Pleasure is necessary to our well-being even if we do not follow the hedonistic view that pleasure is only good. However, we need to distinguish between a number of different kinds of pleasures. Plato's attempts to do this are inadequate for our discussion of the relationship between pleasure and education. In this paper it has been attempted to draw the distinction of pleasures and explain the nature of each kind of pleasures. Admitting that the distinction depends on the things and activities with which pleasures are concerned, it is significant for establishing the concept of 'well-being' to understand pleasure and have it attained by the pupil in the light of her worthwhile life. Meanwhile, the subjective and objective accounts on what is worthwhile in education for the pupil's well-being seldom coincide. In this context, John White's argument that autonomy is central to the good life and Richard Peters's justification for worthwhile activity shall be examined in terms of the nature of pleasure and its distinction.

I. Introduction

If, by surrendering a pleasure of little worth, one sees a large pleasure, the wise man will give up the pleasure of little worth, and look to the larger pleasure. Dharmapada 290 (chapter 21)

Pleasure is necessary to the sense of human well-being, otherwise well-being may be distorted. By this I mean the pleasure which the agent experiences when she is either engaged in carrying out physical acts or in a certain state which is in harmony with her character. Without pleasure, something involved in the agent, whatever it is, can be recognized as a mere burden or pain in her life. But it is also a serious problem when trying to identify what pleasure is as an essential part of well-being or what is meant by pleasure as well-being. Some may see pleasure as certain human sensations or perceptions and others
as the outcome of ascetic self-discipline. Obviously there are a number of uses for 'pleasure' such as personal choice, a state of consciousness or even its own sources, and a number of synonymous terms to 'pleasure' such as 'gratification', 'satisfaction', 'enjoyment', 'delight', 'rapture' and so on (Perry, 1967, chapter 3). In order to dissolve some of the perplexities in the use of the term and its implications, therefore, it is beneficial to our understanding of the pupil's well-being to identify its various characteristics.

When the pupil's well-being is claimed to be the supreme aim in education, it also embraces some sense of pleasure. And when pleasure is recognized and considered as an essential part of well-being in education, its various notions can be in contrast and conflict with the other. It is partly due to the notion of education to be characterized, and partly to the conceptions of well-being. While there are a number of constituents in the conceptions of well-being, pleasure must be one of them. Pleasure is not only concerned with something worthwhile, but it should also be the hallmark of the outcome of education. Nevertheless, if pupils' well-being is to be defined in terms of being in their interests, pleasure is obviously a necessary ingredient of their well-being because it promotes their interests.

From these inferences, we can assume two contrasting views of pupils' well-being. One is that well-being can be defined in a rather subjective tone, meaning self-determination; whereas the other defines it as something objectively worthwhile. Of these contrasting accounts, John White's takes a subjective position, where pupils' well-being should be defined and understood as autonomy (White, 1990), characterized in terms of desire-satisfaction, which I nonetheless categorize into the subjective account. By contrast, particularly since the 1960's, the intrinsic worth of certain activities has been considered as the most important target of education to which pupils are to be brought up. Perhaps it is rather more significant than other things that the educational value can be found in certain sorts of activities (Hirst, 1965; Peters, 1966, chapter 5). Peters's normative criterion of education links to this (Peters, 1966, chapter 1). This kind of account should be called and classified as the objective account for pupils' well-being.

In this paper I shall attempt to distinguish pleasure into kinds
to show that pupils' well-being can be promoted by education, examining two striking ideas of well-being mentioned above. For this, an examination shall be taken of the contrasting views of two philosophers of education, John White and Richard Peters, on the theme of pleasure.

II. The Sense of Pleasure

In his book *Utilitarianism*, J. S. Mill defines kinds of pleasure by distinguishing merely between lower and higher ones, and thus holds that 'some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others' (Mill, 1863, 258). Nevertheless, his concession seems to be insufficient to provide us with the complete distinction of pleasure and the mistake of circular thinking has been made by advocating the pursuit of higher pleasures simply because most sensitive and sensible people do actually pursue them (Mill, 1863, 260-1, 288). For me, however, there should exist certain grounds to distinguish pleasures in kinds, and that distinction necessitates an explanation of the reason why some of them can be called higher and others lower. According to Downie (1966, 69), one reason why Mill fails in the distinction rests on assuming a hedonistic conception of the ultimate end. The point of *On Liberty* is that Mill's qualitative distinction can be put as a distinction not between pleasures themselves but between activities. However, some activities are actually preferable to others. Why do we prefer some to others? The answer rests on the fact that some activities such as poetry are conducive to self-development rather than others such as pushpin (Downie, 1966, 70). This point shows us Mill's second failure in the distinction. Since, if the distinction is justified by means of conducing more to self-development, it means circularly that the distinction depends upon how great a quality of pleasure is produced (Downie, 1966, 71).

