Comparison of Administration under Different Ideologies

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1. Preface
2. Administrative Function
3. Policy-Making and Planning
4. Organizing
5. Motivating
6. Conclusion

1. Preface: Purpose and Methods of Study

This study aims at comparing the administrations in Republic of Korea and North Korea and examining the possibility of and difficulties for administrative integration in the event of reunification.

One problem in this respect is the feasibility of such a comparison. Experts were skeptical about his comparison until a tendency began arising to pursue and explore it recently.

For comparison, a common criteria must be established. Otherwise a detailed exposition of various heterogeneous matters would not be much conducive to academic research. Therefore, a comprehensive study will be given of the administrative function first, and the process of administration will be used as the criteria for this study. There are various conceptional definitions of administration, but here it will be understood structurally.

This study of administrative process will be divided into seven phases; the establishment of development goal, policy-making, development planning, organizing, motivating, control, and feedback. Here emphasis will be placed on the first five phases.

As to the methods employed for this study, library materials such as books and essays had to be relied upon due to various restrictive conditions.

One significance of this study was that public administration, which is ignored in all countries in the study of the communist bloc, was comparatively studied here by a public administration student for the first time.
2. Administrative Function:

To study the nature of public administration as a means, the development goal must be examined before the administrative function is considered. The Republic of Korea professes economic development and improvement of national defense potentials, and North Korea seems to be the same in this regard.

North Korea emphasizes the parallel promotion of these two objects, neither of them given significant priority over the other. Defense costs accounted for more than 30 per cent of the 1968 national budget of North Korea, indicating a sharp increase over previous years, and surpassing the R.O.K. defense appropriations. Both ROK and North Korea regard economic development and defense buildup as the two foremost tasks for unification. The two opponents seem to be competing in achieving economic development and welfare of the people. Their basic differences in this respect exist in their interpretation of the peoples’ welfare and the methods to achieve it. In North Korea, human rights are disregarded, and its methods are based on the abolition of private ownership and on the dictatorship of the Labor (Communist) Party. In ROK in comparison, overall welfare including the economic sector is considered, and the public participation is allowed, with private ownership recognized.

Though the immediate development goals of North Korea are similar to those of ROK, private economy and participation are extremely restricted in the north, where the party takes charge of administration almost exclusively. Its administration is not confined to the narrow sense but takes charge of considerably political function in extensive fields. In this context, the communist describe their “people’s committees” as having the function of “economic organizers and cultural educators.” The party has multi-and mixed functions of legitimizing, fostering participation, entrepreneurial and innovative undertakings, integrating, planning,

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and communications.

The party, charged with such extensive functions, is superior to the administration, which is subordinated to it as is the case in any Communist country. To ensure this system, all administrative posts down to the working level are occupied by party members for thoroughgoing control. Even so, this results in almost ceaseless friction between the party and administration, and Kim Il-song himself repeatedly remarked that the specialization and coordination between the decision-making and controlling by the party and the execution by the administration were difficult.

Thus in North Korea, though its functions are extensive, the administration is so strongly controlled by the party that it is more implemental for execution than being the decision-maker. In the ROK, to the contrary, where a comparatively brisk private economy and private sector participation have been created, the administrative functions are not under the control of the party or the parliament, though they are primarily dedicated to objectives similar to those of North Korea. The functions are under the strong control of the President, the Presidential secretariat, and cabinet ministers and vice ministers, who are political appointees, and are influenced, though not very strongly, by the mass communications, interested organizations and intellectuals. But the President and his ministers and vice ministers do not have a particularly strong sense of identification with the ruling party, so the decision-making authority of the administration seems to be comparatively strong as compared with that of North Korea. Contributing to the responsibility of the administration are the facts that the President is directly elected by the people in popular voting and that there is a channel, though not very strong, for external influence to affect the administration.

In North Korea, to the contrary, the party does not provide a channel for political participation or external influence, and monopolizes the decision-making authority. Its cadres occupy the major posts of the administration, but they regard themselves more as party members than as administrative members. The only similarity the Republic of Korea has in this respect is the ministers without portfolio, who are members of the ruling party.

