

The New Urban Order

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In a paper published in 1989 I introduced the concept of a new urban order (Short, 1989). In this paper I want to develop this theme further by considering three elements of change: cities and the global economy, new images for old cities and the postmodern city

I. Cities and the Global Economy

Cities are embedded in a world economy, they are nodes in a global network of production, consumption and exchange of commodities, goods and services. The cities of the world make solid in time and space the nature of changing economic transactions. Cities are the physical embodiment of social and economic change. The changing nature of cities can tell us much about the changing nature of society.

Since the mid-1970s a new regime of capital accumulation has been identified. The term 'flexible accumulation' has been used as a shorthand to refer to new labor processes, labor markets and systems of production marked by greater flexibility and deregulation. Two major economic trends have been superimposed upon this structural transformation. First, the continued growth, at least until the early 1990s, of producer services, those knowledge based industries of the service sector including banking, insurance and the full range of business service. This growth was very urban biased especially towards the bigger world cities. Second, there were the revolution in manufacturing. Developments in production techniques loosened the tie of manufacturing industries to centers of skilled population. Modern manufacturing became less reliant on skilled labor; mass production techniques now require less

specialized labor. Improvements in transportation freed industry from traditional locations. Moreover, the sheer bulk of many goods and commodities has been substantially reduced. Just compare a stereo system or video camera of even just ten years ago with the size and weight of these goods produced today. The net result of these recent technological and transport improvements is that manufacturing industries have become more efficient. Manufacturing industries need less people and companies have greater flexibility in choosing the site of their operation. With everything being equal, they tend to shift to areas of low cost labor.

At the international level there has been a shift of industrial employment from the core countries to the semi-periphery and peripheral countries of the world economy. Peter Dicken (1986) uses the term *global shift* to refer to this change. It is caused by the ability of manufacturing companies to base their operations in a number of different locations. In effect there has been a deindustrialization, involving the decline of employment in traditional areas and an overall shift of manufacturing employment from the First World to the Third World. The consequences are most marked in those cities in the old industrial regions of mature capitalist economies which have a heavy reliance on traditional manufacturing employment. In the USA, for example, cities such as Detroit or Buffalo, for example, experienced a real decline since the early 1970s but even in larger cities, such as Los Angeles, New York and Chicago which have a broader economic base, the loss of manufacturing jobs has reduced the level of higher income, manual, male employment. The jobs that have been lost have been skilled and unskilled, traditionally male employment with a history of strong unionization. The expanding job sector, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was the service sector with more female employment, more part-time workers and a very distinct bifurcation between a core of highly-paid, highly-skilled, managerial-type workers and a semi-peripheral and peripheral group of workers who have less attractive conditions of employment.

At the national level the picture varies. The term Third World, for example, does not mean that all poor countries received equal amounts of manufacturing employment. South Korea,

Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, for example, not only obtained the lion's share, it looks as if it has provided the basis for self-sustaining growth. In Sri Lanka manufacturing employment is restricted to small sectors of the national economy with most of the profits and multiplier effects exported abroad. In other countries the growth of the 1970s and 1980s laid the basis for problems in the late 1980s and 1990s. In much of Latin America growth in the first period was predicated on heavy borrowing. With the downturn in the world economy and interest rate increases in the early 1980s many of these countries have been faced with a debt crisis of major proportions. Responses have varied from defaulting on loans, cutbacks on social expenditures and a rigorous fiscal regime which badly affects the low income population. In the First world the same story of marked variation also appears. The experience of 1980s boom and early 1990s slump was experienced very differently in different countries. At the two extremes are Japan and Britain. Japan saw steady economic growth and low unemployment. The so-called 'bubble-economy' has burst, based as it was on inflating land prices and huge trade surpluses, but the economy is still in reasonable shape. In Britain, in contrast, large scale unemployment and low growth has persisted. The boom of the 1980s was only experienced in the south-east region of the country centered on London and with the bursting of London's bubble economy the whole country is under the shroud of sustained economic decline. The experience of the USA falls somewhere between the two. Not so much growth as the Japan, but not so much decline as Britain.

It is at the urban level that economic changes are registered most clearly. The 'national' economy is something of a statistical fiction, an averaging of different urban regions. Because of the globalization of production, consumption and exchange in association with the decline of national regulation in wage fixing and work practices, the 'national' becomes a less significant unit of analysis. The 'global' becomes more significant as the unit for understanding general economic trends while the 'urban' becomes the unit for appreciating the intersection between capital and labor, economy and society, polity and comity. London, New York and Tokyo share more similarities with each other than they do with Glasgow, Cleveland or Osaka

respectively. At the urban level the recent changes in the world economy vary by size and economic base of the city.

