Table 14.** Mobility Motives of the Socio-sectoral Elites

Period	Motive Differentiation of socio-economic system and growth of socio-economic organizations	Group input activity(elite)	Individual power-directed motives	Overall evaluation (mobility forces)
First Period (1/55—4/60)	Fused	Very weak	Strong	Mobility forces were originated from individual motives
Second Period (5/60—5/61)	Little differentiation	Very weak	Stronger	The same as above
Third Period (6/61—12/67)	Differentiation for take-off	Weak	Strongest	The same as above

## IV. Change in Policy Orientation and the Integration of Elites

### A. Change in Doctrines and Policies in Korean Government

It has been previously assumed that the administrative function varies according to the change in the orientation of the doctrine and policy of

the power elites. The doctrine of the power elite group determines the norms which make the future images of the country clear, and make it possible to project the future. The doctrine plays a role as a criteria by which goals and priorities of policies are determined. Therefore, all of the political leaders have a doctrine and use it as a means to gain support.<sup>(23)</sup>

In this point of view, it is quite natural that

(22) Suck-Joon Cho, "Economic Planning," Hahn-Been Lee et al. (eds.), *Historical Analysis of Korean Government Administration* (Seoul: Korean Research Institute of Public Administration, 1969), p.411.

(23) M.J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," J.D. Montgomery and William

policy orientation would vary with variance in doctrine, and that the substance of programs and projects will also vary with policy orientations. Thus, administrative functions change subject to doctrines and policies of power elites.

In this logical context, doctrines of the power elites under the three periods, and program changes closely related to integration forces of socio-sectoral elites, will be analyzed in this chapter.

### 1. Doctrine of power elites

In order to extract doctrines of the power elites, presidential messages to congress were adopted because they reflect major governmental policies for the coming years. Content of the presidential messages was analyzed and categorized in terms

**Table 15.** Changes of Doctrines in Terms of Policy Priority

(unit=%)

Period Doctrine	First <sup>1</sup> (FY 55—59)	Second <sup>2</sup> (FY 60)	Third <sup>1</sup> (FY 64—67)
Diplomacy & Defense	32	18	15
Economics	35	42	50
Social and Educational Problems	8	8	12
Public Administration	12	15	6
Other areas	10	17	17
Total	100	100	100

1. Figures for the First and Third Periods are cited from *Elite and Economic Programs in Korea, 1955—67*, by In-Jung Whang, Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1968, p.29.
2. Figures for Second Period are quantified in accordance with analytical method used in above thesis. The messages are those of 1960 and Jan. 1961.

of such policy areas as foreign relations, national defense and security, national economy, social problems and education, public administration, and other areas as shown in Table 15.

During the First Period, the major emphasis of the power elite was on economic reconstruction in search of the status quo, and for economic aids from the United States. Although the major emphasis of their policies was on economic development, the category of diplomacy and defense was similarly emphasized to promote and secure more favorable support from the United States to this country. The main characteristic was lack of development orientations and efforts of the power elite for self-supporting economic development.

During the Second Period, however, economic policies were given first priority, interpreted as a rapid growth in economic development was the major concerns of the power elite. The power elite were the leaders of the opposition party under the First Period. Actually there was a process of self-sufficient economic development planning.<sup>(24)</sup>

During the Third Period, self-sufficient economic development policy was emphasized more than ever before. These figures were found in the words, expressed with so much frequency in the messages, "promotion of productivity," "export," "construction," etc.<sup>(25)</sup>

In view of the change in policy priority, orientations of the power elites of the three periods are summarized with their characteristics as follows: maintenance of the status quo, and law-and-order oriented doctrines were characteristic of the First Period; economic development-oriented doctrines were dominant over the Second and Third Periods. Therefore, we can find a tendency that the administration was perceived as a tool for

Siffin(eds.), *Approaches to the Development: Politics, Administration and Change*(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp.73-78.

(24) Presidential Message to Congress of FY 1960(Seoul, Korea).

(25) Presidential Message to Congress of FY 1965, FY 1966 and FY 1967(Seoul, Korea).

socio-economic development by the power elites since the Second Period.

## 2. Policy orientations

It is a common practice that the doctrine of the power elite is usually expressed in major policies. In this study, changes of major economic policies

will be reviewed with respect to the changes in economic plans, economic laws and regulations, programs and projects, and administrative organizations, as shown in Table 16. The following figures are derived from an intensive study of Korean administration.

