The China Factor in Japan’s Grand Strategy:  
The Impact on the Korean Peninsula*

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Abstract

Japan’s relationship with China, in addition to that with the United States, has been one of the most important elements of Japan’s grand strategy. During the Cold War, the significance of the China factor in Japan’s grand strategy culminated with the abandonment of Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972. The China factor has had a substantial impact on Japan’s Korea policy. It rendered the two Koreas unprecedentedly competitive for initiating peace proposals. In this context, Japan was able to maintain the Two Koreas policy. Despite no clear reference point yet, Japan’s grand strategy is now being reshaped: engagement but vigilance as to China. This transition may be attributed not only to changes in the international environment and regional dynamics, such as the rise of China, but also to the waning of the pro-China or China-friendly political group in the past two decades. Japan’s changing strategic outlook regarding China structurally perpetuates Sino-Japanese disagreement in dealing with North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction.

Keywords: China factor, Grand strategy, Pro-china group, Two Koreas policy

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I. Introduction

It would be an oversimplification to say that Japan’s policies have been direct, immediate responses to outside stimuli, particularly U.S. pressure, frequently called gaiatsu (external pressure). Ever since Kent Calder inspired the notion of reactive state in the study of the U.S.-Japan relations, many works have addressed the question of under what conditions the U.S. practices of pressure have succeeded in inducing Japanese compliances. Some works on U.S.-Japan economic relations have focused on the reactive and defensive responses of Japan and the need of pressure for final resolutions. They delve into not only ways and means of the U.S. pressure but also Japanese domestic politics in coping with the pressure. Other works on security affairs have investigated either the U.S. pressure on Japan for burden-sharing in the U.S.-led containment strategy or the U.S.-Japan secret deal during the Okinawa-reversion negotiation regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons in case of emergency.

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To be sure, gaiatsu has rendered postwar Japan’s diplomacy uniquely compliant to U.S. demands. However, I raise counterintuitive questions: Were there any Japanese foreign-policy domains in which gaiatus have not worked? If there were, what were they? The gaiatsu theory is hardly applicable to Japan’s policy toward Asia in general or to its external economic relations, except in regards to U.S.-Japan trade. That unique aspect of Japan’s external behavior—that is, gaiatsu—does not deny the existence of Japan’s independent pursuit of a grand strategy and corresponding international status.

In this article, I show that Japan has gradually unfolded its own grand strategy into which China has been seriously factored. The first form of the Japanese grand strategy was an economy-centered strategy, which was launched at the beginning of the 1950s. This grand strategy was adopted by the then-prime minister Yoshida Shigeru; therefore, it is called Yoshida doctrine. For its security, Japan has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella since the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the ensuing U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Yoshida doctrine was based on an economy-centered policy, channeling both available national resources and the postwar U.S. aid toward industrial development. The doctrine was well accepted by both the ruling party and the opposition camps, such as socialists and communists. The doctrine not only avoided any possibility of entrapment in

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any form of international conflict but also managed to hold the level of the
defense budget under one percent of the GDP. 3) The Yoshida doctrine
continued until 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power
for the first time since the 1955 Liberal-Democratic merge created this
particular party. It should be noted that China was at the core of the
economy-centered strategy: engagement with China and its expansion were
a quintessential element of the strategy. This was true even before the
U.S.-China rapprochement and the Sino-Japanese normalization in the early
1970s. Before the normalization, the six prime ministers—Yoshida,
Hatoyama, Ishibashi, Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato—made their best attempts
regarding Japan’s engagement with China. This was also the case even after
the Tiananmen incident, for which western countries applied sanctions
ward China. After this incident, Japan was the first country to resume its
provision of official development assistance to China. Thus, while U.S.-
China relations have seemingly framed the Japanese approach to China, 4) the
Japanese government situated China at the intersecting domain of
Japan's Asia outlook and its economy-centered Yoshida doctrine. It should
be also noted that Japan’s Korea policy, that is, the policy toward the
Korean peninsula, was laid out within the context of its grand strategy of

3) For extensive study on Japan’s grand strategy, see Kenneth B. Pyle, “In Pursuit of
a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future,” Journal of Japanese
Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 243-270; Fred Charles Ikle and Terumasa
Nakanishi, “Japan's Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990),
pp. 81-95; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of
East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Mike M. Mochizuki,
“Change in Japan's Grand Strategy: Why and How Much?” Asia Policy, vol. 4 (July

4) See Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s Relations with China,” in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002).
which the China factor was a crucial component.

In the past two decades, however, Japan’s grand strategy has been in transition. Japan has pursued its expanded role in international security; it has apparently drifted away from the Yoshida doctrine and has further integrated the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) into the U.S. forces. This transition has been at odds with China’s rapid rise on both economic and security fronts. What, then, is the substance of a new grand strategy? There is observable vigilance over China, although there is no real reference point that acts as an alternative to the Yoshida doctrine. Japan’s grand strategy in transition is likened neither to Yamagata Aritomo’s expansionist strategy in the Meiji era nor to the militarist strategy of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the prewar and wartime period. But there are two key ostensible changes in the instruments of the strategy: the solidification of the alliance with the United States and the empowerment of the SDF. Furthermore, the dominant milieu of Japan’s old grand strategy characterizes that of today, as both are marked by a keen awareness of national pride and international hierarchy and status, rather than values or ideologies.5)

Both the second image (domestic sources of international politics) and the second-image reversed (international sources of domestic politics) have worked together for the transition in Japan’s grand strategy.6) Additionally,


6) The term, “second image,” which Kenneth N. Waltz analyzed in his 1954 book Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, did not receive special attention from students of international relations for decades; ironically, this was because of the prevalence of the Waltzian realist tradition in the Cold War. Indeed, Peter Gourevitch’s 1978 discussion about an opposite notion, second-image reversed, contributed to furthering interest in the second image for accounting for the domestic-international linkages. For the notion of second-image reversed and case studies, see Peter Gourevitch, “The Second-Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International
changes in international relations and Japanese views on and interpretations of those external changes have interacted with one another to result in this transition in the grand strategy. There have been a host of instilling processes of strategic deliberation in the domestic realm in regards to the processes of formulating foreign policies and implementing them; in turn, outcomes of the policies have led to adjustments in the grand strategy, which is the framework of those policies. At major historical junctures, such as the U.S.-China rapprochement, the fall of Eastern European communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the rise of China, Japan has undergone such processes of deliberation and adjustment. The integration and disintegration of political groups and the ensuing transitions among political landscapes also have been related to the transition of the grand strategy.

