I.

The word 'primal' used in the title of this paper has a temporal connotation in addition to its ordinary sense, 'fundamental' or 'primary'. This is to say that the 'primal force of education', if there is such a thing at all, is not so manifest in the present educational setting as to be easily discerned by those who are engaged in educational activities, if for no other reason than that it is temporally remote from the present setting. Those who are engaged in the present educational activities may think that there is some fundamental force at work in education, without which education is not possible in the first place. They may sometimes try to identify and describe it in various ways. But more often they are so involved in the present activities, their eyes are so fixed in here and now, that their search will take a different direction and fall short of the 'primal' force to be identified in this paper.

Also, the word 'primal' is used to denote both the initial stage in the human history of education and the very beginning of educational process of an individual human being. Thus the 'primal' force of education refers to the fundamental force that effected education when the human race first started educating and at the same time it refers to the force that was working at the very first stage of education of an individual human being. It covers, in other words, both the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic domains. Therefore, if we want to identify the primal force of education, we will have to trace back as far as possible, both in the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic lines, searching for the modes of education that seem to exemplify it.
The task is not so formidable as it might seem. It cannot be mere luck for us that we find what we look for; there are modes of education that clearly exemplify the primal force of education in the phylogenetic and ontogenetic sense. One is paiderasteia of the ancient Greece, and the other is 'foetal education' in the orient, the former providing a phylogenetic example, and the latter an ontogenetic one. As will be shown below, these two modes of education are so fundamentally different from the ones that are familiar to us today that they can hardly be recognized as modes of education at all. But this is what we should expect, in view of the fact that they are temporally distant, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, from the present modes of education. We might even say that it is only because they are distant from us that they can inform us of the primal force of education hidden from our eyes. As will be discussed below, the two primal modes of education, paiderasteia and foetal education, show a close parallel that cannot be doubted or overlooked, and the parallel points to the same direction with regard to the primal force of education.

If the parallel points to the primal force of education indeed, it cannot be a mere coincidence that we have paiderasteia and foetal education as examples of the primal modes of education. Rather, the two modes were there by some kind of necessity; they were there only to inform us of an essential feature necessarily built in the very act of educating. And, of course, that essential feature is still with us today, when the modes of education have undergone an almost irrecognizable change.

II.

Henri Marrou, in his book, A History of Education in Antiquity,\(^1\) treats paiderasteia as a primal mode of education. Paiderasteia, with its literal meaning of 'boy-loving' (by man) and with its association with the English derivative 'pederasty', may very well provoke an unpleasant or even abominable feeling in us today.\(^2\)

2) Obviously, there is an important difference in meaning between the original Greek word 'paiderasteia' and its English derivative 'pederasty', so that the
But, in the words of Marrou, it was for the Greek ‘the normal mode, the standard type of all education’ (p.56). The word ‘paiderasteia’ reminds us of another Greek word ‘paideia’, which has the same root, paidos, and means ‘boy-rearing’, or education, and more broadly, culture or civilization with education at its center. Marrou states, obviously relying on the common root of the two words, that in ancient Greece ‘paideia found its realization in paiderasteia’ (p.56). Literally the Marrou’s sentence reads: ‘The boy-rearing found its realization in the boy-loving’, which comes almost as a triviality. However, if we render it: ‘Education found its realization in the homosexual relations among men’, then some special explanation is immediately called for.

No one can be sure just when and how paiderasteia started in Greece, but according to Marrou, it started probably in the Homeric period (about the tenth century B.C.) from the camp life of the warriors. As can be easily imagined from the case of military penitentiary nowadays, the situation in which a group of adolescent and adult men have to live in seclusion for a considerable length of time is a suitable hotbed for proliferation of homosexual relations. Unlike that of the military penitentiary today, the Greek relation was characteristically between an adult and an adolescent. There was a strict distinction between the lover (erastes) and the beloved (eromenos). The beloved was in principle a boy of fifteen to nineteen years of age, and the lover was an adult with the spiritual qualities generally admired by the youths. Even though physical beauty had a place in the relationship, moral and spiritual qualities were the more important as a factor that established and facilitated the relationship. The initiative was taken by the lover, who, by displaying his excellent qualities in the presence of the beloved, instigated a passionate desire in the beloved.