**Table 16.** Changes in Priorities of Economic Policies

Period	Economic Plan	Economic law and program	Project	Total	Length of Period (months)
First Period (1/55—4/60)	0.32(20)	0.37(23)	0.21(13)	0.88(56)	63
Second Period (5/60—5/61)	0.50 (7)	0.78(11)	0.36 (5)	1.64(23)	14
Third Period (1961—1967)	0.28(22)	0.58(47)	0.23(18)	1.11(87)	79
Average over three periods	0.31(49)	0.51(81)	0.24(36)	1.06(166)	156

Note: Number of each item in parentheses; plan, law and program, and project.

$$\text{Index Numbers} = \frac{\text{No. of each item in each period}}{\text{Total No. of months in each period}}$$

Indexes of the Second Period were highest over the three periods, and those of the Third Period were next. However, when we take into account that plans, laws and programs, and project are

**Table 17.** Structural Changes of the Central Government Organization Concerning Economic Affairs and Overall Organization (Unit=1. Frequency 2. Frequency/month)

	New Institution(A)		Reformed(B)		Abolished		A+B	
	Total	Economic	Total	Economic	Total	Economic	Total	Economic
<b>First Period</b>								
Times	5	5	5	1	2	1	10	6
Times/mo.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.16	0.10
<b>Second Period*</b>								
Times	3(9)	1(7)	1(3)	0(2)	3(7)	0(3)	4(12)	1(9)
Times/mo.	0.21(0.64)	0.08(0.50)	0.08(0.21)	0.00(0.16)	0.21(0.50)	0.00(0.21)	0.29(0.86)	0.08(0.60)
<b>Third Period</b>								
Times	12	8	10	6	3	2	22	14
Times/mo.	0.15	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.28	0.15
<b>Whole period*</b>								
Times	20(26)	14(20)	16(18)	7(9)	8(12)	3(6)	36(44)	21(29)
Times/mo.	0.13(0.17)	0.08(0.13)	0.10(0.12)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.08)	0.02(0.04)	0.23(0.28)	0.12(0.18)

Note: 1. Parentheses include planned changes without implementation

2.  $\frac{\text{No. of changes of each item in each regime}}{\text{No. of months during which each regime governed}} = \text{Frequency per month}$

taken in turn without consideration for their size and scope of implementation, indexes of the Third Period become the highest over the three periods.

Therefore, it may be more fair to say that administrative functions in the Third Period were the most development-oriented, in terms of socio-economic development through effective policy-making and implementation, and those of the Second Period as the next. These become more clear when changes of administrative organizations of the central government are analytically examined in Table 17.

Table 17 indicates that organizational changes, such as new organization building, abolishment and reorganization, had the highest frequency during the Third Period, and second highest during the First Period. However, when we consider the number of changes planned which did not have the chance to be implemented because of the "coup d'etat," the Second Period should replace the First Period in order, that is, as the Second highest. Even when we focus our attention toward organizational changes only for economic administration as a whole, we may find the same

tendencies as indicated above. But when we focus on the lengths of the political regimes, and take into account planned changes without implementation, there was much more new organization building and reform during the Second Period than during the other two periods.

However, in the substantial changes of economic administrative organization, the figure indicates that during the Third Period there were the most frequent changes, and the next most frequent changes were during the First Period. But in view of new organization building, it is difficult to find any differences between the First and the Second Periods as the figure indicates. The most important fact in the table is that there were more new organizations built than either organizations reformed and abolished during the Third and Second Periods, and that the number of organizations built is equivalent to the number reformed during the First Period.

In order to find out the major cause of the characteristics of the changes in central government organizations, and especially the economic administrative organization, during the three pol-

**Table 18.** Changes in Doctrine, Policy-Orientation, Administrative Structures, and Administrative Functions

	Doctrines of power elite groups	Policy Orientation	Administrative Structure	Administrative Function
First Period (1/55—4/60)	Nation building and law and order maintenance	Foreign support and status quo	a. Simplification b. Integration c. Superiority of law and order, maintenance of organization	Maintenance of system and law and order
Second Period (5/60—5/61)	Economic development	Economic development	a. Goal oriented b. Differentiation and increasing No. of new organizations c. Superiority of economic policy organization	Planning of economic development
Third Period (6/61—12/67)	Economic development	Self-dependent economic development and growth	a. Goal oriented rationality b. Expansion, differentiation, and increasing No. of org. c. Superiority of economic policy organization	Expansion of socio-economic development function

itical regimes, we must review the characteristics of the changes in doctrine, policy orientation, administrative structures, and administrative functions during the three political regimes. These will also provide insight into administrative functional changes in Korea. Table 18 is a brief summary of the changes in doctrine, policy orientation, administrative, and functions in each regime, discovered through analysis in this section. The following table summarizes preceding findings.

