

【논문】

Two Kinds of Metaphor: Rebutting Camp (2006)*

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【Abstract】 In the first half of the paper, I aim to establish the ‘weak’ contextualist thesis that *some, not all*, metaphors contribute to ‘what is said.’ This directly depends on a criterion so-called ‘embedding tests’ by which one could judge whether some content belongs to ‘what is said.’ I will show how we cannot but arrive at a serious dilemma if we both accept a ‘strong’ thesis that metaphors *in general* belong to ‘what is said’ and maintains the reliability of the criterion; I argue, giving up on the ‘strong’ thesis, that there are two kinds of metaphors: ‘derivative’ and ‘non- derivative’ metaphor. In the second half of the paper, from the perspective of the two-kinds-of-metaphor proposal, I argue against the arguments in Camp (2006), where she argues that the four criteria by which ‘strong’ contextualists argue that metaphors contribute to ‘what is said’ really support for the original Gricean classification. In the course, you can see that the four criteria can be used to distinguish ‘derivative’ from ‘non-derivative’ metaphor, and support the existence of the two kinds of metaphor.

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I . Introduction

Consider the utterances of the following sentences:

- (1) Mary is a bulldozer.
- (2) The hourglass whispers to the lion's paw.¹⁾

It seems that there exists an intuitive gap between the “depths” of the metaphors: (2) sounds much “deeper” in the sense that it seems to be intended to evoke a wider range of perspectives than (1). Is this intuitive gap between them just a misleading appearance or a reality that we need to explain? If it is real, then what is responsible for the gap? These are the questions I will address in this paper.

Traditionally, the following two basic related assumptions on metaphor have been widely accepted as innocent: (i) that metaphor belongs to ‘what is implicated,’ or is derived as a kind of implicature (Grice 1989, Martinich 1984, Searle 1979), and (ii) that it comprises a single distinct kind in terms of it being an implicature. I will call this position “a ‘traditional’ thesis on metaphor”.

The assumption of (i), however, has been recently challenged by ‘contextualists,’ who argue that metaphor rather contributes to ‘what is said,’ or the intuitive truth conditional content of an utterance (Sperber and Wilson 2006, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004, Bezuidenhout 2001). This position is supported by using several criteria. And (ii) also is accordingly changed into this: metaphor is a single kind in that it belongs to ‘what is said.’ I will call this position on metaphor “a ‘strong’ contextualist thesis on metaphor.”

1) I borrowed this example from p. 287 of Camp (2006), which says that the metaphor is extracted from W. H. Auden's ‘Our Bias’, translated by Alex Sitnisky.

In this paper, I envisage a middle way between the two positions. They seem to have gone too far. Partially agreeing with each position, I will argue that some metaphors are implicatures, or belong to ‘what is implicated’ while the others are not a kind of implicature and do contribute to ‘what is said,’ the truth conditional content (though do, generally, give rise to at least some implicatures). I will call this position “a ‘weak’ contextualist thesis.” An important result of this division is that there are two kinds of metaphor, ‘derivative’ and ‘non-derivative’: the former conforms to the ‘traditional’ view while the latter does to the ‘strong’ contextualist view.²⁾ If my argument is successful, both the two traditional assumptions are refuted: some metaphors belong to ‘what is said’, and, accordingly, there are two kinds of metaphor in terms of the underlying distinct interpretative processes by which they are communicated.³⁾ This will be done in the first half of the paper.

In the second half, from the perspective of the two-kinds-of-metaphor proposal, I try to rebut the arguments of Camp (2006), where Camp argues that the four criteria by which contextualists argue that metaphors contribute to ‘what is said’ really support for the original Gricean classification. Finally, you can see that the criteria can be used to

2) Long after finishing writing up the draft of this paper in 2009, I’ve recently come to know that in her 2010 paper Robyn Carston has changed her position into a quite similar one to mine: there are two routes or modes of metaphor processing. Hence, strictly speaking, my argument in this paper is not against her current position, but against her past position, which is still supported by other ‘strong’ contextualists I mentioned. Even though she changed her position, I think that her argumentative strategy using ‘embedding tests’ for her past position is still valid in the explanation of what I will call ‘non-derivative’ metaphor.

3) Note that what I mean by ‘distinct interpretative processes’ is not about the overall mechanism of linguistic interpretation but about whether an interpretation of metaphor is ‘derivative’ or ‘non-derivative,’ which I will explain in the section 2. As Carston (2002, p. 352) argues, I also think the same mechanism of interpretation applies to the two kinds of metaphor.

distinguish between the two kinds of metaphor and so support their existence.

