No Distinction between Sacred and Secular: Horace H. Underwood and Korean-American Relations, 1934-1948

An Jong Chol

When the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was established in September 1945 after the end of World War II, the United States was entering unfamiliar terrain and was struggling to manage the situation in Korea. Therefore, General John R. Hodge, the commander of USAMGIK, eagerly sought to obtain experts on Korea. Considering the lack of information about Korea, American missionaries were the only well-organized group who had affection for and information about Korea. Horace H. Underwood in particular was ideally qualified to act as advisor since he had managed the Chosen Christian College (CCC: today’s Yonsei University) as principal from 1934 to 1941. During the latter part of the colonial period, Shinto shrine worship, the ritual that the colonial government enforced upon all the schools, including mission schools, had become a controversial issue. It led to many internal tensions among missionaries, who were divided on the question of how to respond toward the colonial policy. Underwood argued that mission schools should follow the government policy on Shinto worship rather than closing mission schools, so as to maintain Christian influence in the schools. After Underwood returned to the US under an exchange of prisoners of war deal, he cooperated with the US military information agencies in providing Korea-related information. When the war ended, he became an influential advisor to General Hodge and to Archer L. Lerch, the military governor in Korea. Through his influence, he introduced many Korean elites, mostly conservative Christians, to USAMGIK and facilitated the reestablishment of missionary activities. His activities illustrate not only the characteristics of the relation between USAMGIK and Korea, but also the human aspect of Korean-American relations at this time of transition and upheaval.

Keywords: Horace H. Underwood, Shinto Shrine Worship, Mission School, Chosen Christian College (Yŏnhŭi/Yonsei College), John R. Hodge, United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)

An Jong Chol (jan7009@snu.ac.kr) is HK Research Professor at the Center for Korean Studies, Inha University
Introduction

In the chaotic situation around August 1945 when Korea was in transition from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) to American military rule, Korea was relatively unknown among Western societies because it had been a Japanese colony for most of the twentieth century till then. The United States needed to find some experts on Korea at the outset of occupation. Therefore, the missionaries who had been working from the late nineteenth century onwards in Korea were conspicuous and highly useful to the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).

Although it was natural for the Christian missionaries to work closely with USAMGIK, it is surprising that scholars have not paid proper attention to such American advisors to USAMGIK. This is due to the policy-centered approach taken in most studies of Korean-American relations on the one hand and to the lack of consideration for the human dimension in Korean-American relations on the other. However, it has been argued that “psychological variables” can act “as mediators between the environment and human activity” while “mental frameworks can illuminate international decisions;” thus it is certainly relevant to take a look at the actors that helped shape international relations.

Horace H. Underwood (1890-1951), the subject of this study, was an influential person in USAMGIK who had served in one of the best higher educational institutions during the colonial period and was the top advisor for internal affairs to General John R. Hodge, the commander of USAMGIK, during the US Occupation Period (1945-1948). This article aims to illuminate the human dimensions of the Korean-American relations by taking a closer look at the role played by Underwood during this period of transition.

Missionaries and Colonial Korea

The first American protestant missionary, Horace N. Allen, arrived in Korea in


September 1884. From that time until 1910, the Korean political situation was very insecure as Japanese influence increased, finally resulting in Korea becoming a Japanese colony. Nevertheless, because Japan had to pay close attention to Western powers as it tried to strengthen its grip on Korea, Japan guaranteed missionary activities to some extent. During the colonial period, therefore, most mission stations contained a church, school, and hospital in one compound, an enclosed area that was called the “Empire within an Empire” according to one American missionary. Missionaries in Korea were able to preserve their own middle-class life pattern in Korea though Korea was remote from their countries. These middle class values also influenced Korean churches.

No foreign family in Korea can compare with the Underwoods in terms of the degree of their influence over Korean Christianity and modern Korean history. Horace G. Underwood (1859-1916) came to Korea in 1885 and actively participated in Christian evangelism. His parents had immigrated to the East Coast of the United States from Great Britain in the 1870s. His brother John T. Underwood established the Underwood Typewriter Company, which became a huge business success; this allowed him to become an important member of the Board of Trustees at the Foreign Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the USA (Northern Presbyterian, PCUSA), which resulted in large financial contributions to Yŏnhūi College (Chosen Christian College; CCC).

---

3. For a brief survey of the relation between the Korean protestant church and society from the late 19th century to the present in English, refer to Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003).


5. Chung-shin Park is right in noting that in the 1920s after the March First Movement in 1919, the Korean church became fully institutionalized so that it had to compete with other organizations. See his Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 148-157.

6. Most missionaries made Korean names following a Korean sound similar to their original names. The Korean name of Horace G. Underwood is Wŏn Tu’u (元杜尤).


8. John T. Underwood donated huge sums of money to the Chosun [Chosen] Mission, including Yŏnhūi College. The relation of the Underwood family to the East Coast explains the fact that
Horace G. Underwood not only actively practiced evangelism by establishing Sae’ munan Church, teaching the Bible, translating the Bible into Korean, and organizing an ecumenical movement. He also established Christian schools such as Kyŏngsin School and CCC. The former activities resulted in him being called the “father of Korean Modern Evangelism”9 and the latter has been judged to have “laid the systematic foundations of Korean Christian Institutions.”10 He also had a very close friendship with King Kojong (r. 1864-1907) and Queen Min. As for the mission education, it is noteworthy that he persuaded other colleagues, in spite of severe opposition to his plan, to found the CCC in 1915, the school where his descendants worked until recently. The colonial government limited education opportunities for Koreans, making mission education all the more important for Koreans during the colonial period.