This article, first, examines Japan’s grand strategy in which the China factor has been crucial. Second, it delves into the grand strategy’s transition in the post-Cold War era. Third, it examines domestic politics regarding the China policy, tracing the rise and fall of pro-China or China-friendly groups. Fourth, it analyzes the impact of the China factor on Japan’s Korea policy, using the 1972 Sino-Japanese normalization and afterwards as an

example. Finally, it draws conclusions regarding the meaning of the China factor for the Korean peninsula today.

II. “China” in Japan’s Grand Strategy

A grand strategy provides a country with a contextual basis for formulating foreign policies, and it involves the “identification of threat or enemies or friends.”7) In this vein, Avery Goldstein posits that a grand strategy is the “central logic” that interlinks various foreign policies, the country’s vision and capabilities, and international constraints. Yet, a grand strategy is not expressed in an explicit fashion because of the conceptual comprehensiveness.8) The Yoshida doctrine in Japan was embodied in external and internal policy lines rather than in a single document. However, one frequently quoted reference point was Article 9 of the constitution. Article 9 was introduced by General Douglas MacArthur, who wanted postwar Japan to remain an unarmed, pacifist country belonging to the so-called free world. Ironically, this article contributed to Yoshida’s justification of the war-torn country’s restraint from being entrapped in the U.S. strategy of containment, on the one hand, and to persuading socialists and communists to live with the alliance with the United States, on the other.9) The central logic was the conversion of available resources to economic growth while minimizing the security cost. As to the important

9) Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 34-36.
question about the identification of enemies or friends, Yoshida was aiming at engaging with China, the former enemy and victim of the militarist Japan. Whereas the U.S. efforts for transforming Japan and West Germany from enemies to allies were made in the context of the grand strategy of containment, the Japanese logic of engagement with China was settled in the Yoshida doctrine of prioritizing economic and diplomatic empowerment.

A prudent survey of theoretical works on the concept of the grand strategy suggests that for the emergence or transition of a certain state's grand strategy, three elements interact with one another: the cultural or ideological milieu, international environment, and domestic politics. In the Japanese case, these interactive elements have decided the country's strategic direction and redirection. More important, over time, China has


13) Just as scholarship in the study of international relations is divided along the lines of realism and liberalism, so Japan experts’ views are divided into three realist, pacifist, and middle ground. Kenneth Pyle and Richard Samuels are prominent
been factored into all of these elements, albeit in varying ways. First, China has remained a crucial element of the cultural milieu of Japan’s grand strategy. In the Meiji period, political leaders and strategists focused on how to gear up the national pride and how to transform the forced opening by the U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry into a chance to advance Japan’s international status. Certainly the projection of pride and status in Meiji Japan was paired with the nation’s changed international relations, namely, datsu a ron (Leave Asia), an idea presented by the reformist thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi. Japan’s militarist pursuit of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was an attempt to situate itself at the top of the advocates of the realist viewpoint. Pyle, Japan Rising Samuels, Securing Japan. See also Fred Charles Ikle and Terumasa Nakarishi, “Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 81-95; Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization (London: Routledge, 2009). In contrast, there are some works that highlight the pacifist aspect of Japan’s strategic culture. See Thomas U. Berger, The Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Yasuo Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarizing?: The Politics of Norm Formation and Change (Caulfield East, Victoria, Australia: Monash Asia Institute Press, 2008). Also, for a middle-ground viewpoint between the realist and the pacifist views, see Michael J. Green, Japan’s reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2003).  

order in the region, including above mainland China. With this new order, Japan intended to secure vital resources from other Asian countries and further aimed to bolster itself as a great power, enabling the nation to enjoy its prestigious status in the world.

Postwar Japan persistently pursued relative independence in diplomacy. Relying on the United States in security affairs, Yoshida focused on state-supported industrial policies and on market expansion in South Korea, China, and Southeast Asia, later expanding further to include other parts of the world as well. As to China, Yoshida tried to establish an organization of U.S.-U.K.-Japan political consultation regarding China’s affairs, although the attempt was later aborted. While maintaining the 1952 peace treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, Japan made attempts to approach communist China in the mainland. Instruments for achieving the goal were the “separation of economy from politics” and the “two China” policy. Yoshida’s China engagement strategy was inherited by his succeeding prime ministers Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke, whose ideological orientations apparently differed from Yoshida’s.\(^{15}\) The 1972 Sino-Japanese normalization, conducted by the then-prime minister Tanaka Kakuei, was not only the first significant hallmark of Japan’s restored status but also evidence of the significance of the China factor. Whereas Manchuria and other parts of the Chinese territory had been the militarists’ strategic targets of invasion and occupation, mainland China was the postwar Japan’s priority target for fuller realization of the Yoshida doctrine. The milieu of the Japanese pursuit of status and pride has been juxtaposed consistently with the perception of China, even if changing over time.

