

A CONTROL SYSTEM FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY

—A Separate Monitoring Agency—*

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In a society, there is a matrix of control mechanisms which purport to control bureaucratic establishments. This matrix of control mechanisms as a whole constitutes a master control system over bureaucracy. This master system is named here as a "control system for the enforcement of administrative responsibility." On occasion, this system is referred to as an overall control system or a total control system. This master control system is composed of subsystems or control centers with limited control functions. Control activities of these control centers operate in two major directions. "One phase is designed to ensure that power is used for purposes duly authorized and supported by the consent of the governed. The other phase is designed to protect the constitutional and legal rights of persons against the abuse or unauthorized use of power in specific cases."⁽¹⁾ These two phases of control are shared by various control centers. Subsystems of the master control system can be classified into two main groups: external control systems and internal control systems. External control systems include such control centers as the judiciary, the legislature, and the public. These control centers engage in varying control activities in diverse ways. This diversity defies any neat definition of a single control process applicable to all kinds of control. However, we may still discern a basic underlying control cycle which is, more or less, commonly found in all sorts of control. A brief examination of this basic control

* This article is an adapted portion of the Ph. D. Dissertation from the University of Pittsburgh, 1969.

(1) Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (Fourth Edition; Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 495.

cycle and the features of control substructures of the overall control system is attempted in the first two sections of this article prior to the description on the separate monitoring agency.

The overall control system is the suprasystem or an environment of the separate monitoring agency. The examination of this suprasystem is indispensable for the wholesome understanding of the separate monitoring agency.

A. Basic Control Cycle

The basic control cycle portrayed here is an analytical scheme of control processes. It is a kind of *flow model* of control. It may help us understand production activities of control systems including the separate monitoring agency. Three elements seem essential in this control cycle: standards that represent desired performances; a comparison of actual results against the standards; and corrective actions. Control presupposes the existence of pre-set goal parameters or standards that must be achieved. Control centers or controllers seek to find out what has actually happened in the bureaucracy, and evaluate the findings in terms of goal parameters. Controllers decide whether the result is satisfactory or not, and take corrective measures. The basic elements or steps involved in the control cycle were well summarized by Walter Buckley:

(a) a control center establishes certain desired goal parameters and the means by which they may be attained; (b) these goal decisions are transformed by administrative bodies into action outputs, which result in certain effects on the state of the system and its environment; (c) information about these effects are recorded and fed back to the control center; (d) the latter tests this new state of the system against the desired goal parameters to measure the error or deviation of the initial output response; (e) if the error leaves the system outside the limits set by the goal parameters, corrective output action is taken by the control center."⁽²⁾

i. A control cycle begins with the determination of goal parameters, often in the form of law, regulation, orders, and other specifications of requirements. The control standards specify procedures, outcome characteristics that are important in a particular situation, the level of achievement for such characters, designation of individual responsibilities of controllees, etc.

Control standards closely reflect previous decisions and stereotyped standards. The nature of the relationship between the new control standards and the previous control standards or actual performance has a strong impact on the nature of control.

Controllers allow controllees put the standards into action. If control is to have any effective influence, the standards of action must be communicated and understood by controllees. Within

(2) Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 174.

the overall control system, individual sources of control standards, i.e., control subsystems or control centers, must be properly identified, and conflicting standards of different control centers must be resolved.

There are some "ambiguity-reducing devices" in communicating control standards to controllees. Practical examples of these devices include: promulgating elaborate written rules and regulations; developing distortion-proof messages for instruction; developing objective measures of performance; etc.⁽³⁾

ii. The second phase of the control cycle consists in steps whereby controllers gather information necessary to discover what controllers are doing or what is happened in the system.

Sources and forms of information gathering are virtually unlimited. There is a positive inquisition of information through such devices as extraction of reports, investigation, inspection, public hearing, interrogation, etc. There is also an area of passive reception of information and accidental encounter with control information.

Controllers usually sample "information-gathering-points." Controllers cannot review everything done by controllees. The inability of controllers to investigate all of the actions forces them to rely on some samples of these actions. Some alternative ways of selecting specific actions (strategic control points) include: selecting those matters that create strong feedbacks from external sources; selecting only significant deviations from standards; selecting only those matters above a certain quantitative level of significance; selecting only the controversial matters; selecting at random, etc.⁽⁴⁾

Selection of "strategic control points" should be timely in that it helps spot significant deviations when control needs to be exercised; it should also permit practicable and economical observation and report; it should provide at least some comprehensive measures that consolidate and summarize large blocks of detailed activities; it should contribute to securing a balance in control so that some aspects of the work will not be slighted because of close controls in other phases.⁽⁵⁾

Adequacy of information gathering methods and information reception channels is a critical factor for the successful control.

iii. The third phase of the control cycle consists in processes of evaluation. Evaluation is

(3) Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 145.