His son, Horace H. Underwood (1890-1951), the focus of this paper, became a professor in 1912, vice principal in 1928, and principal in 1934 at the CCC.11 Since 1928, when he was selected as a legal “founder”12 in Kyŏngsin Boys’ and Chŏngsin Girls’ School, both Presbyterian middle schools, Underwood13 was able to exert great influence upon educational institutions. His Ph.D. from New York University in 1926 gave him the necessary credentials and authority to take charge of these educational institutions. In the CCC, he supported research on Korea among the faculty members, a policy that contributed to Korean Studies during the colonial period.14 He was known as “one of the best informed of all Occidentals on Korean educational

most Underwood family members received their education and spent holidays in that area such as Cape Cod. It also implies that their theological position would be susceptible to “modernism” in the 1920s. Michael J. Devine, ed., Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections of Horace G. Underwood (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 55-57.


10. Yi Manyŏl, “So’n’gyosa Ōndōudū ū ch’ogi hwaltong e kwanhan yŏn’gu” [Studies on early activities of the missionary Underwood], Han’guk Kidokkyo wa yoŏksa [Korean Christianity and history] 14 (February 2001), 36.


12. Japanese law required each school to designate a “founder” with the purpose of controlling the educational system.

13. To avoid confusion, “Underwood” will refer to Horace H. Underwood (1890-1951), the main focus of this study, only. All other members of the Underwood family will be identified by their first name, initials, and family name.

14. He supported George L. Paik, Choe Hyŏnbae, Chŏng Inbo, and Paek Namun, to name but a few. Son, Wŏn Hangyŏng ū sam kwa kyoyuk sasang, 307-368.
conditions in the [colonial] period” among US personnel in Korea.15

Considering his contribution to Korean middle and higher education and the study of Korea, his life has attracted surprisingly little academic interest. Except for some books published by Yonsei University, no serious academic work using primary sources has yet been published.16 This article aims to show how one of the representative missionary-educators in Korea became involved in Korean affairs through wartime cooperation with the US government and as a postwar advisor to the American Military regime.

Shinto Shrine Worship, Mission Education, and Horace H. Underwood

Mission education started in the late Chosŏn dynasty when king Kojong asked the US Minister to Korea to send Americans to teach at royal institutions in 1883, an invitation that resulted in the arrival of three American missionaries: Dalzel A. Bunker, Homer B. Hulbert, and George W. Gilmore. Mission education commenced with the teaching of these missionaries and continued into the colonial period. It is estimated that mission education comprised 40% of the entire colonial education.17

The prospects of mission education were bright after the March First Movement in 1919, since the colonial government permitted religious teaching in the regular school curriculum, something which had been prohibited


17. No Ch’ijun, “Ilcheha Hŏng’guk Changno Kyohoe ch’ongg’yoe t’ae han yŏn’gu” [A study on the statistics of the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian church during the Japanese occupation], in Han’guk Sahoesa Yon’g’uhoe, Hyŏndae Hŏng’guk ŭ chongg’yoe wa saboe [Contemporary Korean religion and society] (Seoul: Munhak kwa Chisŏngsa, 1992), 84-90.
through the Private School Regulation in 1915. Before the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910, the PCUSA, the largest mission group in colonial Korea, had already set up eight middle schools, of which seven received governmental approval up to the mid-1930s. The PCUSA also participated in the co-management of CCC and Severance Medical College together with other mission denominations. Therefore, the mission school-related issues developed in a context of Japanese-American tensions.

In the 1930s, as the Japanese Army expanded into Manchuria, the Japanese Empire that now encompassed not only the Korean peninsula but Manchuria as well, had to gradually mobilize and accustom its nationals to the necessary military atmosphere, for which Shinto shrine worship was a convenient tool. The Japanese Army and ex-Veteran’s Association pressed the colonial Korean government to force Shinto worship upon all the schools, including the mission schools. Since more than half the Korean Christians resided in the Northwestern area near to Manchuria, the new policy was naturally primarily targeted at the Northwest, especially the P’yŏngyang area.

Traditionally, Korean Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, considered paying homage to Japanese Shinto shrine to be an act of sacrilege. This triggered much debate among missionaries and their Korean counterparts about the religious aspects of this controversy. Many, if not most, Korean Christians were persecuted over this issue. Consequently, the Korean Christians and American missionaries who publicly supported Japanese worship as a patriotic ritual were criticized as religious apostates and Japanese collaborators. Due to the pro-American nature of post-1945 South Korean politics, no criticism was raised against the American missionaries who had at least supported, or at most acknowledged, the Shinto worship.

