Can the Cure for Metaphysical Realism Work? – The Case of Donald Davidson

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I will examine Donald Davidson's attempt to overcome Metaphysical Realism (henceforth, MR). But, merely saying that he tries to overcome MR has a possibility to mislead the readers. It is true that Davidson wants to reject several tenets of MR that has been traditionally regarded as fundamental elements. However, it is not the case that his rejection has led him to be committed to Anti-Realism considered as an opposite position to MR. While it is generally said that anti-realists argue that objects are mind-dependent, Davidson strongly denies this claim and argues that his view retains the point that how things are in the world is a matter independent of our minds. In other words, his view contains his effort to retain the traditional concept of objectivity, which is understood as the existence of objects independent of minds of the subjects. This objectivity, in Davidson's view, is inexplicably related to the concept of truth. Thus, Davidson's concept of truth takes the center of the discussion of this paper.

The most important and controversial claim among the issues surrounding Davidson is his argument that most of our beliefs are true. With his concept of truth as objectivity, this argument leads to further claim there is no possibility that we are systematically misled about the world. This claim has a significant implication concerning

skepticism: Skepticism is not a possible option we can think of, from the view Davidson recommends. This consequence of his controversial claim means that MR is not a choice for us because one of the important consequences constituting the core of MR is the very possibility of skeptical hypothesis such as Descartes' omnipotent devil or Brains in a vat. The possibility of skepticism implied by MR is due to its central tenet that truth is a correspondence between sentences and entities in the world. The world is out there independently of the status of our minds. Sentences expressing our thinking such as belief, which is a mental item of mind, are ours. Truth is nothing but the correspondence between these two areas: mind and world. This concept of correspondence is the very reason how skepticism is possible.[2] Mind does not have a decisive way to find out if there is a sound linkage between mind and world that does not involve any distortion which results in a systematic deception. This is the picture MR strongly recommends. However, Davidson denies the conception of truth as correspondence. Truth is not a correspondence even though it is objective in nature.

　Considering the mentioned above, the main concern of this paper

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2) It is noteworthy that with the denial of the correspondence conception of truth, the possibility of skepticism can be eliminated even if we concede that there is an ontological gap between mind and world. Unless the correspondence requires us to fill this gap for truth, we can be satisfied with certain sort of concept of truth other than correspondence, such as coherence conception of truth according to which truth is nothing but coherence between beliefs that does not need any proper contact with the world. This alternative concept of truth can keep skepticism from arising. We will examine this conception of truth as coherence (which is not what Davidson himself recommends) when we discuss about Rorty's criticism of Davidson's view. In fact, my examination about skepticism is not solely concerned with the concept of truth. I will discuss that denying the correspondence conception of truth is not a complete way to rule out skepticism: We need to reject representationalism for the complete exclusion of skepticism.

converges on the two issues: First, what is the concept of truth that
Davidson has in mind? Especially, how can he make sense his notion
of objectivity of truth with denying the conception of correspondence?
Second, under Davidson's concept of truth, how can he defend his
claim that most of our beliefs are true? If there are positive answers
to these questions, then we can say that there is a sufficient reason
to deny MR, which leads to the conclusion that there is no worry if
we are under a skeptical scenario. My examination as an attempt to
find these answers will take the following course: First, I will discuss
Davidson's early view on truth and knowledge, represented by the
picture of radical interpretation, and show what limitation this early
attempt to cope with MR has, especially, in terms of Davidson's
notorious treatment of omniscient interpreter. Then, I will examine
his later view, which can be called Radical Davidsonism, posed as
an alternative to his early version of radical interpretation.[3] Radical
Davidsonism is represented by his model of triangulation and the
new concepts of content and agent which denies representationalism
as one of the problematic doctrines of MR with regard to the
possibility of skepticism. Finally, I will examine this later Davidsonian
view. This evaluation has two parts: One is to adjudicate whether

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3) This distinction between Davidson' early view and the later one is from
   Ramberg (2001). Also, the term "Radical Davidsonism" is his expression to
   refer to later Davidson. It will be righteous of me to make a note that a large
   part of my discussion in this paper is based on Ramberg's interpretation of
   Davidson. But, the focus and some points here are significantly different from
   his investigation: The emphasis of his discussion is on Davidson's response to
   skepticism, not MR itself. Also, Ramberg does not tell much about the
   concept of truth. On the other hands, evaluating Davidson's rejection of MR
   and his concept of truth as fundamental component of this rejection is the
   center of my concern. Moreover, my final aim is toward the evaluation of
   Davidson's attempt under the conception of therapeutic conception of philosophy,
   which belongs to, put it in Ramberg's term, the level of meta-philosophy. But,
   Ramberg himself does not discuss Davidson's philosophy at this level.

Radical Davidsonism is a successful and satisfactory alternative to MR, with respect to anti-skepticism and the concept of truth. The other is concerned with a deeper issue: Can we understand this Radical Davidsonism as a sort of way to resolve the debate between MR and Anti-realism? I will investigate this matter under the conception of philosophy as therapy (which is distinguished from the theoretical conception of philosophy that occupies the issue dealt with at the first stage of my evaluation), through the metaphor that came from Candrakīrti, i.e. the metaphor of a physic. My conclusion is that, though Radical Davidsonism can be judged as a successful alternative to MR, this view itself must be dissolved as an expedient to make the final move for the resolution of the debate between MR and Anti-realism. I will show this point by arguing that Radical Davidsonism has a problem in explaining its fundamental concept of causation, and by pointing out that this problem comes from the limitation of taking a theoretical or third-personal view, the origin of which comes from MR.

2. How to Defend the View that Most of Our Beliefs are True: the Early Davidson

In his controversial paper, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" (in Davidson 1983) Davidson tries to press home the following two points: First, he denies the concept of truth as correspondence. Second, most of our beliefs that constitute a coherent system are true. It seems clear that accepting these two leads to the rejection of any form of skepticism which raises the possibility that we may be deceived in a systematic way, meanwhile

how to rightly justify those two points appears to be obscure so far.

