

Emotion, Memory and Personal Identity

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Abstract

Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be, changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions, I argue, help us in solving one of philosophy's most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to illustrate this, in this paper, I elaborate on the conception of 'experiential memory' suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, I argue, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memory. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Hence, I argue that experiential memory is not just confined to the recalling of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of person's life as a whole.

1. Introduction

What are the conditions under which a girl A at time t and 10 years later, a woman B, are the very same person? To answer this question, in this paper, I focus on a mental connectedness theory of personal identity. The criteria of personal identity in much recent work have divided into two camps: bodily continuity and psychological continuity theses respectively. The one has sought the criterion in the domain of the physical, identifying personal identity with sameness of body; the other has sought it in the domain of the mental, equating personal identity with continuity of memory. The latter view has been represented in recent literature by psychological continuity theories of personal identity that take Locke's original insight and develop it into a more detailed identity criterion. These memory based theories of personal identity take memory as providing a retrospective form from present experiences to past experiences when they explain the unity of a person's life.

In what follows, I deny the psychological continuity theory described above. Instead, I will defend a psychological continuity theory according to which memory has as much as to do with a person's future as with a person's past, due to the role of that emotions play. In order to do this, the view which follows will elaborate 'experiential memory' suggested by Wollheim.¹⁾

1) Experiential memory is also termed personal memory which is in contrast with merely factual memory of one's past. The distinction between personal and factual memory is developed further in Hamilton. Forthcoming.

I. Experiential Memory

The fact that experiential memory plays a central role in explaining personal identity has been neglected by many philosophers in the mental connectedness tradition. In order to understand memory as experiential, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Thus, for example, the shame or regret that I experience when I remember my past wrongdoing represents the whole of me up to now as well as at that time. In this way, I shall argue, we bring the person under the influence of his past, such that the past is reconstructed and then influences the future. Hence, a life the diachronic expansion of a person is unified.

In defence of a psychological continuity theory which I have described above, in what follows, I shall propose four claims, following Wollheim.

- a) an event is one that I have lived through:
- b) an event is remembered *as* it was experienced and not just as it occurred:
- c) when we remember an event experientially an event is remembered from a point of view and this point of view is represented within the memory [Wollheim 1984: 104].
- d) an affective tendency is attached to some memory

[Wollheim 1980: 309-10].

Experiential memories take the form of 'I remember doing such-and-such,' or 'I remember your, or X's, doing such-and-such,' rather than 'I remember that I X-ed' [Wollheim 1979: 195]. Now in order to see the distinction between 'I remember X-ing' and 'I remember that I X-ed', let us take an example: the difference between a person remembering herself watching a horror movie and remembering *that* she watched a certain horror movie. We can say that the former is an experiential memory that reminds her of what it was *like* to watch such a horror movie. In experientially remembering watching a horror movie, a person thinks and *feels* as she experienced when she watched it. When I experientially remember watching a horror movie all those years ago, I tend to remember also the thoughts I had, the feelings I experienced, while watching the movie, and when I do so, the thoughts and feelings tend to come back over me. I once again may sense my muscles tensed, my pulse quickening, and adrenaline flowing, and those sensations deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. The view described here does not mean that whenever I relive past events I should feel exactly as I did then. What Wollheim is intending to describe is the fact that when I remember something in my past i) I draw my attention to *what it was like* to be experiencing something from my point of view. ii) The affect that a memory preserves reconnects me with a broader affective dimension, which is that of a specific time in my life. Hence for example, when I remember my failing some examination, the despair, shamefulness, and regret that I experience involves the sum of my experience from that point on, considered as a unified

whole. My past experiences affect my present condition –my sense of shamefulness– and this feeling expresses my awareness of the past. Then my concern for my future –a desire for a successful life– causes painful feelings and emotions, for example, regret, in my present condition. This is possible in terms of memory’s recreation of past and creation of future. Furthermore, we can say that this kind of unity of consciousness over time requires unity of consciousness at one time. In what follows I shall show how such an account might go in more detail.