Second, two major junctures in international relations were influential in the transformation of Japan’s strategy with special reference to China: one

was the U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, and the other was China’s rise and perceived vulnerability among the Japanese during the post-Cold War era. The 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty was the first test of forging an equal footing between the two allies; the 1969 agreement between them on the reversion of the administrative right of Okinawa to Tokyo contributed to Japan’s path of diplomatic independence. With these achievements, Japan was able to use Nixon’s China visit to open normalized relations with China in 1972, sacrificing the Japan-ROC peace treaty and abandoning Taiwan. For Japan, political and economic engagement with China was a priority during the Cold War, only coming second to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Since then, how to cope with a rising China, despite deepened economic interdependence, has been a crucial question in the post-Cold War era. Japan’s post-Cold War concern about the growing Chinese power was immediately followed by a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The allies adopted the revised Defense Cooperation Guideline in September 1997, and they identified the scope of the alliance to be “situations in the areas surrounding Japan.” As Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara aptly note, this expanded scope of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation arrangements somewhat “diluted Japan’s traditional postwar policy against the use of force in the absence of a direct attack.”\(^{16}\) The allies’ explicit expression of the need of regional security cooperation, by far beyond the scope of the defense of Japan, had a special meaning for the U.S.-Japan-China security triangle. The Chinese believed that the revision meant potential imperatives related to North Korea and Taiwan. This was because the adoption of the revised guideline occurred right after China’s

destabilizing behavior of missile firings over the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, the United States and Japan, at the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting in Washington, DC, in February 2005, defined the Taiwan Straits issue and China’s military buildup as common security concerns.

Finally, Japanese domestic processes, in which political and social groups take into account the China factor at each important juncture, have been closely related to the transition of the grand strategy. During the Cold War, the consensus politics—particularly in the context of the predominance of the pro-China group centered on the Tanaka faction, the Keiseikai (Takeshita faction), and the Kochikai in the ruling LDP—rendered the China policy consistently significant at both formal and informal levels. In the post-Cold War, the pro-China group’s decline has been paired with the plunge in Japan’s favorable view of China owing to the 1989 crackdown and Japanese suspicion of China’s future. A notable point is that the fall of the pro-China group and the rise of nationalist politicians took place simultaneously. Thus, both China’s pursuit of great power diplomacy and the empowered Japanese nationalist politicians, particularly in the new generation, have contributed to projecting negative images of China corresponding to the China-threat theory, as shall be discussed in the following section.

III. The Reversed Image of China in the Post-Cold War Era

In the post-Cold War era, Japan’s efforts of pursuing its international standing first appeared in its participation in the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia from September 1992 to September 1993. This PKO participation took place immediately after Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy,” a disgraceful nickname given by the United States for Japan’s money contributions without troop deployment during the 1991 Gulf War. The Japanese PKO participation was certainly intended to help the rehabilitation of the country that was devastated by the Khmer Rouge-led mass killings and the Vietnam-Cambodia war. However, it is worth noting that the relationship between Japan and China had already entered into a new phase by 1992, partly because of China’s declaration that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are its territory (Sovereignty over the islands has been a thorny issue between the two countries since 1968 when a UN-commissioned report stated that the offshore areas surrounding the islands might have oil deposits). 18) In the early 1990s, China made efforts to recover itself from the image of totalitarianism incurred by the Tiananmen crackdown and to reenter into the international community. China also made efforts to induce Asian investors from Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to gear up its reforming economy. Japan did not

want to be left behind in its economic relations with China, and in this context, the government resumed providing economic assistance in July 1990. Nevertheless, the Japanese suspicion of Chinese political ambition and territorial irredentism swelled as China conducted its biggest underground nuclear test in 1992 and fired missiles over the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996.

Japan was not simply reacting to these Chinese acts but proactively conceived their impact on regional dynamics. In accordance with the timely publication of the East Asia Strategy Report, often called “Nye Report,” in February 1995, Japan came to demonstrate its choice to cope with the new situation. The Hashimoto-Clinton summit and its resultant Joint Communiqué on April 17, 1996, called for “revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance.” Based on this communiqué, these allies announced the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline in September 1997. The revised guideline defined SDF’s support for logistics and rear-area backing for U.S. military operations; the operational cooperation included intelligence gathering, surveillance, and minesweeping. Furthermore, the guideline mentioned that the alliance would cover “situations in the areas surrounding Japan.” The situations meant, if not a specific geographic area, any potential events in the Taiwan Straits or the Korean peninsula. Regarding this development, Chinese president Jiang Zemin expressed high alert.

What made China most alert in regards to the U.S.-Japan security

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cooperation was these allies’ joint research on missile defense-related technology starting in September 1998. Japan’s decision to cooperate with the United States on the development of missile defense (MD) might have been motivated by the launch of a North Korean Taepodong missile in August 1998, which crossed over the Japanese territory and fell into the Pacific Ocean. And the continued escalation of the tension in the Korean peninsula, owing to North Korea’s ceaseless nuclear ambition and the second nuclear crisis in 2002, eventually pushed the Japanese government to acquire MD capability, a decision which was announced on December 17, 2003.21) To China, Japan’s decision on the MD issue has been more serious than the revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline in 1997. It was commonly said that the Japan’s path to acquiring MD capability was prompted by the North Korean threat and aimed at securing Japan in the event of North Korea’s use of weapons of mass destruction. However, Beijing viewed the MD as an attempt to nullify the offensive capabilities of the Chinese missile system and to counter Chinese means of coercing Taiwan.22)

In the 2000s, the Japanese view of China worsened. With the publication of John J. Mearsheimer’s China threat theory,23) the Japanese perspective on China became even more negative.24) At the public level, China’s image

22) Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” pp. 35-36.
24) Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 106-107. Of course, in Japan, there were also neutral views on China’s rise: for instance,
among the Japanese plunged rapidly; a poll showed that the “dislike of China” increased among respondents from 28% in September 2004 to 40% in June 2005.\textsuperscript{25} The negative image of China was paired with the Japanese government’s further assertive strategic positions. Since February 2005, Japan and the United States have held the Security Consultative Committee with the format of 2+2, in which the Japanese foreign minister and defense agency director and the U.S. state and defense secretaries hold talks together. It is noteworthy that in a joint statement released on February 19, 2005, after the first of such meetings, the allies described China’s transparent military affairs and noted the peaceful Taiwan Straits as their strategic objectives. This specific mentioning of the geographic areas significantly differed from the statement about the situational abstract in the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline.\textsuperscript{26} Here the Japanese concern over the Taiwan Straits was a clear departure from Japan’s previous strategy, which had prioritized deepening engagement with mainland China. The 1972 Sino-Japanese normalization nullified the Japan-ROC peace treaty and the abandonment of Taiwan. That is, Japan dared to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of engagement with China during the Cold War era. But Japan, along with the United States, now came to mention the touchiest issue for mainland China at the 2+2 meeting in 2005.\textsuperscript{27} Japan’s altered view on China reached a climax in December 2005 when the then-foreign minister

\textsuperscript{25} Samuels, \textit{Securing Japan}, pp. 138-139.