As I have pointed out in the introduction, the thought that truth is a correspondence between a meaningful content of, say, a belief in mind and a worldly entity such as a fact is one of the fundamental tenets of MR. In Davidson (1983), he poses a reason for rejecting this conception: The concept of correspondence of truth in MR requires us to find out whether the correspondence that is needed for the establishment of truth is really present. But this task of identifying correspondence, put it in Davidson's word, "confrontation" (Davidson 1983: 225), is actually a mission impossible, because we cannot "get outside our beliefs" (Davidson 1983: 228). This means that, as far as we accept this correspondence conception of truth, we cannot escape from the anxiety of skepticism. However, in Afterthought attached to Davidson (1983), Davidson himself acknowledges this reason is misleading by saying, "since no one has ever explained in what such a correspondence could consist; and, it is predicated on the false assumption that truth is transparently epistemic." (Davidson 1983: 239) When one says that it is impossible to know whether the correspondence between a belief and reality obtains, and thereby argues that truth is not a correspondence, she is committed to the view that truth is a matter of epistemology. However, even if we have no way to get outside the system of our beliefs in order to find out the relation of correspondence, it is still possible that the very relation of correspondence exists independent of our epistemic status of it. Thus, if we take the impossibility for us to know the correspondence as the reason to deny it, then we assume that our epistemic situation is a fundamental part of the ontology of correspondence. However, metaphysical realists who accept the view of correspondence do not have to accept this assumption. In fact, as Davidson says, this assumption is false: truth is not an epistemic notion.

I believe that, besides the defective reason mentioned above, Davidson has two ammunitions to purge the correspondence conception of truth: The so-called slingshot argument and Tarski-style theory of truth. The slingshot argument is to show that if a sentence is true to a fact, then all true sentences have the same fact as their reference. In other words, if a sentence is true via corresponding to an entity in the world like a fact, then all true sentences must correspond to one and the same fact, which is an absurd conclusion.[4] (It is obvious that supporters of correspondence conception would not accept this conclusion because they want to say that different sentences become true by corresponding to different facts) Of course, there has been a debate on whether this argument is a sound one. But I will not deal this question because I want to focus on the second reason that I regard as more fundamental to Davidson's position.

It is noteworthy that Davidson argues that a Tarski-style theory of truth which provides a minimal basis for the concept of truth does not make the concept of truth as a semantic concept. (Davidson 1973: 66-67) According to Tarski, semantics deals with the relations between expressions of a language and entities (such as objects, facts, or states of affairs) to which these expressions refer. Thus, semantic concepts should express this sort of relations. (Tarski mentions, for instance, satisfaction and designation as the semantic concepts expressing this type of relation[5]) Davidson notes the fact that the concept of truth has a different status from other semantic concepts in Tarski's theory of truth: the concept of truth does not express the

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4) This argument is found in Davidson 1967, pp.305-6. The title, "Slingshot" came from the following paper written by Barwise and Perry (1981), "Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations" *Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, pp.387-403, reprinted in Martinich(ed.), *Philosophy of Language*, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.420-432.

5) Tarski(1944), p.345. In this discussion, my knowledge of Taski's theory of truth is based on Tarski(1944), Tarski(1956).

relation between expressions and the world that is required for a concept to be semantic. Of course, Tarski himself tries to define truth by using a semantic concept, i.e. satisfaction, and to call the concept of truth a semantic concept for this reason. But, Davidson claims that the definition does not necessarily indicate that the concept of truth itself would be a semantic one. Since I think of his own point as not so clear, I would propose my understanding of Tarski's definition of truth which does not generate the need for the concept of truth to be semantic. According to Tarski's theory, a sentence is true if and only if it is satisfied by all the infinite sequences of objects in the domain of discourse. Of course, the concept of satisfaction that constitutes the basis of the formal definition of truth is a semantic one that expresses the relation between an infinite sequence and an open sentence (or a sentential function, in Tarksi's word). But considering the definition of truth as the truth of a sentence, we can know that a specific relation of satisfaction between some objects in the world and an open sentence does not play any significant role to define the concept of truth. One important reason that the concept of satisfaction is introduced for the definition of truth is to show the compositional structure of an object language in order to satisfy the constraint of material adequacy. We do not have to depend upon specifically determined relations between entities and open sentences to show this compositional structure. Therefore, we can treat the concept of truth defined in a Tarskian theory as a non-semantic concept. In other words, it is wholly possible to deal with truth as that which does not involve with any concrete relation between expressions and the world, including the relation of correspondence. This provides Davidson with a right to deny the correspondence conception of truth by using Tarski's theory of truth.

　Now, let's get back to Davidson's discussion in Davidson (1983).

After denying the correspondence conception of truth, he proposes a coherence theory of knowledge: beliefs are justified only by other beliefs. (Davidson 1983: 228) However, justification is not the same as truth, at least according to Davidson. Even if a belief is fully justified by virtue of its coherence with other beliefs, it is another matter to argue that the belief is true. What Davidson thinks with respect to this question in his early period is that we can understand that it is sufficient for a belief to be true if it coheres with other beliefs, once we note the fact that meaning, belief, and truth are interdependent under the picture of radical interpretation that has the principle of charity as its fundamental rational constraint. (Davidson 1983: 232ff)

The main point of the radical interpretation is that we as an interpreter have no choice but to interpret the meaning of a speaker's utterance by ascribing mostly true beliefs to her in order to understand her as a rational agent. In the situation of a radical interpretation, an interpreter can only have correct information about what utterances a speaker holds as true. On the basis of this information, the interpreter must regard the content of a belief the speaker takes as true when uttering the sentence in question as the meaning of that uttered sentence, because the content of that belief is the very content expressed by the uttered sentence. In the situation where the interpreter and the interpreted share the same perceptual environment, the principle of charity allows and requires the interpreter to take the relevant belief of the speaker is the same as what the interpreter herself believes, by saying that they share most of their beliefs. Otherwise, there is no way to regard the person who is interpreted as a rational agent. We as an interpreter should take it that she has mostly true beliefs about the world including the environment related to the situation of interpretation. This is because rationality and holistic nature of meaning and intentional states such as belief force one to have a system of

coherently related beliefs in which the truth of one belief is connected to most of other beliefs in the system in direct or indirect ways.[6]

This is an abbreviated version of radical interpretation: if we want to interpret a speaker, then we must take her as a rational agent who has beliefs most of which are true and shared with an interpreter's own beliefs. This requirement of the principle of charity assumes that we as an interpreter have mostly true beliefs as well as those who are interpreted. However, what is the reason for taking it that most of our beliefs which constitute the very basis of interpreting most of beliefs belonging to the interpreted are true? This is because it seems sufficient to suppose that an interpreter and a person interpreted share most of their beliefs that cohere with one another for the purpose of interpretation: The requirement that those shared beliefs be true seems to need further reason. Coherence of beliefs is what we can correctly examine without knowing the reality that is supposed to exist outside the belief system. But, the truth is not what we can explain without considering reality in so far as Davidson accepts the objectivity of truth, though he denies the correspondence conception of truth. In other words, being asked why we should presuppose that most of the interpreter's beliefs are true, it seems that Davidson is question-begging by saying that that is what we should presuppose for the purpose of interpreting a speaker under a radical situation.[7]

Davidson seems to consider this kind of objection: he asks himself,

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6) See Davidson 1967, 1973a, 1974a.