Besides the debate over whether Shinto worship was a religious activity, the missionary decision to withdraw from secular education altogether triggered much debate and opposition among Koreans. Before the issue arose in late 1935, the Chosen Mission of PCUSA was at first cautious, trying to avoid outright confrontation with the colonial government. With the Japanese enforcement of Shinto worship upon the mission schools, the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission at first “advised the principals of The P’yŏngyang [sic] Schools to obey the order of the Government” in September

12, 1934 in order to watch the procedure of the mandated worship ceremony.\textsuperscript{19}

Japan gradually developed a hawkish policy toward Manchuria and China in the mid-1930s. In September 1935, the Japanese colonial government decided to enforce Shinto worship upon all the schools in Korea. This decision induced a collision with the P'yo˘ngyang missionary community when the South P'yo˘ngan Province governor demanded that the missionary principals such as George S. McCune and Velma L. Snook accept the worship.\textsuperscript{20}

The rationale for opposing Shinto worship among the conservative missionaries was well epitomized in McCune's letter to the Southern P'yo˘ngan Governor just before he was fired from Soongsil middle school and College.

I greatly regret the necessity of informing your Excellency that (1) because these ceremonies held at Shrines dedicated as they are and conducted as they are, seem to me to contain definite religious significance; (2) because large portions of the populace believe that Spirits are actually worshiped there; (3) because Christians believe ancestor worship, as distinguished from filial piety, is a sin against God and (4) because I also believe such to be forbidden to Christians by the Word of God (The Bible), I am therefore as an individual unable conscientiously to perform the act which you have requested of me as a School principal.\textsuperscript{21}

As McCune interpreted this particular Japanese ceremony as religious idolatry, he opposed the Japanese order on conscientious grounds.\textsuperscript{22}

Japanese policy brought discord within the missionary community in Korea. A minority of the missionaries believed that the management of educational institutions should be continued regardless of the religious aspect in the Shinto worship while the majority firmly averred that mission education was not compatible with the heathen practice of Shintoism. In addition, the two missionary groups had their allies among Koreans. Considering the paucity of educational institutions under the colonial system, many Koreans

\textsuperscript{19} “Minutes and Reports of the Chosen Mission, 1935,” 27.

\textsuperscript{20} Wi Jo Kang, “Church and State Relations in the Japanese Colonial Period,” in Robert E. Buswell Jr. and Timothy S. Lee eds., \textit{Christianity in Korea} (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 107-110; Han'guk Kidokkyo Yûksa Yôn'guso, \textit{Han'guk Kidokkyo üi yûksa} [History of Korean Christianity] II (Seoul: Kidokkyomunsa, 1990), 288-301.

\textsuperscript{21} McCune to H. N. Yasutake, January 18, 1936, RG 140-12-15, Presbyterian Church in the USA. Board of Foreign Missions, \textit{Korea Mission Reports 1911-1954}. Department of History, Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania [hereafter \textit{PCUSA}].

\textsuperscript{22} Interestingly, his son George M. McCune became a chief at the Korea Section, Department of State, at the end of World War II. George M. McCune criticized John Hodge's handling of Korean affairs. See Jong Chol An, “Making Korea Distinct: George M. McCune and His Korean Studies,” \textit{Seoul Journal of Korean Studies}, 17 (2004), 167-169.
thought that educational institutions should not be closed at any cost. Since the colonial government had the final authority to grant a charter to schools, the Koreans worried whether non-missionary founders would easily acquire the charter for the new schools.

Underwood represented the “minority” and argued that the educational institutions must be continued in the interest of Christian evangelism. This would guarantee an amicable relationship with the Japanese colonial government while simultaneously supporting the Korean aspiration of preserving educational charters. Underwood’s position on this issue may have come from his long experience in educational work, dating back to 1912.

Just after Underwood, then Principal at CCC, heard of McCune’s sacking from the principal position, he found out that the Chosen Mission was about to take the drastic step of withdrawing from secular education. Consequently, he tried to persuade the PCUSA Board of Foreign Mission not to accept the hawkish majority group in the Chosen Mission. In his letter, Underwood focused on the fact that the “[Japanese] government has steadfastly claimed that this is not a religion and that the ceremonies are not of the nature of worship but that they indicate respect for the glories and benefits of the past and are purely for the inculcation of patriotism.” As a corollary, a different opinion about the ceremony was “certainly possible” to him since both Japanese and occidental scholars differed over this issue.

Underwood presented three possible positions in this dispute: outright rejection of attending the ceremony (the position held by the majority of missionaries), acceptance of the Japanese government’s explanation at face value (an unacceptable position to most missionaries), and accepting the Japanese government’s position “to the extent that it covers the actions performed by the officials themselves,” rather than defining the missionaries’ “behavior.” In favoring this last position as the most realistic, Underwood argued that although ceremonies contained many religious elements, people could attend the ceremonies except “anything which would constitute taking a real part in these ceremonies.” He added that people can “stand, sit, remove their hats, salute or bow entirely according to the dictates of courtesy and without any religious implications.”

23. For this point, see Horace H. Underwood, “Render unto Caesar the Things That Are Caesar’s” in “The Korean Shrine Question: A Debate-Condensed from The Presbyterian Tribune,” World Christianity (March 1938), 73-76.
24. H. H. Underwood to Cleland B. McAfee, February 5, 1936, RG 140-12-16, PCUSA, 2.
25. Ibid., 3.
when no ceremony is going on, the students line up facing the shrine, one of their own teachers gives the command, they bow and are dismissed. Nothing more than attendance and a bow are required.”

