Etite Change and Program Change in the Korean Government, 1955–1967*

by

In-Joung Whang, Ph.D.

(Assistant Professor)

I. INTRODUCTION

Korea's economic growth was sluggish in the 1950's. But it becomes faster since 1962. The average annual growth rate of GNP has been 8.3% during the period of 1962–66. It was merely 4.8% during the period of 1955–61. The question now arises: Why was the economic growth of Korea more rapid in the 1960's than in the 1950's?

In this respect, it is valuable to look at the interplay between two distinct factors. The economic growth of the 1950's was associated with a large amount of foreign aid granted. However, the declining trend of aid received(1) suggests that the post economic growth is little related with foreign aid itself. Associated with the the rapid economic growth of the 1962–66 period has been concerted effort of Korea undertaking economic planning. The planning has been a dominant character of the administration after the student uprising of 1960 and the military coup d'état of 1961. In other words, economic development in Korea does not rest

---

* This article is the summary of the Ph.D. thesis — “Elites and Economic Programs: A Study of Changing Leadership for Economic Development in Korea, 1955–1967” — presented to the University of Pittsburgh in June 1968. This author gratefully acknowledge his indebtedness for the encouragement and guidance provided by Professors Marshall R. Singer, Milton J. Esman, and Hahn-Been Lee. The author is also grateful to the East-West Center for its fellowship assistance to his doctoral study and dissertation in the United States.

(1) The average annual amount of foreign aid received was $277 million from 1955 to 1961 while it was $166 million from 1962 to 1966.
solely on the matter of capital but is related to many other, economic and non-economic, factors. This study is focused on elite change concerned with economic planning because it is motivated by the question of why the administratively planned growth has been more rapid than the administratively neutral growth. In this connection, the main inquiry is stated as follows: How and to what extent are political change, bureaucratic transformation and economic development interrelated in the case of modernization process in Korea since 1960? We can answer this question in terms of a general hypothesis. The hypothesis is: Change in political leadership and its consequent change in administrative elite have brought about changes in economic programs, which in turn have stimulated greater economic development in the 1960's.

The major variables involved in this hypothesis are political leadership, administrative elite, and economic programs. Changes in these variables are hypothesised as being in the same direction, that is greater orientation to, better management of, and more stimulation of, economic development. The hypothesis shall be further elaborated and transformed into operational propositions by referring to the specific nature of changes in these major concepts.

This study is primarily concerned with the period between 1960 and 1967. For the sake of comparison, the period between 1955 and 1959 is also analysed. Before developing and analyzing the hypothesis postulated in the preceding part, it would be valuable to look at social and political conditions in Korea to provide background information for a better understanding of political change in Korea.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN KOREA

Korea’s modernization began with the spreading of western culture toward the east in the late 18th century. It was named Silhak (the True Learning School) and demanded changes and reforms in various aspects of the traditional Korean society. While the indigenous effort for social reform took time, changes in the Korean society were accelerated by the external shocks of foreigners. The changes imposed by the Japanese colonial force (1910—45) were, however, oriented to the imperialistic exploitation of Korean rather than to Korea’s own modernization.

(2) The substantial part of this chapter is drawn from Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration, (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), chapters 3, 6, and 8; unless otherwise indicated.

Some significant changes for national modernization in Korea have taken place only after her national independence in 1948. After the United States Military Government (1945—48), Korea became independent under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. While the Korean government under his leadership was little changed, there were profound changes in various sectors of the society such as the education and the military.

Especially the massive educational drive in the humanities and social science field at the secondary level and above had contributed to the formation of a large group of democratically oriented citizens. The growth of an educated public constituted an important potential force for changes in administration and society as a whole.

The growth and development of military had a considerable impact upon the population. The experience in the modern military organizations as well as modern technology and weapon system profoundly affected the values and behaviors of particularly the rural youth. Thus, the way of life and perceptions of the people changed through civil and military education. In other words, the massive educational drive and military expansions in the 1950's contributed to significant "social mobilization." (4)

As Deutsch points out, the social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the "politically relevant strata of the population." It brings about a change in the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process and thus an increase in the need for greater capabilities in the government. It also tends to generate pressure for a more general transformation of the elite in the political and administrative systems (5).

Because of the accumulated pressures generated by changes in the educational field and the military in the 1950's, the political arena has been under rapid transformation since the student revolution of 1960. The press and academia enjoyed a greater freedom of speech to criticize the government. The intellectuals have tended to enter the political arena.

The intellectual society of Korea was dominated by the younger generation, which began to distinguish themselves from the older generation. Such an "identity of generation" appears in the form of the demand for "generation change" in every sphere of society. The idea would be also an influence after the military coup d'etat of 1961. It is expressed in "antagonism against the flatterers of power holders," "the realization of self independence," i.e., the deve-

(4) It means an overall process of change in a substantial portion of the population from a traditional to a modern way of life. See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in American Political Science Review, LV. No. 3 (September 1961), p. 493.
lopment of a self-supporting economy, rationalization of individual life, self-discovery, and so on. The idea of generation change demanded the transformation of the elite of the society from one type of individual to another and from one group of people to another with different values and perceptions. National modernization became the rationale for such changes.

The unbalanced changes in the Korean society generated pressures upon the lagging bureaucracy. The pressure eventually brought about the two political revolutions in the early 1960's, which accompanied with the change in political leadership.

III. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN KOREA

With respect to the general hypothesis, we now postulate a hypothesis: Since the two political revolutions of 1960 and 1961, there has been change in political leadership. The post 1960 political leadership is more oriented to economic development. The important consideration is not personnel changes but changes in values, perceptions, and doctrines of the political leaders. Therefore, the hypothesis is further elaborated as follows: (a) The doctrine (or goals) of the post-1960 political leaders has emphasized economic development more than that of the pre-1960 political leaders; and (b) The values and perceptions of the post-1960 political leaders are more instrumental to the purpose of economic development than those of the pre-1960 political leaders.

Doctrines of political leaders are applied ideologies: they are a set of intermediate-term goals, priorities and norms which clarify and project images of the future. In this study, the doctrine of political leaders can be discussed in terms of (a) major themes, (b) symbols used in their speeches, and general strategies to solve major national problems.

The degree of emphasis shall be quantitatively measured in terms of the percentage of the number of letters employed to explain certain themes to the total number of letters employed throughout the presidential speeches.

The data on goals or doctrine of political leaders shall be obtained through the content analysis of union messages and budget messages of the President. Because of availability and


(8) It is assumed, in this connection, that the interests and goals expressed in these presidential speeches not only reflect the President's interests but also closely represent those of the governing elite as a whole.
comparability of speeches, only four budget speeches of Syngman Rhee (for FY 1955—59) shall be compared with four of Chung-Hee Park’s (for FY 1965—67).