7) This criticism that Davidson guestion-beggingly posits the truth of most of interpreter's beliefs by appealing to the principle of charity is what Williams and Rorty pose against the early Davidson. (See Ramberg 2001, p.226-7, and Rorty 1995) They argue that what Davidson can only reasonably show is that most of beliefs shared by an interpreter and a speaker who is interpreted should be coherent for the purpose of radical interpretation. Later, I will discuss Rorty's criticism of Davidson's view, focusing on the debate concerning the concept of truth.

"Why couldn't it happen that speaker and interpreter understand one another on the basis of shared but erroneous beliefs?" (Davidson 1983: 236) What he proposes in order to respond to this question is the case of an omniscient interpreter, which, in fact, gives him a real trouble. Before explaining what this omniscient interpreter is, we have to know what Davidson asserts about the determination of the content of one's belief. According to him, causation plays an indispensible role to determine what belief one has. What a belief is about is the cause of that belief. Also, this cause of the belief determines the content of it. This indicates the crucial fact that an interpreter must identify the cause of a speaker's belief in order to interpret the content of the belief.[8] (Davidson 1983: 235) Then, an omniscient interpreter is one who knows everything about the causation involved in her interpretation, though she does not know what the interpreted herself believes and means. Since the content of a belief is determined by its cause, the omniscient interpreter who knows this cause can always correctly interpret what the interpreted believes. (Davidson 1983: 236) We can see that this consequence obtains even in the cases considered as typical skeptical scenarios. Suppose that there is a brain in a vat, whose name is John. The omniscient interpreter can interpret what John says as expressing a true belief. For instance, he would utters, "There is a rabbit," when his brain receives an electric

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8) In fact, this last sentence is not exactly what Davidson himself claims: He says that communication as a process of interpretation begins only after "causes converge" (Davidson 1983: 236) Davidson presupposes that an interpreter already has true empirical beliefs, which implies that she does not have to identify the cause of the beliefs in question. (Davidson 1999, pp.18-9) The matter of identifying the causes of beliefs is not what radical interpretation requires, but what arise in the picture of triangulation. However, we should note that the need to identify cause has been raised when facing with the objection that Davidson commits a question-begging in his model of radical interpretation.

stimulation that induce a rabbit-like visual image. Then, the omniscient interpreter (henceforth OI) can interpret this utterance as the following: "There is a rabbit" uttered by John at time t is true if and only if there is an electric stimulation received by John's brain that induces him to have a rabbit-like visual image at t. This interpretation of OI is to ascribe a true belief to John. In this way, OI can ascribe to John beliefs most of which are true.[9] However, this strategy to depend upon the OI is still vulnerable to criticism that it is another kind of question-begging: When one raises a doubt on the principle of charity, she is asking why we should give an authority to any

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9) Perhaps, somebody can make a counterexample to this OI case: Suppose that John is a person living in the real world, which means that he is a speaker of English, not vat-English. One day an evil scientist extracts John's brain when he is sleeping without his notice. Now, John's perceptions are caused by electric stimulations delivered by the scientist's computer. Under this situation, when there is an electric stimulation delivered to John's brain which causes a rabbit-like visual image, John would say, "There is a rabbit." In this case, the uttered sentence is one of English, not vat-English. This entails that OI cannot interpret John's utterance as true because its truth-condition is that there is a rabbit, not that there is an electric stimulation. Thus, John would come to have many beliefs that are false.

However, this situation would not persist over a long time. As the causal relations related to John's having beliefs has been changed, his language would become vat-English, not English any more. This means that, after a sufficient time has been passed, most of John's beliefs can be interpreted as true by OI. Therefore, as far as we accept that the essential role of causality in determining content, OI can ultimately interpret every person under all kinds of skeptical circumstances as possessing mostly true beliefs.

Of course, the above discussion is based on externalist semantics. Also, we should acknowledge that the poor John has no way to know what kind of language (e.g. English or vat-English) he competently uses, and that he cannot notice the change of his own language from English into vat-English in the above example. My intuition tells that this consequence is obviously at odds with our ordinary conception of what language is. However, I would not argue the validity of externalism because this would go beyond the current discussion. Actually, the focus here is not on externalism, but on if the case of OI would be helpful for Davidson to make a good response to the objection.

interpreter that she has mostly true beliefs including those about the cause of the belief of the interpreted in question. In other words, an interpreter's belief about causation is also under the need of scrutiny, which means that we should not presuppose that it is possible that there is an OI who knows about the causation which is the very problematic concept here. In short, we as an interpreter are not OI. It is mysterious how Davidson's OI can help us under the skeptical doubt about our own beliefs.

This criticism is actually the same as the one that was raised against the principle of charity: There is no difference between presupposing that most of beliefs belonging to an interpreter are true and supposing an OI who knows every cause of any belief which belongs to the interpreted. This treatment of the two makes Davidson's new trial to defend himself merely redundant, which I do not believe is a fair criticism.

Then, what a novel point Davidson has posited with the case of an OI? It is noteworthy that Davidson introduces a third-personal viewpoint with his OI when he says that we can think of the case where the OI pays attention to a fallible interpreter and the person interpreted by that interpreter. Of course, the OI must make an interpretation in order to know what that fallible interpreter believes including beliefs that the interpreter shares with one she is interpreting. It seems that we can extract from this sort of triangular situation[10] the following argument: (1) One's belief B is caused by something in the world, whatever it may be. (2) The content of B is determined by what caused B. (3) The content of B is its truth-condition. (4) As far as there is something that caused B in the world (which is guaranteed by (1)), B is true. The OI provides us

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10) Of course, this sort of triangular situation is not the same as the triangulation about which I will discuss as belonging to Radical Davidsonism.

with the view that makes the premise (1) true. If we are within a first-personal view of an interpreter, then we are still under a skeptical doubt that the cause of our belief may not be a worldly object, but something that exists in our heads or minds, which is the very doubt that occupies the center of the objection that Davidson commits a question-begging with his radical interpretation. In other words, Davidson wants to make most of our beliefs objectively true by introducing externalism about the content of beliefs. However, in order to make externalism work, then we must acquire a third-personal view by which we can guarantee the existence of external cause.