This is quite different from later historians’ position that Underwood simply accepted Shinto worship in order to save schools and to continue Christian education in Korea. Rather, Underwood supported conditional acceptance of Shinto worship ceremony.

In the end, the Shinto issue forced the mission’s withdrawal from the “secular” education institutions. Underwood tried to block the majority move in the Chosen Mission’s Annual Meeting when the latter eventually decided to withdraw from “secular” education in 1938. He hated to abandon the education enterprise, especially CCC and Kyōngsin boy’s school. Therefore, he vehemently continued to prevent the Board of Foreign Missions from accepting the Chosen Mission’s decision. When the end of mission education in Korea, including CCC, approached, Underwood argued in a journal issued by the Federal Council of Evangelical Missions in Korea that “It is our aim therefore to fulfill loyally the functions of an institution training citizens of the [Japanese] Empire. Our Christian principles and character are known to all and are guaranteed in the Charter graciously granted by the Government General.” Finally, however, the schools that he had loved so much were delivered to the Korean Christians just before the Pacific War broke out.

27. This is particularly the case in Korean literature on this topic. See Han’guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Yŏn’guso, Han’guk Kidokkyo ū yŏksa II, 296.
29. For the school transfer processes in P’yŏngyang, refer to An Chongch’ŏl [An Jong Chol], “Chung-II ch’ŏnjaeng palpal chŏnhu shinsa ch’ambae munje wa P’yŏngyang ū ki dokkyogyeye chungdŭg hakkyo ū tonghyang [Shinto Shrine issue and P’yŏngyang Mission School’s response around the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War],” Han’guk munhwa 48 (2009); for Seoul schools, see Pak Hyejin, “Sŏul chiyŏk Mi pukchangnohoe sŏn’gyobu ū kyŏyuk saŏp ch’ŏlsu wa hakkyo in’gye yŏn’gu: Kyŏngsin hakkyo wa Chŏngsin yŏhakkyo rŭl chungsim uro [The withdrawal of educational ministry of the Northern Presbyterian Church in USA from Seoul and the transfer of schools: focused on Kyŏngsin School and Chŏngsin Girl’s School],” Han’guk Kidokkyo wa yŏksa 32 (2010).
The Pacific War and H. H. Underwood’s Wartime Cooperation

1. Cooperation with the US government

With the rise of tensions in the late 1930s, the US government decided to withdraw its nationals, mostly missionaries, from Asia in October 1940. Consequently, in November of the same year, most missionaries departed on board S. S. Mariposa. However, Underwood’s family, along with that of his son, Horace G. Underwood II, decided to stay in Korea, a decision that produced a division between those who left and those who remained. The extended Underwood family, which represented the remaining faction, assumed the position that while women and children had better return to the US, completely leaving the Korean peninsula meant abandoning the mission field. Underwood’s wife, Ethel, criticized those missionaries who justified their departure by condemning Korean leaders for “surrendering to Shinto worship” by seeing them as “apostates” they explained Japanese oppression as a form of punishment and therefore were justified in abandoning them. She pointed out, however, that these missionaries not only blamed the Korean faithful, but also “blocked [them] in every effort to separate patriotism [i.e., interpreting Shinto worship as simply an expression of patriotism towards Japan] from religion.”30 The remaining group, in addition to the consciousness of their duty, assumed that the present achievements in the Chosen Mission would be preserved in spite of the international tension. Many members accepted the Japanese definition of Shinto worship. On the other hand, the leaving faction judged that although the remaining missionaries had “sound reasons for staying,” the presence of the missionaries would jeopardize the safety of their Korean friends, while accomplishing nothing in Korea.31

Just after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Underwood family was detained by the Japanese authorities and only returned to the US in late May 1942 under an exchange of prisoners of war. The US State Department required returning missionaries to turn in reports about colonial Korea. Naturally, the State Department was eager to gain any information about the territory since it had received little intelligence after the war broke out.

30. Ethel Underwood to J. L. Hooper, November 15, 1940, PCUSA. Cited from Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, Conn.: EastBridge, 2003), 253.
The State Department reminded Joseph C. Grew, the representative of the returning US citizens, of five important questions they were required to answer.

1. The reaction among Koreans to the involvement of Japan in a war with powerful enemies.
2. The effect upon the Korean people of food and commodity controls and other war restrictions.
3. The effect of the war upon the attitude of the Japanese authorities toward the Korean population.
4. Information in regard to Korean nationalists.
5. Views in regard to the strength of the nationalist spirit and movement in Korea and to the readiness and capacity of the Koreans to engage in effective hostile activity against Japan.32

Responding to these demands, Underwood, along with other diplomats and missionaries, submitted his report, in which he noted that anti-Japanese consciousness was wide-spread in Korea, especially among middle school and college students, so that “a number of organizations exist with the object of seditious activity.”33 Even though wartime Japanese control over materials produced “bitterness” among Koreans, Underwood predicted that “strength as a real [anti-Japanese] movement is not great” due to tight Japanese control.34 His prediction about latent Korean “hostile activity” corresponded to the information contained in the other reports. His ideas did not change the State Department’s position on the non-recognition of the Korean Provisional Government at that time.

