THE NEW POLITICAL CULTURE, CHANGING POLICY PREFERENCES OF MAYORS, AND CHANGES OF URBAN POLICIES IN JAPAN*

WONHO JANG
Seoul National University

This paper is an attempt to explain the dynamics of the new politics in Japan by examining changes in local politics, the harbinger of national political changes. The theoretical position of this paper is based on the new political culture (NPC) perspective. The NPC perspective focuses on the changing political attitudes and actions of the public and the political elite in many advanced societies. From the NPC perspective, this paper examines the NPC policy preferences of the Japanese local mayors, which include populism, efficient fiscal spending, decentralization and anti-clientelistic politics. The influence of the NPC on the policy changes in the local governments is also examined. By examining the decline of clientelistic fiscal spending in the cities with NPC demographic characteristics, this paper shows the dynamic of the NPC in the local policy outputs.

INTRODUCTION

Japan is now undergoing drastic political changes. In 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), considered a “permanent” government party by many Japan watchers, lost its majority holding in the Lower House election for the first time in 38 years. Ironically, LDP’s long-term rival, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), also suffered a similar defeat in the same election. What was more striking to outsiders was that in the year following the elections (1994) the LDP made a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Since then, the LDP has introduced various reformative polices that include fiscal and administrative reforms. There are two main themes of the political reforms. The first was to make government systems more efficient by reducing national expenditure and the size of the cabinet. The second was to decentralize power by limiting the influence of the national bureaucrats in politics and by enhancing local autonomy.

These changes may be new and significant at the national level; however, a keen observer of Japan would have noticed that similar reforms have already been implemented in Japanese politics at the local level. Izumo city, for example, introduced various administrative reforms to make the...
municipal administrative processes more efficient and attentive to the public (Iwakuni 1991, 1993). The reforms, according to Muramatsu (1986), are part of the effort on local political elites to be more autonomous from the influence of the central bureaucracy.

This paper has a dual objective. It will analyze the dynamics of the local political changes in Japan and shed light on the current national political change from the experience of local political changes. Unlike the national political arena, where lengthy time-delays are inevitable for some reformative policies to be implemented, local governments in Japan have been the harbingers of innovation, due to their flexibility and quickness in policy implementation (Iwakuni 1991). Local political changes, on the other hand, have profound implications for changes at the national level.

There are generally two views in explaining political changes: the elitist and the populist approach. The elitist approach, though wrought with variations, shares the perspective that the elite—public or private—plays a dominant role in policy making process and political changes. Based on the elitist view, the current political changes in Japan are due to the decisions of the political elite, whether good or bad.

In contrast to the elitist approach, populist approaches emphasize the role of the public in the political changes. They stress voters’ growing dissatisfaction with conventional political parties as an important causal factor contributing to the change of government (Kabashima 1994). According to the populist perspective, then, the LDP after regaining power could not but respond to the needs of the public, which resulted in various reformative policies.

Although both the elitist and populist approaches are deemed valid in explaining some of the political changes in Japan since 1993, I argue that neither approach can fully explain the profound causal mechanisms underlying the current shifts. In addition, both approaches fail to adequately explain the inter-relationships between the political elite and the public in the process of political change in Japan. During the process of change, the political elites and the public are interrelated closely in such a way that, some political elites recognize the changes in society and make decisions which results in political change keeping pace with societal needs. Consequently, the public, in support of the decisions of the political elite, contribute to and complete the political changes through their voting patterns. Yet, changes in the political system can also be initiated by the public: significant political change can occur when the public signals their discontent with political elites who are reluctant to respond to their changing needs.
To explain the current political change this paper emphasizes the interrelations between the political elite and the public. As the fundamental cause of the current political change in Japan, this paper proposes an important variable which has previously been overlooked: the transformation of Japanese political culture. In order to examine this change in political culture, this paper will introduce the theoretical framework of the New Political Culture. The New Political Culture (hereinafter NPC) is defined by changes in the body of shared political meanings and ideas, and the underlying rules of game for the conduct of the various political actors such as citizens, parties, and the state bureaucracy (Rempel, forthcoming). This paper bases its theoretical position on the NPC perspective which is described in the following section.

