Case Collections for Leadership Training for Public Development Projects: Inquiries and Illustrative Cases

Suk-Choon Cho
(Professor)

Table of Contents

I. Forward
II. Conceptual Note
III. Selection of the Cases in this Paper
IV. Background Knowledge for the Selected Cases
   1. Mayor Kim's Biodata, His Appointment, Initial Period, and Achievements
V. Case I: Urban Renewal Project; Shopping Center and Apartment Complex
V. Case II: Relocation of Slum

Residents; Building a New Town

VII. Further Inqury into "Linkages" and "Client Support"
   1. General Comments on the Cases
   2. Linkage
   3. Client Support

VIII. Conclusion
   1. Description of Future Cases
   2. Supplementing and Utilizing the Illustrative Cases

I. Forward*

The purpose of this paper is to develop some guidelines for the collection of cases for leadership training in public sector.

* The author conducted two public leadership workshops at the Technology and Development Institute, East-West Center, Hawaii and served as a senior fellow there from Sept. 1974 to Feb. 1975, during which the first draft of this paper was written.

The clients for such leadership training we have in mind are those top managers at the local and the field government level. They are the persons who are ultimately responsible and accountable to the residents and also to the...
officials in charge at the next higher level.

In receiving the contents of leadership training for such clients one approach is to aid them in the performance of general functions of public leadership. This has been the most dominant practice adopted in the field of training for mayors and field officers.

One can conceive of the second approach which is to more sharply focus the contents of training in terms of the ability to initiate and implement development projects whatever the kinds of these projects may be. We think what the leaders at this level in developing countries lack is this ability or project development and management. This approach will tend to give the training content more concreteness and it can tie in with the participants' sense of mission for the development of their country.

In the paper, we take the second approach. However, mayors are not the representatives of specific municipal functions. Therefore, we cannot incorporate into the program contents too much of the technicalities of specific functional projects. Also, mayors and to a certain extent the leaders of central governments' field offices are not project managers in the sense usually referred in the textbooks of project management.

Their responsibilities and activities include those of highly political nature. And what differentiates their role from that of staff positions are their functions for environment scanning and management. Consequently, the training content has to reflect this nature of their jobs.

Conceiving of their job content in this manner leaves us with no readily available recipe which the trainers can use for cooking up the contents of training. This is why research is needed in this area.

Thus the collection of cases proposed in this paper is to serve the dual purpose of conducting researches on the pedagogy. This is again deviation from the traditional pattern in which one can find no relationship whatever between pedagogical cases and research cases. What is attempted here is to recommend, together with guidelines, the simultaneous undertaking of both activities.

Out of this nature of case collection strategy and the lack of readily available knowledge, there arise the necessity to develop unique frameworks for the description of cases and the researches.

II. Conceptual Note

Even if we agree on the elaborate frameworks for the description of leader behavior in connection with development projects, the case contents will necessarily have to vary according to such multiple criteria as functional and technical nature of the project, levels of organization the leader is representing, the sector in which the organization is working, structural context of the environment both in and outside the organization, and the culture and the nation in which the project is located.

In order to let our cases amenable to some degree of meaningful generalizations of at least middle-range level, the strategy should be to group the cases based on the criteria cited above.

Assuming that the cases are classified in this fashion, then the most crucial task will be the formation of concepts and their operationalization with regard to leader behaviors.

The purpose of these cases should be to enhance the participants' ability for decision making with regard to development projects. The cases, therefore, in describing the decision process will have to identify critical points at which major decisions should be made and the leader's behaviors of choice among alternatives at these critical points together with the ensuing results.
However, in spite of our common tendency to judge the merit of choice according to the subsequent results, the results cannot serve as good measures for evaluating the choice behavior because of the unpredictable and uncontrollable factors which occur during the time lag between the choice and the consequences. Consequently, there is no other way than just to assume that if certain characteristics govern the leader's decision process behavior, the results will have more probability of achieving success. These characteristics are the desirables a researcher cherishes before he undertakes actual conduct of research.

Where can we find different ways of formulating these characteristics? Organization theories with the exception of those few recent efforts dealing with extra-organizational relations have been concerned with internal dimensions of organizations. Thus, the leadership theories were focused on supervisor of subordinates. Small group theories facilitated this tendency and the level of application was at the first-line supervisors.

In the area of political leadership, one does not find the body of accumulated knowledge centering on this specific topic. Compared to the field of organization theories, political leadership is not a recognized field. Moreover, to seek help from this field may mean the neglect of internal administrative dimensions of leadership functions.

From the area of business administration, policy formulation case studies for top business executive development may render some help. However, the use of these cases for the public leaders may deprive the program of the sense of political judgments and public interests.

Project management literature are more or less aimed at the functional and technical executive development. The political and dynamic features of operations are not covered in these literature. Project behavior perspective is more relevant for our purpose. However, the literature based on this perspective is very small in number.

The field of decision theories is another field we can examine. Quantitative and normative theories have the same characteristics with those of the project management literature. Theories of incremental type, besides their nature of culture boundness, lack the normative and prescriptive elements. Bounded-rationality approach is the only one which can be of some help for our purpose.

From the area of development administration, institution building perspective needs special attention. This is not a model or theory. It has only broad categories of concepts. It can not recommend any concrete choice when a leader is faced with conflicting alternatives. This is why I used the term "perspective" for this approach.

In spite of these shortcomings, my teaching experiences at the Graduate School of Public Administration has shown that the students who are already in the public service were most enthusiastic of this perspective. This was due to the greater relevance of this perspective to their performance of leadership functions and also because of the fact that this perspective suggests some prescriptive guidelines for leader actions. In this sense, if this perspective is broken down to more concrete level, relevance to the leadership activities and usefulness may decrease.

Among the various categories of concept, the "linkage" has attracted widest attention from the students. This is probably due to the students' long bureaucratic socialization backgrounds and also because the complex environment is simplified by four categories of enabling, functional, normative, and diffused linkages. Out of a number of different ways of conceiving these desirables, we have used in this paper such categorical notions as "establishing linkages," "getting client support," "getting staff support," and "utilizing
symbols and culture.” These were regarded as most crucial decisions in the series of various decisions a leader has to make in connection with his project.

Excess: “getting staff support,” all the rest are linkage activities. We used different terms and do not necessarily follow the institution building perspective as it is and in toto.

“Linkage” is a relation a leader has with extra-organizational units, in which various kinds of resources are flowing in relation to a project.

Therefore, linkage behavior of the leader is his decision aimed at establishing and maintaining such linkages. However, this behavior will take many number of different expressions depending on the kinds and degrees of support he is seeking and the latter will again depend upon the leader’s evaluation of the existing linkages he already has. Many ways of conceiving linkage alternatives can be contemplated based, for example, on such criteria as nature and number of linkages, and degree of identification with the linkages. However, with regard to this process of decision making to establish linkages, we have very little knowledge.

Client support is the support given to the leader by the public and the client and is expressed by their awareness of, and sense of positive involvement with the project.

Therefore, when the clients are aware of and feel sense of identification with the project, one can say there is client support. However, there is a problem of whole ranges of degrees in support rendered. Also there is the problem of defining the clients. At first thought, it seems that clients are those benefitting from the project. However, if one conceives of benefits very broadly, then anyone who is providing inputs can be regarded as beneficiaries because one can safely say that everyone is contributing in anticipation of returns. Therefore, the concept should be narrowed down for research purpose, and the clients should be regarded as those primary beneficiaries as expressed in the project nature. For example, in public housing project, expected occupants should be regarded as clients, because they are supposed to be the primary output consumers of the project. However, they also provide varying degrees of inputs to the project such as passive acquiescence, and overt expression of either support or opposition. They also provide financial inputs as expressed in terms of rents.

In the same housing project, the word “public” should be applied to the other ordinary citizens who will indirectly acquire benefits because of the reduction of annoyances which could have increased if there had not been such project.

Even with these definitions of support, client, and public, we are still left with the problems of identifying how a leader conceives of various alternatives for getting client and public supports. For a researcher to formulate the conceptions which can be meaningful to the practitioners of leadership will be difficult indeed.

In conclusion, both in “linkage” and “client support,” the ways of perceiving alternatives together with suggested choices which can be meaningful to the project leader are little known at this stage.

III. Selection of the Cases in this Paper

The Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, Korea, has developed around 20 cases for its courses on “Policy Formulation.”

All of these cases dealt with the dynamic decision processes of the issues covered. However, most of them were concerned with the central
government policies. A few dealt with the cases of the metropolitan government of the city of Seoul. There were only two cases on the decisions of ordinary local governments in provinces. The following is the list of titles of these cases.

1. Designation of Free Export Zone in Masan Port Area
2. Building Industrial Estate in Cheonju City Area
3. Relocation of Seoul National University Campus
4. Building Agricultural Development Corporation
5. Seoul-Pusan Express Highway Construction Project
6. Petro-Chemical Industry Complex Project
7. Designating the Pier for Coastal Liners in the City of Pusan
8. Abolition of Middle School Entrance Examination
9. The Decision to Build a Subway in the City of Seoul
10. Urban Renewal Project: Shopping Center and Apartment Complex
11. Urban Renewal Project: Slum Clearance and Apartment Housing
12. Relocation of Slum Residents: Building a New Town
13. Korea-U.S. Visa Agreement
14. The Decision to Recall the Korean Technicians abroad
15. Establishment of the Korea Housing Bank
16. Regional Development Along the Demilitarized Zone Line
17. Tax Reform in 1968
18. Decision to Raise Bus Fare in the City of Seoul
19. Budget Conflict and Mayor's Resignation in Taegu City
20. Transportation System and Community Development at North Kaja-Dong, Seoul

The writer wanted to concentrate on small number of cases in view of the time available. The following criteria were used in selection.