Pleasure has had a long history in ethical debates and has been regarded as a significant part of the good life. Mill's distinguishing of pleasure into kinds is not novel. Plato had already been concerned in the *Philebus* with weighing the importance of pleasure within the good life, which for him was related with honour and knowledge, and then goes on to argue
which one is the best kind of pleasure for the good life. But the significance of pleasure in its contribution to the good life lies only in the pursuit of knowledge. Plato tries to classify the variety of pleasures in his *Philebus* (20c and 33d). But his division into kinds of pleasures is based on the distinction of the ideal life in his *Republic* (580d ff.). For Aristotle, pleasures perfect the activities through which *eudaimonia* exists. These pleasure are also of different kinds and correspond to the different kinds of activities which complete them (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X, chapter 4). Whereas Plato conceives pleasure as a certain process or replenishment, Aristotle views it as inherent in the activities which are made perfect by it. Aristippus placed even more importance on the pursuit of pleasure by stating that pleasure is the goal of life. This idea continued through the Hellenistic age by Epicurus and the Epicurean hedonists. For Epicurus, pleasure is the end of life at which we are free from pain during our life-time. This is, however, not an ethical account but a natural condition, as they assert that if this natural condition is distorted, pain follows. Pain is a disruption of the natural condition. Thus there is something more required for an ethical account of their hedonism (Long, 1986, 64).

Because of a weakness of logical link from this Epicurean natural account to the ethical one, it is required that pleasure be divided into kinds, and then we can say the hedonistic account is considered as an ethical one. And their claims that pleasure should be divided into kinds are, for me, an unsatisfactory ground for the educational account that education aims at the good life. It is not only because pleasure often includes sensations, activities or both, but because it is actually used in the expression of mixture of emotions and vulgar interests. This conceptual difficulty denotes that there exist certain objects for which ‘pleasure’ is used, physical or psychic. This means the diversity of pleasure to be captured. If pleasure is taken as an essential part of the good life which education aims at, the diversity should be analyzed lest it distort these aims.

**III. The Distinction of Pleasure**

The distinction of pleasure should be drawn according to what
provides us with pleasure, i.e., the nature of things that pleasure is concerned with. For instance, sensual pleasure can be defined as an absence of pain in the sensory level; whereas some advantage as an outcome gained can lead us to be pleased, by which pleasure is seen as certain interests. Finally our enjoying of an activity, as in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book X, chapters 1-4), can also be understood as pleasure which always accompanies certain activities. Pleasures can thus be classified and defined as follows:

(i) sensual pleasure ($P_1$): pleasure attained through the satisfaction of physical desires associated with instinct and basic needs, which is seen as physiological and purely composed of the natural properties.

(ii) advantage pleasure ($P_2$): pleasure gained through the psychological satisfaction and in pursuit of interests in the ordinary sense. This is not only within the activity through which amusement and excitement are gained but in a person's interests, logically irrespective of activity. In any case, this pleasure is seen as certain advantages attained.

(iii) achievement pleasure ($P_3$): pleasure seen as a certain good state achieved through the commitment to certain activities. This is hypothetically supposed to be a pleasure inherent in certain activities, and also accompanied, in Aristotelian sense, with cognitive concerns which require the conceptual or epistemological apparatus rather than with the pursuit of material interests. This pleasure rests on the intrinsic feature of the proper activity. That is to say, it is impossible to get pleasure without commitment to certain activities.

As defined above, sensual pleasure ($P_1$) primarily rests at the physiological level, bodily or corporeal. When we say man naturally pursues pleasures and avoids pains, it could be initially understood in the physiological sense. The association with stimulus and response following psychological behaviourism could give a theoretical foundation of this pleasure. For as our body operates automatically, $P_1$ therefore has the physiological autonomy as its paramount feature. For
instance, *homeostasis* is one of the cases. The operation of this pleasure can be far removed from our rational capacities but can possibly be controllable by our volition. The Epicurean sense of pleasure might fall under this category, provided that, as seen above, pleasure is opposite of pain and regarded as a natural condition. By this definition, Epicurus also failed in a clear distinction between kinds of pleasures.

According to Epicurus, *advantage pleasure* (*P2*) should be heterogeneous in that it only exists in the psychological anticipation and satisfaction under the consideration of our interests. That is, *P2* cannot be explicable by its internal autonomy in the sense of Platonic pleasure, because it is composed of the mixed forms of physical and psychological pleasures. It is relative to the activity with which our vulgar or lower-order interests are concerned. The pleasure of anticipation falls under this, *i.e.*, psycho-physical pleasure which Plato regards as one kind. Unlike *P1* this *P2* requires certain skill and ability external to certain activities being carried out. In this sense, this pleasure is utilitarian if we can judge this as a good when maximized. While maximizing pleasure is, according to utilitarians, desirable and thus appreciated as valuable, the utilitarian position can be justified in the sense of the aggregate good and only this good is identified with pleasure.