Values and perceptions mean the process or standard by which an individual selects, evaluates and organizes stimuli from the external environment. (9) Values and perceptions of political leaders are important indicators for understanding their political courses of action related to economic development. Values and perceptions which are instrumental to the purpose of economic development are (a) achievement motivation, (b) change-orientation, (c) future-orientation, and (d) overseas-orientation.

Achievement motivation is "a desire to do well, not so much for the sake of social recognition or prestige, but to attain an inner feeling of personal accomplishment." (10) Change-orientation is a standard by which an individual tends to adapt to environmental change and to be motivated to initiate changes in his environment. Future-orientation (11) is a standard by which man’s action is projected into, and ordered by the unknown future. Oversea-orientation (12) is a standard by which an individual views his actions as extending beyond the national boundary i.e., the expansion of his "domain area" into the world. If the expansion of "economic space" beyond the national territory is associated with the early stage of industrialization, this aspect of perception of political leaders is important in rapid economic development.

By assuming that the content of speeches imply values and perceptions, we can attempt to determine whether any differences exist in the values and perceptions between political leaders through the content analysis of the same speeches. (13) Since our concern is in economic development, the content analysis will be limited to the parts of their speeches which are related to economic goals, problems and policies for the country. For the comparability, the "word" has been

(9) Both values and perceptions are used interchangeably in this study, because there have been similar definitions to each other. See Marshall R. Singer, The Meaning and Effect of Culture; A Perceptual Model, (Pittsburgh: U. of Pittsburgh: mimeo, 1965), p.l.; and F. Kluckhohn, Variations in Value Orientation, (Evanston, Ill.: Raw Peterson, 1961), p. 4.


(12) This can be conceptualized as a type of "space orientation." It is based on human problem related to the question: what is the modality of their conception of space with which their actions are concerned?

selected as unit of analysis having the same weight. "A content analysis category consists of a number of language signs that together represent a variable"(14) in the hypothesis to be tested. Therefore, this study constructed four categories of values and perceptions which are instrumental to economic development. The selection of words for category construction is based on an "empirical" survey.

A. Goals or Doctrine of Political Leaders

Doctrinal differences of political leaders shall be analyzed in terms of (a) the major focus, (b) the major symbols used, and (c) the general strategies to solve major problems and issues in the speeches.

1. Major Themes of Speeches

As Table 1 demonstrates, in view of the number of letters employed for subject matters, the pre-1960 speeches focused more on the theme of unification and national security while the post-1960 speeches emphasize national economic developments. Although 38% of the pre-1960 speeches was devoted to the discussion of economic matters, it is related to ad hoc problems in the process of post-war economic recovery rather than economic development. However, 50% of the post-1960 speeches is devoted to the projection into the future path of economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Syngman Rhee (FY 1955—59)</th>
<th>Chung-Hee Park (FY 1964—67)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security and Diplomacy</td>
<td>3,566 (32%)</td>
<td>7,700 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Development</td>
<td>4,378 (38%)</td>
<td>25,840 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Social Welfare</td>
<td>858 (8%)</td>
<td>5,973 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Administration</td>
<td>1,320 (12%)</td>
<td>3,182 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,000 (10%)</td>
<td>9,305 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,400 (100%)</td>
<td>52,000 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Content Analysis of Speeches.
Note: Significant at 10% level (based on Chi square test).

2. Major Symbols Manipulated

Symbols are the major terms employed by political leaders for mobilization of popular

support for goal attainment. The major terms frequently stressed in Rhee’s speeches were: “anti-communism,” “antipathy toward Japan,” “patriotism,” “march north,” etc. Especially the terms of “unification” and “anti-communism” were used in almost every aspect of government action. But the goals or doctrine of the post-1960 political leaders are symbolized in terms of “national modernization,” “economic development plan,” “administrative reform,” “change in social base values,” and so on.

3. General Strategies to Solve Problems

In the four budget messages of Syngman Rhee, only twelve problems and issues were presented. Those repeatedly discussed were related to (a) unification, (b) foreign exchange rate, (c) economic stabilization and development, (d) unemployment, (e) education, and (f) the salary of government officials. When the speeches of both the pre-1960 and post-1960 leaders are compared with respect to these problems, there are substantive and consistent differences in their views of problems and their strategies for problem-solving. In Rhee’s speeches, unification was viewed as an ultimate national goal and a domestic problem. The speeches suggested that the solution of unification rest on the expansion of military force. On the other hand, Park’s speeches consider it to be an international problem. It is suggested that its solution depends on the international cooperation as well as the building of the national power of South Korea through economic development. Thus, the speeches suggest the military use for “productive and constructive” projects.

To the pre-1960 political leaders, the foreign exchange rate was the most important matter for economic stabilization as well as for the smooth execution of the national budget. Because they believed the rate of foreign exchange to be a matter of national prestige and sovereignty, they preferred the fixed rate at the low level. However, because the post-1960 leaders seem to regard the rate as a reflection of both domestic and international markets, they prefer to keep the realistically flexible rates such as in the free floating system.

In the pre-1960 speeches, economic development was viewed as a part of the economic recovery and an extension of economic stabilization. Because especially Rhee regarded economic planning as the basic tool of communist regimes, the pre-1960 political leaders tended to depend rather on foreign aid. Nevertheless, the inducement of foreign loans or investment were not favored because they were regarded as being dysfunctional to national sovereignty. In the post-1960

(15) Although the coverage of problems in Park’s speeches is further greater than in Rhee’s, these perspectives provide the common ground to be compared.
speeches, however, the belief is expressed that economic development is the main course of national modernization and that a self-supporting economy can not be achieved only by foreign aid. The speeches express the need for purposive planning in economic development and the preference for attracting foreign loans.

This study is not interested in political leadership alone, but in its relationships to the bureaucracy within the context of social and economic development. Therefore, the political leaders' view and use of government bureaucracy is also important in understanding their leadership role. Because of his aristocratic origin and his education with Confucianism at his perceptive early ages, Syngman Rhee tended to perceive society as a family tree. He expressed the view that government officials under his leadership were working hard and patriotic. Therefore, the pre-1960 political leaders conceived the negligible salaries of officials as the main administrative problem. As the authoritarian military reformers, however, the post-1960 leaders tend to regard the bureaucracy as the rational instrument to carry out their political goals. Therefore, "administrative change," the elimination of corruption, and rationality are urged.

4. Summary

The analysis of this section shows the differences in doctrine between two periods. The post-1960 speeches are more focused on economic development than the speeches prior to 1960. The major symbols used by the post-1960 leaders for the projection into the popular support are related more to economic development than those of the pre-1960 political leaders. The issues and major strategies discussed in Park's budget messages are based on, and related to, a felt-need for economic development and self-help. All the differences are consistent with each other and changes are in the same direction. Therefore, it is concluded that the doctrine of the post-1960 political leaders have emphasized economic development more than the doctrine of the pre-1960 political leaders.