3. Policy-Making and Planning:

Generally speaking, the policy-making authority is monopolized by the party in any

Communist nation, and North Korea is no exception in this regard. But in ROK, decisions are made by the President and his political appointees, all of whom regard themselves as administrators. In North Korea, decisions are made by a small group of party leaders around Kim Il-song, and the participation of technicians and experts of the party and the administration or of interested outside organizations is unthinkable in the decision-making process. Decisions are made under strict security measures and on the basis of very limited relevant data and information, and consequently their validity, responsibility, and representative quality are extremely questionable. In such an industrialized Communist society as the Soviet Union, the inevitable participation of experts and pressure organizations can be seen in policy-making, but hardly in North Korea, where even very recently the technical knowledge of administrators was emphasized only after the loyalty to the party.

In ROK the extent of participation in decision-making is rather limited when compared with advanced nations of the West, and the decision-making does not undergo group pressure. But it is participated in ROK by the National Assembly, political parties, mass communications, various committees in the administration, and interested organizations, although the administration is sometimes criticized for being authoritarian. Even under the military government following the military revolution of 1961, many domestic and foreign experts participated in the economic sectors requiring high specialization, and this contributed a major factor leading the first and second economic development five-year plans to success.

ROK or North Korea, participation in policy-making is anticipated to inevitably increase in pace with industrialization and specialization. But in the north, it will come very slowly, if it ever comes, due to the iron rule of communist ideology. In the ROK, such a restriction does not exist except from cultural tradition, and the participation, which is relatively extensive already, is anticipated to expand steadily in the future.

Planning, like in any other Communist country, also is unified and centralized in North Korea. The planning of all functions of the ministries and all other central and local administrative agencies is monopolized by the National Planning Committee which has as many as 22 bureaus in it.

Though the emphasis placed on the (planning) ideologically and structurally in North Korea is understandable in a way, such excessive monism and centralism seem to cause not a few defects. Kim Il-song said in this respect: "It is imperative to root out the sectionalism and localism of the procedures as well as the subjectivism of the members of national planning agencies by means of properly harmonizing the national call and the opinion of producers."

Defects resulting from such a practice in North Korea are:

a. Planners tend to set production norms as high as possible in order to improve their achievements, while producers always endeavor to lower the norms, resulting in constant frictions between them.

b. Effectiveness for accomplishment of norms is overly emphasized, resulting in the low quality of products and in higher production costs.

c. The supply and demand of raw materials and products do not meet each other, hampering production. In this respect, Kim Il-song always emphasized that raw materials must be supplied with priority, and instructed that 8 to 10 per cent of the required materials be stocked in reserve all the time.

d. Statistics are unreliable due to the incompetency of statistic workers and to reports falsified for the purpose of exaggerating accomplishments.

e. The lack of flexibility and adaptability to suit locality and producers.

f. Overtaffed personnel are required for planning. For instance, for instance, a provincial planning committee has as many as 13 department in it.

In the Republic of Korea, planning began attracting attention in the 1960’s, and a planning organ was created in each of the ministries and agencies. But the planning function is not unified or centralized as was in North Korea. Each ministry and agency plans its own development programs. However, the Economic Planning Board, which retains the budget authority for all government branches, coordinates the planning of each ministry and agency, but only in connection with the budget. Structurally, the Office of Premier has in it the Office of Planning and Coordination for overall planning, review, analysis, and control, but this office does not control the budgetary affairs of each ministry and agency.

In the Republic of Korea, the government does not intervene in all social activities, with private activities carried out in many sectors, and the area covered by government planning is not so extensive. The government faces less difficulties in the supply and demand of raw materials and products than does North Korea. And there is little discrepancy between the producers and the planning authorities over the production goals. The government therefore does not need so many planning workers.

Such differences between the south and north stem from the difference of the role of the governments for development. In North Korea, the private profit-seeking activities of the people are not allowed, with all such businesses undertaken by the government directly, while the Republic of Korea government provides support for development only indirectly, in principle, with all production activities undertaken by private profit-making businesses.

The North Korea-style planning might be advantageous in the early, comparatively simple phase of industrialization, especially for mobilizing resources. But when North Korea has been industrialized to some degree, it will be confronted with the same difficulties as those the planning administration of the Soviet Union faced in the past. The North Korean planning is anticipated to be more decentralized and differentiated, with the opinion of the end-users reflected on it.

