DIVIDED COMMITMENT: EAST GERMAN SOCIALIST INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REUNIFICATION WITH WEST GERMANY

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Clientele nations such as North Korea, North Vietnam, South Yemen and East Germany do not fit into the present paradigms of a sociology of nationalism. The transnational context of the global civil war after the end of WWII had given birth to a new type of divided nations belonging to their respective global patron’s spheres of influence. The nation-building process of clientele nations is dominated by the exigencies of the global framework destined by their global patrons. The intellectual groups of clientele nations especially experience the dilemma of divided commitments they have to show towards their national reference societies, as well as to the transnational, globalized attitudes and aspirations demanded by their global patrons. As far as the East German socialist intelligentsia is concerned, it is very interesting to observe how it tried to solve the paradox of divided commitments. On the one hand, East German socialist intellectuals seriously regarded their salvationist mandate to enlighten and emancipate the East German population from the dark sides of the genocidal past of German history. On the other hand, they had to find a suitable way of distancing themselves from this immediate past and to ground their salvationist gospel into a national culture specifically designed to the DDR-socialism. The concepts of a class nation and later of a socialist nation were intended to shape a national culture combining socialist universalism and German particularism. Furthermore, the invention of the anti-fascist myth of pure, courageous, anti-fascist resistance solely practised by the Communist led alliances nourished a moral unanimity among the different cliques, factions and groups of the socialist intelligentsia. At decisive moments of the DDR-history, namely in the course of the implosion of the state and government of the DDR, the ‘laboring masses’ of the DDR did not follow their socialist intellectual guardians. The people of the DDR opted for a united fatherland of all Germans. The socialist intelligentsia deplored this betrayal of the people and invented patterns of explaining this changing of sides by the formerly highly praised and admired ‘laboring masses’.

INTRODUCTION

The formation of clientele nations such as North Korea, North Vietnam, South Yemen and East Germany (GDR/DDR) occurred within the context of the Cold War, resulting from WWII. In the process of the Cold War, the global area was divided into hostile camps competing with each other for power, fellowship, moral superiority and military domination. The Cold War antagonism had given rise to the conception of a global civil war
(Weltburgerkrieg), with the Soviet Union as superpower of the totalitarian world trying to endanger the foundations of democratic societies led by the United States of America. This global civil war was conducted without a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers, both of whom were privileged by a threatening and deterring nuclear weapons arsenal. Even up to of the Korean War, the two superpowers did not confront each other directly on the battlefields, but rather cared for reliable allies bearing the burdens of military costs and civilian losses. In the case of the Korean war, the North Korean army supported by Communist Chinese troops and Soviet weapons met the South Korean armed forces supported and led by American ground forces and strategic command on the Korean battlefields. As far as East Germany was concerned, the Iron Curtain prevented a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers, and they delegate the immediate tasks of conducting the global civil war to their respective allies, namely East and West Germany.

The building up of the East and West German clientele nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain followed the internal logic of a global civil war requiring the civic commitment of their populations to their respective governments. These governments had to play the roles of dependent clients to global patrons. Each of the two clientele nations were characterized by the paradoxes of a nation-building process undergoing their formative phases in the shadows of their superpower patrons. These patrons established with the NATO and the Warsaw pact effective systems of political and military clientelism for their respective allies. On each side of the Iron Curtain, the East and West German governments tried to stimulate, influence, push, supervise and direct their population into new forms of national and transnational commitment and identification not yet experienced in the German history. Dependency on the superpowers acting as patrons who guaranteed the mere national existence of their clients is typical for those clientele nations.1 This includes the boundaries of the territorial extension of the clientele nation, the specific forms of their political sovereignty, and the symbols, values and integrative commitments to the imagined communities. Those clientele nations are built upon a very precarious basis if they are not able to mobilize a national consciousness which could support and

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1The concept of clientele nations is unknown in the sociology of nationalism. Even within the sociology of political clientelism it is not mentioned (for example cf. Schmidt et al., 1977). The term of satellites state was commonly used within the comparative framework of world communism focusing on different development models (Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav Communism etc.), but without considering the problem of the nation-building process within a divided society characteristic of those clientele nations.
deepen the allegiances of their populations to the political and moral models of nation-building expected by their superpower patrons. Furthermore, clientele nations act in the global civil war as true followers and disciples of their respective superpower patrons in propagating the moral crusade against their national adversaries on the other side of the dividing boundaries. Clientele nations are operating as mission cadres for propagating the universal principles, ideologies and values held and recommended by their protective powers. Specifically, the intellectuals of clientele nations are obliged to work as mission cadres waging the moral battle between the Manichaean forces of evil and good, offering the prospects of individual and national salvation, and leading their public to the desired utopias of a proletarian world revolution or a liberal society fundamentally bound to the gospel of the American constitution.

With respect to the socialist intelligentsia of East Germany, its position was characterized by a unique paradox. On the one hand, its leading representatives were committed to the universal principles of a socialist society. These principles negate the importance of national obligations and primordial commitments. On the other hand, East German Socialist intellectuals were obligated to their particularistic national background binding them to the specific traditions, symbols, and codes of German history and society. Paradoxically, East German Socialist intellectuals had to simultaneously combine their universalistic beliefs in a socialist eschatology (socialist society) with the expediencies of the particularistic traditions of a German history which praised the Volk (people), but not the proletarian class as the sole embodiment of national commitment and salvation. Not surprisingly under the structural and cultural requirements of a global civil war, the East German socialist intelligentsia was supposed to cultivate a divided commitment to their universalistic socialist hopes and eschatologist aspirations as well as to their particularistic grounding in German history of romantic nationalism, that invested the Volk with the sacred aura of national unity and strength. The unexpected collapse of East Germany, and the fall of the Berlin wall in autumn of 1989, ended this double binded commitment upheld by the East German intelligentsia.