Admittedly, there was in paiderastiea among the Greek warriors an element of passionate friendship or comradeship, which could be found among men at any period of history. It cannot be denied, however, that there was also an element of unwholesome physical relations, usually associated with ‘pederasty’ today. Marrou describes a typical case of
paiderasteia among the Cretan warriors (pp.52-3). First, a veteran who is the lover ‘abducts’ a young warrior as his beloved, with the connivance of his friends. The lover leaves with the beloved and his friends for a two months’ 'honeymoon' in the country, where they spend their time with banquets and hunting. After the honeymoon, the young beloved returns the lover's favour in a solemn feast, whereupon he receives a suit of armour and other gifts from the lover. From now on, he is received into the ‘Order of Illustrious Men’, and takes part in the same social and cultural activities with the lover. This was the process of 'initiation' into the culture among the warriors, and the description fits, with a necessary modification, well into the relationship between man and woman today.

A half millenium down from the Cretan ways, Alcibiades' confession in Plato's Symposium can also be cited as indicating the place of physical relation in Greek paiderasteia. In one word, Alcibiades' confession shows his ardent desire to have Socrates as his lover, and the bitter frustration he had to undergo. After several tantalizing attempts, Alcibiades at last succeeds in getting into bed naked with the stinking Satyr of Socrates. But, of course, their relation turned out to be abortive, mainly due to the inability on the part of Alcibiades to resist the temptation from the public applause and to the consequent severance of the spiritual tie that constituted the very foundation of Greek paiderasteia.

Moreover, the passion involved in paiderasteia was almost indistinguishable from that involved in the usual relation between man and woman. The intensity of the passion was such that it opened an easy way to a violent jealousy often found in the ordinary heterosexual relations. Marrou, citing Plutarch, points out that tyrants were assassinated and political revolts fomented not because of the political oppression as such but by the burning jealousy of the lovers who were deprived of their beloved by the tyrants (p.54). Obviously the love of political freedom was a poor match for the passion toward the beloved as a motive for engaging in life-risking resistance. Such an action,

3) It may be noted that in the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades, the roles of the lover and the beloved, seem to be reversed, in that it is Alcibiades the beloved, not Socrates the lover, to take the lead. Indeed, this is an essential aspect of erotic relation as treated by Plato. See Section 4 below.
which amounts to nothing but a disgraceful murder for passion according to our own standards, was an object of respect and admiration to the youths of those days. Again, the respect and admiration was due not so much to the valiant acts for the reestablishment of political freedom as to the erotic passion for the recovery of the beloved.4)

According to Marrou, however, scholars have gone wrong in treating paiderasteia mainly as a kind of sexual aberration acquired from a secluded life among men (or among women). (In Greece, homosexuality was not confined to men, as evidenced by Sappho's feminine society in Lesbos. In view of the disputes as to whether Sappho was a lustful woman caught in an abnormal desire or a holy woman furnished with perfect female virtue (p. 62), what is said of paiderasteia largely applies to the female homosexuality.) This scholarly tendency has been, according to Marrou, partly due to the failure to do justice to the typical Greek situation and the peculiar sensibility of the Greeks, but it can also be explained in terms of the psychoanalytic 'repression' on the part of the scholars.