II. Two Kinds of Metaphor

In this section, I pose a serious dilemma for a version of the ‘strong’ contextualist position on metaphor that uses the criterion of ‘embedding tests’ to support their position. And I argue that we have to accept one of the two horns that there are two kinds of metaphor.

Contextualists (Carston 1988/91, 2002, Recanati 1989/91), adopting the ‘strong’ thesis, have been using so-called ‘embedding tests’ to show that some pragmatically derived contents contribute to the level of ‘what is said’, rather than ‘what is implicated.’ This criterion plays a significant role for any contextualist position on metaphor since without the criterion it would often be very difficult to determine whether some content belongs to either of the two. For example,

(3) She insulted him severely, and he hit her on the head with his umbrella.

It seems that there is a causal meaning AS A RESULT between the truth conditions of each clause and that we have trouble deciding whether it is within ‘what is said’ or ‘what is implicated.’ But when the sentence is *embedded* in the scope of a logical operator such as ‘if’ and the sequence of its clauses is changed, it becomes clear that the causal meaning falls in the scope of the logical operator.⁴⁾ This shows that the

4) Consider the conditionals:

- (a) If Mary insulted Tom severely and he hit her on the head with his umbrella, then Robert will be angry.
- (b) If Tom hit Mary on the head with his umbrella and she insulted him severely,

causal meaning contributes to the truth conditional content of the original (unembedded) utterance. Note, however, that ‘global (propositional)’ implicatures, generally, do not fall in the scope of an operator. Consider the discourse:⁵⁾

- (4) a. Ann: Does Bill have a girlfriend these days?
Bob: He flies to New York every weekend.
- b. If He flies to New York every weekend he must spend a lot on travel.
- c. Bill has a girlfriend who lives in New York.

Suppose that in a context the implicature of Bob’s utterance is (4c). However, (4c) cannot fall in the scope of the conditional in (4b). It follows from this consideration that this ‘embedding tests’ criterion helps judge whether some pragmatically derived content contributes to the truth conditional content or implicatures of an utterance. Thus, Robyn Carston emphasizes the power of the criterion by saying “strongest evidence against implicature analysis”.⁶⁾ She directly applied this test to metaphors to show that their metaphorical meaning is within ‘what is said.’ One of the examples she used is as follows:⁷⁾

- (1) Mary is a bulldozer.
- (1’) If Mary is a bulldozer, she’ll be ideal on the committee.

then Robert will be angry.

Given the truth-functionality of ‘if’ and ‘and’ in these conditionals, they must be truth-conditionally equivalent. However, this does not seem so. The causal direction between the conjuncts contributes to the truth conditions of the antecedent, and this makes the whole conditionals truth-conditionally distinct. See Carston (2002, p. 191-197) for more details.

5) The example of (3) is taken from p. 193, Carston (2002)

6) Section 6 of Carston (1988/91) By ‘implicature analysis’ she means an analysis, e.g., one that regards the causal meaning of the utterance of (3) as contributing to its implicature, not its truth conditions.

7) p. 338, Carston (2002)

Carston argues that the proposition expressed by (1') is that if Mary is a BULLDOZER*, she will be ideal on a particular committee. The occasion-specific or *ad hoc* concept BULLDOZER*, which denotes a category of things that exhibit an aggressive disposition, falls in the scope of the conditional operator. This decisively supports the position that metaphors contribute to the explicit content, rather than the implicit. From this, we can see that contextualists have heavily relied on the criterion to establish, at least, their position on metaphor as belonging to 'what is said.'

That said, now let me apply the 'if' embedding test to the following poetic metaphor:

(2') If the hourglass whispers to the lion's paw, everything is transient.

At least, my intuition strongly says that this sentence sounds strange or awkward, to which, I think, ordinary speakers would agree. Such feeling may come from the fact that we can't easily make sense of what is intended to communicate by the antecedent. One may think that the reason (2') sounds all the more strange is that the intended or sufficient context needed for the derivation of its metaphor is destroyed. However, even in the readings of it within its poetic context, or in the poem,⁸⁾ it

8) The poem is as follows:

Our Bias by W.H. Auden

The hourglass whispers to the lion's paw,
The clock-towers tell the gardens day and night,
How many errors Time has patience for,
How wrong they are in being always right.