A. World Cities

At the apex of the urban hierarchy, the very largest cities lost their status as manufacturing centers and new employment growth in the 1970s and through most of the 1980s was dominated by service employment. In the world cities this resulted in a marked polarization. On the one hand there was the growth of the yuppie, the icon of the 1980s boom was the urban based young professional working in the financial sector. It was always as much myth as reality but the myth captured an important trend. On the other hand there was what I have referred to elsewhere (Short, 1989) as the *yuffie*, the young urban failure beached on the shore of indifference by the loss of manufacturing employment and the restriction of the less educated males to service employment that paid less than a quarter of top manufacturing rates. The result was a dual city, rich and poor sharing the same urban space. The experience varied. Tokyo never had the street people of London, the city was located within a richer society of a more even distribution of wealth. London had more street people than Tokyo but the harshness of the divisions were less than in New York, offset as it was by the remaining elements of a more welfare state.

The 1980s was the period of marked division between rich and poor. By the early 1990s, however, many of the yuppies had to sell their BMWs. With the slump came the cry of the middle class. Shielded from the manufacturing restructuring of the early 1980s the downturn in the demand for producer services and the removal of many of the middle levels of management the yuppie was replaced by the mids, middle-incomes in distress. Again the experience varied. In the USA loss of employment can mean loss of health insurance coverage, inability to pay college fees and a quick drop into the less than affluent. In Japan corporate culture dictates less firings while in Britain the very worst affects of unemployment are softened by universal health care and income support schemes.

B. 'Boom' Cities

Below the level of the world city are the regional and national

capitals. Examples include Bristol in England, Seattle and Atlanta in USA, Bordeaux in France and Bologna in Italy. Here the loss of manufacturing was sometimes offset by the growth of producer services, both public and private services including financial services, government functions, health care and education. In these cities there was never the same polarization as there was in the world cities and in the 1980s some of these cities experienced some of the largest growth in the First World. Greatest growth was experienced by amenity rich cities on the fringes of economically buoyant urban regions, eg Silicon Valley next to San Francisco or Reading close to London. But even here the downturn of the world economy in the early 1990s led to changed expectations. The benign cycle of growth attracting investment generating new growth was broken by the economic downswing. It will be interesting to see how the boom towns of the 1980s will respond to the changed economic climate of the 1990s.

The most obvious 'boom' cities of the world were in the Third World where rates of growth, fuelled by both natural increase and a high level of rural-urban migration, bordered on the spectacular. Of the 25 cities expected to exceed 10 million people by the end of this century, 18 of them will be in the Third World. Mexico City, for example, had a population of 5 million in 1950. By 1990 it had increased to 16 million and the estimates for 2000 suggest 25 million. In these cities we can speak about urban explosion without much economic growth. The population growth of these cities is based on an urban primacy where individual cities contain the bulk of national investment, economic growth and political power. Living in the city provides access to employment, formal and informal and a range of public and private services that are unavailable to the rural dweller. The cities are a magnet, not an attractive magnet but often providing a marginally better opportunity for the rural poor than staying where they are. There is something about moving that bespeaks effort, trying to make something better of your life. The great tide of rural to urban migration is fuelled by the waves of human hope. It is as well to remember this when the focus is only on the slums and shanty towns, the crime and the pollution. There is a superior Western academic attitude that only looks to the problems of these booming cities. And there are

problems aplenty. Urban infrastructure overwhelmed by the population explosion, the lack of high paid employment, the pollution and the lack of affordable shelter. But there are also glimmers of light. The self-help construction of housing, the creation of an informal economy and the recycling of goods and materials derive from hardship, but they also represent human ingenuity as well as market failures, solutions as well as problems.

C. Slump Cities

There is urban decline around the world as well as urban growth. In the richer world old manufacturing centers have seen the most rapid decline. In cities where the economic base is overwhelmingly manufacturing the decline has not been offset by an increase in producer services. In medium sized cities without national or regional capital functions, eg Buffalo, USA or Glasgow, UK manufacturing decline can be expressed as net decline. There is not only a loss of jobs but a loss of the defining spirit of these places, built as they were on a culture of blue-collar employment.