Considering the point above, we can argue the following: The fundamental objection to Davidson's OI is not that he begs the question by introducing the OI who knows external causes, but that he is obsessed with the very view of MR that allows the possibility of skepticism as its essential nature. When Davidson denies the correspondence conception of truth which is fundamental to MR on the ground that we cannot go beyond the system of our beliefs, he tries to rule out a kind of transcendental viewpoint which is third-personal in its nature. Under the view of MR, a theory can be understood as an attempt to describe the relation between mind and world from a third-personal viewpoint. The reason why MR is opened to skepticism as its essential part is that there is no doubtless ground on which this viewpoint is based. Then, the fundamental question to Davidson's view is whether his conception of objective truth which constitutes the common denominator shared with MR does necessarily lead to the possibility skepticism. I believe that the answer is negative, which is favorable to Davidson. However, in his radical interpretation model and OI, there are other factors than the objective concept of truth that make him susceptible to the threat of skepticism: His early view implicitly presupposes the distinction between subject and object. When Davidson considers seriously the question of how to acquire

the point that most of the shared beliefs are true, he is under the
notion that the content of a belief is what is given to the subject in
question. Then, she has to find out the way to guarantee the truth
of this content. However, as far as we retain this picture, there is
no way out from skeptical doubt. Of course, when Davidson claims
that the content of a belief is determined by its cause and talks
about "causal truth" to show that beliefs are in nature veridical
(Davidson 1983: 237-8), he actually intends to deny that distinction
along with the existence of antecedently given content within a
subject's mind independently of the world. But, as he introduces the
OI to obtain a third-personal viewpoint, he, in fact, betrays his own
intention: He accepts the possible existence of the cause of belief
which can be unknown to the possessor of that belief. The introduction
of OI is to attain the viewpoint that this cause unknown to the fallible
interpreter can be recognized by OI so that there is still the ground
for OI to interpret the belief induced by this cause is true. This
provides the view that the meaningful content of our beliefs is
representational. This is because the acknowledgement of the existence
of a belief the content of which does not guarantee the existence of
external cause makes a distance between the content and the cause
determining it, thereby making the content as a representation which
may not have its external cause even if it is contentful. The central
notion constituting representationalism is that any content can
misrepresent the world thereby to be false, which leads to skepticism.
However, if we adopt the causal notion of content and truth, there is
no room for representation vulnerable to skeptical doubt that it may
be false.[11] In a nutshell, the early Davidson is not radical or

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11) Ramberg also argues that the OI does not help Davidson to avoid the criticism
the he begs the question. It seems that he has two reasons for this claim:
First, "the very notion of an omniscient interpreter reinforces the impression
that intentionality is assumed[.]" Secondly, depending upon the OI is another

naturalistic enough to acquire what he himself is trying to argue.

At this juncture, it would be better to examine Davidson's denial of reprentationalism. As I have already pointed out, representationalism that the content of our belief is a sort of representation about how things in the world are, is opened to the possibility of skeptical scenarios. This is because representation always contains the possibility of misrepresentation as its essential nature. When he denies the correspondence conception of truth as an attempt to rule out skepticism, Davidson also tries to reject representationalism. He argues that there is "no difference between a correspondence view of truth and the idea that utterances (or sentences) 'represent[.]'"[12] However, this is not that simple.[13] Especially, while the notion of representation explains the possibility of falsehood based on the concept of misrepresentation,

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version of question-begging as we who are interpreters have no right to interpret in the same way as the OI does. (Ramberg 2001, p.229-230) The second reason is what I have mentioned earlier as not that fundamental. I think Rambergs attempts to say by intentionality (which is not naturalized) that Davidson is committed to representationalism because intentionality is the central function of representation. (It is very probable that Husserlians are eager to argue that intentionality is not the same as mere representation. However, as far as I know, they have no story to prove this point.)

12) This attempt does not explicitly appear in Davidson 1983. But, he clearly expresses his rejection of representations in Davidson 1999. (The quoted sentence is in Davidson 1999, p.17) Also, see Ramberg 2001, pp.218-9, in which there are several quotations of Davidson's explicit denials of representationalism.

13) In fact, the denial of correspondence does not necessarily entail anti-representationalism. To know this point, considering the following discussion Ramberg provides will be helpful: For the denial of correspondence not to fall into idealism, Davidson needs externalism of content. But the combination of anti-correspondence and externalism itself does not rule out representationalism if we are committed to the first-personal epistemology of mind, which raises the doubt that there is not a proper linkage between mind and world. This leads to the conclusion that we need to deny representations internal to mind. (Ramberg 2001, pp.219-221) This discussion implies that accepting anti-representationalism is a further step beyond committing to anti-correspondence.

it does not seem clear how we can explicate fallibility in Davidson's denial of representation and his notion of causal truth. Even if Davidson wants to say that most of our beliefs are true, it is obvious that he would not want to say that all beliefs are always true, which drives him to commit a sort of Anti-realism such as idealism. Therefore, the notion of fallibility is one of the essential components of the concept of objectivity.

The early Davidson may say that the process of interpretation can be quoted to answer this question on fallibility. In the course of radical interpretation, an interpreter sometimes has to modify his earlier interpretation based on further information of the behaviors of the interpreted. But this response has a serious problem: it appears to make the concept of truth epistemological. In order to take the ascribed content of a belief as false on the ground that additional information is recalcitrant to it, we must antecedently take the empirical content of that information as true, which leads to the regress into another information or beliefs taken as true. Since Davidson is not a foundationalist, he has no choice but to resort to the notion of coherence: Falsehood comes from incoherence. However, this also means that truth is merely a guaranteed coherence. But this is totally contrary to what Davidson wants to claim. Under the objective conception of truth that posits the picture in which there are mind and world independently of each other, there is a worry that the modification happened in the interpreter's mind may not have a proper link to the world. Mere coherence does not provide this linkage.