B. Values and Perceptions of Political Leaders

This section is devoted to the analysis of four aspects of values and perceptions of leaders which are instrumental to economic development.

1. Achievement Motivation

Throughout budget messages for FY 1955—FY 1959, as Table 2 indicates, Syngman Rhee used approximately 1,390 words to explain his view of economic situations and main course of action for economic recovery. Among these words, forty words refer to a "need for achievement," They are such terms as "achieve," "accomplishment," "promote to
do,” “do best,” etc. These are 2.9% of the total words. In the budget speeches for FY 1964—FY 1967, however, 8,270 words are employed to discuss national economy. Among them, 389 words refer to the achievement motivation of post-1960 leaders. These words are 4.7% of the total. The difference in these percentage figures indicates the significantly different degree of achievement motivation between Rhee and Park with respect to the national economy.

2. Change-orientation

Throughout the four budget speeches of Syngman Rhee, according to Table 2, only two words refer change in the economic area. This is only 0.1% of the total. But, in Park’s speeches, 139 words refer to change in the economic system. They are, for examples, “change,” “reform,” “transform,” “innovation,” etc. The figure is 1.7% of the total words which are employed for the explanation of economic goals and strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS REFLECTED IN BUDGET SPEECHES (Summary Table)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rhee’s Speeches (FY 1955—59)</th>
<th>Park’s Speeches (FY 1964—67)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Words used to Discuss Economy</td>
<td>1,390(100%)</td>
<td>8,270(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Words Reffering to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve</td>
<td>40(2.9%)</td>
<td>389(4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>2(0.1%)</td>
<td>139(1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>15(1.1%)</td>
<td>214(2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>7(0.5%)</td>
<td>143(1.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from content analysis of speeches.
Note: Significant at 1% level (based on the test of difference in proportions).

3. Future-Orientaiton

In the speeches of President Rhee, the concept of the future is vague and indeterminant. Table 2 shows that among the 1,390 words used to discuss economic matters, fifteen words refer to the future. They are 1.1%. Moreover, among these words, there are no terms referring to a positive projection of future such as “plan.” Rhee was rather past-oriented\(^{(16)}\) in which his past became the prime reference for all his courses of action. As Allen’s description, he perceived “Korea in the 1950’s in terms of the same shibboleths as he had at the turn of the century: fear of Japan, fear of Russia, and…”\(^{(17)}\) In the messages of Park Chung-

Hee, on the other hand, 214 words refer to the future in the part of his speeches on economic problems and issues. This figure is 2.5% of the total. Among these words, the terms which refer to a projection into the future such as “plan” are consistantly employed throughout his speeches. He projects specific future image of national economy and the claim for society-wide support for his action programs. In this sense, Park appears to be future-oriented.

4. Overseas-orientation

Among the total words used to discuss the national economy in Rhee’s speeches, the words referring to the foreign sector were seven, which is only 0.5%. His friendly reference with regard to the international system was only to the United States. Rhee paid great attention to foreign aid but viewed it with suspicion. In Park’s speeches, there is a commitment to international cooperative actions. Throughout his four budget messages, 1.7% of the total words refers to “overseas,” “abroad,” “exports,” “international cooperation,” etc.. The spatial horizon of Park is broader than Rhee’s in that his reference to abroad extend beyond one or two countries.

5. Summary

From the above discussion, it is realized that post-1960 political leaders are (a) more achievement motivated, (b) more change-oriented, (c) more future-oriented, and (d) more overseas-oriented than the pre-1960 leaders. Changes in all these aspects of their values and perceptions are in the same direction—i.e., more instrumental to the purpose of economic development.

C. Summary

Since the two political revolutions of 1960 and 1961, there have been changes in political leadership in Korea. The doctrine of the post-1960 political leaders has emphasized economic development more than that of the pre-1960 leaders. Also their values and perceptions are more instrumental to economic development than those of pre-1960 political leaders. Thus, both institutionalized doctrine and internalized values and perceptions of political leaders have changed consistently in the direction of orientation to economic development.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE IN ECONOMIC MINISTRIES

The hypothesis is that that the post-1960 political leaders, upon coming into power, have imposed changes in the administrative elite. The post-1960 administrative elite more closely reflects the values and attitudes of the post-1960 political leaders with regard to economic development. Since it was found that the values and attitudes of the post-1960 political elite are more instrumental to the purpose of economic development, a sub-hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Values and perceptions of the post-1960 administrative elite are more instrumental to the purpose of economic development than those of the pre-1960 administrative elite.

The next question which arises is: how and through what process have the political leaders imposed changes in administrative elite? What are the criteria for elite recruitment and promotion in order to represent their political values? The answer will be formulated in terms of another sub-hypothesis: The pattern of, and the criteria for, elite promotion and recruitment in the bureaucracy have been changed by the post-1960 political leaders.

Administrative (bureaucratic) elite can generally be defined as those individuals who exercise major decision-making power in the government bureaucracy. In this study, however, the criteria for formal office—rank and position—apply as an operational definition. In the Korean civil bureaucracy, elite positions are identified as certain career levels: vice-minister, assistant vice-minister, program coordinator, and bureau-director in the central government. The scope of research is limited to economic ministries. They are the Economic Planning Board (the Ministry of Reconstruction before 1961), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Transportation.

Therefore, anyone who works or has worked in the elite positions during the period of 1960—67 is considered to be a member of the post-1960 administrative elite. Anyone who worked in the same positions during 1957—59 is counted as a member of the pre-1960 elite.

In order to distinguish values and perceptions of the administrative elite, their social background information will be examined. It is assumed that information about an elite's socio-economic origin and socialization process implies something about his world outlook, values, and orientations.


In this study, it is assumed that important information on social backgrounds of an elite is provided by education, previous occupation, travel and training abroad, language skills, socioeconomic origins, birthplace, religion, and age.

With regard to the second sub-hypothesis, the pattern of elite recruitment and promotion means (a) the percentage of combination of the two main channels of elite mobility—i.e., promotion and recruitment; and (b) the rates or speed of the mobility. The criteria means factors which are to be used to determine elite recruitment and promotion by the political leaders.

Because in Korea there is no Who's Who of bureaucratic elites, interview and mailing questionnaire have been used in order to collect data. In the analysis of social backgrounds of the elites, the study has faced a problem of weight in dealing with the period of incumbency of an elite position of an individual because each elite member had a different longevity. Therefore, the study applies trend analysis to the examination of elite changes during the period under this study. The unit of quantitative analysis is "elite year" by which we mean the time spent in the role by an elite member during a single year. Although "elite year" is the conceptual unit of analysis in this study, the actual unit of data collection is an "elite member." In terms of elite member, the population is 267 during both periods. Since the population is not so big for the trend analysis covering eleven years, this study attempts to collect data on the whole universe rather than a sampling. Approximately 90 percent could be covered by this study, because some of elite members died or were missed.