(4) Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-7.

(5) William H. Newman, *Administrative Action: The Techniques of Organization and Management* (Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 423-8.

concerned with the situation of action as well as the action of controllees. In the latter case, controllees' decisions, results of such decisions, processes of decisions, or all three of these may be subjected to the evaluation.

Modern bureaucracy seems to have well tested and elaborate methods of decision making. Thus, to rely on a soundly conceived decision making procedures contributes to the likelihood of reasonable results. In some cases, a strict observation of processes is itself a main objective of the bureaucratic action, or procedural requirement is the only available standard for the evaluation of an administrative action. However, the emphasis placed on the manner of reaching the decision (procedural approach) has its obvious limitations. Observance of procedures is not necessarily equated with right decisions.⁽⁶⁾

The device of judging by results of decisions permits a controller to judge activities of controllees who are his superiors in knowledge, since the controller does not have to penetrate into the processes of reasoning that might have led the more intelligent controllees to their action. In order that judgment by result may be used, the tasks assigned to a controllee must meet three requirements: tasks must be such that the results can be, without great trouble, measured; it must be possible to attribute the result to particular task performances; and the results must be comparable one another.⁽⁷⁾

The memory facilities of controllers are of critical importance in the evaluation phase of the control cycle. The control information is evaluated against the stored information on goal parameters. Controllers' memory recall capacity and perception are important elements in the evaluation processes.

iv. The last phase of the control cycle is concerned with corrective actions. According to the results of evaluation, controllers take corrective measures. This phase is the end of the first-instance control cycle and the beginning of the next control cycle. When deviations from the standards are detected, controllers start corrective actions either to correct the past action or to bring a new action in the future closer to the desired goals. Corrective measures may amplify original actions or diminish or negate original actions. In taking corrective measures, controllers must avoid the belated reaction, over- and undercorrection, and excessive interference with the controllees' activities.

A noteworthy problem in control phenomena is related to the "allowable margin" of goal

(6) cf. Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Public Affairs Press, 1965), pp. 196-7.

(7) *Ibid.*

deviation. A comparison of actual happenings and established standards will almost always reveal some discrepancies. Furthermore, there might be some degree of mismatch between the perception of the controller and that of controllees on the fulfillment of the standards. No two persons perceive things exactly alike. Here arises the problem concerning the relative amount of goal deviation which is actually subjected to corrective actions, or which is not subjected to corrective actions. Cultural and social norms play important role in the determination of this *allowable margin* of deviation. In some societies, certain action is regarded as corruption, while in other societies it is not.

Corrective actions must take into account the motivational pattern of the bureaucracy. Effectiveness of corrective actions, especially of punishments and rewards is closely related to the motivational pattern of the bureaucracy.

B. Administrative Control

Administrative control is that control exercised by the chief executive to hold the bureaucracy responsible. The administrative control system is formally built into the bureaucratic structure. Guarding the feedback loop of the bureaucracy, the administrative control system channels all the feedback information to administrative control centers, and takes corrective measures. The administrative control system is a part of the administrative management system. Management is a continuing cycle of planning, organizing, directing and controlling. These phases of management are mutually dependent. Control relies on other phases of management. The line between control and other aspects of administration is not sharp. Control is inextricably interwoven into a complicated matrix of administrative interactions.

Administrative control system constitutes a part of the overall control system. Effectiveness of any one control subsystem is dependent upon the operation of other control subsystems. Distinction between the administrative control system and other control systems (external control systems) is made in terms of their structures. The administrative control system is acting within the administrative structure, while external controls impinge upon the administrative system from its environment. In principle or doctrine, administrative control supplements external controls exercised by the people, the legislature and the judiciary. Technically, however, external controls such as the surveillance of the legislature and the courts over administration are the power held in reserve that may be called on to enforce bureaucratic responsibilities when administrative self-regulation breaks down. In terms of relative tendencies, external control

is concerned more with the legality of bureaucratic action and the response of the bureaucracy to environmental demands, while administrative control is concerned more with efficiency.⁽⁸⁾

Administrative control is primarily based on the institutional responsibility of the bureaucracy to the chief executive. "To the extent that the chief executive is held responsible by the legislature and the public for the administration of a governmentwide program, he will in turn try to establish the responsibility of administrative agencies to himself."⁽⁹⁾ The chief executive is given the resources to carry out his control.