EAST GERMAN INTELLECTUALS: THE SOCIALIST INTELLIGENTSIA OF A CLASS NATION

The ideological construction of a class nation (Klassennation) tried to establish an alternative means of nation-building without recoursing to the primordial ties of ethnic obligations, historical traditions and cultural collec-
tive identities as formative basis for a national reconstruction after the catastrophic results of WWII for the defeated Germany. The abolition of the bourgeois, capitalistic class hierarchy with their class antagonism between capitalist ownership and exploited working masses would be substituted by an egalitarian society whose citizens shared, equal class status. An egalitarian class status would shape the new frame of identification for a socialist nation. Neither Volk (people), nor Kultur (culture), but the egalitarian class status of a Sozialistische deutsche Nation (Socialist German Nation) served as the new mode of legitimation of the DDR (Lepsius, 1982: 21).

The ideological invention of an East German nation based on the specific figurations of class membership defined in terms of the Marxist theory of class struggle, was supposed to serve as a social and cultural developmental alternative towards West Germany. This ideological invention was intended to sharply the socialist beginnings of a new society not corrupted by the capitalist deformations of a liberal society shaped by the USA as global patron (cf. Lepsius, 1982: 20-21). The socialist progressive forces of the East German nation, especially the leading Marxist-Leninist cadre party “Socialist Unity Party (SED)”, defined themselves as the best representatives of the emancipatory parts of German society, culture and history. Therefore they believed that they were legitimately entitled not only to build up a class nation but to claim a moral and cultural hegemony over West Germany. According to them, West Germany still had to be liberated from the chains of an imperialistic, monopolistic capitalism, and was additionally besmirched by the crimes of Nazi genocide. The ideological construction of a class nation was deeply embedded in the socialist sacred tradition which considered the proletariat and his organized representative, the Marxist-Leninist party, to be a universal, supranational historical agent dedicated to the universal liberation of all mankind. Not surprisingly, Marx and Engels prophesied a globalized market economy obliterating national modes of

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2The classic statement can be found in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. “In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations, and as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creation of individual nations become common property. National one-sided-ness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature” (Marx/Engels 1948: 11). In “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith (1847),” Engels asked the Communist catechumen to answer to the question 21: Will nationalities continue to exist under communism? In this way: “The nationalities of the peoples who join together according to the principle of community will be just as much compelled by this union to merge with one another and thereby supersede themselves as the various differences between estates and classes disappear through the superseding of their basis — private property (Der Bund der Kommunisten 1970: 475).”
life.

The German Democratic Republic was seen as the first embodiment of this utopian vision of universal emancipation on German grounds. In German history, it was the first *Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat* (state of workers and peasants) which had to play the role of the socialist outpost on the battlefield of the Cold War. In its ideological self-definition, this *Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat* had discarded the feudal, capitalistic and imperialistic phases of German history, ignored the narrow-minded nationalist commitments of its citizens and opened up the door for a not yet undertaken socialist experiment for social, cultural and economic transformation. This experiment was protected and supported by Soviet Russia as the dominant global patron of the socialist world. In this sense, Johannes R. Becher, the first Minister of Culture of the DDR, praised the national renaissance solicited by the progressive forces of a socialist *avant-garde* that cleansed German history from the dark sides of feudalism, imperialism and Nazism. The socialist belief transmitted to the people “a new sense, a new belief, a new flag (Becher, 1946: 527).” For example, in a declaration on the national question at the third party meeting of the SED (1950), the German worker class was destined to be the sole harbinger of a national unity shaped after socialist principles (Hacker, 1987: 45). Almost ten years later, Ulbricht hinted to the DDR as the rallying point for the national interests of the entire Germany, leading Germany in the direction already chosen by the DDR (cf. Ulbricht 1966: 529). In this sense, Ulbricht underlined his conviction that the new German national culture was based in the DDR, and not in the capitalist West Germany (cf. Ulbricht 1956: 422-423).

The East German socialist *intelligentsia* acted in this rebuilding of a morally superior socialist class nation as a moral elite dedicated to the re-education of the East German population. This claim to the exclusive mandate to moral and cultural superiority, the self-imposed command to re-educate and lead the socialist class nation, and to speak in the name of the morally corrupted West German nation, was legitimized by the invention of the myth of anti-fascism. This myth of an uncompromising struggle by the socialist progressive forces of German history against Nazi fascism formed the inner core of moral unanimity binding the different factions, cliques and ideological groups of the East German socialist *intelligentsia*. In their mythical self-definition, the East German socialist intellectuals were convinced that in the past, only the Moscow oriented Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and its socialist allies, front-organizations and sympathetic followers were engaged in the bitter struggle against Hitler’s fascism. Thus, they were morally superior men and women who resisted genocidal inhumanity³,
capitalistic exploitation and imperialistic expansion of German militarism and racism. In this way, East German intellectuals emancipated themselves from the criminal sides of German history, cleansing their consciences from the inner guilt and shame associated with the inhuman pages of the German past. Therefore, they could also transform the historical guilt of German Nazism into an undisputed mandate to liberate the ignorant, passive and reluctant masses of worker and peasants of the German Democratic Republic from their sinful involvement with the former fascism.