The New Political Culture (NPC) Perspective

Since the 1970s, the changing political culture of the advanced industrial societies has received heated discussion among many students of sociology and political science. Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1987, 1990) discusses the emergence and increase of “post-materialism” in western Europe and the United States, which emphasizes “quality of life” over economic and security issues. Murakami (1982) discusses “new middle mass politics” of Japan, where the influence of “Hoshu-Kakushin” (conservative-progressive) ideology has become weak as the Japanese people have become more individualistic and more interest-oriented. Clark and Ferguson (1983) have investigated the “new fiscal populism” in the United States, in which social

---

1 I borrowed the term of “New Political Culture” from Clark and Inglehart (1990).
2 Regarding sources of the changing political culture, most of them stress the social structural changes. Inglehart (1987, 1990) believes that affluence, an increase in education level, and the success of the welfare state are causes of the rise of post-materialism. Murakami (1982) contends that the increase in the proportion of the middle class (over 90 percent in the Japanese case) leads to new middle mass politics. Offe (1987) emphasizes societal differentiation as a source of new politics. That is, as a society differentiates, it gets more individuated and the old politics become both less distinctive and less durable as points of reference. Clark and Inglehart (1990) contend that changes in three factors of society; the economic, social and governmental, are the driving forces of the new political culture. On the economic level, they point out that; (1) there is a decline of agriculture and manufacturing and a rise of high technology-based industries such as the information and service industries, which leads to a decline in the importance of hierarchical relations in the economic system, and (2) the general affluence resulting from higher individual incomes continues to grow. On the level of social change, they point out (1) the ‘slimmer family’, in which the extended family declines and family links to education and occupations weaken, and (2) more education and more media access. In terms of changes on the governmental level, they point out development of welfare programs which have sloved many urgent problems in the past.
and economic issues are explicitly distinguished. Offe (1987) stresses the importance of the new social movements in “new politics,” in which the values of “autonomy” and “identity” are raised above the manipulation, control, bureaucratization, and regulation typical of “old politics.” Clark and Inglehart (1990) develop a general theory based on the concept of “new political culture” whose main features are (1) the classic left-right dimension is transformed; (2) social issues are clearly distinguished from fiscal and economic ones; (3) social issues gain salience relative to fiscal and economic ones; (4) issue-based politics rises and citizen participation broadens; (5) market individualism and social individualism rise; and (6) the welfare state comes into question. Although there are differences in the key concepts of the above studies, they have many common elements, which can be included under the broad category of the NPC perspective. Table 1 exhibits differences between old political culture and new political culture.

The NPC perspective contends that the NPC of the public and political elite has an influence on the policy making of the government, especially local governments, which leads to significant policy changes. The NPC public are more active in participating in policy making and they want efficiency in carrying out the policies, which lead the political elite to respond to the needs of the NPC public and to change policies. The policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Key Features of the New Political Culture Vis-À-Vis the Conventional Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Political Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Materialistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Loyal to group/organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ideology-based political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emphasis on economic issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Acceptance of political organizations such as political parties and labor unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Institutional political participation such as voting and membership in political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More oriented toward political organization than the public in approaching politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
changes are more distinct in local governments than in national government, since the traditional political organizations, such as parties and labor unions, are much more influential in national policy making than in local policy making. Clark and Ferguson (1983) recognize significant changes in fiscal policies among the US cities which are led by new fiscal populist politicians who are socially liberal but fiscally conservative. Clarke et al. (1989) discuss significant policy changes in the local governments of various industrialized countries including the USA, France, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the Netherlands.

Based on the NPC perspective described above, this paper will examine the influence of the NPC in current Japanese local politics, especially as it relates to policy making. To do so, I will first examine the NPC-ness of local mayors in their policy preferences. Secondly, I will examine how the NPC has led to actual policy change in the local governments.

CHANGING POLICY PREFERENCES OF THE JAPANESE LOCAL MAYORS

This section will examine the NPC of local mayors in their policy preferences. Since the NPC of political elite is characterized by public-oriented politics, I will raise the following NPC hypotheses, based on three principles-two based on Inglehart’s psychological principles (Inglehart 1990: 56), and one based on the demographic principle.

Three Principles

1) The scarcity principle: Persons place the greatest subjective value on what is most scarce. In times of poverty and war they give top priority to physical sustenance and safety; in times of greater affluence and security, their attention tends to shift from materialist concerns to others such as self expression and the quality of life.

2) The socialization principle: A person’s basic scheme of values largely reflects the conditions of his or her pre adult years.

From these two principles, we can infer that persons raised in the relatively affluent conditions that increasingly prevailed after World War II and those who are relatively wealthy and well educated, exhibit more NPC type values. In addition to these psychological principles, Clark et al. (1994) suggest a demographic principle which relates demographic characteristics of a political system (city or nation) to policy preferences of political elite (mayors or dietmen) of the political system.
3) *The demographic principle*: Demographic growth of a sector increases its legitimacy and power. Here, sectors represent people who share preferences about a public policy. Thus, nations and cities change because sectors in them change. In addition, the more persons there are in a political system (city or nation) who support a policy, the more likely it is to succeed (Clark and Inglehart 1990; Clark 1994). Therefore, policies also change as sectors change.

Based on the above three principles, the following relationship between demographic characteristics of the public/mayors and the NPC-related policy preferences of mayors can be hypothesized.

