

The Effect of Personality on Bureaucratic Behavior in the Case of South Korea

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Problem Setting

When public administration in developing countries is compared to that of modern Western developed countries, several distinctive characteristics can be observed. One finds in developing countries an excessive degree of centralization caused by unwillingness to delegate authority and lack of administrative initiative, discontinuity of administrative program, lack of consistency in governmental policy, nepotism, favoritism, lack of cooperation and coordination among administrative agencies involved in an execution of public policy, substantial discrepancy between formally prescribed rules and regulations and actual application of those rules; other discrepancies between administrative theories and practices such as between authority and control, and personalization of administration in general.

The nature of such administration has been analyzed by a number of social scientists. Fred W. Riggs identified it with "the prismatic"⁽¹⁾ or "the sala model,"⁽²⁾ characterized mainly by "formalism" in which administrative laws and regulations invoke other meanings in actuality and do not reflect reality; a hierarchical position of authority tends to differ from an actual power position; any changes in theory do not bring with it concomitant changes in administrative practices. While making "double talk"⁽³⁾ possible, such formalistic nature rules all functions such as (1) personnel administrations, in which nepotism and family or kinship institutions provide a formal basis of government; (2) a related practice of official discrimination in favor of his own community and against members of other communities,⁽⁴⁾ what Riggs called "poly-communalism"; (3) "The Bazaar-Canteen"⁽⁵⁾ economy in which

- (1) Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964). Entire contents of this book are related to the prismatic model; but for conceptualized part, see pp.3-49.
- (2) Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala Model'," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1962), pp.19-35.
- (3) Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, pp.200-202, 279.
- (4) Riggs, "The Ecological Approach: 'The Sala Model'," *op. cit.*, p.24.
- (5) Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, pp.100-121.

price determination occurs under "kick-back"⁽⁶⁾ practice; (4) extreme over-centralization in which a separation of authority from control occurs and personal patterns of power become a dominant force, while providing a means to an end of simple control.

The preoccupation of control in non-Western bureaucracy is so much a significant phenomenon that Fritz Morstein Marx used "control" as a main analytical framework along with "responsibility."⁽⁷⁾ Centralized authority, as a means for an effective control accompanies little sense of responsibility, mainly because bureaucrats are primarily concerned with their "self-defense and self-advancement"⁽⁸⁾ which promotes routinization of work, avoidance of controversial issues and consequent reluctance of initiative. Since promotion or advancement is largely determined on confidence and personal relationship rather than competence and impersonal standards of performance, bureaucrats are preoccupied with cultivating friends at various hierarchical positions. Control is so tight that "administration has become preoccupied with ways and means of gaining relief...by being granted exception, ...To do this one must know the right man...and one must have something to offer in return."⁽⁹⁾ In such a form of administration, personal relationships tend to become predomi-

nant; disintegration of control is serious; control is eroded by formal control itself. There exists no sense of responsibility.

Control is intensified under personal rulers whose words become public policy, in which today's policy becomes suddenly dies and yesterday's dead program may immediately be used to further the ruling elite's personal interests. Control operates mainly by reliability and trust in subordinates, involving subtle aspects of superior-subordinate relationship.

Subtle ways of administration are systematically analyzed by Gabriel Almond's conception of "latent," "diffuse," "particularistic," and "affective" ways of operating government in terms of "output function" of "rule-making," "rule-application" and "rule-adjudication."⁽¹⁰⁾ The conceptions involve relating the profound impact of *primary* orientations generated in family and other social relationships on government operations which are seen as part of a secondary organization. Official roles are substantially affected by private roles in primary groups, while involving intimacy of feelings.

The foregoing characteristics of administration tend to be in common in most non-Western countries. Robert Presthus has found it in Turkish administration,⁽¹¹⁾ as was done by Morroe Berger in Egypt,⁽¹²⁾ by Martin Greenberg in Mexico,⁽¹³⁾

(6) *Ibid.*, pp.115,188.

(7) Fritz Morstein Marx, "Control and Responsibility in Administration: Comparative Aspects," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes(eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, pp. 145-170.

(8) *Ibid.*, p.149.

(9) *Ibid.*, p.156.

(10) The "latent," "diffuse," "particularistic," "affective" nature of politics and administration are further analyzed in connection of Korean bureaucracy in chapter IV of this study. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman(eds.), *The Politics in the Developing Areas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp.17-64.

(11) Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol.V (June, 1961), pp.1-24.

(12) Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

(13) Martin Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1970).

by Victor Ferkiss in Nigeria and Ghana,⁽¹⁴⁾ by William Siffin in Thailand,⁽¹⁵⁾ by Nghien Dang in Viet Nam,⁽¹⁶⁾ by Raul de Guzman in Philippines,⁽¹⁷⁾ by James Coleman in sub-Saharan Africa,⁽¹⁸⁾ by George Blanksten in Latin America,⁽¹⁹⁾ by Lucian Pye in Southeast Asia,⁽²⁰⁾ by Myron Weiner in South Asia,⁽²¹⁾ by Merle Fainsod in the Soviet Union,⁽²²⁾ by Ralph Braibanti in Pakistan.⁽²³⁾

The problem of centralization, anomalous administrative practices, and personalization have been particularly chronic in Korean bureaucracy. Considerable efforts have been made for improvement since the military revolution in 1961. The establishment of the *ad hoc* commission on Administrative Reform and Investigation which has been working on those problems, is a visible effort. Despite the intensified attempt, it seems that little genuine improvement has been made; many struc-

tural changes and rearrangements of authority relationship helped little in solving the problems.⁽²⁴⁾ The main practical purpose of this study is to investigate failure in terms of bureaucrats' behavior, assuming that failure has its roots in behavior in which needed change has not occurred.

Korean bureaucrats' behavior is studied from three main points of interest: (1) What is the behavior that affects or causes administrative problems? (2) Why do incumbents behave as they do in the bureaucracy? (3) Finally, what are the administrative implications of bureaucratic behavior? In a theoretical sense, this study concerns the influence of socio-bureaucratic environments and Korean basic personality, upon behavior. More specifically, it attempts to define (1) socio-environmental factors which may affect the behavior in general, (2) Korean basic personality