\textsuperscript{27} For the significance of the Taiwan issue in the U.S.-China-Japan triangle during the Cold War and the post-Cold War alike, see Asai Motofumi, \textit{Chugoku o do miruka} [How to See China] (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2000), pp. 127-133.
Aso Taro called China a threat for the first time.28)

Recently, such a negative image regarding China has become reincarnated in domestic debates on the immigration policy that is crucial to the aging Japanese society. Japan has to accept foreign migrants, predominantly Chinese; however, many politicians oppose legislation that grants permanent residents suffrage in local elections because of the fear of the effects that massive numbers of incoming Chinese migrants are anticipated to have on local Japanese politics.29)

To be sure, the negative spiraling in the 2000s differed from that of the 1990s. The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s, particularly Tokyo’s commitment both to the MD cooperation and to the SDF’s rear support for the U.S. operation, was in part attributable to China’s provocative acts in the Taiwan Straits and the North Korean missile firings. In contrast, the negative spiraling in the 2000s was due to factors other than the destabilizing behavior of China and North Korea. The then-prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine every year during his tenure from 2001 to 2006 brought about anger in and protests from Asian countries.30) In April 2005, the Japanese education ministry’s approval

30) Koizumi’s visit to the shrine on August 15, 2006, was the culmination of the campaign promise at the 2001 LDP president election, but the impact of the 2006 visit on the rise of popular nationalism in Japan was enormous. It is notable that the public response to the visit turned out positively. According to surveys conducted after the August 15, 2006 visit, responses of supporting the visit outnumbered those of opposing it, a situation that has never occurred in the postwar history. For the surveys conducted by Kyodo News, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun, see http://www.j-cast.com/2006/08/17002575.html (accessed on
of revisionist history textbooks, which seriously watered down the history of the militarist invasion of Asian countries, resulted in diplomatic tension between Japan on the one hand and China and South Korea on the other. Demonstrations spread out across all major cities in China, following the Chinese and South Korean governments’ protests. The demonstrations transformed into Japan-bashing rallies accompanied by violence, and then they developed into a rejection of Japan’s bid for obtaining permanent membership on the UN Security Council.31) Probably the Sino-Japanese standoff in 2010—induced by the clash between Japanese Coast Guard ships and a Chinese fishing boat in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands area and the ensuing Chinese export ban of rare earth metals to Japan—best represents the culmination of persisting tensions in their relations. This incident shifted Japanese perception “from Japan and China together in international society to one in which Japan and China are on opposite and opposing sides.”32)

The reversed image of China is accompanied by strategic views appearing in important official documents. An advisory committee’s report on Japanese national security and defense, prepared under the auspices of the Kan cabinet in August 2010, underscores the importance of “access to markets” and “safety of sea lines of communications (SLOCs).” Japan is a maritime state with a lack of raw materials; thus, it needs safe SLOCs for access to both resources and markets. This point reminds observers of potential dangers of territorial disputes and non-traditional insecurity issues in the


East China Sea, South China Sea, and Malacca Straits. The report draws attention to a change in the balance of power in international relations by the rise of China, India, and Russia and the relative decline of the United States. This makes China’s political and economic development all the more important, as the report describes it as “extremely significant” to Japan’s interest.\(^3\) Compared to that advisory report, the governmental report, that is, the National Defense Program Guideline, illustrates Japanese concern over China in a more straightforward way. This guideline, which appeared six years after its previous version, was based on the above-mentioned report and approved by the Kan cabinet at the end of 2010. It revealed that Japan’s grand strategy is in transition. It states that the Chinese military’s modernization and its insufficient transparency are of “concern for the regional and global community.”\(^3\) Japan considers North Korea’s behavior an immediate destabilizing factor and a present threat, but Japan further vigilantly watches the Chinese military buildup and activities with a long-term perspective.

Taking into account the above-mentioned change, it is fair to say that Japan’s grand strategy is now being reshaped into the following: engagement but vigilance as to China. But reference points of the grand strategy are not yet clear. Unlike the Yoshida doctrine with its economy-centered strategy, the grand strategy in transition reveals no other than the combination of the alliance with the United States and the elusive East Asian cooperation.

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3) See National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2011- (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010).
IV. Domestic Dynamics: The Fate of the Pro–China Group

A grand strategy is not thought of as a given, but it “flows from the national leader’s underlying beliefs, central goals and preferred tools.”35) Fair understanding of the China factor in Japan’s grand strategy requires an examination of the rise and fall of the group of politicians who were most concerned with Japan’s China policy.36) It is necessary to closely examine the policy initiative taken by the mainstream pro-China group in the 1970s and 1980s particularly the Tanaka faction, the Keiseikai (Takeshita faction), and the Kochikai and to investigate how the group came to lose its influence in the 1990s and the 2000s.