Now one might wonder how the view described here might be put to use in accounting for a person’s emotional change and their identity. I can recognize that my emotions or feelings have changed if I look back on past experience. For example, when I was 5 years old, I was scared of a monster which appeared in a horror movie, but now I am not. Change can also be seen in, for example, recovery from shock or grief. How then can Wollheim explain our emotional change for example, from having been afraid to no longer being so by appealing to experiential memory?

If we apply the above claim b) –an event is remembered *as* it was experienced and not just as it occurred –to explain one’s identity we are left with the following: what it is to be a psychologically identical being is to be a creature who can be, from a first person, phenomenological perspective, in the same state. In this respect, E. J. Lowe argues that if a person ‘remember his own thoughts, experiences, feelings and actions in a special way –that is, so called a “first person” way and if the person remembers them, as it were, “from the inside”, as episodes undergone *by him*,’ this is different from the fact that the person ‘remember events in the life of another person

only in an “external” or “third-person” way, as episodes undergone by *somebody else*’ [Lowe 1995: 109]. I shall argue that this is the problem of synchronic unity. The synchronic unity question is: in virtue of what do different experiences or mental states occurring at the same time count as belonging to one and the same person? Now even if the view which describes the above can explain the synchronic unity, how can the view explain personal identity through time? Questions about identity over time can be said to be questions about the diachronic unity of consciousness of some kind, e.g., persons or tables. Identity over time which is a diachronic view is in contrast with an episodic view according to which the self is nothing but fleeting inner mental states, for the episodic view denies the kind of self of long term concern or self created and creating narrative self. In order to understand personal identity over time, we should consider the above claims a), c), and d) in conjunction. Firstly, let us consider the claim d): *an affective tendency is attached to some memory*. Wollheim says that ‘the affective tone that accrues to the memory [...] will differ qualitatively from that which would have accrued to it had the other entertained the memory’ [Wollheim 1979: 230]. And this is so because ‘when the rememberer’s affective store from which the affective tone comes was reinforced by an experiential memory, the impact of the memory was mediated by his current beliefs, desires and feelings, which become increasingly peculiar to him’ [Wollheim Ibid.]. However, this seems to make trouble with Wollheim rather than helping him. For, as Lowe notes, ‘if one *can* have first person memories of episodes in the lives of other people, then, clearly, such memory does *not*, after all, provide a satisfactory criterion of personal identity across time’ [Lowe 1995: 110]. Faced with

this difficulty, Wollheim would argue that it is not occurrent psychological states alone that are part of one's psychological make up, but underlying traits and dispositions as well—this concerns my claim a), namely, *an event is one that I have lived through*. If we take a memory to be disposition, it is difficult to say a memory disposition which I have and a memory disposition which someone else has would manifest identical experiential memory states, even though both rely on the same initiating event. This is because a memory disposition, established in me by my living through the event, would manifest itself differently from others'. If this is so it is impossible, as Wollheim point it out, that 'mental dispositions could shift from one person to another and remain intact' [Wollheim 1984: 113]. Since 'dispositions form...a web or network: they are ancillary to one another, and there seems no method for determining what in the way of other dispositions, what in the way of beliefs, emotions, desires, fears, and other memories, would have to be transferred along with it if the original memory is to run across persons.'²⁾ Furthermore, if we accept my claim c), namely, when we remember an event experientially an event is remembered from a point of view and this point of view is represented within the memory, then we can understand that memory has as much as to do with a person's future as with a person's past, for one's disposition would, on occasions, manifest itself in appropriate mental states, due to the role of that his or her point of view plays. Having elaborated on my four claims, namely, a) memory is a disposition; b) memory has a first person perspective; c)

2) [Wollheim Ibid]. For the reasons, I deny that the idea of memory replication and memory transfer are both implausible.

memory has a point of view; d) an affective tendency is attached to some memory, in what follows I shall argue that these four characteristics which constitute experiential memory play a vital role in explaining the problem of both synchronic and diachronic unity.

