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This paper identifies the two paths where the Ottawa Treaty to prohibit the use of anti-personnel landmines has been introduced into the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea: constituency politics and progressive transnational advocacy. National Assemblymen who have minefield fields in their districts have been active in promoting the norm to clear landmines; those who have been involved in progressive transnational advocacy networks actively participate in the law-making process to provide assistances to landmine victims and clear anti-personnel landmines. In addition, this paper shows that National Assemblymen’s ideological position has stronger impacts than their partisan identification in the co-sponsorship of the two bills related with anti-personnel landmine issues at the National Assembly in South Korea.

Keywords: International Norms, Norm Diffusion, Anti-Landmine Norm, Korea Campaign To Ban Landmines (Kcbl), Co-Sponsoring, National Assembly, Korea

* Translated from an article published in the Korean Political Science Review 44 (3): 27-52, 2010 with permission from the Korean Political Science Association.
** This project was funded by the Korean Institute of Legislative Studies in 2009. The authors thank Professor Kang, Won Taek at Seoul National University, Professor Lee, Hyeon-Woo at Sogang University and Professor Lim, Sung-hack at University of Seoul for providing a couple of survey datasets on Korean National Assemblymen.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The prohibition of anti-personnel landmines was a resultant of a transnational social movement coalition emphasizing human security more than national security. The social movement coalition behind the outlawing of anti-personnel landmines has challenged the usefulness of mines as an instrument for military defense and exposed landmines as a direct threat to human security. The coalition relays graphic images of landmine damage and continually updates statistics about mine-affected communities in order to help people understand that anti-personnel landmines incur humanitarian disasters. The coalition’s efforts have led landmines to be perceived as a threat to human security (Banerjee and Mugah 2002: 43-46; Parlow 1994; Rutherford 2000: 70-110; Taylor 2008: 41-45; Wexler 2003: 576-578).

While carrying out a variety of campaigns to raise the awareness of anti-personnel landmines as a threat to human security, the anti-landmine coalition has collaborated politicians to place the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines on the political agenda (Sigal 2006: 9-24). The coalition’s efforts ultimately resulted in the 1997 Ottawa Treaty. Some like-minded countries which played key roles in making the Ottawa Treaty coalesced into the Human Security Network in 1999, which comprises of ministers of foreign affairs from Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand. The Human Security Network has labeled landmines as a cause of “human devastation” and approaches the campaign to ban landmines as a way to improve human security and eventually to realize “freedom from fear.”

There were two legislative campaigns to import some components of the Ottawa Treaty into the Republic of Korea in the 2000s: one for clearing landmines and providing compensations from landmine victims and the

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1 It is the conventional name given to the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction’. The Ottawa Treaty’s first draft was presented in Oslo, Norway on September 18, 1997 and it was open to signing in Ottawa, Canada on December 12, 1997. It entered into force on March 1, 1999, right after 40 countries ratified the treaty.
other for providing humanitarian assistances for landmine victims.\textsuperscript{2} Although neither campaign succeeded, the anti-landmine norm has slowly diffused through the National Assembly’s public hearings and policy discussions. Furthermore, the anti-landmine norm has indirectly challenged the military advantage of the landmines even in the demilitarized zone (DMZ).\textsuperscript{3} The National Assembly has become a venue for the anti-landmine norm to be internalized in the Republic of Korea.

This article examines the two campaigns to internalize the anti-landmine norm in two step: one to raise the awareness of landmines as a threat to human security and the other to legislate the norm. More specifically, this article focuses on the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) which has introduced the anti-landmine norm to Korea and has been involved in the two legislations.\textsuperscript{4} Also, this article explores the two pathways where anti-landmine norm has diffused into the legislative process in Korea. Lastly, it assesses the relative power of assemblyman’s constituency interest, socio-political orientation, partisan affiliation, and committee participation in explain why legislators join the co-sponsorship of the two anti-landmine

\textsuperscript{2} “The Bill on the Clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the Compensation to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O” (draft bill # 162627, 09.05.2003): “The Special Bill on Assitances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk” (draft bill # 174946, 09.18.2006). Assemblyman KIM’s draft bill was not discussed at any legislative step of the Standing Committee for National Defense, National Assembly and it was discarded because the 16\textsuperscript{th} National Assembly ended its term on May 29, 2004. Assemblyman Park’s draft bill was reviewed by the Standing Committee for National Defense. The Standing Committee for National Defense decided not to pass it to the plenary of National Assembly, because the draft bill would be in conflict the compensation law. The Standing Committee for National Defense recommended the Ministry of National Defense review alternative methods such as an international trust fund and medical treatment for those affected by mines. (Secretariat of National Assembly 2007, 14-17).

\textsuperscript{3} Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo publicly advocated the removal of mines in the DMZ between the two Koreas for “the conservation of the DMZ’s ecosystem and its peaceful development” (Kim, J. 2009).

\textsuperscript{4} The KCBL has been the forerunner in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norms since 1998 in Korea. It participated in the legislation of the norm by drafting the second anti-landmine bill with Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk from 2004 to 2007 and participated in congressional hearings (Jo 2008).
II. THE TWO PATHWAYS IN THE DIFFUSION OF THE ANTI-LANDMINE NORM IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

In February 1998, Jody Williams, the founding coordinator of The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, visited Korea. Her visit raised the awareness of landmine issues in Korea. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1997 for her contribution to the conclusion of the Ottawa Treaty and was invited by the KCBL. While staying in Korea, she met the politicians and members of social movement organizations who were involved in or sympathetic to the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines. National Assemblyman Kim, Sang-hyun, who was the leader of the Environmental Forum of the National Assembly and attended Jody Williams’ lecture, promised her that he would organize a congressional hearing on the issue. The first hearing, which was entitled as “The International Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines and Our Response,” was held at the Environmental Forum of National Assembly (Environmental Forum of National Assembly 1998: 668). Since then, the anti-landmine norm has become an agendum at the National Assembly. This section first reviews the diffusion of the international norms in general and then discusses the two diffusion pathways through which anti-landmine norms have permeated into the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

5 There is very limited empirical research on the co-sponsorship in the National Assembly. The presence of network among assemblymen in the co-sponsorship was reported (Shin, H. 2004; Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009) and the size of co-sponsorship was positively associated with the chance of success in the legislative process (Youm, Y. 2007).

