

특집논문

Coping with Colonialism: Mita and Indian Community in the Colonial Andes^{*}, ^{**}

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Abstract The Potosi *mita* system reflects that the Spanish colonial system heavily relied on the supply and control of native labor force for its survival. While the Potosi *mita* system functioned as a key apparatus to absorb rural population into the Spanish imperial enterprises in the Andes, a greater number of Indian peasants discarded their ethnic communities to avoid the duties. The increase of Indian emigration which coincided with the Potosi silver crisis augmented a need for a new pool of labor force largely comprised of Indian women. The growing status shift of Indian peasants to flee migrants and a greater burden on Indian women imply that the Spanish exploitation of native Andeans transformed in its mode and intensity as colonialism matured. What was the impact of the *mita* labor draft on native Andean society? How did peasant men and women cope with growing pressure in the Spanish colonial tributary regime? Inquiring these questions, this article contemplates on the Indian community as a unit through which native Andeans built relationship to each other not only for survival but also for social and cultural identification. Confronted to colonial demands, native Andeans chose multiple strategies, selectively relying on individual as well as collective resources. On the one hand, as a member of ethnic communities, native Andeans collaborated regardless of their sex, age, or marital status, providing labor force for diverse imperial enterprises. On the other hand, native Andeans chose to discard the connection to their ethnic communities and

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adapted to the colonial system arranged by the Spanish norms when they could not afford to fulfill their communal duties, or when they could improve their economic and social status. In sum, this article concludes that native Andeans maneuvered the colonial system by relying on diverse strategies such as conformity to forced labor, migration, service in wage labor, market trade for their individual and communal survival, which enabled them to sustain their traditional values and institutions despite growing external burdens.

Key words Mita system, Indian Community, Demographic Change, Gender Strategies, Cacique, Potosi Silver Mine, Andes

I. Introduction

The Potosi silver mine was one of the most profitable and reliable assets for the Spanish colonists in the America. It was particularly important from the early to the middle stage of Spanish colonialism in the Andes – for about one and a half century after its discovery in 1545, by far surpassing the total silver output from the entire New Spain (currently Mexico and the Central American region). Once accounting for 74 percent of the world’s silver production at its prime of the late sixteenth century (Moore 2010, 59), the outstanding performance of the Potosi silver mines was premised on a mixture of factors including technological advance through the adoption of the mercury amalgamation technology, geographic concentration of silver ores in the Cerro Rico, ecological and demographic conditions of the Andean highland, and the implementation of a forceful labor recruiting system called *mita*, etc, each of them distinctively affecting the fate of the silver industry in Potosi.¹⁾ In this regard, the radical reform in the 1570s by the fifth viceroy of

1) The Potosi silver mines are located in the capital city of the department of Potosi (called *la Villa Imperial de Potosí* during the colonial period). Until the late eighteenth century, Potosi belonged to the viceroyalty of Peru, comprising the region south of Lake Titicaca called Charcas or Upper Peru (Current Bolivia). Later in 1776, it was transferred to the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata as the viceroy of Buenos Aires took control of Upper Peru and the Audiencia of Charcas.

Peru, Francisco de Toledo was a plain reflection of how these diverse factors were ingeniously combined toward a greater profitability of the Potosi silver industry, ultimately leading to the ascendancy of the Potosi mine to the core of imperial enterprise not only in the viceroyalty of Peru but also in the New World as a whole. While ultimately designed to boost up the silver production in Potosi, the Toledo's reform was remarkably concentrated on modifying the native Andean socio-economic structures so that the colonial state could maximize its control over the Andean regional and local settings, and thus efficiently absorb the native population into its imperial enterprise – principally its Potosi silver industry through the channel of the *mita*.

That is to say, the Toledo's reform exemplified that the colonial state began carrying out its imperialist intervention in the Andes, first of all, by delineating the native population, largely comprised of peasants as its colonial subjects, who accordingly became accountable for a much broader spectrum of demands including individual and collective tribute payment in the form of cash, goods, and most importantly labor power. The consequences of such an intervention were quite comprehensive and enduring, characterizing even some of the contemporary Andean social features. Specifically, the resettlement policy (*reducciones*) of the Toledo's reform entailed the reorganization of space in the Andean highland, through which *ayllu* (a pre-Conquest kinship group) was re-instituted by free Indian communities constructed after the Spanish-style towns (Glave 1999, 505; Saignes 1999, 89; Stavig 2000, 534). This modification of *ayllus* corresponded to the dismantling of the verticality – conceptualized as a vertical archipelago by John Murra (2002) – that had been obtained through a complementary access to heterogeneous Andean ecological zones as a basis for subsistent agricultural production. In this altered scheme, the vertical structure was modified into a horizontal and centralized system. Likewise, the newly established urban centers that were inhabited largely by the Spaniards and *mestizo* elites started claiming a greater control

over the countryside where a large proportion of native Indians resided (Moore 2010, 79-80). This centralization of the Andean countryside paved the way for changes in economic and social life of the native population. Most remarkably, diminished verticality gradually undermined subsistence agricultural production, accelerating the incorporation of peasants into the “mining-centered commodity economy” (Moore 2010, 81).

The more immediate and devastating impact of the Toledo’s reform, however, derived from the implementation of a compulsory labor recruiting policy (the *mita*). Originating from the Inca *mit’a* system – a reciprocal labor rotating system, the colonial *mita* system drained men and resources out of the Indian communities. Its pressure was imposed on the Indian society at multiple levels, both collectively and individually (Saignes 1985; Saignes 1999; Stavig 2000). For instance, particularly notorious for its exploitative nature, the *mita* system provoked a growing number of male peasants and their family members to desert their Indian communities so that they could avoid the *mita* duties. As the status shift of Indians from *originarios* (regular community members, formerly called *naturales*) to *forasteros* (migrant Indians without tie to their originating communities) increased, it resulted in a greater demographic and economic pressure to the communities that were bound to provide their quota of *mita* workers (*mitayos*). As such, each Indian community was responsible for deterring its own members from abandoning or neglecting their *mita* duties. Singled out as the most basic unit for the recruitment and supervision of *mitayos*, the Indian community, thus, had to rearrange its cultural and institutional structures to meet this newly imposed demand. In that respect, the role of *caciques* (traditional elite leaders) was particularly noteworthy. As several historians have well noted, *caciques* in the colonial Andes had taken a unique position in the interaction of Indian society and the colonial state (Gisbert 1992; Monteiro 2006; Murra 2002; Saignes 1999; Serulnikov 2003; Spalding 1973). On the one hand, as a spokesperson

for their communities, *caciques* were expected to defend the Indian traditions and social norms in the interaction with the colonial rulers. On the other hand, assigned to serve the Spanish imperial interests, the authority of *caciques* was enacted on the condition of fulfilling their duty of delivering resources from their respective communities to the colonial state. Thus, standing in the middle of two contesting parties, *caciques* had to reconcile diverging interests of the Indian society and the colonial state.

