

# Anaphoricity and Logophoricity\*

Ki-Sook Choi

## 1. Introduction

In this paper, I propose that the anaphor is separated from the logophor, and that the anaphor and the logophor<sup>1</sup> exist separately in the Universal Grammar (UG).

In the following section, I give the definition of an anaphor and a logophor and their properties.

## 2. Anaphoricity

In this section, the factors which constitute anaphoricity are presented. An anaphor observes the syntactic conditions such as locality and structural c-command. Before discussing these behaviors, I first define the notion, 'anaphor.'

### 2.1. The Definition of an Anaphor

First of all, Chomsky (1981) classifies the NP types by the features [ $\pm$ anaphor] and [ $\pm$ pronominal]. The anaphor is composed by [+anaphor] and [-pronominal] features while the pronoun by [-anaphor] and [+pronominal] features. The following table indicates how nominal expressions can be classified, using the proposed features:

---

\* This is abbreviation of Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. dissertation *Optimality-Theoretic Approach to Anaphora with special reference to English* (1999). I thank my thesis adviser Nahm-Sheik Park for his help to finish the dissertation and James Hye-Suk Yoon for the original idea. Also, I thank two anonymous reviewers for this paper. Of course, all the errors here are mine.

<sup>1</sup> I will return to the definitions of an anaphor and a logophor shortly.

Table 1. Typology of NPs

	LEXICAL CATEGORY	EMPTY CATEGORY
[+anaphor, -pronominal]	anaphor	NP-trace
[-anaphor, +pronominal]	pronoun	pro
[+anaphor, +pronominal]	?	PRO
[-anaphor, -pronominal]	R-expression	variable

According to this table, an anaphor is classified as an element that is made up of [+anaphor] and [-pronominal]. With this classification, Chomsky (1981) proposes the Binding Theory (BT) which captures the distribution of NPs.

(1) Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981)

- a. An anaphor is bound in its governing category.
- b. A pronoun is free in its governing category.
- c. An R-expression is free.

According to the BT, Chomsky defines an anaphor as an element that is bound in the governing category. This definition, however, is circular. Even though the anaphor is composed by the features [+anaphor] and [-pronominal], the anaphor itself is defined as a feature set that is bound in the governing category according to Binding Theory. That is, if an anaphor is defined based on the BT (A) and BT (A) regulates the distribution of an anaphor, it is no less than a tautology. This implies that the definition of an anaphor should be given independently of the binding theory.

Burzio (1991) already noted the conceptual problems of definition of an anaphor in Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981): the absence of explicit definitions for each of the three categories of anaphors, pronouns and R-expressions.

While English defines the anaphor based on the overt presence of certain elements, the *-self*, it will not do for other languages, in which the distinction between anaphors and pronouns are not transparent. This means that the morphological definition of an anaphor doesn't work. For example, the reflexives in Romance languages do not have any distinct morphological element like the "*-self*" form in Englishs.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The Italian uses the clitics as reflexives as in the following examples.

To solve the conceptual problem concerning the definition of an anaphor, Burzio (1991) proposes the following definition.

(2) Definition of an Anaphor (Burzio 1991)

An NP with no features is an Anaphor.

The definition in (2) is *a priori* plausible because it explains the referentially dependent character of anaphors. When it comes to the English reflexives<sup>3</sup> – *myself, yourself, himself, herself, itself, ourselves, yourselves, themselves* – the agreement feature is manifested in the morphology. But they are defined as anaphors in that they are referentially defective. The referentially dependent nature of anaphors distinguishes anaphors from pronouns, which can be either referentially dependent or independent.

On the other hand, Reinhart and Reuland (1993) propose that anaphors are referentially defective NPs, which entails that they cannot be used as demonstratives, referring to some entity in the world.

A different definition was proposed by Pollard and Sag (1992). They note that any attempt to expand binding domains to emerge from re-definition would not predict the difference in behavior between “exempt”<sup>4</sup> and “nonexempt” anaphors, and conclude that non-subject coargument anaphors are the only anaphors that should be constrained by Principle A. These are the so-called nonexempt anaphors such as (3).

- 
- (i) Io *mi* vedo.

I me see

‘I see myself.’

- (ii) Tu pensi solo a *te*.

you think only to you

‘You only think about yourself.’

In other cases, the clitics are used as pronouns.

- (iii) Gianni *mi* vede.

Gianni me sees

‘Gianni sees me.’

- (iv) Maria pensi solo a *te*.

Maria think only to you

‘Maria only thinks about yourself.’