The discussion above helps us to understand Rorty's criticism of Davidson.[14] Although it is the case that Davidson can and should reject the correspondence conception of truth and representationalsim,

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14) My discussion on Rorty's criticism of Davidson is based on Rorty 1995.

it seems that there still remains a doubt about how to rule out the possibility of skepticism through anti-representionalism and anti-correspondence conception of truth. Actually, Rorty is concerned with the question mentioned above, i.e. whether there is a way to escape from skeptical doubt while retaining the objective concept of truth. Rorty's answer is negative: simply taking anti-representationalism and denying correspondence conception do not help. While our discussion begins from the problem of how to acquire the fallibility essential to the objective notion of truth, Rorty starts his investigation from that of how to know if the objective truth obtains. His central thought is that, if truth cannot be explained without the dependence on the notion of meaning and belief under radical interpretation model, there is no room for objective truth.15) In other words, what we can really acquire is a mere coherence which supplies justification to believe something because we cannot have access to a transcendental view to speculate the relation between mind and world, whatever the relation may be. Therefore, Rorty says that Davidson's concept of truth, in fact, does not play any significant role to guarantee his claim that most of our beliefs are true. In this claim, truth is nothing but justification based on coherence or agreement among audiences. Then, why we use the term "true," even if there is no philosophically serious notion related to them? Rorty's answer is simple: The word "true" has a cautionary use which is to commend or caution. (Rorty 1995: 283)

   Although Davidson acknowledges that Rorty saw his position (i.e. the early Davidson) correctly in some ways, he still argues that his position would not lead to pragmatism by reducing the objective

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15) At this point, I believe, Rorty makes the same objection as what I have raised against Davidson's OI, though he does not mention anything about the OI. What Rorty is doing is to provide a pragmatist alternative to the early Davidson.

concept of truth to mere justification or agreement. Davidson has two points here: (1) Davidson thinks that the cautionary use of the term, "true" shows that we have an objective concept of truth: we say, even if we are justified to the fullest in asserting something, it can be the case that the assertion is not true. Of course, Rorty wants to understand this cautionary use as a reflection of the fact that justification is relative to audience, which means that the possibility that some better audience would disagree with us. But, for Davidson, this is a kind of evidence that there can be a difference with regard to objectivity: Better audience is closer to the objectivity of the world. (2) Contrary to Rorty's claim that Davidson's assertion that most of our beliefs are true is based on the claim that the pattern that truth makes is the pattern that justification makes (Rorty 1995: 283-4, 287), Davidson argues that that claim is not a reason for his holding that most of our beliefs are true. According to Davidson, our perceptual beliefs with empirical contents are just true, without resorting to justification supplied from coherence, agreement, or the patterns for radical interpretation.[16]

　　Davidson's alternative to overcome the problems of the radical interpretation model is his later view (i.e. Radical Davidsonism), which is radical in that his early commitment to anti-represenationalism and anti-correspondence becomes to consist in a novel conception of content and agent in which the role of causality is essential. Under this later view, the interpretation itself is composed of causal interaction among the interpreter herself, the one who is interpreted, and the world, the so-called triangulation.

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16) Davidson 1999, pp.18-19. I believe the second response is evidence that Davidson himself denies his early view represented as radical interpretation.

3. The Radical Davidsonism: Triangulation as Radically Causal Model[17]

As discussed in section 2, the reason why Davidson's early model of radical interpretation fails to prove that most of our beliefs are true for the purpose of excluding the possibility of skepticism, though the model is combined with the causal theory on the determination of the content of belief, is that he was not sufficiently radical in pursuing his anti-representationalism and anti-correspondence which are essential parts of the causal theory. Especially, the radical interpretation model implicitly presupposes that the content of a belief is given independently of how things are, which, in fact, makes the content a sort of representation the truth of which must be judged by conducting a further step to find out the causal linkage between the belief in mind and the worldly object as the cause of it. This is related to a traditional view of mind which is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy: We as a mindful being have metal items such as the contents of intentional states and possess a first-personal authority to know this content without identifying the cause of the content. Accepting this picture means that we must adopt the distinction between subject and object, which makes the real trouble of how to know the relation between them. Setting this relation as causal one does not help to avoid this fundamental problem.

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17) As I have mentioned, my understanding of Radical Davidsonism is based on Ramberg 2001 (especially, pp.230-234). I want to emphasize that I am not concerned with the task of correctly interpreting historical Davidson: I would just focus on how to reconstruct his later view as a proper model to avoid the threat of skepticism. In fact, several implications of this model I will derive later are not what Ramberg explicitly says in Ramberg 2001. But this is not an important matter because I will just discuss what I believe is the best interpretation as philosophy, not history.

Then, the Radical Davidsonism contains the denial of the above idea. First of all, it abandons the notion of the first-personal authority to know one's own mind. We do not know what the content of our own intentional states such as belief without identifying the causation between our belief and the cause of that belief. More exactly, the content itself is generated only if there is a right kind of causal relation. The content is nothing that is waiting for the determination from causality. We must abandon the idea that content exists prior to a proper causation. That should be taken as the central claim in Davidson's denial of correspondence. Moreover, according to the triangulation model, a right sort of causal relation requires a third element, in addition to the causal relation between a person and the world: To identify the cause of one's belief (this is the same as to generate the content of that belief), she needs another person who communicates with her about the putative cause. The essential point here is that a mere agreement between the two people does not provide the fact that there is a common cause of the belief shared between them. If this is so, the identification of cause is a mere matter of justification or that of entitlement, given the possibility that the two communicating persons may be misled about the common cause. If we accept the view that our mental content itself is generated and determined by the causation as interaction among two communicators and the worldly object, then we must say that the thought one has without any causal relation constituting a triangulation is not a thought at all. We do not have a thought or the content of any intentional state before we are engaged in triangulation. In this sense, Davidson's later view related to triangulation is radical: There is no intensional mental object privately known to the possessor in the absence of proper causal interactions with others and the world.

The Radical Davidsonism gives the final answer to the question of the explanatory role and identity of objective truth raised by Rorty:

The objectivity constituting the concept of truth is nothing but the existence of the causal relation among the three elements (two communicators and the world), by which the content is determined and generated. In this sense, the expression, "correspondence without confrontation" suggested by Davidson (Davidson 1983: 223) is provided its proper sense. Given that this causal relation itself is constitutive of the content in question, we can say that Davidson's objectivity is, in a sense, created dependent upon causation. Since this causation is a sort of communicational interaction, we agents are one part of the constitution of it, which provides a sort of anti-realistic aspect in that our activity of communication is constitutive of the content we share. But accepting this aspect is not committing to the traditional doctrine of anti-realism that object or reality is mind-dependent. This is because there is no mind or contentful thought prior to the triangulation as causal interaction. Mind and world are interdependent, and the nature of this relation of interdependency is causal. Therefore, the content formed by causal relation in triangulation is itself an objective fact in the world, thereby being true because there is no gap to be filled like the one between subject and object. The formed content itself has objectivity as its part to be true.