During the First Period, the doctrine of the power elite was directed toward nation-building and its management. Therefore, dominant policies emphasized the maintenance of the status quo—that is, maintaining law and order rather than socio-economic development. Also, the attitudes of the power elite were quite dependent on foreign aid for national economy and support<sup>(26)</sup>.

Accordingly, administrative structures for policy implementation were organized along with principles of simplification rather than effectiveness. Therefore, the policy staff, from memory bank to power elite, was reduced and integrated into quite a small force, far from functional rationality in terms of decision-making and control. On the other hand, administrative structures such as the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and home affairs, which held the function of maintaining law and order, were given more administrative power than those socio-economic ones.

During the Second Period, the doctrine was shifted from that of the First Period to one centered on economic development. Administrative structures were also directed to, and reformed for, principles of efficiency and effectiveness in order to implement developmental goals, even though administrative heritages from the First Period still

carried over.

However, it is important that there were a great many attempts to build up new organizations to implement a large number of policies, plans and programs. During this period, even though the regime did not have time enough for implementation of the new ideas and policies, administrative structures for socio-economic policies were given more powerful authority than the other agencies of the central government.

During the Third Period, the doctrine was directed toward socio-economic development policies, too—economic development in terms of self-support. As a result, the administrative structure was differentiated and expanded in scale and number. The principles of efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative function, in terms of management science, were emphasized.

Those structures directly related to socio-economic development policy were given a stronger authority in the decision-making process than any others in the central government. As a result of this developmental movement, government administration was perceived by the power elite and higher bureaucrats of government as a tool for socio-economic development of Korean society for the first time in Korean history.

## **B. Interaction and Integration of the Elites**

It was assumed previously that integration of socio-sectoral elites into governmental bureaucracy depended primarily on two factors: the power elites' orientations in terms of doctrine and administrative function on the one hand, and intensity of the degree of homogeneity in the existing task elites—that is, resistance to or flexibility of hori-

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(26) Suk-Joon Cho, "Analysis of Korean Government Structure," Hahn-Been Lee et al. (eds.), *Historical Analysis of Korean Government Administration* (Seoul: Korean Research Institute of Public Administration, 199), pp. 422-431.  
Also, see Hahn-Been Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-20.

zontal mobility—on the other hand. We have examined, in the former section, changes of doctrines, policy orientations, and administrative functions of the respective political regimes.

In this section, we will analyze the degree of

homogeneity of task elites in each period, which was closely connected with and which made an impact upon horizontal mobility in the context of the developmental assumption presented in Chapter II.

**Table 19.** Degree of Emphasis on Homogeneity by Task Elites

(Unit=%)

Period Orientation	First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/60-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole period
Closed	69.2(18)	75.0(12)	64.7(33)	67.7(63)
Open	30.8 (8)	25.0 (4)	35.3(18)	32.3(30)
Total	100.0(26)	100.0(16)	100.0(51)	100.0(93)

Note: Number of persons in parentheses

As shown in Table 19, the degree of homogeneity feelings among existing elites arising through military organization and government bureaucracy was generally strong. The strongest homogeneity feelings were found in the Second Period, while the weakest ones were in the Third Period.

When strong homogeneity feelings prevailed, the governmental bureaucracy might be subjected to the closed system. Therefore, it is difficult to expect efficient and effective developmental administration, due to a lack of capable elites. When the feelings are relaxed, the bureaucracy might be an open system, which we might expect to promote horizontal mobility of sectoral elites. Thus, such

type of bureaucracy might increase their potential capacities by absorbing capable elites armed with new management skills and insight.

When task elites promoted in the government bureaucracy are compared with those recruited from private sectors, the former were stronger in homogeneity ties than the latter. This means that the intensity of homogeneity feelings working against horizontal mobility became weakened gradually in the course of increasing horizontal mobility. This, in turn, changed the administrative functions from maintaining law and order to performing development goals effectively and efficiently.