1. Central government decisions are excluded.
2. The projects aimed at producing physical outputs are preferred.
3. The cases the description of which ends with the policy decision to embark on a certain project are excluded. In other words, case description should cover the implementation phase and the outcomes.
4. The more detail the description the better.
5. The cases whose description is rather skewed are also excluded. In other words, balanced description covering various dimensions of the process are preferred.
6. The cases selected should be comparable between them.

Using these criteria the following two cases were selected.

1. Urban Renewal Project: Shopping Center and Apartment Complex
2. Relocation of Slum Residents: Building a New Town

These cases occurred between 1966 and 1971 in the city of Seoul. They were initiated under the same mayor and one of them was completed during his term. These projects were in the category of urban renewal and development and their clients were the slum residents in the city of Seoul.

Before starting the description of these projects it should be pointed out that the original cases were not written from the vantage point of the mayor. Nor the writers of these cases had in mind the same interests as ours. Whenever feasible and reasonable in view of the additional data on hand,

(1) Urban Renewal Project: Slum Clearance and Apartment Housing will be touched upon during the description of this case.
adaptations will be made.

IV. Background Knowledge for the Selected Cases

1. Setting

The President of the nation had most influential power in the whole governing system of the country. He was elected by popular vote for a four-year term. The Prime Minister was to serve his position at the will of the President. All the cabinet ministers were also appointed by the President himself.

Each ministry was in turn authorized to direct, in its respective functional area, the local governments which included provincial and special city governments like Seoul and county and regular city governments.

The National Assembly which was a single house legislative arm of the government was composed of elected representatives. Almost two-thirds of them belonged to the government party which was being led by the President.

The special City of Seoul belonged directly to the Prime Minister while the other special city like Pusan and provincial governments were placed under the supervision of the Minister of Home Affairs.

The Mayor of Seoul was appointed by the President without fixed term and the city did not have elected council. The size of the budget of the city was always greater than that of any individual ministry of the central government. At the time our Mayor assumed the position, the budget was 13,500,000,000 Won. Almost 99% of the revenues came from the city's own sources including local taxes, fees and others.

The number of municipal personnel was around 10,000. These were working at the municipal office, 9 district offices and other subsidiary and field organizations.

The population of Seoul at the time this Mayor came in was around 3,500,000 and annual increase rate over the past few years had been around 9% and this rate was predicted to continue in the future. This high rate was mainly due to the inflow of population from other areas of the country especially from countryside. Both the central and the city governments had been fighting with this high rate of population increase, because the congestion in the city not only created extraordinary demands for municipal services but also it was worsening the defense posture of South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea in view of the fact that the capital city is located so close to the armistice line.

Economy of the country had been booming for the past few years with more than 9% annual increase in GNP. The largest proportions of secondary and tertiary industries of the country were concentrated in this city. However, the economy could not absorb all of the above population influx. Many of the migrants were unemployed, underemployed as non-skilled manual laborers and were peddlers.

Based on the voting returns of the various elections of the past, the city of Seoul had been regarded for the past 18 years since Korea's indepence as the most persistent stronghold for the oppositions against the government. Thus, the government party candidates had the tendency to prefer rural districts compared to the opposition candidates who would run in urban areas especially in the city of Seoul.

1. Mayor Kim's Biodata, His Appointment, Initial Period, and Achievements

Mayor Kim was born in a poor faming family and graduated from middle school(3) in 1944. He

---

(2) Exchange rate at the time was 300 Won to 1 U.S. dollar.
(3) Eleventh grade.
then was employed at a local elementary school as an office boy. With the Korean liberation from Japan in 1945, he joined the military academy and graduated from it in 1947. He had served in the army in the field of transportation until retired as brigadier general in 1963. During this period, he went through a series of military education courses including infantry school and army college. While serving in the army, he finished evening classes of a not-well-known civilian college in 1958 with B.A. in political science.

His major military assignments included such posts as deputy chief of transportation staff of the Korean Army Headquarters, director of the Army Transportation School, chief transportation staff of First Army, and the Third Harbor Commander of the Army.

It was in April 1962, a year after the successful military coup, that full Colonel Kim was appointed Mayor of the city of Pusan, the second largest city of Korea. After a year and a half he retired from the army in order to continue to serve this post of mayorship with the promotion of military rank to brigadier general.

During his four years in Pusan, he accomplished a large-scale urban renewal project in the central business district, which involved the purchase of properties from the owners, rezoning, development of land, and construction of buildings. This was considered big achievement, because his predecessors had not been able to undertake this project though the necessity for it had always been there. His another accomplishment was the widening and paving of the street leading to the airport and turning it into a modern highway.

It was because of such achievements that President Park appointed him as the Mayor of the city of Seoul. His age was 40, the youngest of the 15 mayors of the city since 1945.

Traditionally, this position used to be filled by political figures whose names had already been well known among the citizens of Seoul by the time of appointment. Most of his predecessors had served cabinet ministerial posts of the central government.

To promote a mayor of Pusan to Seoul and to appoint such a little known young man like Mayor Kim was directly against these past practices.

During the two months which followed the appointment, he reshuffled the civil service of the metropolitan government. He brought in two deputy mayors who were considered to be his men. Out of the nine positions of bureau chiefs only three positions which were technical in nature were kept intact. The remaining six bureau chiefs were either brought from outside or promoted from within. Compared to the previous administrations, the level of academic background of these eleven men was the highest including three with M.A. and one with Ph.D. Their average age was also the lowest. Five bureau chiefs were in their thirties.

The first target he concentrated on was the alleviation of traffic congestion in the city. For this purpose, projects involving new roads, underpasses and overpasses were launched all over the city.

Urban renewal and slum clearance projects were also undertaken in the scales never seen before. The Han River development project which involved embankment and a series of roads and bridge constructions was also undertaken.

Massive land development projects involving zoning, readjustment of unutilized land for residential estates were another kind of projects he undertook.

In all of these projects Mayor Kim's achieve-

---

(4) During the military rule which lasted more than three years, such practice of appointing military officers in uniform to high-ranking civil service positions was prevalent.
ments were considered extraordinary exceeding those of all the predecessors. In the presidential election in 1963, the votes supporting the government were 28% of the total votes cast in Seoul. However, in 1967 the figure increased to 46%. Knowledgeable sources in Korea attributed this phenomenon mainly to the performances shown by Mayor Kim.

Immediately following his appointment in April 1966, he revised the whole structure of the FY 1966 budget which had already been in execution and approved by the Prime Minister who is legally designated for this authority. The emphasis in the new budget was placed on public works for the series of projects mentioned above.

In addition, he had to find new sources of revenue for the massive projects. This was made possible by letting the city government act as a developer. Thus, the city government, with its expense upgraded the unutilized or underutilized lots and later sold these lots at higher prices. Another means was to induce the private developers to join urban renewal projects and invest capitals. Thus, the city's budget more than tripled in four years compared to that of 1966, the first year of his office.

V. Case I: Urban Renewal Project; Shopping Center and Apartment Complex

It was during the Japanese rule that this area which runs north to south in the central business area of Seoul for the length of 1.2km was made into a 10 meter width street as an evacuation route in anticipation of the U.S. bombardment during World War II. After the war, refugees from North Korea and evacuees from abroad started to settle in this still unfinished street. Most of these people operated small shops of wood shacks not larger than 3.5 square meters in average. These shacks also served as their living quarters. The open space in between the several rows of these shacks which ran north to south were occupied during the daytime by peddlers and open-air mobile shops of every kind.

Adjacent to this area was a so-called red light district or prostitute quarters which had been in existence from the days of Japanese rule. This street market was gradually being contaminated with these bad practices with girls alluring men during the evenings.

Legal nature of this area still remained classified as a 50 meter wide and 1.2km long street. The residents of this area had petitioned several times to the city government to abandon this classification so that they could become legitimate owners of the lots.

However, the preceding administrations did not maintain consistent responses to these petitions. At one time, it was proclaimed that this area would be restored to its original design because the National Assembly had decided to build its new building in the small palace garden also adjacent to this area. Later, the National Assembly and the central government changed this decision and announced they would build the assembly building in another place. The city government could not refuse the applications for the establishment of property rights. Thus, more than half of the residents in this area purchased the lots thereby establishing property rights. Still later, the National Assembly again designated this place as its site and let the city government refuse to accept further applications for purchase. In 1965 the National Assembly again announced that it did not reach to a decision as to its site.

During these years, the city government did not issue building permits in this area. In other words, most of the shacks were illegal buildings. Meanwhile, many of the lots immediately adjacent to the outer edges of the 50 meter
width obtained building permits and buildings were erected to face the street in anticipation of eventual restoration of the original design.

The problem of this case as conceived by Mayor Kim was then to clean up this area the ugly appearance of which had gradually developed over the past 2 years.

It was around June 15, 1966, two months and eleven days after Mayor Kim's inauguration, that the district head Chang of Chung-Ku District, who had also retired from the army to assume this post under the previous mayor, visited Mayor Kim and briefed his proposal to clean up the above area. His idea was to compensate for the lots both in money and in other cheaper lots and build a modern shopping center/apartment complex on this street. Fifteen meter width areas on both sides were to be occupied with this complex and the middle portion of 20 meter width was to serve as the street. The proposal also contained the schedule of activities and the organization for implementing it.

Mayor Kim referred this proposal to the director of Municipal Planning Bureau for further study and improvement of contents. The director again assigned his work to chief of Planning Section, who in turn instructed the subsection chief of Integrated Planning to examine the proposal.