Unlike the physiological autonomy in *P1*, *achievement pleasure* (*P3*) requires in its operation the internally autonomous apparatus accompanying certain activities, and also involves the epistemological entity that Plato regards as psychic pleasure (*Philebus, 31e-32b*). Thus we cannot experience this kind of pleasure at all without a certain mental capacity and an engaging activity. It is quite adequate to say that *P3* necessitates cognitive perspectives, theoretical and practical, required for carrying out some activities. Regarding the theoretical perspectives this pleasure requires a conceptual framework whether or not we accept the Platonic view of 'theory'. By 'achievement' I mean that *P3* should be accompanied by certain activities and then our state of mind ultimately reaches a certain goal by engaging in those activities. If pleasure results from good fortune as much as successful activity, by contrast, this pleasure belongs to *P2* because of its nature of the advantage attained. In this sense, *P3* is nearer to the pleasure asserted in
Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* because it is not necessarily contrasted with mere pain. The aspect of achievement pleasure is not merely seen as a process (*kinesis*) that Aristotle focuses upon. This pleasure involves not only the achievement of certain activity but also requires certain task for its achievement. Thus a main characteristic of *P3* has a quite different sense of process from Aristotle's *kinesis*, which necessarily involves a certain kind of tasks.

The distinction above stated shows us that *P3* does not entirely rest on Aristotle's account of pleasure, but we need to explain the *kinesis* in the sense of its connection with 'accompanying activities'. There would be a possible distinction between the activity and the consequential pleasure in the light of 'kinesis'. The consequential pleasure is derived at the end of the process of an activity. This has the sense of *energia*. From this point, while *P2* includes a consequential aspect and excludes an achievemental one, *P3* apprehends the aspects of activity (*energia*) as well as its achievement. In Aristotle's sense of activity, however, pleasure is identical to enjoyment although enjoyment can be involved in both *P2* and *P3* (Urmson, 1988, 99). It is a truism that pleasure gained as advantage is provided by enjoyable activities, and pleasure as achievement also comes from enjoying activities. Thus distinction among *P1*, *P2* and *P3* does not correspond with that of Aristotle.

While *P1* can be seen as some physical responses, such as ejaculation, *i.e.*, the spurt of basic needs and physiological desires, *P2* rests in the activity effects such as amusement and excitement derived from play or vocational activity, which actually improve our vulgar and lower-order interests. The utilitarian calculus of utility is a good example of *P2*. Thus the balance of an amount of utility against another is only possible in the sense of *P2*. By contrast *P3* does not make any sense in the light of this calculus. But there is an exception in the sense of personal utility in that if a pushpin cannot be compatible with a poem it is obvious that *P3* is independent of this kind of calculus. This is far from Mill's point (1863) since he does not account for *P3* or explain what *P3* is although he points out Benthamite defects with an example of the pushpin.

As regards the mechanism of our capacities, *P1* exists through the physical mechanism outside of activities and concerned with
our survival because it is derived from the satisfaction of our basic needs. Meanwhile P2 and P3 are attained through the psychic mechanism dealing with the nature of activity. Whereas P2 is based on the psychological mechanisms in the pursuit of vulgar and lower-order interests such as desire-satisfaction and rationalization, P3 requires more cognitive concerns and is also concerned with the states of affairs in our mind. Thus pleasure-seeking in P3 does not necessarily mean the lower-order interest-seeking. In this context, P2 requires a psychological reason for the rationalization as psychological mechanism, and P3 necessitates the justification of the logical reason in pursuit of activity, when it is asked 'why should pleasure be pursued?' In other words, P3 links to the particular feature of certain activity, but the relation between P2 and activity is a melange because it includes not only the practical interests but also, on the other hand, the sense of leisure or even pastime with which pleasure is internally connected.

IV. Pleasure, Well-being, Education and their Relationship

A. Pleasure and Well-being

Each kind of pleasure has its own meaning for the sense of well-being whether or not we accept the hedonistic and utilitarian views. In this paper, the term 'well-being' is identical to the good life. As a total concept, it has two main sides of the good life and right life (Particularly on this, see Nagel, 1979). Nobody denies that pleasure, whatever kind of it, constitutes the essential part of well-being even though the hedonistic account of the good life cannot be sustained. Rather it implies the view that the notion of 'good' is to be defined in terms of pleasure. The origin of this view is found in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 'Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain' (Book II, chapter xx, section 2). Otherwise, some examples that pleasure is a crucial component of the good life are: 'There is implanted in the human mind a perfection of pain and pleasure as the chief spring and moving principles of all its action' (Hume, 1740, I.3.10); and 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure' (Bentham, 1789, I.1). In any case we cannot
understand the meaning of the good life unless it involves pleasure. For instance, the fasting monk does not seek his sensual pleasure for a considerable time but tries to derive a certain kind of pleasure for his pursuit of the good life (or maybe his own perfect life such as self-realization). This cannot be derived from the physical sense. In this case, he pursues a certain kind of pleasure as an essential part of well-being.