II. Identity and Change

A. *Transitivity implies change.*

Now some people say that personal identity is constituted by sameness of the psychological subject, but it is not obvious what is meant by this. Locke, for example, claims that personal identity consists, not in sameness of substance, but in 'sameness of consciousness' and holds that continuation of the consciousness itself, not that of body or soul in which that consciousness resides, is necessary for identity. Butler claims that consciousness is 'successive' and, therefore, 'cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it' [Butler 1975: 102]. Reid argues that 'consciousness, and every kind of thought are transient and momentary, and have no continued existence...' [Reid 1975: 116]. Consciousness is, at least according to these theorists, a momentary phenomenon and does not remain numerically the same over time. If this is the case, it is not clear what it means to say that the same consciousness has continued to exist.

In order to answer the question of what it means to say that the same consciousness has continued to exist, Locke

claims that if you cannot currently remember the past thoughts and action of some person, then you simply are not the same person who had and did them.³⁾ Here what Locke makes necessary for identity with a 'past self' is, as Shoemaker notes, 'not that one remember the actions and experiences for that past self but that one have "memory continuity" with that past self' [Shoemaker 1984: 81]. However, one might raise an objection to Locke's memory criterion of personal identity which focuses on the idea of *transitivity*. Reid tries to show this with his 'brave officer' example [Reid 1975: 114-15]. At a certain time a boy steals apples. Years later the same person, now a young officer, performs an act of bravery in battle, remembering still his boyhood's robbing apples. Many years later our man is an elderly general, who remembers the act of bravery in battle, but no longer remember incident of robbing apples. Reid charges that on Locke's theory the general is the same person as the young officer, who is the same person as the boy (because identity is transitive), but the general is *not* the same person as the small boy because he has no memory of the boyhood incident.⁴⁾

Locke himself acknowledges that 'the same Consciousness' is not the same 'individual Action' but 'a present representation of a past Action' [Locke 1979: 337]. Here we should allow, as Shoemaker points out, that 'one's current person-stage contains

3) For Locke, 'person' is a forensic term, which is related to our practices of attributing responsibility and distributing rewards and punishments. According to him, a person should not be held responsible and punished for his actions which he cannot remember of his deed.

4) Locke might reply to Reid as follows: the general is not the same person as the boy, while pointing out that the general is nonetheless the same human being or man as the boy. This is pointed by E. J. Lowe. See [Lowe 1995: 113].

a memory of something even if one has temporarily forgotten that thing, as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it.' 'In such a case the stage will retain a "memory trace" that is the basis of that potentiality' [Shoemaker 1984: 81]. In this respect, we should recall Locke's remarks that present consciousness includes in itself temporally distant actions and experiences in precisely the same way it does present ones. He says that a present self 'extends it *self* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *self* past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present' [Locke 1979: 436].

With the understanding of the psychological sameness described in the above paragraphs, we can explain a person's emotional change and his or her identity. I shall argue that the Lockean memory criterion of personal identity, which is related to the issue of *transitivity* implies 'change', and shall show that change is constitutive of, rather than a threat to personal identity.⁵⁾ According to Wollheim, emotional change is possible because when my affective store, from which the affective tone comes, was reinforced by an experiential memory, the impact of the memory was mediated by my current *beliefs*, *desires* and *feelings*. Hence, I should not be scared of the monster in the horror movie due to my current *beliefs* that it is a fictional character, even though I was scared of it in my childhood. Furthermore, I am not going through grief over the death of my mother due to my present *recognition* that the perceptual image of my mother is weakened, the *belief* that I

5) Some people read Locke's transitivity of consciousness as one what William James [1890: ch. 10] later calls 'stream of consciousness.' I share with this view. Cf. See [Lowe 1995: 114].

can no longer see her, and due to my *desire* for well-being in her absence. Hence, we can say that I am a psychologically identical being, from a first person phenomenological perspective, even though my emotions or experiences have changed.

Wollheim claims that change is constitutive of, rather than a threat to, a person's identity. In this case we are left to clarify how change is constitutive of personal identity. The change must occur in order for a person not to be for an indefinite period struck down, for example, by grief or disappointment. In this respect, Wollheim claims that 'it is in the nature of persons that they change,' since time is not merely a static but a transient thing and a development of the new out of the past and the present. Hence 'as they live, they necessarily change, and therefore it would be a merit in a criterion of personal identity.' Thus Wollheim argues that the mental connectedness criterion of personal identity must permit change. 'It must exhibit how change is compatible with identity' [Wollheim 1980: 313]. Let us consider how such an account might be developed.