The data on pattern of elite recruitment and promotion were collected through interview with individual elites. It was supplemented by statistical documents obtained through help from personnel directors of the economic ministries. The criteria for elite promotion and recruitment will be inferred from changes in social backgrounds of elite.

A. Social Background of Administrative Elite

1. Education

Education is of prime importance in the socialization process of elite, because of its function for "modern and modernizing persons"(20) and for building "the pattern of values and norms which facilitate the assumption of roles"(21) in their future life.

According to data, the less-educated members of the elite have tended to be replaced with more highly educated individuals having a master’s or doctorate degree since 1960. The portion of the elite educated at the college level has steadily grown from 45% in 1959 to 60% in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Backgrounds of Administrative Elite</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Summary Table)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA &amp; Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior College &amp; Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Education: Modern/Western Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of Education:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Language Proficiency in:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Japanese &amp; English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Travels &amp; Trainings Abroad: Western Countries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Government Occupation:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks &amp; Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status Origin:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Lords’ Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Birthpace:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Affiliation:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian &amp; Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confuian &amp; Buddhist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median Age During Incumbency (in years)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on interview with elite members.
1965—66. Those educated at the college and graduate levels has rapidly increased from 59% in 1959 to 91% in 1967.

The type of education is also different between two periods. Since 1960 the portion of the elite educated in Korea and Japan after 1945 and in western countries (primarily the United States) has increased from 24% in 1959 to 63% in 1967, while the percentage of the elite educated in Korea and Japan before 1945 has decreased. In terms of specific countries where the elite was educated, there is also difference. Both ratios of elite who were educated in western countries and in Korea have increased since 1960 but the percentage of those who had studied in Japan has declined. In the meantime, the percentage of the elite educated in Korea has steadily increased.

In brief, the post-1960 administrative elite is more highly educated and relatively modern/western educated than the pre-1960 elite. According to T. Parsons, nationalism, a concern for the international status of one's society, can motivate those who are most affected by foreign opinion to press for new attitudes toward industrialization. With the existing elites such people are most likely to be found among intellectuals, especially "those who have had direct contacts with the west, particularly through education abroad or under western auspices at home." From this point of view, the pattern of changes in the educational background of elite in the Korean bureaucracy implies that the values and perceptions of the post-1960 administrative elite are more instrumental to economic development than those of the pre-1960 elite.

2. Foreign Language

The percentage of the elite who are proficient in Japanese as their first foreign language has rapidly declined after 1960. But the percentage of the elite who are proficient both in Japanese and western languages (mostly English) has increased during the same period. Table 3 demonstrates that 80% of the pre-1960 elite was proficient in Japanese while approximately 45% of the post-1960 elite is proficient both in English and Japanese during 1965—67. Quite recently has emerged a group proficient in western languages but only fair or poor in Japanese. In 1967, this is 15% of the total bureaucratic elite. This fact implies that proficiency in western languages has become an important criterion for elite recruitment and promotion in the 1960's.

Because their western language skills provide many opportunities for contact with western culture through literature and/or travel, the post-1960 elite tends to have different values from

the pre-1960 elite and broader perspectives with respect to spatial horizon. (23) This study also
found a high correlation between the proficiency in English and the confidence in working
abroad. Therefore, it can be inferred that the post-1960 elite tends to be more willing to work
in foreign countries and to be more confident of success and achievement as result of their
overseas activities.

3. Travels and Training Abroad

Through the questionnaire survey it was found that 80% of the elite of 1966—67 had made
trips to western countries. In this contrast, only 43% of elite of 1960 had made trips to
western countries. If we assume that McClelland's contention (24) is valid, this fact implies that
the post-1960 elite is more achievement motivated than the pre-1960 elite. In this connection,
it seems significant that the social background characteristics of the post-1960 elite are
consistent in that it is more western-educated, proficient in western languages, and has traveled
more to western countries. These elements would result in faster imitation and thus adoption
of western attitudes and behavior both in public and private lives.

4. Occupation Before Entering Government

A man's occupation is second in importance to the education in determining his socialization
process. "The differentia that count most in the disengagement of transitionals are occupation,
education, and of course literacy. The job is a channel through which experience of the larger
world is acquired. Preconditions are schooling and literacy." (25)

According to data, the portion of those who had experiences in banking institutions, business
corporations, military officers, and educators is approximately 40% and remains relatively stable
throughout the period under examination. The ratio of the elite whose previous jobs were in the
business world was high, as much as 30% and above, although the trend shows a slight decline
since 1963. In other words, the previous jobs of the elite would be characterized as "bureaucratic"
as well as "business" in nature. The fact implies a considerable degree of consistency between
elite positions of economic ministries and their job experience before entrance into government.

However, there exists a difference in occupational background between the pre-1960 and the
post-1960 elites. Since 1960, there has emerged in the elite a new group which has worked
as high ranking military officers or university professors before their entrance into the govern-

(24) It was generalized that the higher n-achievement, the more travels around. see Op. cit., p. 317.
ment. They have directly taken over elite positions. Thus the post-1960 elite composition is characterized as a considerable number of such elite members. The difference in occupational background indicates that there is a difference in job orientation between the pre-1960 and the post-1960 elites.

5. Status Origin

In the context of traditional culture of the Korean society, it is legitimate to define social origin of the elite members in terms of their fathers’ occupation. Throughout the period of this study, the ratio of the elite whose fathers were landlords has considerably declined from around 50% in the pre-1960 period to approximately 25% in 1965—66. Approximately 30% of the pre-1960 elite were of middle class origin, but the ratio has gradually increased to 45% during 1964—67. The interesting point is the fact that elite members of a lower status origin emerged only after 1960. It suggests that the upward mobility in the post-1960 society tends to be more rapid than before. The emergence of elite members whose origins are middle or lower class as such implies that the post-1960 elite is likely to be more achievement motivated than the pre-1960 elite.


Birthplace means the place where the elite was born and lived until 10 years of age. The data shows that the percentage of the urban-born elite has been stable throughout the period under examination. The Seoul-born elite has been gradually replaced by the rural-born elite, so that the ratio of rural-born elite has increased from 30% during pre-1960 period to 50% during 1965—67. These elite members seem to be mobile in terms of the social distance between rural areas where they were born and the capital city where they are presently living. The mobile personality “becomes intimate with the idea of change by direct experiences” in changes through physical movement. In other words, those who were born in rural areas and moved into Seoul on their own motivation are more likely to be change-oriented than those who were born and have lived in Seoul. Because Seoul is the more modernized sector of the society, it may be thought that the Seoul-born are more change-oriented than the rural-born elite. But the important considerations are: (a) the rural-born are aware of both tradition and modernity, and (b) they

---

(26) In this study, the upper status origin means that the elite’s father was a landlord, a manager of big business, a high official, a lawyer, or a doctor. The low status means that the father was a manual laborer or a subsistant farmer. All other are defined as middle in status.