In this sense, the East German socialist intelligentsia can be defined as a social group of individuals interpreting the symbolic universe of German socialism and presenting a cohesive and seemingly convincing historical map of the heroic anti-fascism by the progressive historical forces. This public interpretation of the symbolic world (Mannheim 1964: 573-75) of Socialism, the proliferation of a historical myth enriched by moral superiority and inspired by the martyrdom of Communist men and woman suffering in concentration camps, provided the moral conscience of the East German socialist intelligentsia with the triumphant confidence to belong to the moral avant-garde of German history. They believed they were entitled to totally transform the structure of society and to command the people in the name of an emancipated mankind of a new and better social and cultural order. Seen in this historical perspective, the East German socialist intelligentsia defined itself as belonging to the rich and manifold Russian tradition of dedicated men and women, as a “revolutionary religious order (Stepun 1934: 25)”, as pursuing the mission of redemption of society and humanity (cf. Pomper 1970; Venturi 1966; Billington 1980), as propagating a gospel of a salvationist Weltanschauung (Berlin 1981: 167), and as a “quasi-religious belief in the socialist eschatology (Weber 1978: 515)” that should be realized within a communist utopia on earth.

3 The concentration camp Buchenwald, nearby Weimar located, served as a symbolic focus for that anti-fascism. Originally planned and organized by the Nazi for detention of political prisoners, it was used after 1946 as a rallying point for huge anti-fascist memorial demonstrations by the SED and various anti-fascist organizations of the DDR. Buchenwald had a highly emotional identification value for the German Communist movement since many Communist party cadres were deported to Buchenwald. An interesting report of the organization of this concentration camp, especially the underground movement organized by the Communist political prisoners, was written by Eugen Kogon (1947). Interestingly after WWII, the Soviet military administration used this concentration camp for the detention of alleged Nazi party members, among them young people supposedly belonging to Nazi youth organizations. The SED concealed this dreadful continuity of the tradition of deportation, torture and murdering of political prisoners practiced by the Soviet military administration. Today, Buchenwald symbolizes the two totalitarian systems of the German past and still serves as a highly controversial point in public discussion depending on which side the participants are.
In contrast to their Russian intellectual counterparts, the East German socialist intelligentsia held a monopoly of ideological definition and interpretation of the symbolic universe of socialist thought, eschatology and ultimate beliefs. The members of this intelligentsia worked as ideological experts without serious intellectual competitors. Its members did not form a “relatively uncommitted intelligentsia (relativ freischwebende Intelligenz) (cf. Mannheim, 1956: 106),” but were closely linked to the power structure of the state and internal security authorities of the DDR. The monopolistic role of intellectual public interpretation of the socialist symbolic universe was guaranteed by the power structure of the party (SED). Its security control organs (Staatssicherheit) persecuted and liquidated not only alternative bourgeois intellectual groups, but also competitive conceptualizations of the socialist cosmology. Indeed, the true intellectual believers of the intelligentsia itself were silenced or excluded from the party membership in case of dissenting opinions, forming informally organized social circles, discussing deviant socialist conceptions, or doubting the infallible wisdom of the party leadership.

For example, the show trial of W. Janka, a former military lieutenant within the ranks of the German socialist brigade which fought during the Spanish War (cf. Jank 1991), was set on stage after the arrangement rules of the infamous Moscow show trials (cf. Riegel 2000). In his later function as lector of the prominent state-owned Aufbau publishing house, Janka had organized an intellectual circle of socialist writers, historians, philosophers and journalists (Just 1990). They discussed and criticized specific actions of the Party leadership dominated by W. Ulbricht. Facing the coterie of prominent socialist intellectuals rallied in the court room, Janka was accused of heresy, before detainment by the Staatssicherheit. He was isolated from his companions, exposed on stage as an example to all potential dissenters (Janka 1989). Although most of the socialist intellectuals became entangled in conflicts either with the control commissions of the Party or with the security organs of Staatssicherheit, the majority faithfully served the socialist cause of the party. The devotion to the inner-worldly salvationist goals of the socialist promises attracted quite a few writers, journalists, and artists to join the wide network of the Staatssicherheit as informal agents, in order to supervise, denounce and control their colleagues (Walther1996). Prominent authors of the DDR like Loest (1991), Kunze (1990), and Fuchs (1990) have given detailed reports regarding the covered supervision, direct interven-

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4Interestingly, Robert Havemann (1990: 26) characterized the power of Stalinism as based upon an unre-flected “Gläubigkeit” (faithfullness) by the believing cadres.
tion into the privacy, and brutal intimidation carried on by the organs of the state security service (MfS). The cases of prominent socialist dissidents like Wolf Biermann\(^5\) (Berbig et al., 1994), Robert Havemann (Havemann 1991), and Heiner Müller (Braun 1996) who conflicted with the party and the state internal security are extensivly documented. The written reports delivered by informers from the ranks of writers\(^6\), artists, actors, scholars, scientists, composers, and painters to the Ministry of State Security (MfS) resulted in a monstrous and monumental archive of documented denunciation, watchful suspicion and vigilance.

The history of the East German socialist *intelligentsia* was shaped by a permanent conflict between a sacral orthodoxy and heterodox intellectuals claiming artistic freedom *within* the socialist sacral canon. The official dogma of sacral orthodoxy were represented by the party leadership and their internal security organs. This dogma was very often committed against the aspirations of the intellectuals and their right to artistic freedom, within the confines of the socialist tradition. For example, the conception of socialist realism was interpreted differently by the party orthodoxy and by the intellectuals. Both parties conceived of themselves as true believing soldiers of the socialist eschatology, but insisted on their rights to define in their own way the means and conceptions to realize the utopia of a classless society. Especially in the case of the socialist intellectuals pursuing a utopian vision of the socialist tradition, the orthodox party line and the intellectual imagination very often conflicted (cf. Kersten 1957: 139-182; Rüther, 1987; Jäger, 1995). Whenever the party orthodoxy believed that the intellectual interpretation of socialist realism would cross the ‘correct line’, the arsenal of repressive measures\(^7\) were enforced against the socialist dissidents. The permanent infight between party orthodoxy, censorship, internal security organs and believing but dissenting socialist intellectuals led to a continual exodus of creative socialist intellectuals from the party and their commissions, associations and discussion circles. The institution of official or informal censorship (cf. Brohm, 2001) was the permanent companion\(^8\) of the

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\(^5\)In autumn 1976, the poet and vocalist Biermann was expatriated by the authorities of the DDR. In the course of this expatriation, most of the writers and artists who refused to consent to this police action were expelled from the German Writers Association (cf. Walther et al., 1991; Pleitgen, 2001).