From this point of view, pleasures in all kinds should be intrinsic in its own feature. It is perhaps supported by G. E. Moore that all kinds of pleasures are intrinsically valuable. This is obvious in his passage:

It is now apparent, on the contrary, that the whole 'enjoyment' owes its value quite equally to the presence of other constituents, even though it may be true that pleasure is the only constituent having any value by itself. (Moore, 1903: 188)

Nevertheless, each intrinsic feature can be distinguishably characterized. In the case of $P_1$, well-being is derived from the cardinal pleasure, whilst $P_2$-regarding well-being is perhaps concerned with the pursuit of interests. If $P_2$-regarding well-being is certainly connected with continence or practical wisdom as virtue, however, we understand the Platonic mean between the excess and the deficiency or the balance in the utilitarian calculus as mediocre. Meanwhile $P_3$-regarding well-being lies, regardless of practical calculus of vulgar and lower-order interests, in the intrinsic features of particular activities. This is not affected by a person's arbitrary choice but determined by the proper achievement of certain activity. In the Buddhist monk's case again, his $P_3$-regarding well-being is seen in terms of tranquillity derived from practicing Buddhist charity. It can also be achieved by means of the strict observance of certain rules as a logical part of his involvement in the very activity, but it is never determined by his espoused system of value or his deliberate calculus of interests. Thus his well-being is explicable in terms of the achievement which is based on the internal and particular feature of that activity.

All kinds of pleasures are also connected with welfare, as a cognate of 'well-being'. The minimal provision and the fulfilment of some conditions for survival are concerned with the
satisfaction of \( P_1 \), and also welfare policy may be regarded as the manipulation of the citizen's satisfaction by means of the pursuit of \( P_2 \). The cases of \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) are considered to be the contrary of virtue, namely incontinence by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, chapter 1). More importantly, \( P_2 \) may be concerned with the serious matter of justice, if it is a certain social matter of distribution in the political life. Historically, Aristotle's remedial and distributive justice as a kind of moral virtue have, perhaps foremost, dealt with the matter of \( P_2 \) (Aristotle, 1925, Book V, chapters 3-4). In modern times, it is obvious that \( P_1 \) is something to be satisfied through the remedial treatment and material provisions such as clothing, food, shelter, etc. and that \( P_2 \) is related with work and leisure. That is to say, \( P_2 \) is involved in the consideration process of personal interests in the workplace or amusement resort, and thus it is a matter of welfare policy concerned with employment, social security, or even fiscal support for public amenities like the public theatre, etc.

As defined above, \( P_3 \) is not a matter of material welfare to fulfill human basic needs but of universal needs in connection with something to be achieved. Universal needs are ones that everyone should fulfill and any person's life is mentally deteriorated unless these needs are fulfilled. In this sense education is a sort of welfare, particularly at the level of basic education. Free and compulsory education can be justified in the light of this sense. The aim of education, however, does not necessarily imply the notion of welfare because it is far from the better state of what people seek or want. Nonetheless some human activities like education have their own internal features such as the pursuit of truth, beauty, moral goodness and so on, which always tend to achieve a certain end-state like a plateau. The main aim of these activities is obviously to take us to a better state of affairs, explicable in terms of \( P_3 \). Thus these kinds of activities require a distinct and particular logic rather than others defined in terms of the pursuit of short-term or lower-order interests. It is therefore our next task to examine what differences the education in connection with \( P_3 \) will make.

B. Pleasure and Education

As regards education, each kind of pleasure has its own
appropriate sense of well-being. For $P_1$, education should be able to provide the pupil with the basic requirements present and future which are a prerequisite condition for her good life. It might be called a necessary evil that we should consider the pupil's basic needs, though not our aim to be achieved, since every person as well as a pupil is entitled to avoid suffering from a shortage of material resources for the good life. In this sense, this pleasure is grounded on the substantial needs (Kim, 1996, 77-88).

Regarding $P_2$, the pupil's short-term or lower-order interests make sense and put its significance at the crucial centre viewed from the satisfaction of present desires. Insofar as the term 'interest' is complicatedly used and often contrasted with 'uninterested' referring to the excitement of attention and curiosity, $P_2$ takes into an important account of the pupil's well-being (Kleinig, 1976, 11-2). The Latin etymological sense of *educere* emphasizes the pupil's authentic capacity. Recent progressive trends in education also regard this aspect prior to content and method over the traditional form of education. On the other side, the term 'interest' refers to 'benefit', 'profit' or 'good' and thus $x$ refers to the pursuit of the pupil's own good when it is said that '$x$ is in the pupil's interests'. For the pupil's good, however, $P_2$ should be examined at least in the light of two different senses of 'interest' when we use the ordinary usage 'in one's interests'. The pupil's interest as a real want should be distinguished from a normative claim for her interests (Benn, 1959/60, 138-40). From the point of the normative view, it is necessary for the pupil's well-being to give her what is needed, rather than what she actually wants. Thus $P_2$ should be either considered as a means to what is good for the pupil or be reduced to $P_3$ in the sense of the certain achievement taken in compulsory curriculum. In both cases, there are some possibilities to undermine the authentic feature in $P_2$.