(27) The inference was based on McClelland’s finding that the middle class origins are more apt to have higher achievement than those from the upper class. Op. cit., pp. 276—80.

have directly experienced significant changes in their own lives. Thus the post-1960 elite seem to be more change-oriented than the pre-1960 administrative elite.

7. Religious Affiliations

According to the data, the ratio of christian-affiliated elite has increased from around 20% during the pre-1960 period to 30% during 1965—67. The percentage who have no religious affiliation has also increased from 28% to 37% between the periods. The figures suggest that those with traditional religions such as Confucianism and Buddhism have been replaced during the post 1960 period by those not affiliated with a religion and those affiliated with Christianity. Since the post elite tends to be more oriented to western religions, it now can be inferred that they are more indoctrinated with the Protestant ethic\(^{(29)}\) than the pre-1960 elite members.

Among 336 elite-years during the post-1960 period, 75 elite-years consisted of those who had given up their parents' religion and adopted a new religion or ceased to affiliate with any religion. In contrast, the figure during the period prior to 1960 was only 9 elite-years out of the total 86 elite years. In other words, 22% of the post-1960 administrative elite is religiously mobile while only 10% of the pre-1960 was.

If it is remembered that religion is a fundamental belief system of human beings, the high degree of religious mobility in the post-1960 elite seems to suggest that post-1960 elite is more change-oriented.\(^{(30)}\) The data further suggests that the mobility is patterned after western religions and the majority of religiously mobile elite is from rural areas. All the above information suggests that the post-1960 bureaucratic elite is more future-oriented, achievement-motivated,\(^{(31)}\) and change-oriented than the pre-1960 elite.

8. Ages

The median age of the administrative elite becomes younger, so that the age of the elite in 1959 was 47 years but it was 38 years in 1967. An implication of such difference in median ages is that the pre-1960 elite and the post-1960 elite have grown up under different socio-cultural conditions. In view of the Korean history, the pre-1960 elite with a median age of 47 means that most of them spent at least 32 years —i.e., the first two-thirds of their lives under


\(^{(30)}\) For the implication of religious mobility in terms of the innovational personality, see Erik H. Erickson, Young Man Luther: A study in Psycho-Analysis and History, (New York: Norton & Co., 1958).

\(^{(31)}\) It is the key hypothesis of McClelland’s study that Weber’s protestant ethic effects achievement motivation and is thus instrumental to the capitalistic prosperity. Op. cit., pp. 46—50.
Japanese rule. They grew up while Japanese colonialism was expanding and controlling the country. But the post-1960 elite with a median age of 38 means that the independence came and thus a high degree of nationalistic feeling which accompanied it when they were young teen agers, and that most of their early adult life came in a period of independence, war,\(^{(32)}\) and change.

In addition, age still seems frequently to confer a special prestige in the traditional villages where the Confucian doctrines are dominant. Along with age, there frequently seems to go a conservatism and a rigidity inimical to the total transformation of society. Therefore, the gradual shift of bureaucratic power from the older ages to the younger hands means that the post-1960 elite is more change-oriented and modernized sector.

9. Summary

The post-1960 administrative elite is more highly and more western-educated, more proficient in English, more experienced in travels around western countries, more middle status in origin, more rural in origin, affiliated with more western religion and more religiously mobile, and younger than the pre-1960 elite. The implications of these changes have already been discussed. Changes in all characteristics moved in the same direction. From these data, inferences can be made about their values and perceptions. They are more achievement-motivated, change-oriented, future-oriented, and overseas-oriented than the pre-1960 elite.

B. Recruitment and Promotion of Elites

Changes in the elite’s background have taken place through the turnover in elite membership by means of: (a) promotion from within the bureaucracy, (b) recruitment outside the bureaucracy, and (c) releasing from the elite positions. This will be discussed in terms of pattern of, and criteria for, the elite mobility.

1. Pattern of Recruitment and Promotion

In association with changes in social backgrounds of elites, the pattern of elite turnover has changed since 1960. As Table 4 demonstrates, the ratio of new appointments to the total number of elite positions has rapidly increased from 16\% during the period of 1957—59 to 60\% during 1960—63. During the period of 1960—63 (specifically from the student uprising until the end of military junta), both ratios of promotion and recruitment became greater than those of the pre-1960 period. It is found, in this study, that the average longevity of the

\(^{(32)}\) For a dramatization of the impact of war upon the value change of human beings, see Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind, (New York: Pocket Book, 1958).
externally recruited elite is 4 years while that of the internally promoted is 1.5.

The faster rate of internal promotion with a shorter longevity of membership serves as a mechanism to speed new blood from the bottom up to the top echelons of the bureaucracy. It also serves as a mechanism for the “system’s release process” (33) of old elite members who

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of elite positions (A)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of new appointments (B)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of turnover (B/A)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of promotions (C)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of promotion (C/A)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of external recruitment (D)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of recruitment (D/A)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on interview and supplemented with information obtained through personnel directors of each ministry.

had assimilated traditional values during the Rhee administration. The external recruitment primarily from the military and the university with a longer longevity of membership can be regarded as an “emergency compromise” of the bureaucracy with the external society. Under a strong threat from the environment, the lagging bureaucracy required a certain “maintenance input” for its survival. (34) In Korea, it took the form of a “cooptation process” (35) at the top bureaucracy.

However, since 1963 the elite turnover has been characterized by the inter-ministrial flow of elite members, which means (a) the horizontal transfer of elite members from one ministry to another at the same level of elite positions, and/or (b) the diagonal flow of elite members from one ministry to another by promoting to the elite positions. The data shows that, among 12 elite members transferred across ministries during 1963—67, ten elite members were from the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and two from the Ministry of Finance. Thus the patterned transfer implies that EPB has been the primary “enclave” of elite formation in economic ministries of the Korean bureaucracy. Because “organizational sub-culture” (36) of

EPB has been associated with the future-orientation as well as technology on planning and research, the diffusion of EPB-oriented elite exert great influence upon the bureaucratic transformation as a whole.

The changing pattern of elite mobility has another set of implications in the process of bureaucratic transformation. Prior to 1960, under the status-quo-oriented political leaders, the pattern of elite turnover took primarily the form of internal promotion. It seemed a "capillary action" process in which the bureaucracy would recruit new members at the bottom and advance them to the top levels. The infusion of new blood was limited because of the slow rate of promotion and its seniority base. The result was an "inbreeding" of existing bureaucrats. Thus, the process of internal promotion hardly allowed the bureaucracy to adjust to the social change but provided lower tensions and conflicts within the elite. Its function was continuity and stability of the system of 1950's.