\(^6\)Prominent examples are Christa Wolf (cf. Vinke, 1993) and the chairman of the Writers Association of the DDR Hermann Kant (cf. Corino, 1995) who acted as informal agents of the *Staatssicherheit*. See also Jäger (1993); Böthig and Michael (1993).

\(^7\)Exclusion from the prestigious *Akademie der Wissenschaften*, as in the case of Havemann, signified a dramatic loss of personal, political and scientific identity, a very effective way of social boycott (cf. Muller/Florath, 1996).
socialist *intelligentsia*. The intra-role conflict between a socialist intellectual identity that was obliged to artistic claims of creative originality within the socialist tradition, *and* simultaneous subjects to the party norms of obedience and discipline could not be resolved under the structural conditions of a total institution (cf. Goffman, 1961).

Finally, the socialist *intelligentsia* of the German Democratic Republic were organized and supported financially by the welfare state bureaucracy. With respect to the socialist doctrine of an egalitarian society, they possessed unusual privileges. Special guesthouses, substantial regular payments by the welfare bureaucracy, traveling abroad, meetings with excursions, dinner parties, privileged access for their children to the education system, prestigious receptions at party sessions and public ceremonies, allocation of scholarships, awards, pension funds, better housing facilities, vacation resorts and medical care demonstrated the prestigious status of this *intelligentsia* within the hierarchy of the *nomenklatura* system, similar to the practice in the Soviet Russia (Fitzpatrick, 1999). Not surprisingly, the ideological experts of the socialist symbolic universe were interested in holding an effective monopoly of interpretation of the sacral canon of socialist beliefs. This monopoly of ideological definition was sustained by the material security and political power interests of intellectual benefits recipients, typical for a “hierocratic reglementation of conduct (Weber, 1978: 1165).” In this sense, the security apparatus of the state authorities supported this close symbiosis of party and *intelligentsia* by the means of excommunication (expulsion from the party), by “strictest social boycott (Weber, 1978: 1165),” by means of stigmatization (class enemy), or by threatening with detention, public scapegoating, supervision, and intimidation.

**AFTER AUGUST 13, 1961: A SOCIALIST NATION**

The building of the Berlin Wall, mainly organized by Honecker, the later party secretary of the SED and Chairman of the *Staatsrat* of DDR, marked the start of a new phase in the history of nation-building of the DDR. The permanent flight of thousands of citizens from the first *Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat* to the capitalist West Berlin or West Germany, especially by members of the ‘bourgeois’ professions, had almost ruined not only the eco-

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8Very lately, at the Congress of Writers of the DDR in 1987, such prominent intellectuals as Günter de Bruyn and Christoph Hein openly criticized censorship (cf. Wichner and Wiesner, 1991: 32-37). The systematic persecution, and harassment of Peter Huchel, editor of the highly sophisticated intellectual journal “Sinn und Form”, is also very indicative of censorship (cf. Parker, 1992).
nomic basis of the DDR economy but also the credibility of a revolutionary experiment of a class nation running out of loyally committed citizens. With the forcefully established dividing line between the two German clientele nations, a New Chinese Wall, the government of the DDR hoped to consolidate their societal experiment, separated from the lures of the capitalist consumer society and media culture of rivaling West Berlin and West Germany. Ironically, even the West German DDR research assumed that the citizens of the DDR would accommodate to their destiny of being encapsulated within a closed society, with no possibility of evasive alternatives to the status quo. The beginnings of a social welfare system, and the growing social and functional differentiation with the enhanced importance of technology and technological experts, were valued as indicators of a peaceful development of a socialist society. The political leadership of this society was no longer inclined to use open terror, intimidation and repression measures to enforce the loyal commitment of its citizens. Ludz spoke of a “consultant authoritarianism (Ludz, 1968: 36-37),” a deliberating, consulting and persuading party leadership that sought consent, and not domination by command of the various sections, factions and informal pressure groups of East German society. Specifically, the newly formed technical professions and their intellectual spokesmen were supposed to play a moderate and modernizing role, superseding the old party veterans with their stubbornly held dreams of a classless socialist utopia. Modernized socialist societies were supposed to be able to develop national forms of enduring commitments and identification patterns supporting the socialist party system and securing the yet not available national and political legitimation (Kleßmann, 1988: 330). The new industries of electronics, petrochemics, engineering, and optics resulting from the industrial administrative reorganization initiated in the mid-1960s required highly qualified personnel rather than disciplined party cadres (cf. Staritz, 1985: 157-165). A new form of socialist society with socially differentiated, consent oriented, and technologically advanced mechanisms of policy regulation had seemingly replaced the older patterns of strict party control and repression (cf. Meuschel, 1992: 182). These strong modern components of the DDR allegedly led to a national consciousness (Ludz, 1968: 106; Staritz, 1985: 174) shared by the population. The people praised the accomplishments of the party leadership and their own industrious virtues of hard work, parsimony and endurance in hardship.

Therefore, a modernized, socialist nation had achieved an equal standing with its rival in the form of the modernized, consumer society of West Germany. The ever expanding international diplomatic recognition even by states of the Western alliance pact systems enhanced the international status
of the DDR and nourished the assumption of a growing national commitment by their population (cf. Glaeßner, 1989: 59). A specific DDR-nationalism seemed to replace the transnational orientations and obligations of the former ideological self-definition as a class nation. The role of the DDR in international relations, its social welfare program, distance to the policy of its global patron (Soviet Union), and achievements at Olympic games, indicated a moderate equality with West Germany. A net of international and bilateral treaties and economic transactions gave to the impression of a socialist nation proud of her international recognition and national achievements.