When he returned to the US and joined the PCUSA Board of Foreign Mission, he concentrated on church-related affairs even while continuing to attend the circular lectures on Japanese suppression of Korea, the lecture tours which were organized by a Korean national group in the US. Due to the recommendation of his friend, James E. Fisher, who at that time was a specialist on Korea, Japan and the Philippines with the Office of Strategic


34. Ibid., 3.
When Underwood worked at the Mission Board during the war, he suggested several ideas for post-war missions in Korea. Prior to working at the Board, he turned in a personal annual report covering the period 1940-1942, which contained his activities in Korea. Due to his diverse works at YMCA, Pierson Bible Institute, Chōngsin Girl’s school, Christian Literature Society, Seoul Foreign School, and the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, to name but a few, his report presented the last picture of the mission activities and property in Korea before the end of World War II.

In the report, while depicting his activities and wartime internment experience, Underwood predicted the post-war prospects for the Korea mission and presented some suggestions for the Mission Board to consider. He anticipated good opportunities for Christian missions since “there will be a large body of Korean Christians friendly to America and American missionaries and anxious for help, as well as a warm welcome from non-Christian Korean society.”38 Elaborating on that point, he argued that the


36. His exemplary interviews occurred on September 30, 1942, April 26, 1943, March 27 and 31, 1945 etc. For the information it was helpful that he had extensively travelled the whole Korea during the colonial period.


mission property in the Chosen Mission would be a starting point at which the Mission Board would launch its own works. Therefore, Underwood thought that the Mission Board had to decide who should return to Korea. The selection criteria should be “personal acceptability” and health. He recommended that a small team, including a woman and one medical doctor, investigate the post-war Korean situation followed by missionaries.39 He absolutely desired that his family should be included in the group.

His ideas were carefully followed in the mission policy toward Korea. Though the meaning of the word “acceptability” as he used it is not clear, it might indicate a requirement that missionaries would accept and be familiar with the Korean situation. He also argued that the Mission Board had to use the existing “pro-American and pro-Christian” attitude among Koreans to the utmost.40 This was very similar to the idea of his father, Horace G. Underwood, in that the boundary between American civilization and Christianity was blurred.41

Underwood spent his stay in the US as an officer at the Mission Board, becoming at one time “acting director” in charge of the Chosen Mission. He was even ordained as a pastor in March 1944.42 His works were possible thanks not only to his prestigious position at CCC, and but also thanks to the financial contribution of his uncle, John T. Underwood, to the Board.

US Military Occupation Period (1945-1948) and H. H. Underwood

1. Advisor to the American Military Government

North Presbyterian missionaries had diverse opinions pursuant to where they came from, where they were based, and the kind of work they did. The missionaries residing in the Northwestern regions of Korea, mostly from middle-class Midwest US families, adopted a conservative interpretation of the

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 13.
41. Ryu Taeyŏng, Kaehwa ki Chosŏn kuwa Miguk sŏnyŏgyosa: Chegukch'ūŭi ch'imnyak, kaehwa chagang, kuriigo Miguk sŏnyŏgyosa [Korea and American missionaries during the enlightenment period: imperial aggression, enlightenment self-strengthening, and American missionaries] (Seoul: Han'guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Yŏn'guso, 2004), 305-306
42. J. Ernest Fisher, Pioneers of Modern Korea, 270.
Bible and preserved a critical position toward the colonial government in religious issues such as government prohibition on religious education in the 1910s and Shinto shrine worship in the 1930s. However, they did not oppose the colonial authorities per se. On the other hand, the intense sensitivity of the Seoul missionaries to colonial power and Korean educational fever compelled them to try to find a balance between these often competing forces. These missionaries shared common ground with US Consulate officers in that they tried to cooperate with the colonial government in the government control of religious education in the 1910s and over the Shinto shrine issue in the 1930s.43

Underwood was typical of the Seoul missionaries in arguing that the Shinto shrine worship was a patriotic gesture and that the missionaries had to cooperate with the Japanese authorities. After Korea had been liberated from Japan, Underwood’s most prominent political stance was his support for the anti-communist policy of USAMGIK. Serving the US-USSR Joint Commission as an aide to Archibald V. Arnold, US chief delegate to the Commission and later Military Governor in the USAMGIK, he sent a letter to the PCUSA Board of Foreign Mission in May 1946 that was highly critical of the USSR as shown in the following excerpt.

The situation here is exasperatingly dark. It might be very bright if the Russians were out of the picture or if they showed at least a desire to cooperate for the benefit of Korea. Their aim is territorial aggrandizement and exploitation carried out with the same ruthlessness that enabled them to starve to death several missions of their own people. . . . Pastors are in jail.44

What an early cold war warrior! He did not change his estimation regarding Russians. When the Korean War broke out, Underwood argued that the war is not a “civil war” due to the “iron rule that Moscow maintains over its satellites.”45 USAMGIK had different ideas from the State Department regarding the Joint Commission and later opposed any cooperation with the Soviet Union. Underwood also adopted this position, which was developed in

43. For example, during the 1910s disputes over Japanese exclusion of religious education from the regular curriculum, the Northwestern Presbyterian missionary Charles E. Sharp criticized Japanese policy in arguing that the colonial policy was analogous to that of Roman Empire in the first century. However, Edwin W. Koons in Seoul supported the Japanese educational policy. To this opinion, Consul General, Ransford Miller concurred. Yi Sŏngjŏn, Amerikajin senkyōshi to Chōsen no kindai [American missionaries and modern Korea] (Tokyo: Shakai heironsha, 2006), pp. 107-114.

