The cultural politics of the East Asian “miracle” helped to legitimize the “lean and mean” economism of Western neoliberalism, which in turn became the dominant ideology of post-Cold War globalism. With special reference to the recent work of Arif Dirlik, and a related article by Sang-In Jun, this essay explores the less miraculous elements of East Asian development. These elements went public “after the fall” — i.e., after the 1997 Crash. Until then the myth of “Asian values” had afforded an effective diversion from political repression and ecological carnage. A negative symbiosis had developed between Western globalism and these tendentious “values.” Only “after the fall” did globalists rush to distinguish Asian “crony capitalism” from the no-less-unde mocratic practices that could justly be labeled “crony globalism.” Clearly the neoliberal -al/Asian values alliance — a crucial pillar of the so-called New World Order — has been damaged. Dirlik and Jun weaken it further by exploding the claim of top-down Asian values to represent anything other than present power structures. In line with Amartya Sen’s “Asian strategy,” and my own adumbration of a “Korean model” as opposed to Singapore-style autocracy, Dirlik invokes the developmental alternative of “bottom-up” Asian values. These, I suggest, offer a potential corrective for the current privileging of economic over political development.

INTRODUCTION

Writing at the peak of the East Asian “miracle,” Paul Kennedy (1993) had the prescience to expose the dark side of the region’s political and economic prospect. South Korea, for example, lived under perpetual threat from the north. Hong Kong faced repatriation with a politically atavistic China, and Taiwan remained a diplomatic pariah state. Meanwhile, rising oil prices pushed up import bills, higher wages ate away at competitiveness, and inflated stock prices all but guaranteed a regional collapse (Kennedy, 1993: 200-1). Tellingly, Japan was already mired in recession. The remarkable thing is that most putative “experts” could manage to be surprised by the economic crash of 1997.

It is easier to understand how, ten years before, many would declare the West in decline. The poor showing of Western liberal capitalism relative to the new Asian model seemed to augur a cultural as well as economic eclipse. The pressing question was how the West should prepare for the hard times ahead. Some pundits were suggesting that what was good for Asia — namely the “Japan model” — could also work for flagging Western
But this proposal ran aground on the fact that the Japan model (not to mention its even more centralized Asian relatives, such as the Korean “vortex” model) involved intense central direction of the economy, while the emerging Anglo-American model blamed the Western malaise on a plethora of governmental regulation. In Britain and the U.S. alike, the political pendulum was swinging in the opposite direction: toward a sweeping decentrism that attempted to correct for decades of liberal excess. It was an accident of history that New Right policies in both countries ran counter to the tactical assumptions of their East Asian allies.

Despite those operational differences, the Asian “miracle” made an indelible mark on Western neoconservatism and subsequent neoliberalism (the two having largely converged in their economic programs by the 1990s). If the Asian example undermined faith in liberal capitalism, it restored confidence in capitalism per se, expelling the economic insecurities that brought Thatcher and Reagan to power in the first place. By putting non-economic liberalism on permanent hold, the studendous success of the Asian tigers helped legitimize the “lean and mean” neoliberalism that was fast becoming the dominant ideology of post-Cold War globalism. It was enough that, like its East Asian counterpart, the new Anglo-American model subordinated political progressivism to growth-first economism. The flagrant defects of the Asian political system would be conveniently ignored, just as they had been under the sway of Cold War realism. Old-style liberals who had hoped for a more ethical (which is to say a less “realist”) geopolitics in the wake of the Cold War would be sorely disillusioned. Already the realist torch was being passed to neoliberal globalism.

 Throughout the “miracle” years, economic triumphalism had masked the reactionary aspect of East Asian growth. Even the worst colonial regimes of the early twentieth century — the French in Indochina or the Japanese in Korea — had not been this destructive of local culture and ecology. One can now understand why Graham Greene, in his prophetic novel *The Quiet American* (1955/1996), favored the patent corruption of French colonialism over the salient alternatives: national movements funded either by foreign capitalism or communism. Whatever its real intentions, the U.S. notion of capitalist development — as inscribed by Greene’s fictional York Harding and America’s tragically non-fictional W. W. Rostow — would be a recipe for disaster in Vietnam and America alike. Unfortunately, American readers spurned *The Quiet American* in favor of *The Ugly American*, thus missing one of the best warning signs in modern literature. Bad taste never carried a higher price.