On the other hand, it was a fault of the Republic of Korea that the problem of planning was almost totally ignored until 1960, and it has been less than 10 years since it began formally studying this problem. Though the planning in South Korea has much room for technical improvement, it will rapidly improve with the spontaneous efforts of each ministry and agency. Some of the numerous problems which should be solved or improved promptly
are the reliability of statistics, the need for more concrete and realistic plans with flexibility through decentralization of planning, formalism resulting from the over-emphasis on effectiveness for accomplishment of targets, and waste resulting from the impromptu method all of which can be seen in North Korea likewise. A peculiar defect in ROK is that, though planning is understood to have the prime importance for development, it enjoys importance only structurally, with chiefs of unit organizations thinking or acting otherwise. At any rate, planning is still handled with unduly little attention in ROK. The exact situation in North Korea in this regard is unknown, but is presumed to be much different from ROK in view of their ideology.

4. Organizing:

When a policy and a plan on what to do and how through the administration have been decided, the project enters into the implementation phase, but it cannot be implemented by the chief of the pertinent agency alone. He needs the cooperation of a number of personnel for division of labor. There arises the problem of organizing, and organizing as a means will be discussed here in terms of structure, personnel, and appropriation of budget.

a. Structure:

Structure will be divided into central and local here for the convenience of study.

1) Central Agencies:

North Korea has a conspicuously large number of central agencies, as is a common tendency in Communist countries. The first cabinet had 22 members, and the number of agencies began rapidly increasing after the Korean War 1950-53. As of December, 1967, the cabinet comprised one first deputy premier, eight deputy premiers, six committee chairmen, 30 ministers, one director for the Science Board, and three bureau chiefs of the cabinet secretariat (first, second, and fifth bureaus).

The first of the characteristics in the steady increase of the number of central agencies is that the government businesses are rapidly being specialized. Second, many of the newly created agencies are in the economic field. Third, the number of new agencies with names of the council style distinguishable from the ordinary unitary ministries, amounted to six.

Fourth, the number of deputy premiers increased, and a first deputy premier was instituted to control them. Fifth, as the size of the cabinet burgeoned, it was divided into the plenary cabinet and the standing council comprising the premier and deputy premiers exclusively.

Most interesting in this administrative reorganization is the creation of committees. They are charged with planning, construction, scientific technology, supply of materials, international economy, and agriculture, the fields which North Korea had long emphasized but had had little success in due to their complexity. These committees came into being after the first three-year plan and before the five-year plan[19]. Judging from the fact that they directly control local agencies, they were created to take charge of the most important and difficult tasks under the council system despite the strong Communist fondness for the monist control system[20] and by centralizing local agencies for improved efficiency.

The creation of North Korean committees suggests several things. First, it indicates what the North Koreans are most interested in but what they have not been successful in achieving. Secondly, despite the Communist fondness of party loyalty and monistic control systems, experts had to be allowed to participate in the projects due to increasing specialization, with the monistic tendency decreasing. Thirdly, certain organs are separated from their comprehensive local agencies such as the provincial and county people’s committees and transferred to central agencies as a means of emphasizing certain projects. All agricultural functions have been unified under the Agricultural Committee in a sharp contrast with the case of the Republic of Korea.

2) Local Agencies:

In ROK and North Korea alike, horizontal division of works is briskly taking place in local agencies as well as central ones. But in North Korea, local autonomy is not allowed, and even the education administration is placed under the control of provincial and county people’s committees.

One of the most conspicuous administrative changes in the last two decades in North Korea

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[20] Kim Chong-gi, A Historical Study of North Korean Agricultural Policy and the Managerial Structure of Cooperative Farms, Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National U. M.A. thesis, 1966, pp.142-3. And, when the Provincial-level Agricultural Economy Committee was newly instituted, its chairman was regarded more important than the chairman of the provincial people’s committee, and a top-class personage was appointed to the post (pp. 146-5).
is the creation of new provinces and counties to equalize their numbers with those of the Republic of Korea. Accordingly, the basic administrative unit of myon (township) under county was abolished, with ri (village) elevated to myon’s place. The reasons for such a reorganization were:

First, politically, the North Korean Communists intended to have as many administrative areas as the Republic of Korea in preparation for general elections throughout the Korean peninsula.

Second, Communist regimes share one common tendency to strengthen their field offices in direct contact with the public. The natural village structure in North Korea was promoted to the administrative unit in this line.