By contrast, the idea that $P_2$ is to be based on what the pupil really wants implies that pleasure can be explicable only by her authentic experience. Authenticity in her experience is a paramount feature of her own well-being, and can determinate the genuine achievement accompanied by $P_3$. But the weakness of this claim is that $P_2$ can be composed of amalgamation of various wants and desires that the pupil actually desires, and,
as Plato points out, of a mixed type of pleasures. Pleasure as an essential ingredient of the pupil's well-being necessarily includes not only what she desires but also what is valuable independently of what she actually wants. This is, as Benn asserts, 'not because a desire has been disappointed but because a well-grounded claim has been overruled' (Benn, 131).

P3 seems to be concerned with a well-grounded claim of its value perhaps in the case of liberal education. The idea of liberal education initially aims at freeing our mind from error, illusion, prejudice and so on (Hirst, 1965), which are also seen as notoriously contrasted with our genuine pursuit of pleasure. In this sense liberal education can provide us with pleasure that we regard as an essential ingredient to well-being. Nevertheless we can raise a serious problem whether liberal education is in accord with P3 if it is to be defined by the nature of knowledge as Hirst claims (Hirst, 1965). Plato also sees 'pleasure' as a means to the goal of knowledge, and true pleasure can be found in terms of the pursuit of knowledge in his Philebus (63d). Regarding this problem I shall attempt to examine what is educationally worthwhile for the pupil's well-being in terms of pleasure.

V. White on Pleasure

So far I have shown three distinct kinds of pleasure and their particular features. According to the distinction, well-being can be defined in different ways. In education, if its task is focused on the pupil's well-being, its significance can be notably weighed in terms of the particular features of pleasure, as contemporary philosophers of education suggest, though without directly arguing on pleasure. In these following sections, White and Peters shall be examined as regards the theme of pleasure so that we can suggest what kind of pleasure in education should be taken into account rather than others.

White does not directly argue on pleasure in connection with personal well-being or vice versa, except where he states physical pleasure (White, 1990, 122). Rather his account of autonomy in terms of desire-satisfaction seems to seek alternatively the non-hedonistic way of understanding the
identification of well-being with happiness (White, 1982, 32). In this section I shall try to demonstrate: (i) White's claim of autonomy, so far as it is defined in terms of desire-satisfaction account, rests on advantage pleasure \((P2)\), if we accept pleasure as a necessary part of well-being. And (ii) desire-satisfaction account such as White's claim has an educational difficulty to improve the pupil's well-being, not because we undermine the significance of autonomy, that is to say, the autonomous life is a logical part of an enlightened (or educated) person's conception of the good life, but because it faces the practical peculiarity that activities in education imply when applied to the educational practice. It is not my intention to argue in this paper that certain inconsistency with autonomy is not coherent with real account of autonomy as White mentions almost all the possible objections (White, 1982, 40-2; 47ff), but I shall tackle his argument in connection with the matter of pleasure.

As to the first problem, why does a philosopher such as White try to identify personal well-being with the scheme of desire-satisfaction? There would be several merits with this. First of all, the actual desire or desire-satisfaction could be appreciated as worthwhile, only if it is concerned with our autonomy. Related to this, the liberal idea supports the autonomy claim where autonomy is defined as an essential part of personal well-being in terms of desire-satisfaction if the pupil concerned is regarded enlightened. White above all recognizes desire-satisfaction as the core for the pupil's future life-plan. According to him, we must structure out our future to some extent and according to some scheme of priorities (White, 1982, 42). It seems appropriate to say that we are autonomous to have a certain structure of our desires in a liberal society. Nevertheless there still remains a serious problem as to what we desire for our future life.

If what is desired is to be 'desirable', we have to elucidate what we actually desire. It is a clich \textit{Meno} (82b-85b) does not really desire to know what the diagonal mathematically means because he is in a state of ignorance, namely, he does not know what he really desires or what he may have to know. By this is meant that we are seeking certain advantages or good results as we anticipate the future. In this process, there are required some conceptual apparatus for dissolving the difficulty involved in the problem of desire-satisfaction. I dub this apparatus
'would-be-desirable' as an intermediate between 'what is actually desired' and 'what is really desirable' (Kim, 1996: 99-103; 275-80). The notion of 'would-be-desirable' enables us to calculate what is in our interests during our lifetime. When we tackle the 'desire-satisfaction' scheme with 'would-be-desirable', therefore, the scheme links to advantage pleasure.