The administrative control structure is shaped in a hierarchical manner throughout the bureaucratic structure. Numerous control cycles form an amalgam of continuous layers. The ordinary hierarchy of the bureaucracy constitutes the main stream of control activities. Beside the ordinary hierarchy of operating agencies, there are some special organizational arrangements to help the chief executive carry out his control activities.

1. Ordinary Hierarchies: Operating Agencies

Bureaucracy is subjected to a hierarchical control from within. At the top of this control structure is the chief executive. This hierarchy also includes the top echelon political command structure of the bureaucracy.

The term "operating agency" is used here broadly, including not only the hierarchies of line organizations of the administration but also general and special staffs, assistant and auxiliary organizations attached to or an integral part of line agencies.

Control processes in operating agencies are built into hierarchical layers of control cycles. Numerous control cycles are interconnected both horizontally and vertically. The control effects work from the top down as well as laterally. Individual control cycles form successive communication loops. Between the bottom and the top of the hierarchy, come the multitude *punctures* of communication. Consequently, the control authority is distributed and diffused in the entire hierarchy of operating agencies.

According to the definition of Fritz Morstein Marx, hierarchy means the succession of levels of decision, with each giving the lower levels orders. Hierarchical structure has its undeniable advantages for controlling as well as directing. In hierarchical relations, the responsibility for

(8) J.M. Phiffner and R.V. Presthus, *Public Administration* (Fourth Edition; Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 162.

(9) Arthur A. Maass and Laurence I. Radway, "Guaging Administrative Responsibility," in *Public Administration Review* (Vol. IX, No. 3, Summer 1949), p. 187.

direction and control from the top is not overextended, because every order, traveling down, is reinforced by the way it secures attention on successively lower levels of control. The performance of supervisors in transmitting orders received by them to their subordinates can be observed and controlled with relative ease. Observance of orders can be stimulated by prospects for advancement and threats of disciplinary action. As a result, instead of losing force because of the distance it has to cover in moving throughout the organization, each order from above gains new force as it proceeds from one supervisor-subordinate relationship to the next lower one. Not only does hierarchy make it easy to transmit orders, which set in motion specific actions, but also is effective in conveying to all parts of the organization a general sense of direction, a common approach, operating doctrine, and common control standards.⁽¹⁰⁾

Despite its organizational merits for control, the hierarchical control of operating agencies alone is not sufficient for the enforcement of administrative responsibility. It has to be supplemented and counter-checked.

Hierarchies of operating agencies as control channels have their shortcomings. Most of all, the control information sent up through the hierarchical channel may be highly edited and often unreliable. "The typical upward communication loop is small and terminates with the immediate supervisor. He may transmit some of the information to his own superior, but generally in a modified form... The closed nature of the upward circuits... resides both in the restricted communication passed upward and in the limited codes of the recipients."⁽¹¹⁾ In the hierarchical control process, the controller and the controllee tend to have same bias on the problem. Consequently, corrective actions taken by the controller tend to be inadequate and preferential. To remedy this tendency, some lateral, counterchecking mechanisms are built into operating hierarchies through devices of interconnected or overlapping jurisdictions. However, in controlling extremely complicated bureaucratic operations, the chief executive needs additional measures designed to supplement or countercheck the hierarchical control channel of operating agencies. Such additional arrangements serve for following purposes: expert assistance in control problems; objective evaluation of control information; specialized corrective actions, etc. Special agencies for administrative control can be broadly categorized into two broad groups, i.e., separate monitoring agencies and "criss-cross" organizations. A more detailed description will

(10) This portion of description is based on: Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 22-3.

(11) Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 246.

be accorded to the separate monitoring agency in the later section. At the moment, we will concern ourselves with "criss-cross organizations" of the bureaucracy.

Many miniatures or counterparts of the separate monitoring agency and criss-cross organizations are installed in operating agencies.