Thirdly, the general development of transportation and communications has made it possible to reduce the number of the administrative echelon, and the myon system was thus eliminated.

After the reorganization, the importance in local administration seems to be attached more to county and village than province. Kim Il-song said in this respect: “The county must serve as the base for technical revolution, cultural revolution, and ideological revolution, as the base for connecting cities with rural communities, and as the channel for the political, economic, and cultural support of cities for rural communities.”

Not that the county people’s committee is exclusively charged with such roles. In fact, the count-level party committee and agricultural committee are playing more important roles. A county committee of the party has 100 personnel, as compared with 70 of the people’s committee.

Ri (village) serves almost exclusively as an agricultural production unit, and the chief of the village agricultural cooperative concurrently serves as chairman of the village people’s committee, though the two organizations are distinctly different from each other. This might be because the by far most important task of village is to increase the agricultural production. A village people’s committee has six to seven regular personnel besides the chairman.

(21) Kim Il-song, “On the Achievement in Eliminating Formalism and Bureaucratism from Party Activities and in Revolutionizing the Party Workers,” Kim Il-song Collection, No. 4, op. cit., p. 436. “...now the success of the party activities and the administrative economic works heavily depends on the field workers.”


and the secret ry. (25)

We have examined how the central and local agencies have been reorganized in North Korea. One thing common among them is the characteristically frequent reorganization. For instance, agencies in the production management sector alone underwent no fewer than 59 reshuffles in the 17 years from 1948 to 1965, 34 of them between 1954 and 1964. (26) Experts interpret such frequent reshuffles variously (27), and some of typical explanation are: first, that it is due to the rapid expansion of the government structure accompanying the alteration of internal and international political, economic, and social conditions. The second is that it is a continued effect of the North Korean government to rationalize the administration as a means. The third is that it is trial and error process resulting from impromptu reorganizations without adequate study on the administration.

One thing we cannot overlook in discussing such frequent reorganization of administration by the Communist regime is that the North Korean bureaucracy is so feeble that it offers almost no resistance against such reorganization, that there is almost no pressure group outside the administration to offer any dissidence, and that therefore the ruler can effect such frequent reorganization at will anytime he chooses to do so.

b. Personnel:

The personnel administration of the North Korean central agencies is handled by the Fifth Bureau of the Cabinet Secretariat. And each ministry has a cadre (personnel) department, and each province has a cadre office. However, the personnel administration is the most important tool for the dictatorship of the Labor (Communist) Party, which therefore can hardly allow the administration to exercise its own personnel authority. The Organization Guidance Department of the party’s central headquarters makes all important personnel decisions.

The Fifth Bureau of the Cabinet Secretariat has some 400 personnel in it, and its chief has been made a cabinet member. Its authorities include 1) assignment of the graduates of the 25 colleges and retired military officers with the rank of colonel or navy captain or higher, 2) promotion, transfer, reward and punishment, and decoration of administrative personnel of the ranks subject to the approval of the party central headquarters, 3) decisions on the total

--- 68 ---

(26) ROK Ministry of Public Information, North Korea 20 Years, Seoul,1965, p.34.
number and payroll of administrative personnel, and 4) arrangement and maintenance of laws and ordinances. (28)

The following statements by Kim Il-song indicate that, though the Communist profess political ideas based on historical materialism, they emphasize the human element in actual administration: "However, it is man who produces and who operates machines and techniques (29) and "The problems cannot be solved merely by reorganization; the point is whether or not the guided workers achieve the masses’ line. (30)

Kim Il-song also made the following remarks to emphasize that stress should be laid on party loyalty, ideology, and political works in developing the human element: "The masses’ line must be carried out under political works...Debates disclose that many comrades tend to think that economic managerial workers have only to carry out their technical works because they have nothing to do with political works. This kind of thought is quite wrong." (31)

Kim Il-song also said, indicating that many personnel interpreted this wrongly in the early stage, that even ministers avoided complying with it, and that cadres made cynical remarks about it: "Some people went to party chairmen with gifts to flatter them after they had been told to improve their party loyalty (32)...To be frank, how many of our ministers can confidently say they know enough about politics? I think we have very few such comrades. When a cadre becomes a minister or a bureau chief, he tends to regard himself as a prerogative being assigned to evade attending party conferences and party lessons. Such an attitude is basically wrong. (33)..."A certain cadre walked out of a room where his subordinates were eagerly