44. Horace H. Underwood to J. L. Hooper, May 1, 1946, RG 140-18-. PCUSA.

the course of exchanges with American military officers, and his views way have influenced the many Korea conservatives he introduced to USAMGIK.

Underwood played a key role in introducing a US-based educational system into the Educational Bureau (Department of Education since March 1946) as a chief advisor to the Minister, Yu Uck-kyum [Yu Ōkkyōm], who had been a Vice Principal during the 1930s at CCC, when Underwood was principal. Among those who were involved in the education policy, the highest officials, such as Yu and George L. Paik were all from CCC. In the department, Underwood was able to recommend important figures such as Yu and Paik and establish the American Language Institute.46 The most important idea in the education policy was the instigation of compulsory primary education for Koreans since he believed that primary education was pivotal in laying the social foundation for democracy in new Korea. He supported the “6 (elementary)-3 (middle)-3 (high)-4 (university)” educational timeline based upon the American system, instead of the complicated Japanese system such as 6-5-3 or 6-5-4.47

The Korean local administrations, according to Underwood, should “be urged to give immediate attention to the desirability of creating school districts with local taxation and local control through school boards” for primary education. He also supported the “largest amount of decentralization” in secondary education, although he also acknowledged the need for government funding for education.48 He noted the urgency of securing a sufficient number of teachers because the Japanese, who had comprised one third and two thirds of the primary and secondary teachers, respectively, had all returned to Japan.49 Therefore, he opposed the expulsion of Koreans who had served the Japanese in the educational arena. In light of the urgent need to reestablish the

47. “Education in South Korea,” summarized by Horace H. Underwood to Troops Information Program, June 1947 (http://e-archives.snu.ac.kr). This compulsory education was only realized during the Korean War. See Seki Eiko, “Mi kunjōng ha e issōsō Han’gukin ū kyoyuk chaegōn noryōk” [Korean endeavors to reestablish educational system under the US. Military Government], Abe Hiroshi ed., Haebang hu Han’guk ū kyoyuk kaehyōk (Seoul: Han’guk yōn’guwōn, 1987), 91-92.
49. Ibid., 1-2.
educational institutions, he agreed to the Department of Education’s policy of forbidding students from joining political demonstrations. However, Underwood’s ideas were not realized during the USAMGIK period. For example, the Korean Council on Educational Aid from America, which was advised by H. Merrell Beninghoff, a State Department official, and Underwood, suggested to the first Military Governor, Archer L. Lerch, an educational aid program including visits to Korea by US educational experts, study abroad programs for Korean teachers and students, and extensive aid program. Up to the summer of 1947, however, the USAMGIK did not show much zeal in directing funding at educational projects. This contrasted starkly with the US policy toward Japan where the US educational delegation had already come to Japan in March 1946 for Japanese democratization in education. Therefore, Underwood and his Korean counterparts fully achieved their own agendas such as 6-3-3-4 educational system and study-abroad program etc. only after the Korean War.

Though his grand design in the Education Department met with some obstacles, Underwood precipitated the CCC’s advancement to a university. As special committee members, Yi Myo-mook [Yi Myomuk], Paik, and Educational Minister Yu decided to elevate the status from college to university on October 6, 1945. Underwood was elected as a Board of Trustees member so that he could send letters to the US in order to secure funds for higher education. For the rebuilding and for advancing the status of the institution, he resigned from his position of advisor in the Education Department in order to return to the college in October 1947. With Underwood’s efforts, the Yŏnhŭi University (former CCC) became “probably the only institution in south [sic] Korea that is not in debt” with Paik as President.

52. Abe Hiroshi, “Mi kunjŏnggi e issŏsŏ Miguk ŭ taehan kyouyuk chŏngch’ae” (US educational policy in Korea under the US Military Government), Abe Hiroshi, ed. Haebang bu Han’guk ŭ kyouyuk kaehyŏk, 21-32.
55. J. Ernest Fisher, Pioneers of Modern Korea, 272.
At this time Underwood’s son, Horace G. Underwood II, was also involved in Korean educational work under the USAMGIK and later within Yŏnhūi (renamed Yonsei in 1957) University management. His assessment of colonial education and post-war educational policy was very similar to his father’s ideas. It is worthwhile here to examine Underwood’s ideas:

The Japanese faculty were all repatriated after the war, and, because most of the university faculty during the war were Japanese, there was an immediate shortage of qualified people. A large number of chunmun hakkyo teachers were moved up to the university level and brought into the system almost overnight. These were by and large very good people; however, they had all cooperated during the occupation with the Japanese. One could not hold any position during the occupation without cooperating to some extent. 