After 1960, under the post-1960 political leadership, the external recruitment extended throughout the whole bureaucracy. It is likely to bring the intra-elite conflicts in the bureaucracy and discontinuity in policies and programs. However, the extensive recruitment of elite constitutes a condition under which the bureaucracy initiates changes and adjusts to the rapid social change. Through the cooptation process, the environment impinges upon the bureaucracy and affects its leadership, structure and policies. After 1963, however, the elite turnover has taken place through the flow of elite across ministries. The patterned flow from a relatively modernized ministry brings the infusion with developmental values into the top level of bureaucracy. It brings less tension with the elite's than the massive external recruitment. In this sense, inter-ministrial flow is a compromise between the narrow, internal promotion and the massive, external recruitment.

2. Criteria for Recruitment and Promotion

In view of changes in the social backgrounds of elite and its mobility, the post-1960 criteria seem to be concerned with: (a) more formal education, (b) attributes such as the possession of modern skills, languages, western experience, and probably modern technique, (c) achievement motivation and change-orientation for national modernization, and (d) youth. These factors

are consistent with the criteria for recruitment of members of the government party.\textsuperscript{(40)} The post-1960 criteria for elite recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy seem to reflect the general ideology of the post-1960 intellectual and military elites, i.e., the so-called "generation change" and "national modernization". By applying the new criteria, the post-1960 political leaders tend to create a new administrative elite which represents their political values and interests with regard to economic development.

3. \textit{Summary}

The considerations of extensive recruitment as well as faster promotion and the congruence of the new criteria of elite turnover with political values suggest that the pattern and the criteria of elite recruitment and promotion have been changed by post-1960 political leaders.

\textbf{C. Summary}

From the difference in social backgrounds, it was inferred that the values and perceptions of the post-1960 administrative elite are more instrumental to economic development than the pre-1960 elite. The post-1960 political leaders are likely to bring and maintain a high degree of perceptual similarity or value congruence between the administrative elite and themselves for a more effective and efficient performance of political decisions. The changing pattern of elite recruitment and promotion also implies that the post-1960 political leaders brought into bureaucratic power those who represent their values and interests. It was accompanied by the change in the criteria of elite turnover which was imposed by the political elite. Therefore, it seems reasonable to make an inference that the post-1960 political leaders have imposed changes in the administrative elite in order to make it represent their values and interests. The post-1960 bureaucratic elite have more closely reflected the values and attitudes of political leaders with regard to economic development.

\textbf{V. ECONOMIC PROGRAMS AND POLICIES}

To what extent has the elite change contributed to the economic development of the country in the 1960's? The hypothesis is that the post-1960 administrative elite has brought about changes in economic programs, which in turn have, in collaboration with political leaders,\textsuperscript{(41)} stimulated greater economic development. It implies the following sub-hypotheses: (a) the post-1960 economic programs have stimulated greater economic development than the pre-1960 economic programs;

\textsuperscript{(40)} Myungyung Lee, \textit{Loc.cit.}, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{(41)} This shall be fully discussed in chapter VI
and (b) The values and perceptions of the post-1960 administrative elite have been reflected in economic programs developed by them.

Economic programs is defined as policies or certain bureaucratic actions which were indicated by the chief executive as important for the economic development of Korea.\(^{(42)}\) Their important aspects for the comparison of the pre-1960 and the post-1960 programs is related to the extent to which a program stimulates to economic development.

They are: (a) the temporal aspect, in terms of the number of years during which a program to be operated and/or effective; (b) the spatial aspect, in terms of the number of countries involved in a program; and (c) the coordinative aspect, in terms of the number of ministries involved in the formulation and implementation of a program.\(^{(43)}\) These variables are continuous in nature.

To economize the cost of research, ten important programs and policies were selected for each year through the content analysis of budget messages. The data on administrative characteristics of economic programs was obtained through the content analysis of documents\(^{(44)}\) for each program.

A. Administrative Characteristics of Economic Programs

1. Long-range Programs and Policies

The projection of images of the future is one of the important aspect of leadership for economic development. It would be manifested in the form of long-range programs. A long-range program is defined in this study as a program which is to be operated over a period of five years or longer.

Most of the pre-1960 economic programs were concerned with an annual budget and had little of a long-range perspective. Prior to 1960, programs tended to follow the annual cycle of the budgetary process.\(^{(45)}\) On the other hand, a considerable portion of post-1960 programs tend to have longer time-spans than the pre-1960 programs. It is found that 40% of the total post-1960 programs is long-range in nature. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the long-range programs

--- 256 ---

\(^{(42)}\) Another approach is the analysis of laws and regulations. However, it seems less relevant to the study in the Korean administration because of the "double talk" phenomena related to "formalism", as Fred Riggs conceptualizes. See Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 15—19 and 200—2.

\(^{(43)}\) The selection of these variables seems constant to this study, because it attempt to understand the relationship between elite change and program changes rather than economic analysis.

\(^{(44)}\) They are budget documents, annual surveys of programs and policies, annual review of each ministry's programs, monographs or pamphlets of individual programs, records of conferences, etc.

\(^{(45)}\) There had been few budgetary appropriations of a so-called "continuous expenditure" nature
and policies beyond the annual budget period have been formulated primarily after 1960. They are, for examples, the First Five Year Economic Development Plan, the Seven Year Plan for Food Production, Five Year Technical Development Plan, the Long Term Economic Projection for 1967—1981, etc.

![Chart](chart.png)

**Fig. 1.** Changes in Economic Programs and Policies (based on content analysis of documents on selected programs).

A long-range program suggests certain courses of action for the future as well as changes in attitudes and even in value systems of the individuals who are to be concerned with the program. In this sense, the long-range programs are essentially the manifestation of a positive approach to social change and of the purposive course of actions for a better future.

2. **Overseas Programs and Policies**

When the national economy grows, the overseas commitment tends to expand,\(^{(46)}\) especially in the early period of industrialization.\(^{(47)}\) It is also generally understood that the rapid economic development in small, less developed countries,\(^{(48)}\) tends to depend on the foreign sector of the economy.\(^{(49)}\) Therefore, the ratio of overseas economic programs to the total economic programs beyond the annual budget period.

\(^{(46)}\) It is an analogy of Redford's study in the relationships between market expansions and the political commitment over political boundaries in the case of the United States, see E. Redford "Centralized and Decentralized Political Impact on a Developing Economy: Interpretation of American Experience", (Bloomington, Ind.: ASPA/CAG Occasional Paper, 1967).


is another indicator of administrative stimulation of economic development.