In fact, the Greek paiderasteia was more than anything else an educational relation. In the words of Marrou, it was 'a blaze of passion that united the master and disciple in bonds forged by its heat' (p.61), and education was lit up by this blaze. To repeat what was quoted earlier, 'paideia found its realization in paiderasteia'. Of course, Marrou of the twentieth century is not the only one to express such a view. Xenophone the Greek also considered paiderasteia 'the most beautiful, the perfect form of education' (ten kallisten paideian)(p.57). Moreover, Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus are moving expositions showing that education involves paiderasteia, or more precisely, that education requires the erotic (or, pederastic) bond as its primal force.

To recapitulate, the educational aspect of paiderasteia can be schematized in the following way. The lover, erastes, is a man of excellent qualities coveted by the youths. He seeks for a young man, eromenos, to whom he can transmit his qualities. To

4) Not only the assassination of tyrants but also the death of Socrates can be seen as caused by the jealousy involved in paiderasteia. The word 'to corrupt' used in the indictment of Socrates, is a translation from the Greek, diaphtheirein, which also means 'to seduce'. See Section 4 below.
obtain the favour of the beloved, he displays his qualities in the presence of the beloved, to which the beloved responds with passionate love. For the beloved, the lover is the embodiment of human ideals, the model for 'identification'. The passion of the beloved induces him to exert himself to rise to a level that is worthy of the love bestowed upon him by the lover. Thus, in *paiderasteia*, 'the amorous relation was the chosen ground for affectionate emulation' (p.54). Of course, the process of 'affectionate emulation' had to be extended for a long period of time which the lover and the beloved shared in parties, festivals, and wrestling houses. The blaze that forged the lover and the beloved into one had to stay for a long time.

The Greek *paiderasteia* gradually disappeared as the formal mode of education made its appearance. But the disappearance was never complete. Indeed, *paiderasteia* did not disappear but went hiding underneath the outward mode of education. Even when the teacher-student relation became to be based on formal institutions instead of natural spontaneous passion, the passionate affection characteristic of *paiderasteia* has survived all along, working as the primal force of education. Even today, it is not uncommon among the secondary school students that the subjects they like most are those which are taught by the teachers they like most. Insofar as the attitudes toward the subjects are conceptually distinct from the attitudes toward the teacher, the question as to whether they like the teacher because they like the subject he teaches, or they like the subject because they like the teacher who teaches it, can have meaning. In relation to *paiderasteia*, the question amounts to whether the youth fell into amorous relation with the lover because of his spiritual qualities, or the youth emulated the spiritual qualities of the lover because of the amorous relation. We may be assured that the ancient Greeks could not find meaning in this question. For them, *paideia* was *paiderasteia*. And for them, *paideia* without *paiderasteia*, i.e., education without passionate love, was almost unimaginable.

III.

We will now turn to the ontogenetic side and discuss 'foetal
education'. The word is a translation from the Chinese (pronounced 'Tae-gyo' in Korean) and literally means 'teaching of the foetus'. Even without going into the detail, the idea itself is clear enough, which is that the mother can (and should) teach something to the child during her pregnancy. Thus stated, the question seems to be inevitable as to whether it can count as a mode, primal or not, of education. Of course, the same question could have been raised in relation to paiderasteia, but it becomes all the more pressing in the case of foetal education. In ordinary uses, 'education' or 'teaching' has its application to the relation between two individuals with spatially separated bodies. Foetal education represents a violation of this conceptual condition. Unless we can call the mother and her womb two separate bodies, which is hardly likely, how will it be possible for us to talk about her educating or teaching the foetus? This is the first, conceptual question that ought to be raised in relation to foetal education. So far, however, the theoretical approach to foetal education has been empirical in nature. The concern has been primarily on the scientific validity of it, asking what scientific evidences can be adduced to establish its effectiveness.