The experience of decline varies by size. There is something called the urban ratchet effect. It comes into operation somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million. Below this size decline has few countervailing tendencies. Below the ratchet decline can lead to a free fall. Above the ratchet, the sheer size of the local market, the political and social importance of the city can generate some resistance to decline; in effect, decline can be ameliorated by the strength of the local urban economy and the weight of local political representation.

Small cities, a narrow reliance on manufacturing, remoteness from large metropolitan regions, a local economy dominated by big firms, and a lack of a tradition of entrepreneurship are some of the preconditions for job loss leading to economic decline. All cities in the western world have experienced a measure of job loss. In the 1970s for example, the city of Reading in England suffered a massive loss of traditional manufacturing. The traditional base of beer, bulbs and biscuits was undercut by restructuring and closures. However, this job loss did not lead to economic decline because of the growth of employment in producer services and the expanding high technology sector

meant new jobs. The people who lost their jobs in the brewery and the biscuit factory were not the same people who became computer analysts, but the local economy remained buoyant. In slump cities job loss leads to economic decline because there are few areas of job creation. In the recession of the early 1990s job loss in leading to decline in all cities.

D. Urban Competition and the Global Economy

During a recession there is increased competition for a declining pool of investment. The result, more intense competition between cities. As the recession deepens the competition increases. In the global economy the competition is not restricted to national boundaries. Seattle is not just competing with Portland or even Phoenix and Chicago for mobile capital; it has to compete with Hong Kong, Singapore, Kandy, Tijuana and Bangkok. The net effect is to deflate wages and lower living standards. Of course Tijuana cannot compete with Seattle in aircraft manufacture. Not yet anyway. We can imagine a continuum of competitiveness from aircraft to transistor radios. Aircraft is still a high technology, high-craft content process. It cannot be done just anywhere. Radios, in contrast can be made anywhere. Aircraft will be made in Seattle but radios will be made in the cheapest place. As aircraft manufacture becomes more like radio manufacture, and that is the end result of economic competition, then aircraft will be made in the cheapest location and jobs in aircraft manufacture will not pay as high as they do just now. In effect technological change in association with the globalization of the economy is leading to increased urban competition and a deflation of wages. Where this has proved more difficult, eg aircraft manufacture or business services, competition is less and cities with a spatial monopoly and the people who work there will maintain their higher living standards.

With the decline of national systems of regulation, local labor markets become a significant variable in explaining wage rates, conditions of employment and work practices. The general effect is to make local labor markets, just as much as the national economy, an important backdrop in negotiations between capital and labor over wage rates and conditions of employment. The experience of similar groups of workers and hence particular

types of households may vary by place. Where you live and work becomes an important determinant of standard of living and quality of life. As locality becomes an important determinant of relative bargaining power, differences occur as much by place as by economic sector or socioeconomic position. The same locality has different communities and similar communities may have varying fortunes in different localities.

The experience of manufacturing employment may be a valuable pointer to the future. Let us summarize. In a period of globalization of the capitalist economy and a regime of flexible accumulation when, manufacturing is no longer tied to traditional urban economies the urban order is subject to fundamental change. Large cities, such as New York, and London experience growing polarization of the workforce as traditional manufacturing jobs disappear, employment moves to the suburbs and the central city fractures along the deepening divides of race and class. While new growth cities emerge, cities whose economy was based on traditional manufacturing lose their economic *raison d'être* and have to find new sources of investment and employment. Restructuring of the economy involves spatial reorganization of society.

II. New Images for Old Cities

The increasing competition between cities is felt in a variety of ways. In this section I want to look at the generation of urban images. A recent advert for a Canon camera had the slogan, "Image is everything." Let us see how this slogan has been acted upon in an era of intense competition. Let us begin at the very top of the hierarchy.

At the level of the global urban hierarchy we can identify three world cities—London, New York and Tokyo. They constitute a cross-section of the three most recent economic powers—Britain of the nineteenth century Empire, USA of the American Century and the emerging Japanese superpower.

There is both competition and collusion between these three. They compete for business and do business. They provide a temporal coverage of incessant business. They need each other to provide a wide time coverage for international dealing in

stocks, shares, bonds, futures, currency and commodities.

The stability and relative security of their position allows them the luxury of a *metropolitan provincialism* - a belief that the world is their city and a comforting sense that if you stand in Covent Garden, Fifth Avenue or the Marunouchi district that world's most important business deals, cultural commentators, and social movements will pass through.