Yet Time, however loud its chimes or deep,
However fast its falling torrent flows,

seems difficult for us to get to a certain determinate metaphorical meaning of the antecedent; we often cannot but process its literal meaning. Contrary to (1'), it is quite clear that the metaphorical meaning of the antecedent, whatever it would be, doesn't fall in the scope of the operator. Camp acknowledges this, saying:

I am willing to hazard that the poet means something like that every source of activity and forcefulness is ultimately undone by the passage of time. I'm not at all certain of this. But even if I were, I'd still be very hesitant to report the poet as having *said* this, precisely because his metaphor is so clearly intended to be elusive and allusive. (2006, p. 287, her emphasis)

Her point is that it is difficult to pinpoint the determinate metaphorical meaning of poetic metaphors. Carston (2010) also agrees with me that for these poetic metaphors we usually don't get to their determinate metaphorical meaning but to their literal meaning. That is, she also accepts the existence of two kinds of metaphor in terms of processing:

What I am suggesting is that there are two kinds or modes of metaphor processing: (a) a process of rapid on-line ad hoc concept formation which is continuous with the kind of context-sensitive pragmatic adjustments to encoded lexical meaning that are made in comprehending a variety of other loose and/or non-literal language uses, and (b) a process in which

Has never put the lion off his leap
Nor shaken the assurance of the rose.

For they, it seems, care only for success:
While we choose words according to their sound
And judge a problem by its awkwardness;

And Time with us was always popular.
When have we not preferred some going round
To going straight to where we are?

the literal meaning of metaphorically used language is maintained, framed or metarepresented, and subjected to slower, more reflective interpretative inferences that separate out implications that are plausibly speaker-meant. (2010, p. 308)

If you want, you can apply the test to the following poetic metaphors, which I borrowed from Carston(2010, p. 295-296).

(5) Love is the lighthouse and the rescued mariners. (Oskar Davico, 'Hana')

(6) The fog comes
on little cat feet.
It sits looking
over harbour and city
on silent haunches
And then moves on.
(Carl Sandburg, 'Fog')

What does this application of the test to the poetic metaphor show? It shows that no *determinate* metaphorical meaning contributes to the truth conditions of the antecedent. Otherwise, it should be seriously against speaker/hearer intuitions. This is the first horn of a dilemma, which can be stated as follows:

The first horn: According to the 'embedding tests' criterion, some (poetic) metaphors do not contribute to 'what is said.' Therefore, there are two kinds of metaphor: one contributing to 'what is said', and the other not.

This is clearly against the 'strong' contextualist position that metaphor in general belongs to 'what is said.' To avoid this result, the other immediate alternative may be as follows:

The other horn: The ‘embedding tests’ criterion is not reliable when deciding whether some metaphorical content belongs to ‘what is said’ or ‘what is implicated.’

This horn also is not favourable for the position at all because it loses its “strongest” evidence against the ‘what is implicated’ analysis. So this is a serious dilemma for this version of the ‘strong’ contextualist position that uses the test.

It might be objected that the dilemma only applies to the version of the ‘strong’ contextualist position that uses the criterion and is not a problem for other versions of it. He or she would be right on this. We need not have considered the ‘embedding tests’ criterion at all in the first place, considering the fact that, as Camp acknowledges in the quotation above, it seems very clear that we cannot confidently report the speaker of (2) as having said a determinate metaphor even when it is not embedded. Without the help of the criterion, we could have established the falsity of the ‘strong’ contextualist position. We can say that the truth conditions of the poetic metaphor are its semantic (conventional) meaning, not any determinate metaphorical meaning. And this is only confirmed in a clearer way by the ‘embedding’ criterion. It directly follows from this consideration that we have to accept the first horn, not the second.

Further, it might be objected that the reason that (2’) makes no sense is because we cannot identify the metaphorical content of the antecedent. And this seems to suggest that the metaphorical content falls in the scope of the operator.⁹⁾ However, it is not clear whether the source of the feeling of nonsensicalness comes from the anomalousness of the semantic (conventional) meaning of, the unidentified metaphorical content of, (2) or both. I think the source is the first one, just as in the

9) Thanks to Alison Hall for raising this objection.

case of Chomsky's example of semantic anomalousness, "Colorless green dreams sleep furiously". By embedding (2) in the scope of the logical operator, the literary context that pushes us into finding its literary significance is, at least to a great extent, damaged. And even with the presupposition that (2) is used for some poetic effects, ordinary people cannot but get to its semantic (conventional) content first when it is embedded. If this is correct, it follows that we have to take *the first horn*, not the second.