The subsection chief, in consultation with the section chief, drafted a revised plan in a couple of days and briefed the Mayor, who instructed for further refinements. Thereafter, Mayor Kim, District Head Chang, chief of Planning Section and subsection chief of Integrated Planning visited the site in group. The roads were too narrow to permit a car to enter. Consequently, they had to walk and prostitutes tried to allure them not knowing who they were.

While the plan was further being examined on the basis of this site visit, the Mayor, on June 19, suddenly ordered the project planning team composed of the above persons to prepare a briefing chart on this project which would be used for his briefing in the early morning of the following day at the presidential mansion. The chart was prepared during that night.

The President gave his approval after listening to the briefing the following day. Upon his return to the city hall, Mayor Kim instructed to District Head Chang to start implementation of the project. District Head Chang issued the notifications to the residents of the area under his jurisdiction requesting the demolition and removal of the existing buildings at the expense of the owners.

It was only then that the newspapers learned and reported on this project. Head of Chongno-Ku District which had areal jurisdiction over northern section of this site also issued the notifications to the residents concerned.

Until this time design for the division of land was not decided upon. Neither was decided the amount of compensation for the lot owners who would not join the lot owners association which was to be formed at the suggestion of the city government.

The deputy mayor in charge of public works asked one of his American friends who had been working as an expert at the Urban and Regional Planning Center of the Ministry of Public Works at the invitation of the Asia Foundation to draw

---

(5) This was against the legal stipulations which require prior approval of the Minister of Public Works for this kind of project.

(6) According to the Korean administrative law, if the notifiee does not abide by this order until the second notice, the government can eliminate the building after seven days from the last notice and charge the expense to the owner.
a land utilization design for this area. His assistance was sought in order to strengthen the position of the project team as to the design of the land. However, the alien expert's design was not accepted by the project team, because it did not well fit housing customs of the Koreans, involved excessive building costs and, if adopted, would further complicate the legal procedures in the transfer of titles among the owners of different lots.

In the discussion among the staff, the section chief of Planning and the subsection chief of Integrated Planning insisted to protect the legitimate rights of the owners of those buildings which were located along the outer edges of the 50 meter width. Thus, the finally adopted design of the site was to build shopping center/apartment buildings in the center 20 meters, and 15 meters at both idea of those buildings were designed to serve as streets. This land design was approved by Mayor Kim and the design for the buildings was contract out to a well-known architect firm in the city. By the middle of June almost all of the shacks located in Chongno-Ku District were demolished and eliminated.

Those residents who thought they could afford a new fancy store in this site gradually took the leadership in the lot owners association. Many who did not think they could afford grudgingly joined the association with wait-and-see attitude. A series of demonstrations were staged by others at the district offices and the city hall. In these demonstrations those who in the past had been given opportunities or had not been able to afford to purchase the lots joined those tenants renting the stores and living quarters.

It was largely by the initiative of two men, the subsection chief and the section chief, that the legal process for the approval of the Central Urban Planning Commission of the Ministry of Public Works began. Mayor Kim approved this document on July 26 and it was sent to the ministry on the same day. The approvals sought were the abolition of the 50 meter width street and the establishment of urban renewal project in that area.

The section chief of Urban Planning of the Ministry of Public Works returned all documents to the city government requesting the supplement of further data. This action of the Ministry was released to the press, which then more vigorously criticized the project as a poor and indiscreet policy disregarding due process of law. This instigated another demonstration by those residents opposing the project.

The documents together with the requested supplements were again submitted to the Ministry. This time, the subsection chief of Integrated Planning of Seoul acted as go-between these two men to ease the tension. The Ministry introduced the case to the autonomous body called Central Urban Planning Commission.

After almost twenty days the Commission voted down the case. Meanwhile, the district heads of both districts continued to eliminate the illegal buildings. The City submitted the matter again.

(7) One of the motivations for this initiative on the part of these two men was to exempt themselves from the possible reprimand the Board of Audit will exercise upon investigation of the project in the future.

(8) The section chief of Planning of the City of Seoul and the subsection chief of Urban Planning of the Ministry of Public Works were the rivals when the former used to work in the Ministry.

(9) He used to work with these two persons in the same Ministry.

(10) This Commission is composed of 14 commissioners majority of whom are private citizens regarded as experts in the field. The Commission enjoys the authority to make legally binding decisions on such matters as involved in this case.
to the Ministry of Public Works. This time the deputy mayor, the bureau director, the section chief, and the subsection chief all went out to persuade each commissioner through informal person-to-person contacts. Out of these efforts, only one commissioner changed his attitude and showed positive response. In the meeting following these efforts, the Commission appointed a subcommittee composed of seven commissions. The next day, the members of this committee visited the project site where they found busy removal work were going on. The strongest opponent as shown in the committee deliberations following this visit was the former deputy mayor of Seoul who at that time was serving as an advisor to a construction company. Anyone who mentioned favorably for this project was labeled by this man as a stooge of the city government. Thus, the meeting was adjourned without any decision.

At this point, the Mayor asked for help to the offices of the I resident and the Prime Minister, who then asked the Minister of Public Works to resolve the case in favor of the city of Seoul. It was also said that a presidential memo was sent to the Minister.

Both the Minister of Public Works who had been behaving so far as if the matter was none of his business and the subsection chief of Urban Planning who had been in bad terms with the section of Planning of Seoul started to act positively and aggressively even more so than the project team members of the city government. At the same time there was a rumor that the Commission will soon be reorganized.

Both of the deputy mayors were attending the next meeting of the Commission. This was extraordinary in view of the fact that in the past the practice had been for either a section chief or subsection chief to attend the commission sessions for explanations of the proposals concerned. Just before this meeting, the city of Seoul had submitted to this Commission aside from the above case a proposal to dispose of several children’s parks in the central business district and surrounding residential areas in order to generate new revenues for other projects. By this time, all the other revenue sources had been drained because of extraordinary number of new projects. The press stood against this measure to dispose of children’s parks. This new proposal consequently worsened the relationship between the Commission and the city government.

The commissioners in the meeting severely criticized the city government pointing out that the city’s practices are flatly against the sound rule of urban planning. The deputy mayors in turn charged that the Commission seemed to oppose without reasonable grounds whatever the city government was trying to do. The bureau director of the Ministry of Public Works, an ex-officio member of the Commission, suggested to hold a closed session for voting. Thus, the members of project team and two deputy mayors walked out of the room. The Commission voted down the case again. City officials were so angry that one of them used abusive language which led to another complication.

Both sides were too exhausted to continue further confrontations. However, informal and unorganized debates continued to occur occasionally.

On the other hand, the city government presented the design of the building to the lot

(11) This company later constructed one of the buildings in this site.
(12) The practice of the Commission had been to decide on the basic of unanimous agreement.
(13) Commissioners did not have fixed terms of office.
owners’ association and asked to undertake the construction based on this design. The estimated cost for construction was 4,400,000,000 Won.\(^{(14)}\) Eight separate buildings each ranging from four stories to twenty-two stories were to house stores in the first two floors and apartments in the remaining floors.

Because of this enormous cost for construction, the lot owners association could not possibly undertake all of the eight buildings. There appeared many who withdrew from the association. Wealthier ones organized themselves into two corporations dissolving the lot owners association. Each corporation conceded to build one building each. The groundwork for these two buildings started in late September.

In order to raise additional funds, these corporations started to sell certificates which would entitle the possessors for preferential treatment in the process of establishing property rights to new stores and apartments upon their completion. District offices also issued the documents entitled the possessors to preferential treatment to those who persistently refused to join the relocation scheme for the slum residents of this area. Because of the removal of shacks in this area, many, while waiting for new buildings to complete, stayed with their relatives and friends. Those who were poor and had no place to stay were given 4.5 square meter of undeveloped government land in average to start new settlements in several parts of remote outskirts of the city. They were transported by government trucks.

On October 15, the Urban Planning Commission finally passed resolution approving the city’s proposal for this project possibly because it found that it was too late to restore the original conditions of the area. By this time the groundwork for the two buildings were well under way. Only nine out of fourteen commissioners attended this meeting. In that meeting the Commission, in contradiction to the resolution per se, made the following recommendation to the Minister of Public Works. It read as follows:

> Launching of a project before the approval of this body is deplorable. Therefore, the Minister should supervise the city of Seoul to the effect that the project can be halted.

Attachment of any letter as in this incidence to its formal resolution was unprecedented and exceptional practice.

This area consisted of 50% of central government owned lots and 40% of privately owned lots. About half of the former were located in the space on which the buildings were to be erected. The members of the project team, on August 14, initiated through Mayor Kim a proposal to the Office of National Taxation which is responsible for the management of real properties of the central government to transfer the land title to the city government inasmuch as the area was going to be declared as an urban renewal project site and the project of this nature falls clearly under the category of “urban planning” as stipulated in the law. However, the above office rejected this proposal on the ground that the project was benefiting the residents of only a very limited portion of the city and therefore, the project did not fall into the category of “urban planning.”

The next move taken by the city government was to propose the exchange of these nationally owned lots with the privately owned lots which were located in the portion where the two roads were going to be constructed. This was again rejected on the ground that it would not meet the conditions stipulated in the law with regard to the exchange and merger of nationally owned real properties. The city officials then suggested

\(^{(14)}\) 14,000,000 U.S. dollars.
that they might raise the issue of the city-owned land being used by the central government.

The Office of National Taxation finally loosened its position and leased the land to the city government as a temporary measure. This Office agreed to exchange the lots only after all the buildings were completed.

For the other six buildings, initially there were no persons to volunteer for the construction. People were still very dubious about the expected business volume of this future shopping center. Mayor Kim then asked the two biggest construction companies in Korea to build another two buildings with their expense. These companies had been the major contractors of the various public works projects the Mayor had launched in Seoul. They could expect more business in the future as long as Mayor Kim stays in office. The ownership and the management of the whole building were to be granted to the company constructing the building. They accepted this offer, but very reluctantly, because they were also not very sure about the attractiveness of this venture. This area used to be regarded as slum areas and only the low-income class shoppers used to come here.