The concept of a socialist nation, the rhetoric of *nationale Gemeinschaft* (national community), and the search for progressive, but not socialist precursors in German history as historical roots of the present socialist state, substituted the older slogans of revolutionary class struggles and worldwide support for the revolutionary movements of the Third World. National identity, national community, and a progressive heritage from the historical past were considered as the most important components of a socialist nation (Meuschel, 1992: 274-305). The new DDR-national consciousness was not a part of the German *Kulturnation* uniting the politically divided German nation. Rather, it constituted a new nation based on its own history and tradition. With the transition of the DDR towards socialist formations of production, a new emotional attachment of the population to a socialist nation seemed to develop. The withering away of the dominant class relations of the former formations of societal and economic reproduction paved the way for attitudes more inclined to emphasize the national, historical and primordial roots of the specific peculiarities of the DDR history. However, it should be emphasized that this ideological self-definition of national identity was restricted to the tradition and presence of the DDR. It explicitly excluded a common historical tradition for both parts of Germany. For example, the officially promoted renaissance of a specific historical collective memory attempted to incorporate selected parts of the Prussian state, of some characteristic traits of the enlightened philosophy of reason of Friedrich the Great, of the historical merits of the statemanship of Bismarck, and even of the revolutionary millenarism of Thomas Müntzer (1489-1525), a Baptist rebel\(^9\) preaching, wandering and fighting against the exploitation of medieval peasants in Thuringia. Even Martin Luther was discovered as a

\(^9\)Müntzer was already glorified by Friedrich Engels *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg* (1850) as a social rebel and broadly documented by historians of the DDR (cf. the perspective of millenarism by Cohn (1974: 234-251).
forerunner of humanitarian tolerance, a heritage supposedly continued and cultivated by the first Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat on German soil. This invented tradition, an attempt “to establish continuity with a suitable historic past (Hobsbawm, 1994: 1),” reflected the search for a new integrative ideology suited to a socially differentiated and culturally diversified society.

The former ideological nation concept (cf. Kosing/Schmidt 1979: 1070; also Kosing, 1976) emphasizing the primacy of class relations and devaluing the ethnic bonds of belonging to a German community irrespective of their political division, was turned upside down. The primacy of primordial obligations and ethnic bonds were reemphasized, but restricted to the new socialist community, as represented by the government of the DDR. The ideological invention of a socialist nation as a new form of a non-capitalist community, cultivated especially during the Honecker era, served as an ideological boundary against the West German rivaling consumer society. At the same time, it was supposed to consolidate a fragmented and differentiated society with the unifying bond of a political ideology that deemphasized the violence of class struggles. Finally, it moderated the still existing utopian attitudes for a classless society held by ideological party experts and intellectuals. By emphasizing the advantages of a social welfare system offering its clients the security of useful services instead of ideological promises, the new socialist nation imagined as a Gemeinschaft seemingly attained the respectable status of social saturation and ideological ritualization.

AFTER AUTUMN 1989: “WE ARE ONE PEOPLE”

The longterm historical, political and economic causes, as well as the immediate historical events leading to the implosion and dissolution of the German Democratic Republic are well known and extensively described (see for example Maier, 1997; Joas/Kohli, 1993; Jarausch/Sabrow, 1999). The glasnost policy of Gorbatschow exerted an enormous pressure on the hesitating and resisting political leadership of the DDR. This resulted in an internal loss of authority for Honecker, who appeared as too conservative and inflexible to the younger generation of high ranking party cadres. The general economic crisis of the COMECON also afflicted the DDR economy, which was a reliable factor within the Soviet Bloc up to this time. As far as the immediate historical events are concerned, the dramatic mass flight of East German citizens to neighbouring socialist allies like Czechoslovakia and Hungary who finally gave them exit visa to go to West Germany, was a televised event. This event resulted in both despair and rage for the remaining population that was confined to a closed society, cut off from Western
Europe by walls and border zones highly dangerous to pass illegally. The mass exodus of East German citizens to the capitalist West Germany further led to a severe political legitimation crisis of a political leadership unable to stop the bleeding out of the socialist nation.

Finally, the massive demonstrations of the ‘broad laboring masses’ in all the major cities of the DDR, spontaneously occurred in connection with the Friedensgebete (Prayers for Peace) held in Protestant churches, and were previously not organized. These demonstrations were protected and tacitly supported by Protestant communities. They peacefully demanded citizen rights, and confronted the state authorities with lighted candles and protest posters. In these decisive moments, the armed security organs (police, special units of the MfS, army battalions) did not use their monopoly of state power by shooting at the participants of the silent revolution demonstrations. Instead, they confined themselves to arrest, intimidations and threats (cf. for the demonstrations at Leipzig Maier, 1997: 237-243). These processes of civilian disobedience caused the final breakdown of the gerontocratic power of the Honecker regime. During these months of mass demonstrations and an apparently paralyzed political leadership, the people of the DDR went to the public stage, playing their own role. The state authorities and the demonstrating people seemed to play reversed roles: the state authorities were sitting in the ranks of the audience looking at a play whose script was not written by them, but by the actors themselves. Not only did the ‘laboring masses’ occupy the public theatre of the silent revolution. The socialist intelligentsia also came to the fore, claiming to realize that the utopian dreams not yet fulfilled by the party cadres had been bureaucratized and accommodated to a trivialized social welfare socialism.