It is below this level that the greatest competition takes place. We can identify three groups. I will call them:

- wannabee world cities
- clean and green
- look no more factories

A. *Wannabee World Cities*

Wannabee world cities include Paris, Los Angeles, Chicago, Milan, Frankfurt, Melbourne, and Toronto.

A good though not infallible guide is to look at the cities who have applied to host the Olympic Games or have hosted the Games in recent years. These include Seoul, L.A., Atlanta, Barcelona and Birmingham in UK. To host the Games is to achieve media coverage of a global spectacle, it implies that you need and want media coverage. It means you have world city pretensions if not quite there. The desire is prompted by the growth machine in individual cities—politicians, business leaders, developers, local elites often in association with organized labor. The lure is status, income, development, wealth and power. The drive for world city status is prompted by the feeling that there are footloose business opportunities from conventions to corporate relocations—which can be attracted to successful cities. Get the right world city image and the business will come.

Wannabee world cities are marked by a kind of edgy insecurity. They have an acute concern with their role and position in the global network of global cultural capital. Hence the importance given to art galleries, big name architects, academic schools, art traditions. An edgy sense of not being at the center combines with a rather brittle cultural boosterism.

B. *Clean and Green*

In the advanced capitalist countries the annihilation of space

and time allows a more serious consideration of smaller towns and cities as places to do world and national business. One important selling point for places with good accessibility is the fact that they are not big cities like London or Paris or Atlanta. They are clean and green. Unpolluted, closer to nature. The 'old' image of such cities as Seattle, Portland or the emergence of the technology based areas in Probencale is of non-cities. They have the advantages of cities without the disadvantages. The 'purity' of these cities is not only their relationship with nature, it implies pre-urban, pre-industrial. In the USA in particular this implies places where there is no organized working class, strong regulatory bodies or redistributive interventionist states. New definitions of purity are constantly introduced as clean and green cities become 'developed'.

C. Look No More Factories

There are now a large, and increasing number of cities in the advanced capitalist world whose economic growth and prosperity was based on manufacturing employment. Examples range from Pittsburgh to Glasgow, Syracuse to Scranton. The global shift of manufacturing has left these cities in need of a new economic base, a whole image. They are associated with the old as opposed to the new, the polluted in contrast with the clean, work in comparison with leisure. The phrase 'look no more factories' encapsulates their attempt to create a postindustrial image. This image involves a distancing from the industrial legacy, sometimes even a conscious distancing through the historicising of industrial districts, the creation of factory museums and industrial heritage sites. The physical reconstruction of parts of the city become crucial metaphors for the phoenix-like rise from the ashes of industrialism. Old harbor fronts turned into leisure, old industrial districts transformed to postmodern business parks. There is a powerful financial incentive to these land use changes. But there is also an important symbolism—saddled with a negative industrial legacy these cities seek to restructure their image. Even the terms renewal, revitalization, renaissance all bespeak redemption through change.

Another important element in this transformation is the renegotiation of the contract with the physical environment. One of the most important legacies of their industrial past was a

polluted and disfigured environment. Lakes and rivers which previously were considered dumping grounds now become central to a new discourse. Cleaning up pollution is not only a mandated responsibility it becomes an act of redemption, the forging of a new contract, the reconstruction of a new place. The clean air of Pittsburgh becomes a peg on which to hang a whole range of transformative discourses. When a National Geographic reporter wrote about the city, "Pittsburgh's air is cleaner than ever, and its waters run clear" (Miller, 1991, pp.133), he was telling a tale of a born again city.

Cities compete for business, trade and investment. They struggle for corporate attention. What sells the city is the image of the city. In a very real sense the city becomes the image. Business journals are full of urban images, the space economy involves the marketing of places. The images can be realistic, parodies, stereotypical. There are a number of different devices and marketing strategies. Here I am concerned images which are often superimposed one on another and cut across the different categories of cities. Four main images can be identified:

- fun city
- green city
- culture city
- pluralist city

A. *Fun City*

Fun city is the conspicuous consumption of leisure, it is the beach, where only the beautiful can be seen. The city, like the predominance of body shots of attractive young women used in much of the advertising, is laid before the eager consumer eager to meet their needs, willing to satisfy their fantasies. It is a place where the sky is blue, people smile and laugh. There are no problems to wrinkle the landscape or the lifestyle of the hyperfun city. Come to work in fun city and it won't seem like work. Efficiency in the fun city does not imply the Protestant work ethic or deferred gratification.