If what I have said is true, we have to discover what characteristics are responsible for each kind of metaphor. I will argue that the kind belonging to 'what is said' is '*non-derivative*' in the sense that metaphors of this kind are not the conclusion of any logical inference, but a *starting* premise for further reasoning to derive intended implicatures. This is a significant insight of contextualism in the explanation of metaphor: we do not go through the Gricean inference in every instance where an expression is uttered metaphorically. On the contrary, those metaphors of the other kind are '*derivative*' in the sense that they are a conclusion of inference or reasoning, which is an important point contributed by Grice that a conversational implicature is characterized by the fact that it is the conclusion of a reconstructed argument. Note that the following explanation for each kind is attributed to the basic ideas of 'strong' contextualism, in particular, Relevance Theory, one of its versions, and the Gricean explanation, respectively.

First, I will discuss the non-derivative kind. Consider the following discourse.

- (7) A: Do you think we can stop Tom continuing the project?
 B: Hmm. He is a bulldozer!

To the hearer A, B's metaphorical utterance functions as a starting

premise to derive further intended conversational implicatures, not as a conclusion of reasoning. To derive the negative answer, A would need to go through this inference:

- (8) a. TOM IS A BULLDOZER*.
- b. IF SOMEONE IS A BULLDOZER*, THEN IT IS DIFFICULT TO STOP WHAT HE IS DOING.
- c. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO STOP TOM CONTINUING THE PROJECT.

As you may easily see, (8c) is the conclusion of this inference and a conversational implicature of the B's utterance in (7). But why do we exclude the possibility that (8a) also is a conclusion of, or a conversational implicature of, another inference, as the 'traditional' view on metaphor explains? To this question, the result of 'embedding tests' kicks in, that the same metaphorical content could be in the scope of a logical operator. As I said above, it is impossible for a 'global' conversational implicature to be in the scope of a logical operator.

Let me discuss the 'derivative' kind of metaphor. Traditional explanations can apply to this kind of metaphor. According to Grice (1989) and Martinich (1984), metaphors are arrived at or calculated through inference as a conversational implicature. For example, if one says "you are the cream in my coffee", blatantly violating the maxim of truthfulness, the hearer first arrives at its semantic (conventional) meaning, and assuming that the speaker observes the Cooperative Principle, the hearer looks for its metaphorical implicature with the help of 'what is said' and the context of utterance. Generally, to work out a conversational implicature, the hearer follows this pattern:

He has said that q; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that p; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that p is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that p; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that p; and so he has implicated that p. (Grice, 1989, p. 31)

As you can see, the hearer, first, gets to the semantic (conventional) meaning of the sentence uttered, and with the recognition that the speaker is violating the maxim of truthfulness and, possibly, others, and with the assumption that he is observing the Cooperative Principle, the hearer starts to look for an intended implicature.

Why is then it the case that some metaphors are arrived at derivatively while others non-derivatively? Before answering the question, it is important to notice that it ultimately depends on *the hearer side* whether some metaphor belongs to either of the kinds. If he directly arrives at the metaphor of an utterance, it is non-derivative, and if not, it is derivative. In this sense, the distinction of the kinds of metaphor is *relative to the hearer*. The distinction varies according to individuals and contexts. Therefore, it is possible that a metaphor that is very ordinary and so belong to the non-derivative kind to one person can be derivative to another even in the same context.

For the non-derivative kind of metaphor, usually, the speaker's primary purpose is communicative in an effective, explicit way. So he explicitly makes available the background context needed for the hearer to get to the hypothesized metaphor to the hearer in an easy enough way to the level that he could get to it first without any feeling of absurdity. If this succeeds, the hearer gets to the intended metaphor non-derivatively. One might ask why, to this end, people use a metaphorical utterance rather than literal in the first place. To use this kind of metaphor is more

effective than to use its literal counterpart, if it exists, in a way, e.g., in terms of process effort. Uttering “Mary is a bulldozer,” for instance, is more effective than uttering its literal counterpart “Mary is a kind of person who does not allow anyone to get in her way” in that the former is much shorter and so the process effort is less exerted.