The data shows that 92\% of the total pre-1960 economic programs were limited within the national territory. Prior to 1960, the mobilization of human and material resources for the management of, and actions involved in, the economic programs were limited within the boundary of political system of Korea. However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, there is atendency for the number of overseas programs to increase since FY 1961. Thus the portion of overseas programs becomes 26\% of the total economic programs during the post-1960 period. They are, for examples, the export promotion program, the third country training program for foreigners, the manpower export program, etc.

The post-1960 bureaucracy tends to be more concerned with overseas programs than the pre-1960 bureaucracy. Overseas economic programs during the post-1960 period are a reflection of the nation’s effort toward the growth of economic power. The expansion of economic space beyond the political space is one of the national phenomena of, as well as a necessary condition for, a growing economy.\(^{(50)}\) In this sense, the government is tackling the serious problems of economic development in this area.

3. Inter-ministrial Programs and Policies

The coordinated and cooperative actions of government agencies would be manifested in the form of inter-ministrial programs across the jurisdictional lines of the existing ministries. Most of the problems of development to be managed by the government tend to overlap the areas of the responsibility of the existing ministries. Therefore, the handling of the problems (especially under the rapid social change) invariably seems to require inter-ministrial programs.\(^{(51)}\)

The data indicates that programs which were formulated and implemented by a single ministry were as much as 76\% of the total pre-1960 economic programs. However, only 40\% of the post-1960 programs is being handled by individual ministries. The rest is interministrial programs. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the interministrial programs have become regarded as being ordinary in the post-1960 bureaucracy. The examples are the National Construction Program, the economic development plans, the Extended Conference of the Export Promotion Committee, and so on.

Thus, the ratio of interministrial economic programs is greater in the 1960’s than in the 1950’s. It seems a significant change that since 1960 several ministries are coordinating in the

\(^{(50)}\) For experience in U.S. history, see E. Redford, \textit{Op. cit.}

formulation and implementation of a single program and also that government tries to obtain the cooperation of the private sector for effective management of programs. The increasing trend of inter-ministrial cooperation implies the improvement of administrative capability of the post-1960 bureaucracy for coordinating actions so as to handle the issues in social change and also to cope with a changing society.

4. Summary

There are trends in economic programs and policies toward long-range, overseas, and inter-ministrial programs. These changes have taken place since 1960. All the three indicators of administrative contribution to economic development have been in the same direction. Therefore, it is concluded that the post-1960 economic programs and policies have stimulated greater economic development than the pre-1960’s.

B. Administrative Elites and Program Changes

The post-1960 administrative elite is more achievement-motivated, more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented. Their change-orientation and achievement motivation have been reflected in the "changing nature" and in the "formulation and implementation" of their programs. The emergence of a future-oriented elite has been reflected in development of long-range economic programs. The overseas-orientation has been reflected in the development of their overseas programs.

Another set of relationships is found between elite mobility and program changes. The post-1960 elite mobility is characterized by the extensive recruitment and the patterned transfer of elite. Similarly reared, trained, and occupied, these members of the bureaucratic elite possess a common language and a shared set of values and referents that facilitate discourse and minimize conflict and tensions among themselves. This contributes to inter-ministrial programs.

C. Summary

In order to facilitate economic development and to handle various problems involved in the development process, the formulation and implementation of long-range, overseas, and inter-ministrial programs are required. The post-1960 administration has been characterized by a larger percentage of these types of programs than the pre-1960. In these trends in economic programs, changes in the values and perceptions of the post-1960 administrative elite have

(52) The Economic Planning Conference, for example, was organized and included non-governmental personnel such as professors, journalists, and representatives of business associations.
(53) This implies an aspect of the performance of elite changes.
been reflected. In this sense, the post-1960 elite has developed programs which have stimulated greater economic development.

VI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES

What then is the relationship between political and administrative elites in the process of program changes for economic development? The answer is hypothesized: With respect to program changes, the relationship between political leaders and the administrative elite has been characterized by a two-way interaction since the two political revolutions, in contrast to a one-way interaction which existed before the revolutions. The hypothesis involves two sub-questions: (a) What has been the action of the political leaders toward the administrative elites? and (b) What has been the reaction of bureaucratic elites toward political leaders in this respect? For the first sub-question, it is hypothesized that political leaders had and have infused their doctrines and values into the bureaucracy with regard to action programs. With respect to the second question, the important thing is how administrative elite members perceive the political leaders and how they conceive themselves. Their perceptions would be reflected in their attitudes. Therefore, another sub-hypothesis is formed: There have been differences in attitudes of administrative elites toward political leaders with respect to program changes, between the pre-1960 and the post-1960 periods.

A. Doctrines and Values Infused into Bureaucracy

1. Infusion with Doctrines Reflected in Resource Allocation

First of all, political doctrines have been reflected in the allocation of budgetary resources between defense programs and economic programs.

During fiscal years 1957—60, the average percentage of expenditure for defense programs to the total expenditure of the central government was 33%. But the ratio for economic programs was only 21%. During fiscal years 1961—66, in this contrast, the average percentage of defense expenditure has dropped to the level of 26% while the percentage for economic programs has increase to 32%. Figure 2 shows that the trends in resource allocation between the defense and the economic programs\(^{(54)}\) have been reversed since Fiscal Year 1961.\(^{(55)}\) More

---

(53) This figure is based on the functional classification of budget.
(55) The Budget for FY 1961 was formulated by the Democratic Government in 1960 after the
resources have been allocated to economic programs than to defence programs since that time.

Fig. 2. Allocations of Budgetary Resources Between Defense Programs and Economic Programs (based on the statistics from the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, from 1960 throughout 1967).

Secondly, political doctrines have been reflected in the allocation of budgetary resources also between government savings for capital formation and government consumption. Figure 3 demonstrates that the ratio of government savings to the total current revenue was inconsistent in the 1950's. The fluctuations imply that government savings for economic investment has been highly dependent on the situational changes. In other words, the resource allocation to the capital formation has been a “residual process”—i.e., its priority was lower in the pre-1960 government. Thus, the pre-1960 pattern of resource allocation reflects the doctrine of pre-1960 political leaders who were more interested in current operations of government than in the long-term investment for economic growth in the future. In this contrast, during the period of fiscal years 1961—66, the budgetary allocation to government savings has been consistently

Fig. 3. Government Savings and Foreign Aid Received (based on Statistics from the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook of 1967, pp. 22—23).

---

student uprising.

(56) Government saving is the residual amount of the annually recurrent receipts (primarily revenues, such as taxes) after deducting government consumption. Government consumption means the
increasing. The consistent increase in the ratio implies that the distribution of resources is a
purposive and planned process. In other words, higher priority has been given to government
savings than to government consumption. (57)

In this connection, a very interesting finding is the relation between the percentage of foreign
aid received and the percentage of government saving out of the total current revenues. Figure
3 demonstrates that the trend of foreign aid received by the Korean government and the
trend in government savings are positively correlated during fiscal years 1955—60. The fact
demonstrates that the source of capital investment in the 1950’s was dependent upon the
portion of foreign aid. This reflects their view of, and strategy for, economic recovery of pre-
1960 political leaders. It has been shown that the pre-1960 political leaders viewed economic
development as an extension of economic recovery and economic recovery as being based on
foreign aid.