It might be said that emotional change is a kind of recovering. But once a person notices herself to have recovered, for example, from deep grief or shock, she could say that she is not the same as the person who once grieved or shocked. That is, she has changed. But the recognition that her feelings have been changed with passage of time is not itself a feeling. Then what is it? In order to appreciate this, let us consider 'two senses of experience' suggested by William James. William James defines the concept of memory as 'the knowledge of an event, or fact with the additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before' [William James 1980/1950: 628-29]. He presents two senses of

experience as follows:

A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling of their succession is added, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its own elucidation...[W. James Ibid: 628-29].

Here James seems to suggest that the feeling of succession cannot be much like sensations or emotions. He suggests that it is one thing to be presented by a succession of feelings, it is another to appreciate it as a succession. On this view, memory plays an important role in taking notice of this succession, since without the 'taking notice,' mere occurrence of successive perceptions would not provide us with a self-conception. But 'taking notice' is not itself a feeling.

B. Recognition of Emotional Change: from the past to the present

One might say that 'taking notice' of emotional change is *disaffection* with oneself. When someone, for example, finds herself not only changed but also finds that she has become an alien to herself many times over, she realizes that she is in a disaffective state. Martha C. Nussbaum sees this disaffective state as being in the state of 'a detached, unemotional, or intellectual deliberation' [Nussbaum 2001: 24]. She views this disaffective state as various cognitive features, such as a 'personal point of view', 'cognitive denseness', and 'cognitive freshness.'⁶⁾ These features do not imply noncognitive components for they impart the cognitive content of the judgments. Although

I agree with Nussbaum in the sense that the recognition of emotional change depends on cognitive features, I do not accept her view in the sense that cognitive elements are both necessary and sufficient for the requisite of such recognition, since it seems to me that we can recognize our emotional change in terms of noncognitive features, such as bodily feelings or affects. In explaining the fact that grief fades as time passes by, Nussbaum ignores the aspects of *felt* urgency and the affective side of the emotional experience. She seems to admit this point when she says that 'it is the emotion itself, and not some further reaction to it, that has urgency and heat' [Nussbaum Ibid: 78]. But she views this urgency as a cognitive feature for it 'comes not from the unthinking force, but from my thought that my well being is threatened by that force' [Nussbaum Ibid]. For example, if there is urgency in being hit by a gust of wind, it is not after all a noncognitive urgency - the urgency, if it is there, comes not from the unthinking force, but from my thought that my well being is threaten by that force [Nussbaum Ibid]. If this is right, as Peter Goldie notes, Nussbaum's cognitivism fails to recognise that 'how profoundly and systematically our emotional feelings can mislead us - how the emotions can distort perception and reason' [Goldie 2004: 91]. In order to appreciate the point, in what follows I demonstrate how affect or bodily feeling also plays an important role in our recognition of emotional changes. I will do this by taking an example from *Remembrance of Things Past by Proust*.⁷⁾ When

6) See [Nussbaum 2001: 63 65 and 79 85]. In this paper I do not discuss these features in more detail. A. Ben ze'ev provides a critical assessment of these features. See [Ben ze'ev 2004: 453 55].

7) Nussbaum also discusses this example. See [Nussbaum 1990].

Marcel hears the news of Albertine's death, he suffers great anguish. Up until this point he had believed that he did not love her. However, upon hearing the distressing news, he realizes with certainty that he did indeed love her. According to Proust, Marcel has deceived himself about his love for Albertine. If we hold, like the cognitivist, that recognition of our condition can be best explained by a detached unemotional and non-affective cognition, then we do not have the resources to explain Marcel's shock and suffering. This intellectual judgment that he did not love Albertine is shattered by his anguish. Of Marcel's self-deception, Proust writes:

I had been mistaken in thinking that I could see clearly into my own heart. But this knowledge, which the shrewdest perceptions of the mind would not have given me, had now been brought to me, hard, glittering, strange, like a crystallised salt, by the abrupt reaction of pain [M Proust 1981: Vol. III. 426].