<sup>3</sup> The anaphor refers to both a reflexive and a reciprocal. Here, I only investigate the uses of a reflexive.

<sup>4</sup> The exempt anaphors are equivalent to logophors in this dissertation.

- (3) a. John<sub>i</sub> hates himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. John<sub>i</sub> saw [Mary's picture of herself<sub>j</sub>].

The anaphors in (3) are bound by the antecedents in the co-argument positions. Thus, they are nonexempt anaphors.

If we follow the definition of nonexempt anaphors, it leaves a wide class of anaphors exempt from grammatical constraints. However, exempt anaphors are not completely unconstrained with respect to the choice of antecedent. Pollard and Sag (1992) propose that both processing (intervention) and discourse (point-of-view) constraints are relevant to exempt anaphors as the following example shows.

- (4) John<sub>i</sub> was going to get even with Mary. That picture of himself<sub>i</sub> in the paper would really annoy her, as would the other stunts he had planned.

The anaphor in (4) is not bound by the co-argument. However, the anaphor is licensed as an exempt anaphor, since the narrator has taken *John's* perspective.

Adopting the above proposals that an anaphor should be defined independently of the morphology and an anaphor should be distinguished from a logophor, I propose the following definition of an anaphor; an anaphor is a referentially dependent NP which lacks meaning in itself.<sup>5</sup>

#### (5) Definition of an Anaphor (Proposal)

An anaphor is a referentially dependent NP without any meaning, keeping syntactic constraints.<sup>6</sup>

This definition is motivated independently from the form in languages which lack the reflexive form or in which both the reflexive and pronoun forms appear. Therefore, the *-selfless* reflexives in Romance languages are also properly accounted for.

In this paper, I define an anaphor as an element without any reference in itself, observing syntactic constraints. Given this definition, I present the properties of an anaphor below.

---

<sup>5</sup> As Reinhart and Reuland (1993 : 672) indicate, logophors carry out several functions such as point-of-view and focus.

<sup>6</sup> I will discuss the relevant syntactic conditions in the next section.

## 2.2. Properties of an Anaphor

In this section, I investigate the factors which constitute anaphoricity, given the definition of an anaphor. First, the syntactic conditions such as c-command, local domain, and antecedenthood are presented. These are the properties in relation to the antecedent. Finally, the bound variable reading is examined.

Let us begin with the c-command condition.

### 2.2.1. C-Command

First of all, an anaphor is c-commanded by its antecedent. As indicated in Binding Theory, *governed* means that it is c-commanded and co-indexed. This syntactic property is illustrated in (6).

- (6) a. \*John<sub>i</sub>'s brother loves himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. John's brother<sub>i</sub> loves himself<sub>i</sub>.

(6a) and (6b) show a contrast in grammaticality, which is explained by the c-command condition. In (6a), the reflexive *himself* is not c-commanded by its antecedent *John*. On the other hand, in (6b), the reflexive is c-commanded by its antecedent *John's brother*. Thus, I will assume that the c-command condition is a necessary condition for the anaphoric binding. I do not include the anaphors which do not observe this condition in this paper.

### 2.2.2. Local Domain

In the above section, I proposed that the c-command condition is required for an anaphoric binding. But this is not the sufficient condition, which needs an additional condition as manifested in BT (A) – An anaphor must be bound in the governing category. The governing category varies slightly depending on the languages. In English, the local domain is restricted to the tensed clause and specified subject.<sup>7</sup>

In English, there is one more factor in terms of locality condition – Tensed S Condition (TSC). What Tensed S Condition (TSC) means is that an anaphor must be bound in the tensed clause domain. Let us consider the following contrast.

---

<sup>7</sup> Manzini and Wexler (1987) parameterize the governing category according to the languages. Here, I mainly focus on English in the discussion of a local domain.

- (7) a. \*John<sub>i</sub> believes that himself<sub>i</sub> is intelligent.  
 b. John<sub>i</sub> believes himself<sub>i</sub> to be intelligent.

Assuming that the two sentences are not different in the meaning, the difference is that (7a) is ungrammatical because *himself* is not bound in the embedded tensed clause. In (7b), *himself* is bound by *John* in the tensed clause. Therefore, in English, the tensed S constitutes a local domain in which an anaphor must be bound.

The Specified Subject Condition (SSC) says that an anaphor must be bound within the domain of a specified subject. Here, the subject is understood as [NP, NP] or [NP, S] – that is, a subject of an NP predicate or a sentence.