2. Criss-Cross Organizations

Service-wide management agencies of the whole administrative structure are named as "criss-cross organizations,"⁽¹²⁾ since they are crossing the command channels of the bureaucracy. Criss-cross organizations operate in the area between the chief executive and heads of operating agencies. Their function is to facilitate the operation of operating agencies by doing for them some of their secondary, house-keeping functions, and, on behalf of the chief executive, to serve as a means of coordination and control in the respective area of competence. They help and control operating agencies.⁽¹³⁾

Criss-cross organizations combine a series of organizational characteristics. First, they have functions of conventional staff organizations. In some respects, they are "special staffs" for the chief executive. They assist, advise and counsel operating agencies. They are responsible for developing policies and methods for the performance of specialized functions, and they cannot directly implement their plans, policies and methods. Secondly, they have commands over their own hierarchies, and have functional authorities over other operating agencies on important matters within their competences. To the extent that they have operating authorities, they exercise a direct control power. Finally, their operations cross the hierarchical commanding channels of the bureaucracy. They create an organizational arrangement in which two chains of command work as external checks each other. This arrangement provides two channels of communication from the top to any given part of the bureaucracy, with the result that any intermediary may be bypassed either in giving orders or in obtaining information. It is a pattern of overlapping jurisdiction requiring coordination among different organizational units before anyone can act.

Criss-cross organizations are managerial arms of the chief executive. Like any other overhead units grouped about the chief executive, they are devised to meet the demand for strengthening the administrative capacity of the chief executive. Therefore, their role is not limited merely

(12) This term is borrowed from: Gordon Tullock, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

(13) cf. Leonard D. White, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

to control activities. Nevertheless, they play an important role in the bureaucracy-wide control system. Their major roles in control include: (a) by crossing command channels, their everyday operations become a natural check on reciprocal activities between them and operating agencies; (b) they establish control standards which necessitate special skills and government-wide applications; (c) they undertake objective, professional evaluations of the performance of operating agencies; (d) they engage in pre-action control activities. On important matters, they exercise a "concurring" authority over activities implemented in operating agencies. In such instances, operating agencies must clear such activities with criss-cross organizations before getting into action; and (e) within limits of their operating authorities, they receive reports from operating agencies, and inspect the performance of operating agencies.

Principal criss-cross organizations include the organization and method agency, the budget agency, the personnel agency, the national development planning agency, the office of prosecutor-general.

C. External Control

1. Legislative Control

"Representative bodies are the institutional embodiment of democracy. An administration responsible to the legislature is of the very essence of democratic government."⁽¹⁴⁾ Bureaucracy is answerable to both the chief executive and the legislature. However, in the final analysis, bureaucracy is responsible to the legislature through the chief executive.

The authority of the legislature to empower, limit and investigate the bureaucracy is a safeguard for responsible government. The "enabling actions" of the legislature are the source of administrative authorities. Principal legislative control devices include: (a) passage, amendment and repeal of the enabling legislation under which the bureaucracy operates; (b) review and approval of budgetary requests, and review of the settlement of the public accounts; (c) investigation of the operation of the bureaucracy; (d) legislative consent or confirmation in the appointment of high ranking officials; and (e) reception and disposal of petitions from the public.⁽¹⁵⁾

Some of legislative control activities are constitutional and legal, and others are "political"

(14) Maass and Radway, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

(15) cf. Felix A. Nigro, *Modern Public Administration* (Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 486-9.

and informal. If the legislature does not possess direct remedial measures, it can “only investigate, protest, denounce and recommend.”⁽¹⁶⁾ However, it may constitute political pressures upon the chief executive and instigate actions of other control centers.

2. Judicial Control

Responsibility of the bureaucracy is a responsibility under law, and “it is the judiciary to which administrative agencies must prove, when challenged, that they have not abused their discretion, overstepped their jurisdiction, or committed an error of law, fact or procedure.”⁽¹⁷⁾

The judiciary has the ultimate responsibility in holding the bureaucracy within proper legislative restrictions imposed by the legislature. “When an agency of the executive branch needs help in enforcing the law, when controversies arise that administrative officials are not qualified to settle, or when administrative officials in the course of their work invade the legal rights of citizens,”⁽¹⁸⁾ the courts are called into action.

Control by the judiciary contributes not only to correction of administrative wrongs, but also to creation of restraining influences which the availability of judicial remedies has upon bureaucratic actions. Punishment of wrong-doers by criminal procedures is the strongest deterrent to wrong-doing.

Judicial review is largely a negative, *post hoc*, and very rigid check addressed to wrongs of the bureaucracy. Courts cannot take the initiative in selecting the issues they review. Concerned parties of legal disputes over administrative actions have to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies.