Marcel's feeling-anguish-is said to have the power, just in terms of its own felt quality, 'like a thunderbolt' [Proust Ibid: 431], and forces his assent to his state of love. His state is revealed by his feelings, not his intellect. Proust tells us that our feelings are systematically buried by the workings of habit, the primary manner in which self deception operates. The truth of Marcel's condition is brought about by his feelings. His painful anguish demonstrates his prior state of self deception. If this is indeed a typical or common phenomenon, then it shows that a full account of our condition cannot be given simply by appeal to a cognitive evaluative state. Confronted with this objection, Nussbaum might say that

the relevant feelings are not bodily but can themselves be unpacked 'cognitively.' She claims that the occurrence of non cognitive features in emotional experiences is contingent to the definition of emotions. Thus, Nussbaum could say that Marcel's feeling - anguish - wasn't just a physical sensation of pain that articulated his emotion, but the pain of a particular loss. She writes:

We also have a type of pain that probably is necessary for grief: namely, the pain *that an important element of one's life is gone*. But of course that is not a noncognitive element, and we have already included it in our cognitive/evaluative account, which has stressed, with Chrysippus, that such losses are bad and that it's right to be upset about them [Nussbaum 2001: 64].

If this is true, she might say that Marcel's feelings, in our example, is psychological pain, which would yield to a purely 'cognitive' analysis. Yet if this is right, Nussbaum must explain what 'affect' is and whether it can be fairly contrasted with cognition. However, she remains unclear about this matter. Hence, I argue that the attempt by Nussbaum to reduce the role of cognition and affect in our recognition of emotional change to a single cognitive element is implausible, since both cognition and affect play an important role in our mental lives.

C. Recognition of Emotional Change: from the past present to the future

Now I shall discuss how experiential memory can explain a

person's future. Memory is broadly understood as a mental phenomenon. Memory as a kind of mental phenomenon has been divided into two categories by a number of philosophers: memory, on the one hand, is a mental state, on the other hand, a mental disposition.⁸⁾ What is the difference between a mental disposition and a mental state? A mental disposition differs from a mental state in that mental states are events, in the sense that they can be ascribed a discrete temporal location, whereas mental dispositions cannot. Mental states are 'episodic or transient phenomena,' whereas mental dispositions are persisting and they 'manifest themselves intermittently' [Wollheim 1984: 34-5]. A disposition explains events that occur in a person's life whilst underlying mental states.

In order for my current mental state and the earlier experience to be connected some kind of causal connection is needed. But what kind of connection?: not just any causal connection, but the current mental state and the past event have to be connected in the right way. This idea can be illuminated in terms of what Wollheim calls 'dependency relation.' What then is the 'dependency relation'?

The way in which dispositions manifest themselves is in terms of their specific causal influence in a person's life. Now if we see memory as a disposition as Wollheim does, it entails that it has causal influence on an earlier events. Wollheim calls this the dependency relation. There is a three term relation to be found in the orbit of experiential memory. First, 'the original event causes the disposition to be.' Second, 'the disposition causes the mental state to occur' [Wollheim Ibid:

8) In developing this idea, in what follows, I draw heavily on aspects of Wollheim's philosophical psychology. See [Wollheim 1984 and 1980].

98]. Third, the mediating disposition has the role of keeping an event 'causally alive'[Wollheim Ibid]. Here we can say that 'causation occurs not just once but twice in the orbit of experiential memory, or that the memory onwardly transmits the causal influence of the remembered event' [Wollheim 1980: 308]. Given that memory is a disposition, it exerts a causal influence over the manifestations of a person's later life. Hence, we can explain a person's future life in terms of memory as disposition. Later I shall show how such an account might be developed. Having established that memories, as dispositions, have a backward and a forward looking dimension, Wollheim argues that a memory criterion of personal identity is not merely an 'indicative' criterion: 'it is creative in that, when it holds, it brings about or helps to bring about that for which it is a criterion' [Wollheim 1984: 109].