On the subjective account side of well-being, autonomy can be evaluated as the supreme value in a liberal society since this society presumes the individualistic value. Insofar as autonomy is identified with personal well-being as White apprehends, the pleasure concerned in this context must be $P_2$. His autonomy claim depends upon advantage pleasure, amongst others, which each individual seeks in the process of considering one's interests. For White, if personal well-being is defined in terms of desire-satisfaction, however, pleasure is seen as an outcome from desire-satisfaction and autonomy means the attainment of power in the sense of self-decision that enables us to achieve what one wants. This is a mistake. If well-being is defined as desire-satisfaction and pleasure arises from this scheme, there is no room for the fact that we can recognize our well-being where we have no desire. In the *Meno* (Loc. cit.), for instance, the slave boy comes to understand a geometrical truth during the dialogue with Socrates, even if he does not desire the truth. Against this, White says that autonomy is a way of regulating one's lower-order desires by the higher-order desires of one's choosing.

Autonomous people learn in this kind of way to bring their lower-order desires under higher-order and more global desires of their own choosing. (White, 1990, 84)

But his assertion needs to be examined in two ways. How can we possess the higher-order desires that regulate the lower-order ones? And is it really true that the higher-order desires can be determined by one's own choice? If this is true, we need to define what characteristics the higher-order desires have. There is no attempt for White to answer this.

What is the difference between the higher-order and the lower-order desires, if both are determined by one's own choice? Here, the higher-order (or global) desires seem to be the agent's own
picture for her life. But the self-picture requires some objective ground to make itself up, not any kind of desires. In education, moreover, it is still not obvious what makes the pupil have her own picture and what plays the role of responsibility which the pupil gradually takes over for her life. If the higher-order desires bring the pupil her self-picture, it falls viciously into the circular reasoning trap. What makes the self-picture require more than the higher-order desires? The prior concern should be on what makes people self-directed if to be autonomous is agreed to be self-directed. This is an educational difficulty in the autonomy claim by White.

As for this difficulty, we may have to explain that all children do not desire the worthwhile state of affairs or mind. The following statements would be helpful to examine what they actually desire.

(i) All children can desire as what they actually desire.
(ii) All children can desire some desirability as the form appreciated by themselves as desirable.

The statement of (i) would be regarding a state of mind; that of (ii) a state of affairs (Griffin, 1986, 7-10). But Griffin's distinction seems to me to be relevant only if it is considered under the utilitarian scheme as he puts it. In any case, neither (i) nor (ii) provides them with a logical link to the worthwhile state of affairs or mind, except the case that their own choice from the desire-satisfaction scheme should be respected under the liberal idea. The statement (i) could lead them to the wrong way of life such as alcoholism, self-indulgence and covetousness; whereas some preference to desirability can throw light on what is to be desirable for their well-being, but this kind of preference does not itself make sure of what is really desirable for their lives. In either sense of these, pleasure rests on the consequence from desire-satisfaction. In other words, preference requires something more than merely a psychological account of desire in order that it be proved as a desirable thing. Thus the scheme of desire-satisfaction such as in White's claim of autonomy itself presupposes certain pleasure-seeking.

Related with (ii), I will examine his claim in the light of educational aim. If autonomy is to be seen as an educational
aim, we need to explore the meaning of becoming an autonomous person, when education aims at bringing up an autonomous person. In fact we cannot directly teach the pupil to be autonomous, but we can impart to the pupil some skill and knowledge which are necessarily required for becoming autonomous. This is the same problem as the difficulty of moral education because of the difficulty that becoming autonomous is a matter of character formation. We cannot directly teach the pupil to be moral and by the same token to be autonomous, but merely impart to the pupil moral knowledge and skill so as to be moral. To dissolve the difficulty in becoming autonomous, we first of all have to examine the meaning of 'being good'.

'Being good' also implies two senses (Straughan, 1982, 12). One is purely moral, and the other is concerned with 'well-doing'. The moral sense of being good is concerned with moral goodness and implies the formation of character, disposition, and habits. Meanwhile, in the sense of being good at something, being good implies to possess certain abilities, skills, knowledge, and understanding. Certainly the latter sense can also involve moral knowledge and understanding and moral skills and manners. Moral education makes sense in this context. Moral character, habit, disposition and so on are to be taught only in terms of moral skills and manners as well as moral knowledge and understanding. To say, we teach the pupil moral knowledge and get her acquainted with skills and manners in order to bring up moral judgment, and then we can appreciate whether the pupil is moral or not. As for this, Straughan distinguishes three forms of teaching: teaching-that, teaching-how and teaching-to (Straughan, 1982, 83-92). Teaching-that is concerned with information and knowledge; teaching-how is about how to form moral rules so that the pupil can get to attain moral abilities, skills and principles for moral judgments; and teaching-to is the methodological matter of character formation for becoming moral agents by means of judgment to be taught. We can abstract some educational implications from these. Teaching-that is prior to teaching-how in that some knowledge and understanding are required in order to attain some skills and abilities. From this, the distinction of knowing-that and knowing-how are necessary but not sufficient for being a moral agent as a cognate of teaching to be moral. Straughan says in
connection with moral education:

