Hiddink is Ḥuí Tonggu: Korean Nationality and the Global “Other” at the 2002 World Cup

Hong Sun-ha

Even more so than other mega-events, the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup was a critical moment for contemporary Korean nationality. Within South Korea, its iconic images of celebration and triumph have been widely interpreted as cathartic moments that restored confidence and pride in Korea’s national identity, redefining it for a new age of democracy and globalization. This article critically reviews the events of the 2002 World Cup and the Korean media coverage from the time, and argues that this positive narrative must be balanced by recognizing the major role played by the foreign ‘Other’. It suggests that the collective euphoria during the mega-event demonstrates a general discursive process wherein contemporary Korean nationality defines itself in relation to a collective imagination of the foreign, global “Other” – the “eyes of the world.” In particular, it focuses on the series of overlapping discursive inscriptions that produced Guus Hiddink, the Dutch manager of the Korean football team during the tournament, as simultaneously foreign and Koreanised. His case demonstrates how a constant and collectively imagined awareness of the foreign Other furnished the norms and standards through which Korean nationality could be defined and justified. Informed by Michel Foucault’s works on power and subjectivity, this article interprets these processes in terms of a “double-sided gaze,” in which the Korean imagination of the Other – in particular, the envied sŏnjin’guk – is inseparable from their understanding of the Self. It is a discursive paradigm which continues to shape Korea’s conception of itself and its place in the world today.

Keywords: Korean nationalism, globalization, media, World Cup, news discourse

Hong Sun-ha (sunha.hong@gmail.com) is a Doctoral Student at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania.
The 2002 football World Cup has emerged as a powerful symbolic moment in narratives of Korean nationality. The images of millions of Koreans pouring out into the streets to celebrate their nation have come to symbolize a sense of *arrival* – the validation and legitimisation of Korean nationality on the world stage. With a rare uniformity, the Korean government and media helped project a powerfully dominant narrative of catharsis and evolution. This directly addressed a generational question for Korean society – how is Korean nationalism and identity to position itself in relation to both a globalized world and a modernized Korea? The popular interpretation of the World Cup affirmed that Koreans could have confidence and pride in their own “Korean-ness.” Some of the most iconic phenomena during the 2002 World Cup, such as the “Red Devils” and the street supporters, were mobilized for this positive, internally oriented assertion of Korean nationality.1

Yet this dominant narrative must be viewed in context of another, equally influential discursive paradigm that underlay the entire event. Consistently throughout the mega-event, the foreign “Other” was a powerful symbolic presence that grounded discourses of Korean nationality, furnishing it with ideal norms and standards of value. Korean nationality does not exist in a vacuum: it is shaped through relationships of both inclusion and exclusion, and the affirmation of what it is is always accompanied by the rejection of what it is not – the Other as referent.2 During the 2002 World Cup, Koreans were acutely aware that the “eyes of the world” were watching. The government and media proclaimed the event an opportunity to advertise Korea to the world, and gave optimistic projections about its impact on Korea’s economy and reputation. The high-profile debates on the challenges of globalization in the mid-to-late 1990s had also contributed to a pervasive impression of Korean nationality on the world stage during the tournament.

The media was the primary contributor to this sense of the panoptic visibility of Korea. The Korean media deployed a coordinated strategy that framed the mega-event in terms of “branding” Korean nationality for the international community, accompanied by a constant fretting over external opinion that entailed a discursive invocation of a foreign gaze. Although this narrative aligned closely with the Korean government’s own policy goals, the latter’s efforts were generally judged bland and out of touch.3 Meanwhile, the media coverage

1. For example, many media commentators interpreted this as “moving beyond” the traditional rubric of anti-communism and anti-fascism towards an emancipated Korean nationality. See: Kang Chunman, *Ch’ukku niun Han’guk ida* [Korea is Soccer] (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang, 2006), 250-251.
3. As an indicator, official installations for street support set up by the government were largely ignored both by the media and the public; the official World Cup mascot and song, “Atmo” and
included texts that informed and entertained to varying degrees, all of which were clearly designed to inform and encourage Korean citizens to regard the World Cup as both a national celebration and a critical opportunity for national branding. These stories were so prioritized that at its peak, other stories such as the regional elections were pushed to the very margins. Individual broadcasters organized special production teams and editorial guidelines for World Cup coverage, and voluntarily produced and distributed foreign language pamphlets and other promotional material. This narrative strategy was remarkably consistent across media publications, and should be seen as the major factor behind the dominant interpretation of the 2002 World Cup as a cathartic moment of national evolution.

In this article, I suggest that this strategic and pervasive discursive output of the Korean media was a clear manifestation of a “double-sided gaze,” wherein Korean subjects were constantly made to gaze back at the foreign Other – or rather, an imaginary Other of their own making – in order to determine what was desirable and valuable for themselves. This imagined gaze worked to position Korea within a wider context of the global, giving the “Other” a critical position in the production of the Korean Self. This is part of a larger dynamic, where globalization does not displace or replace nationalities, but inflects their productive mechanisms.

In 2002, none exemplified this process better than Guus Hiddink, the Dutch manager of the Korean national football team. Guiding the team to extraordinary success during the tournament, Hiddink was canonized a Korean hero, and has remained an iconic figure long after his departure. To date, most interpretations of Hiddink – both popular and academic – remain positive, focusing on his identity as a Korean or “glocal” hero and his alleged contribution to a more multicultural Korean society. Such a perspective assumes a relatively

“Boom” respectively, were also forgotten in favour of fashion and songs from street supporters and commercial advertisements. See: Chu Kanghyŏn, Redu sindirom kwa Hidingk’u sinhwa [The Red Syndrome and the legend of Hiddink] (Seoul: Joongang M&B, 2002), 182.

4. Ibid.

5. See: Ha Yun’gŭm, 2002 Han-Il Wŏldiŭk’op pansong [Broadcasting in Korea-Japan World Cup] (Seoul: Han’guk pansong sinhŭngwŏn, 2002), 2-3, 63-64.

6. See: Kang, Ch’ukku nin Han’guk ida, 247.


painless procedure of hybridity both on the part of Hiddink and Korean society as a whole, and in some cases, uncritically supports the grand narrative of Korean evolution. In this article, the story of Hiddink is complicated through the notion of the double-sided gaze, and considered in terms of complex and often contradictory discourses that constituted him as a public figure.