**Hypothesis**

*Hypothesis 1*. Younger, more educated mayors demonstrate more NPC-oriented policy preferences.

This hypothesis is mainly based on scarcity and socialization principles. Mayors who had been socialized after World War II, during a period of significant social structural change, are expected to bear more NPC.

*Hypothesis 2*. In cities and towns with younger, more educated, and more affluent constituencies, mayors tend to exhibit more NPC-oriented policy preferences.

This hypothesis is based on the demographic principle. Since younger, more-educated and more-affluent people bear more NPC, the NPC has relatively more legitimacy in the cities and towns with constituencies bearing these characteristics, which lead the mayors to be more NPC-oriented in policy preferences.

Youth, education, and affluence tend to be positively correlated with professional employment white collar positions, and with the tertiary industry. Therefore, as a corollary of hypotheses 2, it can also be hypothesized that in the cities with more professional, white-collar, and tertiary industry workers as constituencies, mayors tend to exhibit more NPC-oriented policy preferences.

**Data and Methods**

Two different kinds of data are used to test hypothesis 1 and 2. One is Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation\(^3\) (herein after FAUI)- Japan data

---

\(^3\) FAUI project, coordinated by Terry Clark in the University of Chicago, has hundreds of participants over 40 nations around world. For more details on FAUI, see Clarke (1989) and Clark (1996).
which were collected by Yoshiaki Kobayashi in 1987. Japan FAUI surveyed local political elites, mayors and city council members on their positions toward various political and fiscal issues. The other data set are Japanese Census data which include demographic characteristics of the Japanese local cities. The two data were merged to examine the relationship between the city’s demographic characteristics and mayors’ policy preferences.

NPC-oriented policy preferences are represented by two different set of variables, ones used by FAUI projects to test general NPC-oriented policy preferences, the others constructed for Japanese specific NPC-oriented policy preferences of mayors. The general NPC-oriented policy preferences are populism and selective fiscal spending.4

(1) Mayor’s NPC policy preference-1 (POPULISM): This index is represented by the variable of POPULISM which is composed of two indexes, MEDIA and CITRESP. MEDIA is the index which taps how much mayors appeal directly to citizens through media use. This index is based on two questions from the Japanese FAUI survey: “How often did you use local media (radio, TV, the press) in your last campaign?” and “Excluding election period, how often have you appeared in the local media in the past two years?” Those who have used and appeared in more local media are considered NPC mayors.

CITRESP is based on the question from the Japanese FAUI survey asking about the mayors’ favorable response to citizens in spending preferences. Thus, this variable exhibits the extent to which mayors respond favorably to citizens. Those who respond more favorably to citizens are considered NPC mayors. Thus, NPC mayors are expected to be positively related with POPULISM.

(2) Mayor’s NPC policy preference-2 (PRRSD): PRFSD, an index representing mayor’s selective fiscal spending preference, is a standard deviation of the average spending preferences of mayors. The Japanese FAUI survey asked mayors to provide their own preferences in all areas of city government and for twelve specific areas, such as welfare or education5. The mayors answered on a scale ranging from “spend a lot less” to “spend a lot more”. PRFSD is the standard deviation computed for each

---

4 These variables are widely used to represent NPC-oriented policy preferences by the FAUI project teams around the world.

5 The 12 specific areas include: 1) primary and secondary education 2) social welfare 3) streets and parking 4) mass transportation 5) public health and hospitals 6) parks and recreation 7) low-income housing 8) police protection 9) fire protection 10) capital stocks (e.g., roads, sewers, etc.) 11) number of municipal employees and 12) salaries of municipal employees.
mayor across the 12 specific spending areas and for all areas. This variable expresses how selective mayors are in various spending areas, which is one of the key indicators of NPC mayors. For example, conventional left mayors would spend more in all areas and conventional conservative mayors would spend less; both of which lead to a low standard deviation of mayors spending preferences. In the case of Japan, conventional clientelistic mayors would spend more in all areas in order to receive more grants from the central government. On the contrary, the NPC type mayors are more selective in the spending preferences, which makes the PRFSD high. Thus, the NPC mayors are expected to be positively related with PRFSD.

While the above two variables can be used to test the NPC policy preferences of mayors in general, there can exist some Japanese specific variables for NPC policy preferences. Since the dynamic of the NPC is a skeptical attitude toward conventional politics, differences in the conventional politics among different societies should lead to country specific characteristics of NPC mayors. In other words, different political developments allow for differences in some of the key aspects of the NPC policy preferences of mayors between Japan and the Western societies. To understand the variables tapping the Japanese specific NPC policy preferences of mayors, the key characteristics of the conventional Japanese central and local politics to which the NPC mayors would be opposed must be determined. The conventional Japanese politics can be summarized as clientelistic relations among political actors both at the central and local levels.