Classical realists share Greene’s aversion to the American habit of mixing
moralism with geopolitics. The problem with that mix, however, does not stem from the moral factor per se, but rather from bad moral judgment — bad in the undialogic sense that would apply to any cultural monologue. The crux of the problem is that Americans never learned to listen to Asian voices. Frank Baldwin observes, for example, that the U.S. effort to block the Soviets in Korea “overlooked one fact: the Koreans .... [The] United States intervened in a local Korean revolutionary situation. American power collided not with the Red Army but with the Korean revolution, Korean demands for social justice and rapid political change” (1973: 8). The Korean Left had earned its legitimacy through long and perilous resistance to Japanese imperialism. By suppressing this indigenous revolution, the U.S. military government not only rendered itself illegitimate (1973: 9), but set a pattern for invasive foreign policy that constitutes one of the three darkest chapters in American history — the other two being Afro-American slavery and Native American genocide.

True to this pattern, America once more turned against a World War II ally, this time in Vietnam. Massive U.S. funding supported the French against the Viet Minh resistance that would later give rise to the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the North and the Viet Cong in the South. For years Ho Chi Minh’s government tried in vain to communicate its basically nationalistic and non-alligned intentions to the U.S. Greene, however, was dead right: they were wasting their ink writing letters to Washington.

Some hoped that the end of the Cold War would remedy America’s tunnel vision. But the most distinctive feature of the old realist worldview — its cultural closure — would find a new home in neoliberal globalism. Under the auspices of a new “Washington Consensus,” and more particularly the Treasury Department’s firm grip on the IMF and the World Bank, the American model of development became the blueprint for another monologic enterprise: the “New World Order.”

Thus the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an equally Cold Peace. The good news was that the U.S. could conceivably bring its foreign policy “in from the cold,” putting it closer to American domestic ideals. No longer was it necessary to support autocratic regimes simply because they promised resistance to communism. The bad news was that much of East and Southeast Asia was seizing the same opportunity in reverse, removing the liberal democratic cloak from development strategies that no longer had to compete with insurgent alternatives. A new, cultural cloak was fabricated in the guise of “Asian values.” Modernization, by this standard, would no longer be equated with broad-spectrum Westernization. The lessons of East Asia seemed all too obvious at a time when neoconservatism was taking
hold in economically vibrant China, and relatively democratic Japan was
caught in a protracted recession. Human rights and democracy could thus
be cast as luxuries that threatened social order and impeded growth.

Across the Pacific, meanwhile, another kind of retrenchment was in order:
the forging of a virulent corporate globalism on the anvil of the new “Wash-
ington consensus.” Then it happened: for the newly dominant ideologies of
East and West—“Asian values” and neoliberal globalism — it was love at first
sight. The two formed a rearguard alliance on behalf of the New World
Order. What made this wedding so “orderly” was that both sides — despite
the gap between their respective centrist/decentrist strategies — gave full
priority to economic over political development. Both tied market forces to
traditional institutions such as the family or the nation (on this contradic-
tory linkage in neoliberalism see Giddens (1998: 12, 15) and Baldwin (1993:
9)). The two, moreover, formed a healthy economic symbiosis. Asia’s emerg-
ing markets were to this global order what Japan had been to early Cold
War America, with one cardinal difference: here there was no social net of
full employment, as Japan had put under its postwar workers. Nor was
there any commitment on the part of global investors to long-term develop-
ment. Post-Cold War globalization was a hit-and-run operation from the
first. The IMF was there to bail out investors, should boom give way to bust.
No one was looking out for the newly globalized workers of Asia, not to
mention the traditional workers outside the corporate gates.