- (8) a. John<sub>i</sub> took a picture of himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. \*John<sub>i</sub> took Peter<sub>j</sub>'s picture of himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 c. \*John<sub>i</sub> thinks that Peter<sub>j</sub> took a picture of himself<sub>i</sub>.

In (8a), there is no intervening specified subject which acts as a blocking antecedent for *himself*. But in (8b), the subject of the picture NP *Peter* plays a role as a specified subject to block binding between *John* and *himself*. The same condition applies to (8c) to rule out this sentence. (8c) violates the Specified Subject Condition, because *himself* is not bound by the subject in the embedded clause.

As we see in the above English examples, the anaphor must be bound in the local domain, which brings about TSC and SSC.

### 2.2.3. Overt Antecedent

That an anaphor is bound means it is *c-commanded* and *coindexed* by the antecedent. The anaphor must have an overt antecedent. The implicit argument cannot be a legitimate binder of an anaphor.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> This property contrasts with the discourse binding where an implicit antecedent is allowed.

- (i) a. Nwu-ka Chelswu-uy swukcey-lul haycwuessni?  
       who-Nom Chelswu-Poss homework-Acc helped  
       'Who helped with Chelswu's homework?'  
 b. Caki-ka honca haysseyo.  
       self-Nom alone did  
       'He<sub>i</sub> did it alone.'

- (9) a. I gave John<sub>i</sub> the picture of himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. \*I gave Ø<sub>≡<sup>a</sup><sub>i</sub></sub> the picture of himself<sub>i</sub>.

The antecedent should be realized overtly to bind the anaphor. In (9a), an anaphor is bound by the overt antecedent, but in (9b), *himself* cannot find the overt antecedent to bind. Thus, the grammatical antecedent is required. Otherwise, a reflexive fails to function as an anaphor.

#### 2.2.4. Bound Variable

The anaphor can be used as a bound variable. Consider the following example.

- (10) a. Everyone<sub>i</sub> loves himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b.  $\forall (\lambda x (x \text{ loves } x))$

In the above example, the reflexive behaves like a variable bound by the antecedent. The bound variable reading of an anaphor is well represented in the VP-Ellipsis construction with the anaphor in it.

- (11) a. John loves himself and Bill does, too.  
 b. John thinks that he is a genius and Bill does, too.

In (11a), only a bound variable reading is possible in the deleted VP which has a reading of 'Bill like himself'. Anaphoric binding allows only bound variable reading. On the other hand, in (11b), *he* can be read as either a bound variable or a coreferential pronoun. That is, in the second conjunct, the deleted pronoun can be read as a bound variable referring to *Bill*, or as a coreferential pronoun referring to *John*.

It is widely accepted that anaphors are necessarily interpreted as bound variable (e.g. Chomsky 1981). Thus, (12a) is interpreted only as (12b) and there is no ambiguity in (12c), so that only the bound variable reading - Lili praised Lili - is obtained.

- (12) a. Lucie<sub>i</sub> praised herself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. Lucie ( $\lambda x (x \text{ praised } x)$ )

---

As we see in (ib), *caki* which is used in discourse binding does not have the sentential antecedent. Rather, it has an antecedent in the discourse.

<sup>9</sup> The pointing finger  $\Rightarrow$  means that it is discourse-bound.

- c. Lucie praised herself, and Lili (did) too.  
(Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 674)

This is a crucial test which distinguishes the anaphor from the logophor.

In this section, I investigated the anaphoricity – the definition of an anaphor and its properties. An anaphor is defined as an NP that is referentially dependent, observing the syntactic conditions. As its properties, the c-command condition, the local domain, an overt antecedent and a bound variable reading are given.

In the next section, the definition of a logophor and logophoricity will be dealt with. As we see, a logophor is free from the syntactic conditions – either keeping or not keeping the syntactic conditions.

### 3. Logophoricity

The notion of logophoricity was introduced in the studies of African languages in which a morphologically differentiated logophoric pronoun has a distribution distinct from that of other pronouns.<sup>10</sup> This notion has been used in accounts of reflexives in the long-distance binding occurring in such as Korean, Japanese, and Icelandic. Cross-linguistically, logophoricity may be expressed by one or more of the following mechanisms: (i) a separate paradigm of logophoric pronouns which may be free forms (ii) logophoric verbal suffixes (iii) long-distance reflexives (Huang, Y. 1994 : 185).

In the following sections, I give a definition of a logophor and present factors that constitute the logophoricity.