The first two buildings were going up. Gradually, the residents started to show interest in this future shopping center. Forced out of their shacks under the excuse of voluntary evacuation, the only proof that they could claim to enter here again was a piece of paper in their hands, called reentry certificate issued by the two district offices.

There appeared the people who wanted to buy these certificates. The price gradually went up. Those who thought they could not afford the high amount for the contract which the companies would require upon completion of the buildings withdrew from the scene by selling these certificates.

It was only then that other construction companies volunteered for the construction of the remaining four buildings. The competition became so severe to the extent even quasi-political groups and small companies volunteered themselves. The city government requested the deposit of 50,000,000 Won to qualify for open bidding.

One of the first two buildings was almost complete and the management started to accept the applications for contracts. How ever, the number of certificates issued far outnumbered the number of stores available. The company then decided to lease the stores rather than selling them and the lease contracts were made with those bidding the highest price. Those who failed sued the district office concerned. Those who had bought the certificates from the company could subtract this price from the amount they offered in the bidding.

The management of the other buildings followed largely the same procedures. The apartments above the third floor were sold to whoever could afford the price the company requested, which was too high for most of the residents of this area. This high demand for stores and apartments in these new fancy-looking buildings was taken by many including Mayor Kim as a good sign of success, and the Mayor instructed city officials to plan for similar projects in other blighted areas of Seoul.

It was on the memorial day of April student revolution that President Park and Mayor Kim together cut the ribbon in the inauguration ceremony for this giant shopping center/apartment complex. The mass media in reporting this incidence designated the site as a new famous spot to visit in Seoul. In the Christmas and New Year season of that year, the shopping center competed very well with the two most prominent department stores in downtown Seoul.

When visited again in the summer of 1968,
those for who used to pay personal visits to the city hall and the district offices with petitions in hand's were serving in managerial positions of the corporations. However, those majority who used to demonstrate in groups in the city hall and the district offices could not be found among the faces of those attending the stores. The area next to his shopping center/apartment complex which used to be a clean area was being contaminated with prostitution.

VI. Case II: Relocation of Slum Residents; Building a New Town

Mayor Kim upon his appointment on April 4, 1966 promised in public to the citizens of Seoul various public works projects. Within three months p r o d, overpasses and underpasses over several spots of downtown Seoul were being constructed, and street expansion and water supply works projects for the hilly sides were simultaneously going on. Most of the groundbreaking and inauguration ceremonies were held on national memorial days with either the nation's President or the First Lady attending.

Whenever he undertook such projects, the biggest headache for him was the fact that in every project site slums hindered the smooth implementation of projects. In order to solve this problem, he Mayor directed the bureau director of Municipal Planning to secure land estates in the outskirts within the city boundary and evacuate the residents of these illegal houses and develop new communities. Thus, several land estates of less than 10 acres in each were being developed for this purpose and the relocation of slum residents was being carried out.

While this process was going on, a big fire occurred in one of the slum areas near one of the business districts of Seoul with heavy loss of lives and properties. The residents of this area were evacuated, after the fire, to one of the above estates.

In late July, there was heavy rain fall which accompanied unprecedented floods in the city. The most damaged part of the city was the slum areas formed along the river beds and river banks.

On the other hand, the officials were trying to prevent further increase of shacks by demolishing new ones. The year of 1967 was the year for general elections. In the winter of the preceding year, the Minister of Home Affairs had ordered the Mayor to stop the demolition of shacks and evacuation of slum residents during the cold season.

The Mayor complied with this order. Meanwhile, he directed the bureau director of Municipal Planning to conduct a more accurate survey of the current situation of illegal houses in Seoul. Thus, an extensive survey was conducted during that winter with the following result.

The total number of illegal houses was 126,650 and these houses accommodated 230,000 families with the population of 1,270,000 persons. These houses were divided as follows according to the nature of lots and the rear's they were built.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Woods</th>
<th>River beds</th>
<th>River banks</th>
<th>Roads</th>
<th>Private lands owned by others</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39,922</td>
<td>13,567</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>6,167</td>
<td>60,550</td>
<td>11,941</td>
<td>136,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— 223 —
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Houses by the Year Built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>before 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these data, Mayor Kim, in January 1967, directed bureau director of Municipal Planning to draft a master plan to eliminate all of these illegal houses. The latter transmitted this directive to the subsection chief of Housing Administration. The subsection chief, after a series of discussions with the section chief of Housing and the bureau director, completed, on March 20, 1967, the draft titled “The Program for Elimination of Sub-Stndard Houses.” In formulating this draft he had consulted the various ideas which had appeared in the newspapers and the Korean professional journals of urban planning.

This draft had the following features. It consisted of three component parts: one was massive relocation of sum residents to very large estates, the other was improvement of the existing houses at the present sites, and the last was to build frame apartment(s) at the slum areas and accommodate the residents there. The case we are describing here concerns the first portion of this program. We will name this portion hereinafter as “relocation of slum resident project.”

This project planned to demolish 76,650 houses and evacuate 131,535 households with 719,558 persons. Two or three large sites in the area of Gyeonggi-Do Province would be expropriated with compensation. The city government would construct necessary infra-structures and induce light industry to generate employments.

Mayor Kim, while basically agreeing to this draft program, was rather hesitant to launch this project immediately with this scale. He instructed for further study and, if possible, to reduce the size of the project.

Meanwhile, the second portion of the above program, improvement of housing at present sites, seemed more feasible. It proposed to cover 46,000 houses under this category. This was thought as the easiest way of drastically reducing the total figure of illegal houses. Thus, on January 11, the city proposed to the Ministry of Public Works to establish legal titles to the current owners of the houses of the following categories:

1. The houses built on the lots which are not amenable to floods,
2. The houses on the lots which do not violate the zoning regulations,
3. The houses which are built with the materials stronger than cement blocks.

The Minister after two days approved the special ordinance for above purpose.

Thus, on April 23, 1968, Mayor Kim announced to the public that 150,000 houses of the above categories would be saved at their present sites. However, many citizens took this announcement as a sign of goodwill on the part of the government to win the elections scheduled in June and July of the year. As a consequence, more shacks were being built illegally. Every district office was out to every possible area to find and fight this trend. However, many shacks were being

---

(15) These are apartments the frames of which will be built by the city and the rest will be completed by the residents.
(16) This province surrounds the city of Seoul and the provincial government has legal status equal with the Special City of Seoul in the set-up of government hierarchy.
(17) Seoul had nine of them.
built over light. It was said that some city officials including policemen stationed on the spots were bribed. Meanwhile, both government and opposition party candidates were promising their poor constituents that they would protect these shacks. This stimulated further increase of new shacks.

Mayor Kim, in April 1967, requested the bureau director of Municipal Planning to submit the final version of the relocation of slum resident project as soon as possible. In the new version of the project the size was reduced considerably. However, the essential features were same with the initial content. Thus, only one site was to be selected where 300,000 persons would be relocated from various slum areas in Seoul. Mayor Kim give his approval.

In the following months of the year, the subsection chief of Housing Administration secretly looked for a possible site in the province of Kyonggi-Do. Secrecy was necessary because the estate would be expropriated with the exercise of eminent domain and the compensation would be made at the price prevailing at the time of such declaration.

In order to make the cost for remuneration to private owners minimal, the area where the national government possessed a large proportion of the site was to be preferred. Also, the arable lands were to be avoided. The area was to be remote enough from the city of Seoul because generally the farther away from the city the lower the price of land.

Selection of the site was carried out so secretly that the Kyonggi-Do provincial government which has area jurisdiction over the area did not know what had been going on.

The site was finally decided in May 1968 at the present location which is 13km. away from the outer boundary of the city. The consent of the governor of Kyonggi-Do province was then obtained and the Urban Planning Commission of the Ministry of Public Works also approved it. After further revision of the project plan at the direction of Mayor Kim, it was finally announced to the public on June 11, 1968.

The details of this project plan were as follows

1. Location and Area Space:
   Chungbu-Myon, Kwangju-Kun, Kyonggi-Do Province, 26km away from central business district, Seoul, area space; 2,450 acres

2. Planned Proportions of the Division of Lands
   a. residential; 60%
   b. roads; 20%
   c. public facilities (schools, parks, markets, factories, etc.); 20%

3. Land Purchase Schedule
   1st purchase; 408 acres in 1968
   2nd purchase; 816 acres for Jan. to June, 1969
   3rd contract; 1,224 acres for Jan. to June, 1970

4. Land Development Schedule (leveling the lands by contractors)
   1st contract; 408 acres for 1968
   2nd contract; 816 acres for Jan. to Dec. 1969
   3rd contract; 1,224 acres for Jan. to Dec. 1970

5. Schedule for Relocations to the Site
   a. Total Number of Houses to be Demolished; 55,650
   b. Population to be Relocated; 326,400
   1st relocation; 18,340 houses during Mar.-Oct., 1969
   2nd relocation; 27,310 houses during Mar.-Oct., 1970

In 1968, 10,000 houses will be demolished and the residents will be relocated based on the scheme already in use.

6. Road Construction
   a. Networks of 12~30 meter width streets will be built.
   b. New connecting road to the city of Seoul will be built and city buses will be run.