At the central level, Japanese politics are characterized as "bureaupluralism" (Aoki 1988) or "patterned pluralism" (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987), where the bureaucracy/LDP alliance mediates pluralistic politics. The LDP functioned as a network for absorbing pluralistic interests, old and new, and channeled them into the bureaucratic process. The bureaucracy, in turn, either recognizes or screens pluralistic interests.

6 There have been long debates on who has more power in political decision making between the bureaucrats and politicians. Chalmers Johnson’s famous concept of the developmental state explicitly suggests that the bureaucrats has more power vis-à-vis the LDP politicians. On the contrary, the studies of Zoku politicians argue that influence of LDP Dietmen in policy making has grown because of long governance of the LDP, and the Zoku politicians of the LDP who have obtained expertise through long years of service in party and cabinet positions even dominate the bureaucrats in policy making. (Muramatsu, 1981; Park, 1986; Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987; Shoppa, 1991). I, however, agree with Aoki’s view that mutual interests between the LDP and the bureaucracy have been established due to the long governance of the LDP and that based on this mutual interests, the bureaucracy-LDP alliance has emerged.
through the administrative framework. One of the key characteristics of this bureaupluralism is the clientelistic relationship between the LDP and the people employed in the backward and declining industries, such as farmers and small shopkeepers. This clientelism occurs because, threatened by competitive pressure from abroad, farmers and small shopkeepers tend to rely more on the protectionism of bureaupluralism, and the LDP Dietmen needs these votes for a continuation of the LDP governance. Another important aspect is the clientelistic relationship between the LDP politicians and construction industry. As Japan develops very rapidly, the need for construction has exploded. The state orders much of this construction based on contract *ad libitum*. This opened a way for the LDP politicians to receive a premium for granting state-ordered constructions contracts to their construction company clients. This premium has constituted a very important financial base for the LDP politicians.

At the central-local level, the most important characteristic has been the vertical relationship between the central bureaucracy and local government. In this relationship, a particular ministry of the central bureaucracy exclusively directs the administration of a specific parts of local governments. Most notably, in the area of local policy making, central bureaucrats subject their decisions on the mayors. This occurs legally through the agency delegation system and financially through the grants-in-aid system. Thus, 1) the bureaucrats delegating decisions from the center have essentially been the local agents to carry out the central policies, and 2) to ensure grants-in-aid from the center, mayors need to follow the central policies. In addition, to ensure more grants-in-aid from the center, the mayors have maintained a close relationship with the LDP Dietmen of their prefectures. For this reason, many of the local mayors have been characterized as “LDP-kei mushozoku (the Independents leaning to the LDP)”.

At the local level, a clientelistic relationship occurs between mayors and local construction companies. This is the local counterpart to the central level the clientelistic relationship between the LDP and the construction

---

7 The famous Japanese scholar, Tsuji Kiyokaki, expresses this view in 1969 in his well-known book *Nihon Kanryosei no kenkyu (A Study of Japanese Bureaucracy)*. Opposing to this view, Muramatsu (1986) contends a lateral competition model where local governments are no longer passive recipients of central administrative procedures but act as local representatives for important policies for their locales competing with the central bureaucracy. However, Muramatsu also agrees that before 1970s the vertical relation between the central bureaucracy and local governments had been true for Japanese local politics. Thus, the vertical control of the central bureaucracy over the local governments can be regarded as the conventional central-local politics. The lateral competition model can be regarded as a model explaining the development of the NPC in central-local relation in Japan.
industry. Some factors might contribute to the establishment of this local
clientelism. First, LDP-kei mushozoku mayors who have a close connection
with LDP Dietmen, have learned how to use construction companies as a
basis for political funds. Second, because the LDP Dietmen have influence
over the grants-in-aid for the local governments, a sizable portion of which
is supposed to be spent on construction, these Dietmen can influence which
construction companies are chosen. Therefore, they recommend their client
companies or the subsidiary companies for the local constructions ordered
by local governments, which subsequently leads to a clientelistic
relationship between mayors and these companies.

The above description of conventional Japanese politics, summarized by
the concept of the clientelistic politics, provides a sense of what can be the
NPC policy preferences of mayors in the Japanese specific cases. First the
Japanese specific NPC mayors tend to oppose the clientelistic relationship
between the LDP and the construction industry. Thus, NPC mayors are less
willing to have connections with the construction industry, and support the
decrease of construction expenditures in the local fiscal policy, especially
notable in the expenditure for roads and bridges based on funds from
central grants.

Second, the Japanese specific NPC mayors oppose the direction of the
central bureaucracy. As Muramatsu (1982) argues, the Japanese specific
NPC mayors, taking initiatives in the policy making process of the cities,
laterally compete with the central bureaucracy to achieve the goals for their
own cities. The NPC mayors would also have a more lateral relationship
with other local governments (including local governments in other nations)
for cooperation—such as information exchange—rather than receiving
directions from the center. In addition, the Japanese NPC mayors put
relatively more emphasis on citizen opinions in the local policy making
while putting relatively less emphasis on the desires of the central
bureaucrats and politicians.