The pro-China group consisted of the four broad political forces in Japan at that time: the socialists, the Komeito members, the mainstream conservatives in the LDP (centered around the Tanaka faction, the Keiseikai, and the Kochikai), and Leftists in the LDP. Those politicians who can be categorized in the pro-China group shared viewpoints of improving Japan’s relations with China. In the ideological orientation, they differed from the conservative Rightists, such as Kishi Nobusuke and Fukuda Takeo, who maintained anti-communist and nationalist orientations and preferred the pro-Taiwan policy and U.S.-Japan alliance alone.37) The pro-China group

was not a coherent political association; particularly the Keiseikai and the Kochikai were byproducts of Japanese factional politics in which politicians sought to defend their positions against competitors within and outside of the LDP, with regard to the China policy in this particular case.\(^{38}\) The two associations in particular were clusters of those politicians who belonged to the mainstream in the LDP and, if necessary, contributed to a transinstitutional consensus or post facto consensus, to use Yoshihide Soeya’s term regarding the development of Sino-Japanese relations.\(^{39}\)

The mainstream conservative tradition in the LDP can be traced back to Yoshida Shigeru. Despite his pro-militarist view on China in his youth, Yoshida came to hold a strategic standpoint on the importance of China in the postwar period. His postwar view on China differed from Matsumura Kenzo’s guilty consciousness of or remorse for wartime Japan’s brutality.\(^{40}\) His view was completely based on national interest. Yoshida opposed the Japan-Soviet Union joint declaration in October 1956 in the era of the Hatoyama cabinet because he believed that Japan’s stake in China was larger than that in the Soviet Union.\(^{41}\) Ikeda Hayato, who rose to prime minister in July 1960, was Yoshida’s successor of the mainstream and the

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\(^{39}\) Post facto consensus refers to that by the time a consensus at the governmental level is formed, non-governmental initiatives are already made and the initiatives prevail. For the case study of Sino-Japanese economic relations, see his book \textit{Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).


leader of the Kochikai. Ikeda could not generate concrete results with regard to the China issue; he was one of the postwar prime ministers who had to follow the line of the U.S.-centered foreign policy. But Ikeda was quoted as frequently saying to his secretary that the Sino-Japanese relations were so important that the normalization should be restored by younger politicians.42)

Ikeda's contribution to Sino-Japanese relations was the conclusion of the LT (Liao-Takasaki) Memorandum Trade Agreement, which was reached in November 1962. The expansion of trade volume owing to the memorandum was so impressive that Japan’s exports to China increased by more than 100 times between 1960 and 1966 and China's exports to Japan increased by about fifteen times during the same period.43) The LT memorandum became the source of “China fever” in the Japanese business circle that was a facilitator of the 1972 Sino-Japanese normalization.44)

Once the United States had made a shift toward China to forge rapprochement, most segments of the Japanese society accepted the reality and warmed up to China, notwithstanding some guilt for abandoning Taiwan. To be sure, there was a driving political force. At that particular juncture, the China policy became a focal point in the election of the party head of the LDP in July 1972. As Tanaka Kakuei, in competition with Fukuda Takeo, failed to receive a majority vote in the first round, Ohira Masayoshi in the Kochikai, along with a progressive politician, Miki Takeo, supported Tanaka.45) Probably in compensation for Ohira's and the Kochikai's

42) Ibid., pp. 168-169.
45) Hoshi Hiroshi, Jiminto to sengo: Seikento no 50nen [The Liberal Democratic Party and
support, Tanaka appointed Ohira the foreign minister who became the prime mover of the normalization. If Tanaka was likened to a bulldozer with regard to the China policy, Ohira was a strategist with determination. As soon as he was appointed as foreign minister, Ohira bypassed the bureaucratic hierarchy in the foreign ministry to give instructions to the China department; this bypass was intended not only to maintain secrecy but also to overcome the huddle of the longstanding pro-Taiwan or Taiwan-sympathetic atmosphere in the foreign ministry. At that important time, Ohira made it clear that Japan should sever the Japan-Taiwan relations in order to open normalized relations with China.46)

Along with the Kochikai, the new formidable force of the Tanaka faction and its successor, the Keiseikai, which was led by Takeshita Noboru and Kanemaru Shin, steadfastly sustained the pro-China policy. After Tanaka rose to power, the Tanaka faction and later the Keiseikai, rather than the Kochikai, became the pivotal, powerful force in the LDP.47) Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the Tanaka faction, the Keiseikai, and the Kochikai induced consensus in the political realm, including among socialists and communists, with regard to the Sino-Japanese relations. In this context, although Fukuda, a descendent of the rightwing Kishi faction, became

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47) Indeed, the Tanaka faction and the Keiseikai either elected prime ministers from their factions or supported other faction leaders as prime ministers until the end of the 1990s. With the support of the Tanaka faction, Ohira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenko, and Nakasone Yasuhiro could become prime ministers. The prime ministers Takeshita Noboru, Hashimoto Ryutaro, and Obuchi Keizo were from the Keiseikai; Uno Sosuke, Kaifu Toshiki, and Miyazawa Kiichi were backed by the Keiseikai to become prime ministers. For the details, see Oshita Eiji, Keiseikai Takeshita gakko [The Keiseikai Takeshita School] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999).
prime minister between December 1976 and December 1978, he did not reverse the existing China policy but indeed deepened the Sino-Japanese relations. Fukuda contributed to establishing the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty in Tokyo on August 12, 1978. In the Suzuki cabinet, the chief cabinet secretary Miyazawa Kiichi’s and the education minister Ogawa Heiji’s adroit handling of the first textbook incident in 1982 was another example of the mainstream’s influence of carrying out the China-friendly policy. The education ministry’s approval of a high school history textbook, which described the Japanese militarist invasion as “advancement” and used the term “violent uprising” in describing the March 1 Independence Movement in Korea, brought severe criticism from China and South Korea. Miyazawa made a governmental statement that Japan brought “serious pain and damage” to Asian countries, including China and South Korea, during that period. In the same vein, Ogawa stated that he believed the “Sino-Japanese war” was a Japanese “invasion.” With these statements and the ensuing establishment of the proviso of considering neighbor countries, the controversy over the textbooks was submerged for the time being.