7. Street cars being eliminated from Seoul will
be transferred to this area in the future.

8. Public Facilities.
   a. elementary and secondary schools; 120 acres
   b. market; 19 acres
   c. public lath houses; 14 acres
   d. hospitals and clinics; 16 acres
   e. theatres and amusement centers; 13 acres
   f. household industries and medium industries
      (1) household industries; 10 sites with 2.4 acres
      (2) briquettes manufactories; 5 sites with 8.0 acres
      (3) medium industry estates; 3 sites with 200 acres

These public facilities will be constructed to coincide the flow of residents. Profit rendering facilities of the above list will be persuaded by the city to come in and the other facilities will be constructed by relevant government agencies.

9. Transportation Facilities
   a. City-owned mass transit buses will be operated
   b. Private company-owned buses will be operated

10. Daily necessities will be transported from Seoul.

11. Electricity and telephone systems will be installed by relevant government agencies.

12. Drainage and water works will be installed by the city of Seoul.

13. Relief foods including cereals will be provided by the city of Seoul for initial months.

The cost of this project was estimated approximately 27,000,000,000 Won. Included in this figure were such items as (1) purchase of lands, (2) land development including road constructions, (3) city water works and drainages, and (4) subsidies to every household for their construction of new houses.

The scheme for the generation of revenues was as follows. The city in dividing and zoning the land will keep certain portions as its properties. Meanwhile, in the first year, roughly one-third of the above cost would be borne by various existing revenue sources of the city including loans from banks. From the second year the city will sell the city-owned lands with higher prices. This will generate the revenue for further inputs in the following years. On the other hand, the areas evacuated in the city of Seoul will, with necessary improvements, become highly valuable properties. This will also generate revenues of considerable amounts.

During the internal discussion on this plan before public announcement it was frequently said among the staff that a town with population of more than 500,000 can support itself without much of outside assistance because of high volume of give-and-take activities among the residents. As to the social effect of such project, the planners asserted that the frustrations the poor people feel when mixed with well-to-do people would disappear because of the homogeneity of community created by such relocation project. Indeed, the previous experiences of similar relocation projects of smaller scale seemed to prove this latter assertion.

Immediately following the public declaration of the project, the city started to purchase the land with the compensation of 300 Won per Pyong in average. A field office was set up in the site and the land survey was conducted by contracted engineers. Woods were cut and cemeteries were removed. It was in August that the design for

(18) 900,000,000 U.S. dollars.
(19) Pyung is a Korean unit of area measurement and 1,225 Pyung is equivalent to 1 acre.
land division was finished.

Meanwhile, Mr. Chang who used to be district director during the shopping center/apartment complex project was appointed as the project manager. He recruited some one hundred persons from among the current civil servants of the city government. Around forty of them worked in the center, the city hall, for Mr. Chang and the rest worked in the above field office.

It was in October that the actual land development works were undertaken by several contractors. From the spring of 1969 actual relocation of slum residents was carried out. There was resistance by the slum residents in the initial months. However, Mr. Chang, who had had many experiences of carrying out forced evacuation of slum residents believed that he knew well the psychology of these people and the best way for carrying out such a vast project was to force them out. With nominal amount of subsidy for housing and the certificates entitling them to new lots of twenty Pyung each, they were transported by trucks to the project site, where the site of each lot was decided by drawing lots.

With the gradual progress of land development and completion of some facilities, the price of land began to rise rapidly. From the summer of this year the resistance of the evacuees subsided possibly because of their hope for free acquisition of new land of some value. People who hoped to make fortune out of land speculation came in from Seoul. Rows of real estate dealer shops came into existence. Middle-class residents of Seoul offered to buy the certificates possessed by evacuees in expectation of further escalation of land price. Quite a few sold these certificates and returned to Seoul to build another shack. Many others came in from other parts of Seoul to this place to occupy lots and build illegal shacks.

This place looked like a booming town. All sorts of stores including tearooms, barber shops, beauty parlors, groceries, drinking houses were opened in the central districts of the town. This line of stories got around the whole nation. The peasants and poor people of the remotest provinces immigrated to this place to join the bonanza. Some of these people first came to Seoul and rented a room in slum areas to get transported to the site with certificates.

The land price in the central portion of the new town rose up to 200,000 Won per Pyung, 666 times of the original price.

All sorts of crime occurred. For example, the statistics in first half of 1970 shows 4,167 criminal cases, out of which 1,786 were violence, 927 were robbery and 543 were fraud.

All sorts of informal groups came into existence based on the location of their previous residence in Seoul, the provinces of permanent domicile, the kinship lineages, religions, occupations, generations, etc.

Those on subsistence level with unskilled daily labor could find jobs almost every day in the construction works of various buildings with the relatively decent pay of 500 Won to 1,000 Won a day.

Many small factories came in to utilize the cheap labors in this area. More than 40,000 persons got jobs in these factories.

These phenomena continued with ever higher escalation during the year 1969 and the first half of the year 1970.

Meanwhile, the Kyonggi-Do provincial government had to establish a branch office as an adjunct to the county office which has jurisdiction over this area. Some 80 provincial personnel worked in this office providing such services as resident registration, military drafts, public health and sanitation, education, and building permits and regulations. The provincial government also established a police station which
owned one jeep and several personnel.

In April this year, there occurred in the city of Seoul a big tragic accident which involved the deaths of 50 residents of an apartment building just completed in the preceding year in connection with another project. This project was the third portion of the Draft Program for Elimination of Sub-Standard House which we mentioned earlier.

Mayor Kim, while pushing through this relocation project, was simultaneously implementing the apartment housing project which involved the construction, in the hilly sides, of 40 frame apartments each of which containing 100 to 150 units of apartments. In the early dawn of April 8, while many residents were still in bed, one of these buildings collapsed. Because of this accident Mayor Kim submitted on the same day his resignation to the President, who rather ordered for the post facto control of the situation. In view of Mayor Kim’s uncooperative attitude to the government party during the past four years and the general elections to be held in the following year, the vocal groups of the party insisted Mayor Kim’s resignation.

After the funeral services for the deceased, the President on April 16 appointed a new mayor who had been serving until this time as governor of Kyongbuk-Do Province. The new mayor, Mr. Yang, found that the city’s financial situation was grossly in deficit.

Meanwhile, the national economy which so far had been in good shape began to enter a recess period. This was adversely affecting the revenue flows into the city’s treasury.

He reduced and halted many projects of the predecessor but decided to continue this relocation project and more infra-structure investments were made. However, because of sheer lack of additional revenue sources, he decided to charge the price for the lots in this area. Each household of original evacuees was charged 2,000 Won per Pyong and was allowed to divide into five payments over five years. The city-owned lots were no longer in good demand and, after all, there were not many left.

In the latter half of 1970, the economic recess hit this area very hard. Construction of buildings and houses decreased sharply. Factories started to close down. In addition, commuters to Seoul for daily unskilled labor were also losing jobs. The price of land and buildings was declining very rapidly thus bringing big loss to those who had bought them at higher prices.

In May next year general elections were held. The government party candidates promised to the residents and other property owners exemptions of all kinds of taxes.

After the election the city government levied those owners of the lots which they had bought from original evacuees 8,000 Won to 16,000 Won per Pyong and requested the total payment be made by July 31 of the same year. The city officials in this measure estimated that about 20% of the residents belonged to this category.

On the other hand, the Kyonggi-Do provincial

(20) The causes of this collapse were attributable to the following: (1) poor design because of inadequate funding and accessibility of the surveyors and engineers to the site due to the resistance by the slum residents; (2) low technical quality of the designer; (3) the fact that a research assistant used his professor’s (architect engineering) seal in his absence for the endorsement of the design; (4) two to three step subcontracting with the initial and in-between contractors withdrawing with commissions; (5) inadequate supervision by government officials in the process of construction; and finally (6) the haste in getting the results thus neglecting technical time requirements and overloading the administrators.

(21) However, the actual figure later found was around 60%.
government levied local taxes to all real property owners in the area and the tax bills stated that "in case of disobedience the violator will be subject to no less than six months of imprisonment."

It was on August 9, 1971 that several hundred residents in this area got together and staged a series of demonstrations against the city government of Seoul. About two hundred of them had convened in one of the Christian churches in the area to discuss the ways to fight against the government. The real behind-the-scene figure in this movement was a Christian minister serving as advisor to the fighting committee. He had lost the past election in which he ran as an opposition candidate in this district. (22)

The demonstrators surrounded the project field office. Project Manager Chang and his staff arrived at the scene after a few hours. The following demands were being made by the demonstrators.

1. Evacuees should be totally exempt from payment for their lots.
2. Those who bought the lots from original evacuees should be treated equally with the latter in their payment for lots.
3. Rationed cereals should be provided.
4. Job opportunities should be provided.
5. All the taxes should be exempted.

The project manager promised to provide both cereals and job opportunities. However, he said since the first and the second demands were beyond his authority, Mayor Yang would be able to tell about his decision in the morning of the following day. For the fifth demand, he said it belonged to the authority of Kyonggi-Do provincial government.

During that night a deputy mayor rushed to the site and promised that the Mayor would personally appear before the residents by 11 o'clock of the next morning.

The next day, August 10, the mayor's group in three sedans departed the city hall for the project site at 9:30 a.m. While they were on their way, a police jeep came from the opposite direction and reported to the Mayor that the situation in project area was very tense. Meanwhile, the director of police of Kyonggi-Do Province was also telling the Mayor over the telephone in the mayor's car that the situation there was so tense that it would get out of control any minute. The Mayor accepted the suggestion to wait at a suburban residential area located on the way and dispatched the members of the project team to the site.

At the project site, around 50,000 persons including children and the aged were gathered holding up more than 2,000 pickets. These pickets bore the following signs.

"Give us jobs."
"Reduce the price of land."
"Stop making outrageous profits out of the lands which you bought at 100 won and now selling them at 10,000 Won."
"Don't squeeze the poorest people any more."
"The bodies thrown away south of the Han River, where can they be saved?" (23)
"Don't divide us. You cannot cheat the people here."
"Don't make promise but first implement and then promise."
"Don't irritate the people who are crying out of hunger."