6 The KCBL dispatched two people to the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony to discuss Jody Williams’ visit to Korea. The KCBL organized several events where Jody Williams handed over prosthetic legs to landmine victims. Also, the NGO arranged meetings with politicians and activists to raise the awareness of landmine issues and internalize the anti-landmine norm (interview with Cho, J., the founding coordinator of the KCBL, 01.08.2007).
1. The Diffusion of International Norms

There are three phases in the life cycle of international norms: emergence, cascade, and internalization (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998: 894-96). At the emergence phase, activists and organizations who have strong feeling on certain issues work to get others embrace their beliefs. Activists frame certain issues to be consistent with their beliefs, while challenging the conventional framework (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2-3). They eventually present a set of alternative normative frameworks on certain issue. At the cascade phase, norm entrepreneurs muster supports enough to get their norm widely accepted at a political community. At this stage, some activists abroad, who are not involved the norm emergence, import the norm into their political communities (Koh 2004: 337-39). At the internalization phase, the imported norm is widely accepted to be taken for granted.

There are two schools on how international norms affect the behavior of state actors and non-state actors in two ways. The first school, liberalists, claim that international norms change conventional incentives and lead social forces and political activists to behave differently; thus, actors shift their behavior to make it consistent to the new payoff matrixes (Moravcsik 1995; Cortell and Davis 1996). According to liberalists, states get benefits by abiding by international norms and increase their national interests, while being restricted from doing what is not consistent with international norms. International norms appear to regulate the behavior of states, as states are responsive to new incentives which international norms bring. In contrast, constructivists claim that the effect of international norms is much deeper. Constructivists focus on the process where state actors shape their identity based on international norms and frame their national interests consistent with those norms. They emphasize international norms as a reference to national identity and interests (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996).

The two schools are similarly interested in the effect of norm diffusion upon the behavior of states. More specifically, the two schools are interested in how international norms would bring changes in the behavior of states, if states comply to international norms. The two schools share the assumption that states are rational actors and examine the effect of international
norms upon the behavior of states at the interstate or systemic level. The
two schools do not pay attention to how international norms diffuse into
domestic politics. In other words, the two schools are not interested in how
international norms are domesticated into the legal system at the national
level. The compliance of international norms is not identical to internalization
(Checkel 1997: 473-74).

The genuine effect of international norms may be found in the process
where norms diffuse into the domestic legal system or practices of individual
states. It is state that eventually enforces international norms at the national
level. The research on the diffusion of international norms is helpful in
measuring whether and how international norms are internalized. The
efficacy of international norms should be assessed in terms of whether
states implement them at the national level. Therefore, domestic politics
is a key factor in the diffusion of international norms (Cortell and Davis
2000: 66). Political activists who import international norms without much
consideration of material incentives are conditioned by their domestic
political contexts (Landolt 2004: 579-80).

The diffusion or internalization of international norms starts with norm
empowerment, a process where prescriptions embodied in international
norms become agenda in domestic political contexts (Schweller and Priess
1997: 3-11). Norm empowerment refers to legitimizing certain political
behaviors which are consistent with norms. It, as a process of politicization,
highlights early stages where international norms become prominent
agenda in domestic politics. As it occurs through changes in discourse,
norm empowerment is deeply involved in political debates and discourse
competitions (Checkel 1997: 475-76).

Norm empowerment refers to a politicization of norms, while norm
compliance means simply adopting norms. The diffusion of norms includes
various political decisions. Once they are introduced into domestic political
areas, international norms affect political actors’ behavior and their choice
repeatedly. When they are routinely obeyed by actors, international norms
become conventional at the national level and actors come to have a belief
that certain norms should be followed. Norms provide legitimacy to certain
behaviors at early phases and become later conventional references to how to
behave in domestic political areas.
Hence, the national legislature plays important roles in internalizing international norms into domestic political areas. Though various actors are involved in the diffusion of international norms, such as the United States Congress, officials in developing countries, lobbyists in Western democracies, members of global civil society, and national policy makers (Checkel 1997: 474), political elites play primary roles in the internalization of international norms, because the legislature decides whether to domesticate international norms at the national level (Cortell and Davis 2000: 70-71). The incorporation of international norms into domestic legal system is a later stage in the norm diffusion.

There are two pathways where legislators interact with international norms. First, legislator may bring international norms for their constituency interests. Though they do not internalize international norms into their beliefs and behavior, legislator may introduce international norms into domestic political issues in the ruse of global opinion or standard. Legislators are interested in taking care of their constituency interests for their re-election. Second, legislators who are exposed to international norms may redefine their interests. Transnational advocacy networks provide information consistent with international norms to legislators. Those who are sympathetic or attentive to international norms may assess their interests and political outcomes unconventionally. The cooperation between legislators and transnational advocacy networks may lead to new political contexts.

2. Pathway 1: Constituency Politics

Constituency interests are identified in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm into the Korean National Assembly. Some assemblymen whose districts include minefields have brought anti-landmine norms to politicize the presence of landmines in their districts. Korea’s minefields are generally grouped into two categories. One category has been named as “unconfirmed minefield,” an area where the exact locations of the mines are unknown. These unconfirmed fields were formed in two ways. First, fighting forces in the Korean War failed to record the exact locations of the mines or they lost their records. As the warfront became volatile and chaotic, militants in both sides planted mines without having the time to create a detailed record
or map, hence the Korean War has left a number of undocumented and unconfirmed minefields in Korea. Second, there are areas where misplaced landmines are believed to be laid down. When some mines were displaced by floods, landslides, and avalanches, areas near to the location of mines have been designated as “unconfirmed minefields.” For example, floods in North Korea in the mid-1990s led to displace landmines from North Korea and the DMZ into South Korea and have increased the risk of mines.