The implantation of “free market” capitalism in Southeast Asia is reminis-
cent of the first free market in England, which likewise was pre-democratic.
John Gray points out that this puristic capitalism — founded as it was on
the ouster of the traditional social market — could not have been spawned
if democratic institutions had already been in place. Indeed, “the free mar-
ket began to wither away with the entry of the broad population into politi-
cal life” (1998: 8). So too, democratic reform movements were still in an
infant stage in Southeast Asia when foreign investment crested in the early
1990s. Thus globalization came under the management of unreformed insti-
tutions. After the Crash of 1997, the Western press would condemn the
region’s “crony capitalism,” seldom mentioning that this corrupt and
authoritarian system had been propped up by the West for decades — first
by American Cold War politics, and then by neoliberalism’s self-proclaimed
“apolitics.” So it was that early 1990s globalization led directly to what
Khanishka Jayasuriya calls “reactionary modernization” (1998: 8). Local
reform initiatives that might have offered a balance between economic and
political development were overwhelmed. Democratic values, social equity,
and ecological sustainability went up in smoke — quite literally in the case
of Indonesia. The exogenous force of globalization precluded grassroots political development wherever democratization had not achieved a “take-off” point before the Post-Cold War economic boom. Having reached that point in the late 1980s, Korea and Taiwan did not suffer the full brunt of reactionary modernization. Indeed, their democratic movements may have been energized by the boom. But similar movements, still in a germinal stage, were retarded if not extinguished in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia — not to mention post-Tiananmen China. Korea and Taiwan, which are often cited as exemplars of “growth first” democratization, are in fact the exceptions to Asian exceptionalism. Their democratic take-offs came just in time, before the post-Cold War turn to pure globalist economism.

What needs consideration is the role of “Asian values,” and cultural values in general, “after the fall” — i.e., after the economic Crash of 1997. With this in mind I turn to two important articles by Arif Dirlik and Sang-In Jun in a recent issue of *Development and Society*. Jun thinks it imperative that we resist the temptations of pure culturalism. Whereas Weber found in Confucianism a reason for East Asia’s long economic stagnation, the same “Asian values” were conscripted during the “miracle” years to explain the region’s unprecedented success. Now, “after the fall,” these values are again blamed for Asian inertia. Jun does not expel the cultural factor altogether, but helps us put cultural determinism in its place as one causal element among many.

This corrective is crucial for any post-Crash analysis of Asian development. Before the Crash, “Asian values” were widely used to direct attention away from political repression and ecological holocaust. “Singapore school” economism officially subordinated politics to commerce, writing human rights off as a Western fetish.

For their part, Western neoliberals were willing to accept “Asian values” as an interim station on the road to broader liberalization and democratization. Minxin Pei, for example, was there to tell us that “regarding the democratization of neoautocracies, ... the question is not whether, but when and how” (1994: 102). This reform teleology (see Thornton, 2000c) assured that little pressure would be put on the Singapore school to give its growth-first model of development an expiration date. Nor was its political credo given much scrutiny. Few cared that while “Asian values” were credited with stoking economic dynamism, it was in fact the economy that legitimated those values and the oppressive policies they sanctioned. Lucian Pye points out the double irony that, first, “Asian values” only achieved popularity in Asian countries with the least coherent traditional values (e.g., Singapore and Malaysia) or the least certainty about their traditional cul-
ture’s merits (China); and, second, the collectivity celebrated in the name of those values was nationalism, a Western import (1998: 140).

It would be bad enough if neoliberal globalists simply refrained from applying economic pressure for humanitarian purposes. Many go further, however, by inverting the case for political engagement. Where economic growth is accepted as the main prerequisite for freedom and democracy, doing business with authoritarian regimes becomes a moral imperative, and any action that obstructs “free trade” can logically be considered anti-democratic. It follows that the Seattle protesters against WTO secret agendas and closed door sessions are anti-democratic. Indeed, even pro-democracy dissidents locked away in Chinese prisons can be regarded as paradoxical anti-democrats, while the CEOs of multinational corporations doing business with the PRC can be depicted as heroes of the coming democratic transformation.

Given this logic, it is easy to see how “Asian values” came to have an almost canonical place in globalist thought “before the fall” — a time when, more than ever, Asian authoritarian regimes were having to defend their legitimacy domestically (Thornton, 1995: 69). Some might have been thrown out except for the support they got from the globalist West. A negative symbiosis emerges. Dirlik reminds us that Confucianism had been restored, by no accident, at the moment of capitalism’s crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s. Since then global capitalism has become so inextricably tied to Asianism that the 1997 Crash seemed to implicate both. William Greider needed no Asian Crash to reach such a conclusion. For him corruption is a core element of the whole global system (1997: 35). To keep such critics at bay, globalists rushed to distinguish Asian “crony capitalism” from their own operations (Palat, 1999: 3), which were in danger of being exposed as “crony globalism.” As Dirlik puts it, “Asia as the motor force of the world economy has turned once again into an Asia that requires Western guidance to save it from itself, or even an Asia that may be a threat to global order” (1999: 175). That threat is compounded by the present “reterritorialization” of Asian capitalism, a trend which has gained momentum after the Crash, but which Dirlik had noticed early in the 1990s (Dirlik, 1993: 9).