The word 'foetal education' appears in a Chinese document compiled as early as the second century B.C.. Certainly, the practice dates from much earlier than the record, and in view of the close and frequent interchange between China and Korea, it can be safely inferred that the practice was known to Korea almost at the same period of history. This means that foetal education has been practiced in China and Korea for more than two thousand years. Indeed, it seems as if nothing definite could be said about foetal education except its long history. However, for our purpose at hand, it is enough to note that in both countries foetal education has been practiced for such a long period of time by all sensible women in pregnancy, including even those who had serious doubts about its 'effectiveness', and

5) Won-Ho Lee, Tae-Gyo (Foetal Education), Seoul: Pak-Young, 1977 (in Korean), p.172. The document in question is titled, 'The older Dae's Book of Rites' (Dae-Dae-Rye-Ki in Korean pronunciation). It is of interest to note that Marrou records, by hearsay, that Chinese civilization also encouraged 'homosexual relations between master and disciple, and also between disciples of the same master' (p.59). If this can be documented, the Chinese is a rare nation that exemplified the primal modes of education in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic aspects.
perhaps more important, that they designated the practice explicitly as 'foetal education'. In other words, inasmuch as the word 'foetal education' violates the ordinary usage of the word 'education', the very idea that anyone can educate or teach something to a foetus in the womb is in itself a cause for wonder and admiration.

First of all, let us look into the sense in which the word 'foetal education' violates the ordinary usage of 'education'. If foetal education violates the usage, paiderasteia must also be said to be the case. Seen in this light, the alleged violation means nothing but the fact that foetal education and paiderasteia represent the default of one or the other of the conceptual conditions usually met in today's typical mode of education. If 'influence among spatially separated individuals' is one of such conditions, foetal education falls short of being an education. Similarly, if 'conscious imparting of educational influences to an individual' is one of such conditions, paiderasteia also falls short of being an education. Therefore, if paiderasteia can count as 'the most beautiful, the perfect form of education' (Xenophon's words), there is no reason why foetal education cannot be a mode of education. Moreover, whereas it took the insight of Xenophon the Greek and Marrou of the modern age to define paiderasteia as a mode of education, foetal education has been practiced explicitly under the name of 'education'. At any rate, insofar as foetal education and paiderasteia are examples of 'primal' modes of education, it is more than expected that they represent the default of one or the other of the ordinary conceptual conditions.

Putting paiderasteia and foetal education in parallel, we can see that the two instances point to the same direction with regard to the primal force of education. More precisely, they represent a continuum, revealing the primal force of education with varying degrees of explicitness. In this continuum, foetal education is more explicit than paiderasteia, and it is in the light of the nature of foetal education that the educational aspect of paiderasteia can be clearly defined. It is in our daily experience that, once a child is physically separated from the mother, any educational influence directed toward him is bound to be limited by virtue of the spatial separation itself. He is literally an 'individual', an 'indivisible being', with his own intentions and
disires, and no matter how powerful the pedagogical devices we may invent and implement, he has at his disposal every possible means of resisting and escaping from the influence. This is the essential limitation that any ordinary modes of education cannot but accept. Foetal education is free from this limitation. If foetal education can have its effect, if, in other words, it is indeed possible for the mother to exert educational influence over the foetus, it is not in the power of the foetus to resist or escape from the influence. The foetus can only absorb in toto whatever the mother tries to teach, as if he sucked orange juice from a straw. And this is because the foetus is united in one body with the mother and no space has yet been created to separate him from the mother.

When it is said that the mother exerts educational influence over the foetus, the word 'educational' has a special significance. Up to now, the so-called 'validity' of foetal education has been discussed mainly based on the results of medical or psychopathological studies, showing, for instance, that general health and nutritional condition or taking particular medicines during the pregnancy has influences over the mental and physical health of the child. But keeping the child away from mental and physical abnormalities falls to the domain of medicine, not to the domain of education. If the concern of foetal education stops at this negative aspect, foetal education cannot be an education, for the same reason that therapy cannot be identified with education. The influence of foetal education, in order to be 'educational', must extend further to the positive concern, that is, to inculcating educationally significant traits and qualities to the child. Indeed, we can see that this positive aspect is the more prominent among the items of traditional foetal education practices. An expecting mother is advised, for instance, to put portraits of noble and wise men and women near at hand, to touch and cherish such precious things as official belts, emblems and jewels, and to hear, recite and write beautiful poems and phrases. It is in the hope that the noble and pure spirits connected with such things will somehow be passed on to the baby to be born that she engages in such practices.