The magnitude of the Potosi mining deposits foretold that the Andean native population, as the cheapest and largest labor pool, would bear a much greater weight for the colonial governance as colonialism matured. As its outset, the Toledo's reform in the late sixteenth century illustrates that the imperial interventionist policy started transforming drastically broad dimensions of rural Indian society. As a core source of colonial revenues, particularly as a provider of the *mita* service, the rural Indian society to the Spanish colonists was, thus, assets to be exploited as well as to be protected. Then, how did the colonial state achieve, or intend to fulfill such seeming contradictory needs? Given the abusive nature of the *mita* system, how did Indian peasants manage to alleviate its damaging effects so that they could preserve their distinctive systems without being entirely disrupted? Why didn't the Andean people completely discard the connection to their ethnic groups even when their ethnic communities operated as a venue through which the colonial power was most fiercely enforced? Why didn't or couldn't the Andean peasants openly defy the colonial *mita* system even though they apparently recognized the exploitative nature the system? What were the major strategies of the Andean people to cope with growing colonial demands that were particularly intensified through the compulsory *mita* labor draft? These questions allow us to explore the complex interface of shifting colonial governance and the Andean people's strategies that accompanied such economic and social changes. This article purposes to explore how native

Andeans coped with such growing colonial pressures. As well, this article is interested in inquiring how traditional Andean institutions such as *ayllus* (later transformed into Indian communities) and *caciques* shaped native people's strategies. In the following pages, I first examine the Potosi *mita* system and labor composition in the Potosi mining sector. Then, I examine how the *mita* system placed burdens on Indian communities, leading to the transformation of Indian society. Specifically, in this section, I delve into the role of Indian women and *cacique* leaders as a component of community strategies. At the concluding section, I evaluate the strategies of native Andeans to cope with colonial demands and the role of traditional institutions in the making of such strategies.

II. The Potosi *Mita* and the Colonial Labor System

1. The Potosi *Mita* System and the Native Andean Population

Differently from the majority of mineral deposits in the Spanish American colonies that had been moderately extracted by the pre-Columbian natives, the silver veins and most notably the Cerro Rico of Potosi began to be worked by the Spanish conquerors since 1545, about a decade after Pizarro and his army made a definite victory in the Incan territories (the area largely comprising current Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador). Since then, the Potosi mines had been one of the foremost sources of mineral income in the New World, producing about two thirds of the world's silver production at its prime of the late sixteenth century (Moore 2010, 59), and over half of the total silver output from the colonial America in the early seventeenth century (Klein 1992, 54).²⁾ The Potosi mine satiated the Spanish Crown's thirst for mineral revenues

2) Silver from Potosi in 1592, for instance, corresponded with about 44 percent of Spain's average annual state spending between 1593 and 1597 (Bakewell 2010, 225).

which were vital so that its empire could maintain the hegemonic status worldwide while affording to oversee its transatlantic colonies. Despite its prominence, the Potosi mine went through several ups and downs in its silver production. Carmen Salazar-Soler (2009, 84) marks out Potosi silver production into the following four stages: (1) rapid growth of production by using the Incan mining technology (1545-1550); (2) production decline due to mineral depletion (1551-1570); (3) golden age driven by the introduction of mercury amalgam technology and the *mita* system (1571-1614); (4) chronic decline (from 1615 to early-eighteenth century).

Enabling the remarkable success in the Potosi mining sector, the *mita* system was implemented by Toledo in the 1570s, which made up an important component of his extensive reforms in Upper Peru (Alto Peru in Spanish, corresponding to the Audiencia of Charcas).³ Above all, Toledo's reforms, which ultimately aimed to reinforce the colonial dominance and enhance its taxation in the Upper Peru region, transplanted the pre-Columbian *ayllu* (real and fictive kinship group) to free Indian communities confined by the *reducciones*. Even though traditional practices and values of the *ayllus* of Quechua and Aymara groups continued guiding the social life of these new social units, such as communal land rights, priority of kinship ties, and inheritance by principles of parallel descent, Toledo's resettlement measure condensed previously dispersed nearly 900 communities in Upper Peru to 44 units (Klein 1992, 39).

In this altered environment, dependency or reciprocal exchange among the *ayllu* members of heterogeneous ecological tiers was remarkably weakened,

3) Established in 1558, the Audiencia of Charcas was one of few *audiencias* in the New World which possessed judicial authority and executive power (Klein 1992, 44). Its territorial boundary continued to change over time. However, it largely referred to the region south of Lake Titicaca encompassing the following provinces in the vast altiplano region: Charcas, los Carangas, La Paz, Chucuyto, el Collao, los Canas and los Canches (Saignes 1985, 66).

especially because the colonial *ayllus* (or Indian communities) were now relocated into permanent and contiguous settlements (Klein 1993, 58).⁴⁾ The resettlement policy encloses a desire to centralize the colonial governance by deterring mobility of the Indians among diverse ecological zones, thus attempting to reduce the significance of the puna zone (highest pasture zone) – a region relatively more difficult for the Spanish colonists to control ? to their subsistence. The colonial *mita* system was also reliant on the previous notion of reciprocity in which the Spanish Crown replaces the position of the Incan emperor at the highest order of the hierarchy, ensuring the communal land rights and community autonomy to the Andean peasants in exchange for their services. The colonial system, however, fundamentally differed from the Incan *mit'a*. Above all, the colonial *mita* labor draft was designed to maximize the extortion of peasant labor force at a lower cost while the pre-colonial *mit'a* was both a forced labor draft and a redistributive channel of state revenues. In other words, the *mita* in the Spanish America was exclusively motivated by economic considerations whereas in the Incan Empire, it operated to absorb surplus labor from rural villages as well as to consolidate the dominance of the Incan rulers by reciprocating commoners' service and royalty in kind. This distinctive nature of the colonial *mita* led it to be experienced as an

4) Sergio Serulnikov considers the Toledo's resettlement policy as one of the most remarkable failures in the colonial governance. New colonial administrative units largely encompassed the pre-conquest social units of the Andes, which enabled the traditional ethnic/social groups of the region to survive the colonial restructuring. However, peasants continued their residence in previous agricultural plots which were vertically dispersed whereas the town of *reduccion* was mostly concentrated by mestizo or Spanish officers (2003, 9-10). From this perspective, the ethnic affiliation continued operating as a major social rule of the Andean people while Toledo's reform attempted to replace it by contiguous residence (2003, 10). Serulnikov's position implies that two distinctive rules of social organization – one drawn by the traditional ethnic affiliation and the other by contiguous residence – might have operated simultaneously in this altered colonial system, creating social and political dynamics which transformed over the course of Spanish colonialism in the region.

exceptionally onerous and exploitative system.⁵⁾

The Potosi *mita* stipulated that Indian men between 18 and 50 in 16 Upper Peruvian provinces were subject to the labor draft. Each year, one out of seven men of these provinces was required to serve as a *mitayo* in the mines.⁶⁾ Initially, these *mitayos* were to work for one week followed by two weeks' rest. Both rigid regulations (where men were subject to the draft regardless of their marital status) and harsh working conditions certainly made the system notoriously demanding.⁷⁾ On the other hand, there were additional factors that intensified the burden of *mitayos*. Differently from the Incan *mit'a*, the colonial *mita* barely subsidized *mitayos* for their service. A fixed daily wage of 4 *reales* was paid to the forced workers, the amount which barely covered *mitayos*' subsistence needs (Zulawski 1987, 406). What is worse, *mita* workers had to rely on their personal means or communal provisions to afford journey back and forth the mine. The law stipulated a payment of half-wages for days spent on travelling to and from Potosi. However, only a portion of actual