If moral education is not to remain a wholly 'theoretical enterprise, it cannot shut its eyes to the problems of teaching to. (Such teaching cannot consist simply of the transmission of knowledge and skills. (Straughan, 1982, 92)

The problem here is to bridge the gap between teaching—that/how and teaching-to. It is extremely difficult to become autonomous through education. Insofar as we cannot directly bring up the pupil to be autonomous, we have to seek another method to teach the pupil to be autonomous, unless teaching skills and abilities as well as knowledge run parallel with teaching to be autonomous.

With educational difficulty in the autonomy claim, it is our next task to examine the problem of what makes children informed, if autonomy is explicable for the informed desire-satisfaction scheme, as White asserts. First of all it is not easily agreed that the structure of desires directly provides the criteria for the informed desires, but, for me, what makes us autonomous is not dependent on the scheme of desire-satisfaction itself. This requires certain objective desirability. As for this, we need to argue about a 'desirable consciousness'. If all other things called good are only means to the end of making conscious life better or more desirable, according to Sidgwick (1907, 398), it can imply that they are means to an end of happiness. As he points out, we face some difficulties that 'nothing is desirable except desirable feeling' and that 'the desirability of each feeling is only directly cognisable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it' (Loc. cit.), or the ultimate good can be recognized only in a subjective way. But is there only the subjective way to recognize desirability? Sidgwick distinguishes the desirability of feeling from feeling in relation with 'knowing mind to the object known which is implied in the term "true" or "valid cognition" which is seen to be an element of consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability (Loc. cit.). Thus he admits that certain state of consciousness such as 'Cognition of Truth, Contemplation of Beauty, Volition to realise Freedom or Virtue', is not preferred as the present consciousness itself but as future consciousness that will be
foreseen to give some effects or be recognized in the objective relations of the conscious being (Sidgwick, 1907, 399). This shows us that our preferences have been mistaken when we are considering our life-plan or autonomous plan under the scheme of desire-satisfaction. Thus our preference should lie in 'the relation between the mind and something else which, as the very notion of “truth” implies, is whatever it is independently of our cognition of it' (Loc. cit.), which I think is objective.

It is rather important to note that we accept the preference of conformity to virtue or contemplation of beauty, and to a state of consciousness recognized as more pleasant. This rests on an ideal to some extent objective and valid for all minds (Sidgwick, 1907, 400). The argument so far provides the ground to make us move to the objective account of well-being as well as the fact that what makes us informed should be taken into account whenever we try to explain well-being in terms of the desire-satisfaction scheme.

VI. Peters on Pleasure

Unless the educational value is defined in terms of the subjective idea of well-being, we need to inquire into a problem as to whether the objective account possibly improves the pupil's well-being and it also involves pleasure. For this I will go on to argue Peters's point on worthwhile activities.

For Peters, I assume, P3 should be more seriously taken into account of the pupil's well-being. He distinguishes between activity and mere performance. His position of it would be analogous to Aristotle's distinction for pleasure between kinesis (process) and energia (activity) (Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, chapters 1-4). Above all he admits that pleasure can link to our sensations and emotional states as well as activities (Peters, 1966: 151). The important things lie in the following: to maintain that something should be chosen or done for the sake of pleasure can be identified with maintaining the intrinsic worth in activity (Peters, 1966, 148). Something done for the sake of pleasure, however, denies the instrumentality of what is to be done in relation to some further reason or the deontic reason that it is to be done out of duty (Peters, 1966, 150). The
something done for the sake of pleasure can be the way to guarantee the intrinsic worth in activity. Some activity such as taking opium or cocaine can nonetheless be pursued for the sake of pleasure. Against this Peters asserts that 'it is impossible to characterize this without reference to the characteristics of the activity' (Peters, 1966, 149).

For Peters as well as for Aristotle, an activity is not to be pursued for the extrinsic outcome of it. But there is a different point of Peters from that of Aristotle. In order to understand an educationally worthwhile activity, we need to distinguish between achievement and task within the category of activity. Further to this distinction, Peters has earlier argued the criteria of 'education' where he demonstrates that 'education' is a task term as well as an achievement term, suggesting some difference between 'education' and the Rylean achievement term (Peters, 1966, chapter 1). The distinction throws light on the fact that pleasure involved in educationally worthwhile activity should be P3. Pleasure in an activity can involve not only achievement of it but it also requires certain task for it. That is to say, Peters's pleasure in worthwhile activities involves the different sense of task or process from Aristotle's kinesis. The term 'for the sake of pleasure' can be sometimes understood as the term for pleasure-seeking, even if it indicates, as we have shown, the intrinsic worth in an activity. It seems to me, however, that Peters's pleasure cannot be interpreted for pleasure-seeking so far as the sense of pleasure depends upon the nature of the activity. It is helpful for us to note that Aristotle's contrast between kinesis and energia is also analogous to that between poiesis (production) and praxis (practice in the sense of activity or action).