(30) ibid., p. 169.
(31) ibid., p. 165.
(33) Kim Il-song, "On the Accomplishments of Guidance Workers to Enhance Party Loyalty, Class
holding a lecture meeting, and yelled from outside, ‘does a lecture give you bread or butter?’ (34)"

But Kim I-song, who laid so much stress on party loyalty and political works, seems to have had a change of heart. An example is the following statement he made in December of 1967 emphasizing technical knowledge as much as party loyalty and political works: "Workers at national economic agencies, while sharpening their awareness of class and masses, must improve their technical level constantly. Without improving his technical standard, a worker cannot be free of bureaucracy in his performance, and he can hardly fulfil his heavy responsibility to the party, nation, and people. All workers of national economic agencies must develop a revolutionary trait to learn profound economic theories and technical knowledge so that they can be well versed in their duties." (35)

This tendency causes us to think that north Korean economy may have grown complicated and specialized to the degree that, as in more advanced Communist nations, expected results cannot be attained merely by party loyalty. Secondly, the fact that north Korea is recognizing the importance of technical knowledge at least in the economic field resembles the situation of the Republic of Korea following the military revolution of 1961 when military personnel refrained from interfering in economic ministries and agencies. Thirdly, it can be presumed that the influence of the Labor Party could be gradually reduced through replacement of "revolutionaries" in such specialized fields with management technicians and experts. (36)

The qualifications considered in appointing such personnel include party loyalty, family background, competence, and experience. One's career is stated in the form of autobiography. For measurement of competence, schooling records and speciality are considered, but not what school one was graduated from and his school credits. (37)

Loyalty, and Civic Loyalty and to Improve the Management and Operation of the People's Econom., "op. cit., p. 164.
(34) Ibid., p 168.
(36) Roger V. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," APSR, Vol. 62, No. 1, March 1968, p.110-1. In the initial phase of economic development, the Communist Party is weak, but it grows stronger with the progress of the economic development. But when economy further develops, the party grows weaker, because it is impossible to rule the complicated economic society only with revolutionaries.
(37) Fae Ch'ung-nin, op. cit, pp. 27-9.
c. Budget:

In the light of the north Korean ideology, its budget is not aimed merely at appropriating current expenses for maintenance of status quo but to provide the government with necessary expenses as a means for developmental projects. This intention is clear in the following explanations: "The budget is aimed at distributing and redistributing national income through the budget while precisely maintaining the balance of accumulation and consumption in line with the principle of well-planned, well-balanced development of the people's economy." (38) The party also said: "The budget must be formulated so as to guarantee adequate funds needed for creating a high tide of revolution in consideration of the party policy of parallel promotion of economic construction and national defense construction through positive mobilization of internal reserves." (39) This indicates that the funds are appropriated in line with development planning. The national expenditures comprise people's economy expenses, socio-cultural expenses, national management expenses, national defense expenses, and reserve expenses. Noteworthy in his regard are 1) that the proportions of people's economy expenses and socio-cultural expenses are abnormally increased year by year, 2) that, to the contrary, the national management expenses are decreased, and 3) that the national defense expenses, which had been comparatively small until 1966 outwardly, were increased to some 30 per cent of the total in 1967 and thereafter. These items are very deceptive, and actual appropriations are hard to grasp without carefully studying the details. The actual execution of the budget each year may better present the true appropriations.

National revenues include transaction incomes, national enterprise profits, reimbursement, income tax from cooperative organizations, national property incomes, other incomes, and tax revenues. The tax revenues in 1967 accounted for no more than 2 per cent of the total revenues, and the major part of the revenues depended on transaction incomes. This may be attributable to the absence of private ownership and private economy in North Korea.

We have roughly examined the structure, personnel and budget of North Korea. To examine the problems for the integration of ROK and North Korean administrations by comparing them, the Republic of Korea will no doubt propose that the unification formula be based on the proportion of population, and North Korea may be anticipated to insist on basing it on the number of administrative units. Second, concerning the administrative units of county.

(38) Communist Bloc Problems Research Center, op. cit., p. 363.
(39) Le d., p. 367.
myon (township), and ri (village), it might be possible and desirable for the Republic of Korea to abolish one of the three like north Korea abolished myon, with ri strengthened functionally as in North Korea.