B. *Green City*

Then there are the green cities where a nature safely controlled, and manicured provides a close though comforting experience with the semi-wild while also providing room service

and fax. As in the fun city, water is an important icon, along with fresh air, mountain vistas and lack of traffic.

C. Culture City

After the beach what?

Here the emphasis is on a manicured and sanitized cultural experience from high class shopping malls, symphony orchestras to art galleries. It involves the representation of the city as a cultural festival. Music festivals for the small cities, resident world famous conductors for the bigger cities. The underlying message is to assure the discriminating that this is no hick town; this is a place of a sophistication, well wired to the flow of global culture.

D. Pluralist City

The pluralist image is associated with the culture theme. Now the message is, Come and experience the rich mix of different lifestyles. It also links in with the pleasure theme; the urban experience is just one round of different ethnic holidays; constant fun-filled days with a never-ending cycle of festivities and celebrations.

This is the upside of multiculturalism. The pluralist dream of different ethnic groups adding to each other's experience but with no struggle over scarce resources or battles over cultural identity; mixed but nice, varied but safe. It is the definition of multiculturalism as the blending of sushi bars with rap music and Armenian holidays. It is the reduction of cultural identity to modes of consumption.

These are difficult times for cities. The competition is now global, not just national or regional. In recession and downturns the competition becomes even more severe. What becomes of crucial importance is for the city to identify its market niches and construct the appropriate images for its market niches. The right combination of powerful images will not solve all the problems, but it sure does help. Maybe the Cannon advert got it right.

III. The Postmodern City

Changes in advertising imagery are more for external consumption than internal use. Inside the city some of the most important changes have been described using the term *postmodern*. Elsewhere I have taken some care to understand the many implications of this term (Short, in press). Here, I will concentrate on three aspects:

- the 'new' look
- the new enclosure movement
- the 'new' civic culture

A. The 'New' Look

In the past twenty five years the whole look of central cities has been changed. The straight-lined, flat-topped modernist towers now have to compete with buildings in a variety of shapes and colors, office blocks designed as Greek temples and government offices as Renaissance palaces. The modernist blocks look austere in comparison with this riot of color, shape and ornamentation. Square buildings have been given new angles, flat roofs have been given pediments, glass walls now have holes in them or baroque-heavy detailing. We can understand this shift as one more round of architectural fashion. In the 1960s modernist architecture was all the rage, no self-respecting architect would be seen designing an office block with any ornamentation. By the 1990s a postmodern look was the fashion and young architects looked down on all those straight lines. It is the fate of all new fashions to be seen as revolutionary, then standard and then merely boring. In architecture, as in much of life, nothing dates so quickly as the most recent.

But there is something more than a shift in style. There is a deeper message to be drawn than the fickleness of design. The shift from modern to postmodern, which we can date around the early 1970s, came at a time of increasing competition between cities. When a sharp cleavage occurs as in the modern/postmodern shift, buildings and cities can look very dated very quickly. The building boom of the 1980s gave an

added opportunity for the new look. The postmodern shift was part of an attempt at differentiation between cities at a time of growing global competition. There was a surge of both new building and refurbishment all in the new styles in an attempt to seem still connected to the global culture of capital. As cities chased after mobile capital they wanted to present a contemporary view, an image of being on the cutting edge. The postmodern look gave that image. Behind the shift in style was an attempt not to be caught in the past. The need to appear contemporary arose from the need to attract and retain mobile capital. The look of cities became an important cause and effect of inter-urban competition. The competition of the present helps explain the dive into the architectural past.

B. The New Enclosure Movement

The postmodern city is more than just a collection of new buildings. There is a new syntax as well as new words to this architectural shift. There is what I will refer to as the new enclosure movement. The first enclosures occurred in England reaching their peak in the last half the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth centuries. Enclosures meant the privatizing of open common lands, it involved the enclosing of open fields and the private appropriation of public pastures. The modern enclosure occurs in urban areas and can be seen in many different ways. There has been the creation of what we may rightly call bunker architecture. More and more buildings seek to regulate access. More than this they seek to hide access. The blank wall a withdrawal from a civic culture. More and more hotels, for example in downtown locations seek to hide their entrances, block their entrances or restrict them to the ordinary citizen. Walls come down to the street, entrances are taken away from direct street level and access has to be negotiated. The result is the closing of from public space. There has also been the rise of 'gated' communities. These are communities which have gates to keep out all but the residents and their friends. Private security guards, walls, gates and electric fences all reflect a concern with safety and a palpable expression of fear of the urban other. The gates reinforce the fear we have with one another. The shared space of the city becomes the segmented segregation of tiny communities fearful of the rest of the city.