As for this some notes should be taken further. Insofar as Peters's pleasure is seen as P3, first of all, 'pleasure-seeking' is a consequential term of which the meaning lies outside of the activity concerned. In this manner, poiesis is a term used for a certain outcome that the agent anticipates after carrying out a performance. Thus pleasure-seeking cannot be a part of the activity concerned. Secondly, 'pleasure-seeking' or 'kinesis' can be a term used for a certain performance regarded as an instrumental means to it. Even if pleasure is promoted by means of a certain performance, it is not always identical to the
pleasure that has been intended in the pleasure-seeking. Rather
pleasure-seeking is nearer to P2, which is, as I have already
shown, a pleasure gained as a certain advantage or outcome.
Educationally worthwhile activities cannot be appreciated in
terms of the forms of desire-satisfaction or pleasure-seeking.
Educational worth is rather considered as something worthwhile
after certain activities, no matter how far the pupil has not
recognized their value before engaging in them.

For Peters, worthwhile activities have ornamental value. By
ornamental value, I mean the intrinsic worth where theoretical
activities are pursued, prior to the practical needs, namely
immediate satisfaction of needs. This does not lie in the
'education for life' but in 'the life for education'.

There is an important sense in which 'life', by which is usually
meant that which goes on outside the class-room, is for the
sake of education, not education for life. (Peters, 1963, 57)

It seems to me that education for life is concerned with P2 but
life for education, more exactly speaking, theoretical life for
education is concerned with P3. Here, some worth for well-being
can be definitely found in the pursuit of theoretical activities,
and has its own intrinsic motivation that is valued as its own
internal logic. Thus the intrinsic worth inherent in theoretical
activities are for their own sake.

Further to P3, educational value should be characterized in
terms of certain perfect achievement but not defined in the form
of desire-satisfaction since the scheme of desire-satisfaction is in
the danger of pleasure-seeking. About this, Bond says:

We cannot be happy unless we endeavour to be good; mere
pleasure-seeking cannot lead to happiness. We have reason,
therefore, first to strive for excellence and only then to seek
pleasure. (Bond, 1983, 122)

To enable education to bring about good consequences, we
should at least pursue certain perfection in terms of
achievement and recognize that P3 is above all to be attained in
education as is necessary for the pupil's well-being. The good
consequences here need not be identical to the utilitarian or
consequentialist claim but to a certain aspect of achievement attained through the pupil's own commitment to certain activities and endeavour in the process of learning and schooling. Only when this point has been taken, we can have the ground for the meaningful sense of P3. Otherwise it is still too far from the pupil's own well-being: as Plato asserts, the sense of pleasure, like in the theory of Idea, goes beyond our worldly experiences, or as the subjectivists like to assert, the sense of pleasure falls under the inner-mind experience without objective standards we can fairly assume in the educational context.

VII. Concluding Remarks

So far I have shown that pleasure is to be distinguished in terms of its nature and is so much an essential part of one's well-being that education should be focused on the improvement of pleasure in any kind of way, for education aims at something valuable defined in terms of one's well-being. Particularly two kinds of pleasure have been taken into account although many kinds of pleasure can contribute to one's well-being and their harmony has significance in the process of education. P2 in terms of the desire-satisfaction scheme may be involved in the process of education, but has somewhat of a capricious aspect in the sense of the achievement of valuable states we regard as the educational aim. On the other hand, P3 is obviously far from the pupil's experience in the present stage while she is engaged in the process of learning and schooling, but throws light on what she virtually attains and achieves. This is not merely a problem we should tackle by means of the dichotomy between subjective and objective accounts but we also need an alternative solution for the improvement of the pupil's well-being when we try to explain it in terms of pleasure. By an alternative solution I mean a normative reason for the pupil's action that we always have in mind in the educational situation. In this aspect P3 has a more relevant sense than P2.

In sum, pleasure implied in the pupil's well-being through education should be P3, and education should aim at something valuable beyond desire-satisfaction. This provides us with the ground to accept Peters's sense of pleasure rather than White's.
This is supported by the first sentence of the *Analects* if we can imagine why Confucius gives it to us as the prime precept.

The Master said, To learn and at due times to repeat what one has learnt, is not after all a pleasure? *Analects* (I-1)

References


Plato, *Meno*.

Plato, *Philebus*.

Plato, *Republic*.