- (14) Victor Ferkiss, "The Role of the Public Services in Nigeria and Ghana," in Heady and Stockes (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp.173-203.
- (15) William Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966).
- (16) Nghien Dang, *Viet Nam: Politics and Public Administration* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1963).
- (17) Raul de Guzman, *Patterns in Decision-making: Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964).
- (18) George Blanksten, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa," in Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp.247-368.
- (19) George Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," *op. cit.*, pp.455-531.
- (20) Lucian Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," *op. cit.*, pp.65-152.
- (21) Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia," *op. cit.*, pp.153-246.
- (22) Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph Laparlombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.233-266.
- (23) Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," *ibid.*, pp.360-440.
- (24) For further information in this connection and a general aspect of the bureaucracy in South Korea, see Chang-Hyun Cho, *The System of Local Government in South Korea as Affected by Patterns of Centralized Control*, unpublished Dissertation (Ph.D.), The George Washington University, 1968; Chong-Mo Pak, *The Dynamics of Government Reorganization*, unpublished Dissertation (Ph.D.), Southern California, 1961; Dong-Suh Park, *Public Personnel Administration in Korea: A Mixed Heritage in Contemporary Practice*, unpublished Dissertation (Ph.D.), University of Minnesota, 1962; Pyung-Kun Kang, "Administrative Structure and Management in Regional Development," *Korean Quarterly*, Summer 1968, pp.121-132; Sung-Yup Kim, "Past, Present, and Future of the Civil Service System in Korea," *Korean Quarterly*, Winter 1963, pp.314-331; Byung-Chul Koh, (ed.), *Aspects of Administrative Development in South Korea* (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korea Research and Publication Inc., 1967).

which is shaped in the process of socialization, (3) the bureaucratic structural stimuli which may evoke certain personality characteristics which may be considered as a dynamic determinant of the behavior, on the basic theoretical assumption that behavior is a function of the person and of his environment.⁽²⁵⁾

Systematic studies of human behavior suggest that individual behavior in an organization is mainly affected by two main factors: organizational structure,⁽²⁶⁾ and individual personality. The organization influences its members through rewards, sanctions, and other inducements, the value of which may force them to conform to its rules and regulations. The hierarchy⁽²⁷⁾ and regulations confine the individual's choice in decision and action, as the classical analysis of bureaucratic organization by Max Weber pointed out, by assigning works and validating authority along a descending scale throughout the organization.⁽²⁸⁾ Thereby, all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements⁽²⁹⁾ may be eliminated, thus precision, speed, unambiguity, continuity,⁽³⁰⁾ prediction can be obtained.

Robert Merton, a leading sociologist, also recognized the similar structural influence on members,

saying that "the bureaucratic structure exerts a constant pressure upon the official to be methodical, prudent, disciplined," in order to attain "an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action."⁽³¹⁾ The bureaucratic structure provides various such incentives as incremental salaries, pension, promotion based on seniority, for disciplined actions and conformity to the official regulations.

The effects of the structural element on the behavior of its members' according to Merton, are many: the stress on adherence to the rules leads to the displacement of goals from the conformity as a means to an end in itself and conduces the "development of rigidities," "an inability to adjust" to special conditions readily, "timidity," "conservatism," and "technicism". Thus, the elements which are designed to conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances. Another influence is the *esprit de corps* which develops in the bureaucratic atmosphere of little competition in the sense that promotion is based on seniority. This often leads personnel to defend their entrenched interests rather than organizational goals, often resisting change of the existing arrangement, or opposing new orders which may

(25) K. Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics," in D. Cartwright, (ed.), *Field Theory in Social Sciences*, (New York: Harper, 1951), pp.188-237.

(26) Organization structure means not only formal hierarchical structures of authority relationship, but also informal structure of that relationship, since organizations are composed of a of small informal groups that may influence its members' behavior. For an overview of this connection, see Joseph A. Litterer, *Organizations*, Vol.1, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., second edition, 1969), pp.157-295.

(27) The definition of hierarchy is adopted from Robert Presthus' conception "a system for ranking positions along a descending scale from the top to the bottom of the organization." R.V. Presthus *The Organizational Society* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p.31.

(28) Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, ed. with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp.333-341.

(29) *Ibid.*

(30) *Ibid.*

(31) Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" in Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbaar Hockey, and Hanan C. Selvin, (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p.365.

reduce their advantages. That the emphasis on depersonalization of relationship may encourage arrogant attitudes of its members toward the public, is another bureaucratic inducement. Differentiated functions and itemized rules may ignore unique characteristics of individual cases. A domineering attitude may further be aggravated by the structural element of discretion and *esprit de corps*: As the bureaucrat acts as a representative of the power and prestige of the government, he tends to conceive of his position on a higher level of status than that of the public. Any protest and recourse to other officials in connection with that cynical attitude tends to be prevented by the "in-group"⁽³²⁾ nature of bureaucratic solidarity. Such haughty attitude tend to persist because of the monopolistic nature of public organizations; if there are alternatives, or competitive organizations for service, as in the private sector, such attitudes may be minimized. The substitution of personal for such impersonal treatment within the bureaucracy, ironically, may also evoke the attitude of "favoritism" or "graft."

Beside the foregoing structural elements which condition individual behavior in an organization, the bureaucracy contains other built-in character-

istics, notably, the oligarchical nature of hierarchy,⁽³³⁾ disproportionately distributed authority, and prestige which can be characterized by inequality and invidious differentiatiation, specialization which results from big size⁽³⁴⁾ and its consequent conflict between generalist and specialist,⁽³⁵⁾—all may effect such behavior and attitudes (on the part of its members) as drive for power, charismatic authority at the top,⁽³⁶⁾ tendency of centralization, resistance of delegation, upward looking manner on the subordinates, and tendency of personalization at the top.⁽³⁷⁾

However, the degree of the structural effect on behavior may vary and differ from one individual to another: one may be more highly motivated by the organizational inducements than others, one's desire for power is more encouraged by the tension-evoking hierarchical system of inequality, and one may conform to the organizational expectation or to the superior's authority more mechanically or prudently than others. Chester Barnard attempted to explain the reason for the variety in terms of personal interests, saying that a person will accept an organizational demand when "he believes it to be compatible with his personal interests as a whole."⁽³⁸⁾ James March's and

(32) The term in-group refers to the group with which an individual identifies himself.

(33) The term "oligarchy" means "rule by the few," thus in bureaucratic organizations, oligarchy refers to the bureaucratic system controlled by few employees who nearly monopolizes the organization power. This meaning is employed largely from Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949).

(34) Emile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 267-270.

(35) For further discussion of the conflict between generalist and specialist in an organization, see Alvin Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2 (December 1957), pp. 281-306, and Vol. 3 (March 1958), pp. 440-480; and also, Victor A. Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (1960), pp. 508-11.

(36) According to Victor A. Thompson, those who are at the top tend to be more easily charismatic in its authority, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 73-75.

(37) For why and how do those who are at the top want to personalize their relationship with subordinates more than those who at lower levels, see Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 71-73.

(38) Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 165.