In the following sections, I will first discuss what the idea of the “global” meant for the production of Korean nationality, and how the Korean idea of the sōnjin’guk, or “elite / advanced nation,” frames the deployment of the “double-sided gaze.” Afterwards, I will draw from a close reading of 931 print articles and 32 television programs from the period 9 to analyze the media coverage around Guus Hiddink. Based on this analysis, I will argue that the 2002 World Cup did not herald a new age of a global or multicultural Korea; rather, Hiddink was an axiomatic instantiation of the global inflection of the national, a negotiated process that will characterize Korea’s relationship to the foreign Other in the years to come.

Global and Globalization

This complex relationship was grounded in, and symptomatic of, a particular understanding of the “global.” The global refers to not only contemporary debates on globalization, but a constellation of non-Korean nationalities that act as the Other. Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup made use of a set of familiar discursive constructs to define the global, position Korean nationality in relation to the global, and produce ideal norms and subjective values.

The 2002 World Cup followed a tradition of modern mega-events, where host nations have increasingly treated them as opportunities to assess and recalibrate their reputation in the eyes of the world, and to mobilize extremely large audiences for national celebration.10 The liberal use of motifs from Mediterranean Sea myths in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics employed the same

---

9. The print media sample includes Chosun Ilbo and Donga Ilbo, two of Korea’s largest print media publications. Although access restrictions prevented the inclusion of Hankyoreh, the flagship liberal paper, media commentators at the time do not mention a significant divergence from the dominant narrative on their part.

logic as the Korean government’s designation of “Olympic food” in 1988, and the Chinese government’s programs to train its citizens in queuing for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. At the same time, other nationalities were often appropriated to produce a backdrop of national characteristics against which the host nationality could be positioned. For instance, one Donga-Ilbo article claimed that “African football teams heavily rely on magicians called ‘Ju ju men.’” That this framing was sourced from the LA Times is symptomatic of the generality of the practice, as is the fact that the CAF (Confederation of African Football) had attempted to ban these magicians in anticipation of precisely this kind of coverage. Such typical portraiture established a comparative taxonomy of nationalities whose relative flexibility could be used to position Korea in convenient ways. Korea’s sensitivity to this global gaze was not unfounded: in their study of American media coverage of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Larson and Park found that even though thirty-five years had passed since the armistice, the Korean War had remained the defining framework by which the country was presented. The Korean government and media’s high-level policy directives, special government committees, information campaigns and education programs were all part of a conscious effort to prevent such a branding failure. Throughout the 2002 World Cup, the media consistently promoted the belief that the world was watching Korea, and that Korea needed to impress those watching. The Korean nationality produced through this media coverage was a performance oriented towards a global Other.

This outward-looking gaze was also motivated by Korea’s complex relationship with globalization. By 2002, globalization was being regarded as both an opportunity for and a threat to Korean nationality. In the early 1990’s, Kim Young-Sam, Korea’s first democratically elected civilian president, had run on an election platform of “Creating a New Korea” (sin Han’guk ch’angjo), which eventually crystallized into the idea of globalization, or segyehwa, as an overarching strategy. This discourse of national transformation and evolution offered globalization as the best and only way forward for Korea. It argued

12. Larson and Park, Global Television, 204-5, 212-4.
that globalization was an inevitable historical process to which Korea had to adapt in order to prosper. The 1993 Taejön Expo, held in the first year of Kim’s term, demonstrated this explicit connection between globalization and progress both in its content and official discourse. This discourse retained its resonance into the 21st century, even as Kim’s own legacy was undermined by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

Globalization as an ideology, therefore, simultaneously dominated the local and was appropriated by it. Shin Gi-Wook claims that “most Koreans appear to see no inherent contradiction between nationalism and globalization. Rather, they seek to appropriate globalization for nationalist goals.” Shin argues that this appropriation has been motivated by a Social Darwinist belief that globalization presents an “evolutionary” challenge for nation-states that must be met. The hosting of the 2002 World Cup was articulated as such a challenge, but one caught in the tension between globalizing impetus and nationalism. On one hand, we find the Korean government and media voluntarily establishing “global” standards and proving grounds where the international community is invited to evaluate Korean nationality. This was exemplified by Korea’s effort to catch up with the West in football, a sport where the latter possesses a historical advantage. Ironically, it was Korea, not the West, that considered the sport as a barometer for Korea’s progress and status.

Yet at the same time, Korea’s performances and strategies in this foreign proving ground was shot through with a strong confidence in the quintessential value of Korean nationality. This discursive turn can also be found in Korea’s articulation of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and more generally, Korea’s deep-seated tendency to see itself as an underdog. Originating from a series of traumatic experiences including Japanese colonization, poverty, civil war and military dictatorship, it involved a defensive mentality and a constant urge to prove Korea’s legitimacy. During the 2002 World Cup, the Korean media touted the story of the national football team as underdogs, and a parallel tale of Korea as a small nation that could compete with the “best” in the world. This defiant mentality helped consolidate Korean ethno-nationalism in the face of globalizing discourses, adopting them as an opportunity for the export and validation of Korean nationality. Globalization and the global did not rest on a continuum of

subservience and appropriation, but functioned as an ideological framework for evaluation. In this sense, globalization was not something to be justified, but itself a justification for other decisions and arguments.

A Hierarchy of Nationality

Specifically, the media frequently invoked a particularly resonant signifier in contemporary Korea: that of the sŏnjin’guk. Loosely translated as “elite nation” or “advanced nation,” the term often serves as a point of reference and gold standard for national advancement in contemporary Korean society. Countries labelled as sŏnjin’guk are perceived as not just rich, but ‘advanced’ by standards such as civil liberties, economic strength and cultural influence. The media coverage of the 2002 World Cup was no exception; it invoked the sŏnjin’guk as a national goal for Korea in a typical manner.

There are many factors that will decide this World Cup’s success... In particular, Korea’s involvement will be very carefully compared against that of co-hosts Japan. It is crucial that this World Cup is used to make the world recognize very clearly that we are a sŏnjin’guk.  