#### 3.1. The Definition of a Logophor

Logophoricity refers to the phenomenon whereby the 'point of view' of an internal protagonist of a discourse, as opposed to that of the current, external speaker, is reported (Huang, Y. 1994). Some languages in the UG employ logophoric pronouns which are morphologically distinct from pronouns and reflexives. The logophoric pronouns are used to refer to the individual whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or reflected in a

---

<sup>10</sup> The examples in Ewe will be illustrated in the next section.



given linguistic context (Clements 1975). For example, in Ewe, the logophoric pronoun *yɛ* is used of which usage is distinct from the personal and reflexive pronoun. It should designate the individual (other than the speaker) whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported or reflected in the linguistic context.

- (13) a. Kofi be *yɛ*-dzo.  
           Kofi say LOG-leave  
           ‘Kofi said that he (Kofi) left.’  
       b. Kofi be *me*-dzo.  
           Kofi say I-leave  
           ‘Kofi said that I left.’  
       c. Kofi be *e*-dzo.  
           Kofi say PRO-leave  
           ‘Kofi said that he/she (≠Kofi) left.’
- (14) a. Kofi *lɔ̃ e* ɖokui.  
           Kofi love himself  
           ‘Kofi loves himself.’  
       b. Kofi be *yɛ-lɔ̃ yɛ* ɖokui.  
           ‘Kofi said that he (Kofi) loves himself.’ (Clements 1975)

As we can see in (13) and (14), when the logophoric pronoun *yɛ* is used, it must refer to *Kofi*. This contrasts with the regular pronoun *e* which has to be disjoint with *Kofi*.

Sells (1987) notes that the logophoric pronouns appear predominantly within sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience. He divides the logophoricity into three primitive notions: source of the report, the person with respect to whose consciousness (or ‘self’) the report is made, and the person from whose point of view the report is made.

The logophoricity is expressed by the logophoric pronouns in such languages as Ewe and the reflexive form is used in others like Korean, Japanese, and Icelandic. Let’s consider the following examples.

- (15) Chelswu<sub>i</sub>-nun                    Yengswu-ka            caki<sub>i</sub>-lul            coahanta-ko  
       Chelswu-Top                    Yengswu-Nom            self-Acc            like-Comp  
       sayngkakhan-ta.  
       think-decl (Korean)  
       ‘Chelswu<sub>i</sub> thinks that Yengswu loves him<sub>i</sub>.’

- (16) Taroo<sub>i</sub>-wa Yosiko-ga zibun<sub>i</sub>-ni aitagatteiru-to  
 Taroo-Top Yosiko-Nom self-Dat visit-was-wanting-Comp  
 iwareta.  
 was-told (Japanese)  
 'Taroo<sub>i</sub> was told that Yosiko wanted to visit him<sub>i</sub>.'
- (17) Jón<sub>i</sub> segir a δ María elski sigi.  
 John says that Maria loves(subj.) self (Icelandic)  
 'Jón<sub>i</sub> says that María loves him<sub>i</sub>.'

The above examples show that the reflexives in Korean, Japanese, and Icelandic are bound by the matrix antecedents across the local domain in which a reflexive should be bound. I assume that the reflexives in these languages are lexically ambiguous between an anaphor and a logophor.<sup>11</sup> As an anaphor, it must be bound in the local domain and as a logophor it can refer to the matrix antecedent, indicating the point-of-view of the binder.

### 3.2. Logophoricity in English

Turning to logophoricity in English, Zribi-Hertz (1989) argues that the English reflexives are used like logophors in certain contexts to indicate logophoricity.

- (18) a. Miss Stepney<sub>i</sub>'s heart was a precise register of facts as manifested in their relation to herself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. But Rupert<sub>i</sub> was not unduly worried about Peter<sub>j</sub>'s opinion of himself<sub>i</sub>.

In (18a), both the locality and c-command conditions for an anaphor are violated, but *herself* is allowed. In (18b), the reflexive is bound across the specified subject, which also violates the syntactic condition on an anaphor. To explain the marked usage of the reflexive, Zribi-Hertz (1989) proposes like the following.

- (19) In English, a reflexive pronoun may occur in violation of the syntactic conditions iff it refers back to the minimal subject of consciousness.

---

<sup>11</sup> I assume that the reflexives are ambiguous between an anaphor and a logophor in these languages, following the current literature.

When applied to (18), both (18a) and (18b) can be said to be spoken from the perspective of *Stepney* and *Rupert*, respectively. The following examples also support the proposal that English reflexives violating locality conditions are used as logophors.