Forms of judicial remedies include suit for damage, *Mandamus*, injunction, *Certiorari*, and *Habeas Corpus*.⁽¹⁹⁾

Availability and costs of judicial remedies and scope and nature of the judicial review of administrative actions have important effects on the work of the separate monitoring agency.

3. Public Control

Society as a whole is the environment of the bureaucracy. “Because public administration is the embodiment of one aspect of the total cultural milieu, government can be no better

(16) E.L. Normanton, *The Accountability and Audit of Government* (Manchester University Press, 1967), p. 403.

(17) Maass and Radway, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

(18) Marshall E. Dimock and Gladis O. Dimock, *Public Administration* (Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1953), p. 505.

(19) cf. Leonard D. White, *op. cit.*, pp. 512-515.

than the community it serves.”⁽²⁰⁾ The degree to which the public is concerned with and participates in the operation of the bureaucracy ultimately determines the degree to which the bureaucracy will be responsible. The people in a democratic society are the ultimate source of control over the bureaucracy.

There may be innumerable ways in which citizens may enforce bureaucratic responsibility. However, in general, the unorganized public at large does not possess institutional means of direct and immediate control over bureaucratic actions. The remedial or corrective power of the public is mostly indirect. Even if there is an institutionalized route of public control of a concrete administrative action, usually the final step of the control cycle, i.e., the corrective action, is carried out by other control centers. In this sense, the public control is an indirect form of control.

Individual citizens may initiate or provoke control activities of other control centers, and may provide control information. Many intermediaries of the public control may stage similar activities. David Easton calls these intermediaries “structural regulators” of the volume of social demands to the political system.⁽²¹⁾ These structural regulators keep the gate of the communication channel of the political system. They manipulate, diminish, or create the control demands of the public. Interest groups, political parties, professional associations, opinion leaders, “influential men,” and mass media are the important examples of intermediary public control centers.

There is a variety of “response-patterns” of public control centers toward bureaucratic actions. Some of them are louder and more positive and others more passive. Those whom the bureaucracy affects and who cannot make themselves heard may inform or influence other control centers more powerful than their own, or may organize themselves into pressure groups and thereby develop incentives or sanctions that will force the bureaucracy to respond. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is not only the passive recipient of the demands from these public control centers, but also it is often the positive elicitor of the control information from public control centers. When dissident environmental elements seriously threaten a bureaucratic organization, that organization may attempt to incorporate such dissident elements into its own structure.⁽²²⁾

(20) Dimock and Dimock. *op. cit.*, p. 516.

(21) David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 122.

(22) cf. Robert A. Rosenthal and Robert S. Weiss, “Problems of Organizational Feedback Processes,” in Raymond A. Bauer, ed., *Social Indicators* (The M.I.T. Press, 1966) pp. 310-331.

D. A Separate Monitoring Agency

The separate monitoring agency is a central control organization of the bureaucracy. It is an instrument of intra-bureaucratic self-criticism or internal police. This organization is a component part of the administrative structure, but at the same, it is distinct from and superior to the ordinary active administration in some respects, being placed midway between the active administration on the one hand and the chief executive and external control centers on the other. Thus, its operation is marked by a fair degree of autonomy and independence from the active administration.

The separate monitoring agency is established primarily for control purposes. It helps the top control center of the bureaucracy (the chief executive) in inspecting, evaluating and correcting the structure and performance of the administrative system. The separate monitoring agency also supplements and assists the work of external control centers such as the legislature, the courts and the public.

The separate monitoring agency is an age-old device for the surveillance over the bureaucracy. It has been devised and utilized in many bureaucracies of various governments. However, drastic changes in the quantity and quality of administrative systems and changing environmental conditions created a situation in which separate monitoring agencies were expected to assume new roles. The growing size and diversity of administrative activities coupled with the qualitative changes necessitated a more and more comprehensive measure of administrative control. Also there have been mounting needs for delegation of rule making authorities by the legislature to the bureaucracy and needs for lightening the overburdened courts. These forces generated an impetus for the elaboration and development of separate monitoring agencies. With the recognition of the changing needs, governments began to expect separate monitoring agencies to reorient themselves and to move out from the confines of the regularity control and toward the positive and substantial control. Their activities have been gradually expanded and their environmental interrelations have been newly appreciated and institutionalized.