The other category is “confirmed minefield,” an area where mines have been precisely recorded. Three separate incidents are responsible for “confirmed minefields” in Korea. First, the Korean Military planted landmines in the DMZ and in the Military Control Zone (MCZ) contiguous to the DMZ to slow down the North Korea’s any possible attack. In addition, the Korean Military in the rear areas planted landmines to protect military facilities. Second, fearing of North Korea’s attack in collaboration with the former Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the US forces in Korea planted landmines around U.S. military bases. Third, around the mid- to late 1980s, when the Asian Games and Olympics were hosted in South Korea, the Korean Military planted landmines around air defense units, which have been located near metropolises. The South Korean government in the 1980s was fearful of the possibility that North Korea might carry out preemptive strikes against air defense units first. The minefields around air

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7 In 2003, Korea’s Ministry of National Defense reported that there were 112.5 km² minefields (90.7 km² unconfirmed minefields, 23.8 km² confirmed minefields). In contrast, the KCBL estimated that the size of minefields in Korea would be at least 300 km².

8 During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration concluded that the Cuban missile was a trap. The Kennedy administration worried that the Soviet Union would attack Berlin, while attracting US attentions to Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 99-108). The trap hypothesis led US military forces in Korea to prepare North Korea’s attack.

9 The KCLB claims that the US military forces in Korea have been responsible for at least 26 civilian landmine casualties. 24 US military facilities have minefields for protection, though they have not been involved with any landmine accident (The KCBL 2003).

10 The KCBL claims that anti-personnel landmines were planted around 33 air defense facilities in the rear in the 1980s.
defense units have given a serious threat to human security in South Korea, where air defense units are located near by large cities.

It is expected that any legislator whose district has minefields will take interest in eradicating mines and bringing relief to mine victims. Every elected legislator has a higher chance of re-election when s/he projects constituency interests into the legislative process. Electorates who face mine threats, such as those who live in the Military Control Zone or nearby minefields, are likely to support candidates who promise to get rid of landmines and provide aids to landmine victims. Also, electorates whose lands have mines or are located nearby minefields would develop their land more freely, if landmines were gotten rid of. Candidates from areas in and around minefields may bring the anti-landmine norm as a way to satisfy their district demands for their election.

So far there are two cases where assemblymen brought the anti-mine norm for their constituency interests. In 2000, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O, who represents Yeongdogu in Busan, initiated a legislative process to clear mines and provide relief to mine victims. Landmines were planted on Mt. Jungni, Yeongdogu to protect the US air defense base in the 1950s. A displaced mine claimed a fire fighter’s ankle, who put out a fire near the minefield on February 25, 1996 (KcBL 2003). The landmine incident led electorates in Yeongdogu to perceive the mine threats.

Cho, Jai-Kook, the founding coordinator of the KcLB and a co-worker with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O, described the link between constituency interests and anti-landmine norm as follows:

“Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O represents Yeongdogu, Busan. Mt. Jungni is located in Yeongdogu and many landmines were planted in that area. The landmine clearance was a major constituency interest in his district. In all honesty, I think that Assemblyman Kim independently initiated the legislative process and then proceeded with a collaborative research effort regarding landmines. … Assemblyman Kim’s office made the first move in asking the help from the KcBL. After the KCBL responded favorable to his move, he proposed collaboration.”

“I personally wanted the KCBL to focus on providing aids to landmine victims. I believed that it would be too difficult to pass the anti-landmine bill which dealt with both humanitarian assistance and mine clearance. I also
believed that it would be difficult for the National Assembly to pass the bill to provide compensations for civilian landmine victims, as it was a retrospective measure. However, Assemblyman Kim and his office said that they could not leave out the mine clearance” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

Assemblyman Kim’s bill was not passed, but the constituency interest of his district was satisfied. The Joint Chief of Staff, the Korean Military decided to clear 36 mine-affected areas in the rear, and within them the clearance of landmines in Mt. Jungni area was the first project (Yu, H. 2001). The mines in the Mt. Jungni area were gotten rid of in 2003 (Park, H. 2003). After the mines in his district were cleared away, however, Assemblyman Kim became disinterested in the anti-landmine norm.11

Second, Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, who represents P’och’eon and Yeonchèon, Kyeonggido, has been preparing another bill on mine clearance in collaboration with the KCBL. The Military Control Zone includes some parts of Poch’eon and Yeonchèon and has been mined since the armistice of the Korean War. Furthermore, displaced landmines which have been swept away from the North Korean side and the DMZ and ended up in the Hant’an River and Imjin River basin have posed a threat to electorates and visitors in P’och’eon and Yeonchèon. Also, the presence of minefields adjacent to the DMZ has been a roadblock against development in his district. Therefore, the clearance of landmines is the primary constituency interest for Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo.

Cho, Jai-Kook described the cooperation with Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo as follows:

“Nobody at the KCBL knew Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, before he was elected. After he was elected, I gave him a call to ask for his help in aiding landmine victims. At the time, he showed no interest in the matter. However, I heard later that he was interested in clearing landmines in the DMZ and aiding landmine victims in his district. When I called him again, he told me that he was preparing a bill on landmine clearance. He said that he came to know the KCBL, while preparing his bill. He wanted a collaboration with us”

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11 In 2006, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O co-sponsored Assemblyman PARK’s bill.
Both Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O and Kim, YoungWoo were more interested in clearing landmines in their districts rather than banning anti-personnel landmines and providing humanitarian assistances in general. The anti-landmine norm has more ideological affinity to progressives than conservatives. Considering that the two Assemblymen are political conservatives, their enthusiasm toward the anti-landmine norm appears to reflect their constituency interest.\footnote{Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O described himself a right-wing conservative while Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo declared himself a moderate conservative (Koh, J. and Chung, K. 2008; Kim, B. 2009).}

3. Pathway 2: Progressive Transnational Advocacy Networks

Considering that landmine issues are closely associated with human security, it is highly likely that progressive transnational advocacy networks work as an intermediary in the diffusion of anti-landmine norms. As transnational advocacy networks are interconnected based on their ideological orientations, those who have participated in progressive transnational advocacy networks and are elected into the National Assembly have an ideological affinity to the anti-landmine norm in general and are expected to bring the anti-landmine norm to the legislative process. A large number of young activists, who had been involved in various social movements, were recruited into the National Assembly since 1996. They were labeled as “young blood” and formed an influential group. Especially, the number of Assemblymen who had been involved in social movements was substantial in the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} National Assemblies (2000 to 2004, 2004 to 2008) (Yoon, J. 2004; Chang, B. 2004). The National Assembly came to be favorable to the anti-landmine norm.