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- 5) For instance, the *Mercurio Peruano* in 1792 described the departure of *mitayos* as follows, "The Indians that go to Potosi and its refining mills leave their homeland with very much mournfulness ... The day of their departure is very sad ... [After mass] they pay [the priest] in order to entreat from the Allpowerful the success of their journey. Then they leave for the plaza accompanied by their parents, relatives and friends; and hugging each other with many tears and sobs, they say goodbye and followed by their children and wife, they take to the road preoccupied with their suffering and depression. The doleful and melancholy nature of this scene is augmented by the drums and the bells that begin to signal supplication." (*Mercurio Peruano*, (1792), Edicion Fuentes, I, p. 208, re-quoted from Stavig (2000) p. 540)
- 6) The quota of *mitayos* for individual Indian communities was determined by the type and magnitude of resources, number of members, and the level of skills of respective communities (Glave 1999, 516)
- 7) Vicente Cañete y Dominguez, a late eighteenth century colonial official, described labor conditions in the Potosi mines as follows, "one bad night can break the most robust and well nourished man. For these unhappy ones all nights are very bad. They climb and descend overloaded with four arrobas [100 lbs.] of weight, through caverns filled with horror and risk, that seem like habitations of devils." (Pedro Vicente Cañete y Dominguez (1952) *Guía Histórica, Geográfica, Física, Política, Civil y Legal del Gobierno e Intendencia de la Provincia de Potosí*, Potosi: Editorial Potosi, p. 112, re-quoted from Stavig (2000) p. 546)

travelling distance was paid for or, this requirement was simply ignored by the mine owners (Tandeter 1981, 119). For residents from provinces distant from Potosi, the journey to the mine implicated two or three months' of walking and camping, fighting against hunger, cold and hazardous environments.

Entrenched at the core of colonial imagination both for its notoriety and its economic importance (Serulnikov 1996, 204), the *mita* system mounted great pressures not only on *mitayos* and their families but also on their free Indian communities until the demise of the Spanish dominance loomed large. The pressures from the *mita* system were, however, experienced somewhat differently as external conditions changed. Above all, the decrease of Indian population which could be retrieved only later than mid-eighteenth century continued intensifying the burden of remaining members of the free Indian communities.⁸ The male Indian members of the community (*originarios*) subject to the *mita* service had to complement the resultant labor shortage, either by increasing the service duration in the mine or by curtailing the rotating term (Tandeter 1981). Similar burden was imposed on remaining members of the community who were to subsidize the absence or shortage of labor force eligible for the *mita* demand. While demographic decline tended to intensify the overall pressure of the *mita* labor draft on the entire Indian population, the impacts of the Potosi silver depression since the early-seventeenth century seemed rather ambiguous.⁹ The Potosi mining crisis mostly came from deteriorating ore quality caused by the exhaustion of richer

8) By the mid-eighteenth century, Oruro and Potosi had lost over half of their populations after a century of population decline. The number of *mitayos* drastically decreased as well. In the 1570s, about 13,500 Indians worked as a Potosi *mitayo* annually. However, by the 1690s, its number was estimated merely at some 2,000 (Klein 1992, 65).

9) Silver production in Potosi began to rise in the mid eighteenth century. However, it never recuperated its previous scale and continued staying below the half of late sixteenth century production (Klein 1992, 68-69).

and more easily accessible surface deposits (Bakewell and Holler 2010, 231; Klein 1992, 71). Confronted to the higher production cost in the Potosi mine, greater priorities started being given to the Mexican mines in New Spain that were experiencing fast and constant growth in silver production since mid-seventeenth century, ultimately surpassing Peruvian silver output in a few decades (Bakewell and Holler 2010, 298-300; 353). The lower profitability in the Potosi mine might have relieved the state demand on its silver production to a certain degree, even if this change was insufficient to offset the pressures imposed on the Potosi *mitayos* by enduring demographic decline (Zulawski 1987, 418).

2. Peasants Turning into Miners: *Originarios, Forasteros and Yanaconas in Potosi*

The sixteenth and seventeenth depopulation of native people in the Andes was astonishing in its extent. According to David Cook's demographic research on the colonial Andes published in 1981, the colonial Peru had lost about 93 percent of its native population over a century after the conquest, where the number of Indians had gone down from around 9,000,000 in the pre-Columbian era to about 600,000 by 1620.¹⁰ Similarly, Sánchez-Albornoz's research published in 1977 indicates that the total population of ten provinces in Upper Peru had decreased from about 280,000 to 70,000 between 1530 and 1722.¹¹ Depopulation of native people was certainly the most noteworthy demographic change in the colonial Andes after the conquest, posing a constant and far-reaching threat to rural villages and

10) Noble David Cook (1981), *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520-1620*, New York, p. 247 (Re-quoted from Zulawski (1987) p. 417)

11) Sánchez-Albornoz (1977) *La población de América Latina desde los tiempos precolombinos al año 2000*, 2nd ed. Madrid, pp. 107-110, 122, (Re-quoted from Zulawski (1987) p. 418)

eventually to the colonial system that was fundamentally reliant on the Indian labor force for its maintenance. On the other hand, it is notable that rural villages in Upper Peru were simultaneously undergoing a rather different type of demographic change as a consequence of the Potosi *mita* system. Specifically, the Potosi *mita* labor draft most directly affected the adult male Indians (*originarios*), leading to the male depopulation of rural villages that were subject to *mita* demand. The demographic change in Chucuito, one of the most prominent Potosi *mita* provinces near the Lake Titicaca, well illustrates this phenomenon. Providing the highest number of Indians to Potosi, Chucuito had adopted the *mita* service a few decades earlier than the Toledo's implementation of the system (Premo 2000, 68). In 1566 when the visita of a former governor of Chucuito was made, Chucuito registered 23,093 adult female residents compared to 16,668 adult male inhabitants, representing the demographic pressure of the *mita* labor draft (Ibid. 70). This trend continued until the seventeenth century. For instance, the number of *originarios* in Chucuito dropped by 74 percent between 1578 and 1684 (Ibid. 66). The male depopulation created gender disparity among remaining residents of rural villages. In Juli, a rural village of the Chucuito province, most of remaining people were "women and old people" (Ibid. 70).