On the other hand, the speaker of the derivative kind of metaphor aims not just at explicit, effective communication but at getting across literary, often times, poetic, or some ‘deeper’ effects. To this end, the speaker intends for the hearer to make a ‘detour’ from the semantic (conventional) meaning to the significance that he intends to convey, i.e., to make an inference from what is explicitly said to what is implicated. In other words, to get across a wider range of effects, the speaker intends the hearer to exert more effort. Among other effects, a distinctive kind of effect achieved by this kind of metaphor is a poetic effect. Its characteristic is to provoke endless perspectives or implicatures. Sperber and Wilson say, “We suggest that the peculiar effect of an utterance that achieves most of its relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures is properly called a *poetic effect*.”¹⁰ Often times, the intended content by poetic metaphorical utterances is not determinate; it is due to this indeterminacy that the hearer cannot get to a metaphor by an utterance like (2) with confidence, and he or she cannot help first arriving at its semantic (conventional) meaning. Soon or later, the hearer tries to hypothesize one metaphor as is implicated from the conventional meaning, and derives a set of further implicatures, but by virtue of the indeterminate nature of the metaphor intended by the utterance, he continues to hypothesize another metaphor, driving another set of implicatures, and ad infinitum. This explains why such metaphors as (2) exist and should be considered as derivative.

10) p 707, Sperber and Wilson (1987)

III. Rebutting Camp (2006)

In this section, I will argue that other four criteria used by contextualists to support their ‘strong’ position on metaphor actually suggest that there exist two kinds of metaphor. This will be demonstrated in the course of rebutting the arguments of Camp (2006), where she argues that the four criteria by which contextualists argue that metaphors contribute to ‘what is said’ really support for the original Gricean classification. The four criteria are as follows: ‘what is said’ (i) as what is ordinarily said to be ‘said’, (ii) as the first meaning a hearer consciously gets to, (iii) as a vehicle for implicature, (iv) as what is available for explicit response.

1. On her first argument against ‘what is said’ as what is ordinarily said to be ‘said’

The crux of the criterion is that we have to respect the ordinary intuition of the concept of ‘say’ when we decide ‘what is said’ with an utterance. If we follow the intuition, the Gricean ‘what is said’, the minimal proposition, which is the result of only two pragmatic processes, reference assignment and disambiguation, from the logical form of an utterance, is not enough to capture people’s more enriched conception of ‘say’. Consider the discourse:¹¹⁾

- (9) A: How about Bill?
 B: Bill’s a bulldozer.
 A: That’s true. But isn’t that a good thing in this case? We want someone who’ll stand up to the administration and get things done for our department.
 C: I disagree that he’s a bulldozer; that exterior hides someone who’s

11) p. 157, Bezuidenhout (2001)

basically insecure. But either way, Bill wouldn't make a good chair.

It is likely that when they are asked A and C would report B as having *said* the metaphorical content of B's utterance of the sentence, which may be phrased like 'Bill is a kind of person who does not allow anyone to get in his way'. Therefore, metaphor belongs to 'what is said,' not 'what is implicated,' according to Bezuidenhout.

It has been argued by authors such as Carston (2002, p. 168-170) that this criterion is theoretically useless due to the fact that there are variants of understanding of 'say'. But Camp rescues this criterion by pointing out a useful sense of 'say':

I believe that our ordinary practice of speech-reporting is sensitive to a certain standard of explicitness, and that speakers can legitimately object to reports that disregard this standard. Specifically, it is normally only appropriate to report speakers as having 'said' contents to which they have *openly and obviously* committed themselves by their utterance. (Camp, 2006, p. 286, her emphasis)

If we accept this usage of 'say' for the criterion, there are highly poetic metaphors for which people hesitate to report the speakers as having said a certain determinate metaphor. For example, again,

(2) The hourglass whispers to the lion's paw.

Camp concludes from this observation that this criterion cannot do its alleged job of supporting the 'strong' contextualists' position that metaphors are within 'what is said'. However, we need to notice that she hasn't yet accomplished her original aim of showing that the criterion rather supports the traditional position on metaphor because she still needs to

explain the case of B's utterance in (9), whose metaphor is reported to be said. Obviously, the semantic content of utterances of sentences is reported to be said by the sentences and it is still possible that the metaphorical content of B's utterance contributes to its truth conditions. In other words, to achieve her aim, she should have put forward reasons why we have to exclude the possibility that the metaphor contributes to 'what is said' of the utterance.

I think that this criterion with the usage of 'say' she proposed can be used to distinguish the two kinds of metaphor *in a way*. If a hearer is *not* in a position to report the speaker of a metaphor as having said a determinate metaphor, it belongs to the derivative kind. However, it cannot be used to draw a clear line between more "moderate" derivative metaphors unlike (2) and non-derivative ones since there are derivative ones whose meaning is determinate. Rigorously speaking, therefore, the criterion should be considered as an indication that there are two kinds of metaphor, not as an accurate tool for distinguishing between the kinds.