In attempting to offer a theoretical explanation to any degree of conclusiveness for such positive effect as hoped for, one is faced with almost insurmountable difficulties. The difficulties are of at least two kinds. First, there is the methodological difficulty. In the present academic world, no method is accepted other than the 'scientific' to produce convincing evidence for the effectiveness of foetal education. It is small wonder, then, that the studies of the validity of foetal education has had recourse to the medical researches. From a different point of view, however, the effect of foetal education may be of such a kind that cannot be ascertained in terms of the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements. Take the concept of 'kt' (or 'chi' in Chinese pronunciation) in oriental philosophy, for instance, which can be best translated as 'cosmic energy'. The 'evil kt' or 'pure kt' that is said to run through our body does not appear in the Periodic Table of Elements, nor can its existence and function be ascertained 'scientifically'. Whereas the components and circulation of blood are subject to scientific investigation, no objective evidence can be adduced with regard to the nature and circulation of kt. Our doubt and denial of the effectiveness of foetal education is largely due to the 'scientific' tendency of our time, to our reluctance to accept any evidence except those which are admitted in the biochemical analysis. The belief that nothing can count as evidence unless it comes out from scientific analysis is at best a sign of intellectual arrogance of the age. The theoretical approach up till now seems to betray such arrogance.

This methodological difficulty becomes more serious in connection with the second, conceptual one, which is that foetal education represents a special aspect of the perennial philosophical problem of 'mind-body relation'. Needless to say, the mother and the foetus are connected through the body. It is also evident that the mother has a body and a mind, and that the foetus also has what amounts to a body and a mind, or a body and a mind 'in the making'. The point of foetal education consists in obtaining the mental connection by means of the physical connection between the mother and the child, or, one might say, in uplifting the physical connection to the mental level. Seen in this way, the mind-body relation makes a double

entry in foetal education. First, there is the mind-body relation in the mother, and second, this maternal mind-body relation enters into a relation with the foetal mind-body relation. Therefore, insofar as foetal education is based on the bodily connection, any theoretical explanation of it which does not involve the mind-body problem is bound to be incomplete. In other words, the theoretical explanation of foetal education requires some kind of settlement of the mind-body problem, which is unlikely to realize in the foreseeable future.

This point suggests the connection with the first, methodological difficulty. It is only the body that is amenable to the scientific method known to us. As long as the effect of foetal education must be ascertained by scientific method, the evidence can only be about the body. The closed circuit that connects the bodies, those of the mother and of the foetus, can never extend to the minds, in the same sense that the blood can never flow outside the vessel. On the other hand, however, if we define human beings by means of the hypothetical construct of $ki$, for instance, the situation can be entirely different. Even though $ki$ is not amenable to scientific analysis, it can open a new perspective toward clarifying the mind-body problem. When we are contemplating evil thoughts in our mind, the evil $ki$ runs through our body. This evil $ki$, without being exactly mental or physical, characterizes the person as a whole. Even if we cannot adduce scientific evidence, our 'subjective' experience bears witness, not infrequently, to the changes in our body concurrent with the evil or noble thoughts in our mind.