Then, how did the *mita* draft lead to the male depopulation in rural villages of Upper Peru? Above all, we need to take into account the possibility that some demographic data available to us might have excluded the adult men who had temporarily left home villages to complete their *mita* duties at the point of survey.¹² Still, the gender imbalance of the *mita*-bound villages cannot be fully explained by the absence of *mitayos* because *mitayos* were almost always

12) In this respect, Bianca Premo notes that even when the male members who were absent for the *mita* draft was counted into the census, much higher number of women was recorded than men in seven villages Chucuito in 1566 (2000, 70).

accompanied by their female counterparts, or by their female relatives throughout their draft service.¹³⁾ The assistance of female family members was deemed crucial for the *mitayos* to fulfill their duties especially because the wages paid for the *mita* service and journey back and forth the mine were insufficient to cover *mitayo*'s subsistence needs. To make ends meet, women that had joined their husbands or male relatives in their journey to the mine earned additional income by getting involved in a variety of activities, working as a domestic servant, selling foodstuffs or goods at the market, or even assisting their husbands at the mine (Premo 2000, 74; Zulawski 1990, 101). The assistance of family members became more indispensable as a growing number of mine owners began imposing a fixed quota to the *mitayos* to multiply individual worker's output, the practice that greatly increased labor intensity in the mine. Realizing that they were incapable of completing the quota on their own account, *mita* workers had to rely on the contribution of extra labor force usually from their family members if available. Otherwise, they had to pay penalties from their own pocket for the unmet work load or pay to hire a temporary help to accomplish their work load (Tandeter 1987).

Given that *mita* migration was usually carried out as a family strategy and thus entailed women's involvement as much as men's, the male depopulation of rural villages in Upper Peru had better be explained from rather permanent decline of taxable adult males. Differently from male migrants bound by labor draft whose absence was involuntary and temporary in its nature, this type of male depopulation was largely caused by male migrants who had intentionally deserted their home villages to avoid *mita* duties or who had refused to come back after fulfilling their term in the mine. Called as *forasteros*, these migrants

13) In the province of Canas y Canchis, one of the *mita* provinces in Cuzco, about a quarter or a third of its total population was living in Potosi either as *mitayos* or their accompanying families in 1689 and 1690 (Stavig 2000, 543).

referred to the Indians who did not reside in the places of their origin and thus gave up any communal rights. The Toledo's reform in the 1570s which stipulated only adult males residing in the Indian communities to be subject to the *mita* draft and tribute payment enabled *forasteros* to be exempt from the *mita* draft.¹⁴ The growth of *forasteros* until the late seventeenth century was impressive. In Cuzco, about half of this population was categorized into *forasteros* by 1690 (Bakewell and Holler 2010, 309). Similar phenomenon was also observed in Upper Peru. In 1645, 22 percent were classified as *forasteros* and 14 percent as *yanaconas* (Indians who do not claim any tie to Indian communities by birth) among 71,000 Indian men in Upper Peru. In 1683, their proportion grew larger, comprising 46 percent of entire male Indian population in the region (Zulawski 1990, 9).

Both classified as voluntary wage workers, the status of *forasteros* and *yanaconas* reveals an important dimension of the Andean native society that could not be fully encompassed by free Indian communities. Furthermore, the status transition from *originarios* to *forasteros*, and less frequently a shift from *forasteros* to *yanaconas*, reveals how colonial tribute systems, particularly the *mita* labor draft generated disruptive ramifications on the Andean social order by accelerating the so called “cholification” or acculturation of Quechua or Aymara Indians to the Hispanic world. The fleeing of *originarios* was one

14) This regulation was annulled later. Confronted to the decline of *originarios*, the colonial government changed its previous legislation in order to include *forasteros* and *yanaconas* as taxable subjects. From that moment, three groups of *originarios*, *forasteros*, and *yanaconas* were registered as colonial tributary categories, where the *originario* group was imposed a highest rate of tax while the other two groups were charged at the same rate (Klein 1993, 11-63). However, the incorporation of *yanacona* group into the colonial tributary system seems to have been made earlier than that of *forastero* group because *yanaconas* were obligated to pay tax based on their occupations since the early colonial stage (Zulawski 1987, 411). Accordingly, we can interpret that a primary intention of new tributary regulations of the eighteenth century was to delineate growing *forasteros* populations as a taxable category, and integrate them into the colonial tributary system.

major source of status change to *forasteros*. As above discussed, *mita* labor draft was one of the most notorious colonial institutions for a number of factors including heavy workload, dangerous working conditions, a long-distance journey to and from the mine. The meager payment worsened the situations of draft workers, pressuring *mitayos* to rely on their own means for survival that derived either from *mitayos*' personal property or supplies from their community of origin. Even worse, a number of *mita* workers found themselves further indebted after their return to home villages because they were often pressured to pay additional tax for a period that they had been absent for the *mita* duties (Tandeter 1981, 120). Confronted to such pressures, *mita* workers either migrated to the villages that were exempt from *mita* duties, ran away from their journey back to villages, or continued staying in Potosi. While some of these fugitive Indians continued fulfilling a portion of their community duties – by paying tributes or completing *mita* duties – to preserve the bond to their community of origin (Stavig 2000, 542), most of *forasteros* eventually lost contact with their home villages and chose to integrate into new communities or turn into a free wage worker in the Potosi or adjacent mining sites or in haciendas.

Turning into *forasteros* assured an exemption from tribute payment and *mita* duties, even though these benefits stayed valid only until the early eighteenth century when the shortage of *originarios* pressurized Spanish colonials to register Indians unbound by free communities as taxable subjects. On the other hand, a shift from *originarios* to *forasteros* involved giving up a range of privileges, most prominently an access to communal land, a right to participate in the governance of community, and the capacity to participate in the Spanish labor market while maintaining land rights (Klein 1993, 62). It also entailed getting detached from reciprocal networks in the communities of origin that had shaped a wide spectrum of *originarios*' daily choices and opportunities. Once integrated into a new community, *forasteros* could gain

access to a communal land only by making labor contract with originario families or through marriage to a female originario of this new setting (Klein 1993, 61-74).¹⁵ Given that this kind of labor contracts were insecure by its nature and this instability grew as land scarcity escalated for demographic or economic pressures, marriage to a female originario must have been a more popular channel through which most of male *forasteros*, especially those without a private land, could obtain a stable access to a communal land, eventually formulating their own family unit in this new free community.

Differently from *forasteros* who could recognize their communities of origin with considerable specificity? some of them even continued fulfilling a part of their tributary duties regardless of their present residence in order to maintain reciprocal ties to their home villages, *yanaconas* usually identified their place of origin from urban cities (Zulawski 1987, 423-425). Getting involved in a wider spectrum of occupations including wage laborer in the mining site or in private agricultural plots, personal servants of Spaniards, attendants to religious institutions, merchants, or artisans, *yanaconas* were strongly integrated into the Spanish labor market, often for generations. Many of them adopting Spanish languages and clothing style, *yanaconas* were perceived as an acculturated Indian whose ethnic status was deemed rather ambiguous compared to *forasteros* or *originarios*.¹⁶

15) There were some *forasteros* who owned private land. Premo says that the integration of these *forasteros* with land contributed to stabilizing Indian communities as they brought additional resources into new communities (2000, 84). According to Premo, in several communities of Cuzco, *forasteros* seemed to have succeeded in formulating a stable family unit. However, in certain places like Juli village of Chucuito province, some 90 percent of *forasteros* did not have any right to land or any other resource (2000, 86).