Thus, the variables tapping Japanese specific NPC policy preferences are
as follows:

(3) Japanese specific NPC policy preference-3 (DCRROAD): DCRROAD
exhibits mayor’s support for the decrease in spending on road construction.
As explained in the previous section, the expenditure on roads is considered
as the most explicit example of clientelistic expenditure. Thus, one of the
key Japanese specific NPC in policy preferences is the skeptical attitude on
the clientelistic expenditure, especially expenditures on the construction of
roads. The younger and more educated mayors are therefore expected to
support the decrease of the expenditure on construction of roads.
Additionally, in the cities with NPC type demographic characteristics, mayors tend to support the decrease of the expenditure on roads. The variable, DCRROAD, is selected from the Japanese FAUI survey.

(4) Japanese specific NPC policy preference-4 (DECENTRAL): DECENTRAL exhibits the support of mayors for the decentralization in policy making. Since NPC mayors want more initiative in policy making, they tend to support more decentralization in the local politics. In addition, in the cities with the NPC type demographic characteristics, the citizens demand more say in local policy making, which leads the mayors to support more decentralization. Thus, it is expected that NPC type mayors/cities have positive correlations with decentralization, while the cities with anti-NPC type demographic characteristics have negative correlations with decentralization. DECENTRAL is an index which represents the power of local mayors and citizens in policy making vis-à-vis the central bureaucrats and politicians.\(^8\)

For independent variables, mayor ‘s age and education from the Japanese FAUI survey are used to examine the relationship between mayor’s demographic characteristics and mayor’s NPC policy preferences. In addition to those primary independent variables, MAYYRS (how many years the mayor has served as mayor) is included as a control variable. It is because the experiences as mayor can be an important factor affecting mayor’s policy preferences.

Independent variables indicating demographic characteristics of the local cities are coded from the Japanese Census of 1985.

The potential independent variables include IMEANED (mean years of education of the city residents), IPCTINCT (mean of the per capita income of the city residents in 1980 dollars), IPOP2534 (percent of the population aged 25-34), IPCPROF (percent of workers in professional occupation), IPCDIFF (percent of workers in tertiary industry), and IPCWHITE (percent of white-collar workers in the city).

\(^8\) The method to create this index is as follows: The Japanese FAUI survey includes items asking mayors to order the influence of the political actors (e.g., mayor, union, political party, citizens, Dietmen, national bureaucracy, etc.) in local policy making. Form the items, first, the following variables of MAYPOWER (mayor’s influence in the local policy making), BURPOWER (central bureaucrat influence in the local policy making), and DIETPOWER (Dietmen influence in the local policy making) are created. The highest score of each variable is 16, while the lowest score is 1. In other words, if a mayor answers the mayor is the most powerful, Dietmen as the second most powerful, and central bureaucrats as the least powerful in the policy making of the city, the scores of MAYPOWER, DIETPOWER, and BURPOWER of the city are 16, 15, and 1, respectively. The index of decentralization, DECENTRAL, is created by subtracting (DIETPOWER + BURPOWER) from (MAYPOWER + CIVOPWER), thus representing how much the mayor thinks that mayor and citizen are influential vis-à-vis central bureaucrats and politicians in the local policy making.
However, the problem in these independent variables is that there are many multicollinearities among them. Thus, only 3 independent variables are chosen: IPCPROF (proportion of professionals in the city), IPCINCT (mean income of the city), and IPOP2534 (proportion of young people aged 25 through 34) to represent NPC type demographic characteristics of cities. In addition to these variables, Japanese specific demographic variables are included to exhibit clientelistic characteristics of the city. They are IPCCONS (proportion of people employed in construction industry) and IPCAGRI (proportion of people employed in agriculture). Since these two demographic characteristics are closely related with clientelism in Japanese national and local politics, they are expected to work as the constraints against the NPC in the Japanese local politics.

In addition, a control for the effect of urbanization is needed for the model with DCRROAD as dependent variable, since in the less urbanized cities it is actually necessary to build roads for the infra-development of the cities. Thus, we need to rule out the urbanization effect. The variable representing the degree of urbanization, URBAN, will therefore be included in the model with DCRROAD as a dependent variable.

As shown in the above table, all of the correlations between independent variables are significant and high. Most notably, IMEANEDU has very high correlation with most of the variables, which makes it difficult to include IMEANEDU as an independent variable. In addition, since the correlation between IPCPROF, IPCTTER, and IPCTWHTE is very high, only one of these variables can be included as an independent variable.