Then, we can see the anti-skeptical implication of Radical Davidsonism. Under the picture of this view, there is no question of how we can know whether the object of one's thought to which she has causal relation is really what she thinks as it is because this question can be raised only if we take the content of the thought as representation. The causal relation in a triangular situation is constitutive of the content of any thought. Moreover, this causal relation itself is necessary and sufficient condition for us to have a thought with content. This has a fundamental implication: like Putnam's anti-skeptical argument[18], it is impossible to think the possibility that we are under a skeptical scenario in which we are

deceived in a systematic way. If we can have any meaningful content only when there is a proper causation including the object in the world as its cause and other communicator, we cannot have a skeptical doubt as a meaningful thought if we are really in a skeptical situation: No proper causation, no content at all. Of course, if we are in a normal world in which triangulation works, then we can think of the possibility of skeptical situation as a meaningful content. But, in this case, raising a skeptical doubt has no significance because that doubt is simply false. Furthermore, this anti-skeptical consequence of Radical Davidsonism can be applied to Kripke's Wittgenstein's (KW's) skepticism. The reason how this kind of skeptical doubt is possible that the skeptic presupposes that we must possess a non-semantic fact which gives justification for meaning to fix a semantic content, which causes the infinite regress of interpretation of every non-semantic fact given as justification.[19] However, under Radical Davidsonism, meaning and content are not a matter of interpretation: There is nothing we must interpret to obtain a meaning. Meaning itself is a constitution of causal relations in a triangular situation.[20]

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18) Putnam proposes an argument to show the statement that we are not a brain in a vat (BIV) is necessarily true, using the combination of MR and externalist semantics: The content that we are a BIV itself must possess certain causal relation in order for that content to be content at all. However, if we are a BIV, there is no causal relation which gives the meaning of the very thought. Since we as a BIV have no causal relation to the term like "brain" and "vat," it is impossible for us to meaningfully think the possibility that we are a BIV. Therefore, if we are a BIV, skeptical doubt about BIV cannot be true since externalism says that the content itself cannot be provided. On the other hand, if we are not a BIV, then the doubt is simply false. Thus, that we are a BIV is false in every possible case: it is necessarily false. See Putnam (1981), Ch.1.

19) Kripke (1982), Ch.2.

20) Though he does not consider Radical Davidsonism, Rorty seems to understand well this aspect of Davidson's position when he talks Kripke's Wittgenstein

The last and the most fundamental issue that has persisted from the early Davidson is that Davidson must show in a non-question-begging way how most of our beliefs are true while retaining his objective concept of truth. However, this question is, in a sense, to be dissolved if we accept Radical Davidsonism. Under the model of radical interpretation, the conceptual priority of many beliefs possessed by an interpreter is necessary to make radical interpretation work. But, under the picture of triangulation, that necessity itself goes away: It is not the case that an interpreter and the interpreted possess their own beliefs with contents before they begin to communicate, according to Radical Davidsonism. There is no repertoire of mental contents in an individual's inner space of mind, independently of the causal interaction happened in a triangular situation. In this sense, the principle of charity that has sparked the criticism that Davidson begs the question is dropped as unnecessary element in constructing the theory of meaning in Radical Davidsonism. Transition from radical interpretation to Radical Davidsonism requires us to abandon an interpretational attempt to apply one's beliefs antecedently existing in her private space of mind to the person who is interpreted, and to accept the view that any meaningful content arises only after we get into a causal interaction as triangulation. Radical interpretation and the principle of charity take the notion of agent as that which can be sustained without interaction with others and the world in a triangular way. But this is what Radical Davidsonism tells we must refuse in order to understand the concept of agent as that which can

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against Wright. (Rorty 1995, pp.295-6) From the early Davidson, Davidson has argued that facts do not play any role in explicating truth and meaning. By denying the correspondence conception of truth, Davidson rejects that facts are truth-makers because that is a mere claim that presupposes representationalism. In fact, non-factualist conclusion of KW's skepticism does not hurt Davidson's view: Davidson can agree with this conclusion, in a sense.

be established only when there is a causal interaction of triangular communication. We should note that this claim does not imply that a person has no background belief prior to a specific token of triangulation. A communication with a meaningful content as one case of triangulation is possible only after there has been a sufficient number of antecedent causal interactions as triangulations: A real communication can happen only if there are mature and strong causations which provide its causal basis. This makes Davidson's early idea of meaning holism able to be sustained as a version of triangulation.

What has been discussed about Radical Davidsonism so far reveals the naturalistic nature of it. One of the essential problems in the traditional view which is committed to MR is that it is hard to understand mind and its faculties such as thinking and using a meaningful language in the natural world because the view poses the concept of mind as an isolated inner space that must be connected to the world in a way to make a translation between the two difference kinds of realms. Radical Davidsonism abolishes this very picture by naturalizing the concept of mind and meaning. By ruling out the deep rooted notion of mind as a representational system which has its own inner area of intensional mental items, and by placing the status of mind and content on a pure causal system of nature, Radical Davidsonism dissolves the traditional problem: We are actually parts in the natural world which is governed by causal relations. Therefore, any peculiar kind of faculty or property which is at odds with the natural order of the world represented by causation is not necessary.[21]

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21) Of course, the fact that Davidson holds anomalous monism which is a version of non-reductive physicalism makes the notion of causation somewhat complicated because it cannot be a lawful relation in the case of mental-physical causations including communicative interactions. (On

4. Radical Davidsonism as a Cure for MR: Is a Physic Remaining in the Gut?

In the last section, we have seen that Radical Davidsonism succeeds in ruling out skepticism by removing several views hidden in Davidson's early position which play as an obstacle to arrive at anti-skeptical conclusion. So, does Davidson refute skepticism? Actually, answering to this question is not quite simple. First of all, Radical Davidson is a theory which gives us a view under which we can see the world including us in anti-skeptical way. This means that we can still think a possible case where some people would not accept this view even though it can be used to exclude skeptical possibility. As Ramberg says, there can be Willing Skeptics. They can concede that representationalism and the correspondence conception of truth are the very reasons how skeptical doubt can be seriously raised. However, they do not want to abandon these views. If there is no theoretical alternative to choose for the purpose of denying represent-ationalism and correspondence conception of truth, then we have no reason to criticize Willing Skeptics for the reason that they would not abandon those views. Radical Daivdsonism, however, is this alternative which shows that there is a coherent theoretical view that makes representaionalism and correspondence conception incoherent, thereby excluding the possibility of skeptical situations. Given that there is an anti-skeptical alternative, the burden of proof has shifted into the side of Willing Skeptics. It is the Willing Skeptic who must prove that there is a good reason to hold representationalism and correspondence conception of truth even if they give rise to the