Thus, foetal education can be defined as an effort of the mother to make her own $ki$ noble and pure so that the same noble and pure $ki$ can be transmitted to the foetus connected in one body with her. The $ki$ of the foetus cannot be different from that of the mother as long as the two bodies remain connected. And in this way, the ten months' permeation of motherly influence will lay the groundwork for the total person of the foetus, thereby largely determining the mental and temperamental characteristics throughout the whole life. To quote a wise woman of the last Korean dynasty (early 19th century), the effect of foetal education is such that 'the ten months' education in the womb is more important than receiving a ten years' teaching from the teacher'.
It is not the concern of this paper to establish, by science or otherwise, the validity of foetal education. The discussion so far has been directed to explicating the very presupposition of foetal education. The concern here is to disclose the primal force of education suggested by the parallel of the two primal modes of education, *paiderasteia* and foetal education. As has become obvious in the foregoing discussion, education in its primal modes represents an effort to exert influence at the mental level by taking the advantage of the physical connection, or more paradigmatically, to uplift the physical connection to the mental level. Foetal education and *paiderasteia* are examples of this effort in the ontogenetic and phylogenetic aspects, with the difference that the natural, biological connection in foetal education is transformed into the erotic passion merging very closely to the sexual desire in *paiderasteia*. Thus, if the foregoing discussion has met with some success in revealing the primal force of education, it can be said that all education takes the form of an extension of foetal education.

IV.

Needless to say, we are concerned more about the institutionalized education as we have today than about *paiderasteia* or foetal education as such. It is in the hope of understanding today's education that we discuss *paiderasteia* and foetal education and derive therefrom what is called the primal force of education. As has been said above, *paiderasteia* gradually disappeared as institutionalized education made its appearance. By analogy, this corresponds to the birth in ontogenesis, the severance of the natural tie that united the mother and the foetus. This point has a significant bearing on understanding the nature of institutionalized education. In foetal education and *paiderasteia* alike, the fundamental force that effected education was provided by a natural or seminatural tie, which has now to be replaced by an institutional substitute. But the substitution can never be complete. The institutional substitute can never provide the same vital force as was provided by the natural tie. This explains the better part of 

the difficulty that the teachers are facing in institutionalized education.

Consider, first, the problem related to the selection of students. In *paiderasteia*, the initiative of the relation was taken by the lover; it was for the lover to select the beloved worthy of his love. And in foetal education, the selection was assured by the natural process. This process finds its substitute in an institutionalized setting in the student selection procedure usually in the form of entrance examination. But selection in this case can be so called only in the passive sense, falling short of genuine choosing. The teacher has to accept whoever has passed the entrance examination. The students have been 'selected' but they are given to the teacher only as members of a group formed by institutional mechanism. It is difficult to imagine that the students nowadays mean to the teacher what the beloved meant to the lover in *paiderasteia* or what the foetus means to the mother in foetal education.

In the absence of the natural or semi-natural tie that was working in the primal modes of education, education has only to rely for its effectiveness on some kind of artificial force, designated by the generic term of 'motivation'. This means that the erotic desire and the biological tie with the mother are substituted for by motivation for learning. This change has impact, more than anything else, upon the position of the teacher in education. In the primal modes, the teacher, i.e., the lover or the mother, was the very embodiment of, and therefore inseparable from the content of education. In this case, the content of education is nothing but the excellent qualities of the lover or the educational influence infiltrated from the mother's body. And in this case, there was no need for 'motivation' additional to the tie with the lover or the mother. The replacement of the original tie by motivation for learning is the obverse of the conceptual separation of the teacher and the content of education. Now the teacher stands only in contingent relation with what he teaches, and he remains an external agent to the content of education, serving as an external motivator. In short, institutionalized education imposes upon the teacher the burden of arousing students' motivation, which was hardly necessary in the primal modes.

Little need be said about the difficulty of the teacher in dealing
with this additional burden. No small part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the students' motivation for learning, at various stages of education, tends to be extrinsic in nature, which has only indirect bearing, if ever, upon the content of education. Inasmuch as the extrinsic motivation hinges upon the individual intentions and desires of the students, it is never easy to make the students turn their sight away from such extrinsic considerations toward the content of education itself. Moreover, the teacher often has to cope with the common sense notion, held by the general public, that the value of the content of education consists of nothing but such external paraphernalia.