The urbanization indexes have been created by many scholars in many different ways. The proportion of having own house is highly negatively correlated with all the urbanization indexes (about –.85 in average). Therefore, in this chapter, the proportion of having own house will be used as representing urbanization of cities.
DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1

Table 2 exhibits the results of multiple regression with four NPC-oriented policy preferences of the Japanese mayors as dependent variables and mayor’s demographic variables as explaining ones.

We can see that mayor’s age has a significant negative effect on populism index, which means that younger mayors are more populistic: they are more attentive to the citizens and use more media during the election. Mayor’s age also has a significant negative effect on PRFSD, which means that younger mayors are more selective in their spending preferences. In addition, mayor’s age has a significant negative effect on DECENTRAL, indicating that younger mayors more support decentralization in policy making. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1. Mayor’s education has a significant positive effect on PRFSD, which means that mayors with higher levels of education are more selective in their spending preferences. The number of years as mayor has a significant positive effect on the populism index, which means that mayors who have been in office longer are more populistic. This result seems to be contradictory to the results above in that mayors with more years as mayors tend to be older, and older

TABLE 2. MAYOR’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND MAYOR’S NPC-ORIENTED POLICY PREFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>POPULAR</th>
<th>PRFSD</th>
<th>DCSRROAD</th>
<th>DECENTRAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAYAGE</td>
<td>-.272*</td>
<td>-.268*</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>-.255*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAYED</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.258**</td>
<td>-.225</td>
<td>-.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAYYRS</td>
<td>.318**</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.274*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAUI Japan
Note: All the coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.
*p < .05   **p < .01
MAYAGE: mayor’s age
MAYED: mayor’s education
MAYYRS: years served as mayor
POPULAR: mayor’s support for populism
PRFSD: mayor’s support for selective spending
DCRROAD: mayor’s support for the decrease in clientelistic expenditure
DECENTRAL: mayor’s support for decentralization
mayors tend to bear more populistic preference. However, since the effect of age is ruled out, the results indicate that mayors with more populistic preference tend to have longer years of service, given that their age is the same. In addition, the number of years as mayor has a significant positive effect on DECENTRAL, which means that mayors, who have served more years as mayors, support decentralization in local policy making. This results is consistent with the above findings that mayors with more service years are more responsive to the citizens.

I have thus far examined hypothesis 1 based on Japan FAUI data. The results of the analyses generally support hypothesis 1. A possible problem in this analysis is that of small sample size, which prohibits the analysis from reaching the statistically significant level, though their effect is consistent with hypothesis 1.

Hypotheses 2.

Table 3 shows the results of multiple regression with city’s demographic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>POPULAR</th>
<th>PRFSD</th>
<th>DECENTRAL</th>
<th>DCRROAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPOP2534</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCPROF</td>
<td>.294*</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.456*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCINCT</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.411*</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>-.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCCONS</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>-.327*</td>
<td>-.298*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCAGRI</td>
<td>-.191</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.234</td>
<td>-.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All the coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.
*p < .05   **p < .01
IPOP2534: proportion of young people aged 25 through 34
IPCPROF: proportion of professionals in the city
IPCINCT: mean income of the city
IPCCONS: proportion of people employed in construction industry
IPCAGRI: proportion of people employed in agriculture
URBAN: degree of urbanization of the city
POPULAR: mayor’s support for populism
PRFSD: mayor’s support for selective spending
DCRROAD: mayor’s support for the decrease in clientelistic expenditure
DECENTRAL: mayor’s support for decentralization
variables as independent variables and four NPC-oriented policy preference as dependent variables.

The proportion of professionals in the city has a significant positive effect on POPULISM as well as on DCRROAD. The former means that in the cities with higher proportions of professionals, mayors tend to be more populistic, while the latter indicates that in the cities with higher proportion of professionals, mayors tend to have more support for the decrease of city expenditures on clientelistic construction. These results are consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 2.

Mean income of the city has a significant positive effect on PRFSD, which means that in cities with more affluent constituencies, mayors are more selective in their spending preferences. This result is consistent with the expectation of hypothesis 2.

The proportion of people employed in the construction industry has a significant negative effect on DECENTRAL. This indicates that in the cities with a higher proportion of people employed in the construction industry, mayors tend not to support the idea that citizens and mayors should have more power vis-à-vis central bureaucrats and politicians in the local policy making. Since the proportion of people employed in construction industry is the anti-NPC demographic characteristics of city, it should constrain the Japanese specific NPC policy preferences of mayors. Thus, the results is consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 2.

The proportion of people employed in the construction industry has a significant negative effect on DCRROAD. This means that in the cities with higher proportion of people employed in construction industry, mayors tend to not less support the decrease of the city expenditure on clientelistic construction. This result is also consistent with what hypothesis 2 predicts.