Leaflets with the similar signs had also been distributed. Until 11 o'clock, Mayor Yang did not appear. The words "we are again cheated," were going around among the crowds. It was

(22) He was a Yale graduate with Ph.D. in theology and served as a cabinet minister of the Syngman Rhee's government.
(23) The town is located south of the river which runs in the southern section of Seoul.
around 11:40 a.m. that the demonstrators became really aggressive.

Every car passing by was foraged. The three buildings of the Kyonggi-Do Province branch office, one of which stored tax bills, were demolished. City government's jeeps were set on fire. The project office was also set on fire. Fire-fighting brigade and 63 policemen were called in from outside, but could not approach the scene. Even the innocent passengers in taxis were scolded by them as men of arrogance and wealth. Press cars reporting the incidence were also attacked with the yelling, “people starving to death do not need press!”

It was during his turmoil that the project staff of the city government finally managed to arrive at the scene. However, they could not identify any person to whom they could approach for persuasion and bargaining.

More than 2,000 demonstrators divided themselves in ten city buses and tried to march to Seoul. Meanwhile, the police station was burnt and more government jeeps were set on fire. Police force was increased to 700, but if further irritated these force people.

Mayor Yang, while waiting in the suburb, was keeping the Prime Minister informed over the phone about the details of developments of the situation. He continued to do so after he managed to arrive at the scene at around 3 o'clock. The Prime Minister upon instruction of the President called upon an emergency cabinet meeting which recommended unconditional acceptance of every demand the residents of this town are making.

This decision was then relayed to the leaders of demonstrations including the Christian minister. Around 6 o'clock in the evening this word finally got around to the demonstrators and the order was being restored.

Since then, people involved in the similar projects of smaller scale in other parts of the country also staged series of demonstrations of various scales against the local governments concerned making similar demands. This situation continued through the rest of the year throughout the country until the central government finally took strict and repressive measures against all the demonstrators of this kind.

It was on October 14, 1971 that, by order of the President, the city government and the Kyonggi-Do provincial government worked out the details for the transfer of the project to the latter. The following are the agreements made between the city government on the one hand and the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Kyonggi-Do provincial government on the other hand.

1. The Kyonggi-Do Government will implement the rest of the project.
2. Entire properties and public facilities including garbage collection equipment, altogether equivalent of 3,800,000,000 Won, will be transferred to the Kyonggi-Do Government from the city government of Seoul without any remuneration to the latter.
3. During FY 1972, the city government of Seoul will donate 1,000,000,000 Won in cash to the Kyonggi-Do Government for further development of the area.
4. All the debts the residents owe to the city government of Seoul will be collected and used by the Kyonggi-Do Government and all the debts the city government owes to the various contractors will continue to remain with it.
5. The city government of Seoul will continue to bear the responsibility to complete the connecting roads to the city, will provide for three months hence the technical personnel, and will also continue to operate the city buses.
6. Any difference of opinion as to this transfer
of project will be decided upon by the Prime Minister.

The citizens of Seoul did not have any say and no seem to show concern with regard to this transfer to another local government body, the Kyonggi-Do provincial government in this case, of the project in which their tax monies had been invested.

The following is the table showing the status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of Project as of Oct. 14, 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>project elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>city water works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrial estates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daily necessities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total investments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the project at the time of transfer.

In the early part of 1973, the town was granted a legal status of a full-fledged city with a mayor appointed by the provincial governor. When visited again in the summer of that year, the city had a population of over 150,000 with peace and order prevailing. Though smaller in scale the business districts revived their vitality. Most of the people were busy in earning their livelihoods while still a sizable number of the residents were depending on government reliefs such as cereal and medical cares.

VII. Further Inquiry into “Linkages” and “Client Support”

1. General Comments on the Cases

As to the success or failure of the above two
projects, one is not able to make judgement. However, in spite of many flaws, if Mayor Kim had not developed and implemented the project, the modern shopping center apartment complex and the new city of 150,000 residents could have never come to existence. One can easily think of another kind of leader, being overconcerned about the elimination of every possible flaw in the planning and implementation, leaving behind him no memorable achievements upon his resignation.

Out of these two cases we are not supposed to generalize anything. These were the cases of a specific county during a specific period involving the specific leader and the specific projects. The only purpose of description then was to derive some insights on leader strategies under these constraints by applying the notions of linkage and client support. In doing this, we will also be able to suggest both directly and indirectly a prototype of case descriptions for future cases.

When we use the word "strategy" it necessarily implies subjective judgement on the part of the leader. However, the above two cases were not written from such subjective stance of Mayor Kim. Consequently, his strategies we speculate hereinafter may not be acceptable to Mayor Kim.

2. Linkage

A characteristic of these two cases is the fact that the environmental units of action besides the clients were very small in number. For example, in Case I, the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Works, the Urban Planning Commission, the National Taxation Office, the press, the government party candidates, and the contractors were all those mentioned in the case. Out of them, the President and the big contractors were the only ones whose linkages were actively sought for by Mayor Kim himself.

In Case II, the Minister of Home Affairs and the provincial governor are added to the above list and the National Taxation Office is excluded. In this case again, his major target for support was the President and to somewhat lesser degree the support from the Minister of Public Works and the Urban Planning Commission was sought for.\footnote{According to a reliable source, the Mayor saw the President once a week in average at the presidential mansion during his term of office. This frequency was higher than any of the ministers of the central government.}

Out of these environmental actors, we will single out the government units and call them as "legally prescribed linkages" because all of them had legally defined jurisdictions over functions, areas, and processes with regard to these projects. We will call the President as "the appointing power" for the following analyses.

As was mentioned already, Mayor Kim had no linkages to start with among political and high administrative figures in Seoul. Because of this nature of the initially existing linkages, he might have faced two alternatives: one, to establish linkages widely among the new faces surrounding the President and at the same time continue to strengthen the president’s support and the other, to rely solely upon the president’s support. He chose the latter.

In order to interpret this choice, one has to know the latter’s objectives which can serve as criteria for the evaluation of these alternatives. Let’s think that Mayor Kim was the type of man who wanted to get things done and show the results to the President within a very short span of time. He was picked up as Mayor of Seoul because of exceptional performances while
in Pusar and his style of administration was geared to the production of visible results. We can hypothesize that the man recruited on the basis of past performance will perceive his new role as performer.

We also have to know the leader's perception of the situation. In these cases, all the legally prescribed linkages were dependent upon one person, the President, for the maintenance of their authority. Political structure was thus highly centralized.

Taken this objective and the situation granted, then the first alternative was a poor one, because it will consume so much time for getting accept to the new faces that the achievements will not be realized by the time he wanted. The second alternative was the only one feasible. Also, the second clearly a better alternative in the sense only the President had ultimate power to keep, remove or advance him.

To summarize, the choice of Alternative A was governed by the following factors.

a. Initially, legally prescribed linkages did not exist.
b. Achievement motivation based on recruitment process.
c. Sense of urgency for the results of achievement.
d. Highly centralized political structure with the appointment power at the center.
e. Perception of law as hindrance to development.

With regard to the last item, it needs further explanation. We think the choice of Alternative A will be reinforced when the leader's perception of legal codes in general is such that law being inflexible cannot cope with the rapidly changing conditions of environment and, therefore, law is hindrance to the projects aimed at solving the problems encountered in these environmental changes. Mayor Kim on another occasion explicitly expressed such belief. To quote, "laws, orders, ordinances, regulations were all excellent excuses for those colonial bureaucratic administrators for behaving arrogantly...If we refuse to perform what the country wants us under the excuse of laws and regulations, we will be condemned as betrayers."

We can say then those legally prescribed roles were perceived by Mayor Kim as representing laws and regulations or bureaucratic pathology. Therefore, these linkages were considered as hindrances to be avoided.

The interactions of the above factors to produce the choice of Alternative A are depicted in the following Diagram I.

According to the legally stipulated procedures, he was to take the following sequence of activities. Minister of Public Works—Urban Planning Commission—Prime Minister—President in Case I, and Minister of Home Affairs—the Provincial Governor—Minister of Public Works—Urban Planning Commission—Prime Minister—President in Case II.

Taking Alternative A means that his initial contact was with the President rather than the Minister concerned.

However, having established the initial contact with and approval of the President, he then did not seem to think he was totally free from these legally prescribed linkages. This is why in the later stage he sought for the approval of these

(23) Alternative B.
(26) Alternative A.
linkages. However, his approach was to coerce them to approve his project and such calculation had already been taken into account when he initially approached the President for his approval.

For the next step after the presidential approval, he could have thought of the following alternatives for the sequence of actions. First alternative is to go ahead with the implementation of the project by issuing notifications in Case I and declaring eminent domain in Case II.

**DIAGRAM I.**

- achievement based recruitment
- sense of urgency; time orientation
- high degree of aspired-for performance level
- existing legally prescribed linkages: none
- highly centralized political structure
- perception of law as hindrance to development
- Alternative A; solely rely upon the appointing power

The second alternative is to seek the approval of the legally prescribed linkages and then implement the project. Since the President had already approved, these ministers were also supposed to approve. Therefore, this second alternative should have looked as good as the first alternative.

To show it more clearly, the following were the possible steps of action.

1st alternative (A1): approval of the appointing power→implement→seek approval of legally prescribed linkage

2nd alternative (AII): approval of the appointing power→seek a proval of legally prescribed linkages→implement

The choice of alternative A1 vis-à-vis the Minister of Home Affairs was governed largely by the need to prevent the rise of land price and the leakage of information by the Minister and the governor.