Probably thanks to both the Tanaka faction’s prevailing influence and the Kochikai’s China-friendly orientation, a pro-U.S. nationalist prime minister Nakasone also had to change his viewpoint and demonstrated an internationalist stance with regard to the policy toward Asia, including China. Nakasone received severe criticism from China and South Korea for his visit to the Yasukuni shrine on August 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of World War Two; he was recorded as the first prime minister who made an official visit to the controversial place that enshrined fourteen Class-A war criminals. However, accepting the advice of both the political and business leaders of the Japanese side and close associates of the General

Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang, Nakasone did not visit the shrine again in the ensuing years. Nakasone's considerate policy toward China and South Korea was followed by his determined action over the education minister Fujio Masayuki's nationalistic statement on Japan's wartime history. When the education ministry's approval of a rightwing history textbook, *Shinhen Nihonshi* (Newly Edited Japanese History) by "Nippon o mamoru kokumin kaigi" (National Council for Guarding Japan), faced opposition from Nakasone, Fujio in defiance to Nakasone wrote a provocative article in the monthly magazine *Bungeishunjhu* in October 1986. In response to this, Nakasone replaced the education minister.

However, the fall of the Fifty-five system, along with the changes in the international environment mentioned earlier, contributed to the waning of the friendly China group. In the general election in July 1993, the LDP, won more seats than other parties but failed to forge a winning parliamentary coalition (At that time, the party was led by the then-prime minister Miyazawa, who was at that time the Kochikai leader and was sustained by the Keiseikai). As a result, the political landscape underwent a grand shift: the launching of the Hosokawa cabinet as the first non-LDP eight-party coalition since the establishment of the Fifty-five system. Given this situation, the weakened integrity of the LDP was most observable in the fragmentation of leading factions—particularly internal divisions in the Keiseikai and the Kochikai.

The Keiseikai fell apart as Kanemaru resigned as a Diet member and the Keiseikai chairman in August 1992 due to the Sagawa Kyubin bribery scandal. Ozawa Ichiro, a young, ambitious politician in the Keiseikai, departed from this faction to form his own faction, the so-called Kaikaku

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49) Ibid., p. 183.

50) It is called the second textbook incident, in comparison to the first one in 1982.
Foramu 2t; meanwhile, with the support of Takeshita and his associates, Obuchi Keizo became the chairman of the Keiseikai.\textsuperscript{51)} Whereas the Keiseikai’s name officially remained intact, its power in the LDP was seriously eroded (In 1996, Obuchi eventually changed the Keiseikai’s name into the Heisei Kenyukai). No doubt the Keiseikai’s division and its weakened influence in the party were accompanied by the decline of the China policy.

In a similar fashion, the Kochikai became a battle field between the two leading figures Kono Yohei and Kato Koich, which was called the KK war in 1994. The Kochikai became seriously weakened in 1995 when Kono left it to form his own group. Even after the LDP returned power in January 1996, the weakened Kochikai was no longer a faction that was able to exercise organized power for maneuvering foreign policy, particularly the China policy. To make the situation worse, the Kato-led Kochikai was divided again in January 2000 in relation to the non-confidence motion of the Mori cabinet. Within this Kochikai, two factions were formed: the Tanigaki faction and the Koga faction. Each faction tried to maintain a long-standing identity by calling itself Kochikai.\textsuperscript{52)} But each Kochikai was no other than a small faction, losing the tradition inherited from Yoshida and Ikeda.

With the Democratic Party of Japan’s rise to power in September 2009, the then-prime minister Hatoyama Yukio came up with a fresh vision of Sino-Japanese relations anchored within an East Asian community.


\textsuperscript{52)} Koga Makoto and Tahara Soichiro, “Kochikai wa bunretsu sazaru o enai” [There Was No Other Way for the Kochikai to Be Divided], \textit{Chuo Koron}, vol. 116, no. 3 (2001), pp. 106-115.
However, he stepped down in less than a year because of the domestic fallout of his unfulfilled promise to relocate the U.S. bases in Okinawa to a location outside of Japan.

V. The Impact of the China Factor on the Korean Peninsula

It is not a coincidence that Japan’s Korea policy, particularly its North Korea policy, has been paired with its China policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Advocacy groups for the China-friendly or China-bashing policies in Japan have mostly overlapped with similar stances regarding the North Korea policy. As China, not Korea, has been the most crucial ingredient of the Japanese grand strategy, Japan’s Korea policy has been mostly formed and transformed within that strategic framework. During the Cold War, the “two Koreas” policy was a result of Japan’s increasing engagement with China. In the post-Cold War era, Japan’s coercive policy toward North Korea has coincided with its vigilance over China. The impact of the China factor in Japan’s grand strategy on the Korean peninsula may be best exemplified by a series of events in the early 1970s: the U.S.-China rapprochement, the Sino-Japanese normalization and abandonment of Taiwan, and Japan’s formulation of the two Koreas policy.

U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to mainland China in February 1972 was a historic event that warranted Japanese concerns of being left behind. However, in view of the Nixon administration’s cautious but gradual approach to China, Nixon’s China visit was not a shock but an opportunity for Japan’s grand strategy. Japan waited for this opportunity, with which

it was able to turn the prevailing “China fever” into a fruit, that is, deepened economic relations based on normalization. Owing to the China fever, the volume of trade between Japan and China in 1970 already reached 826 million U.S. dollars, which was around 30% of Japan’s trade and brought Japan a black-ink balance of 318 million U.S. dollars. Therefore, with Nixon’s visit, the realization of the Japan-China normalization seemed only a matter of time.

In this rapidly changing international environment, North and South Korea reached a historic agreement in 1972, the so-called July 4 Joint Statement, which came after rounds of Red Cross meetings as preliminary means of rapprochement between the two sworn adversaries. Notably, South Korea accepted the three concepts for national unification— independence, peaceful unification, and national unity—concepts with which for more than a decade North Korea had insisted on the exclusion of foreign influence.