Herbert Simon's motivational theory of participation and productivity contains similar reasons, but they viewed individual behavior in connection with personal value each participant will participate when the organizational inducement offered him appears to be equivalent to his contribution to it, "measured in terms of his values."⁽³⁹⁾ In more theoretical abstraction, not only individual behavior in an organization is affected by its structural environments, but also the individual possesses his own system of what psychologist Gordon Allport called "the functional autonomy of motives,"⁽⁴⁰⁾ by the mechanism of which individual interests and values are selected. The mechanism seems to be represented by "personality."⁽⁴¹⁾

The effect of personality on behavior has been a theoretical subject by many social scientists and empirical researchers. The range of studies has been from (1) an analysis of an individual actor;

(2) group typology, to (3) national character analysis.⁽⁴²⁾ The individual actor analysis includes E. Victor Wolfenstein's analysis of the revolutionary personality and behavior of Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi,⁽⁴³⁾ and Lewis Edinger's study on Kurt Schumacher's personality and political behavior.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The typological approach classifies people in terms of personality character, and includes, David Riesman's tradition-inner and other directedness,⁽⁴⁵⁾ Harold Lasswell's "agitator-administrator-theorist trichotomy,"⁽⁴⁶⁾ and Theodor Adorno's authoritarian personality.⁽⁴⁷⁾ In terms of administrative role typology, we find Robert Presthus' threefold upwardmobile-indifferents-ambivalents,⁽⁴⁸⁾ Anthony Down's climbers-conservers,⁽⁴⁹⁾ B. Gardner's successful-unsuccessful executives,⁽⁵⁰⁾ and Alvin Gouldner's Cosmopolitans and Locals.⁽⁵¹⁾ Analysis of national personality and behavior includes Geoffrey Gorer's *Burmese Personality*,⁽⁵²⁾ Geoffrey

- (39) James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p.84.
- (40) Gordon Allport, *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp.230-237.
- (41) The definition of personality varies depending upon scholar's research objects. In this study, it is adopted from *Dictionary of Psychology* by James P. Chaplin (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.), "The dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought."
- (42) These three typologies are borrowed, with changes, from Fred Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), pp.14-20.
- (43) E. Victor Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
- (44) Lewis Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965).
- (45) David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950).
- (46) Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); reprinted in *Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951).
- (47) Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
- (48) Robert V. Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).
- (49) Anthony Down, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp.88-91.
- (50) B. Gardner, "What Makes Successful and Unsuccessful Executives", *Advanced Management*, Vol. 13, pp.114-123.
- (51) "Cosmopolitans and Locals": Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vols. 2-3, pp.281-306; 444-80.
- (52) Geoffrey Gorer, *Burmese Personality* (New York: Institute of Inter-Cultural Studies, 1943), (Mimeograph).

Gorer's American Character, and Erich Fromm's German Personality and Behavior.⁽⁵³⁾

There are also many empirical researches on an association of personality with behavior: notably Robert Bales' 27 typologies of personality and group,⁽⁵⁴⁾ C. Wright Mills' white collar's personality and behavior,⁽⁵⁵⁾ William Whyte's upward-mobile's character⁽⁵⁶⁾, Robert Presthus' study on British executives,⁽⁵⁷⁾ Timothy Costello's on a planned merger,⁽⁵⁸⁾ Morris Janowitz's on public opinion,⁽⁵⁹⁾ Richard Christie's personality impact on attitude toward minority groups,⁽⁶⁰⁾ and Oscar Grunsky's conformity and deviance behavior.⁽⁶¹⁾ When related to the above classification, our study is to apply the personality typology of authoritarianism to the Korean national character.

The main theoretical concern of this study is to investigate the possible effect of the Korean basic personality on a bureaucrat's behavior. The dynamic organization of psychological processes operating in the inner mind may give more systematic fundamental sources of understanding the Korean bureaucrat's behavior. The rationale for

this speculation is that an individual in an organization tends to behave and react to others in terms of his personality shaped in socialization. Individual personality and behavior, as Robert Presthus pointed out, is mainly molded by social institutions and values by which he was raised and inculcated. Society provides the main source of "values and expectations that determine individual character, his ethical feelings and his ideas about progress, success, and failure."⁽⁶²⁾ Empirical findings support this assumption. Harry Sullivan's inter-personal theory, developed after twenty years of research, suggests that human beings are products of a given society. Their motivating value and behavior is mainly determined by the dominant values of the society, mainly because social conditions define the knowledge with which they think; they are bound together by their connection with a definite portion of environment.⁽⁶³⁾ The social rule and norms conduce them to a certain concerted character; moral values drive them to definite behavior by inner compulsion.⁽⁶⁴⁾ G. Doran also pointed out that what human beings

(53) Erich From, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941).

(54) Robert Bales, *Personality and Interpersonal Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

(55) C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 1951).

(56) William H. Whyte Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1956).

(57) Robert Presthus, *Behavioral Approaches to Public Administration* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965). pp.103-146.

(58) Timothy Costello, Joseph Kubis, and Charles Shaffer, "An Analysis of Attitudes Toward a Planned Merger," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 8(1963) pp.235-49.

(59) Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," Neil J. Smelser and William T. Smelser, eds. *Personality and Social System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), pp.517-529.

(60) Richard Christie and John Garcia, "Subcultural Variation in Authoritarian Personality," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, (1950), pp.457-69.

(61) Oscar Grunsky, "Authoritarianism and Effective Indoctrination: A Case Study," *op. cit.* pp. 636-646.

(62) Presthus, *The Organizational Society*, p.7.

(63) For more systematic analysis see Harry S. Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, H.S. Perry and M.L. Gawel, (eds.), (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1953), pp.16-18.

(64) Socio-cultural effect on personality formation as a national character or a concerted character in a given society, see Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1945); and, Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

think is an expression of mind which is largely determined by the social forces of tradition and values of those with whom the mind comes in contact.⁽⁶⁵⁾

However, what an individual learns from the social environment and through interpersonal contacts is processed by the mechanism of personality the functions of "id," "ego," "superego" in "object-relations." The most critical processes of learning are said to be "identification" primarily with family members and "internalization" through which object choices are made⁽⁶⁶⁾ (further analyzed in Chapter III). Thus, childhood becomes the most critical period in personality development. What the individual perceives on and selects from the environment, according to Gordon Allport, is determined by his own independent function, although environment may stimulate that function. He always "suffers (from) basic anxieties" and "relates himself to others through his interests." "His motives are his own." Anxiety produces tensions, since "he is born in a condition of dependency."⁽⁶⁷⁾ According to Sullivan, his behavior results from his efforts to minimize the painful tensions.⁽⁶⁸⁾ The degree of tension tends to be determined by environmental conditions under which he lives. He learns what behavior helps relieve tensions and what behavior aggravates them. Here again, psychological theories suggest that to what extent the individual suffers from tension depends upon his own "functional autonomy of motives."