On this view, a person's memories are not merely instances of the spatio temporal connections of psychological states, in the way that the traditional mental connectedness proponents, including Locke and Hume, propose. According to Locke and Hume, memory is a kind of store and the occurrent psychological state. On this traditional view, memory is a retrospective form only. However, the assumption of the view which I defend is that it is not the occurrent psychological states alone that are part of one's psychological make-up, but underlying traits and dispositions as well. On this view, memory and the forward-looking dimension in the temporal unity of a person's life are interwoven.⁹⁾ The most distinctive

9) I am indebted for this point to Philippa Byers. See [Byers 2005: especially, Chapter 5, Section 5.5]. Byers discusses the relation between memory and time drawing on Proust's *In Searing of Lost Time*. On Byers's analysis of Proust,

feature of this is the emotional tone and richness of each person's life, since as Byers notes, for Proust, 'memory is the emotionally textured expanse or register of a person's life, as without it the past would be empty, rather than emotionally nuanced, textured, and on occasion, devastating' [Byers 2005: 175]. This idea suggests that in a person's life memory is deeply implicated in the forward looking orientation or impetus of a person's life. Now in order to understand this idea, the implication that memory has a point of view needs to be spelled out. This concerns my claim c), namely that when we remember an event experientially an event is remembered from a point of view and this point of view is represented within the memory.

Now the discussion which follows will show the role of memory which has a perspective or a point of view in our emotional change. This idea will show us how experiential memory creates one's future. The reason why the emotional change is possible is that memory embedded in feelings also has a perspective, or a forward looking dimension. The idea that memory embedded in feelings has a perspective can be shown by using an analogy with *sense-perceptions*. We can compare a memory which has a perspective with the Muller-Lyre lines: Muller-Lyre lines continue to appear to be of different lengths while they are known to be equal length.

the time that memory recalls is time that memory recreates. According to Byers's Proust, although the stuff of memory is the past, what is produced from the past, as the result of the labour of remembering, is new. Memory calls forth something new, rather than something repeated [Byers 2005: 170]. This view implies that memory not only recreates time but also has a future. In this respect, Byers criticizes the traditional memory based theories of personal identity, such as Locke's, where memory is characterized as presenting a retrospective form of unity.

In this respect, many people try to develop this idea to show how, at times, our beliefs, feelings and actions seem to behave with a mind of their own despite our best efforts in trying to control them. This is because, the content of memory embedded in feelings, resembles the content of sense-perception in that both kinds of representational content need not be revised in the light of belief and better knowledge. Suppose that someone may not remember a part of his or her lives, due to the trauma which happened to them. Furthermore, they may recall their past in a revised way which is different from the original event that had occurred. In this case, just as Muller-Lyre lines continue to appear to be of different lengths while they are known to be equal length, so the person cannot help remembering in that way even though she has relevant or countervailing knowledge. We can also apply this kind of analogy to the emotions as follows: just as our perception that the two lines differ in length persists in the faces of our belief that the lines are the same length, so some emotions may persist even though we have relevant and countervailing knowledge. Thus, we can say that a person can have a sense perception or can feel emotion that p , and at the same time consciously believe that $\neg p$. However, this is not the case in the case of contradictory beliefs. The point that I want to make here is that in the cases of emotion or experiential memory, we are able to be in a contradictory or ambivalent state while in the case of belief, this is impossible. In order to appreciate this point, let us imagine the following example.

Suppose that Kate wants to gain revenge on her ex husband who had an affair with her friend, Lucy and left her. Kate is also jealous of Lucy, and wants to gain revenge on

her as well. Kate knows that her ex husband depended on her financially and also Lucy is impoverished. Kate desires to see him financially ruined so that he will regret leaving her. But one day Kate falls in love with a man whom she dreams of marrying. Then she realizes that she has become a person who is no longer obsessed with her ex husband, and no longer jealous of Lucy.

Having established that emotion and experiential memory have a perspective, we can say that Kate's jealousy is comparable to the following cases: the snake is not dangerous and at the same time someone fears it; a person believes that the Muller Lyre lines are equal while they continue to appear to be of different lengths. As I have said before, this implies that Kate's jealousy, for example, like sense perception can present in the face of better knowledge. She may know that Lucy is superior to her and more attractive than her. However, the emotion does not tend to get out of control, due to the passivity of feeling. In this respect, I argue that the emotion which does not vanish in the face of better knowledge is 'recalcitrant emotion' in the sense that to some extent our emotions and emotional responses are passive, and cannot be controlled.¹⁰⁾ This is because the subject's attitude toward those involved in jealousy is very complex and the desire in which jealousy is involved depends on all kinds of things: the circumstances, character traits and moods that the person has.