Thirdly, through the North Korean practice of emphasizing party loyalty excessively and of discriminating for or against public employees in their appointment according to their family background poses a serious problem for integration, this might be ameliorated in pace with in dustrialization and specialization. Then the weight of actual achievements will increase, and the possibility of mutual approach might grow in the future in that, as long as both ROK and North Korea endeavor for developmental works through administration, administrative workers will be expected to improve their developmental quality.

Fourth, though the North Korean and ROK budgets resemble each other in nature, they differ in the administrative process. The largest problem might be the difference of the revenue sources arising from the difference of their economic structures.

5. Motivating:

However eagerly a political leader with a sense of political responsibility might endeavor to accomplish a certain project, and however hard he might drive the components of his structure to that end, the result is more likely to be unsatisfactory. In the case of North Korea, while it superficially seems that what ever Kim II-song says is done as he intends and instructs without any delay, the following remarks of Kim himself indicate that the fact is not so: “It is not only in the water management sector that the party policy is not carried out satisfactorily in the rural management field. I instructed the Agriculture Department of the party headquarters long ago to build seed storages and seed farms, and this task has not yet been satisfactorily accomplished.” (40) Kim repeats similar criticism on every available occasion since the founding of his regime. The foremost subjects of his criticism seemingly are bureaucratism and formalism. (41) Bureaucratism as used here refers to the attitude of trifling the ruled with the sense of privilege. Kim said in an address: “Why have party workers, while professing to work for the benefit of the working class, failed to take care of such a thing? This is because


of the unliquidated remainder of the undemocratic thought of the Japanese colonial days to drive the laborers at will." (42)

As to formalism, Kim criticized: "Ministers and many other workers do accept whatever their superior say. Then they take notes of the instructions and go to their subordinate workers to tell them that 'the Comrade Premier has just raised such problems significantly.' And what they do ends there, and the instructions are not implemented. Therefore, party policies are not materialized in many cases." (43)

Kim also said: "Let me cite an example of how formally city of P'yongyang executes its businesses. I instructed the city authorities to plant pine trees. And they did plant pine trees, but having planted then, they should have cared for them. Though they planted the tree mobilizing many trucks and manpower, they neglected them until all of them were dried up." (44)

The following remarks of Kim Il-song indicate how chronic formalism has grown in North Korean officialdom: "I have been studying how to root out formalism for the past few years. Everything I tried failed, and formalism remains unaffected." (45) Then he went on to say: "Now formalism has grown to the extent that they neglect party instructions with sang froid." (46)

The answer to the question why Kim Il-song's instructions are not implemented should be sought in a general theory to investigate the motivating of bureaucrats and to determine under what conditions they come to work devotedly. Various theoreticians have advanced varied theories in this regard (47). And here the question will be approached from the angles of coercion, incentives, and normative quality.

Regarding the coercive method, causes of punishment in North Korea are quite different from those of South Korea. For high-ranking officials, factionalism, extramarital affairs, and

(43) I im Il-song, "On the Achievement in Eliminating Formalism and Bureaucratism from Party activities and in Revolutionaryizing the Party Workers," op. cit., p. 408.
(44) I id., p. 410.
(45) I id., p. 407.
(46) I id., p. 413.
the delinquency of their children constitute major causes for penal actions. (48) Methods of collective pressure and surveillance agencies are diversified and systematized, (49) and party members and inspection officials vested with surveillant or penal authority wield their power and behave like the Lord of Hades, as described by Kim Il-song. (50) The status of government employees is not protected by law, and they have no private property. Consequently, they are haunted by uneasiness and fear.

Kim Il-song, awaking to this problem, has been asking the personnel concerned not to handle a delinquent official on the punishment-first principle, but rather to improve him through organized life and mutual criticism at the cell committee as well as enhancing the role of the propaganda department, groom him into a revolutionary through effective personnel administration, give him an opportunity to correct his wrongs without fear, and advise him instead of the whip-and-embrace method (51), but good results are little likely.