16) Providing an example of an Indian who identified his father as a quadroon and his mother as a mestiza upon the question of a census taker, Zulawski notes that the colonial officers classified him as a yanacona because this category could be applied to any person who matched the Indian attributes by colonial standards even though whose ethnic origin was unclear (1987, 425-426).

The distinction among *yanaconas*, *forasteros*, and *originarios* was also applied to the mining site, affecting a wide angle of Indian miners' working and living conditions. At the initial phase of the Potosi silver extraction between 1540s – 1560s, mine owners had relied on two channels to obtain Indian miners, either by contracting *yanaconas* (known as *indios varas*), or by recruiting Indian peasants through the mediation of *caciques*. These two groups of miners had distinctive occupational roles in that *yanacona* group was largely classified into skilled labor required for the refinery while *originarios* represented a bulk of unskilled carriers, called *apiris* (Monteiro 2006, 202-203) This division of occupational role by miner's status continued valid after the Toledo's reform in the 1570s. In this changed system, *originarios* who were mandatorily conscripted *mita* workers without previous training were assigned to unskilled labor mostly as ore-carriers (*apiris*) or less frequently as grinders (*mortiris*) among others,¹⁷⁾ while *yanaconas* and *forasteros* were usually assigned for skilled labor as pick-men (*barreteros*) or for other tasks in the refining mills (Tandeter 1981, 101-109).¹⁸⁾ This distinction, however, had a certain degree of flexibility in it. *Mita* workers were paid for lower wages at 4 *reales* a day compared to 6 *reales* for wage workers without holding any rights often entitled to wage workers to take a piece of ore extracted from the mines for

17) Ricardo Godoy notes that the number of forced laborers in Potosi had increased three-fold right after the adaptation of mercury amalgamation technology (1985, 104).

18) Apart from the Potosi mine, a significant number of Indian peasants were allocated to the Huancavelica mercury mines through the *mita* system. According to Monteiro, the number of *mitayos* for the Potosi mine in 1578 was estimated at some 14,000 workers while the Huancavelica mine received about 2,200 *mitayos* (2006, 205). As for the labor composition in the Potosi mine, Monteiro quotes an anonymous report showing that among 19,000 workers involved in the mining sector, 4,000 men listed as *mitayos* and 600 free workers worked in the mines while 4,000 free workers and 600 *mitayos* worked in the refinery. This figure is consistent to the tendency that was quoted in Tandeter's study. According to data provided by "Visita de Cerroe Ingenios" of 1790, there were 2,376 *mitayos* and 2,583 free miners in the Potosi mining sector in the 1790s. Of 2,376 *mitayos*, 1,509 men were classified into ore-carriers while 1,039 free miners worked in the mills for diverse tasks related to the amalgamation process (Tandeter 1981, 101).

sale in the market which could value more than their salary in the mines (Tandeter 1981, 114; Zulawski 1987, 411).¹⁹⁾ To offset such insufficient payment, it was customary for *mitayos* to be hired as a wage worker during subsequent two weeks of rest after a shift of one week's labor. Thus, the boundary of free and forced workers in the mine often blurred because forced workers actually became a ready pool of salaried workers. This hybridity of mine workers implies that free and forced labor in the mine coexisted, complementing each other. It also implies that work at the mine instigated *mitayos* to be incorporated into capitalist labor market even though they continued maintaining their originario states, thus familiarizing Indian peasants with paid employment and facilitating prospective fugitive Indians to get adapted to a new way of life outside their native communities.

The *mita* system disclosed Indian peasants into the commodity economy even if their commitments were only partially made. Their lives in the mine, however, were still meticulously controlled by their racial and ethnic status. In a few decades after the adoption of *mita* system, Potosi grew into one of the largest city in the world, containing about 160,000 residents in 1610 when the city experienced the highest population growth. Called by the name of Villa Imperial de Potosi, its population exceeded that of London (130,000) or even that of Sevilla and Venice combined (150,000) (Moore 2010, 60), acquiring an international reputation of a metropolitan city. Although the majority of population derived from Indian workers whose number surpassed 10,000 men in the mid-sixteenth century (Accarette 1998, 79), the city also attracted people in a variety of occupations such as government officers, soldiers, policemen, merchants, market vendors, service providers, brokers,

19) Even though the state stipulated 4 *reales* as a daily salary for *mitayos*, the actual salary often fell behind the official level. The actual salary for free and forced miners fluctuated for diverse factors such as silver output, market profitability, availability of *mitayos* and wage workers, etc.

and priests, among others, from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. Despite such diversity, the residence of *mita* workers was constrained within the indigenous barrio. Separated from the Spanish barrio by a stream that ran across the city, this indigenous barrio was again divided into smaller settlements by the communities and provinces of origin (Stavig 1987, 548). Such segregation was applied not only to residential units but also to much broader dimensions of everyday lives including affiliation to particular parishes of the Catholic Church and death registers (Stavig 1987, 549). This segregation of Indian miners by race (separation among diverse racial groups such as Spaniards, *mestizos*, *mulattos*, blacks, Indians, etc.) and ethnicity (separation by communities of origin) resulted in solidifying their bond to home communities.

In this fashion, the Potosi *mita* labor draft had made countervailing repercussions when it came to the maintenance of Indian society. On the one hand, it motivated a growing number of Indians to discard ties to their ethnic groups by turning into a voluntary laborer. Even if Indian miners did not entirely shift to the status of *forasteros*, they were pressured to join the capitalist labor market to make ends meet. Hence, the system accelerated the acclimatization of the Indians into the Hispanic capitalist system to a certain degree. On the other hand, as the *mita* system identified Indian communities as a basic unit of surveillance, it ended up reinforcing individual Indian's material as well as emotional attachment to their home places. Likewise, as I will discuss more thoroughly in the following pages, the *mita* system played a critical role in legitimatizing the logic of colonial reciprocal pact between traditional Indian society (*República de los Indios*) and the colonial system (*República de los Españoles*), therefore consolidating the autonomy of Indian society. Moreover, the growing shift of *originarios* to *forasteros* also generated immediate and comprehensive effects on the Indian communities. Above all, subsequent absence or shortage of *originarios* led to additional tributary

pressures on respective communities. As I have previously noted, the *mitayos* were registered in a community unit, which implies that it was both an individual and communal responsibility to supply a stipulated number of *mitayos* on a regular basis. Losing registered *originarios* for a number of reasons which included flight, desertion, or death, incurred an immediate burden on *caciques*, traditional *ayllu* authorities, who were in charge of the recruitment and delivery of *mitayos* to and from the mine. The loss of *originarios* had to be compensated by *caciques'* own means or by additional communal tributary payment either in goods or in cash (Premo 2000, 90-91), eventually turning into a burden on people who were left behind in free Indian communities. In this respect, the growth of *forasteros* in the seventeenth century indicates that the *mita* system increasingly translated into greater tributary pressures on the people remaining in the Indian communities, particularly female Indians whose contribution to the sustenance of their *mitayo* family members was little recognized and thus whose labor was perceived as an “underexploited commodity” (Graubart 2000, 546). In the next part, I delve into the interface of Indian communities and the colonial state. Specifically, I inquire the following questions: What were the effects of colonial control – particularly the compulsory *mita* labor draft – on Indian communities, especially on Indian women? What were cultural and institutional mechanisms that enabled Indian communities to respond to the colonial pressure without being fully subjugated to it? How did native Andean society re-define itself over the course of confrontation and/or adaptation to the colonial domination?