2. On her second argument against 'what is said' as 'first' or 'primary' meaning

The second criterion says that the first interpretation of an utterance is 'what is said' of the utterance. The first interpretation of metaphorical utterances is their metaphorical interpretation, rather than their literal one; therefore, the metaphorical one should be considered as 'what is said.' In this sense, the metaphorical meaning is 'direct' or 'primary'. Camp, against this, argues that if we properly understand this 'directness', the criterion rather supports the Gricean classification. However, I will argue that this conclusion directly arises from her misunderstanding of an important point in Recanati (2001).

First, let me consider how Camp develops her argument. She says:

... both Recanati and Bezuidenhout ground ‘directness’ in ordinary language users’ intuitions about meaning; Recanati encapsulates this as a ‘transparency condition’ on indirectness, or what he calls ‘p-nonliterality’:

P-nonliteralness is transparent to the language users ... This transparency is not a contingent property of p-nonliteralness. It is definitive of p-nonliteralness that the sort of inference at issue is conducted at the ‘personal’, rather than sub-personal, level and is therefore available to the language users (Recanati, 2001, p. 270-1).

The relevant question thus becomes how to understand ‘transparency’.
(2006, p. 288)

According to this passage, if some content is ‘transparent’, it is ‘p-nonliteral’ in Recanati’s sense. On this ‘transparency’, Camp proposes two interpretations, stronger and weaker. In the stronger one, for a content to be ‘transparent’ a hearer should consciously recognize the inferential processes of deriving indirect or secondary meaning. She rejects it on the grounds that it is too strong in that we normally are not aware of the two inferential steps to derive the secondary meaning. In the weaker one, for a content to be ‘transparent’ a hearer should be aware of its nonliteralness. That is, that “there is something ‘special’ about the use of words”¹²⁾ is available to the hearer if the content is ‘transparent.’ And she accepts this transparency condition on indirectness as plausible, saying:

This seems right: I believe that conversational implicatures and sarcastic utterances are nonliteral because I, like non-theorist speakers, recognize that my intuitive sense of their intended meanings differs markedly from, while depending upon, their conventional meanings. (2006, p. 289)

12) p. 289, Camp (2006)

Then, she argues that this condition *rather* supports the Gricean ‘what is said’ because when people are asked to justify how they get to the metaphorical meaning they do mention about the “two layers of meaning” of the utterance in question. This means that the metaphorical content is ‘transparent’ in the weaker construal, and, from this, metaphors are not direct. So by the contextualists’ own criterion, metaphors are not within ‘what is said’, but within ‘what is implicated’, according to Camp.

Nevertheless, this conclusion is based on the serious misunderstanding of Recanati’s idea on ‘transparency condition.’ When hearers of those utterances are asked to justify their interpretation after completing the process of understanding them, who would deny that there is a marked special metaphorical meaning different from the encoded literal one? I don’t think this is the correct construal of the condition. Note that the reason he posits the condition is to show that metaphor is within his ‘p-literal’,¹³⁾ rather than ‘p-nonliteral’ and that *at the very moment when* people understand metaphors, *not* when they are asked to justify their metaphorical understanding *later*, it is not ‘transparent’ or felt that the encoded meaning exceeds the conveyed metaphorical one. The ‘transparency condition’ should be applied to *the moment* when hearers are in the process of understanding metaphorical utterances. If they feel or are aware that the conveyed meaning of an utterance goes beyond the encoded one at that moment, it would be both ‘transparent’ and indirect. Recanati says:

Now *metaphor*, in its most central varieties, *I count as p-literal*. For example, if I say that the ATM swallowed my credit card, I speak metaphorically; there can be no real ‘swallowing’ on the part of an ATM, but merely something that resembles swallowing. Still, *an ordinary*

13) Here, we can think that his ‘p-literal’ is equivalent to the enriched ‘being within what is said’.

hearer readily understands what is said by such an utterance, without going through a two-step procedure involving the prior computation of the 'literal' meaning of the utterance (whatever that may be) and a secondary inference to the actual meaning. (2001, p. 271, my emphasis)

This passage just follows the one on the transparency condition. The last sentence clearly indicates what his transparency condition means. It follows that her argument is not convincing at all.

Camp (2006, p. 290), again, takes issue with poetic metaphors, which seem to make the transparency condition even on the correct construal problematic. I think she is right on this. So the criterion defended here can be used to distinguish the two kinds of metaphor: simply, if a metaphor is 'transparent' on the correct construal, it is derivative whereas if one is not, it is non-derivative.