However, during fiscal years 1961—66, government savings is no longer dependent upon
foreign aid. The figure shows that the percentage of government saving becomes greater than
the percentage of foreign aid. The resources allocated to government savings is negatively
related with foreign aid. Such a change reflects the self-help efforts, and planned allocations
of government budget, which have been demonstrated in the doctrine of the post-1960 political
leaders. The priority given to economic development in the post-1960 political doctrine has
been reflected in the governmental budget as such.

Thus, the doctrinal change was sharply reflected in the changing pattern of resource allocation.
Because budgeting is an “incremental process,” (58) such a shift in resource use in the 1960’s
eloquently reflects the revolutionary change in political leadership.

2. Infusion with Values as Reflected in Programs

When the values of political leaders changed toward the future-orientation and the overseas-
orientation, there were corresponding changes in economic programs for long-range and
overseas programs. Since the program changes over time were associated with changes in

(57) Actually, in Park’s speeches, the post-1960 political leaders repeatedly argue that government
consumption for current operation should be cut down to increase saving. But, in Ree’s
speeches, no such claim has appeared.

pp. 13—6 and 135—8.
political leadership, it can be said that their values were reflected in their action programs.

3. Summary

The doctrines of both pre-1960 and post-1960 political leaders have been associated respectively with their pattern and priority of resource allocation among government programs. Their values and perceptions have been reflected in administrative characteristics of individual programs.

B. Attitudes of Administrative Elites to Political Leaders

According to data obtained through interview, it was found that there is a difference between the pre-1960 and the post-1960 administrative elites in their attitudes toward political leaders. In Table 5, most of the pre-1960 elite members were negative toward political leaders with respect to program changes. They preferred that new programs or program change be initiated only by political leaders. Even in the case that new programs were initiated by bureaucratic elite members, the formulation of program change tended to be motivated to the preservation of their bureaucratic power under the conditions of changing government and to the bureaucratisation in order to obtain more power. In view of these attitudes, the initiation of significant changes in programs by the pre-1960 elite tended to be quite limited.

However, a considerable change has taken place in attitudes of the administrative elite over the period. The largest part of the post-1960 administrative elite is very positive toward political leaders concerning the initiation of new programs or imposing changes in programs. The portion is 36% of the post-1960 elite while it was negligible among the pre-1960 elite. On the other hand, the percentage of those having negative/routine attitudes has declined from 50% during

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Pre-1960 Elite</th>
<th>Post-1960 Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative/routine</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>11 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-preservation</td>
<td>4 (29%)</td>
<td>12 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratistic</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive/innovative</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Interview.
Note: Significant at 1% level (based on the test of difference in proportions).
the pre-1960 period to 27% during the period after 1960.

From this examination, it is realized that the attitudes of the post-1960 administrative elite toward political leaders is more positive/innovative with respect to program changes, than the pre-1960 elite. What, then, is the significance of this attitudinal difference between pre-1960 and post-1960 elites in bureaucratic change?

C. Summary

It was found that the Korean political leaders constantly act to infuse with their doctrines and values into the higher administrators. During the pre-1960 period, the attitude of administrative elite is negative. Therefore, the relationship between political and administrative elites can be described as a one way influence upon the bureaucracy. The pre-1960 administrative elite was simply a “controlled agent”(59) of political leaders. In this contrast, during the post-1960 period, the attitudes of administrators are more positive and innovative in program changes. While there is action from political leaders upon the bureaucracy, there is also positive reaction to them. Thus, their relationship has been a two-way interaction in the 1960’s. They become interdependent “partners.”(60) In this context, both post-1960 political and administrative elites reinforce the new social forces and the new values and ideas through their two-way interactions. The change in their relationships from indiscriminate acceptance to the mutual consensus implies that the post-1960 elites have, in collaboration with each other, stimulated continuous changes in bureaucracy for rapid, and better management of economic development of Korea in the 1960’s.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study demonstrate that there have been interrelated changes in political leadership, the administrative elite, and government programs. All these changes were of the same nature that is, toward a greater orientation to, better management of, and more stimulation of, economic development of Korea in the 1960’s. The post-1960 political leaders were motivated to bring about fundamental changes in the bureaucracy as well as in the society. They imposed profound changes in the administrative elite. The post-1960 bureaucracy has

been composed of those who are more capable of dealing with developmental problems in view of their values and perceptions than the pre-1960 elite. Subsequently, the new elite has brought about changes in programs and policies for better management of economic development. Also the political leaders have been strongly committed to these changes and innovations. Their interdependent partnership has contributed to the process of interactive and interlocking changes in doctrines and action programs for economic development.

Therefore, it is the contention of this study that the post-1960 economic development of Korea is not a unique change in economic system but rather a contextual part of the total changes of the society. The classical theory of economic development focused on the capital investment. Nevertheless, this study contends that a most important factor for economic development has been effective leadership, under which scarce capital and human resources have been effectively and efficiently mobilized and organized through coordinated arrangements over space and time.

Nevertheless, the inner dynamics of the administrative elite in the development process should not be overlooked. They have induced the political leaders to commit themselves to new programs and policies by helping the leaders in the formulation of doctrines and policy guidelines. By bringing program changes and enforcing their implementation, the administrative elite would not only induce changes in values, attitudes and behavior of the population, but also control and regulate certain sectors of the society. The elite exacts support from its own members as well as members of the society. Thus the post-1960 bureaucratic elite has become a change agent. Since the bureaucracy is a part of the whole society, it now could be inferred that "change induced within and through the bureaucracy may not only affect bureaucratic behavior but also impinges on some of the base values of the society."(61)

The source of inner dynamics does not include all elite members but a small cohesive elite group within the bureaucracy. Cohesiveness, in terms of a high degree of value congruence or perceptual similarity, has been formed among a small informal group of elite members in the Korean bureaucracy; this group is comprised of younger, western-educated intellectuals who are involved in tasks such as planning, budgeting, and economic research.

It now can be concluded that the administrative development of the post-1960 Korean civil bureaucracy has taken place in the form of "exo-endogenous" change. That is, change has

come through inner dynamics of bureaucracy and under the strong influence of political leadership. It seems clear that the change in the politco-administrative system in Korea is related to change toward economic and social development. Nonetheless, it is only a beginning stage. If it is remembered that routinization tends to be a general trend of bureaucratic operations, there still remains a problem of how to institute the continuous innovation in the Korean bureaucracy.