III. Colonial Domination and the Indian Communities

1. Indian women and gendered effects of the mita system

The notion of “dual republics” which stipulated a series of privileges as well

as obligations of “*República de los Indios*” points to the unique position of Indian communities in the colonial Andes. Resorting to a pre-conquest logic of reciprocity in order to define its relationship to native Andean society, the Spanish imperial state endeavored to take the place of the Inca Empire without openly challenging native hierarchical and moral orders, thereby minimizing the overall cost of its colonization project.²⁰⁾ Representing a basic unit of the Republic of Indians, Indian communities in this colonial system served as a key vehicle through which colonial domination was enforced and from which the greatest portion of colonial revenues were generated. Meanwhile, Indian communities played the role of a safeguard to native Andean society through which Indian peasants were able to preserve their traditional social order and continue practicing subsistence agriculture without being fully incorporated into the Spanish capitalist systems. The Potosi *mita* labor draft is a good example of how the Spanish crown and Indian communities were dependent on each other for survival. As I have above discussed, the Potosi silver production was heavily subsidized by Indian communities and the *mita* obligations were imposed not only on individual Indians but equally on individual communities. On that account, Indian peasants complied with the *mita* duties first and foremost as a member of their ethnic communities, that is to say, to secure their privileges as originario which included use-rights to communal land, attachment to reciprocal kinship exchange, and claims to autonomous communal decision-making, among others. As such, it was crucial for remaining community members to share any financial or physical burdens of their *mita* members so that these *mita* members could effectively fulfill their duties. In the following pages, I discuss such collective responses of Indian communities by concentrating on the role of Indian women who

20) Irene Silverblatt points out that Spanish control was grounded on a principle that it respects native custom and tradition as long as these are not contradictory to the laws of its mother land (1987, 111).

played the most prominent role in such endeavors.

It is well noted that native Andean women have actively collaborated with their male counterparts in private as well as in public sector for the maintenance of their societies. The contemporary gender ideology in the Andes has been conceptualized through the notion of gender complementarity (Bourque and Warren 1981; Hamilton 1998; Mayer 2002; Nash 2001). Examining gender ideology in Inca and colonial Peru, Irene Silverblatt traces the origin of this concept from kin-based norms of reciprocity in the pre-Inca *ayllus* (1987, 3-19), which, from her perspective, was further strengthened by the Incan cosmology and socio-economic institutions. Historical accounts of Indian women's activities also indicate that gender complementarity continued guiding native Andean social life throughout the colonial era (Graubart 2000; Premo 2000; Silverblatt 1987; Zulawski 1990), implicating Indian women's active role in spite of the conventional view associating the *mita* system with a male enterprise. As such, native Andean women's contribution arose largely out of household and community strategies. Specifically, as I have earlier discussed, native Andean women contributed to the *mita* system by accompanying their male family members in their journey to the mine.²¹ The supplementary labor of these family members was vital for each *mitayo* to carry out his quota of work in the mine, the importance of which by far grew since the seventeenth century as concerns for profitability

21) According to a population census of Potosi in 1779, the total number of married men (of all racial groups) in Potosi was surveyed to be 5,319 while that of married women (of all racial groups) was to be 5,315. Single men (of all racial groups) were estimated at 2,388 whereas single women (of all racial groups) were to be 2,714. Such gender balance is also valid in the category of "forced migrants and their families". In this group, the number of men was 1,969 while that of women was 1,933 (Maria del Pilar Chao (1965) "La población de Potosí en 1779," *Annuario del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas*, viii, Rosario, p. 180, re-quoted from Tandeter (1987) p. 109). This survey confirms the view that *mita*-migration was made not in an individual unit but in a family unit where male *mita* workers were mostly always accompanied by their female family members.

started driving the labor regime in the Potosi mine to be extremely exploitative, therefore aggravating the labor intensity of each *mita* worker (Tandeter 1981, 104-105). Accompanying their male partners, Indian women served in a variety of activities, for instance by working inside the mine to extract minerals, working as a domestic servants for the Spaniards' or *mestizos*' houses, by selling their supplies at local markets (Zulawski 1990, 101).

Indian women, thus, upheld the colonial *mita* system by furnishing their *mita* family members with supplementary labor. Indian women's contribution, however, was not constrained simply to it. Even when they were not accompanying their male counterparts to the mine, greater or equally great burdens fell on the back of women who were remaining in the communities, especially as the colonial state began trying to offset dwindling profitability of the Potosi mine by tribute incomes from Indian communities. The Spanish tributary system contravened the long-established norm of the Inca system that posed tribute levies only on a married adult male as a household representative (Silverblatt 1987, 126-127; Premo 2000, 78). Instead, it extended its tribute obligations to a much wider category of native populations: adult Indian males and females of any marital status, thus identifying not a household but an individual peasant as a basic entity liable to colonial exigencies. Moreover, the prevailing perception associating the *mita* labor draft with predominantly male labor force combined with the Spanish gender ideology associating men with productive activities and women with reproductive activities made Indian women's contribution in productive activities little recognized. Under these circumstances, colonial gaze began to be headed toward Indian women who were perceived underexploited. The lack of mobility of Indian women who, compared to their male counterparts, were likely to stay in communities for a more extended period with fewer possibilities for emigration reinforced this view portraying Indian women as a "virtually captive labor force" for insatiable colonial demands (Graubart

2000, 554; Silverblatt 1987, 136-137).

The incorporation of Indian women into the colonial tributary regime was carried out primarily through their involvement in the textile production. Andean native women have been well noted for their time-honored commitment to weaving since pre-conquest period (Silverblatt 1987, 9). The colonial incorporation of women as weavers, however, considerably differed from pre-conquest customs, first because most of textile production was then made not for domestic consumption but for market economy, and second because it created a gender division which supposed weaving as a completely female arena despite considerable dedication of male Indians to weaving prior to the conquest (Graubart 2000, 545). Income obtained through peasant women's textile production was collected not only within the boundary of official tributary regime. The illegal practice of permitting monetary payment in compensation for the *mita* service (known as "*indios de faltriquera*") augmented demands for tribute payment of Indian communities (Premo 2000, 82). At the initial stage of the *mita* system, this *faltriquera* practice was mostly used as a channel through which few individual Indian peasants who possessed sufficient resources to pay off their onerous duties (Stavig 2000, 537-538). However, the decreasing profitability of the Potosi mine in combination with demographic crisis characterized by a scarcity of *originarios* led to the distortion of this system. Confronted to the crisis of silver mining industry in Potosi since the seventeenth century, colonial officials began levying cash payment on individual communities in compensation for unmet labor quotas, or for fugitive or even dead *mitayos*. The prevalence of such a practice was noteworthy. For instance, by the 1620s, from one-third to one-half of the total draft to Potosi was reported to be done in cash payment (Premo 2000, 82). Under these circumstances, peasant women who comprised a bulk of remaining community members were obligated to provide their labor not only to meet official tribute demands but also to

substitute for their missing *mitayo* family members. In sum, the colonial *mita* system made distinctive effects on Indian women. Even though Indian women had never been formally recognized as an entity liable for the *mita* service, the *mita* system rendered them to be subject to manifold demands, compelling them to get incorporated into the Spanish commodity market as assistants in the mine, servants, market vendors, and weavers, among others.