The legislative process of the draft bill entitled as “the Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims” in 2006 shows that the ideological affinity between assemblymen who were involved in progressive transnational advocacy networks and the anti-landmine norm is positively associated with the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm. After witnessing that Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O
failed to get his bill ever reviewed at any level in 2003, the moderate wing in the KCBL shifted their focus to providing aid for landmine victims. While it was looking for someone to present a bill to help landmine victims, the KCBL was connected to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon. Cho, Jai-Kook described the collaboration between the KCBL and Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon as follows:

“There is an ecumenical forum among religious leaders called as Korean Conference of Peace for Peace (KCPP). The late pastor Kang, Weon Nyong is one of the founding members and also served as the president. I met the last pastor Kang in a KCPP meeting and asked his help to find assemblymen who would propose a bill to aid landmine victims. The last pastor Kang immediately introduced me to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon, a leader in a peace movement based on Won-Buddhism in Korea to help war victims and orphans. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon served as the secretary-general of the KCPP, when the late Pastor KANG served as the president of the KCPP. He was the majority leader of the National Defense Committee, National Assembly, when I met him first” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

“Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon approached the anti-landmine campaign as a peace movement. He was very interested in the KCBL’s anti-landmine initiative. He promised to sponsor a bill which the KCBL prepared to help landmine victims. He collaborated with us” (an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

Since its establishment, the KCBL was comprised of moderates who focused on humanitarian aid to mine victims and hardliners who shared anti-American and anti-governmental sentiments. Mr. Cho described the relationship between the two factions in the KCBL as followings:

“There were ideological differences among the early members of the KCBL. … A portion of the participants approached the anti-personnel landmine issue as a continuation of anti-nuclear and anti-war movements where they were affiliated. These people, who were relatively more militant, slowly phased out of the KCBL. The linkage between the KCBL and organizations where former KCBL hardliners were affiliated also weakened. After hardliners left the KCBL, the remaining members focused on directly helping landmine victims and began collaborating with governmental officials and law-makers” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, the founding coordinator of the KCBL, 2009.9.18).
Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk sponsored the bill that the KCBL and Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon prepared. There were two reasons that Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk played the leading role on the surface, though he was not involved in the early stage of preparing the second anti-landmine bill. First, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of the National Defense Committee in the second half of the 17th National Assembly. He was reluctant to introducing the bill, since he was afraid that his initiative would pressure his committee colleagues. Instead, he asked Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk to sponsor the bill. Second, the KCBL had personal ties to a few staff in Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk’s office. Park, Hyeongyong, who was a staff for Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk and had been the student union leader at Kyungpook National University, has been friends with Ko, Jeongho, who was involved in the KCBL. Cho, Jai-Kook described the relationship among the KCBL and the two assemblymen in detail as follows:

“The KCBL had five meetings with some officials from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Justice at Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon’s office. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon played the intermediary role between us and the government officials. We came to find a common ground and agreed to introduce a draft bill to help landmine victims. While preparing the bill, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of the National Defense Committee, National Assembly. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon said that he would make arrangements for Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk to sponsor the bill. Nobody at the KCBL had ever heard of Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk, but one of our members was a friend with an aide to Assemblyman Park. Expecting that the personal tie would lead to an efficient collaboration, we contacted Assemblyman Park and asked him to lead the legal process” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18). 

14 Mr. Cho, Jai-Kook revealed a negative opinion on the collaboration with Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk as follows:

“Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk had no interest in landmine issues. He did not make any efforts to pass the bill. … He took care more of his constituency
III. CO-SPONSORSHIP FOR THE ANTI-LANDMINE NORM

Co-sponsorship is a requirement for any draft bill that is introduced by assemblymen in the Korean National Assembly. The Article 79 of the National Assembly Law stipulates that any draft bill shall be sponsored by at least 10 assemblymen. Any assemblyman must gather at least nine supporters, when preparing to propose a bill. The law has led to a flood of co-sponsorships. This section reviews how the KCBL targeted assemblymen as potential co-sponsors. And then, it categorizes the factors to lead assemblymen to participate in co-sponsoring the two draft bills of the anti-landmine norm into constituency interests, ideological affinity, and partisan affiliation.

1. Initiators’ Interests

The initiator of any draft bill tries to get co-sponsors whose participation highlights the public interest and political relevancy of the bill (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 555; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). There are two major factors in the co-sponsorship for the success of a draft bill. One is the size of co-sponsorship, which signals the amount of support behind the legislation. Even if legislators are not familiar with a draft bill, the sheer number of the co-sponsors for the bill gives an impression that the draft bill is consistent with public interest (Koger 2003: 228). Therefore, those who plan to sponsor any draft bill to the National Assembly attempt to increase the co-sponsorship size. The co-sponsorship size actually has a positive relationship with the probability of legislative success (Browne 1985: 483-88; Wilson and Young 1997: 34-37). This is called as the bandwagon model (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 556; Wilson and Young 1997: 28).

The other is the composition of co-sponsorship. When it is co-sponsored interests than attaining the goal of banning landmines. There was no minefield in his district. It was very hard to get him even understand landmine issues (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

15 The average number of draft bills which a legislator initiated was 10.2 and that of draft bill which a legislator co-sponsored bills was 142.5 in the Korean National Assembly in 2008 (Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009).
by influential legislators in the majority party, committee chairs, or experts, a draft bill conveys its relevancy. Also, non-partisan co-sponsorship signals that the bill does not cater to partisan interests (Fenno 1991: 45-55; Koger 2003: 228-29; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). Empirical studies of the co-sponsorship in the US Congress attest to the signaling model (Koger 2003: 238-41; Krehbiel 1995: 910-12; Wilson and Young 1997: 34-37).