The above introduction to the process of person-

ality development tells us that human personality is a product of interpenetration of sociological and psychological processes. According to Talcott Parsons, the interaction between social and psychological factors takes place through individuals who are basic entities of the society; the major structure of the ego, which is a core of personality development in Sigmund Freud's theory, is "a precipitate of the object relations which the individual has experienced in the course of his life history."⁽⁶⁹⁾ It means that internalization of the socio-cultural environment provides the basis of the core component of the human personality development. (This process is analyzed in detail in connection with Korean personality development in Chapter III). If we assume that this theoretical suggestion is based on a sound logic, understanding Korean basic personality by analyzing the social system and culture may provide major insights into the bureaucrats' behavior.

Another rationale for using an aggregate analysis in finding personality effect on behavior is that Korea is an exceptionally homogeneous society as to family system and child raising practice, social norms, language, educational system, and race, all of which are considered as fundamental factors in personality development. There is no ethnic minority. Even under frequent foreign invasion and rule, miscegenation occurred rarely. The homogeneous national characteristics have been further strengthened by centralization throughout Korean history, inducing uniformity in almost all aspects of social life.⁽⁷⁰⁾ There exists little alien

(65) F.S.A. Doran, *Mind: A Social Phenomenon* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953), p. 169.

(66) Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (London: Hogarth Press, 1935), pp. 35-36; and also, Talcott Parson and Robert F. Fales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955). For a general idea of the relations between psychoanalytic theory and the theory of social systems, see Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, (revised edition), (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954).

(67) Allport, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-7.

(68) Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, p. 190.

(69) Sigmund Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

culture and similar socialization process as have produced similar personality characteristics with few deviations.

The authoritarian personality, a concept developed by Theodor Adorno and others⁽⁷¹⁾ on the empirical base of clinical survey, is adopted in this dissertation as a dominant type of Korean character developed during socialization. The reason for the application of Adorno theory is not only the sociological bases of the authoritarian personality, but also its characteristics are remarkably similar to Korean situations. The reliability of authoritarianism has been controversial, particularly in connection with its methodology based on quasi-clinical psychological techniques. One of the vigorous critics, Edward Shils, argued that the authoritarian personality was erroneously treated as if it was equal to authoritarianism on the most positive side, saying that the researchers "concentrated on the interpretation of the major differences between the deeper dispositions of the High Scorers and the Low Scorers and paid practically no attention to the Low Scorers in the questionnaire, who in clinical interviews showed the traits of the High Scorers."⁽⁷²⁾ However, the validity of the theoretical foundation seems to be defended by the fact that the reviews of the topic have been abundant, since the publication of Adorno's authoritarianism in 1950 to 1956, 260 referable publications were published,⁽⁷³⁾ and that we can hardly find an issue of a journal containing no reference to the authoritarianism and no use of the various techniques designed to measure

it. In connection with this dissertation, Shils' critical points are not germane, since the study is mainly designed to define an association of a positive side of authoritarianism with the bureaucrat's behavior in administrative situations.

The theoretical implication of the authoritarianism in our study is that "strictness," "rigidity," "punitiveness," "ritualism," "forcefulness of family system and child raising practices in particular and social system and cultural norms in general, appear to be remarkably similar to the Korean socio-family system. These are main determinants of the personality character of "conventionalism," "dominance and submission," "exploitative-manipulative opportunistic," "in-group oriented," and "intolerant of ambiguity" appear to be closely associated with bureaucratic behavior in contemporary Korea.

More illustratively, it has been found that for those who were raised in the family system in which parental discipline was rigid, their affection was conditional rather than unconditional. The role and status in terms of dominance and submission were clearly prescribed, and children who were forced to submit to parental authority with no understanding, tended to be more hostile and aggressive than others who were raised in a less autocratic family atmosphere. Dominated children tended as adult, to be more suspicious, to desire power, to blindly submit to superiors, to have contempt for the weak, to aggressively dominate powerless people; to view human relationship in terms of hierarchical system of strong and weak

(70) For further information of the homogeneous character of Korean society, see Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.18-55.

(71) Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

(72) Edward Shils, "Authoritarianism: Right and Left" in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), *op. cit.*, p.31.

(73) Richard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature Relating to the Authoritarian Personality Through 1956," *The Journal of Psychology*, XLV (April 1958), pp.171-99.

and of getting material benefits, to be selfish, to rationalize whatever values were conventional in their setting, and to emphasize family heredity and background. The above characteristics may be seen to have some rather immediate potential bearing on the Korean bureaucrats' behavior in administrative situations. Prenkel-Brunswik in his study on the authoritarian personality drew similar conclusions about how authoritarianism arises in the process of socialization:

"In the home with the orientation toward rigid conformity, maintenance of discipline is often based upon the expectation of a quick learning of external rigid and superficial rules which are found to be beyond the comprehension of the child. Family relationships are characterized by fearful subservience to the demands of the parents and by an early suppression of impulses not acceptable to the adults. Since the moral requirements in such a home must appear to the child as overwhelming and at the same time unintelligible, and rewards meager, submission to them must be reinforced by fear of and pressure from external agencies. Due to lack of a genuine identification with the parents, the fearfully conforming child does not make the important developmental step from mere social anxiety to real conscience."⁽⁷⁴⁾

One argument against authoritarianism may be made on the grounds that the theory is largely based on the Freudian psychology with emphasis on early childhood socialization. The Marxian explanation of the development of authoritar-

ianism has occasionally been made, saying that "people are continuously molded from above because they must be molded if the overall economic pattern is to be maintained."⁽⁷⁵⁾ But, when the family is considered as fundamental and a core entity of society, the theory has reliability. Not only the system of family and roles and status members of the family, but also norms which rule that family are a reflection of the given society. We see a miniature society which plays the role of a transmission belt including the type of a social role which the society requires.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This proposition seems to provide a logical base of personality theory that the first social relationships to be observed within the family are, to a large extent, formative of attitudes in later life.⁽⁷⁷⁾ The validity seems to be further strengthened, in the case of South Korea, by the Robert Levine's anthropological finding—in a culturally homogeneous society, the primary socialization is largely produced in the family and is likely similar to the secondary socialization which is mainly obtained from school education, specialized training programs and the like. There is less even continuous subcultural variation which permits an individual role in the family to guide more predictably his role in a secondary organization.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Further, in a monistic society there is only one ultimate doctrine by which a society is ruled and independent or deviant organic parts rarely appear. One more explanation seems to be desirable: it may be erroneous to think of personality, directly as bureaucrats' behavior in administrative situations.

(74) Christie and Jahoda (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp.236-7.

(75) Adorno, *op. cit.*, p.976.

(76) Erich Fromm, *op. cit.*, pp.277~299.

(77) For more idea about this connection, see Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); and also, E.H. Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, IV (November, 1942), pp.475-493.

(78) Robert A. Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority System: A Cross-Cultural Application of Stimulus-Generalization Theory", *Behavior Science*, V (October, 1960). p.293.