In Case I, Mayor Kim might have expected that even with prior presidential approval, still the Minister of Public Works and especially the autonomous body, Urban Planning Commission, would resist the proposal sufficiently delaying the progress of project. In addition to better probability of project completion by fixed date, alternative A1 could enable him to exercise more pressure on the autonomous body like the Commission by establishing the project as de facto and unrecoverable to the original state. For the stronger resistances to be encountered in this case, he might have thought that he could bear the costs.
Case I is somewhat different in the process Mayor Kim took with regard to legally prescribed linkages. In this case, Mayor Kim, after the presidential approval, also secured the approvals of the Minister of Public Works and the Urban Planning Commission before the declaration of eminent domain. This difference between the two cases was mainly due to the following differences in the characteristics of client and lot owners' interests. In Case I, the client interests were to be accommodated in the plan by constructing the buildings at the same site and the residents were to own better stores and apartments in these buildings. Also, many of the clients had acquired the lots and buildings by illegal means.

However, in Case II, the clients were those slum residents living outside of the project site and the consent sought from the Minister of Public Works and the Commission was on the acquisition of the vacant lands many of which were possessed by legal owners who had nothing to gain or lose from the project. To put it another way, Case II was the project which deprives of the rights of the innocent, while Case I in essence was supposed to benefit the clients who were not necessarily innocent.

Thus, in Case I alternative AI was taken. In Case II the two alternatives were combined. With regard to Minister of Home Affairs and the provincial governor, alternative AI was used; and on the other hand, with regard to Minister of Public Works and Urban Planning Commission, alternative AI was used in the same case.

These factors are depicted in the following Diagram II and added to the preceding diagram to show the complete picture of Mayor Kim's steps of action in the initiation phase of the two projects.

Alternative AI was to accompany more resistance than alternative AI especially from the alienate: autonomous body like the Urban Planning commission. The conflicts with the Commission in Case I took place during the implementation phase. The Commission showed the most stubborn resistance in the whole process. The expectation that the legally prescribed linkages who belong to the same appointing power (the President) with the leader (Mayor Kim) would abide by the will of the appointing power did not work in this case. It was true that legally all the commissioners had been appointed by the President. But actually, the Minister of Public Works was the one who could decide whom to choose for recommendation to the President. The Minister, by keeping himself quiet, could signal this body to take side with him, who in turn could pass the buck to the this body. In addition, the commissioners were all honorary positions without pay and meeting in sessions only when called upon by the ministry. In other words, the incentive to keep the position was not big enough for them to abide by pressures from appointing power. Also, the Commission was a cohesive body following the precedence of unanimous decisions.

Applying alternative AI to this body literally meant coercing this Commission to grant the approval at the cost of the resistance expected. Thus, Mayor Kim's strategy vis-a-vis this Commission differed from the one he used vis-a-vis the ministers. He tried to reduce the resistances in this instance by various means such as persuasion, explanation, dividing the group, applying pressure from above again, etc. Similar attempts were not made with the other legally prescribed linkages. Consequently, we can say that Mayor Kim's strategy vis-a-vis this Commission was to push through the project as scheduled and at the same time try to reduce the resistances with the use of the above means. Depicted in diagram, the mechanism at work will look like the following:
President and the Prime Minister. This action might have isolated the Commission from the ministerial support. This is reflected in its letter of recommendation to the Minister of Public Works, whose content was totally contradictory to the resolution itself.

The Commission granted its approval only when it found that the restoration of the project site to the state visualized in the original plan was virtually impossible. This was when enough progress had been made in the concrete-steel frame ground works for the initial two buildings.

In Case II, as referred earlier, the two legally
prescribed linkages, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Provincial Governor of Kyonggi-Do, were alienated in the initiation phase leading to the declaration of eminent domain. They reluctantly cooperated to the project from this time on until the massive uprising. The city officials, however, having established legitimacy of the project, made it their practice to inform and seek approvals of the provincial government on the details of administration pertaining to the latter's authority. However, all along the project it was one-sided game by the city government until the uprising occurred.

Because of the massive resistances by the demonstrators, the issue quickly became the most urgent concern to the national government. The President decided to transfer the project to the Kyonggi-Do provincial government. The details were to be worked out by the relevant units of government. Mayor Yang in this negotiation was placed on the losing side. To transfer the project was a sign of failure on the part of the city government. Yet, Mayor Yang and the project team still had strong attachments to the project. On the other hand, it was unpredictable when another uprisings of the similar kind and scale would erupt again at the project site. Nobody including the Mayor himself was sure of the city government's capacity to prevent or control these uprisings in case they occur again.

On the other hand, the Home Minister and the Provincial Governor did not exactly want to have this hangover transferred to the provincial government mainly due to similar worries about another uprisings. Thus, the Home Minister and the Provincial Governor tried to capitalize to the maximum degree possible in the dealings with the city government over the details of transfer.

The antipathy created out of their earlier alienation might have reinforced this posture.

Because of these circumstances, Mayor Yang's strategy was to give in as less as possible while at the same time making the transfer realized as soon as possible.

The text of agreement as appeared in the case was the result of bargaining made with these counter strategies of both sides.

So far, we have dealt with the operation of strategies with regard to legally prescribed linkages and the appointing power. The other linkages did not appear during the initiation phase. In other words, the press, party candidates, and the contractors all appear only after the projects were formally announced to the public. In the following, we will only briefly characterize Mayor Kim's strategies vis-a-vis these linkages because of paucity of data.

a. The Press

(1) Keep it secret from the press until the project is approved by the relevant authority. Public announcement will be made only after such approval.

(2) Whenever the President or the First Lady attends the ceremonies, the press will pick up the story together with the project as big event of the day.

(3) Most of the criticism should be disregarded because they will eventually recognize my achievements.

(4) If the criticism continues to persist, then exercise some leverage putting pressure on the management of the press.\(^{28}\)

b. Politicians and Election Candidates

(1) Avoid direct encounters with politicians as much as possible unless strongly initiated by them.

---

\(^{28}\) I was said Mayor Kim one time threatened to rezone the area on which the building of arost vocal press was located. However, this was not proven by evidence.
(2) Election period is the worst season for smooth execution of projects. Therefore, delay the project until the election is over and continue to carry it out in tact after the election as was originally planned.

(3) With regard to the promises the candidates make to the slum residents, do not take counter-measures because the president's and the government's survival also depends on the election outcome.

c. Contractors

(1) Ask for their help on the basis of past business when the city government needs it for project success. If they do not agree, threaten to refuse further contracts or delay the payments for the projects they are already involved.

3. Client Support

a. Orientations of Mayor Kim

In his inaugural address Mayor Kim made the following statements, "All the staff advice I get from city officials will be judged by the sole criterion whether they will benefit the citizens and are wanted by the citizens, and I will render the maximum support as Mayor to the program which meet such criterion." He also asked the city officials to "take new attitude of serving the citizens to the extent of volunteering to die for the benefit of citizens and to give up all the bureaucratic mentality perceiving yourselves as ruling group i.e. this metropolitan administration." In other occasion, he also said in his policy statement, "I will serve the citizens as their servant." 10

Aside from such formal statements, let us look at the actual programs. He launched many innovative programs aimed at better service to the public. These programs had never been thought of under the predecessor administrations. The first was to set up a so-called "citizens service room" in each district office and the city hall to enable the citizens coming into contact with the city government for licenses, certificates, registrations, payment of fees and taxes, etc., visit only this room rather than multitude of sections and get their business done at the same spot within legally fixed periods of time which were set drastically shorter than before.

The other program was to operate a so-called "night city government" in order to continue the service to the citizens after the regular office hours. This system was set up not only at the city hall itself but throughout all the district offices and sub-district offices.

The third, and in fact the first measure he took upon his appointment, was the so-called "citizens hall" which was set up in the room right next to the mayor's office where any lay citizen with inquiries, petitions, proposals and demands could meet the Mayor personally.

The fourth was the program in which city officials of sub-district offices were required to make regular visits to every household to collect the applications the citizens wanted to process at the city government.

The fifth was the program of "roving mayor" in which every head of the sub-district office as roving mayor was required to make rounds of visits every day by autobike to various corners of his area in order to listen to the suggestions and the complaints of the residents. In view of

---

(29) Besides the President, the big contractors seem to be the only category of outside actors with whom Mayor Kim was in good terms. This might have been due to his perception of dependence on these big contractors for smooth execution of physical parts of projects.

(30) Lee, Hee Soo, Developmental Perspectives in Metropolitan Administration (Korean), Ph.D. dissertation, Pusan National University, 1968, p. 375.

(31) Ibid., p. 378.
the above, we will define Mayor Kim as strongly client-oriented or more accurately citizen-oriented than any of his predecessors.

b. Client Benefits and the Strategy

However, did most of the clients (slum residents) receive the intended benefits out of the projects fault in the two cases?

Obviously, contractors and speculators and wealthier ones got most of the benefits in both projects. In Case II, the original evacuees who stayed until the uprising were less than 40%. In Case I, most of those who used to put up demonstrations in the city hall and the district offices could not be found when the site was visited again. Then, did the citizens in general get benefits out of the projects? If one considers significant those nice-looking new buildings in Case I and the widened streets in the original slum area in Case II, then the citizens also must have acquired some indirect and in many cases invisible benefits. However, if one considers the fact that enormous amount of tax money was lost to another local government body in Case II, then all tax-paying citizens suffered a great deal.