Now with the change of prime ministers in July 1972, from Sato Eisaku to Tanaka Kakuei, the Japanese sense of being left behind became one of high expectations about the relationship with China. Rather than avoiding giving direct answers to questions about China, the new prime minister Tanaka expressed a strong desire for normalized relations with it from the first press conference. Accordingly, his press conference was considered a totally new development, compared to previous new prime ministers’ press conferences. Indeed Tanaka made an unusual political determination by

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56) Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to State Secretary, July 19, 1972, POL 15-1
which he started preparing for a normalized relationship with mainland China, bypassing the foreign ministry’s high-ranking officials who had stuck to the two China formula. 57)

At Tanaka’s China visit from September 25 to 30, 1972, Japan and China achieved their own objectives. Of the many points adopted at the Zhou-Tanaka Joint Communiqué on September 29, the following points called for special attention: the Japanese government recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government as the “sole” legal government of China, and it “fully understands and respects” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC; the PRC renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan; and the two governments have decided to establish diplomatic relations immediately, putting an end to the abnormal relations. 58)

As for the Taiwan issue, the two governments did not formally nullify the Japan-ROC peace treaty, as China desired. 59)

For South Korea, the Zhou-Tanaka Joint Communiqué meant no more than Japan’s abandonment of Taiwan. Who would be the next? Only two weeks after Tanaka’s China visit and the Joint Communiqué, South Korean president Park Chung-hee declared the launching of the Yushin regime in Korea, allegedly naming it after the Japanese Meiji Yushin in 1868 (Yushin means restoration in both Korean and Japanese). The Yushin regime was a clear departure from existing procedural democracy. With a presidential special statement, the constitution was suspended, the National Assembly

JAPAN. U.S. archive.
59) Memorandum for the President, October 2, 1972, POL 7 JAPAN. U.S. archive.
was dissolved, parties and political activities were banned, and nationwide emergency martial law was declared. It still remains a controversial question why Park chose the new authoritarian model at that particular juncture. But the key point is that Park Chung-hee viewed the rapid change in international relations, particularly the Japan-China normalization and Japan’s abandonment of Taiwan, as a move favoring North Korea.60)

In parallel to the development of Sino-Japanese relations, the improvement of the Japan-North Korea relations seemed a matter of time. From mid-1972, Japanese politicians entered into a kind of race for visiting Pyongyang. More important, the Japanese government’s position was indeed in accordance with the viewpoints of the Pyongyang visitors. In response to the South Korean embassy officials’ protest in January 1972 against the Japanese government’s permission of politicians’ visits to North Korea, officials in the Japanese foreign ministry made it clear that their government would “diversify” its diplomatic efforts.61)

In mid-1973, the Japanese government came to launch its two Koreas policy and developed Japan-North Korea relations, albeit with no political recognition. As early as May 9, the Tanaka cabinet transmitted Japan’s new


61) Kang kongsa wa Sunobe asea kukjang kwaui myondamrok [Memorandum of Conversation between Minister at the Embassy in Tokyo Kang Young-kyu and Director of Asian Affairs Bureau Sunobe], JAW-01025, January 4, 1972, in Han-II jongmu ilban [Korea-Japan Political Affairs], 722.IJA, C-0051. Korean diplomatic archive.
view on the Korean affairs to the U.S. government. Tokyo believed that there was “no alternative to a two-Korea solution.” Furthermore, the Japanese government suggested that third countries, certainly including Japan, should establish an “international framework” that would support its two Koreas policy. At that time, an international framework probably meant a kind of multilateral security-guarantee mechanism, in which the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet Union were expected to participate. Despite this new view, Japan did not take an actual initiative for fear of being blamed for intending permanent division of the Korean peninsula.62)

The Japanese position contributed to intensifying the two Koreas’ competitive peace initiatives. These initiatives were essentially a competition for legitimacy and pertained particularly to the unification issue. One clash between the two Koreas occurred on June 23, 1973. South Korean president Park Chung-hee declared the Special Declaration for Peaceful Unification, whereby the ROK government would admit the existence of two Koreas at the international level. In this declaration, Park stated that his government would not oppose simultaneous entry of the North and the South to the United Nations.63) Park’s adventurous peace initiative was immediately countered by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s declaration of the Five Points for Peaceful Unification on the same day. The main points of Kim’s declaration include the establishment of a Korea Confederation and opposition to Park’s proposal for the entry of two Koreas into the United Nations. North Korea renewed its own proposal for the building of a Korea Confederation as the precondition to UN membership;

in other words, North Korea maintained that Korean membership in the United Nations should be a single seat, not two.\(^{64}\)

The Japanese government welcomed both Park Chung-hee’s declaration and Kim Il Sung’s proposal at the same time. The then-foreign minister Ohira Masayoshi appraised Park’s declaration as “practical, constructive foreign policy” at a news conference on June 23. Likewise, Ohira stated at the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the House of Councillors on June 28 that the Japanese government would carefully pursue the development of Japan-North Korea relations within the range of not damaging the existing Japan-South Korea relations. In a similar vein, major Japanese newspapers welcomed Park’s practical approach to the international recognition of two Koreas. For example, Asahi Shimbun published on June 24 an editorial entitled “Two Koreas and Japan’s Diplomacy,” which interpreted the South Korean declaration as recognition of de facto two Koreas and the pursuit of peaceful coexistence.\(^{65}\) It is noteworthy that Japan’s notion of an international framework, originally presented on May 9, developed into an idea of cross-recognition of the two Koreas by four powers surrounding the peninsula: China and the Soviet Union for the South, and the United States and Japan for the North. This idea of cross-recognition appeared in a document by the Japanese foreign ministry that was prepared for the Tanaka-Nixon summit in Washington, DC, scheduled on August 1.


\(^{65}\) For the U.S. media coverage, see The Washington Post, which on June 23 called Park’s declaration “Seoul alters on North Korea in U.N.,” and The New York Times, which on June 23 named it “a major foreign policy switching.”
idea on this type of Korean resolution preceded Henry Kissinger's deliberation of it after his appointment to state secretary in September 1973 and his official proposal of it at his UN speech in September 1975.66)

Japan considered the two Koreas policy contributive to maintaining the balance of power in the peninsula as long as China remained stable. It is notable that Japan's policy toward the peninsula, particularly its North Korea policy, has been relatively independent of South Korean demands and interests. The Japanese government made overtures toward the North despite South Korean protests and complaints. Furthermore, Japan's North Korea policy was mostly independent of U.S. intervention, excepting its political recognition of the communist state. Japan's Korea policy resulted in competitive peace initiatives between the North and the South. This situation could not bring about any tangible consequence as to peace in the peninsula, but such a competitive situation rendered the inter-Korean relations stabilized for the time being.