**Table 20.** Intensity of Homogeneity among the Task Elites Recruited from Social Sector

(Unit=%)

Period	First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/60-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole Period
Closed	57.1(4)	54.5 (6)	60.0(15)	58.1(25)
Open	42.9(3)	45.5 (5)	36.0 (9)	39.6(17)
No response	-0-	-0-	4.0 (1)	2.3 (1)
Total	100.0 (7)	100.0(11)	100.0(25)	100.0(43)

Note: Parentheses indicate number of persons

The intensity of homogeneity ties by backgrounds of all task elites, including government professionals and those recruited from the private

sector, is shown in Table 21.

Through the entire period, homogeneity feelings were strongest among the task elites promoted

through government organizations, and weakest among task elites promoted through military organizations. Other task elites promoted through business, banking and academic organizations were

moderate in intensity of homogeneity feelings.

Task elites from the military showed the direct converse—that is, flexible or weak feelings in terms of intensity of homogeneity of 46.2%.

**Table 21.** Intensity of Homogeneity of Task Elites by Background before Recruitment

(Unit=%)

	Government Office	Military	University & Research ins.	Industry & Business	Banking & Finance	Others	Total
Open	71.2(57)	46.2 (6)	58.4 (7)	57.2 (8)	53.8 (7)	75.0 (3)	64.7(88)
Closed	28.8(23)	53.6 (7)	33.3 (4)	42.8 (6)	46.2 (6)	25.0 (1)	34.6(47)
No response	-0-	-0-	8.3 (1)	-0-	-0-	-0-	0.7 (1)
TOTAL	100.0(80)	100.0(13)	100.0(12)	100.0(14)	100.0(13)	100.0 (4)	100.0(136)

Parentheses indicate number of persons

When comparing each period with the other, homogeneity feelings were strongest in the First Period and weakest in the Third Period, as shown

in Table 22. The degree of intensity of homogeneity feelings was on the decrease incrementally.

**Table 22.** Homogeneity of Whole Task Elites by Period

(Unit=%)

	First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/65-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole Period
Open	69.7(22)	66.7(18)	63.2(48)	64.7(88)
Closed	30.3(11)	33.3 (9)	35.5(27)	34.6(47)
No response	-0-	-0-	1.3 (1)	0.7 (1)
TOTAL	100.0(33)	100.0(27)	100.0(76)	100.0(136)

Parentheses indicate number of persons

We could summarize the above analysis in Table 23. Over the First Period, major administrative functions were perceived as being the maintenance of law and order, because of the doctrines centering on nation-building and maintaining law and order. The homogeneity feelings of bureaucrats were stronger than in any other period. Due to these factors, elite integration and horizontal mobility were very weak.

During the Second Period, the administrative function was in rapid and great change as the doctrine was directed toward economic development until the eve of the military coup d'etat. The feeling of homogeneity was relatively strong as most task elites were recruited from party members in power. Therefore, elite integration by

the government became inevitably weak.

During the Third Period, the doctrine of the power elites was development-oriented. Thus, the administrative function for economic policy was expanded with efficiency and effectiveness. During this period, horizontal mobility and integration of the elites by the government was relatively active and strong. Therefore, the intensity of homogeneity became relatively weak—that is, flexible to horizontal mobility.

So far, we have examined the elite mobility pattern and integration forces of the respective political regime in context of changes of doctrine, policy, and characteristics of the bureaucracy in terms of the task elite's homogeneity feelings.



**Table 23.** Elite Integration Forces by Government Administration

	Doctrines of power elite group	Administrative function	Intensity of homogeneity of task elites	Elite integration forces by administration
First Period (1/55-4/60)	Nation building and law and order maintenance	Maintenance of the system and law and order	Strong	Weak
Second Period (5/60-5/61)	Economic development	Trial of economic development	Relatively strong	Relatively weak
Third Period (6/61-12/67)	Economic development	Expansion of administrative function for economic development	Relatively weak	Relatively strong

**Table 24.** Situational Characteristics of the Government at Time of Task Elite's Recruitment from Social Sectors (Unit=no. of persons)

	First (1/55-4/60)	Second (5/60-5/61)	Third (6/61-12/67)	Whole Period
Change of political regime	1(14.3)	9(81.8)	10(40.0)	20(46.5)
Lack of policy expert in related department or ministry	4(57.1)	1 (9.1)	7(28.0)	12(27.9)
Organizational reform	-0-	-0-	2 (8.0)	2 (4.7)
Crisis of political regime	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Normal personnel recruitment or change	2(28.0)	1 (9.1)	6(24.0)	9(20.9)
Total	7(100.0)	11(100.0)	25(100.0)	43(100.0)

Parentheses indicate percentages

Now it seems very significant in light of our theoretical assumptions to see what condition or situation in the government caused greater recruitment of socio-sectoral elites.