It seems that the KCBL tended to focus on the size rather than the composition of co-sponsorship. The KCBL's targeting was based on the following criteria: First, the KCBL lobbies assemblymen who had personal ties with the network's key members. Assemblymen who were already acquainted with KCBL leaders joined as co-sponsors, even though they were not familiar with the anti-landmine campaign in detail. Meanwhile, it took long to meet and explain landmine issues to those who did not have personal ties with the anti-landmine movement. Second, the KCBL lobbied assemblymen who were involved in progressive social movements or democratic movements.

“I was in charge of lobbying Assemblymen. When I was studying theology at Yonsei University in the late 1970s, I was involved in Christian social movements. I was affiliated with the Ecumenical Youth Council in Korea as a leader from the Methodist denomination and was later elected as the president of the council. At that time, the church was a safe heaven for the democratic movement. Christian social movements and the democratic movement were intermingled. I got to know young leaders who participated in social movements in the second half of the 1970s. Those who led social movements and the democratic movement eventually became government officials (in the 1990s and 2000s). I targeted assemblymen based on my personal connection” (from an interview with Cho, Jae-Kook, 2009.9.19).

Several hypotheses derive from the KCBL's lobbying experience and previous empirical studies on co-sponsorship.¹⁶

¹⁶ There are difficulties at testing the two competing models of co-sponsorship in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm in the Korean National Assembly. As there are only two cases of co-sponsoring and no committee chair participated as a co-sponsor, it is impossible to assess the effect of the co-sponsorship composition upon the legislative process. Also, though the two bills are different in terms of their emphasis: one for landmine clearance, the other for humanitarian assistance to mine victims, it
Hypothesis 1. Those who are not affiliated with initiators’ political parties are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

Hypothesis 2. Members of the National Defense Committee are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

Hypothesis 3. Those who were involved in progressive social movements and the democratic movement are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

2. Potential Co-Sponsors’ Interests

There are three factors in deciding whether to participate in the co-sponsorship. One is the constituency interest. An assemblyman’s participation in the co-sponsorship may be viewed as a behavior to represent the constituency interests of his/her district (Arnold 1990; Bianco 1994; Mayhew 1974: 63). In other words, participating in the co-sponsorship is a way to outwardly display dedication toward constituency interests (Regens 1989: 502-12). However, if a legislator co-sponsors a bill that goes against his/her district interests, the backlash from constituents weakens the chance of being re-elected. Therefore, it is likely that a legislator co-sponsors draft bills which are consistent with his/her district interests. Promotion of constituency interests is more important than participating in the co-sponsorship for promising draft bills (Mayhew 1974: 62 & 132).17

Another is the ideological orientations of legislators. Co-sponsoring reveals the socio-economic orientations of participants (Campbell 1982: 417). It is a signal friendly to actors who want to politicize certain issues. The findings that moderates tend to be late joiners to draft bills imply that co-sponsoring is an action to convey political stances on certain issues (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 562). Furthermore, when faced with controversial draft bills, co-sponsoring is a preemptive move to avoid being pressured to choose

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17 The constituency interest hypothesis does not explain the co-sponsorship for draft bills which are negative to district interests. Considering that legislators are not familiar to all draft bills in detail, the constituency interest hypothesis has a weakness in explaining the co-sponsorship (Campbell 1982: 416).
a side (Koger 2003: 232-33).

The last is party affiliation. Party is an institutionalized human network. Loose networks and groups based on personal ties exist in the legislature (Shin, H. 2004; Jeong, W. and Ahn, Y. 2004; Porter et al. 2005) and further there are co-sponsoring networks cross the partisan line (Kim, L. 2009; Yoo S. 2009). Partisan identification has relatively lost its influence in predicting the voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005). Yet, partisan identification is the most important factor in the co-sponsorship. Whether a legislator is affiliated with the same political party the sponsor of a draft bill belongs to is still most powerful in predicting whether the potential co-sponsor to support the bill or not (Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009; Fowler 2006: 483-84; Krehbiel 1995: 910).

The above three factors in the co-sponsorship leads to the following three hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 4.** Those who have minefields in their districts are more likely to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.

**Hypothesis 5.** Progressive assemblymen are more likely to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.

**Hypothesis 6.** Those who are affiliated with the same political party the leading sponsors of the anti-landmine bills belong to are more likely to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.

**IV. RESEARCH DESIGN, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSIONS**

Though previous studies identify several factors in explaining the co-sponsorship at the Korean National Assembly, none of them assesses the relative explanatory power of each factor. This section presents a research design to assess how much each factor explains the co-sponsoring behavior at the Korean National Assembly.

1. **Two Anti-Personnel Landmine Bills**

The Ottawa Treaty gives several duties to each member state. First, each
member state should not use anti-personnel landmines. More specifically, each member state should not use anti-personnel landmines in storage “under any condition,” should not produce or retain anti-personnel landmines, neither transfer anti-personnel landmines to anybody (Ottawa Treaty, Article 1, para.1). Second, each member state should destroy all anti-personnel landmines which it possesses or controls (Ottawa Treaty, Article 4). Furthermore, each member state should clear planted anti-personnel landmines under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention (Ottawa Treaty, Article 5, para.1 and 2). Third, each member state should provide assistance for landmine victims (Ottawa Treaty, Article 6).

Two draft bills which incorporated partially the duties of the Ottawa Treaty were introduced in the Korean National Assembly. On September 5, 2003, Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O presented a draft bill entitled as “the Bill on the Clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the Compensation to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Hyong-O KIM” (draft bill # 162627). The draft bill has several features. First, this draft bill defines anti-personnel landmines as “inhumane weapons that indiscriminately claim casualties.” This definition implies that landmines do not contribute to national security, but actually threaten human security. Second, this bill frames planting landmines as an act to destroy the land. Meanwhile, it describes clearing landmines as an act to “restore the land into a normal state.” Third, this draft bill emphasizes the need of governmental compensations for landmine victims who were unable to apply for indemnities, portraying the governmental compensation as a way to help landmine victims maintain “socially and economically stable life.”

Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk introduced the other draft bill entitled as “The Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk” (draft bill # 174946). The bill incorporates minimally the Ottawa Treaty. The bill does not mention the inhumane nature of anti-personnel

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18 Transferring mines with the intent to educate those who are involved in mine clearances is exceptionally accepted (Ottawa Treaty, Article 3).

19 There is a 4-year grace period for the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines after the entry into force of the convention for each member (Ottawa Treaty, Article 4).
landmines; it does not refer to banning the use of and destruction of stockpiled landmines or the clearance of planted anti-personnel landmines. Nonetheless, it proposes a special grace period for landmine “victims and their families” to apply for monetary compensations. In addition, it mentions the need of “minimum medical assistances” to landmine victims. Although the anti-landmine norm was gaining supports in Korea, landmine as an instrument of national security was too strong for Assemblyman Park’s bill to incorporate fully the Ottawa Treaty.

2. Research Design

This article assesses the explanatory power of several factors in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of whether to participate in the legislative process for the anti-landmine norm as a co-sponsor. Independent variables include partisan identification, the membership to the National Defense Committee, involvement in progressive movements, ideological orientations, and the presence of minefield in a district. This article employs a series of cross-tabulation analyses and a logit analysis.

**Dependent Variable.** It is a dummy of whether a assemblyman to co-sponsor the two anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly: Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s bill on September 5, 2003 and Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk’s bill on September 18, 2006.” 30 people co-sponsored Assemblyman Kim’s; 46 people co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill. Participants are coded “1” and others “0.”

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20 The co-sponsors were Kwon, Ki-Sool, Kwon, Oh-Eul, Kim, Seong Ho, Kim, Young Whan, Kim, Yong Hak, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Hee Sun, Namgoong, Seuk, Min, Bong-Gee, Park, Myung-hwan, Park, Chong-Ung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-Chul, Ahn, Sang Soo, Yang, Jung-Kyu, Eom, Ho Sung, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Keun Jin, Lee, Sung-Hun, Lee, Won Young, Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Jae-Oh, Lee, Jooh-Young, Lee, Chang Bok, Chang, Sung-Won, Chung, Kab-Yoon, Choung, Byoung-Gug, and Hong, Moon-Jong.

21 The co-sponsors were Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, Chang Il, Koak, Sung Moon, Kim, Duk Kyu, Kim, Sung-Gon, Kim, Jae Yun, Kim, Jae-Hong, Kim, Jong Yull, Kim, Tae Nyeon, Kim, Hyuk Kyu, Kim, Hyung-O, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Woong Rae, Park, Myung
Independent Variables. Five independent variables and one control variable are incorporated. The first independent variable is a dummy variable of whether a legislator is affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor is associated. Those who share a partisan identification with a leading sponsor are coded “1” and others “0.” The second is a dummy variable of whether a legislator is a member of the National Defense Committee. The members of the National Defense Committee are coded “1” and others “0.” The third is a dummy variable of whether a legislator was involved in progressive social movements. Those who were involved in progressive social movements are coded “1” and others “0.” The fourth is a dummy variable of whether a legislator was involved in progressive social movements (Donga Ilbo’s Editorial Department 2000; Donga Ilbo’s Editorial Department 2004). Also, we look at several other articles to code the involvement in progressive social movements (Park, C. 2004; Baik, W. and Shin, C. 2004; Cho, S. 2003; Choi, J. 2004; Hue, M. 2003). We identified 44 assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movements and were in active service in 2003: Kang, Samjae, Kim, Kyungjae, Kim, Geun Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Moon Soo, Kim, Boo-Kyum, Kim, Sung-Ho, Kim, Young-Choon, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Tae Hong, Kim, Hong Shin, Kim, Hee Sun, Park, Kwan-Yong, Suh, Sang-Sup, Sul, Hoon, Song, Young Gil, Shin, Geh-Ryeun, Shim, Kew Cheol, Shim, Jae-Kwon, Shim, Jae-Chul, Ahn, Young Keun, Oh, Se-Hoon, Oh, Young-Sik, Won, Hee-Ryong, Rhyu, Simin, Lee, Mykyung, Lee, Bu-young, Lee, Sang Su, Lee, Sung Hun, Lee, Woo-Jae, Lee, Jae Oh, Lee, Jong Kul, Lee, Chang Bok, Lee, Hae Chan, Lee, Ho Wung, Im, Jong Seok, Lim, Chae Jung, Chang, Kwang Keun, Chang, Young Dal, Chung, Dong-Young, Choung, Byoung-gug, and Hong, Sa-Duk. Also, we identified 56 assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movements and were in active in 2006: Kang, Ki Kab, Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, Chang Il, Go, Jin Hwa, Kwon, Young Gil, Kim, Geun Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Boo-Kyum, Kim, Young-Chun, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Tae Nyeon, Kim, Tae Hong, Kim, Hyun Mee, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Young Min, Roh, Hoe-chan, Dan, Byung Ho, Moon, Hee Sang, Min, Byung Doo, Park, Kye Dong, Baek, Won Woo, Sun, Byung Ryul, Song, Young Gil, Shim, Sang Jeong, Shim,
legislator has minefields in his/her district. Those who have minefields in their districts are coded “1” and others “0.”\textsuperscript{23} The fifth is a composite index of ideological orientations which Joongang Ilbo and the Korean Association of Party Studies made based on the survey data entitled “Ideology and Policy Orientations of Elected Assemblymen” in 2002 and 2004. The composite index ranges from “0” (very progressive) to “10” (very conservative). Lastly, the gender is incorporated as a control variable. It is coded “1” for female assemblymen and “0” for males.\textsuperscript{24}

3. Cross-Tabulation Analyses

We carried out a series of cross-tabulation analyses to find out whether the six independent variables explain the co-sponsoring behavior in the Korean National Assembly. First, Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation analysis