- (20) a. Tom<sub>i</sub> believed that the paper had been written by Ann and himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. John<sub>i</sub> thinks that Mary is taller than himself<sub>i</sub>.

In the above examples, the reflexives are not bound in the local domains, but they are licensed by the discourse factor – *point of view*. In (20), *himself* is used to denote the logophoricity: the sentences are delivered from the viewpoint of *Tom* and *John* respectively. When *him* is used instead of *himself*, it indicates an objective report of the speaker.

Kuno (1987) uses the term 'logophoric' equivalent to the meaning 'pertaining to the speaker and the hearer.' The subjects of verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, *complain*, *scream*, *realize*, *feel*, *know*, *expect*, and so on, and the objects of verbs such as *worry*, *bother*, *disturb*, *please*, and so on are marked in underlying structure as [+logo-1]. The dative objects of verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, *complain*, *scream*, are marked as [+logo-2]. By recourse to logophoricity, Kuno (1987 : 121) explains the irregular English reflexives.

- (21) a. \*Speaking of John<sub>i</sub>, the article was written by Ann and himself<sub>i</sub>.  
 b. According to John<sub>i</sub>, the article was written by Ann and himself<sub>i</sub>.

The above two sentences have an identical constituent structure, but only (21b) is acceptable. This is due to the fact that *John*, the antecedent of the reflexive, is semantically a [+logo-1] NP in (21b) but not (21a). Thus, it can be said that only logophoricity explains the difference between the two sentences. In English, the long-distance reflexives as logophors are licensed when they are used to denote the point-of-view of the internal speaker.

I adopt the above proposals that a logophor designates the individual whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported or reflected in the linguistic context in which the pronoun occurs. The logophor can be represented either as an exclusive set of morphologically distinct forms as in some African languages or a reflexive used as in Korean, Japanese, and Icelandic.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Clements (1975 : 147) notes that the logophoric and reflexive pronouns of Latin

### 3.3. Logophoric Domain

Logophoric domain refers to stretches of discourse in which a person's words, thoughts, knowledge, or emotions are being reported. As the anaphor is bound in the anaphoric domain, so the logophor should be bound in the logophoric domain. First of all, it starts with the complement clause of a verb of saying and thinking, since this verb indicates speech, thought, etc.

- (22) Oumar Anta inyemeñ waa be gi.  
 Oumar Anta LOG-ACC seen AUX said  
 'Oumar<sub>k</sub> said that Anta had seen him<sub>k</sub>.' (Culy 1994)

If we look at the logophoric languages to see which verbs allow marking of a logophoric domain, the following logophoric hierarchy is formed.

- (23) speech > thought > knowledge > direct perception  
 (an implicational universal for logocentric verbs)

What this hierarchy means is that if a language has logophoric marking with (some) verbs in one class, then it will also have logophoric marking with (some) verbs of every class higher on the hierarchy (Culy 1994).

A logophoric domain always starts in a clause that is subordinate to one in which the logophoric trigger<sup>13</sup> is identified, either explicitly or implicitly. We can call this part of the logophoric domain the sentential logophoric domain, as opposed to the discourse logophoric domain, which is the whole stretch of discourse in which the trigger's words, thoughts, knowledge, or emotions are being reported. The following schema illustrates the sentential and discourse logophoric domain.

- (24)
- |                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
|                             | Sentential logophoric domain |
|                             | ↓                            |
| [s ...logophoric trigger... | [s ...] [s ...] [s ...]      |
|                             | Discourse logophoric domain  |
|                             | (Culy 1994: 1057)            |

---

and Greek are in fact homophonous. He attributes this fact to diachronic factors (the assignment of a new grammatical function to an already-available grammatical form).

<sup>13</sup> A logophoric trigger refers to the person whose words, thoughts, knowledge or emotions are being reported.

The logophoric domain is marked by either the logophoric verb or the verbal suffix.<sup>14</sup> The most common type verbs are of speech and thought. Thus, logophors are found to occur predominantly with clausal complements of communication and consciousness.

In this section, a logophoric domain is presented as having no relation to the structure. Rather, it has a relation with the meaning of a verb. Below, I search for the logophoric factors.

### 3.4. Logophoric Factors

The pure logophoric languages have morphologically distinct set of pronouns that are distinguished from regular pronouns. Some languages which lack the logophoric pronoun use the reflexive pronoun to refer to the logophoricity. In these languages, there are grammatical or discourse factors that constitute logophoricity. I will discuss the logophoric factors one by one in the following.