Throughout the entire period, as shown in Table 24, the largest number of elites were recruited after a political regime change, the next highest was due to a lack of capable policy experts, normal personal recruitment third and during organizational reform the least number. It was characteristic for socio-sectoral elites to be recruited more(in number) after the change of political regime, in general.

However, when comparing the respective periods, during the First Period a lack of capable policy experts was the first condition for recruitment, and normal personnel recruitment the next.

During the Second Period, change in the political regime was indicated as the first condition for

recruitment, while lack of policy experts was shown as last.

During the Third Period, change in the political regime was illustrated as the first case, and lack of policy experts was the second.

Therefore, during the Second and Third Periods, most of the task elites were recruited after the change of political regimes, while during the First Period, a lack of policy experts was the dominant cause for recruitment.

Finally, it must be pointed out that during the Third Period, the number of task elites recruited had the tendency to increase under the normal situation, which was interpreted as implying stability of the political regime.

The backgrounds of the task elites prior to being recruited into the government are shown in Table 25. More than half of the task elites during the entire period were recruited from government

and military organizations. Those from university and research organizations, industry, and business and banking organizations were less than half.

During the First Period, the majority were promoted from within the government bureaucracy, whose orientations were mainly the maintenance of law and order.

During the Second Period, those recruited from various social sectors were in the majority in contrast to the case of the First Period. Most of the elites recruited from outside government organizations were promoted in the political party organization, the reason being that the system of government in the Second Republic was the parliamentary cabinet system.

During the Third Period, task elites from social

sectors that is, not from the government bureaucracy were in the great majority, as in the case of the Second Period. The number of task elites shifting from military organizations reached 18.8 %, mainly due to this being a regime resulting from a military coup d'etat.

One notable fact was that the number of task elites promoted from within the government bureaucracy tended to decrease during the Second and Third Periods, in contrast to the number of task elites from universities, and industry and business organizations, which were on the increase over the Second and Third Periods.

Finally, it should be noted that recruitment patterns shifted to multiple areas in social sectors during the entire period in Korea.

**Table 25.** Major Backgrounds of Task Elites Prior to Recruitment to Government

(Unit=%)

	First (1/55—4/60)	Second (5/60—5/61)	Third (6/61—12/67)	Whole Period
Government officer	70.1(54)	37.3(13)	36.2(53)	46.9(120)
Military	1.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	18.8(27)	10.9 (28)
Academic and research organizations	7.8 (6)	8.6 (3)	13.3(19)	10.9 (28)
Industry and business	3.9 (3)	8.6 (3)	12.6(18)	9.4 (24)
Banking and finance	13.0(10)	14.3 (5)	10.5(15)	11.7 (30)
Others	3.9 (3)	31.4(11)	8.6(12)	10.2 (26)
Total	100.0(77)	100.0(35)	100.0(144)	100.0(256)

Parentheses indicate number of persons

## V. Conclusion

Development could be assumed to be socio-structural differentiation and its successful integration. In fact, socio-structural differentiation could make it possible to form foundations on which a variety of social elites are promoted, and through which the energies of these elites could be directed into developmental forces of a society. However, if a society failed to integrate these energies to achieve the goals of their society, the formation of a variety of elite groups might cause increased

conflicts between these elite groups, and could deteriorate social stability.

Therefore, the main function of governmental administration should be the integration function, which could identify the development-oriented elites promoted through these various socio-sectoral organizations, and recruit them into the government organization so as to direct their energies into developmental goals.