Why are such results? The following are the insights we obtain from the cases. Mayor Kim, in spite of his very strong citizen-orientation, did not seem to believe in client participation in the process of project development and implementation. The following statement he made during the special lecture at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University is an excellent expression of this line of his belief. He said as follows: (32)

Let's take the example of those planting flowers on the streets. After the planting there will be the citizens who will cut the flowers. We do not need to be afraid of them. We should enlighten and elevate them to become the citizen who will not cut flowers. If you feel annoyed by them, they will increasingly look like so. If you think them as berefting you, they become increasingly friendly. Therefore, if they cut the flowers, you have to repeatedly plant them again until they finally surrender. Then the flowers will belong not to those who planted but to the four million citizens.

Thus, he perceived himself as one of "those planting the flowers." He assumes he knows, through various ideas which include his own staff, having flowers on the street is good and wanted by the citizens. Once the decision to plant flowers is reached, he will then "repeatedly plant them until they surrender." Consequently, we can conceive of his strategy for client support consisting of two component parts—one, to incorporate the client benefits as much as possible into the substantial portion of project, and the other, to prevent the clients from participation in the decision process.

Thus, the public and the clients learned about the project only after the public announcement. For the lay clients, the only way left for them to express their wishes was to stage demonstrations. However, as the project gradually made a progress, the clients started to show positive interests to the project as if they stopped cutting flowers.

For the other component of his strategy, there were other concurrent objectives to be satisfied in incorporating client interests in the plan on project substance. In Case I, together with the interests of slum residents the objective of erecting modern looking buildings served as important consideration. These two were then combined into a form of modern shopping center/
apartment complex on the same site.

Then, the cost for constructing these buildings was planned to be borne by the residents forming themselves into lot owners’ associations.  

The specifications used in the contract to the architect for building design did not take into account the slum residents’ capacity to afford. It was also impossible to accommodate in this design all of the existing shops and living quarters unless the city government gave up the level of modernity desired. This self-financing scheme together with limited number of available stores and apartments did create the severe competition in which poor clients were gradually pushed out.

In Case II also, the majority of residents in the new town were destined to be non-slum residents because of the financing scheme. Mayor Kim wanted to raise the price of land and these non-slum residents in effect helped him in the escalation by moving into this area playing economic game which gradually pushed out the originally evacuees.

In both cases, the common feature was self-financing scheme. What this scheme actually meant was throwing economically poor people into economic games whose outcome was self-evident. But ironically because of this game the clients who had initially opposed the project gradually started to feel incentives to the project at least for a while.

In Case I, Mayor Kim did not try to exercise leverage on the managers of corporations to protect the interests of the majority of the residents. It seems his objective was gradually changing leaning heavily toward the erection of modern-looking buildings on the site.

In Case II, then the new mayor levied very high prices to the non-slum residents who had bought the lots from original evacuees, it meant, besides alleviation of difficulty-ridden city treasury, to be the negative sanction on these people to prevent further purchase of lots from the original evacuees.

In conclusion, Mayor Kim’s strategy for client support was to incorporate the client interests as judged by him into project substance as much as possible during the development stage of project, keep the information closed from the clients until public announcement, and implement the project to the end in spite of initial resistance. However, because of contradictory objectives and the self-financing schemes based on economic games and also because of little participation by the clients, the primary beneficiaries of his projects turned out to be those other than the clients. Thus, his strategy produced the results which did not necessarily coincide with the mayor’s strong belief in the service to the clients and the citizens.

VIII. Conclusion

1. Description of Future Cases

We have so far practiced exercises on what to describe and how to describe the future cases which can be used for the training of public leaders in developing countries. The following guidelines are recommended.

a. The decision process should be described from the subjective perspective of the leader himself. This stance is needed because we are concerned with his strategies. Thus, the case researcher should constantly aim at finding how the leader perceived the realities, alternatives, and objectives.

(33) It was said the slum residents in this area were well to do compared to those in other slums. However, the administration did not have exact knowledge on the financial status of each household nor the possible amount they could contribute to the project.
This should be conducted by series of long personal interviews with the leader or by prolonged participant observations of the leader's behavior or combination of both. Local level leaders will be more accessible for this purpose.

b. Details of personal backgrounds and the basis of recruitment each reflected in the leader's biodata and recruitment process seem to have significant relationships to his subsequent styles of behavior in project development and implementation.

c. Leader's strategies aimed at cultivating linkages, getting client support and also getting staff support should be focused in the description as originally suggested. With regard to linkage, initial linkage characteristics should be described because these influence greatly the subsequent strategic for linkage cultivation.

Until we are able to derive better classifications, the categories as illustrated in this paper such as "legally prescribed linkage," "appointing power," "the press," "the party candidates," "contractors," etc., are recommended for use, because these terms incorporating common usage serve the purpose of empirical description and make it understood for the readers better than the categories used in the Institution Building Model.

With regard to leader's behavior of setting target, the following observations are made. First, the word "target" cannot be differentiated clearly with similar words such as objectives, aims, purposes and goals. Therefore, for the sake of expediency "target" should be taken to mean a set of initial objectives as conceived by the leader. The word "objective" then should be used to mean those served as criteria for the decisions in the later stages of implementation.

The other consideration is the fact that, in describing the process of setting target, one will necessarily have to deal with the linkages, client support, staff support, etc., thus overlapping with the descriptions of the latter categories. Therefore, as long as the statement of target is included and the descriptions of other categories are carefully related to the components of target, the separate category of "setting target" is not necessary. In other words, recommendation is to absorb the description of target-setting process into other categories and at the same time to include the statement of target consisting of a set of initial objectives.

The following categories which we did not explicitly raise in the past should be newly added in view of their significance as appeared in the cases of this paper. One is "strategy on financing scheme" and the other is "time management strategy." Evidently financing scheme has very significant relationship to the required networks of linkages, the client support and also to other categories. By "time management strategies" I refer to leader's choice behavior as to the durations of project together with deadline for completion and his activities to make those involved time conscious about the project progress. However, this does not mean PERT/CPM type scheduling. In the cases dealt, Mayor Kim's strategy was always to shorten the project period initially proposed by the staff and make himself committed to and bound by the President and the public and also let the project staff make the similar commitments. Thus, the project planning and implementation were always in haste with very quick actions.

d. To summarize strategies on linkage, client support, staff support, financing scheme, and time management, and the statement of target should be searched and identified in the future cases by examining the process in chronological order.

Many cases can be phased into three parts: initiation, implementation, and termination. In the illustrative Case I, initiation phase was taken as
ending around the moments the government issued notifications and the public announcement was made. Termination phase was taken to start roughly around the time of delivery of the project outputs. The in-between period was implementation phase. In Case II, the end of initiation phase was the point of declaration of eminent domain and public announcement and termination started around the time the President decided to transfer the project to another local government body. However, in the actual description one does not necessarily have to have clear-cut divisions among phases. It is both harmful and impossible. This phase notion is only to help the case writer quickly grasp the main stream of events.

In the examination of process, critical decisions on the choice of alternative strategies should receive the main focus. Description thus should cluster around these decisions. Whether or not a decision is critical should be determined by two criteria. One is to judge on the basis whether the choice produced significant impacts on the subsequent developments. The other is whether the decision maker faced serious difficulty in formulating and choosing an alternative strategy. In the illustrative cases of this paper only the first criterion could be applied. In applying these criteria of criticality, the leader’s perception and opinion should be given primary importance.

The strengths of the collected cases will vary. Some cases will be strong in some categories while others will be strong in other areas. Later, we will be able to classify the cases according to different categorical strength of each case.

Once a critical decision is identified the case writer is then recommended to describe the process in terms of “situation,” “objectives,” “alternatives,” “evaluation,” and “choice.” In doing this, as pointed out earlier, he has to constantly try to read the perceptual world of the leader rather than his own evaluations. The description should show not only the alternative strategy chosen but also the strategy not chosen. However, the case writer in many cases will find unable to show this unchosen strategy, because this is usually hidden from outside observations and also the choice is sometimes very quick and self-evident to the leader in view of the surrounding considerations. However, an attempt should be made to identify the hidden strategy and to explain the surrounding conditions making the choice self-evident.

f. There are two kinds of alternative strategies, i.e., process alternative strategy and substance alternative strategy. In the areas where legal regulations are developed, one concrete way to observe the process alternative is by looking at the legally prescribed procedures and comparing them with the actual dynamics. This was done in the illustrative cases of this paper. Legally prescribed procedure is always a process alternative strategy which is usually required by legitimate norms governing the process. Also, for the case writer, this serves always as a good starting point because of the concreteness of legal stipulations. However, as the writer gradually grasps better picture of the process, he should go on to catch the process alternative strategies as actually perceived by the decision maker himself, in which the legally prescribed alternative might or might not have been included.

2. Supplementing and Utilizing the Illustrative Cases

The above two cases were fairly strong in the areas of linkage and client support. Therefore, these cases are to be used in the sessions aimed at these two areas.

However, if we were to conduct a research on
these cases for their refinement and revision, Mayor Kim's own field of perception throughout the whole decision process should be examined. The cases as written and interpreted in this paper depended largely on in direct evidences including his own behaviors.

In describing the strategies on linkages, there was paucity of data on the mayor's alternatives vis-a-vis the party candidates, the press, and the contractors. This was why his strategies with regard to these units of action were mentioned in brief.

More data on events and decisions are also necessary with regard to his strategies for client support in order to scrutinize if he thought of other alternative strategies than the one referred in the analysis part of the cases.

Supplementing these cases in this manner will greatly increase their value for both pedagogical and theoretical interests. However, for immediate purpose, these as they stand are still recommendable for use in the training of public leaders of developing countries.

The following are the illustrative questions to be discussed by the participants at the relevant session.

a. Assume that you are determined to let the slum residents receive the most benefits out of the project. What revisions would you make in the project plan and how will you go about it in implementation? (34)

b. Assume you decide to follow the legally prescribed procedures. What would have been the consequences? Compare these consequences with those in the case. (35)

(34) Case I and Case II.
(35) Case I.