But, rather personality is a functionally autonomous organism by which various attitudes may be formed in the presence of different stimulus situations. Individual behavior in an organization may be affected by various structural elements such as formal or informal rules or regulations, official position in the organization,⁽⁷⁹⁾ security system and incentives,⁽⁸⁰⁾ which we have noted previously. However, no attempt is made in this study to define a unique pattern of individual behavior in a specific bureaucratic situation. Our interest is not in peculiarities by which individual personalities differ from each other but in the common personality character that members of Korean society may have in general. Likewise our main concern is to ascribe relationships of that common personality to most widely observed administrative behavior in static, rather than dynamic, bureaucratic situations. It is the main theoretical purpose of this study to focus on the following hypotheses:

I. Korean people in general are highly authoritarian in basic personality characteristics.

In the bureaucratic administrative situation,

II. The more authoritarian an individual is, the more positive will be his attitude toward the compulsive drive for power and the more vigorous will be his attempt to have access to power.

III. The more authoritarian the individual is, the less will he be satisfied with his work, while more superficially involved in his job.

IV. The more authoritarian an individual is, the more dependent his attitude toward his superiors will be.

The more dependent is an individual, the more independent will he desire to be.

The stronger desires an individual for indep-

endence, the more negative will be his attitude toward specialist advice.

V. The more authoritarian an individual is, the more positive will be his attitude toward personalization of his official activities.

(For specific theoretical bases for assuming the above see Woo Kon Yoon, *The Effect of Personality on hypotheses, Bureaucratic Behavior in the Case of South Korea*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, 1972, Chapter V)

Methodology

Since our major objective is to investigate the fundamental cause of administrative problems, by determining the influence of personality structure on the bureaucrats' behavior, on the assumption that the degree of environmental effect on behavior largely depends on personality, it seems to be necessary to define (1) Korean basic personality, (2) direct environmental factors which may evoke the personality character which may become dynamic source of bureaucrats' behavior, and (3) the behavior resulting from the interaction between two determinants of the environments and the personality.

(1) Authoritarianism is assumed as the Korean basic personality. We attempt to defend the logic of the assumption by identifying Korean socio-family systems with the social bases of the authoritarianism. Then, how Korean socio-family systems have contributed to develop the authoritarian personality is analyzed. In this connection, psychological theories of personality development are applied.

The degree of authoritarianism is measured by Adorno's "F (for Fascism) scale."⁽⁸¹⁾ Six of nine

(79) For more information of this connection, see Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, p.90; and also, Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp.58-91.

(80) Simon, et. al., *op. cit.*, pp.23-62.

categories were selected [by giving a priority to the categories which seem to be more closely related to administrative behavior. They are "conventionalism," "aggression," "submission," "anti-intracception," "power and toughness," and "projectivity." Two items from each category were chosen with a consideration of Korean cultural norms. In other words, the item which might more likely be accepted by the norms was excluded, so as to avoid the possible bias for leading the result to a high authoritarianism.⁽⁸²⁾ The average reliability of this scale's coefficients are indicated by authors as 90. But, the correlation between the twelve items used and the original forty-six items is unknown. Adorno's F-scale has been used by many studies including Victor Vroom's personality effects on participation,⁽⁸³⁾ and Robert Presthus' study on upward mobility of British executives.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Their applications tend to endorse the degree of reliability of this scale. Validity, however, is limited to the extent that the scale was designed and tested in a small part of the population (mainly college students in California and Oregon areas) in the United States, the cultural norms of which are assumed to differ largely from those of South Korea. The reliability of the scale in South Korea is unknown. Subjects evaluated in this dissertation were asked to check their degree of agreement with each of the statements on the five-point scale which has been used by others.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Two criteria⁽⁸⁶⁾ were used: cumulative score on all twelve questions and ratio

of "agree" to "disagree" responses. Numerical equivalents from one to five were assigned to responses ranging from "strong agreement," "agreement," "I cannot make up my mind," "disagreement," "strong disagreement." In order to be classified as a high authoritarianism, a cumulative score of all twelve questions must be more than 36 points and more than 8 items must be indicated on our positive response-category (when a response is indicated on 4 or 5 points blank, it is included in our positive category); for a low authoritarianism, a cumulative score of all questions must be less than 36 points and not more than 4 items must be indicated on our negative response-category (when a response is indicated on 1 or 2 points blank). Those responses which do not meet both criteria are counted as medium authoritarianism.

(2) The political system and bureaucratic structure are analyzed as direct environmental stimuli which may affect current bureaucrats' behavior. Gabriel Almond's analytical model of "political socialization and recruitment," "interest articulation," "interest aggregation," and "political communication" in "rule-making," "rule-application," and "rule-adjudication" of the government⁽⁸⁷⁾ is used as frameworks of the analysis.

(3) Korean bureaucrats' behavior is analyzed in terms of four main frameworks: compulsive drive for power, dependence and loyalty, independence, and personalization. Our main assumption, that Korean administrative problems are profoundly

(81) "F-scale" is the questionnaire items used by Adorno and others for the measurement of authoritarianism.

(82) For more information on the methodology in studying personality cross-culturally, see Daniel R. Miller, "Personality and Social Interaction," in Bert Kaplan (ed.), *Studying Personality Cross-Culturally* (New York: Harper and Row, publisher, 1961), pp. 271-310.

(83) Victor H. Vroom, *Some Personality Determinants of the Effects of Participation* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960).

(84) R.V. Presthus, *Behavioral Approach to Public Administration*, pp. 103-146.

(85) Victor H. Vroom, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

(86) This two criteria measurement method was adopted from Janowitz's study on "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," in Smelser, (ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 520-521.

(87) G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-84.

affected by high degree of authoritarianism, is attempted to be substantiated by finding a positive association of authoritarianism with the above four items and other sub-indicators (specific methods in this connection, see Woo Kon Yoon, *The Effect of Personality...Chapter V.*)

It shall be mentioned that substantial difficulties were involved in designing the questionnaire and interpreting responses, mainly because of the authoritarian character or "defense mechanism" and "projection" (for further defined concepts, see W.K. Yoon, *The Effect of Personality...Chap. III*). That is to say, an authoritarian individual tends to conceal things he feels undesirable, by exaggerating or by completely displacing his unpleasant inner feeling with an opposite or positive attitude, thus he may respond to others or to the questionnaire in completely opposite ways. Daniel Miller pointed out such displacement as follows:

An undesirable attribute is disowned and seen

or exaggerated in somebody else. A man who is tempted to steal feels he is scrupulously, but erroneously suspects others of trying to cheat him.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Responses, therefore, may not give us accurate information. Real behavior and attitudes may be difficult to be observed. In order to minimize such problems, indirect questions, along with direct ones, were designed on the assumption that, as Miller in the methodology of studying personality and others indicated, such an ego-defensive individual may more likely express his inner feeling and real attitude indirectly "in a language he does not understand."⁽⁸⁹⁾