In anticipation of the World Cup, this newspaper article suggested that Koreans could use the tournament to make the world at large recognize Korea as a sŏnjin’guk. Not only was the notion of sŏnjin’guk established as something to aspire to, the achievement of those aspirations was to be judged by external recognition. For this reason, the Korean media frequently reported on the way various sŏnjin’guk were talking about Korea during the tournament. Excerpts like the following were common:

A British daily, the Guardian, introduced Ahn Jung-Hwan (26, Perugia) as Korea’s leading player. Ahn was introduced 22nd in a feature called “Rising Stars,” which introduced players with the potential to catch the eyes of the world through this World Cup...  

19. These standards generally correspond to the Western ideal of liberal democracies and market capitalism, and again speak to the Western orientation in modern Korea’s conception of the Other.
21. “Yŏngguk sinmun, An Chŏnghwan ‘tŏorŭnnŭn ch’ukku sŭr’a’ 22e sogae” [British paper: Ahn...
In general, these media texts show how sŏnjin’guk were mobilized as supporting examples for particular arguments about Korean society, and how the legitimacy of these advanced nations in that role was foreclosed. This is an extension of the global inflection of nationalistic discourse. The constant reference to sŏnjin’guk bears similarities to the postcolonial gaze, wherein the “colonized” internalizes the perspective of the colonizer, and comes to perceive itself as inferior and in need of the colonizer’s civilization. The implicit and foreclosed acceptance of the sŏnjin standards renders the Korean a willing subject who actively works to fulfil the requirements set by those standards. On the other hand, the optimistic and even defiantly confident tone in the above excerpts suggests that there is more to this process than subordination. Korea is consistently depicted as a nation that is not inherently inferior to sŏnjin’guk, but one that can and will surpass sŏnjin’guk by their own standards – a nation whose potential merely awaits realization at the conclusion of this redemptive narrative. In fact, as the World Cup progressed and the Korean national team achieved remarkable success on the football pitch, the discursive role of sŏnjin’guk began to shift, and Korea began to be repositioned in subtle ways.

For instance, when the Italians expressed outrage at Korea’s controversial victory, the Korean media dismissed them as paranoid, bitter losers. One opinion column, headlined “Italy, take a look in the mirror,” exemplified this patronizing attitude: discussing the Italian club Perugia’s threat to terminate Korean player Ahn Jung-Hwan’s contract, it argued that Ahn should leave Perugia voluntarily and move on to a “bigger stage,” implying that Italy was no longer a football sŏnjin’guk.22 Korea’s victory over a sŏnjin’guk was thus used to reposition Korea, leading to more confident and bullish coverage for the latter stages of the tournament.23 Such a discourse of confident assertion presaged a longer-term effect that the 2002 World Cup would have in the collective imagination of nationality.

The sŏnjin’guk is therefore part of a graduated field of nationalities, a hierarchic grid wherein each nationality and each national characteristic is imbued with a given level of capital. Such processes of gradation and valuation stretched across all nationalities, so that they would serve as a global backdrop against which Korean nationality could be positioned. Relationships with other Asian nations, for instance, were strongly inflected by a belief in Korea as a regional leader.

Jung-Hwan is 22nd on ‘Rising Stars’], Chosun Ilbo, 31 May 2002.
22. “It’alla ya chasin uł torabora” [Italy, take a look in the mirror], Chosun Ilbo, 22 June 2002.
23. See: “T’aegük chŏnsadul ‘urin kanger’im... 8gang do munje opta” [T’aegük Warriors: ‘We are strong – we can make the quarter-finals’], Donga Ilbo, 16 June 2002.
The Double-Sided Gaze

The inflection of the “global” produced a Korean nationality that was highly performative, mediatized, and founded on an impression of panoptic visibility. It was encapsulated by a basic but powerful mantra repeated by the Korean media – “the world is watching us.” One of the recurring images from the period was a typically “colonial” one, wherein a foreign (white) journalist trains his camera on the Korean masses. “Vision itself became a kind of discipline,” wherein the Korean host imagined and spoke into being a visitor-inspector whose existence exhorted Koreans to performances of nationality, and whose standards and judgments were projected onto this figure of the Other by the hosts themselves. The hierarchy of nationalities served as a backdrop for this projection of the Other; the projection also doubled back on the Koreans as the panoptic figure, motivating particular performances of their own nationality.

One of the most prominent and explicit ways in which this disciplinary power was enacted was in the discourse of hospitality. During the World Cup, the Korean press demonstrated unusual levels of directness by exhorting its citizens to improve their behavior for the event and to be good hosts. The chief motivation was to improve Korea’s standing in the eyes of the world – a goal built on the assumption that Korea would benefit from meeting ‘global’ standards, and that doing so would help the nation “go forward.”

As we prepare the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, what might foreigners be thinking about our country? ... I think it will be a unique opportunity to show Korea’s transformation and the way Korea really is. By demonstrating a friendly and orderly civic mentality, the public can spread the image of a Korea that one would want to visit again, a Korea that leads the new information age.

In contrast to what Koreans might have hoped, foreigners’ images of Korea were often negative, such as that it is a “divided country” or “a country with unstable economy and politics”... But the Korea-Japan World Cup is providing an opportunity to change this. Journalists and expatriates all over the world are saying that the World Cup is the first time there’s been so much positive news about

In such articles, the question “what do others think of us?” frames the entire discussion. A problem is identified (Korea’s current image), a solution provided, and a call for action made (public order and etiquette). The majority of the media coverage involving national image adhered to this general format, and conceptualized hospitality as a test for the Korean nation. This discourse was consciously produced by the media and other institutional sources - primarily academia and the government. It was grounded in the idea of the global and the implicit normality of Western civil society – with the sŏnjin’guk the ideal:

The difference between a sŏnjin’guk and a hujin’guk [primitive, backward nation] can be one of economic or military power, but the most important standard is that of civic responsibility. It is expressed through manners and refinement, which are most visibly represented through what might be called “basic public order.” “Say sorry when you bump into someone,” “no spitting in the streets,” and “keep the noise down in restaurants” – putting just these three things into practice can upgrade Korea to another level.