2. *Caciques*, redistribution or exploitation?

The Toledo's reform in the 1570s signified a serious disjuncture to the Andean traditional social arrangements. As I have previously discussed, the forceful settlement of Indian population into *reducciones* signified the separation of Indian peasants from vertically connected ecological zones. Alienated from their traditional means of subsistence economy, resettled Indian peasants became more attached to the economic and social fields that were guided by the Spanish colonial norms and interests. In coordination with this resettlement policy, the *mita* labor draft and ensuing tribute levies triggered more immediate disruptions, triggering comprehensive and profound transformations in the Indian society as a whole. The radical changes brought about by the Toledo's reform reveal that the colonial rule in the Andes was premised on the intervention on native population, particularly Indian peasants. The Toledo's reform, however, points to another distinctive feature of the Spanish colonialism in the Andes, considering that it permitted the endurance of traditional institutions and social orders as long as they did not seriously undermined the imperial interests, and as long as they did not contradict the Spanish or European ones. The re-installment of *ayllus* within the framework of Indian communities, and the formal stipulation of legal and customary rights entitled to Indian communities which included usufruct rights to the communal land and political autonomy on internal affairs at the

core exemplify this tendency for indirect control. In this respect, the practice of *cacicazgo* (Andean chiefmanship) is particularly relevant given that it acquired greater importance as colonialism continued even though its origin traces back to the pre-Inca period.²² Studying the role and status of *caciques* is also important if we are to comprehend the transformation of Indian society in the colonial Andes, because *caciques* stood especially vulnerable in the fragile power matrix of the colonial Andean society, turning themselves into a first-hand target of peasant uprisings which began to encroach the colonial hegemony since the late seventeenth century (Glave 1999; Serulnikov 2003). In this section, I examine how *caciques* got involved in the colonial tributary regime, particularly focused on their role for the maintenance of the compulsory *mita* labor draft and forced textile production. Also, I inquire what such changing role and status of *caciques* did imply when it came to the transformation of Indian communities in the colonial Andes.

In the colonial Andes, *caciques* (called *kurakas* in Quechua and *mallku* in Aymara) were entitled to a series of responsibilities and privileges. Even though they shared their ancestry with commoners, they were entitled to privileges of the Inca elite members which included rights of private land ownership and the exemption from *mita* labor service and from tribute payment. These

22) Saignes explains that the Spanish respect for the traditional and symbolic authority of *caciques* as ethnic chiefs largely derived from their fear for losing control of Indian population once they got liberated from the regulations of *ayllus*. The following transcript written by a Spanish lawyer eloquently delivers such concerns. “The day we decide to count and tax all Indians individually, so that if they have paid they are no longer under the domination and authority of the *caciques* and under their orders, being free to go wherever they want, we will have taken away the restraint that holds them together in an orderly manner, for this is the way in which they survive and have survived before the Christians obtained these realms: if one could put this fact to the test for only one year, one would clearly see their destruction.” (Juan Polo de Ondegardo (1571) “Relación de los fundamentos,” Carlos A. Romero (ed.), *Colección de libros y documentos referentes a la historia del Perú*, Ser. I., Vol. 3 (Lima, 1916) pp. 180-181, re-quoted from Saignes (1999) p. 65)

privileges of *caciques* were, of course, contingent on a string of responsibilities such as the delivery of the quotas of *mitayos*, tribute collection, and monitoring of religious idiosyncrasy, which placed them in a delicate position between two opposing demands of the colonial state and Indian communities. Assigned with new demands in the Spanish colonial system, relying on the ideal “pact of reciprocity” with the colonial state enabled *caciques* to justify their duties within the framework of redistribution. However, a hunger for personal gains and for social mobility in combination with escalating pressure of tributary regime lured them to turn easily into a key agent of colonial exploitation. When *caciques* succeeded in meeting local expectations of reciprocal exchange, their power could serve for the defense of communal interests, thereby enhancing social coherence. For instance, the notarial archives in Canas y Canchis well recorded how *caciques* maneuvered two disparate systems of the colonial legal one and traditional Andean one in order to penalize misdemeanors conducted either by the Spanish officials or by their own communal members, and to excuse their communal members from formal duties under due circumstances (Stavig 2000, 551-562).²³ Even when *originarios* returned to their communities without fulfilling their *mita* duties, these transgressions were locally justified if community standards deemed them rising out of abusive treatments, thus requesting formal actions of *caciques* to exempt these *originarios* from further punishment. However, if claims for mistreatment proven to be unwarranted, these flee *mita* workers were subject not only to communal disciplinary measures but also to the Spanish judicial system (Stavig 2000, 559-560).

Accordingly, *caciques* contributed to reinforcing the solidarity of Indian

23) *Caciques* often relied on the legal petitions to denounce abusive treatment in Potosi and even to request the abolishment of *mita* system. These legal acts sometimes were made in alliance with crown-appointed officials such as *corregidores*, or priests (Stavig 2000, 556-559)

communities when their acts were guided by communal standards of social justice which mostly frequently was elaborated by the principle of reciprocity. However, when *caciques* failed in acquiring communal legitimacy by getting involved in the misappropriation of communal resources or by abusing local residents, or simply by failing in maintain the “tacit complicity” with other local authorities (Saignes 1999, 90), their presence led to the disruption of social cohesion, triggering intense resistances from both their communal members and the Spanish officials. There are ample cases recorded on the abusive activities of *caciques* in the colonial system. Confronted to the pressure to satisfy intensifying demand for colonial taxation, *caciques* often turned into the labor of women and the elderly who were formally exempt from tribute levies not only in the pre-Hispanic but also in the Spanish tribute system as a source of additional contributions (Graubart 2000; Silverblatt 1987, 125-147). Conducted in an extra-legal system with a tacit condolence of diverse local authorities, these forced textile production of Indian women were rarely compensated in due measures and the rule of reciprocity was easily violated as relationship based on reciprocal exchange turned into an exploitative one.²⁴⁾ Moreover, transgressions of *caciques* were often motivated by a desire for material accumulation. *Caciques* obtained personal gains by manipulating their meddling role between the Spanish system and the traditional one to their own advantages, emulating the wealthiest Spaniards in some cases (Saignes 1999, 67-68). A court case against corrupt *caciques* in 1614 marks