For all its impact on our reading of “Asian values,” the Crash did not alter the conventional wisdom of the 1990s concerning cultural determinism. Most post-Crash assessments of Asian values still rest — contra Krugman (who denies the Asian miracle) and Bhagwati (who explains it in terms of export policy; see Bhagwati, 1999: 52) — on the assumption that culture is the key to economic performance. This countenances Asian exceptionalism, and amounts to a postmodern inversion of the old material causality that
for decades was as fundamental to modernization theory as to Marxism. Culture is now in the driver’s seat, but toward what end? This radical shift in causal theory is anything but radical politically. By eschewing transcultural rights, it unwittingly shuts down a main channel of political reform, while leaving authoritarian traditionalism very much in place. Thus the “Asian values” / neoliberal alliance has a friend in the new culturalism.

Culturalism’s inadvertent trade-off between rights and growth finds further impetus in the standard “postmodern” reaction against liberalism. The “postcolonial” wing of postmodernism regards liberal reformism as just another case of “Orientalist” imposition. For Dirlik, however, it is the silence of postcolonialism that speaks loudest, especially where the new capitalist colonialism is concerned (Dirlik, 1994). The two “posts,” postmodernism and postcolonialism, deny all “foundational” investigations, including the left critique of capitalism. The activist left is found guilty of the same “Western” bias that discredits modernization theory, or any distinctly “Western” analysis. This animus is so strong in today’s cultural studies that its pro-Western opponents have usually held their silence for fear of being labeled ethnocentric, like Richard Rorty, or imperialist, like Francis Fukuyama.

Dirlik has conspicuously defied that code of silence. His unique background, as a sinologist from the Middle East, gives him the cultural high ground to critique Orientalism on both its Eastern fronts. By challenging the anti-Orientalist dictum from the vector of Chinese Occidentalism, he has helped launch a counterdiscourse (see Chen, 1995) that shares many of the nominal concerns of anti-Orientalism but drops its propagandistic methods.

Dirlik reminds us that many Western values can still be put to progressive uses, and indeed may be indispensable for basic reform in the developing world. This puts him on a collision course with many academic expatriates from the Third World. Beneath their cloak of alienation and despair, these “postcolonial” voices represent an empowered First World discourse, not the world they left behind (Dirlik, 1994: 339). Postcolonialism’s obsession with “exorcising the EuroAmerican ghost” (Dirlik, 1999: 181) is in fact an act of empowerment vis-a-vis an older academic establishment. Its dubious war on the West recycles the false dichotomy that Dirlik (following Abdallah Laroui) associates with reified cultural traditions: on the one side there is the liberal alienation that would flatly reject the past in the name of Westernization, while on the other there is the fundamentalist alienation that would jettison all Western influence. In both cases the past that is affirmed or rejected is largely a product of Western Orientalism, “now internalized by the Orientals themselves. . .” (Dirlik, 1999: 168).
National liberation movements tried to get past that West/past or modernity/tradition dichotomy by linking themselves to a transnational order of liberation. Now such movements are themselves a thing of the past (Dirlik, 1999: 169). The loss of that revolutionary agent is part of the dilemma faced by any local resistance to globalization. The local is thrown into a David and Goliath situation in which globalists join postcolonial postmodernists in denying David his slingshot: the sense of universal justice that seems to have its last world champion in Kofi Annan (see Thornton, 2000a). Minus that transcultural artillery, local resistance loses its staying power — the kind that defeated first the French and then the Americans in Vietnam. Globalists offer the locals a sop in the form of a new “glocal” identity (See Thornton, 2000b). They have their reasons: as a stage play for cultural difference, “glocalization” does a good job of masking the inroads of capitalist globalization.