Deviations from this ideal were labeled “backward,” establishing a graduated field of normality and obliging the Korean subject to aspire towards the standards of a sŏnjin’guk (in this case, public order and social etiquette). This imagination of the Western, sŏnjin Other again articulates the tension between an ideological belief in globalization and ethnic nationalism as a form of passionate attachment. Rather than attempting to justify Korea’s own cultural practices of hospitality (which, in fact, might favor a noisy, bustling restaurant), the standards were set against the Korean imagination of sŏnjin’guk. In essence, the Koreans were being asked to internalize an imaginary gaze positioned at an external origin.

That a process of collective imagination was involved did not make the idea any less real or effective. The media constantly communicated a sense of visibility and external surveillance; while it would not have been internalised completely, this awareness undoubtedly contributed to heightened efforts on the part of Koreans to act hospitably. Thus, “it is too naïve to regard the cleaning process as a proof of increasing social consciousness or civic ethics in South Korea. By promoting and participating in the street cleanings, citizens embodied a nationalism that was

27. “Kukka imiji ŏpkiireidii” [Upgrading our national image], Donga Ilbo, 29 June 2002.
28. “Segaji manirado chik’ija” [Let’s keep at least these 3 rules], Chosun Ilbo, 01 June 2002. Another example is the “Bright Smile Movement” that held public sessions educating Koreans on how to smile at strangers.
symbolic with their global desires and disciplined by the global gaze." Media discourses of national image, national progress and the World Cup as a global festival therefore looked both inward, to pre-existing conceptions of Korean nationality, and outward, to projected standards of sŏnjin’guk and discourses of globalization. Through this process, it engendered a passionate attachment to Korean nationality and formulated matrices of normativity which induced the Korean subject’s desire to perform and promote Korean nationality.

To summarize, the double-sided gaze performed the following functions in the media discourse of the 2002 World Cup. Firstly, it looked to an internal system of values and phenomena to assert that the Korean “Self” was valid, valuable and normal, but relied on standards derived from the “Other” to justify this assertion. Secondly, the Self’s relationship with the foreign Other was simultaneously aggressive – establishing the validity and superiority of the Korean “Us” through unfavorable comparisons – and self-deprecating, recognizing the sŏnjin Other as the standard to be met. The gaze therefore mobilizes the Other in such a way that Korean nationality in the present is justified, and a narrative of progress oriented around an ideal Korea is presented. Finally, the media constructed a collective imaginary of the “Other,” a Baudrillian simulacrum that is more “real” than the real Other. There were undoubtedly direct contributions from foreign sources regarding impressions of Korea, but Korean media discourse of the Other far superseded this “primary evidence.”

Hiddink, the Foreigner

The cult of worship around Guus Hiddink, the manager of the Korean national football team, was one of the key features in Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup. For months, he was hounded by doubt, and occasionally, active vilification as a foreigner who failed to understand Korea and the Korean team. Yet by the end of the tournament, that foreignness had been radically transformed to inscribe him as a champion of Korean values. The trajectory of Guus Hiddink

32. While there was some direct reporting of foreigners’ impressions or coverage on Korea and the World Cup, most references were indirect and speculative – based more often on “what they must be saying about us.”
as a public figure is perhaps the most telling example of the double-sided gaze.

In January 2001, Guus Hiddink became the third foreigner to manage the South Korean national football team, after the short-lived, unsuccessful tenures of Dettmar Cramer and Anatoliy Byshovets in the 1990s. Despite Hiddink’s good reputation, this was a risky appointment. The Korean team had a track record of a “revolving door of coaches,” and Hiddink’s foreignness made him an even likelier scapegoat for failure. The first few months of Hiddink’s reign indeed appeared to follow such a pattern, as the Korean team succumbed to two humiliating 5-0 defeats against France and the Czech Republic in May and August 2001. Journalists later recounted that from then on, “Hiddink and his team begin to tread a thorny path.” Hiddink was christened odaeyŏng, which means “five-nil,” but can also be read as a typical Korean name (O Taeyŏng). Following the two defeats, a current affairs program held a debate titled “Team Hiddink: Is This OK?” The program opened by assuring the viewers that it was not out to blame Hiddink for the loss:

Host: “I’d like to begin by assuring you that this [blaming Hiddink] is not the case at all. We are here today to discuss... what we – the football association, Hiddink, the players, the public – can do in the remaining time to get a good result at the World Cup...”

Despite these pre-emptive caveats, the program’s intentions were clear. The provocative program title was followed by a montage of the team’s recent defeats, and the questions asked of the panel presupposed issues that had to be resolved: the debate was structured around topics such as “Why are we weak against Europe?” and “Are there no problems with Team Hiddink?” When the guests began to provide optimistic responses that argued Team Hiddink was “OK,” the host interjected and drove the discussion back to the “problem:”

Panelist: “In particular, the 5-0 [result] against the Czech Republic should not be

34. This has been especially true in England, where the first foreign manager, Sven-Göran Eriksson, was constantly hounded by calls for an “English manager for an English team,” eventually resulting in the appointment of Steve McClaren. At the time of writing, history looks set to repeat itself, with the Italian Fabio Capello widely expected to be succeeded by an Englishman.
considered as anything more than a friendly match… the score may have been 5-0, but I could find many positive things to take from that match.”

Host: “[smiling] Even so, 5-0 is a fairly embarrassing result in a first team match… there’s not a lot of time left, and some people are saying, how long can this go on? Please point out some problems as well.”

Equally consistently, the program problematized Hiddink’s leadership as the reason for that failure. Whether Hiddink was, in fact, to “blame” or not is not so important. The program demonstrates how the Korean team’s flaws were discursively isolated and located onto Hiddink—his profile, his actions, his policies. The football experts on the panel pointed to Hiddink’s lack of knowledge about Korean culture and players, as well as his excessive physical training, as stumbling blocks in the Korean team’s World Cup bid:

Panelist: “To manage a Korean team, you need to understand Korean culture; and to direct that team’s tactics, I think you need to be able to at least say basic football terms [in Korean]… we need to see that kind of effort, or signs of that effort [from Hiddink].”