\textsuperscript{23} We referenced the two reports published by the KCBL to identify assemblymen whose districts had minefields when the two anti-landmine bills were introduced (The KCBL 2001; The KCBL 2006). We identified 33 assemblymen whose districts had minefields in 2003: Kang, Bong Kyun, Kang, Sung-Goo, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Young-il, Kim, Yong Hak, Kim, Yong Hwan, Kim, Hyung-O, Na, Oh-Yeon, Moon, Seok Ho, Park, Geun Hye, Park, Jong-Woo, Park, Joo Sun, Bae, Ki Yoon, Suh, Sang-Sup, Song, Hoon Suk, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoon, Doo-Hwan, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Sang Deuk, Lee, Yong-Sam, Lee, Jai Chang, Lee, Han Dong, Lee, Hae Goo, Chang, Sun Won, Cheung, Byoung-gug, Chung, Woo-taik, Chung, Jang Sun, Choo, Chin-Woo, Choi, Don-Woong, Choi, Byeong Gook, Han, Seung-Soo, Ham, Suk Jae, and Hwang, Woo-Yea. Also, we identified 16 assemblymen who had minefields in their districts in 2006: Ko, Jeou Heung, Kim, Yang Soo, Ryu, Keun Chan, Park, Sei-hwan, Shim, Jae-Yup, Ahn, Byong Yup, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Kwang-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Jai Chang, Chung, Moon-Hun, Cheung, Byoung-gug, Chung, Jang Sun, Choi, Chul Kook, Han, Kwang Won, and Hwang, Woo-Yea.

\textsuperscript{24} Women have been reported to be more inclined to participate in humanitarian aid than men (Sapiro 2003).
between partisan identification and co-sponsorship. It shows that when s/he was affiliated with the same political party where a leading sponsor was associated, a given legislator was more active in the co-sponsorship. Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s draft bill was more co-sponsored by his colleagues in the Grand National Party; Assemblyman Chan-Suk’s was more supported by his colleagues in the Uri Party.

The comparison between the two cases clearly shows that partisan identification is associated with the co-sponsoring behavior. Only 4 legislators co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill out of 13 assemblymen who had already been involved in introducing Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s bill in 2003 and were in active service in 2006: Kim, Hyung-O (the leading sponsor), Kim, Hee Sun (co-sponsor), Ahn, Sang Soo (co-sponsor), and Lee, Jae Oh (co-sponsor). Meanwhile, 9 legislators who had supported Assemblyman Kim’s and were in active service in 2006 did not support Assemblyman Park’s: Kwon, Oh-Eul, Kim, Won Wung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-Chul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Joo-Young, Chang, Sung-Won, Chung, Kab-Yoon, and Choung, Byoung-Gug. Eight legislators who had supported Assemblyman Kim’s in 2003 and did not support Assemblyman Park’s in 2006 were affiliated with the Grand National Party. The finding implies that the 8 legislators co-sponsored Assemblyman Kim’s, simply because they were members of the Grand National Party, considering that Assemblyman Kim’s bill incorporated more elements of the Ottawa Treaty than Assemblyman Park’s.

Second, Table 2 present the cross-tabulation analysis between committee membership and co-sponsorship. It appears that the members of National Defense Committee participated in the co-sponsorship less than others. The percentage of the committee members who co-sponsored the two anti-landmine bills is 17.14%, while that of the non-committee members who supported the two bills is 13.16%. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups.

The detailed comparison between the two cases unveils that the membership to the National Defense Committee was not related with the co-sponsorship. Assemblyman Park, Sei-hwan and Chung, Dae-Chul, who were members of the National Defense Committee and studies landmine issues with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O in 2001, did not co-sponsor Kim’s draft bill in 2003. Only Assemblyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae supported Kim’s bill out of 12
members of the National Defense Committee in 2003: Kang, Samjae, Kang, Chang-Sung, Kang, Chang-hee, Kim, Ki-Jai, Kim, Jong-Pil, Park, Sei-hwan, Park, Yang-So, Suh, Chung-Won, Yoo, Han Yul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Man-Sup, and Lee, Sang Deuk. Only 5 members (Kim, Sung-Gon, Song, Young-Sun, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoo, Jay Kun, and Lee, Keun-Sik) co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill in 2006 out of 17 members of the National Defense Committee.

It seems that partisan identification is more powerful than committee membership in the co-sponsorship. Assemblyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae, the only co-sponsor of Assemblyman Kim’s bill in 2003 out of 13 members of the National Defense Committee, was affiliated with the Grand National Party.
where Assemblyman Kim was a member; four assemblymen who supported Assemblyman Park’s bill in 2006 and were members of the National Defense Committee were members to the Yuri Party where Assemblyman Park was associated. This finding implies that the effect of partisan identification is dominant over that of committee membership.

Third, Table 3 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between the involvement in progressive social movements and co-sponsorship. It shows that the percentage of those who had been involved in progressive social movements and co-sponsored the anti-landmine bills is 22%, while that of those who had not been involved in any progressive social movement but co-sponsored the bills is 11.56%. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant.

Fourth, Table 4 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between constituency interest and co-sponsorship. It appears that those whose districts had minefields were more active in the co-sponsorship than those whose districts were free from landmines. The percentage of those who had minefields in their districts and supported the two anti-landmine bills is 16.33%, while that of those who were free from landmines and supported the two bills is 13.13%. However, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. It implies that constituency interests were not strong in the co-sponsorship.

Fifth, Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progressive Social Movement Participation</th>
<th>Co-Sponsorship</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s Chi^2(1) 7.7293  (Pr. = 0.005)
and co-Sponsorship. It appears that femaleasmbymen were less active in co-sponsoring the two anti-landmine bills than male counterparts. The percentage of female assemblymen who were involved in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm is 10.71%, while that of male assemblymen who supported the two bills is 13.73%. This finding is not consistent with reports that women are more active in peace movements. Considering that female assemblymen were over-represented at the National Defense Committee, this finding appears to be counter-intuitive to the conventional wisdom.
4. Logit Analysis

A logit analysis is employed to assess the relative explanatory power of the six factors at the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm in the Korean National Assembly. There are two notable findings in the table 6. First, partisan identification and ideological orientations have statistically significant coefficients. This finding is consistent with the cross-tabulation analyses. This finding implies that the log-rolling is linked with partisan identification, if there is. Also, this finding implies that co-sponsorship reflects personal beliefs on social issues. The fact progressive legislators were more active in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm is associated the linkage between anti-landmine norm and human security.