There is a shattering of the notion of a collective good into the kaleidoscope of individual fears. Our cities now reflect our sense of fear more than our sense of hope. In his book on Los Angeles Mike Davis (1990) has a chapter on Fortress L.A. Some of the sections headings tell us much about the contemporary enclosure movement: *the destruction of public space, the forbidden city, sadistic street environments, Frank Gehry as Dirty Harry, the panoptican mal, from rentacop to Robocop, the fear of crowds*. In varying degrees these headings would serve for books about other cities around the world.

C. The 'New' Civic Culture

The new look of cities reflects and embodies a 'new' civic culture. This 'new' culture has emerged in a time of increasing competition at both the global, national and urban level. When combined with a recession the result is a fiscal crisis which is interpreted as the need to curtail social expenditures. The result, around the world, is a decline in the benevolence of national and urban governments towards welfare, public goods and many of those things that add to the quality of urban life. Public transport has been cut back, as has spending on cultural affairs, environmental quality and the creation and maintenance of urban public spaces has been reduced. There are exceptions. French cities, and Paris in particular has emerged as a major exception to this trend. And the base point obviously varies around the world. Swedish and Dutch cities, for example, still have an incomparably larger level of public expenditure than the case in the USA.

In the 'new civic' culture more emphasis has been placed on revenue-generating rather than revenue-disposing. The needs of business have been returned to a dominating primacy while footloose capital has been wooed with all manner of incentives, grants and tax breaks. As recession deepens the bidding intensifies as cities compete one with another. City governments have also taken a more active role in land development deals and the encouragement of revenue-generating activities. The redistributive city is turning into the entrepreneurial city.

There are countervailing tendencies. In the cities of the rich countries many people are just as concerned with the quality of employment as the quantity of employment. In the 1990s, as

before, those who are struggling, will perhaps take any job, but more and more people are concerned with finding employment that not only pays well but is socially useful, ecologically respectful and provides enough slack to allow time to enjoy the non-working hours. As economic growth and income maximization have to compete as social and personal goals with ecological responsibility and maximization of the quality of life then the nature of citizen activity will change. People will become even more concerned with the quality of public services and after the private greed of the 1980s public responsibility will become an important social objective. The fundamental question is, can the rhetoric be turned into reality? That will be the battle for the citizen activists of the future.

In the poorer cities of the world most citizens do not yet have the luxury of choice. For many the basic necessities are still the main goal in life. But we would do well to look at the struggles and success of Third World citizens with more than just patronizing interest. For too long the view has been—how can we export techniques and technology from the rich world to the poor world. The results have been ludicrous—motorways built for cities where most people are too poor to afford private cars—if not downright dangerous—as is the case with telling mothers to feed their children (inferior) powdered milk rather than (the more nutritious) breast milk. A more radical solution is to look at the self-help strategies and low-tech solutions used by the citizens of many Third World cities and to see them as prototypes for more universal application. This is not to romanticize Third world poverty but to suggest that we can learn something from the success stories of people in poorer cities who have realized that ultimately the most important resource of any city is its citizens.

The 'new' civic culture of 1990s and beyond will be a curious mixture of partly a return to a domination by business interests and partly the evolution of a new enlightened public interest. The 'welfare' state, at least in its most expansive phase, will be seen as a thing of the past, a curious time when rising real incomes and sustained economic growth allowed a social contract based on the need and the ability to create domestic harmony. But the demise of the old welfare state will not imply a return to the pre-welfare state. There too many articulate and powerful people who rely on the range of public services. A new

set of business ethics will also be forged just as a new fiscal agenda for the public sector is being created. The 'new' civic culture will be a mixture of the imperatives of business, ecological responsibility and a concern with a quality of life. They will increasingly be seen as interrelated rather than separate considerations. A city with a healthy environment and a good quality of life will be more likely to attract and retain business. The more enlightened business will see the business sense of spending money on environmental clean up and good education. There will be variations. The richer cities are likely to get richer, those left out of the benign cycle of growth and investment may languish. And the patterns of investment will, as usual, pay more heed to the rich and the powerful rather than the poor and needy. However, the 'new' of the emerging civic culture does at least allow an opportunity for debate and criticism. When things are in flux as they are now, alternative voices have a greater opportunity to be heard. For a new world we need a new rhetoric.

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