Hiddink continued to be the target of negative media coverage. In February 2002, he was accused of immorality and a lack of focus when it was made known that his girlfriend had stayed in the same hotel as the national team during a minor tournament. Rather than excusing it as a cultural difference, the media often argued that it represented Hiddink’s failure to conform to Korean expectations. In such ways, subtle commentary on Hiddink’s foreignness underlined criticism of his performance. Yet later events would prove that the same characteristics that inscribed Hiddink as a foreigner and villain could just as easily be erased from media discourse, or even redefined as highly positive factors.

As it turned out, the transformation of Hiddink into a national hero was remarkably sudden. Although the possibility of a new manager was being discussed as late as March 2002, media criticism suddenly dissipated in the following weeks. In March 2002, Chosun Ilbo published a column that

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. Also see: Chosun-Ilbo World Cup Reporting Team, “Kkum ün iruõjinda” [Dreams come true], 13; Lee, Jackson and Lee, “South Korea’s ‘Glocal’ Hero,” 290.
39. Chosun-Ilbo World Cup Reporting Team, “Kkum ün iruõjinda” [Dreams come true], 17.
40. “Pukchungmi koldï¼‘øp kyõlsan / Han’guk ch’ukku t’esûr’û man hada nal saenda” [North/Central America Gold Cup Summary / Korean football – experiments all day long], Chosun Ilbo, 04 February 2002.
lambasted Hiddink for his “excuses:” only two weeks later, they were suggesting Hiddink had been right all along. Then in May 2002, three matches provided the catalyst for a total transformation. The Korean team produced markedly improved performances against Scotland, England and France, the latter two firmly recognized as “football sŏnjin’guk.” It did not matter that only one of these matches was a victory, or that they were non-competitive matches: they performed the same role of the iconic catalyst that the 5-0 defeats had. Hiddink was suddenly becoming acclaimed as a genius, and the Korean team a success story.

Guus Hiddink was nicknamed “O Daeyŏng” [five-nil] ... but through the friendlies against England and France, he has been reborn. His predictions came true, and the Korean team was reborn into a powerful team... the criticisms of “O Daeyŏng” are now nowhere to be found. These days he is called “He thinks,” after the sound of “Hiddink.”

This article was published on the 28th of May, just three days before the start of the World Cup. By this point, the media had completed the reversal of its depiction of Guus Hiddink. The journalist’s confident assertion that the nickname “O Taeyŏng” is “nowhere to be found” indicated that the negative image of Hiddink was not simply receding, but completely rejected. This rapid transformation well exceeded the moderate improvements the Korean team had made by this point. It is possible that the media had judged that criticism so close to the World Cup would likely be received as destructive and unpatriotic, and at odds with the general atmosphere of celebration they wished to promote. Finally, on the 4th of June, Korea defeated Poland 2-0, completing this symbolic transformation. As the first South Korean victory in the history of the World Cup finals, it was treated as a cathartic event that proved Korea could compete on the world stage. The media discourse had first produced Hiddink the villain, then transformed him into Hiddink the national hero.

Hiddink, the Syndrome

The “Hiddink Syndrome” emerged in late May 2002, and reigned as a dominant trend and news story in Korean society until Hiddink’s resignation in early July. It exemplifies both the expanding influence of the media in the production of nationality and the function of the global Other in defining “Korea” and

“Korean-ness.” In this period, not only was Hiddink re-inscribed as an object of admiration and a symbol of Korean success, but an object that was admired through media consumption. Firstly, Hiddink accrued an abnormally high level of social capital through both the success of his team and the media narrative of his beliefs and behavior: contradictory interpretations were nearly completely foreclosed from the public sphere.42 Secondly, consumption, whether of media texts or consumer products, was offered as a way to not only learn more about Hiddink, but identify oneself with him. In short, a Hiddink fandom had been born. Throughout June and July, the media invested their resources into every kind of coverage regarding Guus Hiddink:

During the Poland match, he made three “uppercuts” after Hwang Sun-Hong’s opener, but was checked by the assistant referee as he approached the field. Then there were two uppercuts after Yoo Sang-Chul’s goal: I thought that was it, but when the final whistle blew he was at it again.43

If I stand on the sidelines, I can hear conversations between Hiddink and the players. “Kihyŏni, what are you doing now? Move!” “Mengbo, very good.” “ppali ppali [hurry hurry].” Hiddink’s orders switch seamlessly between harsh barks and warm praises.44

His every action and gesture was tracked and reported by the press. Quirks such as his “uppercut punch” goal ceremony, or his shortened nicknames for Korean players, were fondly reported by the media and extrapolated to form an image of a witty and passionate, as well as driven and diligent, character.45 Through direct and indirect means, the media coverage accumulated Hiddink as a composite of dispositions and signifiers. Hiddink’s visual identity was, to a large extent, defined by these signs: the thoughtful frown, the firm and outstretched thumbs-up and the “uppercut” goal celebration were icons of a persona that encouraged respect as well as empathy. During and after the 2002 World Cup, Hiddink featured in several Korean corporate advertisements that made full use of these visual signifiers. One such advertisement opens with a close-up of Hiddink, with

43. “Hiddingk’u ui 90pun” [Hiddink’s 90 Minutes], *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 June 2002.
44. “Onul ŭn 4 kang kanŭn nal” [Today we go to the semis!], *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 June 2002.
45. This blend of characteristics provided an air of sophistication that stood out in a milieu where the nation’s heroes were often characterized by more “rustic” values such as humility and modesty. It could be argued that Hiddink offered a hero that was respectable as well as “cool” – a rare blend for Korean media and audiences.
his hand on his chin and sporting his “trademark” frown. As various aural cues indicate a goal being scored, Hiddink is seen celebrating with his uppercut gesture. He calls over the goal scorer in excitement – and into his arms jumps a pizza delivery boy, sporting the product logo. This commoditization of Hiddink’s personal attributes would never have been as feasible or lucrative without his sudden accumulation of social capital. In fact, a year before, in 2001, Samsung had pulled an advertisement featuring Hiddink out of circulation to avoid negative associations. The rapid commoditization of Hiddink’s identity across various media and consumer products also demonstrated the intimacy between media and nationalism, and the ease with which attributes and capital could be transferred.

The same process can be seen in the media narratives of Hiddink’s personal life and history, which mobilized the operative logics of celebrity culture to again maximize his potential as a commodity and trend. Hiddink’s “story” thus emerged through an intersection of familiar narrative models that drew on every available detail from his life:

Hiddink likes to eat spaghetti. Salad and cheese are a must, as well. He’s not especially fond of Korean food, but seems to like a few dishes, like kalbi [ribs]. Oh, and he is a cappuccino maniac. I’m told he drinks one after every meal.