There are some common, classical justifications regarding the establishment of separate monitoring agencies: that administrative adjudication must be separated from judiciary and legislative structures; that administrative adjudication must be performed by an institution which is independent from the active administration; and that there should be liberal judicial review of administrative action, extending to review of facts as well as law and sometimes even to

trial *de novo*.⁽²³⁾

However, in the newer perspective, the separate monitoring agency in the government may be regarded as a "leading system"⁽²⁴⁾ which exerts the greatest influence on inputs of other component systems of the bureaucracy. Guarding the feedback loop of the administrative system, a separate monitoring agency acquires the best opportunity to receive feedback information and stimuli emanating from the environment. Therefore, this agency is placed in a strategic position where it may be able to mediate between the administrative performance and changing environmental demands, and to guide the administrative system toward development.

There are, of course, unique variations in the concrete systems of separate monitoring in different polities. On the one hand, there are hard line configurations such as administrative courts with more rigid and formal authorities and strict legal constraints of operation. On the other hand, there are soft line organizations as found in the design of the Ombudsman system. Some separate monitoring agencies are limited purpose control organizations with a narrow range of activities, whereas others are comprehensive and multi-purpose control organizations.

Separate monitoring agencies are expected to provide protection for the individual citizen against the abuse of administration, and to provide a means capable of demanding certain standards of administrative action and of correcting deviations.⁽²⁵⁾

The separate monitoring agency provides an effective feedback loop for the bureaucracy. This feedback loop establishes a direct communication channel between the top control center of the bureaucracy and its environment, facilitating development of the adaptive coping capacity of the administrative system.

The separate monitoring agency creates a separate communication channel outside the hierarchical channel of the active administration. The top control center of the bureaucracy can use this separate channel to insert messages into or extract data out of almost any level in the bureaucracy without going through all the levels above it. Closely allied to the top level control center and removed from the hierarchies of the active administration, the separate monitoring agency can serve to expand the control capacity of the top control center. In

(23) William W. Boyer, *Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Government Agencies* (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), p. 139.

(24) See: H.A. Thelen, *Exploration of a Growth Model for Psychic, Biological and Social Systems* (Mimeographed Paper, 1960) cited from Katz and Kahn, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

(25) cf. Henry J. Abraham, "The Need for Ombudsman in the United States," in Donald C. Rowat, ed., *The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender* (Unwin Brothers, Ltd., 1965) p. 236.

essence, the separate monitoring agency has three major characteristics: (a) its organizational structure and career paths of its personnel are, to some extent, distinct from those of the active administration; (b) its major role is to control bureaucratic actions, although it may have other functions such as downward transmission of orders; and (c) at the top level, it is integrated into some large bureaucratic or political structure, that is, it is established as overhead units to the total bureaucratic establishment. ⁽²⁶⁾

1. Structure and Maintenance

The primary goal of the separate monitoring agency is to control the administrative system. Under this primary goal, the agency purports to assure adequate performance of administrative affairs by inspecting various phases of administrative activities by reporting and by recommending. The scope of its examination encompasses such conventional control categories as financial audit and administrative inspection. This agency also seeks to protect citizens from administrative abuses by receiving, investigating and adjudicating the grievances. This includes the protection of unfairly treated or challenged civil servants.

The separate monitoring agency is endowed with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authorities as well as the administrative. The finality of its decisions within the bureaucracy and the investigative competence are the important ingredients of these authorities. Adjudicative decisions of the agency may be challenged in the courts, but they have "final effects" inside the bureaucracy. The agency must be able to engage freely in investigatory activities. It requires a free access to the source of information, summoning witnesses and other concerned persons, demanding submission of documents, and requesting cooperation from relevant organizations or individuals. The agency also lays down control standards and procedures.

In relation to the overall governmental structure, the separate monitoring agency is placed at the top echelon of the bureaucracy and reports directly to the top control center. The head of the agency is usually appointed by the chief executive and confirmed by the legislature, and his tenure is legally guaranteed. The hierarchy of the agency is removed from the ordinary hierarchy of the active administration. Although the agency is ultimately responsible to the chief executive and receives from him policy directives, the agency enjoys some operational autonomy in the day-by-day performance. Tenures of key members are legally guaranteed and members of the "decisionmaking college" at the top of the agency are expected to be independent in their

(26) cf. Athony Downs, *op. cit.* pp. 148-9.

judgments. The agency also maintains some autonomy in budgeting processes. The need for autonomy in its extrinsic relations stems from considerations of the impartiality of judgments, the "separatedness" of its communication channel, and the sufficient authority in relation to the active administration. Therefore, this relative independence of the agency in its external relations is deemed an essential structural requirement. A mild and healthy feeling of antagonism between the agency and the active administration is a spur for vigorous control activities. However, an extreme isolation and a drastically different perception resulted from the separation must be remedied by some structural arrangements. "A feeling of isolation is not an incentive to good work, it may easily become a feeling of insignificance."⁽²⁷⁾ There must be some structural links between the active administration and the separate monitoring agency, which facilitate the information flow between them. The separate monitoring agency may have its own branches or dispatches to the active administration, or there may be counterpart units in the active administration.