#### 3.4.1. Point of View

'Point of view' is referred as a notion which licenses the long-distance reflexives. For example, Pollard and Sag (1992) distinguish the non-exempt anaphor from exempt one and argue that the English exempt anaphor is licensed by the discourse factor - *point of view*. As the following example shows, there is no local antecedent in the same sentence in which *himself* is used. Yet, the reflexive is allowed, which explains the logophoric use.

- (25) John<sub>i</sub> was going to get even with Mary. That picture of himself<sub>i</sub> in the paper would really annoy her, as would the other stunts he had planned.

The reflexive is used to denote *John's* point of view. Another example suggests that the long-distance reflexives are licensed by "point of view" factor.

- (26) \*Mary was quite taken aback by the publicity John<sub>i</sub> was receiving. That picture of himself<sub>i</sub> in the paper had really annoyed her, and there was not much she could do about it.

---

<sup>14</sup> I will return to this point, dealing with logophoric factors.

The text (26) is odd, since it is delivered from *Mary's* point of view. Therefore, the reflexive *himself* should be changed to the pronoun *him*, because *John's* perspective is not taken. *Mary* is the holder of the view-point in this discourse, thus *John* cannot license *himself*.

Cantrall (1974 : 99) explains the use of irregular reflexives<sup>15</sup> in terms of *point-of-view*. He relates the English reflexive to point of view. Let us consider the following contrasting examples.

- (27) a. \*You think that I am studying a picture of me but {actually, technically} I am studying a picture of me.  
 b. You think that I am studying a picture of me but {actually, technically} I am studying a picture of myself. (Cantrall 1974)

Cantrall argues that the change of grammaticality in (27) can be attributed to the shift in viewpoint. When a pronoun is used after *but*, there is no shift of viewpoint to incur ungrammaticality in (27a). However, the shift of viewpoint is marked by use of *myself* in (27b), the sentence is delivered from the viewpoint of *I*.

The following example gives an interesting account of reflexives to refer to viewpoint.

- (28) I can understand a father<sub>i</sub> wanting his daughter to be like himself<sub>i</sub>  
 but I can't understand that ugly brute<sub>i</sub> wanting his daughter to be like him<sub>i</sub>.

When the reflexive is used in (28), the sentence delivers *father's* point of view and *him* is used from the speaker's viewpoint.

In addition, the fact that at most one viewpoint is represented in one sentence supports the assumption that English long-distance reflexives are explained by this notion.

- (29) a. \*John<sub>i</sub> told Mary<sub>j</sub> that the photo of himself<sub>i</sub> with her in Rome proved that the photo of herself<sub>j</sub> with him in Naples was a fake.  
 b. \*John<sub>i</sub> traded Mary<sub>j</sub> pictures of herself<sub>j</sub> for pictures of himself<sub>i</sub>.

The above examples show that the English reflexives used as logophors are licensed by point-of-view and there should not be a crossing of viewpoints.

---

<sup>15</sup> Cantrall (1974) calls the reflexives which are not explained by the syntactic conditions as irregular reflexives.

### 3.4.2. Source

The Source-role constitutes the logophoricity according to Sells (1987). The Source-role triggers a logophor. The following Korean example shows that the Source-role licenses the reflexive *caki*.

- (30) Chelswu<sub>i</sub>-ka      Yenghi<sub>j</sub>-loputhe caki<sub>i/j</sub>-ka  
       Chelswu-Nom    Yenghi-Source    self-Nom  
       am-i-la-ko                tul-ess-ta.  
       cancer-be-Decl-Comp    hear-Pst-Decl  
       ‘Chelswu<sub>i</sub> heard from Yenghi<sub>j</sub> that self<sub>i/j</sub> has cancer.’

The source of this sentence is *Yenghi*, and thus it is eligible as an antecedent of *caki* as a logopher. Here we see that the source-role is a logophoric trigger. Here, a reflexive *caki* is used as a logophor regardless of the syntactic conditions.

### 3.4.3. Self

“Self” is the person with respect to whose consciousness the report is made. This role can constitute logophoricity, because a logophor refers to the feelings of the internal protagonist. This role is manifested in the following psych-verb construction.

- (31) Chelswu<sub>i</sub>-ka      caki<sub>j</sub>-lul miweha-n-ta-nun      sasil-i  
       Chelswu-Nom    self-Acc hate-Pres-Decl-Comp    fact-Nom  
       Yenghi<sub>j</sub>-lul      kweylop-hi-ess-ta.  
       Yenghi-Acc    bother-Cause-Pst-Decl  
       ‘The fact that Chelswu<sub>i</sub> hates self<sub>i/j</sub> bothered Yenghi<sub>j</sub>.’