Davidson's view on mental causation, see Davidson 1970) But I would not take this as a serious problem for Davidson. This is because I believe that the most important problem for Radical Davidsonism as a naturalistic theory comes from another source, which I will discuss later in section 4.

threat of skepticism. (Ramberg 2001: 224-5)

It seems that, however, it would not be sufficient to show the shift of the burden of proof: There are some people on the side of MR who think that they have a competing view which allows the possibility of skepticism. For instance, Richard Heck who takes the project of Gareth Evans, claims that the skeptical doubt is a natural consequence of a proper theory of cognition. He argues that we as a cognitive system have a lower-level system of perception called the system of informational states. These states have non-conceptual content, which are available to the conceptual system of the higher cognition where beliefs and judgments are formed based on this non-conceptual information. Heck, along with Evans, argues that this non-conceptual content must be representational in order for it to be conceptualized into the higher cognitive system, thereby providing epistemic support. (Heck 2000) But Davidson would retort that he denies the empiricist idea that our perceptual experience should be an epistemic intermediary to our thinking about the world, by arguing that perception is a mere casual intermediary. Moreover, Davidson has more reason to deny empiricism: It opens the way to relativism by introducing the dualism between conceptual scheme and content. It may be said that Heck is committed to this dualism by distinguishing informational state with non-conceptual content from the conceptual system of higher-order cognition. This implies that our conceptual system as the result of evolutionary development is just one possible system which can be incompatible with other possible conceptual systems. Facing with the different cognitions made by different conceptual systems, there is no absolute way to judge which gives the better view about the world with regard to objective truth.[22] I do not know exactly how Heck would respond

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22) Of course, we cannot perfectly exclude the possibility that a Willing Skeptic

to this Davidsonian objection. But what I am sure is that he would give some reason that he thinks he can defuse this objection. Finding out or guessing this possible response is not my concern: The point here is that just passing the burden of proof does not appear to be sufficient to convert Willing Skeptics to Radical Davidsonism.

In spite of the point I have discussed above, I believe that Radical Davidsonism has one strong merit, compared to Willing Skeptics' competing theories: Radical Davidsonism squares with our commonsense knowledge of the world. A layperson commonsensically believes that there is a table, a tree, a dog, and a car etc. Radical Davidsonism can explain that most of her beliefs the contents of which contain these commonsensical macroscopic objects are objectively true. There is no need to reduce these perceptual objects into some microscopic elements which have a scientific causal powers governed by laws. Triangulation guarantees the objective truth of one's perceptual belief. Decisively, we should note that one of the most important bases of our commonsense knowledge is that we are not systematically deceived: We as a layperson with commonsense believes that we are in the actual world, not in a skeptical scenario. Therefore, the anti-skeptical implication of Radical Davidsonism, along with the fact that it guarantees the objective truth of our commonsense knowledge, gives us the reason to prefer to Radical Davidsonism. This is my conclusion in the evaluation of Radical Davidsonism at the level of theory: As a theory, Radical Davidsonism is a good alternative which effectively expels skepticism by refusing several tenets of MR.

Now, let us turn our attention to the evaluation at a higher level

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may willingly accept relativism. However, in case of Heck, he does not seem to be relativist. That is the reason why I have raised this problem of relativism. In addition, for Davidson's argument against the scheme-content dualism, see Davidson 1974b.

(which Ramberg calls "meta-philosophy"[23])), which leads to the question that was raised in the Introduction: Is Radical Davidsonism a cure for MR? This question seems odd in a sense: Though it is right that the later Davidson provides a view which excludes some of the central tenets of MR, i.e. the correspondence conception of truth, along with the rejection of representationalism, he still retains the objective conception of truth that objects in the world are mind-independent, which is the fundamental tenet of MR. If retaining this conception is innocuous, then we can say that the cure for MR that is required is not a view that totally denies MR, but one that makes a revision of MR, like Radical Davidsonism. But I think that the concept of objective truth becomes a real trouble when we take the task of evaluation at the level of meta-philosophy. It will be helpful to remind Davidson's OI (omniscient interpreter) here: The fundamental point of the criticism of OI is that its introduction is actually a kind of move to bring a third-personal viewpoint in order to guarantee that the theory under consideration (in case of OI, the model of radical interpretation combined with casual externalism) works. However, this newly introduced viewpoint itself is vulnerable to skeptical doubt. The situation is similar in case of Radical Davidsonism. When we describe how the model of triangulation can work, we take a third-personal viewpoint which is somewhat transcendental to what is described. More precisely, we as Radical Davidsonians presuppose that we can have a privileged access to the establishment of proper causal relations required for triangulation. In this sense, we are close to the problematic OI.[24]) Of course, at the

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23) Ramberg 2001, p.234. But, he does not discuss about Radical Davidsonism at this level of meta-philosophy.

24) If this is so, why shouldn't we deny Radical Davidsonism on the same ground that it involves a kind of privileged viewpoint similar to OI? But this objection is a kind of level confusion: In section 2, the reason why we

level of theory, we can retort that the concept of causation is a primitive one, and that every theory has its own primitive concepts. Thus, the fact that there is a concept which is not fully explained in a given theory does not hurt the theory itself as far as it is coherent. But, since we have arrived at the level of meta-philosophy or meta-theory, the primitive concept itself is under scrutiny. How can we as a describer who has a third-personal viewpoint have a proper relation to the causal relations occurring in a triangular situation, in order for us to attain the objective truth of what we describe about these causal relations? Can that proper relation required be a causal one as well? No. it is impossible: According to Tarski-style theory of truth Davison takes as a minimal basis for the objective conception of truth, a meta-language must have richer vocabulary than its object-language. Thus, we need additional concept to describe the occurrences of causal relations. Furthermore, even if we deny this consequence of Tarski-style theory of truth, we as a describer of a triangular situation still cannot use causal terms. This is because, if this is possible, we come to propose a sort of circular explanation: The truth of our view that there are causal relations in the described triangular situation must be provided by the fact that we are connected to proper causal relations which constitute another