The fall of the Keiseikai and the Kochikai in the post-Cold War era has been paired with both Japan's vigilant strategic outlook on China and the Japan-China contention. Equally important, these changes have paralleled Japan's policy toward North Korea, although the basic tenet of the two Koreas policy remains the same as before. In September 2002, the then-prime minister Koizumi Junichiro's first Pyongyang visit was certainly intended to achieve momentum for Japan-North Korea normalization talks. However, his visit backfired as the abduction issue became publicized. Thus, Koizumi's second visit to Pyongyang in May 2004 aimed at both achieving a partial solution to the abduction issue and abating domestic criticism regarding his cabinet's policy toward the North. He brought some

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abductees and their families back home. It is noteworthy that there was no political assistance or sympathy for Koizumi’s initiative. Many of those who favored a China-friendly policy and who overlapped with the supporters for pursuing stronger Japan-North Korea relations had already disappeared from the political scene. Koizumi’s aborted attempts and the subsequent fallouts evince that Japan’s Korea policy does not depend on top leaders—for example, who the prime minister is.

VI. Conclusion

During the Cold War, the significance of the China factor in Japan’s grand strategy culminated with the abandonment of Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese normalization. In dealing with the China issue, particularly the status of Taiwan, Japan was more audacious and determined—and consequently more simplistic—than the United States was. The increasingly important China policy was sustained by the broadly based pro-China group, not by a single top leader. In the 1970s, the then-prime minister Tanaka Kakuei was certainly an audacious politician, but he was able to achieve the Sino-Japanese normalization and expand Japan-North Korea relations only because of business circles’ China fever and the Tanaka faction’s leading role in forming a consensus for new initiatives to those communist countries.

In the past two decades, Japan, along with the United States, has demonstrated its changed outlook on China. Japan has considered the Taiwan Straits one of the vital elements in relation to Japanese security as well as regional stability. It is fair to say that Japan’s grand strategy is being shifted, and thereby gradually being reshaped: despite deepened
economic engagement, vigilance over China in political and security affairs now seems paramount to Japan’s grand strategy. This transition has no clear future reference point yet, but it is closely related to a revival of the milieu of pursuing national pride. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly susceptible to a nationalistic agenda, as compared to the elements of Japan’s grand strategy during the Cold War.

The transition of the grand strategy has been influenced by changes in international and domestic politics. The observed regional and global dynamics—such as the war on terror, China’s economic and military rise, and the North Korean nuclear program—have contributed to the transition of Japan’s strategic outlook. In Japan’s domestic politics, the political forces that enthusiastically incorporated the China factor into Japan’s foreign policy have waned. China-friendly forces centered around the Keiseikai and the Kochikai have declined, and the power of socialists has diminished significantly. Their decline was not simply attributable to electoral politics in 1993 and afterwards but to the then-new ruling Socialist Party’s self-denunciation of its longtime identity (for instance, the party came to recognize the constitutionality of the SDF, while giving up the longstanding position of the unconstitutionality of it). In this changed political context, those advocates of Japan’s alignment with such democratic countries as Australia, New Zealand, and India—as well as with the United States—have spoken up more than ever about the deliberation of the grand strategy.67) Obviously, this idea has been incompatible with China’s.

The China factor in Japan’s grand strategy has had significant and enduring impacts on the Korea policy in different ways. Japan’s North Korea policy in particular has been relatively independent of the

Japan-South Korea quasi-alliance anchored by the United States. Here it is important to note two key implications that the ongoing transition of Japan's grand strategy has for the Korean peninsula today. First, Japan's vigilance over China in political and security affairs, despite its deepened economic engagement, structurally perpetuates disagreement between Japan and China in dealing with North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction. This situation provides Tokyo with a rationale for a further strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, as shown in their close MD cooperation and expected sales of MD system to other countries. With this rationale, Japan apparently aims to strategically cope with a rising China. Second, the waning of the China-friendly political group prevents the Japanese public and the government from contemplating a broader and more sustainable foreign policy. This situation further facilitates the trend of bashing, rather than engaging with, North Korea particularly. To the Japanese, North Korea-bashing might be convenient but will not be helpful to resolve the problems pertaining to Pyongyang's destabilizing behavior.
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The China Factor in Japan’s Grand Strategy: The Impact on the Korean Peninsula


김성철

국문요약

일본의 대전략에서 중국 요인: 한반도에 미치는 영향

김성철(히로시마평화연구소)

대중관계는 대미관계 못지않게 일본의 대전략(grand strategy)의 중요한 요소들 중의 하나이다. 냉전기 중국변수의 중요성은 1972년 미중 담당관에 이은 일본의 중국과의 수교 및 대만 포기에서 잘 드러난다. 중국 변수는 일본의 한반도 정책에 지대한 영향을 미쳤는바, 남북한은 전례에 없었던 평화공세 국면에 접어들게 되었으며 이런 가운데 일본의 두 개의 한국정책(two Koreas policy)이 정착되었다. 일본의 대전략은 현재 재편 중에 있는 바, 중국에 대해 개입과 경계를 동시에 취하고 있다. 이 같은 변화는 중국 부상에 따른 국제 및 지역환경의 변화뿐만 아니라 지난 이십년 동안 일본 내 친중국 정치세력의 쇠퇴에 기인한다. 일본의 대중 전략의 변화로 인해 일중 사이에 대한한 정책에 대한 부조화가 구조적으로 지속되고 있다.

주제어: 일본의 대전략, 두 개의 한국 정책, 중국 변수, 친중그룹