The internal structure of the agency is consisted in a cluster of differentiated substructures under the general direction of the single-headed leadership. Component substructures may be broadly divided into two groups: structures for production (units for the primary task performance), and maintenance and adaptive coping structures (housekeeping units).

The production structure consists in a multi-member college of decision making and in units of preparatory and assistant work. The decision making college is composed of the head of the agency and other decision making role incumbents.

In relation to the maintenance and adaptation of the system, the chain of command, i.e., the hierarchy of authority from the head of the agency, reaches out to every part of the structure. But, the production activities of the decision making college are not subjected to the hierarchical command.

Viewed from the nature of the agency, a shorter hierarchy is deemed more advantageous than a longer hierarchy. A short hierarchy of the internal structure provides a better condition for the accurate communication of information and for the ease of contact between the control center (decision maker) and those who originate observations and are able to explain and give further information about them. In the active administration, the problem is largely a matter of feeding directive impulses downwards; but in the separate monitoring agency, it is rather

(27) E.L. Normanton, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

a question of feeding information upwards.⁽²⁸⁾

Major maintenance inputs are composed of budget appropriations, personnel and information in the form of laws, regulations, directives, etc. Recruitment and socialization processes of the personnel management require special arrangements. Beyond the training in legal knowledge, monitors should acquire a substantial expertise in various fields of the specialized administration. Career paths of monitors must be, to some extent, distinct from those of the active administration. It may be achieved through a legal separation of personnel systems. However, better results can be obtained by making the monitors' group the elite corps of the civil service, with better qualifications and remunerations. The agency needs its autonomy in requesting budget appropriations (including supplies of material resources) lest interferences occur in the budget preparation process within the active administration.

2. Production Performance Cycle: A Flow Model of the Separate Monitoring System

The production performance cycle begins with the *information reception*. Information is then selected by *coding* mechanisms of the system. Information that passed through the initial screening is temporarily stored in the *backlog* for the evaluation and decision making. Other information classified as irrelevant may be returned to the originators or thrown to the *sink* (abandonment). The next step is to *evaluate* the information and make *decisions* in light of the stored *memory facilities* and through *learning*. Decisions of the system are exported to the environment as the *outflow of information*.

The production performance cycle portrayed here presupposes that the main object of production of the separate monitoring agency is comprised of control information.

a. *Information reception*. The system receives information through the environmental demand and support (passive reception on the part of the system), positive investigations (as a result of information extracting output of the system) and the feedback on production outputs of the system. In the first case, the system passively intakes information from citizens, administrators and external control centers, in such forms as accusations, complaints, charges or simple reports, etc. Information is sometimes received accidentally. In the second case, information is received by positive actions of the separate monitoring agency. Investigative or information extracting activities are outputs of the system, but they result in new rounds of information inflow. As an output of the agency, the investigation itself often has enough control effects without further actions. But, incoming information collected through investigative actions

(28) cf. E.L. Normanton, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

becomes an information input which will be processed in the system. Finally, information is received through the feedback process of the system. Feedback information is concerned with the output of the system. This feedback information has its significance in such cases where decisions of the system is disputed in its environment.

Reception of information on active administration is done primarily through "documentary" (voucher) inspections. This impels the active administration to devote additional efforts to produce documents. This problem is aggravated by the tendency of the expanding control by the separate monitoring agency and the defensive reaction on the part of active administration. The separate monitoring agency tends to require more and more documents and written evidence. The active administration tends to produce more documents and justifications to emphasize the conformity to the established procedures and superiors' orders than innovations. Thus, the active administration may assign additional personnel and resources to prepare documents that are not necessary for the proper performance of its tasks. Therefore, superfluous, formalistic control activities would merely increase the cost of control.

b. *Coding*. The separate monitoring agency has its coding mechanism which performs the screening and refinement of information received. Through this coding mechanism, the system can respond selectively to incoming information. The coding process determines the amount and types of information received from the environment, and transforms (or translates) information according to the systemic properties of the agency. The nature of the system sets the limited coding categories, and imposes omission, selection, refinement, distortion and transformation upon incoming information.⁽²⁹⁾

The general coding criteria of the separate monitoring agency are broadly open to information on the active administration. Within the general coding criteria, the agency determines, by its policy, more specific and narrower coding criteria, or emphasizes certain parts of categories.