24) For instance, a visita of Chucuito reported complaints charged by elderly Indian women as following, “[their curacas or *caciques*] had required them to spin wool for clothing and they didn’t pay them anything and this witness fought about it with the curacas and principales and they told him that they fed the women and there-after he learned and found out that they did not give them any money at all but some food so that they might eat while they did the spinning and weaving that they demanded.” (Garcí Diez de San Miguel (1567) *Visita hecha a la provincial de Chucuito*, p. 62, re-quoted from Graubart (2000) p. 546).

out the four mediums through which these *caciques* made profits: the privatization of communal land; long-distance trade; income from public offices; the incorporation of *forasteros* not only into the tributary population but also for service in their own property (Saignes 1999, 70-71). The misconducts carried out by *caciques* provoked strong oppositions of Indian communities. Indian peasants' resistance to corrupt and abusive *caciques* began to be more radicalized on a massive scale since the late seventeenth century (Glave 1999, 512). Despite demographic crisis at the turn of eighteenth century, the inexorable hunger for tribute revenues induced colonial rulers to utterly disregard the rule of reciprocity with the Indian society. Communal rights were easily ignored or denied in this altered tributary regime of late colonial period. Indians became liable to the tribute pressure regardless of their ethnic background or communal membership. Moreover, high frequencies of the Spanish appointment of *caciques* who failed in fulfilling the requirement of hereditary descents seriously undermined the legitimacy of this position (Serulnikov 2003, 107). Under these circumstances, abuses of *caciques* provoked first-hand grievances of local population, successively turning into collective peasant rebellions which culminated in the massive Andean civil wars of the late eighteenth century (Glave 1999; Larson 1999, 622).

IV. Conclusion

Throughout the Spanish colonialism, the *mita* system served as an outlet for forced Indian labor for the Potosi silver mine. Due to the decline of silver output and the rise of the mines in New Spain since the early seventeenth century, Potosi could never regain its reputation of the biggest silver producer for the Spanish crown. Moreover, the transfer of Upper Peru to the viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in 1776 subsided the monopoly of Potosi over trade

and industry of the Andean region, constricting its influences to the Upper Peru region. The waning influence of Potosi, however, did not alleviate the devastating impact of the *mita* labor draft. Contrarily, lower profitability of the Potosi mining industry intensified a need for complementary tribute income, resulting in the imposition of greater tribute levies on a wider spectrum of native Andean population, particularly on women and the elderly remaining in the Indian communities.

In this article, I examined the impact of the *mita* system on the native Andean society and the strategies of native Andeans to survive the system. As the *mita* labor draft exemplifies, individual Indians as well as Indian communities became a minimum unit of tribute duties. That is to say, Indian peasants carried out their duties not only as a colonial subject but also as a member of their ethnic communities. Therefore, regardless of their sex, age, or marital status, all the members of community provided their labor force for the imperial enterprise whether it was in the silver mines, market place, agricultural farms, or textile sweatshops. To deal with colonial demands while sustaining their communities, native Andeans relied on diverse cultural and institutional assets. For instance, gender ideology of complementarity guided men and women to share their burdens. Women collaborated with men by accompanying the journey of their male counterparts to the mine or by working as weavers, servants, or market vendors. *Caciques*, ethnic chiefs, also played an important role to defend the interests of Indian peasants over the course of interaction with colonial rulers, thereby contributing to consolidating communal solidarity. On that account, colonial pressure motivated native Andeans to collaborate for their survival and these collective strategies were defined in conformity with traditional Andean norms and practices.

Nonetheless, colonial demands also generated devastating effects on the Indian society, undermining its social cohesion. The growing status shift of

originarios to *forasteros* and *yanaconas* reflects such destructive impact of the colonial system, particularly of the *mita* labor draft. The growing hispanization of native Andeans were also observed among Indian women who were remaining in their ethnic communities. As tribute demands increased, Indian women were forced to participate in the market economy so that they could make profit out of their textile or agricultural products. The experience in the market facilitated Indian women to gain knowledge of colonial economic and social system. Greater number of Indian women began refusing to stay in their communities and chose to acculturate into the urban society that was arranged by the Spanish norms (Salomon 1988). The growing hispanization of native Andeans was also observed among *caciques* who were capable of taking advantage of their meddling role between two contesting worlds – the *República de los Indios* and the *República de los Españoles* – to their own benefits. The colonial system indeed presented a new opportunity to *caciques* if they were determined to use their ties to the traditional Indian society for personal gains and social mobility. As these cases display, native Andeans chose an acclimatization option when they could not afford to fulfill their communal duties, or when they could improve their economic and social status.

In sum, native Andeans combined individual and collective strategies to alleviate agonizing impacts of the colonial tributary regime. The coexistence of *originarios*, *forasteros*, and *yanaconas* in the colonial economy, as well the active role of Indian women in the Spanish commodity market indicate that native Andeans were capable of maneuvering the colonial system by selectively choosing diverse strategies such as conformity to forced labor system, migration, service in wage labor, market trade for their individual and communal survival. These collective strategies of native Andeans illuminate their flexibility and resilience, which enabled them to sustain their traditional values and institutions despite growing external burdens.

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식민시대 안데스의 미따 제도와 원주민 공동체

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강정원 (2013), 식민시대 안데스의 미따 제도와 원주민 공동체.

초 록 식민시대 안데스에서 뽀또시 은광은 식민 정부를 위한 가장 중요한 소득원을 구성했다. 뽀또시의 번영은 페루 부왕령의 톨레도 부왕이 1570년대 도입했던 강제부역제도인 미따에 근거했다. 스페인 식민 사업에 원주민 노동력을 동원하기 위해 도입되었던 미따제도는 원주민 사회에 전면적인 변화를 가져왔다. 미따 제도는 원주민 공동체의 인적, 물적 자원을 고갈시켰고, 수많은 원주민들은 미따 부역 의무에서 벗어나기 위해 소속된 원주민 공동체를 버리고 도주함에 따라 원주민 공동체에 가해진 인구학적, 경제적 부담이 더욱 가중되었다. 이 논문은 식민시대 미따 제도가 원주민 사회에 미친 영향을 살펴보고, 이에 대응하는 안데스 토착인구의 대응 전략을 분석한다. 식민 시대 미따를 비롯한 과중한 과세 의무에 대응하기 위해 원주민들은 개인적인 자원과 공동체 자원을 선별적으로 활용했으며, 다양한 전략을 취했다. 인종 공동체의 구성원으로서 그들은 성별, 나이, 혼인 여부와 관계없이 서로 협력하며 다양한 식민 사업에 노동력을 제공했다. 하지만 공동체 구성원으로서의 의무가 지나치게 과중해지거나, 또는 경제적, 사회적 향상을 위한 기회가 주어질 경우, 일부 토착민들은 공동체를 버리고 스페인의 식민 체제로 편입되기를 선택했다. 안데스 토착민들의 다양한 전략은 원주민들이 자신들의 생존과 공동체의 영속을 위해 식민지 체제를 선별적으로 활용했음을 보여주며, 식민시대 안데스 원주민 사회의 유연성과 생존 능력을 시사한다.

핵심어 미따 제도, 원주민 공동체, 인구 변화, 젠더 전략, 까시계, 뽀또시 은광, 안데스