Here, *caki* represents the mental state of *Yenghi*. Thus, it constitutes a logophor as “self”. According to the definition, *Yenghi* is the person whose consciousness is reported and thus is used as a logophor.

### 3.4.4. Mood

Although the logophoric function has a primarily semantic basis, it tends to become ‘grammaticalized’ (Maling 1984). In Icelandic, the logophoric domain is licensed by the subjunctive mood. This contrasts with the indicative mood which does not allow the long-distance reflexives. Therefore, in this language, mood is a grammatical marker of logophoric domain.

- (32) a. \*Jón<sub>i</sub> veit a δ María elskar sig<sub>i</sub>.  
           John knows that Maria loves(ind) REFL  
       b. Jón<sub>i</sub> segir a δ María elski sig<sub>i</sub>.  
           John says that Maria loves(subj.) REFL

In (32a), *sig* is not bound with the matrix subject, because it is in the indicative mood, whereas in (32b) it is allowed in the subjunctive mood. Icelandic indicates the logophoricity with a grammaticalized system of mood. Thus, mood constitutes a factor which permits logophoricity.

#### 3.4.5. Verbal Suffix

Gokana marks the logophoricity not with a logophoric pronoun but with a verbal suffix. It employs a verbal suffix *-EE* to mark logophoric reference as in (33).

- (33) a. aè kɔ aè dɔ̃.  
           he said he fell  
           'He<sub>i</sub> said that he<sub>j</sub> fell.'  
       b. aè kɔ aè dɔ̃-è.  
           he said he fell-LOG  
           'He<sub>i</sub> said that he<sub>j</sub> fell.'

When the verb is used without the logophoric suffix as in (33a), the pronoun cannot refer to the person in the matrix clause. In (33b), with the suffix *-è* attached to the verb, the verb comes to denote logophoricity.

#### 3.5. Relation of an Anaphor and a Logophor

In the above sections, I divided a reflexive into an anaphor and a logophor. In the below table, I summarize the differences between the two categories as follows:

Table 2. Comparison of an Anaphor and a Logophor

Conditions	Anaphor	Logophor
C-Command	+	±
Locality	+	±
Overt Antecedent	+	±



As shown in the table, they do not always have complementary values in terms of the syntactic tests, and thus sometimes overlap. As we saw in section 2, an anaphor must be c-commanded in the local domain by the overt antecedent, whereas a logophor may or may not observe the syntactic conditions.

Culy notes that logophoric pronouns are really pronouns that are restricted to indirect discourse environments (personal communication via email).

Table 3. Locality and Logophoricity<sup>16</sup>

personal pronoun	wo	-co, -log
simple complex reflexive	ku wo mo	+mcn, -log
logophoric pronoun	inyeme	-co, +log
logophoric complex reflexive	ku inyem' mo	+mcn, +log

As the above table indicates, an anaphor is used differently in terms of logophoricity. The anaphor itself is even divided according to whether it is logophoric or not. Thus, an anaphor cannot be assumed to be the opposite category of a logophor.

In summary, an anaphor is a category which observes syntactic conditions, whereas a logophor represents a logophoric meaning and does not need to observe the syntactic conditions. Therefore, these two categories are not always contrastive in terms of the syntactic restrictions.

#### 4. Conclusion

In the above section, I searched some factors which divide the anaphor from the logophor. Some African languages give evidence for the separation of these two categories of an anaphor and a logophor. In Japanese, Icelandic and Korean, the anaphor and the logophor are used in the same form - reflexive. In English, the reflexive is used as an anaphor and as a logophor in restricted cases. Therefore, I conclude that an anaphor and a logophor co-exist cross-linguistically.

---

<sup>16</sup> I thank Culy for providing this data via email. Here, *co* indicates the coargument relation and *mcn* stands for 'minimal complete nucleus.'