Now if emotion and memory does not also have a perspective, then we cannot understand how Kate who has been in the grip of jealousy is eventually indifferent concerning

10) The familiar example for emotional recalcitrance is phobia: the phobic who is afraid of something despite believing that it poses little or no danger.

the object of jealousy. But from Kate's self-concern in her future, this emotional change is understandable. Her self concern and self-love, which possess perspective, have forward looking dimensions. If we adopt my claim a), *an event is something that I have lived through*, then we can say that the person has been and will be persisting, since a person is only able to experience something on the basis of his or her past action or experiences and concern for his or her future life. The reason why Kate is psychologically continuous over time is because she is aware of the fact that her past action or experiences, and her concern for her future life, influence her present condition. Hence we can say that the recovery from the obsession or jealousy due to her awareness of a future with the other man shows the fact that Kate is a successor of a series of past embodied subjects, who are similar but not numerically identical to each other. If this is right, we can say that change does not imply the loss of identity, rather change reveals how one and the same person is obsessed and miserable and then becomes no longer obsessed and miserable. This view implies that the unity of a person's life includes changes, for our condition and experiences change.

In explaining change there are elements of both discovery and creation. Kate's recognition of her emotional change involves discovering something new in herself. Recognition of something new is awareness of both the fact that the past is differentiated from the present, and the fact that the future is the new creation of the past and present. In this respect, we can say that experiential memories of Kate's living with her ex husband recreate a dimension of her past life and create her future life. She tends to remember the thoughts and the feelings that she had while living with him with regret: "What

a shame I lived with such a man!; I've wasted years of my life living with manipulative and selfish man." Furthermore, her remembering drives her life towards the future. This shows us that experiential memory is not just concerned with the recollection of events or experiences that the subject has undergone, but concerns the narrative structure of her life as a whole.

III. The Problem of Diachronic and Synchronic Unity

One might raise an objection that although this kind of psychological criterion can explain the problem of unity of consciousness over time, it cannot lend support to the unity of consciousness at a time, since in order for me to stitch together consciously the events of my life into a 'whole self' I have to already know which events those are. So some notion of personal identity is presupposed. In other words, one might say that although this view can explain the diachronic identity of a person, since diachronic identity can best be understood in terms of a *memory relation*, it cannot yet account for the synchronic identity, that is, what makes for personal identity at a time. A traditional mental connectedness view, for example, Hume faces with this kind of difficulty. Hume rejects our belief in the simplicity of the soul in Book One of the *Treatise*, since the doctrine of the mind's simplicity is the doctrine that it has no parts, but according to Hume's view of mind as a bundle of perceptions, the self is a collection of parts [Hume 1978: 251-3]. In order to challenge the doctrine of the mind's simplicity, he appeals to our belief in the self's

diachronic identity. His theory of passion in Book Two of the *Treatise* supports the diachronicity of the self, for the passions which construct the self as a bundle extend through time. Although he accepts the diachronic conception of the self in Book Two of the *Treatise*, the deep problem, it seems to me, is his recognition of a problem about how the perceptions or passions in Book Two—as long as passions are perceptions – to which we attribute identity are held in consciousness in order for us to be able to do this to them. In other words, the real issue for Hume is to explain the synchronic unity of those perceptions that make up the process of judging all the past perceptions to form a unit.¹¹⁾

In order to avoid this kind of difficulty, let us consider the following example proposed by Marya Schechtman:

Consider what it is for different psychological components to be part of the same consciousness at a time. [...] the fact that the various beliefs, desires, images, and so on that are part of the same consciousness at a given time interact in such a way that each provides a context in which to interpret the others. The difference between one person thinking a six word sentence and six people each thinking one word of that sentence is, at least in part, that in the former case each of the words provides an interpretive context that constrains the understanding of the others so that what is experienced is not the same as six separate words side by side, but a single six-word unit. The meanings of the other five words are, in a sense, already present in the consciousness of each word when one is conscious of such a sentence [Schechtman 1994: 208].