Next they emphasize the normative method. As stated above, party loyalty is the most important qualification considered in the appointment of personnel. After appointment, the personnel are trained and brain-washed to strengthen their ideology at the central party school, people's economy college, and the Communist University. It is of course Communism that is most emphasized in the Ch'ollima campaign and the Taean work system. (52)

Thus in its early days, the north Korean regime emphasized the coercive and normative methods (53), but as their effectiveness hit the limit, it seems to be cautiously shifting to incentive methods. To cite a few of such incentive methods, the foremost one is the awarding of non-material honors through various citation systems, which are positively employed. The second is the adjustment of pay between a minimum of 17 won and a maximum of 270 won.

(48) Pae Chong-min, op. cit., pp.69-71. It seems that there are not so many transfers as in the Republic of Korea.
(49) Exposure of wrongs and self-criticism in the presence of many persons.
(50) Kim Il-song Collection, p.163 and p.433.
(51) Ibid. p.426-441.
(53) Mostajr Reajj, "Toward the Comparative Study of the Political Decision Makers," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1969, p.355. The more underdeveloped a nation is, the fondly it used ideology and coercion.
as the case of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The third category includes such incentives for producers as the contract system, efficiency bonus, and a self-supporting accounting system.

Now let us examine the relations between such motivating methods and the bureaucratism and formalism constantly criticized by Kim Il-song. The way to fundamentally correct bureaucratism and formalism might be to open the door for the populace to participate in administration and for the middle and lower echelon within the administration to participate in decision-making. Kim Il-song frequently presented concrete formulae to root out bureaucratism and formalism, but he only told the officialdom and higher officials to go to the populace and their subordinates, respectively, to kindly guide, consult with, and listen to them from the enlightening standpoint, and he has never given them the actual opportunity for participation, which is impossible under their ideology. There seems to have been a contradiction in trying to secure the effect of participation while actually denying it. In other words, the genuine solution is positive provision of participation opportunity, which is ideologically impossible.

The Republic of Korea, meanwhile, also employs the coercive method as a major weapon, although it differs from that used in North Korea in its contents. Besides, normative and incentive methods, though very trifling, are used. But this is attributable not to the ideology but to the lack of understanding on the part of Koreans as a whole that democracy is based on the very participation not only in the political society but in all social life, and to the authoritative culture and tradition of administrative law.

Therefore, though the motivating methods are similar in both halves of Korea, the Republic of Korea has a potential to positively motivate its personnel in the future, while north Korea has almost no such possibility unless its ideology is basically remodeled. A serious friction is anticipated in the case of administrative integration.

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(55) Pae Chong-nin, op. cit., p. 44-5 (soldiers). In Communist China, Doak A. Barnett, op. cit., there are 24 grades, and a minister is graded 6th and receives 400 yuan as compared with 45 yuan of the 24th grade. In the Soviet Union, U.S. Senate, “Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union,” in Nimrod Rapheeli (ed.), Readings in Comparative Public Administration, college graduates are paid nine to ten times as much.

(56) Robert H. Guest, Organizational Change, Homewood, Ill., Irwin, 1962, p. 152.

6. Conclusion:

We have comparatively examined the administration in ROK and North Korea, in which numerous differences have been found.

Major differences were found in the scope of administrative authority, control of it, extent of decision-makers and participation in decision-making, centralism in planning, administrative centralism, horizontal and vertical division of organization, nature of budget and composition of revenues and expenditures, and motivating factors. To extract a few conclusions on the basis of the comparative study of these points from the viewpoint of administrative integration:

a. The highly regulated administration in North Korea may produce favorable results in the simple, early stage before substantial industrialization. But with the progress of industrialization, it will be increasingly felt that such an administration as is operating now, only passively, is unfit.

b. With such a transition, the technical dimension of administration in North Korea will be adapted and reformed at a relatively early date. More concretely, planning will be decentralized, the weight of party loyalty as the qualification for appointment of administrative personnel will decrease, specialization will increase, and the weight of incentive factors for motivating, will increase.

c. But in the more political dimension of the administration, comprising the extent and intensity of the administrative authority, control, and policy-making is unlikely to be easily altered.

d. These differences involving such political matters are ultimately attributable to the denial of private economy and the proletarian dictatorship advocated by Communism.

e. As long as both halves of Korea continue to pursue their developmental programs to develop the economy and to strengthen their defense potentials through their administration as a means, the technical dimension of their administration offers more feasibility for integration than the political dimension does. But the possibility of integration in the more political dimension of administration will have to be preceded by ideological integration.