Hiddink’s hometown is Doetinchem, a small country town two hours by car from Amsterdam... in Doetinchem, he is a legendary figure. At the age of 21, he began his football career with the local club, De Graafschap.

These texts identified and produced Hiddink according to the genres of celebrity culture, historical figures, football, nationality and more. Hiddink was being used as a site of a diverse range of discursive techniques which entertained their audience by presenting simultaneously compelling and familiar narratives. Very quickly, other social fields within Korea, ranging from political parties to small businesses, began to appropriate Hiddink for every kind of product and cause:

Narrator: “Hiddink Syndrome: this time, it’s books. As Team Hiddink reached the semi-finals, men and women are busy reading up on Hiddink.”
Interviewee: “This is called ‘The Power of Hiddink,’ it’s a Hiddink-related book.”

48. “Кyŏnggi̊ggĳiàng pak ūi Hidingk’ŭ kamdok” [Hiddink off the field], Chosun Ilbo, 18 June 2002.
Narrator: “Why are you reading it?”
Interviewee: “Because I’m a fan...” (*laughs*)
Narrator: “Another source of the Hiddink Syndrome is none other than a pub. We are told that following the World Cup, a huge number of people are looking for beer from Hiddink’s homeland, the Netherlands...everywhere we look, there’s Dutch beer on the table.”

On the 8th, Lee Kûnyo ˘ng, head of the FSS [the Financial Supervisory Services], opened the board meeting by commenting that “Hiddink-style leadership has generated a lot of attention lately,” and said that “in the future, recruitment of FSS auditors will avoid discrimination by region and schools and focus on merit.”

Like the FSS, numerous corporate and government entities rushed to adapt Hiddink’s policies and philosophies as best practice – at once a bid to leverage his cultural capital for their own ends and a possibility for social change. The Hiddink Syndrome quickly exceeded its original boundaries of the field of sport and Guus Hiddink as an individual. As the Dutchman increasingly became an ensemble of discursively produced narratives and signifiers, he became more and more transposable to different fields and contexts. The discourse of Hiddink suggested that if he was a hero and visionary for Korean football, he could be the same for Korean business, politics, and more. The logic of the commodity had, through discursive production, organized Hiddink into modular and transposable narratives, signifiers and dispositions that could be widely disseminated, yet still draw their legitimacy from the social capital attributed to Hiddink as an individual. This was notable because it enabled the production of Hiddink as a champion of Korean nationality. Hiddink’s significance was no longer confined to his individual popularity: his character, policies, principles and achievements were used to map out the potential and future of Korean nationality. This is, of course, typical of media-produced national heroes: Zidane and Maradona were also subject to the same techniques of aestheticization and symbolic identification. The key difference was that unlike most other sporting heroes, Hiddink was not indigenous. This contradiction would need to be resolved in some way.

50. Ibid.
51. “Yi Kûnyo ˘ng Hidingk’ù sik insa toip hal kört” [Yi Kûnyo ˘ng will adopt Hiddink-style recruitment policy], Donga Ilbo, 9 July 2002.
The Discursive Reconstitution of Hiddink

How could a triumphant celebration of a “Korean victory” take place while crediting the genius of a foreign manager? The answer effectively amounted to a discursive reconstitution of Hiddink. As the 2002 World Cup progressed, Hiddink’s role as a public figure became a polyvalent vessel of two different and seemingly contradictory discourses. Hiddink simultaneously represented the superiority of Western scientific method and regimes of truth and affirmed the validity of quintessentially “Korean” virtues. Hiddink, and the particular ways in which the media produced him as a public figure, conflated and converged these two discourses so that far from appearing mutually exclusive, they were read as complementary. This allowed the affirmation of Korean nationality in the context of its relationship with the global, and specifically, the sŏnjin’guk.

In these two discourses, and in their conflation, media coverage of Hiddink positioned the audience in a very specific way. In Foucault’s terms, there was a tactical exercise of power enacted through discourse whereby specific relations of power were imprinted on the subject, and the subject was in turn compelled to a perspective that re-affirms the truth value of that relation.53 Firstly, Hiddink’s methods and principles were accredited as sŏnjin technology, superior to existing practices that were now retroactively understood as primitive and flawed. Furthermore, this technology was defined in terms of its compatibility with existing Korean qualities and values – in other words, its scope for appropriation by the local. In this case, Hiddink performed the role of a benevolent external force, whose knowledge and ability was necessary for the success of the Korean team. During and after the World Cup, the Korean media produced a large number of texts that analyzed the “secret” behind Hiddink’s success in such terms:

Hiddink accurately identified the problems in Korean football that domestic experts could not work out for decades... Using “sport scientists” who specialized in physiotherapy and sports physiology, he brought science to Korean football. So far, domestic coaches had relied on their eyes to work out how fit a player was.54

Above all, his man management is a lesson not only for our sports but for our

---

54. “Hidingk’u ˘ u ˘i ‘500il yaksok chik’yötta” [Hiddink keeps his “500 days” promise], Donga Ilbo, 15 June 2002.
politics and society. Taking his post as the national team manager, he picked players strictly on merit. No player could be guaranteed a place. Players who showed off but couldn’t pull their weight were boldly removed... the favoritism by region and school that was so endemic in Korean football did not fly with Hiddink.55

A focus on the basics, a strict merit-based form of player management, scientific methods – all of these factors were described in a way that connected these individual techniques with perceived sŏnjin systems of thought and regimes of truth. These advanced technologies and ways of thinking were described as overcoming flaws seemingly inherent to the Korean way of things.56 As the “Hiddink Way” was transposed across various fields and presented as the solution to many of the problems in Korean society, so was this discursive relationship between Korean nationality and sŏnjin systems:

And really, Hiddink has said that he is only a football coach, but when we see him, we think, if we had a leader like him in our society, then like our football team reached the semi-finals, we [Korean society] too could take a step up.57

Such enthusiasm marks the extremities of one dimension of Hiddink – as the harbinger of sŏnjin tools and techniques that could not only “fix” flaws in the Korean team, but by extension, flaws inherent in Korean society as well. In vulgar terms, the implication was that such “advanced” discipline and logic successfully replaced pre-existing (and parochial) Korean corruption, backwardness and inefficiency. The Korean subject was thus prompted to recognize and internalize sŏnjin regimes of truth. It is questionable, however, whether Hiddink really “opened up spaces for a new vision of what Korean culture and identity could be.”58 I suggest that the overt reliance on Hiddink as a charismatic figure, and the attendant failure to interrogate the origins and logics of his methods accurately, means that this “new vision” was rather shallow and restrictive. In particular, the political and corporate organizations’ rush to adopt the “Hiddink Way” suggests a fetichistic reification of Hiddink and his methods as the gold standard: just do what Hiddink did, and we can “fix” Korea.