According to Karl W. Deutsch, there is a *switchboard problem* in relation to the coding process. It is the problem of choice between different possibilities of routing different incoming information through different channels within the system. If many alternative channels are available for few information, the functioning of the system may be hampered by indecision; if many information has to compete for few channels, it may be hampered by "jamming."

(29) cf. Katz and Kahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-228.

There must be some relatively stable rules in the arrangement of channels.⁽³⁰⁾

c. *Evaluation.* The focal dimension of the throughput processes of the system is consisted in the evaluation process. In this process, the selected incoming information is refined, recombined, and decisions on such information are reached.

Evaluation of information is guided by the memory facilities of the system. According to Karl W. Deutsch, memory facilities are any kind of facilities available to the organization by means of which data from the past are stored and held available for recall and applicable to recombination and action. Such memory facilities exist most obviously in the heads of its members. In addition to that, the organization may have other facilities: filing systems, libraries, or special organizations dealing with the maintenance of available knowledge, such as reference staffs, policy group, overseers, and the like.⁽³¹⁾

Goal parameters or standards of administrative actions are the principal contents of the memory facilities of the separate monitoring agency. They are often stored in physical forms such as legal codes, files of precedents, leading cases, manuals, written directives, policy statements, etc. Monitors have their intangible storage of knowledge in their minds.

Three different levels of criteria may be available for the evaluation of administrative action. One is the adoption of the best feasible performance as a standard of evaluation. The second is the use of precedent (doing as well as previously). Finally, there is a "ratchet principle" (doing a little better than previously). This last category of criteria is deemed sound as the achievement oriented evaluation criteria. The first category may frustrate the administrative performance. The second category may preserve the status quo.⁽³²⁾

d. *Information outflow.* In the final phase of the production cycle, the converted information is exported to the environment. This outflowing information is the production output of the separate monitoring agency; it is an input to the environment; and it is a feedback information to the administrative system.

The information outflow includes requests made to the active administration; advice and recommendation; reports to the external control centers; decisions for fact-finding; and establishment of standards. The information on this outflowing information is fed back to the system,

(30) Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (The Free Press, 1966), p. 94.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 206.

(32) Chadwick J. Haberstroh, "Organization Design and Systems Analysis," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Rand McNally & Company, 1965) p. 1181.

and a new performance cycle begins.

Throughout the production cycle, such concepts as "lag," "gain," and "lead" of communication provide the media for the evaluation of the performance. Often than not, there arises the problem of information overload in the production cycle. Systemic responses to the information overload may vary according to the nature of the system and environmental conditions.

J.G. Millier has classified these responses into seven categories:

"(a) omission, failing to process some of the information; (b) error, processing information incorrectly; (c) queuing, delaying during periods of peak load in the hope of catching up during lulls; (d) filtering, neglecting to process certain types of information according to some scheme of priorities; (e) approximation, or cutting categories of discrimination (a blanket and non-precise way of responding); (f) employing multiple channels, using parallel channels, as in decentralization; and (g) escaping from the task."⁽³³⁾

This schema of systemic responses to information overload is useful in understanding a general tendency committed to either positive coping of overloads or negative avoidance of overloads.

Inaccuracy of the conversion process may be counterchecked by a repetition method or overlapping jurisdictions. This problem, the counterchecking, is related to the question of "who controls monitors?"

3. The Environment

The environment of the separate monitoring agency is made up of external systems. The environmental systems include both intra- and extrasocietal systems. Broadly speaking, the environment of the separate monitoring agency can even extend beyond the national boundaries. However, the environmental variables can be drastically delimited to a manageable scale. Only the directly relevant and essential variables must be selected for discussion. These selected environmental parameters may be mainly related to the external control systems and the state of the bureaucracy.

(33) Summarized from :J.G. Miller, "Information Input, Overload, and Psychopathology," *American Journal of Psychiatry* (Vol. 116, 1960), pp. 695-704.