Second, committee membership, involvement in progressive social movements, gender and constituency interest do not have any statistically significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with the most of the cross-tabulation analyses in the previous section except for the case of involvement in progressive social movements. This finding that the involvement in progressive movements is not associated with the co-sponsorship implies that there is a strong ideological bifurcation among those who had participated in social movements (Choi, S. 2009). Considering that the composite index of ideological orientations is weakly associated with the involvement in progressive social movement (Pearson’s correlation coefficient = -0.3506, \( p \)-value = 0.000), some of those who were involved in progressive social movement become conservative.

The far right column of Table 6 presents a series of relative risks which the method of recycled predictions generates.\(^{25}\) There are two notable findings in

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\(^{25}\) The method of recycled predictions is helpful in assessing the substantive significance of independent variables in explaining the variance in dependent variable, partially overcoming the weakness of statistical significance tests. Three steps are taken to generate the right three columns in Table 6 for each independent variable. First, after finishing maximum likelihood analyses on the relationship between independent variables and a limited (categorical) dependent variable, the minimum value for a given independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for the independent variable and the average predicted probability (“minimum” in
the relative risk analysis. First, the composite index of ideological orientations is the crucial factor in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm. The probability of an extremely conservative assembly member participating in co-sponsorship is a meager 0.04405 in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies, while an extremely progressive assembly member’s probability jumps to 0.25940 (relative risk = 488.8%). The probability of the latter is approximately five times greater than that of the former.

Second, partisan identification is the second most influential factor in the co-sponsorship for the two anti-landmine bills. When a legislator is not affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor is associated, the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.05815. In contrast, when a legislator and a leading sponsor are members to a same political party, the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.16799 (relative risk

Table 6) is calculated. It is the reference probability. Second, the maximum value for the same independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for the independent variable and the average predicted probability (“maximum” in Table 6) is calculated. Third, the relative risk is calculated. The relative risk’s formula is [(the average predicted probability of “maximum” – that of “minimum”)/that of “minimum”] (STATAcorp 2002).

Table 6. Logit Analysis of Co-Sponsorship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable = Co-sponsorship</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Predicted Probabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>1.2220</td>
<td>0.3575</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Com. Membership</td>
<td>0.4276</td>
<td>0.6736</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.1113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Social Movement</td>
<td>0.4562</td>
<td>0.3710</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.1033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minefields within District</td>
<td>0.5204</td>
<td>0.5077</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.1085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Orientations</td>
<td>-0.3025</td>
<td>0.1157</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.04405*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.0703</td>
<td>0.5275</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.6174</td>
<td>0.5526</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>414</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi^2(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; chi^2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “Min.” = most conservative; “Max.” = most progressive.
The probability of the latter is almost twice as high as that of the former. Considering that the logit analysis controls the effect of the rest independent variables, this finding vindicates that political parties are strong networks in the co-sponsorship.

V. CONCLUSION

The Korean National Assembly is a locus where the anti-landmine norm is being empowered. Some legislators play key roles in introducing alternative frames to the conventional perspective to anti-personnel landmine as an instrument of national defense and domesticating the anti-landmine norm into the domestic legal system. They have been collaborating with the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Korean chapter of International Campaign to Ban Landmines. They have been trying to legitimize policies consistent with the global anti-landmine norm. It is an act of norm empowerment.

This study analyzes two aspects of empowering the anti-landmine norm: introduction and legal sponsorship. This study provides several implications to the understanding of the Korean politics. First, ideological orientations are more important than partisan identification in explaining the co-sponsorship for controversial issues in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies. Landmine victims have not formed into a well-organized actor in empowering the anti-landmine norm in Korean politics, even though their welfare is directly related with it. Progressive NGOs, humanitarian assistance groups, progressive politicians have been active in importing the anti-landmine norm. The ideological fault-line is critical in the co-sponsorship for the

Table 6 shows that the impact of ideological orientations upon the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is stronger than that of partisan identification by almost 3 times. This finding may reflect the partisan realignment from 2003 and 2007. The Millennium Democratic Party, the ruling party from 2000 to 2003, was under disintegration, when Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O sponsored the first anti-landmine bill in 2003; The Uri Party, the ruling party from 2003 to 2007, was plagued by the “lame duck” phenomenon, when Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk introduced the second anti-landmine bill in 2006. It is natural that partisan identification was not influential, when parties were realigned.
anti-landmine norm. It is consistent with previous empirical studies on the voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005; Chung, W. and Hong, S. 2009). Second, this study implies that there may be a strong ideological bifurcation among assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movement. Former activists in progressive movements were recruited into conservative parties as well as progressive ones. Some active assemblymen who had been involved in progressive movements may have become conservative. Their current ideological orientations have stronger than their previous activities in explaining the co-sponsorship.

This study has a couple of limitations for generalization. First, the anti-landmine norm is ideologically biased. Considering that the anti-landmine norm has been associated with politically progressive coalitions, it is natural that the ideological fault-line is more influential than partisan identification. Second, the number of cases is too small to identify an evolution in terms of NGO tactics. The KCBL targeted assemblymen whose districts had landmine fields in 2006, while it heavily lobbies assemblymen based on personal connections in 2003. Though the difference between the time points almost reaches the statistical significance level, it is hard to verify whether the KCBL's targeting change paid off.

This study has a couple of further research topics. First, it does not explain why female assemblymen were less inactive in co-sponsoring the anti-landmine bills. Though it is suspected that female assemblymen were not targeted by the KCBL or were isolated from military issues in general, this study does not provide a reliable answer yet. Second, the composition of co-sponsorship might affect the co-sponsorship size. Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s bill, which was co-sponsored by a committee member to the National Defense Committee, attracted 28 additional supporters; Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk’s bill, which was co-sponsored by 5 committee members to the same committee, got 40 additional supporters. Though the composition of co-sponsorship appears to affect the size, the number of cases is too small.
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