As expected, degree of urbanization has a positive effect, although weak, on DCRROAD, which means that, in the cities with higher level of urbanization, mayors tend to not support the decrease of the city expenditure on clientelistic construction.

Additionally, although the effect does not reach a significant level (p = .14), the proportion of people employed in agriculture has a significant negative effect on DCRROAD, indicating that in the cities with higher proportions of people employed in agriculture, mayors tend to not support the decrease of city’s expenditure on clientelistic construction. This result is consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 2 as well.

Thus far, I have examined the relationships between city’s demographic characteristics and the NPC of mayors in policy preferences by using multiple regression analyses. Generally, the results of the multiple
regressions provide supporting evidences for hypotheses 2. By examining the NPC policy preferences of mayors and their relationship with city’s demographic characteristics, I have shown how the NPC hypotheses can be applicable to local politics and policy making in the local governments of Japan. Examination of two hypotheses suggested that (1) younger and more educated mayors tend to bear more NPC in policy preferences and (2) that NPC type demographic characteristics of cities have effects on the NPC of mayors in policy preferences.

THE NPC AND URBAN POLICY CHANGE IN JAPAN

Since the NPC-oriented policy preferences of mayors and city’s NPC type demographic characteristics are expected to have an influence on the policy outputs in the cities, we now turn to examine how the dynamic of NPC has influenced the local policies, especially the fiscal policies.

Hypothesis, Data and Method

Hypothesis 3. In cities with more NPC type demographic characteristics in the constituencies, the city’s political structure becomes more of an NPC type, and the policy output changes towards a more NPC-oriented; in the cities with more anti-NPC type demographic characteristics, the opposite is true.

This hypothesis can be tested by path analysis, which examines a causal path starting from city’s demographic characteristics through the NPC type policy outputs. In the cities with NPC type constituencies, I expect that the city’s political structure will develop along the lines of NPC, which will lead to changes in the policy output toward a more NPC-oriented output.

In this analysis, the NPC type political structure of cities means less support for the conventional political parties (i.e., the LDP and the SDP), which can be represented by the numbers of council members from the LDP or the SDP (ANTI-CON). Thus, it is expected that the NPC type demographic characteristics of cities should be positively related to ANTI-CON, while anti-NPC type demographic characteristics should be negatively related to ANTI-CON. Since the higher values of ANTI-CON indicate that there are relatively fewer council members from the LDP or the SDP, it is expected that ANTI-CON is positively related to the NPC type policy output of cities.

NPC type policy output is represented by the variable LESSROAD, which exhibits the proportion of expenditure spent on roads and bridges among total expenditure. It is coded in such a way that higher value on LESSROAD
indicates a city that spends less on roads and bridges. As explained in the previous section, the expenditure on roads and bridges is considered the most explicit example of clientelistic expenditure. Thus, the Japanese specific NPC should be positively related with LESSROAD, which would prove that the NPC leads to the NPC type policy output, a decrease in clientelistic expenditure.

Figure 1 depicts the diagram for the hypothesis 3.

Data to test hypothesis 3 are coded from three different data set, Japan Census, Shichousonbetsu ketsan shirabe (A Report on Expenditure of cities and villages) and Asahi senkyotaikan (Asahi Review of Election) (1988).

As in the analyses for hypothesis 2, city’s demographic characteristics were selected from Japan Census (1985). ANTI-CON was coded from Asahi senkyotaikan (Asahi Review of Election) (1988). ANTI-CON was created by measuring the proportion of city council members who are members of either the LDP or the SDP, among the total council members. LESSROAD was coded from “Shichousonbetsu ketsan shirabe (A Report on Expenditure of cities and villages) (1988),

DISCUSSION

Table 4 exhibits the results of multiple regression to examine the hypothesis 3.

The following can be inferred from table 4.

The proportion of younger people in the city has a positive effect on ANTI-CON, which means that in the cities with younger people, there are fewer city council members from the conventional political parties, the LDP or the SDP. The proportion of professionals in the city has a positive effect on ANTI-CON, indicating that in the cities with higher proportion of professionals, there are fewer city council members from the LDP or SDP. The proportion of people employed in agriculture has a significant negative effect on ANTI-CON, implying that in the cities with higher proportion of people employed in agriculture, there are more council members from the LDP or SDP. The degree of urbanization has a significant positive effect on
ANTI-CON, implying that in the cities with higher degree of urbanization, there are fewer council members from the LDP or SDP. All the results above are consistent with hypothesis 3; in the NPC type demographic characteristics, the political structure of cities becomes more NPC oriented.

The next step is to examine the effects of city’s demographic characteristics and the NPC type political structure on the NPC type policy output (a decrease of clientelistic city expenditure).

Table 4 exhibits the following facts.