This was only one dimension of a discursive framework, however. Hiddink’s

55. “Hidingk’ŭ sik kyŏngyŏng ridŏshwip” [Hiddink-style management leadership], Chosun Ilbo, 6 June 2002.
role as the representative of “advanced” technologies was delicately woven together with an affirmation of Korean nationality – an affirmation that often drew on the same evidence as the narrative of Western intervention. Even as the Korean subject was provided with the explanation that such tools have provided Korea with victory, he/she was assured that this success was a triumph of Korean virtues and qualities rather than foreign ones. This called to mind a familiar idea in Korea society – “tongdo sógi-ron,” or “The Theory of Eastern Ways, Western Technology,” wherein the adaptation of Western methods is justified as tools to be subordinated to an Eastern ideology.\(^59\) In this way, fears of dependence on the West were assuaged and the viability of an autonomous sovereignty assured. Such a configuration of attitudes allowed the Korean subject – already founded on a passionate attachment to the idea of Korean nationality and values – to understand the triumph of the World Cup as wholly Korean achievement, rather than undeservedly granted by external and superior forces. Firstly, Hiddink was normalized and naturalized: previous accusations of his lack of knowledge and concern with Korean society were replaced by articulations of the affectionate relationship between Hiddink and the Korean people, and pejorative descriptions of his foreignness were now excised:\(^60\)

“Uncle Hiddink … please stay in Korea until the next World Cup in Germany!”

Out of 1,700 children at Taegu’s Uksu Elementary School, some 900 wrote letters thanking Hiddink and sent them to the Korean Football Association by post. These letters were full of each child’s thanks for the World Cup, their passion for football, and their love of Hiddink and the players.\(^61\)

In another example, a television program aired a section titled “I love Hiddink:” the female interviewer boasted of being given a short hug from Hiddink, upon which the other presenters gasped and screamed in jealousy. The interviewer proceeded to describe Hiddink as a kind-hearted, likeable man, emphasizing every snippet he had to say on Korea and Koreans.\(^62\) These types of positive coverage, mostly found near the end of the tournament, consistently drew links between Hiddink and Korean culture, and stressed the “special affection” that


\(^{60}\) Yi, Hiddingk’ũ örök, 8.

\(^{61}\) “Hiddingk’ũ ajŏssi Han’guk e nama chuseyo’ Uksu ch’odŭng 900myŏng kamsa p’yŏnji” [‘Uncle Hiddink, please stay in Korea’ – letters of thanks from 900 at Uksu Primary School], Chosun Ilbo, 4 July 2002.

\(^{62}\) “Aju t’ukpyŏl han ach’im” [A very special breakfast], Seoul: MBC, July 2002.
Hiddink is said to have had for Korea. Similar discursive efforts can be detected in previously mentioned examples of journalists who tailed Hiddink day and night to report on his knowledge of Korean phrases, or approval of Korean food. Such narratives of admiration and familiarity, combined with exhaustive details of his personal life and characteristics, engineered an erasure of distance and located him as a Korean “in spirit.”

However, there is a distinction to be made between a loved foreigner and a thoroughly Koreanized foreigner. The positive emphasis on Hiddink’s Western techniques was woven together with descriptions of the Korean national team itself, which mediated the narrative to complete this naturalization. The national team was attributed with characteristics such as hard work, teamwork, self-sacrifice and bravery – qualities which were then marked as quintessentially Korean. This allowed the Korean team’s success to be understood as the success of Korean values and ideologies. Hiddink could then be positioned not as the sole architect of this victory, but a crucial element in a collaborative victory that emerged from Korea’s inherent excellence.

We will never forget today, the day when football told us that Korea is something to be proud of, that Koreans can be proud of their achievement. It was not by luck that Korean football had pushed aside Europe’s giants to reach the quarter-finals – it was ability. That’s why we can be proud, why we can cheer our hearts out... Trained by Hiddink, the Korean team’s fitness, fighting spirit and strategy had become world class... The players trusted in their manager, and the citizens [of Korea] trusted in their team.

Today, our players did us proud. In the eyes of the Portuguese players, they would have been small-time players from backwater leagues: but we were superior in not only ability, but organization, and humiliated the Portuguese, who thought they were the best.

Rather than saying that Hiddink has created something new, I think it’s much more important to note that he was able to bring out our unique qualities and strengths. We ourselves were not able to identify these and bring these out, but he could, from

63. This same flexibility in nationalistic discourse would repeat itself two years later, when German coach Otto Rehhagel led the Greek team to the Euro 2004 championship. He was described by one Greek newspaper as one who “may not be a Greek, but proved to have Mediterranean temperament and ... acted like a Greek.” See: Rodanthi Tzanelli, “‘Impossible is a fact:’ Greek Nationalism and International Recognition in Euro 2004,” *Media Culture Society* 28 (2006), 492.
This kind of discourse anchored subjects in a familiar and reassuring ground that validated their own position as subjects and their passionate attachment to Korea. The media discourse asserted that Hiddink had not conferred on the Korean nation what it did not deserve, but merely enabled what was always Korea’s rightful place in the world. Any potential contradiction between this assertion of superiority and celebration of Hiddink’s soňjin methods was foreclosed. Hiddink was a foreigner, yet his foreign influences had been firmly integrated into the grand narrative of Korean national triumph. The rubric of national evolution successfully smoothed out the inconsistencies in this representation of Hiddink, enabling him to act as the site for both Eastern Ways and Western Technology.