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should reject the radical interpretation model is that it fails to thoroughly exclude problematic elements of MR inducing skeptical doubt such as representationalism. This is the reason for refusing the early Davidson at the level of theory: The strategy to depend upon the radical interpretation fails to provide an alternative theory which has a sufficient distance from MR. However, Radical Davidsonism itself is a successful attempt to rule out skepticism, within its theoretical scope. Also, it has a merit that gives a reason to prefer it to other theories of traditional MR which allow the possibility of skepticism. As a theory, Radical Davidsonism is a good alternative to adopt as an anti-skeptical view, while the radical interpretation is not. The discussion of OI is for dealing with its limitation as a theory, not as an alternative to other theories opened to skepticism.

triangular situation, according to the theory of Radical Davidsonism. This is nothing but to explain the theory of triangulation by depending upon itself. Therefore, we need a new concept to describe causations in a triangulation. The crucial point, then, is that the need of introducing a new vocabulary to express a new concept will occur indefinitely: If a meta-language is itself a theory, an additional need of introducing a higher level meta-language occurs when the question of the truth of a given meta-language as a theory is raised. Then, for the truth of this meta-meta language, we need a higher level of language⋯*ad infinitum*. The reason why this kind of problem happens is that Davidson sticks to the objective concept of truth as a fundamental tenet of MR. This attitude involves the problem of introducing a problematic third-personal viewpoint to posit a theory about the world, in order to obtain a sufficient distance between a theory and the world that is required to acquire the very concept of objectivity.

   At the level of meta-theory, we have to concede that Radical Davidsonism cannot perfectly rule out skeptical doubt, even if it is a good, anti-skeptical alternative to other theories of MR opened to the threat of skepticism. We saw that this is because Radical Davidsonism is still committed to MR by sustaining the objective concept of truth. At this juncture, the following question arises: If this is so, then should we abandon Radical Davidsonism itself by rejecting its aspect belonging to MR? However, if we do that, then do we go back to the skeptical doubt again because there is no theory we can resort to against skepticism? My answer to the first question is, "Yes, we should do at the level of meta-theory." To the second question, I would say, "No." To explain the reasons for my answers, it would be helpful to introduce Candrkīrti's metaphor of a physic. Suppose that a person who suffers from a disease gets a physic from a doctor. After the physic has gone to the gut, it expels all the bad

things in the gut that are causing the disease. However, if the physic itself remains in the gut, we cannot say that the person become free of disease.[25] This metaphor is used to explain Nāgārjuna's claim that the doctrine of emptiness (that all real things are without intrinsic nature) is a sort of expedient used to expel every metaphysical views, and that emptiness itself must be expelled. I believe that we should count Radical Davidsonism as this kind of expedient: It is a good theory for excluding skepticism based on MR, at the level of theory. However, as far as it is a theory which is based on one of the tenets of MR, it has to be expelled, as it has a component which induces another type of skeptical doubt when we evaluate it at the level of meta-theory. At this point, the conception of philosophy as a therapy needs to be considered, which can be represented by the following steps: We started from a skeptical doubt based on MR. Then we can see that Davidson's later view that denies several tenets of MR is able to provide an alternative view that guarantees the objective truth of our commonsense knowledge about the world. Thirdly, we have found that this Radical Davidsonism itself has its own skeptical problem due to the fact that it is still concerned with the concept of objective truth which constitutes one of the fundamental conceptions of MR. Thus, the final move is to abandon this last view and to stay in our commonsensical world view from which we started our intellectual journey: The Davidsonian physic itself must be expelled. Even if we abandon Radical Davidsonism, this does not make us go back to skeptical doubt again. We come to be in a position to abandon Radical Daivdsonism only after we have already ruled out the possibility of skepticism by accepting this naturalistic view. Also, the denial of skepticism through Radical Davidsonism is

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25) This metaphor of a physic is in Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*,chapter13,line8.The source of this commentary is the handout provided at the seminar taught by Prof. Siderits (1[st]semester,2010)

guaranteed at the level of theory because this view is a good alternative to the traditional MR. Abandoning Radical Davidsonism occurs at the level of meta-theory. We should observe the level distinction. Thus, there is no problem to get back to our commonsense knowledge from the last step of throwing off Radical Davidsonism as a ladder.

 I do not think that Radical Davidsonism is the only cure for MR. In principle, there can be other possible views which effectively rule out the possibility of skepticism by rejecting representationalism and correspondence conception of truth in different ways from Radical Davidsonism. However, as far as they are a theory, they must be expelled as well as Radical Davidsonism at the level of meta-theory. As I have discussed, the concept of theory I treat as one that must be expelled at the meta-level is fundamentally based on the concept of objective truth, which is one of the essential tenets of MR. This means that MR as a whole must be denied at the meta-level after we have ruled out the possibility of skepticism. But this does not lead us to Anti-realism because the final stage is our commonsense. We as a layperson do not believe that things are mind-dependent. Of course, common sense seems to contain the view of MR with regard to the objectivity of truth. But this is not a serious one. We as a layperson actually behave as if the world itself is directly given to us. As far as we do not take a kind of theoretical point such as a scientific explanation, we are a naïve realist. Naïve realism does not make gap between the world and us because the world itself directly appears to us without any epistemic hindrance. Since this directly given world is not what we produce as we want (e.g. we cannot see things as we want to see. I cannot see my computer as a cup of coffee even if I really want it), we have no worry about the threat of Anti-realism as far as we are a naïve realist as a layperson. Therefore, if coming back to our commonsense is the final move we

can and should do through Radical Davidsonism, then the final place
we arrived at is neither MR nor Anti-realism: The debate between
the two is, in a sense, dissolved.26)

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26) Though Prof. Siderits gave me valuable comments on this paper, I couldn't
reflect them because of some reasons. But I think I have to say that my view
expressed in this paper has changed: first of all, now I doubt that there is a
real distintion between the earlier Davidson represented by the Radical
Interpretation along with OI and the later view (i.e. Radical Davidsonism). It
seems to me that there is a fundamental continuity all through his
philosophical journey. Triangulation is an articulation of his earlier view, not a
revision. Also, I am not satisfied with what I have argued in the last section.
The so-called "dissolution" cliche might be a kind of reflection of my
misunderstanding about the real issue: whatever it may be the correct
evaluation of his view, it is far from being what Davidson really intends to
say to argue that the abandonment of the objectivity of truth is required at the
final stage of a meta-theory. Though I still believe that the form of direct
realism I have discussed here is the right conclusion Davidsonians must arrive
at, the method used by me to reach at the conclusion seems to be wrong. I
hope that I will have another chance to develop more satisfactory view on the
issues in the future. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to
Prof. Siderits for his teachings and the discussions in person I really enjoyed,
which I hadn't had at SNU before.

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