The data were obtained from 273 responses of 550 populations of Korean civil servants from June, 1971 to August, 1971. The populations were drawn from nine of eighteen central government organizations, considering variety of the socio-cultural values of members (see Table 1). The selected organizations are considered as more dis-

TABLE 1. Backgrounds of Respondents in Terms of Grade and the Organization They Belonged

Ministry	Grade			Lower Civil Servants		Total
	Higher Civil Servants	2 nd	3rd-A	3rd-B	4 th	
Agriculture and Forest	2	3	5	13	7	30
Communication	2	2	4	12	5	25
Economic Planning Board	2	4	7	15	5	33
Education	2	4	6	10	7	29
Finance	2	4	8	8	2	34
Home Affairs	1	2	4	15	10	32
Justice	2	4	7	21	1	35
Science and Technology	2	4	6	10	1	23
Transportation	2	3	7	18	12	42
Total	17	30	54	122	50	273

Note: For other backgrounds of respondents such as age, education, occupational origin, and length or service in public organizations, see Appendix 2.

(88) Daniel Miller, "Personality and Social Interaction" in Kaplan, (ed.), *Studying Personality Cross-Culturally*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p.288.

(89) *Ibid.*, p.287; and also, Daniel Katz, et al., "The Measurement of Ego-Defense as Related to Attitude Change", *Journal of Personality*, XXV (June, 1957) pp.465-74.

tinctively independent functions, when compared to those of local government. Military and law enforcement organizations are excluded in this sampling selection, mainly because they may inculcate their members more authoritarianism and promote more submissive attitudes under their legitimated machinery of its organizational structure.⁽⁹⁰⁾

The sample units of civil servants were also selected on the basis of official grade and the class of work—specialist and generalist, to make the sample population proportional and various, considering theoretical findings: Specialist may be less authoritarian⁽⁹¹⁾ and a higher bureaucrat might be likely more authoritarian than rank and file.⁽⁹²⁾ It must be noted, however, that the attempt for making the balance of population proportional have rather failed in the case of “generalist versus specialist,” mainly because few specialists existed at higher positions in our selected sample units. We also partly failed to get many top executives (Ministers and Vice Ministers) for interviews. But the main objective of this study is little affected by such factors, since we have obtained large enough numbers of higher officials to compare to lower civil servants, and more basically, our main interest is to identify the difference between high and low authoritarian individuals in terms of the effect of personality on their attitudes.

Questionnaires were distributed by the writer of this study and his colleagues among civil servants, after an explanatory oral presentation

soliciting their cooperation. It was emphasized that the purpose of the questionnaire was for academic research and in no way related to evaluation of participants' performance. It should be repeated that answers would be in complete confidence, because, although there was no item for “name,” it seemed necessary to tell respondents not to anticipate harmful effects. The writer encountered little resistance in gaining access to the organizations, mainly because he was a former civil servant and has many colleagues in the government. Responses to the questionnaire were a little more than two thirds of distributed questionnaires. Reasons, if any, might be found in the way which the data were obtained. Questionnaires were given, after the oral presentation for the solicitation, to be completed later at the respondents' convenience and were retrieved a few days later.

Findings

Degree of Authoritarianism

The analysis of the Korean socio-family system and cultural values of raising children on the basis of previous empirical observations showed a large probability that Korean people as a whole have a high degree of authoritarianism in common. It follows that Korean bureaucrats are also highly authoritarian as a basic personality characteristic. This tentative conclusion was derived

(90) Robert Peabody's research finding suggests that those who were engaged in law enforcement functions tended to accept a superior's order without question of its rationality more likely than those who worked for other functions, *Organizational Authority* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp.107-108.

(91) Peabody also has found that school teachers tended to accept unacceptable instructions from the above less likely than other less specialists. *Ibid.*

(92) Robert Presthus has found that those who have high authoritarian traits tended to have more upward mobility than low authoritarianism, thus, tended to be more successful in climbing to higher positions in the organization. *Behavioral Approach to Public Administration*, p.111. The higher positions itself also tends to reinforce more authoritarianism, since “the higher the position in the organization, the greater the emphasis placed on the importance of authority as a means of accomplishing organizational objectives.” Peabody, *op. cit.*, p.42.

from a non-quantitative method and was substantiated by our quantitative data.

The number of high authoritarian bureaucrats is almost triple to that of low authoritarian respondents in proportional terms. This proportion is more than double, as compared to those of American⁽⁹³⁾ and British authoritarianism.⁽⁹⁴⁾ This means that the majority of Korean bureaucrats are highly authoritarian and that the bureaucracy is governed by that majority.

Compulsive Drive for Power

It has been found that a positive relationship between authoritarianism and instinctive drive for power exists. The more authoritarian the individual, the more positive was his attitude toward getting power. This indicates that the majority of Korean bureaucrats are preoccupied with aggrandizement of official power.

The dynamic personality structure of such instinctiveness is one's inner feeling of weakness, passivity and helplessness, which makes the authoritarian individual perceive interpersonal environments as threatening and overriding. Such insecure and unstable psychological feeling contributes to a stimulated suspiciousness of others, while projecting a hypothetical struggle and competition. These tendencies lead to conceptualizing people as threatening in the sense of oversimplification for survival; one has to destroy others, before he is destroyed by them. Fear of failure and of being dominated by others stimulates him to have the desire to be strong. Because of his characteristic of dependence, however, he looks for the power to destroy his projective enemy by attaching to those who have power or by associating with the powerful and influential person and

groups.

In recapitulation, an excessive preoccupation with getting power is generated by one's psychological defense-mechanism by which the strong feeling on one's weakness must be projected and denied, and replaced by one's conscious effort with the self-image of strength and independence and decisiveness.

Superficial Involvement in the Content of Work

The analysis of our data also showed that the participant attitude of an authoritarian individual toward the content of work tend to be negative: The more authoritarian an individual, the less was he satisfied with his work, the more superficial was his attitude toward his job.

An authoritarian individual may appear to have deep and genuine interest of doing his job, but his such appearance is a disguised expression to achieve his ultimate objective of getting power; it is a simple means to an end. "Indifference" characterizes his real and covert attitude.

The opportunistic-manipulative-exploitative characteristics which are conducive to the development of a utilitarian attitude toward others, exceptional selfishness, and higher immorality produce the superficiality. He gets easily involved in the job which the organization wants to carry out, because of his psychological capacity of idealizing any complexity involved in the job and of justifying to himself everything which he does. He can also withdraw easily from his involvement, whenever his main interests are not connected with that involvement.

(93) Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, *op. cit.*, pp.521.

(94) Robert Presthus, *Behavioral Approaches to Public Administration*, (Alabama: University of Alabama Press., 1965.)