In the eyes of the socialist intelligentsia, the historical moment seemed to have been realized when the emancipated people openly demanded a socialism suited to the needs and wills of the ‘laboring masses’. This historical moment, typical for many revolutionary situations (cf. Arendt, 1975: 139-215), had occurred for a socialist republic not corrupted by the exigencies of power, not polluted by the use of terror and exploitation, not trivialized by the imitation of bourgeois, and capitalist nation-building symbols and slogans. The former contract between the gerontocratic party leadership and the disciplined people was no longer valid, but the new contract between the socialist intelligentsia and the demonstrating people could lead to a new socialist heaven. Similar to the revolutionary effervescence of the French Revolution, the East German Volk had swept away like a hurricane all the institutions of the ancien régime (Arendt, 1975: 181). The united action and deliberation carried out by people and intellectuals during the mass
demonstrations should give birth to a new constitution of liberty within the confines of a socialist tradition. The unlimited trust in the moral forces of the people, a mythical category, and the hope of reinventing salvationist aspirations to a socialist constitution of German Democratic Republic which the socialist intellectuals cultivated during the first days and weeks from November 1989 to January 1990, were soon to be disappointed.

At the beginning of the mass demonstrations in September and October 1989, the slogan "We are the people (Wir sind das Volk)" dominated the public discourse between the people and socialist intellectuals, and resulted in a shortlived consent between them. But the mood and the ideological aspirations of the participants at the mass demonstrations changed within a short period. Typical of this change of people’s aspirations and moral consent with the socialist intellectuals have been the impressive demonstrations at Leipzig (cf. Mühler/Wilsdorf, 1991: 38-42)). After several weeks of seemingly unanimous consent between the demonstrators and the socialist speakers of the intelligentsia, the almost forgotten ethnic commitments and national symbols reemerged from the background of history, reinvented and rearticulated by the many voices of the demonstrating masses. The calling of Deutschland, einig Vaterland (Germany, united fatherland) redirected the emotional attachments of the ‘laboring masses’ away from the first new socialist nation to the united fatherland of all German people. As december, progressed only a minority of the participants at the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig favored a socialist republic, in contrast to vast majority who voted for an accelerated pace in the process of unification. The introduction of a market economy combined with currency reform, establishing the West German currency as the basis for the planned monetary union, and a future accession to the Federal Republic of Germany by East Germany were positively evaluated (Mühler/Wilsdorf, 1991: 41).

In January 1990, the nationalistic pathos dominated the speeches and the former socialist alliance withdrew. The slogan Wir sind das Volk (We are the people) changed to Wir sind ein Volk (We are one people). The seductive attractions of the West German consumer society were openly acknowledged. They were materialized in the symbolic power of the West German currency, the Deutsche Mark, promising the possibilities of free traveling, of buying prestigious West German cars and experiencing the dream of individual freedom, not restricted by the austerity of a planned economy of scarce goods. The question of a common currency and a common fatherland were intimately linked. The East German people voted for the party of the common sense (cf. Ash, 1990: 395), namely to participate in the consumer society within the boundaries of the reunited German nation. During these
weeks, the history of political division and ideological warfare between the two clientele nations, the two worlds of differently experienced live histories alongside of the Iron Curtain, disappeared. An imagined national community\textsuperscript{10} was reconstructed by personal contacts and by televised pictures of hopes, tears and massive crossings of the formerly highly dangerous frontiers by East and West Germans alike. The first elections held in the united Germany at the end of 1990 for a Bundestag completed politically this process of national and economic reunification, indicating a disastrous defeat for the hopes and dreams of the socialist intelligentsia who felt betrayed by the people changing sides.

THE BETRAYAL OF THE PEOPLE

After the reunification, the loss of the monopolistic interpretation of the socialist tradition hit the soul of the socialist intelligentsia very hard. The many explanations\textsuperscript{11} for this loss of interpretative power, and of symbolic capital held by the intellectuals reflected their inability to see the hard facts of the common sense voted for by the formerly praised revolutionary people. Unfortunately, revolutionary people changed sides and revealed their corrupted souls. The revolutionary people, lamented the frustrated intellectuals, had betrayed the hopes for a socialist utopia offered to them. At the beginning of November 1989, at a public mass meeting at the Berlin Alexanderplatz, Christa Wolf spoke emphatically of a dream she had. “Imagine, that socialism is realized, and no one goes away (Wolf, 1990: 214).” After the reunification, she designated the same socialist people as “a people of ants, splashing apart in all directions, negating dastardly their identity (Wolf, 1991: 23).” At the same meeting at the Alexanderplatz, Stefan Heym had called to the public. “Friends, citizens, we should practice the newly won power (Heym, 1990: 208).” However, Heym was enraged when he saw how his companions had used the newly won freedom and power. The people, he exclaimed, “changed into a horde of furious people, to be crowded together, running to Hertie and Bilka, digging out glamouring rubbish, purposefully

\textsuperscript{10}Cf. Anderson (1996). This process of forming an imagined community did not correspond to the evolutionary process of constructing ‘imagined communities’ outlined by Anderson. With respect to the divided Germany, the political and cultural German nation reappeared from the catastrophy of the WWII in order to form a new form and content of an ‘imagined community’.

\textsuperscript{11}The following statements made by socialist intellectuals represent only a small but representative sample. For further interesting statements see Grimm,1993 who asked the nomenklatura of authors, historians, artists of the former DDR.
posted at the entrance and presented on tables by petty-minded grocers from the West; and what a servile humility when the people were queuing to receive the alms of a Begrüßungsgeld\textsuperscript{12} offered by the strategists of the Cold War (Heym, 1990a: 265).” In these denunciations of the people buying in capitalist shopping centres like \textit{Bilka} and \textit{Hertie}, Heym demonstrated his repugnance for a people enjoying their freedom to buy the daily goods not available in the socialist planned economy.