This discursive reconstitution relied not only on positive affirmations of Korean values, but a certain unmooring of Hiddink from his own origins and historicity. For example, the media occasionally mentioned Hiddink’s Dutch background, usually to emphasize his origin from a football soňjin’guk. However, these invocations were piecemeal and haphazard; he was rarely articulated as a Dutchman. Instead, he was often assigned a rather vague, myopic identity of the “White Foreigner,” from which he could be reconciled and articulated as a Korean hero and an honorary Korean. This was symptomatic of the general, collective imagination of a vague, indeterminate West as Other. Such a dynamic is replicated across Hiddink as a bodily site of discourse. Although Hiddink’s football philosophies and methods were frequently mentioned and celebrated, their historical roots in Dutch “Total Football” in the 1970s, or even Hiddink’s own tenure over the Dutch national team in the 1990s, were often ignored. They were simply described as “Western” and “advanced” (soňjin), and then intimately tied together with quintessential Korean values such as “fighting spirit.” Hiddink’s foreignness was not simply erased or denied; rather, it was unmoored and diluted into the West-as-Other, which could then be fitted together with the celebration of Korean values in convenient ways. This discursive mechanism finds its iconic manifestation in another nickname that the Koreans bestowed on Hiddink – “Huí Tonggu,” a transliteration of “Hiddink” to sound like a native Korean name. A mock-up image of a Korean national ID card featuring Huí Tonggu was soon in circulation. The nickname exemplifies the discursive mechanism which unmoored and reconstituted Hiddink as an embodiment of the double-sided gaze. Huí Tonggu was a product of the Korean

imagination of the foreign Other – the foreigner that approved of Korea to such a degree that he, too, “converted” to Korean nationality.

Finally, it is worth noting how precarious Hiddink’s status as hero was; this particular discursive configuration was axiomatic rather than inevitable. The transformation of discourses involving two of Hiddink’s policies over 2001 and 2002 demonstrate how the very factors which were mobilized to vilify Hiddink were eventually used to praise him and Korean nationality. Before the 2002 World Cup, the media had especially focused its criticisms on two of Hiddink’s policies – the prolonged period of experimentation and the refusal to announce a “best 11” squad, and his insistence on physical fitness training.

It’s pathetic... the hardest thing to understand is his training methods and use of players. It’s hard to understand why he insists on physical training when tactical organization is so badly required, and why he used players that had not been tested on the domestic stage... there’s no more time to waste like this.67

Throughout 2001, the Chosun Ilbo fielded headlines such as “Korean football – tests, tests all day long,” and voiced expert opinion that fitness training was “ruining” players.68 But when the national team began to win World Cup matches and perform well, the media was quick to applaud these policies, packaging them into elaborate terms that connoted expertise and excellence:

[The Korean team,] armed with their “multi-player” tactic which allowed every player to move freely across the field, drove the opposition into chaos... The answer [to success] lies in their tireless running and bold movement. The flexible use of players and the strict “power program” training [Hiddink] had employed since last year are now yielding fruit.69

The discourses of Western superiority and Korean legitimacy would perform their productive roles regardless of the rise and fall of Guus Hiddink as an individual. The power of these entrenched discourses was such that Hiddink could only be a facilitator, albeit an extraordinary one. Hiddink did not herald a new era of global community and multiculturalism, as some Korean commentators enthused at the time: rather, the events surrounding his success contributed to a

gradual shift towards a more confident Korean mentality, but one still firmly within the discursive contexts of tongdo sŏgi-ron and the underdog.

Conclusion

The Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup is testament to the increasingly intimate relationship between nationality, globalization and the media in contemporary society. South Korea’s strong ethno-nationalism, its highly developed media sector and its economic position as an emerging power provided the conditions for a particularly explicit demonstration of this relationship. It is a discursive process that continues to play out across other mega-events, and indeed, on a daily basis in the production of banal nationalism. In particular, the case of Guus Hiddink demonstrated a double-sided gaze at work in the Korean media. This was a specific inflection of the global on the national that was predicated on its antecedent positioning in a symbolic matrix of nationalities, wherein the Other is delimited in order to establish the Self. This articulation enables us to go beyond one-dimensional explanations of inferiority complexes or the “death” of nationalism. Korean nationality was being produced not only internally, through positive affirmations of the validity and viability of the Korean Self, but also externally, through the construction of a foreign gaze that would be used to define and affirm Korean nationality. Furthermore, although aspects such as the idea of the sŏnjin’guk are specific to the Korean context, the general relationship remains broadly applicable. Around the world, foreign nationalities act as linguistic and symbolic reference points through which norms can be established in a given society. This Other can be simultaneously an object of condemnation through which the Self is validated, and an ideal by which the Self is pulled towards a revered norm; in either case, the global Other inflects the production of the national Self.

At the same time, it is crucial to understand that in such a relative and discursively maintained system, the “Self” and “Other” are by no means reliably static. The fluctuating media approval of Guus Hiddink demonstrated the connection between the flexibility and polyvalence of nationalistic discourse, and the resilience of normative power relations. In their commentary of Hiddink, the Korean media negotiated the gap between the normative values of nationality in their abstract and actualised forms. The contradictions in their depiction of Hiddink were reconciled as a multidirectional and opportunistic method of generating an acceptable narrative of Korean nationality. Although media discourse can and does challenge existing power relations, this flexibility shows
how the symbolic order of nationality can maintain its authoritative position as the interpretive schema for events and stories. In this context, it was not surprising that the Korean government’s policy directives – of “exporting” Korean nationality and culture to the world – were most effectively implemented through the voluntary initiatives of the Korean media, and that the resulting narrative defined the 2002 World Cup as an evolutionary and unifying moment for all Koreans.

The emergence of these globally inflected discourses of nationality, and their flexible and dynamic manifestations through the mass media, have important implications for the production of nationality in the coming years. This nonlinear, fluctuating and highly contextual relationship between media, globalization and nationality offers one way in which we might obviate the artificial binary between global and local, East and West. In particular, the media, as a site for discursive production, introduces its own dynamics between the various stakeholders. The dialogic relationship between the interests and discursive strategies of media industries, governments and consumer culture will become more and more crucial to the production of globally inflected nationalities.