But the difficulty of the teacher in relation to motivation runs much deeper. Fundamentally it lies in the fact that he must play the role of erastes, the lover, to 'seduce' the beloved without being in the position of erastes. This is the very difficulty that Socrates had to face, and probably the one that no one could ever successfully handle except Socrates. Think for a moment. In a country like Greece where people admired beauty, especially physical beauty, more than anything else, it is hardly imaginable that anyone with Socrates' figure can stand in the role of erastes. Just like today's teachers, or even worse than today's teachers, he was without the handy bait necessary for seducing the beloved. He had but to devise a means that was most difficult but most farreaching. As is witnessed by the last part of Alcibiades' confession in the Symposium (222a-b), Socrates' means was an ingenious one indeed; he seduced his beloved in such a way that the beloved was left in the false belief that the beloved himself was the seducer and not the other way round. In this erotic relation, the roles of the lover and the beloved are reversed as if 'the oyster shell had fallen the other way' (Phaedrus 241b). Socrates was now aloof from the erotic turmoil, leaving the beloved in the agony of burning desire. Alcibiades in the Symposium is made to assert that Socrates mistreated not only Alcibiades himself 'but also Charmides, and Euthydemus, and ever so many more' in this way, and warns Agathon not to fall into the same misfortune.⁹

⁹ We can read a more vivid description of the Socratic seduction in Kierkegaard's 'The Diary of a Seducer'. Here, a woman fallen into the trap of such seduction expresses her feeling: 'When I flung my arms about him ... I embraced the cloud'. S. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. I (W. Lowrie, trans.), Princeton University Press, 1944, p.305.
To be sure, there are people in the world who believe that they can own the heart of their beloved with luxury and comfort. If this belief is mistaken, we can say that the Socratic seduction represents the ultimate form of all genuine seduction. In institutionalized education, the teacher must be a genuine seducer in this sense. He must seduce the students with the gesture that the students will direct their love not to the teacher himself but to what he tries to transmit, a gesture which must be sad indeed, humanly speaking. The object that the students must embrace is not the human teacher but the 'unseizable cloud' called the content of education. This task of the teacher is as difficult to successfully accomplish as it is difficult to have another Socrates in history.

The above discussion of the primal force of education, in conclusion, points to the nature of the fundamental difficulty inherent in education. The institutionalized education as we have today must struggle to enlist motivation for learning as a substitute for the primal force, a substitute which can never adequately replace the original force. The conclusion, however, need not be so depressing as it might seem. We are given to think of education as if it were a one-shot event, taking place at a fixed point of time and in relation to a single individual teacher. In fact, however, education of an individual lasts for an extended period of time following a long sequence, and in the meantime he meets many different teachers. As is often the case with elementary school children today, there exists even in institutionalized education an almost blind emotional tie between the teacher and the students. Seen in relation to the primal force of education as disclosed in this paper, this kind of emotional tie can be an important asset for the effectiveness of education. It is the teacher's job to preserve and extend it to the plane of the content of education. Anyone who is seriously engaged in education will acknowledge that this is more easily said than done.

The above discussion of the primal force of education can also lead to other topics in education. Intrinsic justification of the content of education can be singled out as one such topic. R.S. Peters' argument on the topic, sometimes called 'argument by presupposition', has been criticized, by misunderstanding or

otherwise, as relying on too 'formal' an analysis. If this criticism is not totally off the mark, the above discussion may help to provide the 'substance' to the formal analysis. According to our present discussion, today's education is an extension of the primal modes, in which the lover and the mother transmitted their spiritual qualities as the content of education. The value of the content of education resides in the very fact that those qualities were worthwhile to the lover and the mother themselves, and there can be, or need be, no surer warrant. Similarly, the content of today's education, especially that part which needs justification, has been handed down to us through essentially the same process and with essentially the same warrant. With this point acknowledged, we may easily see that the 'substance' is already there in Peters' 'formal' analysis.

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