11) A similar point has been made by T. Penelhum and D. Ainslie. See [Penelhum 2000: 116 and Ainslie 2001: 557-78].

On the basis of the unity of consciousness at one time described here, we can extend this to unity of consciousness over time. This is because the latter involves '[weaving] temporally distant actions and experiences into the network of one's conception of oneself' [Schechtman Ibid]. Hence, extending the unity of consciousness over time is possible in terms of the fact that our past action or experiences, and our concern for the future, influence our present conditions and experiences. Thus, we can say that in a synchronic case, a person is 'jointly' conscious of all the things of which he is currently conscious,¹²⁾ while in a diachronic case, the person at a later time has a first person memory of some conscious thought, experience or action which occurred to them at some earlier time.

IV. Conclusion

In this paper I have defended a psychological continuity theory of personal identity which claims that memory has as much as to do with a person's future as with a person's past with reference to emotions. Specifically, on the view which I have defended, memory does not simply invoke past events, but creates dispositions for future actions, thoughts and emotions. In this respect, we can say that memory is both past and future regarding.

In order to illustrate this idea, I have elaborated on the

12) In this respect, Lowe presents a useful example: if I am conscious of a pain in my toe, and simultaneously conscious of thinking about a philosophical problem, then I am conscious of thinking of the problem while having the pain. See [Lowe 1995: 109].

conception of 'experiential memory' suggested by Wollheim. The characteristics of experiential memory are: first, it is a memory of an event lived through; second, it involves remembering an event as I experienced it, intrinsic to which are affective elements, as opposed to the mere recall of facts; third, it is a memory of an event from a person's own point of view. Hence, when we experientially remember a past event with feeling and perspective, our remembering not only *recreates* a dimension of our past life but also drives our future life in a certain direction. If my argument is right, we can say that experiential memory is not just confined to the recalling of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person's life as a whole.

One might say that the view which I have discussed implies a narrative conception of the self. What then is the narrative conception of the self? The proponent of a narrative thesis claims that autobiographical memory is an essentially constructive and reconstructive phenomenon rather than a merely reproductive one. Yet the problem with autobiographical memory is that it involves the possibility of revision when a person reconstructs his or her past life.¹³⁾ However, if revision is necessary to being a narrative, a person's life which is reconstructed by revision is not a genuinely identical one. If this is true, I do not want to commit myself to the narrative theory. Whatever narrativity means by the unity of a life, it seems to me that it is not the same as personal identity but seems to presuppose it, since in order for us to stitch together

13) G. Strawson presents the problem of the possibility of revision in his argument against the narrative thesis. See [Strawson 2004].

the event of our life into a whole self we should already know which events those are. So some notion of personal identity is presupposed. Hence, in order to do justice to the narrativity thesis, narrative theorists need to respond to some facts which seem to be problematic for their account: for example, people can remember and relive only a small part of their lives, those things which happened to us when we were very young being forever inaccessible to most of us. I have attempted to meet this kind of objection by taking memory to be a disposition. However, if we adopt the narrative thesis, then we cannot avoid the following objection: there is an important difference between what one *actually* did at a particular time and a *story* that is made up to explain those events that they do remember. I leave this kind of difficulty open in this paper. Instead I want to suggest that as a philosopher, I'd suggest we go for an historical narrative for a past self while trying to be creative about a future self, leaving fiction for the novelists, since I am not convinced that I have been constructed. Autobiographies are not sufficiently reliable for philosophical account of identity.¹⁴⁾

14) This paper is dedicated to Professor Hyo-Myung Kim in honor of his retirement. This paper was presented in the conference of *Emotion, Others, and the Self* at Abo Akademi University, Finland, in August 2005. I am very grateful to the audience at the conference, especially, Lilli Alanen, Kathy Behrendt, and Michael Lacewing for their useful comments. I also thank Roger Squires, who suggested, in personal correspondence, some important improvements. I also extend my thanks to E. J. Lowe and Andy Hamilton.

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