Dependence and Loyalty

Another important relationship of authoritarianism to the bureaucrat's behavior, which we have found in the quantitative data, is dependence and loyalty: the more authoritarian an individual, the more dependent and loyal was his attitude toward his superior.

The motivational origin of these attitudes also is in the achievement of power and prestige. As a means to an end, an authoritarian individual more likely tries to please his superior, whose appraisal of performance may decisively affect his promotion. In the autocratic environment of Korean bureaucracy, the attitude of dependence on and loyalty toward his superior can be considered as an effective, at least harmless, behavior for his advancement.

The reasoning behind such viewpoint is largely founded on psychological proclivities of authoritarian personality. An authoritarian superior is more pleased with docile and admiring followers, who flatter, blindly obey, and respect. On the contrary, he hates those who disagree with him, while considering the disagreement as a challenging and a threatening action against him. This projection of challenging is also the main source of his argument with or struggle against others, because of his emotional dissent rather than because of disagreement in issues involved. Since he is aggressive, his personalized hostility easily transforms into attack against his dissenters. An authoritarian subordinate, who is opportunistic, likely tries to avoid his superior's anger, so as not to jeopardize his future career.

The subordinate's own authoritarian personality structure also facilitates the the attitude of dependence and loyalty. Since he is preoccupied with power and prestige, he can follow anyone who grants him that power, accepting whatever the demands might be. Because of his psychological feeling of insecurity, he always searches for

someone whom he can depend on and who can take care of him. He feels little sense of deprivation at being commanded to conform to his superior's order. If he feels any sense of conflict, he can easily manipulate for himself a compulsory surrender as a necessary means for his end.

Independence

Our data also substantiated the hypothesis that the more dependent was an individual's attitude toward his superior, the more independence does he desire. Therefore an individual who is more authoritarian desires more independence. This desire for independence is a reaction against his dependence, passivity, and weakness.

Distinctive derivatives of independence are that an authoritarian individual feels compulsive for a tight control over his environment, and that he tries to dominate others, to restrict the behavior of others in action, decision-making, or expression of opinion, and to monopolize all issues related to power sources. Besides other psychological capacity for the independence, such as submissive, opportunistic, manipulative, exploitative, and aggressive attitudes, ritualism, which can be characterized by an instinctive expression of two distinctive roles of "blaming from behind and praising to the face," is another source.

Professionalism

A positive association of authoritarianism and professionalism was also found: Those who were highly authoritarian tended to have less respect for the value of professionalism.

Directly related psychological sources of such attitude are: impatience with dissenters, compulsive sense of controlling environments, subjective evaluation, and blind submission to authority.

Personalization

Still another crucial relation between authoritarianism and a bureaucrat's behavior, which our

data supported, was a "personalized attitude" toward public office. The more authoritarian an individual was, the more personalized his public activities.

Since he is extremely selfish and "local," his attitude involves prejudiced opinions and activities, while narrowing down his "in-group" boundaries, finally to "self". He outrageously rejects "out-group" as if he feels threatened by most of the groups to which he does not have a sense of belonging. On the contrary, he feels intimacy toward the in-group involving his total personality and compulsively to pay allegiance to it.

The criteria for making a clear-cut distinction between in-group and out-group are largely based on ascriptive and moralistic dogmas. But since the authoritarian is preoccupied with property and power, he may temporarily accept and ally himself with a distant out-group, when that group is not considered as a direct threat to himself.

Limitation of Validity

We have recognized the limited nature of this study. The reliability of our findings must be restricted by the lack of representative nature of sample units, and the uncertainty of the reliability coefficient of the measuring scales in the culturally different society of South Korea. How typical the investigated behavior is of Korean civil servants cannot be completely ascertained by the small size of sample population. Moreover, the focus on central government organizations makes it almost impossible to determine conclusively the nature of Korean bureaucrats' behavior.

A more profound limitation lies in the way of inferring the quantitative data. Whenever numeri-

cal data showed negative results, that is, contrary to our hypotheses, we attributed the inconsistency (of the results and the hypotheses) to the authoritarian characteristics of "selfgratification of self-idealization" and "mechanism of self defense." Thus we connected the negative results to positive ones, when we found consistency via compared responses on direct questions to the responses on indirect questions. That is to say, although we had many negative responses on direct questions, we interpreted them as positive responses, when we found supporting positive responses on indirect questions, by giving more weight to the answers on the indirect questions. The reason for such inference of nonquantitative methods—"the drawing of inference on the basis of appearance on non-appearance of attitudes"⁽⁹⁵⁾ is that an authoritarian individual tends to conceal negative things whatever he feels undesirable, by exaggerating or by displacing his unpleasant inner feeling with positive ones. Therefore, as Daniel Miller⁽⁹⁶⁾ pointed out, answers on indirect questions, with the language which respondents do not recognize the real meaning, may more likely be real expressions of their attitudes. Our inference may further be defended by the recent trend of methodology in social sciences, which recognize inference by a non-quantitative method based on quantitative data.⁽⁹⁷⁾

But, whatever merit the inference by non-quantitative method on quantitative data might have, the reliability of our findings is limited in the sense that the final judgement of the data was made by writer's subjective knowledge on psychological theories.

(95) Ole R. Holsti, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey, (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, II, (Methodology), revised edition, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), *op. cit.*, p.610.

(96) D. Miller, *op. cit.*, p.287.

(97) Holsti, *op. cit.*, pp.536-673.

Implications in Administrative Problems

If the findings of the positive relations between authoritarianism and the bureaucrats' behavior are based on relatively reliable methods, we may have obtained some insights into understanding dynamic causes of chronic problems in Korean bureaucracy, notably excessive degree of centralization, lack of consistency in government policy, lack of delegation and initiative, discontinuity of administrative programs, nepotism, favoritism, lack of cooperation and coordination among administrative agencies involved in an execution of public policy, substantial discrepancy between formally prescribed rules and regulations and actual practice of those rules; or between administrative theories and practices, and between authority and control, administrative anomaly and personalized powers pattern of public administration. The roots of these problems appeared to lie in the common sources: authoritarian characteristics.

In other words, the most critical factor, or the important common denominator involved in the problem lies in the dynamic structure of human personality, as Reinhard Bendix⁽⁹⁸⁾ pointed out: administrative rationality may depend upon "professionalization," "faithful execution," "persistence of impersonal character," which may be promoted by "administrative neutrality," "cooperation and initiative," but "human preconditions" are prerequisites for the development of such rational factors, since it is almost impossible to make a clear cut distinction between "compliance and initiative in bureaucratic conduct." Whether a bureaucrat exercises his discretionary authority

in the spirit of service, or in the pre-occupation with the concept of a master completely depends upon his character structure. A good example of viewing the human character as a prerequisite may be observed in the following quotation:

"The policemen may observe a multitude of violations, some relating to laws and ordinances which were never intended by the enactors to be enforced; others involving minor regulations of public order...their very number and variety are such that their requirements are largely unknown to the people to whom they apply. Hence violations are extremely common...