## References

- Aoun, J. (1985) *A Grammar of Anaphora*, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
- Baker, C. L. (1995) 'Contrast, Discourse Prominence, and Intensification, with Special Reference to Locally Free Reflexives in British English,' *Language* 71, 63-101.
- Bickerton, D. (1987) '*He Himself* : Anaphor, Pronoun, Or ...?,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 18, 345-348.
- Bouchard, D. (1983) *On the Content of Empty Categories*, Foris Publications, Foris, Dordrecht.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1985) 'PRO, Pronominal or Anaphor,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 16, 471-477.
- Bresnan, J. (1998) 'Optimal Syntax,' ms., Stanford University.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1998) 'The Emergence of the Unmarked Pronoun II,' ms., Stanford University.
- Burzio, L. (1991) 'The Morphological Basis of Anaphora,' *Journal of Linguistics* 27, 81-105.
- Cantrall, W. (1974) *Viewpoint, Reflexives, and the Nature of Noun Phrases*, Mouton, The Hague
- Choi, Ki-Sook (1999) *Optimality Theoretic Approach to Anaphora with special reference to English*, Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University.
- Chomsky, N. (1981) *Lectures on Government and Binding*, Foris Publications, Dordrecht.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1991) 'Principles and Parameters,' ms., MIT.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1995) *The Minimalist Program*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Clements, G. N. (1975) 'The Logophoric Pronoun in Ewe: its Role in Discourse,' *Journal of African Linguistics* 2.
- Cole, P., G. Hermon, and L. Sung, (1990) 'Principles and Parameters of Long-Distance Reflexives,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 21, 1-22.
- Collins, C. (1997) *Local Economy*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Culy, C. (1994) 'Aspects of Logophoric Marking,' *Linguistics* 32, 1055-1094.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996) 'Personal Pronouns and Systems of Pronominal Binding,' ms., LFG Workshop, Grenoble.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997) 'Logophoric Pronouns and Point of View,' *Linguistics* 35, 845-859.

- Dalrymple, M. (1990) *Syntactic Constraints on Anaphoric Binding*, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.
- Hagège, C. (1974) 'Les pronoms logophoriques,' *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* 69, 287-310.
- Hoek, K. (1997) *Anaphora and Conceptual Structure*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Huang, Y. (1994) *The Syntax and Pragmatics of Anaphora*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hyman, L. and B. Comrie (1981) 'Logophoric Reference in Gokana,' *Journal of African Languages and Linguistics* 3, 19-37.
- Keenan, E. (1988) 'Complex Anaphors and Bind  $\alpha$ ,' in *Proceedings of Chicago Linguistics Society* 24, 216-232.
- Koster, J. and E. Reuland (1991) *Long-Distance Anaphora*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kuno, S. (1987) *Functional Syntax*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and K. Takami (1993) *Grammar and Discourse Principles: Functional Syntax and GB Theory*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Lebeaux, D. (1983) 'A Distributional Difference between Reciprocals and Reflexives,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 14, 723-730.
- Levinson, S. (1991) 'Pragmatic Reduction of the Binding Conditions Revisited,' *Journal of Linguistics* 27, 107-161.
- Maling, J. (1984) 'Non-Clause-Bounded Reflexives in Modern Icelandic,' *Linguistics and Philosophy* 7, 211-241.
- Pollard, C. and I. Sag (1992) 'Anaphors in English and the Scope of the Binding Theory,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 23, 261-303.
- Pollard, C. and Xue, P (1998) 'Syntactic and Nonsyntactic Constraints on Long-Distance Reflexives,' ms., Ohio State University.
- Reinhart, T. and E. Reuland (1991) 'Anaphors and Logophors: An Argument Structure Perspective,' *Long-Distance Anaphora*, in Koster and Reuland eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993) 'Reflexivity,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 24, 657-720.
- Sells, P. (1987) 'Aspects of Logophoricity,' *Linguistic Inquiry* 18, 445-480.
- Yoon, J-M. (1987) 'Long-Distance Anaphors in Korean and their Cross-linguistic Implications,' in *Proceedings of Chicago Linguistic Society* 24, 479-495.
- Zribi-Hertz, A. (1989) 'Anaphor Binding and Narrative Point of View: English Reflexive Pronouns in Sentence and Discourse,' *Language* 65, 695-727.

## ABSTRACT

## Anaphoricity and Logophoricity

Ki-Sook Choi

There are two approaches to an anaphor. One approach is that an anaphor is used either as an anaphor or a logophor according to the context. The other is that an anaphor is separated from a logophor. In this paper, I review and discuss several motivations for the division of the reflexive into an anaphor and a logophor. As evidence, I search for the properties of each. I conclude that an anaphor and a logophor co-exist in the Universal Grammar, showing different properties. That some African languages have a morphologically distinct set of pronouns to express the logophoricity gives a clue to my argument that an anaphor and a logophor exist separately in the Universal Grammar.

Department of English Language and Literature  
Seoul National University  
San 56-1, Shillim-dong, Kwanak-ku  
Seoul 151-742, Korea  
E-mail: kisookc@hanmail.net