3. On her third argument against 'what is said' as the vehicle for implicature

According to Camp, the third criterion is that if an interpretation of an utterance functions as an input for the other further interpretations, it is within 'what is said.' Above all, stating the criterion in this way is misleading since what contextualists such as Bezuidenhout (2001) want to establish with this criterion is that metaphorical meaning comes *first* and so can function as a premise for further implicatures, not that *any* interpretation that can function as an input for other ones is within 'what is said'. Without this restriction, it can be refuted very easily, for it is too obvious that global conversational implicatures can function as an input for further implicatures. So the way we should see the criterion must be that it is not an independent one but an *additional piece of evidence for* the point that metaphorical interpretation comes first, or is 'direct', which

is argued in the second criterion. Let me elaborate on how this makes her argument unsuccessful. Consider the following utterance.

(10) She's the Taj Mahal.

Camp agrees with Bezuidenhout that if (10) is uttered in an appropriate context in an ironical way, the ironical interpretation is 'conditioned upon'¹⁴⁾ the metaphorical one. That is, the metaphorical interpretation is in the scope of the ironical one. Contextualists argue from this that metaphors are more 'direct' than the other interpretations. Camp finds a good explanation of this order of interpretation, saying:

Why should the order of interpretation be fixed in this way? I find a suggestion of Josef Stern's (2000, p.237) appealing: *metaphor operates on expressions to determine propositional contents, while irony operates on propositional contents to determine new contents. ... If we grant that the interpretation of metaphor operates on expressions and that of irony on contents, then we can see why the order of interpretation should be fixed as it is: all word-based interpretation should ideally be completed before content-based interpretation begins.* (2006, p. 292 my emphasis)

As you can see in this quote, accepting Stern's explanation, she makes sense of the reason the specific order of interpretation exists. The reason is that metaphor is a word-based interpretation and, only after that, other content-based interpretations begin. In other words, without the content of the parts (words) of the sentence uttered being determined, no proposition expressed by the sentence would be determined, and no further reasoning based on the utterance could begin. Then, she wonders how the very existence of the two stages of interpretation could support the 'strong'

14) p. 291, Camp (2006)

contextualists' position on metaphor. She presents a counterexample:

(11) George's elocutionary style has been subjected to the most rigorous refinement by sustained exposure to the very best company.

She argues that in (11) by using the elevated expression 'the very best', the speaker implicates that the kind of company is upper-class, elegant people, and by 'rigorous refinement' she implicates a kind of dinner parties where George has learnt erudite *bon mots*. If (11) is uttered in an ironical way, their implicatures are in the scope of the ironical interpretation. That is, in the ironical one, the expressions implicate the opposite meaning of the first implicatures. Analogously with (10), in (11), only after the word-based interpretations finishes, the content-based one begins. Let us see how this is considered as a counterexample by Camp: the word-based interpretations in (11) are implicatures that contextualists never accept as being within 'what is said,' so even if we grant that metaphor is a word-based interpretation, it is not established that it belongs to 'what is said' Schematically, this situation can be illustrated in (12):

(12)	word-based interpretation	→	content-based interpretation
	In (10), metaphor	→	irony
	In (11), implicatures	→	irony

For (11) to be a real counterexample, it should be the case that Stern or contextualists accept that *any* word-based interpretations belong to 'what is said'. But she didn't justify it. I do not think contextualists have that assumption. Rather, they should support the following picture:

(13)	word-based interpretation	→	content-based interpretation
	In (10), metaphors contributing to 'what is said'	→	irony
	In (11), implicatures derived from 'what is said' by words	→	irony

As I said in the beginning of this section, that contextualists have this picture is justified by both the second criterion, by which they argue that metaphors belong to ‘what is said,’ and the fact that they definitely don’t think those word-based implicatures generated by (11) belong to ‘what is said’. If we assume that they are consistent when arguing for those two criteria, they must have the picture of (13).

And you can easily see that this criterion when combined with the second one can be used to confirm that non-derivative metaphors can serve as a *starting* premise for deriving further implicatures. Of course, derivative ones can function as a non-starting premise for further implicatures.

4. On her final argument against ‘what is said’ as what is available for explicit response

The final criterion is that the content to which we can agree or disagree in a discourse is always within ‘what is said.’ For instance, in (9), A and C are agreeing and disagreeing to the metaphorical content of B’s utterance, not its literal meaning; hence, metaphor belongs to ‘what is said’. Against this, Camp shows that people can agree or disagree not only to metaphors but also to other cases of implicatures, and concludes that the criterion is not appropriate for its purpose. Consider the following discourses in each of which the first utterance is ironically used:

(14) A: Jane’s really been a fine friend to me in these last few weeks.