Though this is a generous evaluation of the “pro-Japanese” in education, it does not mean that they had any sympathy with Japanese colonial rule. Underwood thought that the colonial “benefits were purely incidental” since they were not undertaken “for Koreans” so that the colonial education was “designed to make of the people better servants of their Japanese masters.”

The Japanese colonial policy in Korea “forced upon every Korean the habit of hypocrisy, which is not too easily to be eradicated.” In post-war Korea, according to him “the ghost of Japanese rule” was an obstacle to Korea.

Following Underwood’s assessment of the Korean educational situation, his son also noted that during the colonial period, less than 25% of the twenty million citizens had “any formal education” and “far less than 1%” had college-level education. In addition, infrastructure such as railroads, running water and paved roads were limited, although it had been markedly expanded during the colonial period. They were “overshadowed by [the] harsh realities of the Japanese repression.”

Expanding his educational experience and attributing social turmoil to Japanese wrongdoings, Underwood opposed the punishment of “pro-Japanese” educators, an idea that was accepted by the Military Government.

Since he was influential in the Military Government, his evaluation of

57. Michael J. Devine, ed., Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 106.
60. Michael J. Devine, ed., Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 67, 104.
Korean politicians was very critical to the American military government in Korea. In evaluating the four most influential leaders, Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, Yŏ Un-hyŏng, and Kim Kyu-sik, Underwood had negative images of three leaders except Syngman Rhee. According to H. G. Underwood II, his father, H. H. Underwood, estimated that Yŏ had “a very slippery character” while he did not “hold him [Kim Ku] in high regard” and doubted that Kim Kyu-sik was “strong enough or had the fire in the belly to hold down the position of president.” The implication was very clear in that Rhee was the only natural selection, despite being considered a “conservative, dictatorial tyrant with little vision beyond unifying the country.”61 H. G. Underwood II also supported his father’s evaluation.

It is no accident that the Korean elites who cooperated and worked with the USAMGIK retained similar views on Korean politics since they comprised many high officials from CCC who were recommended by Underwood. Yi Myo-mook’s view is typical in that he criticized the “middle-of-the-road” people and supported the right wing. He was Underwood’s colleague as a CCC faculty member during the colonial period and supported the Korean Democratic Party while he became Hodge’s personal aide and interpreter. Yi did not believe that the Korean issue would be solved through a coalition movement of left and right.62 Through Underwood and Yi, many like-minded Korean elites were recruited into the US military government, where they in turn helped to turn these ideas into the dominant view.

2. Missionary Activities in the US Occupation Period

After World War II, missionary activities reopened with an influx of money for schools, hospitals, and Christian activities. Since Underwood was in a high position in USAMGIK, his role for the Presbyterian missionary organization was also very serious, particularly because the Mission Board had difficulty in predicting when the missionaries would return to South Korea, one of the biggest mission fields. A missionary return was possible only if USAMGIK permitted non-military personnel to enter Korea. Therefore, Underwood was pivotal in persuading high officials in USAMGIK to invite missionaries to the

61. Ibid., 125-126.

American military government. Due to the shortage of accommodation and high inflationary economy, civilians waited for better conditions. With the decreased personnel in the strategic army and the improving economic situation, a propitious situation unfolded over time.

General Hodge was especially lenient toward missionary groups since he had to rely upon missionary advice about Korea due to his lack of information. The following passage shows how he viewed missionaries and their roles.

We operate more or less without precedent, without too many directives to tell us just what to do or how to do it. We are on our own. All of us are missionaries when you come right down to it. We are missionaries to a less fortunate nation where we have an opportunity to do tremendous good, to offer and give tremendous assistance in advice, example in meeting conditions, helping the people meet conditions. We have among us an important and growing missionary community. Those people are a vast source of information for us if we choose to take it. I advise all of you to learn as much about Korea from those people who have lived in Korea as you possibly can.63

Keeping pace with Hodge’s ideas, Underwood reported to the Mission Board saying that Hodge had a positive image of missionaries, implicitly praising his role.

The attitude of the high command here is both friendly and favorable toward missionaries and Christian work. It should be when they find that their heads of bureaus, provincial governors and most trustworthy workers are (almost) all Christian and graduates of mission schools and colleges. People have called the present government the “Chosen Christian College government” because so many of our graduates are in positions of influence and authority.64

Taking into account that he may have exaggerated somewhat, Underwood shows how he worked with Hodge, and with Korean elites. He did not doubt the Christian leadership in USAMGIK and the new Korean government since “several hundred thousand Koreans in the church and many Korean organizations outside the churches” were able to study “something of democratic processes and of majority rule.”65 The boundary of his role as an advisor to General Hodge and a USAMGIK-hired missionary was blurred here.

His works are summarized as follows.