The policeman's art, then, consists in applying and enforcing a multitude of laws and ordinances in such degree of proportion and in such manner that the greatest degree of social protection will be secured. The degree of enforcement and the method application will vary with each neighborhood and community. There are no set rules, nor even general guides to policy, in this regard. Each policeman must, in a sense, determine the standard which is to be set in the area for which he is responsible... Thus he is a policy-forming police administrator in miniature, who operates beyond the scope of the usual devices of popular control. He makes and unmakes the fortunes of governmental executives and administrators, though rarely falling under the direct influence of the popular will. The only control to which he is subject is the discipline of his superiors.⁽⁹⁹⁾

The foregoing demonstrates the need of human application to administrative rationality, and shows that positive associations between authoritarianism and bureaucrats' behavior may lead to suggestions for administrative efficiency and improvement.

(98) Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting," *American Sociological Review*, XII (Oct. 1947), pp. 493-507.

(99) Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States* (New York: Harpers, 1940), p. 20, as quoted in Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting", p. 505.

(1) The improvement of administrative practices can hardly be achieved by a simple change in bureaucratic structure without a concomitant change in human personality. This does not mean, however, that the structural change never affects bureaucrats' behavior and nor contributes to the reformation of their character. What is meant is that the structural change may affect the bureaucrats' behavior. Bureaucrats may change their behavior, thus conform to the structural change, but the change must be considered as a means to an end. They look for ways to achieve their objectives, utilizing their superficial conformity to the structure change as a means. Even though permanent change in human character may occur, it takes a long time, since, as we have noted, the personality shaped during one's formative years of childhood tends to control one's later personality structure.

Bureaucrats may not exhibit behavior patterns to which they are psychologically predisposed when they are constrained from doing so by structural changes, such as changes in authority relationships and prescribed rules and regulation. However, if they can alter or loosen their constraints, they will revert to behavioral patterns consistent with their natural inclinations.

Korean administrative practice of the last decade seems to support the above viewpoint. As mentioned, the military government in 1961 made substantial effort to eradicate administrative malpractices including anomaly, corruption, and arbitrariness. Such practices looked as if they were disappearing, but they began to reappear, and also going underground (for example corruption) and emerging as a key political issue in 1971 election.

It is still a distinctive character of Korean bureaucracy that bureaucrats' behavior does not correspond to prescribed law and regulations. Such "formalistic" nature of administration (Fred Riggs' term) or the incongruity between struc-

ture and behavior appears to have its roots in Korean authoritarianism.

(2) Without reforming or changing Korean personality, fundamental solution of administrative problems appears to be a dilemma in the sense that an idea or a policy for a problem-solving becomes a vital cause of another problem.

For illustration, we have found that an excessive degree of centralization stimulates various aspects of the bureaucratic personality, notably, charismatic authority, oligarchy, unwillingness of delegation and initiation, and personal relationships, which are considered as dysfunctional characters in terms of administrative efficiency, while providing functional stimuli of effective maintenance of a unitary chain of command. However, a decentralized structure of authority, which may moderate centralization and thus alleviate its subsequent problems, discourages cooperation and coordination among more or less independent agencies or individuals and makes the maintenance of a unitary chain of command difficult. An extreme case of such an example might be the invisible struggles for power agencies and individuals over tense competition is a decisive dysfunctional element for the survival of an organization.

The reason for such possible divisive bureaucratic personality lie in the authoritarian characteristics of instinctive desire for power, compulsive sense of controlling environments, dominance over others, exceptional selfishness and in-group orientation. The case in point is that an authoritarian desire for independence essentially differs from the non-authoritarian desire for autonomy in its basic personality structure. Authoritarian expression of independence is reactionary to restraint and to the insecurity which an authoritarian individual sensitively perceives because of his personality mechanism. In the non-authoritarian or democratic expression of independence, which is considered as "constructive and healthy," reac-

tionary autonomy leads to "friction and strife."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ This means that when a decentralized system of organization, (a council pattern of leadership in contradistinction to a strong one-man leadership) is operated by an authoritarian majority, the organization tends to be in a crisis of possible dissolutions, while evoking instincts for power competition.

This disruptive nature of authoritarian administration suggests another important aspect of leadership. What part of leadership—democratic or authoritarian—may be more effective and efficient in the authoritarian society of South Korea in terms of administrative function? This question seems to be the most crucial question for politics and administration in South Korea, and perhaps in most developing countries. Some theoretical findings⁽¹⁰¹⁾ suggest that authoritarian leadership may be more effective on the ground that an authoritarian individual prefers a leader who leads and directs him, since blind following gives less frustration. A directive leader is seen as more effective than his democratic counterpart. It has also been found that authoritarian individuals tend to feel frustrated in a democratic atmosphere of leadership.⁽¹⁰²⁾ This evaluation of leadership style by authoritarian individuals seems to be natural, if we consider Rensis Likert's view⁽¹⁰³⁾ that "to be effective... a leader must always adapt his behavior to take into account the expectations, values, and interpersonal skills of those with whom he is interacting." That is to say, a de-

mocratic leadership is less qualified to realize authoritarian expectations, and thus becomes weak in leading subordinates.

This theoretical observation leads us to think that an authoritarian leadership may be inevitable in an authoritarian society without changing personality. Thus administrative problems in Korean bureaucracy may continuously persist, since dictatorial leadership and tight control continuously stimulate an authoritarian atmosphere within the bureaucracy as well as in the society in general, while affecting the parental child raising practice. Parents discipline their children according to the behavioral pattern permitted and praised in the larger society. This observation also gives us logical clues for understanding that frequent decentralization programs fail. We may also better understand the insistence of political leaders in South Korea and in other authoritarian societies—the insistence that Western ideas of democracy do not work in non-democratic countries.

If we think of non-Western developing countries, most are authoritarian in their essential culture. This study of authoritarian personality and its effect on Korean bureaucrats' behavior may be useful. Although the present study is rather preliminary, it seems to be meaningful in the sense that no single volume of systematic study of administration in developing countries has been made simultaneously with sociological and psychological theories, particularly in terms of personality structure.

(100) For "friction and strife" generating authoritarian desire for autonomy, see Douglas McGregor, "Getting Effective Leadership in an Industrial Organization," *Advanced Management*, IX (Oct. Dec. 1944), pp. 148-153.

(101) F.M. Sanford, *Authoritarianism and Leadership* (Philadelphia: Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1950).

(102) K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates," *Journal of Social Psychology*, X (May, 1939), pp. 271-299.

(103) Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), *op. cit.*, p. 95.