Heiner Muller sees in the betrayal of the people the typical reactions of a colonized population. “An emancipation of colonized people cannot function without racist forms of expression. The nationalist vocabulary and apparatus are always ready to be called (Müller, 1990: 86).” Müller continues his comparison between racism and nationalism, hinting at the demonstrations at Leipzig. “The DDR population was 40 years long colonized. If one imagines the first slogan at Leipzig ‘We are the people’ then it looked very great. Logically, from this slogan the next one came: ‘We are one people’. And from this it can change very soon: ‘There are no other peoples’ (Müller, 1990: 85).” Roland Links warns of a dictator waiting to lead the fallen people. “In this or other way, the people are engaged in an installment plan with very high interests, but the currency with which one can buy dreams is not yet invented. How long will it take until one will collect all these dreams like bills and ask the republic to pay up (Links, 1990: 116).” It seems clear, the people have sold their socialist souls for the money offered by the cheating consumer society. Gert Prokop speaks of the “entrance fees to a consumer paradise (Prokop, 1990: 151)” which have to be paid by the citizens of the DDR who are willing to sell everything only for entrance into this hell of consumerism. Fritz Rudolf Fries distrusts the spontaneity of the masses, a characteristic which was praised by socialist intellectuals before the Berlin Wall was pulled down. “But the actions of the demonstrating masses were not very spontaneous since the mass media from the other side had shown how far they could speak up unforced, only so far as the substance of the share capital is not concerned (Fries, 1990: 55).” Heinz Czechowski sees no chance for a survival of the DDR. “At the very end, the overmighty West Germany will dominate the DDR with her financial backers. The rebellious people will get accustomed to the new affluent society financed by the credits of the big capital. One has to fear that the people under the pressures of the present situation will forget their revolutionary

\textsuperscript{12}For every DDR citizen (especially for senior citizens getting only a minimal pension) who came to West Germany, a small amount of money (Begrüßungsgeld) was handed out for buying the necessary daily goods since the DDR currency was at that time almost totally devaluated and no longer accepted as currency in West Germany.
utopias (Czechowski, 1990: 41-42).”

THE IMAGE OF AN ENEMY

It is easy to see that most of the socialist intellectuals cited have an image of an enemy which legitimizes their claims to a mandate for the people. This mandate was to protect the people from the detrimental influences of a laissez-faire capitalism and seductive consumerism, and to speak for a people who lost their souls and sentiments for the better world of moral perfection. These stereotypes of the capitalist moloch guaranteed consent within the intelligentsia, compensated its powerlessness, and supported the salvationist aspirations which were previously in disciplined the yoke of party obedience. Their suffering about their own marginality enhanced the fierceness of rejection of the social, cultural and economic order of the other German state. Its economic strength was demonized, and its democratic constitution as only serving capitalist interests devaluated its national identity as a continuation of the national catastrophies of 1871 and 1933 was diagnosed, and the process of reunification as colonial expansion and repression was stigmatized.

According to Heiner Müller, West German colonialism is identical to Stalinist expansion. “The economically overdeveloped but culturally underdeveloped Bundesrepublik tries to destroy by defamation and administration a DDR culture which has achieved its own identity by resisting the Stalinist colonization (Müller, 1991: 667).” Müller attributes a cultural underdevelopment to the Bundesrepublik, which can only by its economic strength be superior to the resistance culture of the DDR. Strictly speaking, the deformation of the Stalinist resistance culture of the DDR should be valued as a cultivated enlightenment. From the Stalinist defense culture stems the morally superior DDR culture, as it is threatened by extinction meted by the colonizing West Germany. To Müller, the loss of the DDR state sovereignty can be compensated for by the growing moral purity of the DDR defense culture, which is in this sense superior to the economic domination of West Germany. Seen from the historic perspective, not surprisingly, Müller chooses a morally stigmatizing category to designate the economic civilization of West Germany. It is the category of selection. “The illusion is no more, the dream no more dreamed of. For decades to come, after the victory of capitalism which signifies a system of selection, the principle of Auschwitz, only art will be the place for utopia, a museum for the utopia preserved for better times (Müller, 1991: 667).”

Apparantly, Müller transposes the colonization process of the Third World
to the unification process of East and West Germany (cf. Domdey, 1992: 67). The downgraded DDR is viewed in the context of exploited societies of the Third World whose resentments were directed against the colonial powers. The inner colonization of Germany enlarges the potential for hate, revenge and resentment cultivated by the expropriated peoples of the Third World. Müller does not appeals for sympathetic action with these colonized peoples. Instead, he declares East Germany to be itself a colony of the mighty Bundesrepublik which additionally applies the principles of genocide and selection on her colonizing mission. In this way, Müller tries to find a link to the anti-fascist myth of the socialist intelligentsia, negating any guilt and shame with respect to the genocidal German past. Thus, DDR could free itself from this shameful past getting in the way of the innocent, true believers. These believers march with the progressive forces of history led by the cosmopolitan party cadres heralding the universal emancipation of mankind. The evocation of the anti-fascist myth has to belong to the morally superior part of Germany. Before the other part of Germany, Bundesrepublik, begins to question the dark and inhuman face of Stalinism, the West Germans had to clean themselves from their genocidal involvement. In this context, Christa Wolf mentions the attractions of this anti-fascist myth offered by the party veterans to the young socialist intelligentsia. “You can understand our not yet realized involvement in this national guilt getting off when you participate actively at the building of the new society which represents the opposite of the criminal system of National socialism (Wolf, 1989: 245).” Wolf notices an emotional attachment to this anti-fascist myth, “a kind of salvationist belief (Wolf, 1989: 253),” which served as bond between the party veterans and the younger socialist intellectuals. This myth also served as a strong emotional bond to the party discipline and obedience, even for an excuse to cooperate as informal agents with the Ministry of State Security (Staatssicherheit).