I have given some time to mission matters, in conference with Property Custodian, Gen Affairs Sect and with Gen. Hodge direct. I have also conferred with and attempted to assist, the Methodists, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists, Y. M. C. A. etc. These people come to me, because they know me and because I speak Korean, with every imaginable problem of Jap. Property for churches and schools, getting a M. E.[Methodist Episcopal] pastor out of jail etc. Because as a civilian I am not hampered by the military strait jacket of “channels” I can go right to the top if necessary and have on one or two occasions done so . . . .66

His role to help ecumenical or non-denominational Christian work was the same type of role as that previously played by his father. In response to Underwood’s urging, Hodge asked the State Department to send ten missionaries as soon as possible.67 With the delay of missionary return, he urged the Mission Board to “bring every possible influence to bear in Washington to hasten the return of the missionaries.”68 Underwood and his colleague John D. Bigger, medical advisor to USAMGIK, worked together in securing relief funding for Severance Hospital.69

Underwood became Administrator of Presbyterian Mission Properties under the supervision of the Property Custodian in the General Affairs Section of USAMGIK.70 His job was expanded to the management of former Japanese religious and school properties that were vested in USAMGIK. He endeavored to secure the former Chosen Mission property, the land where the strategic military stayed. Prior to the return of the missionaries, he had to report on the property situation.71 He worked in USAMGIK as both civilian worker and missionary.

His enthusiasm to take part in USAMGIK and later the Republic of Korea administration was undermined by the assassination of his wife. On March 17, 1949, his wife Ethel was killed by presumably left-wing young men when she was giving a tea party for faculty wives and other women at the Underwood

68. Horace H. Underwood to J. L. Hodge, March 15, 1946, RG 140-18-?, PCUSA.
69. For Severance issue, Horace H. Underwood to J. L. Hodge, March 1, 1946, 3; Horace H. Underwood to Dear Friends, March 12, 1946, RG 140-18-?, PCUSA, 2; “Board Action of April 2, 1946,” in J. L. Hooper to the Korea Mission, April 9, 1946, RG 140-2-28, PCUSA.
70. Horace H. Underwood to J. L. Hooper, March 15, 20, 1946, RG 140-18-?.
71. Horace H. Underwood to Dear Friends, March 12, 1946, 2.
home on the Yŏnhŭi College campus.\textsuperscript{72} After this incident, he noted to his friend, James E. Fisher that “we feel there is good reason to believe that direct orders for Ethel’s death came from P. Y. [P’yŏngyang], if not from Moscow.”\textsuperscript{73}

This tragedy broke Underwood’s enthusiasm and spirit, so that he decided to return to the US in early 1950. With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, he returned to Korea as a civilian under G-2 Military Intelligence. This time too Fisher urged his Colonel, Green, who was in charge of the Psychological Warfare Section under G-2, to invite Underwood.\textsuperscript{74} On the way to Korea and during his stay, Underwood prepared a manuscript for the American public, especially Christians, to inform them of the Korean situation, so that “The churches at home must awake to the magnificent example the church of Korea has set us in her day of agony and to hear her cry for help at this critical time.”\textsuperscript{75} However, the grief and disappointment to see his wife’s death and the outbreak of the Korean War put him under so much stress that he died of heart attack in February 1951.

Conclusion: Democracy and Christianity

In this article, I have reviewed the activities of Horace H. Underwood during the colonial, wartime and USAMGIK periods. These periods witnessed turmoil such as the end of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean division, and the American military regime. Through the management of two middle schools, one higher educational institution, and other Christian institutions in Seoul since the early colonial period, Underwood had more experience in Korea than almost any other foreigner, especially in the education field. During the colonial period, he firmly believed in the positive role to be played by mission education in modern Korean education, even though it was limited due to Japanese educational policy. During the Pacific War, he thought that the United States should expel Japanese militarism and establish democracy in Korea. Therefore, he ardently cooperated with the US government information agency in

\textsuperscript{72} Tonga ilbo [Tonga daily], March 23, 1949. The meeting was for Mo Yunsuk who was a poetess and returned from Europe as a member of the Korean delegation to UN.

\textsuperscript{73} This letter was written on April 17, 1949 and cited in J. Ernest Fisher, Pioneers of Modern Korea, 273.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 274.

\textsuperscript{75} This booklet is Tragedy and Faith in Korea. It was published just after Underwood died and forworded by John C. Smith, the Secretary for Korea at the Foreign Mission, PCUSA. The quotation can be found on p. 55 of the booklet.
providing extensive information about Korea.

After Korea was liberated, due to his prior experience in Korea, especially in the realm of education, his role was expanded into acting as an advisor to Hodge, the commander of USAMGIK, the Military Governor, and the Minister of Education in USAMGIK. He informed them of Korean history and the present situation, especially on Korean education. He did not have any qualms about his simultaneous roles as a government advisor and missionary because he, as an education missionary, thought that Christian education and social progress should be closely interconnected.76

Moreover, in the new atmosphere, he firmly believed that “spiritual victory” through Christianity would be more important than the material victory over Communism.77 On this basis, missionaries including Underwood eagerly justified their cooperation with USAMGIK and the newly born Korean government in waging the Korean War. Fortuitously, Underwood’s position shared many common points with Korean Christians, which enabled them to eagerly cooperate with the state within the context of their religious beliefs. However, the assassination of his wife and his comparatively early death show how difficult it was to achieve the Christian ideals and democracy in a new country that had experienced Japanese colonial rule and post-liberation turmoil.

---

76. Ibid., p. 27-28.
77. Ibid., p. 42.