B: Oh yes, she sure has: just the sort of ally and boon companion that we all dream of.

(15) A: All the brilliant theorists must have gone to lunch.

B: No they haven’t; they’re all just too lazy to come to work in the morning.

Camp pushes us to note that in these discourses people can reply to even ironical interpretations in the same way as to metaphorical ones, and argues that the criterion doesn't work since irony is definitely a case that contextualists also think of as being within 'what is implicated'.

However, notice that it hasn't yet established her original purpose that the criterion rather supports the Gricean classification of metaphor as belonging to 'what is implicated'. In other words, even if the criterion subsumes the cases of implicatures, it never follows that *any* content to which we agree or disagree is an implicature since obviously, we usually agree or disagree to uncontroversial instances of 'what is said'. So it is possible that some metaphors belong to 'what is said'. From the viewpoint of the two-kinds-of-metaphor, we need to examine whether the criterion can be used to distinguish between the kinds. If it works, it follows that Camp's purpose isn't achieved since there are metaphors that belong to 'what is said'. The conclusion is that the criterion can function to distinguish the two kinds of metaphor. The argument is as follows. For ordinary metaphors such as that of B's utterance in (9), it is accepted that they can be agreed or disagreed. On the contrary, consider this possible but odd discourse:

(16) A: Do you agree to this sentence 'The hourglass whispers to the lion's paw' in this poem?

B: ... What do you mean by it? I can't get it.

It appears that B cannot agree or disagree at all to the poetic metaphorical sentence even with the recognition that it is intended to mean a metaphorical content. The criterion shows that there *are* metaphors to which we cannot agree or disagree, and, as expected, those metaphors to which we can agree or disagree are non-derivative ones while those to

which we cannot are derivative ones.

IV. Conclusion

I hope that I have established the ‘weak’ contextualist thesis that there are two kinds of metaphor: derivative and non-derivative ones. The former belongs to the implicit part of speaker’s meaning, conforming to the traditional position. The latter contributes to the explicit part, in accordance with the ‘strong’ contextualist position. The thesis is supported first by the most powerful criterion, the ‘embedding test’. Then I have explained what basic characteristics are responsible for each kind of metaphor. In the second half of the paper, from the perspective of the two-kinds-of-metaphor, I argue against the arguments of Camp (2006). In the course, the four other criteria by which we can distinguish the two kinds of metaphor are saved. Therefore, the five criteria in total consistently support the existence of two kinds of metaphor. From this consideration, I conclude that the ‘weak’ thesis is the case.

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국문요약

두 가지 종류의 은유: 캠프(2006) 논박

정지문

이 논문의 전반부에서 필자는 은유 일반은 아니지만 몇몇의 은유는 (문장 발화의) ‘말해진 것’에 기여한다는 ‘약한’ 맥락주의 논제를 옹호하는 것을 목표로 한다. 이는 어떤 내용이 ‘말해진 것’에 속하는지 아닌지를 판단할 수 있는 소위 ‘내포 측정 테스트(embedding tests)’ 기준에 직접적으로 의존한다. 필자는 은유 일반이 ‘말해진 것’에 속한다는 ‘강한’ 맥락주의적 논제를 받아들이면서 동시에 ‘내포 측정 테스트’ 기준의 신뢰성(reliability)을 주장할 때 심각한 딜레마 상황에 빠진다는 것을 보인다. 그 후 필자는 (이 상황에서 벗어나려면) ‘강한’ 맥락주의 논제를 포기하고, ‘파생적(derivative)’ 은유와 ‘비파생적(non-derivative)’ 은유라는 두 가지 종류의 은유가 있다는 것을 받아들여야 한다고 주장한다. 논문 후반부에서는 이 두 가지 은유 논제의 관점에서, ‘강한’ 맥락주의자들이 은유 일반이 ‘말해진 것’에 속한다는 것을 주장하는데 사용한 네 가지 기준들이 사실 (전통적) 그라이스적 구분을 지지한다는 것을 주장한 캠프(2006)의 논변을 논박한다. 이런 과정에서 필자는 이 네 가지 기준들이 ‘비파생적’ 은유로부터 ‘파생적’ 은유를 구별하는데 사용될 수 있고, 사실 두 가지 종류의 은유가 있다는 것을 지지한다는 것을 보인다.

주요어: 은유, 맥락주의, 말해진 것, 합의된 것, 엘리자베스 캠프