In summary, the process of national reunification of East and West Germany is rejected by a vast majority of socialist intellectuals. It is viewed as reminiscent of national forms of identification which were debased by arguing that West German capitalism tried to extinguish the morally superior culture of anti-fascist and anti-Stalinist resistance of the DDR population. The national reunification is set on stage as a moral drama between the forces of pure, innocent and brave believers of the cosmopolitan and socialist cause and the vicious villains, economically strong, consumer oriented,

13At first sight, Muller seems to evoke the violence and rage by the Lumpenproletariat of the colonized peoples in the sense of Fanon’s (1961) outcry for Les damnes de la terre.
culturally underdeveloped, and afflicted by the involvement with a genocidal past. Not surprisingly, under these unequal conditions, the people of the DDR, bribed by the false promises of a glittering consumerism, changed sides and betrayed the true believers.

THE RESTORATION OF THE SOCIALIST UTOPIA

The socialist intelligentsia did not view the downfall of the DDR as a possibility to discard the failed socialist experiment. Quite the reverse, the discredited socialist experiment was taken as an affirmation of a retrogressive utopia restoring the chiliastic moments of happiness and salvation brought by the Russian October revolution.

Stefan Heym conjured up the dream of “a real socialism where men become brothers holding their hands together in order to master their lives in freedom and justice (Heym, 1990: 240).” Heym reminded his public of the real causes of the failures of the socialist experiment. The building of the Berlin Wall “opened the chance to begin with socialist reforms since the population had been not able to evade the canvassing party leadership and government. This opportunity was missed for transforming the real socialism into an attractive socialism not being discarded by the people (Heym, 1990: 240-241).” Similarly, Jürgen Kuczynski, the famous nestor of the DDR-social history, pleads for a return to true Leninism, and a renovated socialism (Kuczynski, 1990: 187-189). The resolution of rock-artists demanded “reforms which could enable a true socialism in this country (Rock artists, 1990: 39).” The artists of the Berliner Ensemble, the home stage of Bert Brecht, insist on a public discussion with the people (Volksaussprache) in order to guarantee “the continuing existence of socialism” (Berliner Ensemble, 1990: 43). The president of the Academy of Arts declares “socialism as an alternative to the bourgeois life order.” A public discussion on all levels of the society is also necessary. This public discussion should be disciplined, in complete solidarity and concerning the personality of each discussant. This public discussion on all levels of the society should foster “... a substance of thinking, the best currency of our country. This will be the best production reserve to be supported.” This public discussion, which reminds the unattached observer of a critical and self critical party meeting, the presidency warns, is threatened by people ... “who are disputing our right of independent existence and who are plundering the country with an expression of sorrow (Academy of Arts, 1990: 63).” A young member of a theater company exclaims.” We wish to live in our republic! We wish to contribute our creativity and fantasy to the forming of this societal alternative! We do not
want to loose our belief in a socialist alternative! (Young Artists 1990: 119).”

CONCLUSION

Clientele nations do not fit into the paradigm of the sociology of nationalism. The transnational context of the global civil war after the end of WWII had given birth to a new type of divided nations belonging to their respective global patron’s spheres of influence. The formation process of these clientele nations cannot be explained by a modernization process (Gellner, 1983), or by an evolutionary process ending with ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1996). The nation-building process of clientele nations is dominated by the exigencies of the global framework destined by their global patrons. The intellectual representatives of clientele nations especially experience very clearly the dilemma of divided commitment. They have to show commitment towards their national reference societies, as well as to the transnational globalized aspirations and attitudes required by their global patrons.

The very concept of nation has to be redefined by these intellectual representatives in order to create a clientele nation whose territory, common myths and memories, public culture, single economy and common rights and duties for all members are not given facts but have to be reinvented and reconstructed. If the concept of a nation “refers to a particular kind of social and cultural community, a territorial community of shared history and culture (Smith, 1996: 359)”, then clientele nations do not dispose from the beginning of such a community. Rather, they try to construct such a community by shaping a specific national culture out of the cultural and historical raw material stemming partially from their original reference nation. Surely, the process of imagination of a newly formed clientele nation does not start ex nihilo as the original reference nation is still present and exerts an overwhelming influence. Nevertheless, the new political regimes of the clientele nations have to invent and reconstruct national commitments and attachments viable as a national culture shared by the clientele nation. Without this task of a specific nation-building, it would be impossible to find a particularistic audience receptive for the universalist message. In this sense, clientele nations represent the paradox of universalistic mission and particularistic attachment to primordial obligations.

As far as the clientele nation of East Germany is concerned, it is interesting to observe how the socialist intelligentsia tried to solve the paradox of divided commitments. On the one hand, these socialist intellectuals seriously regarded their mandate of the globalized gospel of socialist salvation and
emancipation of mankind. On the other hand, they had to find a solution to escape the genocidal past of Germany’s immediate history and present themselves to their clientele nation as the uncorrupted harbinger of a socialist future. The myth of anti-fascism served as a moral basis, propitious in distancing them from the genocidal German past, as well as an example of virtuous, pure and courageous behaviour. Unfortunately, the ‘laboring masses’ of the DDR did not follow their morally superior intellectual leaders. At the decisive moments of history, the implosion of the DDR socialist state and nation gave them the possibility to vote for a fatherland, a Germany encompassing the two previously clientele nations. The concept of a socialist nation did not survive this crucial test of national reunification. Despite this historical defeat, the socialist intellectuals did not give up their transnational attachment to the socialist promises, but accused the ‘laboring masses’ of having betrayed the socialist utopia. So far, these socialist intellectuals have remained faithfully to their universalist mission; a case of Gesinnungsvirtuosen (Weber, 1958), namely true and virtuous believers cultivating foremost their ethical commitments irrespective of success or defeat in politics and history.

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