This is one of the few cases where Dirlik and I seem to part company. Drawing upon Bruno Latour’s concept of global/local hybridity, Dirlik puts the term “glocality” in a more positive light than I would (1998: 10). Whereas I see the “glocal” as co-opted localism, he construes it as a firelane to forestall the “globalitarian” erasure of place. Our difference is one of means rather than ends, for his foremost concern, like mine, is the destruction of societies and nature by global capitalism (1998: 10). And on closer inspection our positions almost converge. His penetrating critique of ersatz localism reinforces my caveat concerning glocalization. As he discerns, the problem of “placing” the global (and hence “glocalizing” it) is that the locals who participate in the project are almost invariably those who have internalized the norms of the global system (1998: 10). He is in fact affirming what I have said elsewhere (Thornton, 2000b), that the “glocal” is a Trojan horse. Previously this might hardly have mattered, since the local could count on the national for protection; but increasingly the national itself has been co-opted by the global, leaving “places” to fend for themselves (Dirlik, 1998: 10).

Perhaps, as Robert Kaplan suggests in *The Ends of the Earth*, resistance in the 21st century will take the form of pandemic disorder rather than concerted revolution. Samuel Huntington takes a different route — that of civilizational clash — to much the same disorderly end; and even when that disorder is downgraded to mere ethnic conflict, as John Gray would have it (122-23), this is enough to sink any immediate prospect of a *political New World Order*. The question is whether civilizational or cultural resistance can also explode economic globalization. Jun holds that capitalism “is capable of gulping down any kind of religion or culture in the world” (1999:
201). In that case, the most that could be said for tradition-based resistance is that some cultures or religions are harder for capitalism to swallow.

Islam, for example, has proven a real obstacle to global consumerism (Turner, 1994: 91). By contrast, Confucian-based “Asian values” seem highly amenable to some forms of capitalism—though after the Crash, and the subsequent incursions of the IMF, Asian feelings about neoliberal, “Washington consensus” capitalism have understandably cooled. We have noted how the alliance between “Asian values” and global capitalism was strained to the breaking point “after the fall.”

Jun, however, doubts whether the two were ever really compatible, insofar as Confucianism favors “crude loyalty to much smaller, limited units of collectivity …” (1999: 198). In his view — and this cuts to the core of his thesis — “Asian values” did not engender the developmental state, either in Korea or in East Asia generally. That dubious honor goes to the import of Prussian or fascist statism from the West (1999: 198). Elements of the Confucian tradition were “intentionally exaggerated and highlighted for various political purposes,” making for what Eric Hobsbawm has called “invented tradition” (Jun, 1999: 199). In agreement with what Dirlik has been saying for years, Jun concludes that “even the professedly East Asia-centered debate over Asian values is actually … an import from those Western scholars who search for a new non-Western cultural paradigm” (1999: 200).

While Confucianism is not irrelevant to this analysis of East Asian development, neither is it the prime mover that proto-globalists have imagined it to be, or rather “invented it to be.” Much to the embarrassment of theories centered on a unique Confucian/capitalist nexus, non-Confucian success stories (e.g., Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) are now commonplace in Asia (see Gong and Jang, 1998: 92). Jun, accordingly, would have us shift our focus to the “structural conditions in which a particular culture is produced, distributed, mobilized, and repressed. In the analysis of East Asian capitalism, what matters is not Confucianism itself, but the power relations behind it” (Jun, 1999: 201).

There is always, to be sure, the possibility of resistance from below. This grassroots politics figures heavily in what I have called the Korean as opposed to the Singaporean model of development, the former being epitomized by Kim Dae Jung’s thought during his oppositional days (see Thornton, 1998b and 1994; Kim, 1994). That model — which counters the standard image of Korea’s political “vortex” (see Henderson, 1968) — is consistent with Dirlik’s argument in favor of a bottom-up East Asianism that defies “both Orientalist and nationalist mappings of the world” (1999:...
The core problem with “Asian values,” from this perspective, is that only a small sampling of those values have so far found a place in the ruling orthodoxy of Asian exceptionalism. Even if that tested formula can be credited with spawning miracle economies — and I personally hold that other formulas, such as Amartya Sen’s democratic Asianism (see Sen, 1999), could have raised living standards in East Asia with far less social and ecological damage — affluence alone can never guarantee political development. I therefore agree with Dirlik that Asian democracy must develop from the “bottom up,” as Asian values (and here we can drop the reductive quotation marks) are pluralized. In that more comprehensive sense of the term, Asian values cannot be held responsible for crony capitalism or the Crash of 1997, for they have yet to be broadly tested.

REFERENCES


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