The proportion of professionals in the city has a significant positive effect on LESSROAD, meaning that in the cities with higher proportions of professionals, more NPC policy outputs emerge, lessening clientelistic expenditure of the cities. The proportion of people employed in agriculture has a very strong negative effect on LESSROAD, implying that in the cities with a higher proportion of people employed in agriculture, there are fewer NPC type policy outputs. Less council members from the conventional parties in the city has a significant positive effect on LESSROAD, which means that in the cities with political environments of anti-conventional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>ANTI-CONS</th>
<th>LESSROAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPOP2534</td>
<td>.090*</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCPROF</td>
<td>.150***</td>
<td>.143**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCINCT</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>-.234***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCCCONS</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCAGRI</td>
<td>-.366****</td>
<td>-.438****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>.266****</td>
<td>.091*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-CONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>.133**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: All the coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001  ****p < .0001
IPOP2534: proportion of young people aged 25 through 34
IPCPROF: proportion of professionals in the city
IPCINCT: mean income of the city
IPCCCONS: proportion of people employed in construction industry
IPCAGRI: proportion of people employed in agriculture
URBAN: degree of urbanization of the city
ANTI-CON: less council members from the conventional parties in the city
LESSROAD: decrease in clientelistic city expenditure
political parties, more NPC policy outputs emerge. Degree of urbanization has a significant positive effect on LESSROAD, implying that in the cities with higher degrees of urbanization, expenditure on roads and bridges of the cities tend to increase. These results are consistent with the expectations of hypothesis.

Mean income of the city has a significant negative effect on LESSROAD, indicating that in the cities with higher average income, there are more clientelistic expenditures. This result seems to be opposite to hypothesis 3. However, since the effect of higher income has been partially ruled out by the variable of IPCPROF, this effect can be interpreted as showing that the wealth of some cities is due to the high income of traditional occupations which work against the NPC. Figure 2 depicts the significant causal relationship in the path analysis.

A key finding in the above analysis is that the negative effect of the anti-NPC demographic characteristics of cities has a stronger influence on the NPC-ness of the local politics in Japan, instead of the positive effect of NPC type demographic characteristics. This shows that, in current Japanese local politics, the constraint factor is stronger than the factors fostering the NPC in the local politics. However, since many positive effects of the NPC demographic characteristics in cities are found to be significant, it can be
expected, based on the NPC perspective, that in the future the positive factors will increase their influence, while the influence of the negative factors will decrease. Future research should focus on the changing effect of the both constraining and fostering factors.

CONCLUSION

When the LDP and the SDP formed a coalition with the Sakigake to regain the majority in 1994, Kubo, the Chief Secretary of the SDP, mentioned that the age of ideology has ended all around the world and that Japan needed new politics. Through the lens of the conventional political culture the coalition was difficult to comprehend, since the LDP had always been the ruling party representing the conservative camp while the SDP was the primary opposition party that represented the radical camp since 1955. In this paper, I have argued that the coalition was an event signaling the development of the new political rules of game in Japan, now supported by both the political elite and the public. Such changes in the political rules of the game have been more distinct at the local level, since local politics were more flexible and quick in policy implementation.

In the methodological sense, this paper differs from the conventional political culture approach which is based on abstract concepts of political culture; instead, this paper features several concrete middle-level concepts, which are easier to examine empirically. This paper is also different from the anthropologists who tend to regard culture as deterministic and unchanging (Clark and Inglehart 1990). By clarifying the dynamics of change in political culture and by showing how these changes lead to changes of political rules of the game, this paper suggests how political culture which is surely an important aspect of politics can be analyzed systematically to explain the political process.

This paper, however, is not without limitations, and thus leaves rooms for further research. Because the FAUI Japan collected in 1987 contains a small sample size, the multiple regression results cannot exhibit all the significant relations. A second wave of the Japanese FAUI survey should focus on securing a larger sample size. In addition, since the NPC is an ideal type, actual individuals and societies vary in the degree to which they match this type. In this sense, the importance of the NPC perspective should grow more apparent as one compares cross-nationally. Thus, for the further success of the NPC perspective, comparative analysis across different political systems is required.
REFERENCES

Books and Articles written in Japanese
Akuto, Hiroshi. 1975. Gendaijosei no raifustairu to seijiishiki (Lifestyle and political sophistication of women in current Japan), Tokyo, Jishoto Press.
Muramatsu, Michio. 1988. Chihojichi (Local Autonomy), Tokyo, Tokyo University Press.
Statistics Bureau, 1995. Shikumachimura no shihyo (Social Indicators by Cities and Villages).

Books and Articles in English
Rempel, Mike and Terry Clark eds. forthcoming. The Rise of Post-Industrial Politics.
Samuels, Richard J. 1983. The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan-Localities,

WONHO JANG received his Ph. D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago in 1996. He is a research associate at the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research, Seoul National University. His areas of interests are urban policy, Japanese politics, and social statistics.