The main focuses of this study are elite dynamics between socio-sectoral elites and government task elites during the conversion processes from

the one category into the other in developing countries. In this context, conceptual analytical frameworks, to analyze the elite dynamics in

terms of mobilization forces of socio-sectoral elites toward government organizations and integration into government, were set up as follows:

### A Conceptual Frame of Derterminants of Elite Dynamics

Major Variables	Determinant factors
Mobilization force	(1) Growth of elite groups by social differentiation (2) Input forces of socio-sectoral organizations for their interests (3) Power motivations of socio-sectoral elites
Integration force	(1) Developmental goals determined by the doctrines of power elites (2) Perceived functions of administration in achievement of their developmental goals (3) Resistance of task elites originated by the homogeneity ties

Through analysis of the subject matter over the three political regimes with the above conceptual framework, the major findings could be summarized as follows:

#### *The First Period(January 1955—April 1960)*

Social structure was not differentiated enough to have institutionalized social organizations with autonomy in social sectors which could affect significantly the government decision-making process. Therefore, horizontal mobilization of elites into government was characterized by those elites from a very limited number of organizations, such as banks, special advisory committees within the government, and universities. The task elites from social sectors participated in the decison-making process without significant innovative ideas, and their power motives were very strong.

The doctrine of the power elite was to maintain legitimacy, law and social order. Thus, the policy orientations were directed to maintain the status quo. The intensity of homogeneity ties among task elites was very strong, strong enough to resist against horizontal mobility. Therefore, the bureaucracy weakened governmental recruitment opportunities. The gap between strong power motives of the socio-sectoral elites and the rigid bureaucracy came to cause of economic deterioration

and social instability, and the lack of development-oriented policy makers and inadequate administrative functions in the changing society brought about a government stalemate and crisis. These same facts also caused the government to provide few opportunities for socio-sectoral elites to participate in government at the later stage in this period.

#### *The Second Period(April 1960—May 1961)*

This period was not long enough for its social-structural change and growth of social organization to be compared with the same in the First Period. Power motives of socio-sectoral elites were still strong. the doctrine of the power elites shifted from a nation building, law and social order focus to one of economic development in terms of policy priority. Therefore, there were great changes in policy orientations. Attitudes of task elites were weakened little as far as homogeneity feelings go, which means a little flexibility of rigid bureaucracy. Therefore, governmental recruitment opportunities were increased a little. But most of the opportunities were given to those promoted in the political party in power, with very little opportunity to those of socio-sectoral groups.

Even though integral forces of elites from out-

side of government into government organization was strong, the regime was too short to recruit many of those outside elites.

*The Third Period (May 1961–December 1967)*

During this period, differentiation of social structure was most significant. Although input from social sectors was increased compared with the former two periods, mobilization forces still originated mainly from the power motives of elites.

Elite integration forces into government were the strongest of the three periods. The doctrine of the power elite, which emphasized more economic development and policy orientation, was also the result of the development goals. Accordingly, the administrative function was emphasized for economic growth. Therefore, the attitude of the task elite, in terms of homogeneity ties and rigid bureaucracy, became significantly weakened. In this sense, socio-sectoral elites which arose through the socio-sectoral organizations were given a greater opportunity to participate in, and contribute to, policy making.

Throughout the entire period, elites arose through a variety of socio-sectoral organizations by incremental differentiation of the society. They had strong power motivations when the input activities of the socio-sectoral organizations were relatively weak. Meanwhile, integration forces incrementally increased, due to the change of doctrines from nation-building to economic development, and to the incrementally decreasing homogeneity feelings among the task elites.

Based on the findings in this study, the following hypotheses can be derived and used as a basis for further analysis:

1. In the situation of rapid social change and urgent need for economic development, there is

a strong tendency for elites which arose out of the socio-sectoral groups to emerge in the process of social change to participate in the policy-making mechanism as a task elite.

- a. Elites arising through socio-sectoral groups have strong power motives.
- b. In general, elites who were critical at the early stages of social change tend to participate in the center of the policy-mechanism at a later stage.
- c. The stronger the homogeneity feeling among existing elites, the stronger the resistance to horizontal mobilization of elites from social sectors to the government organization, and the deeper the conflicts between those two elite groups.
- d. The deeper the conflicts between task elites and socio-sectoral elites, the more possibilities exist for political instability.

2. The more the power elites perceive the administration as a tool for the achievement of development goals, and the more they urge goals be adaptive, the faster the administrative function is expanded and the weaker the resistance of existing task elites to horizontal mobility from socio-sectoral organizations to government.

- a. Critical elites in a situation of low integration forces of the government tend to become task elites, and tend to justify their participation motives with a greater gap between developmental goals of government and policy implementation.
- b. The more the goal adaptation is urged by task elites from social sectors, the larger the impact to administrative development, and resolution of political instability and societal conflicts.