

SOCIAL CAPITAL, POST-MATERIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE IN SOUTH KOREA: 1981-2003*

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This paper empirically tests recent theoretical explanations on the individual aspects of people who trust or distrust institutions. Based on recent literature in political sociology, I hypothesize that social capital as well as cultural values should affect people's tendency to put confidence in political or civil institutions. Individual-level survey data from several sources covering periods between 1981 and 2003 are analyzed to test whether and how people's social capital and cultural values affect their level of institutional confidence.

The results from regression models show that social trust and social participation, two aspects of social capital, tend to have positive effects on confidence in both public and civic institutions. Significance of effects varies by year and is more pronounced for public institutions. Post-materialist value has negative effect on confidence in public institutions, but has no significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Despite some variance in statistical significance of the effects, the relationship between independent and dependent variables appears consistent across surveys.

Key Words: Institutional Confidence, Post-Materialism, Social Capital

INTRODUCTION

Why don't people trust government? Nye and colleagues (1997; 2001) raised this key question in their diagnosis of what is wrong with American political institutions. The question dates back to the early 1970s, when Miller (1974) warned of increasing political cynicism and distrust among citizens. Lipset and Schneider (1987) analyzed historical trends of declining political trust, comparing business, labor and government. They maintained that a "confidence gap" existed across diverse institutional sectors in America and that the gap had been widening since the 1960s. According to Nye and colleagues, only one-fourth of Americans trusted their government at the end of the 1990s, while in the mid-1960s, three fourths of Americans trusted the government. Concerns about declining public confidence in both

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political and civil institutions begin with the assumption that support and trust are essential for the functioning of institutions in a democratic society.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States is not the only country concerned with declining public confidence in institutions. In their edited volume comparing public attitudes toward democracy in the U.S., European countries, and Japan, Pharr and Putnam (2000) reported that declining institutional confidence plagued almost all the tri-lateral countries. They summarize this situation as "disaffected democracies." It is ironic that democracies face strong internal threat by lessening confidence among citizens, when they are ready to announce victory over external enemies.

The situation is even worse for the countries that are recently democratized. Recent studies show that post-communist societies suffer from lack of public confidence in institutions, especially political institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997; 2001). In Poland, for example, people's confidence in parliament and government, which once showed a high level of 85 and 65 percent between 1989 and 1993, dramatically fell to a low of 20 percent within five years (Sztompka, 1999). South Korea provides another case of rapid decline in public confidence in political and civil institutions (Kim, 2002). According to the World Value Survey results, Koreans' confidence in parliament declined from 70 to 15 percent between 1981 and 2001, while confidence in courts and civil servants declined from 80 to 45 percent during the same period. Survey results show that Korean "democracy in the aftermath of democratization" (Choi, 2002) shows symptoms of general crises.

Since the mid-1990s, South Korea faced self-defeating consequences emerging from the very mechanism credited for the explosive economic growth. According to Chang (1999), patriarchal political authoritarianism, chaebol's despotic and monopolistic business practices, abuse and exclusion of labour, neglect of basic welfare rights, ubiquitous physical dangers, and ideological self-negation are all examples of such hazardous consequences from compressed modernity in South Korea. It is not surprising that confidence in institutions should dwindle when individuals find those institutions incapable of coping with such pervasive problems. In this respect, decline in institutional confidence could be attributable to the malfunction or dysfunction of those institutions and consequent loss in trustworthiness. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the nature of institutional arrangement, and to evaluate institutional performance in order to explain the changing level of institutional confidence among people.

In this paper, however, I am more interested in the individual aspects of individuals who trust or distrust institutions. Much recent research has shown that social capital, as well as cultural values, should affect the ten-

dency to put confidence in political or civil institutions (Nye, 1997, 2001; Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Rapid changes that Korean society has experienced at the macro-level should have concurrent changes at the micro-level in individual psyches and culture. In other words, Koreans' habits of heart should have been largely shaped by the macro social changes. Patterns of social interaction and relationships among people should also reflect the structural changes in polity, economy and society. Therefore, one can say that social capital and cultural values deserve due credit for affecting confidence in institutions.

I use survey data from several sources, covering periods between 1981 and 2003 to examine whether and how social capital and cultural values affect the level of institutional confidence. I begin with conceptual issues of institutional confidence, and then review theoretical backgrounds on social capital and cultural values. Next, I present hypotheses on the impact of social capital and cultural values on the level of institutional confidence. Descriptions of data and analytical methods follow, and results from statistical analyses are presented. I conclude with discussions on the implications of the findings and limitations of this study.

CONCEPTUALIZING INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE

According to Earle and Cvetkovich (1995), only "inter-personal trust" can be meaningfully defined; all the other forms of trust are derivative in that they cannot be based on face-to-face commitment. However, many social scientists apply the concept of trust in diverse situations other than interpersonal relations. They would probably agree with Barber (1983: 18), who argued that "we may usefully think of these various kinds of trust as existing not only between individual actors, but also between individuals and systems. Applying Fukuyama's (1995) concept of "radius" of trust, Sztompka (1999) maintained that we can theorize trust at multiple levels, starting from interpersonal relations to social categories (such as race, gender, or religion), social roles (such as parents or occupations), social groups (such as cabinets, sports teams, or work groups), institutions or organizations (such as armies, churches, courts, police, or banks), technical systems (such as transportation, communication, or stock trading systems), and finally reaching entire societies or social order. According to Sztompka, institutional trust stands in the mid of the continuum ranging from the interpersonal to the societal level. In this reasoning, institutional trust is distinguished from interpersonal trust only in its scope or level. The internal logic of trust remains the same whether it applies to relations between per-

sons or to relations between person and institutions.

Hardin (2002) criticized the view that various concepts of trust differ only by their level or radius of application as too simplistic. We can summarize his argument as follows. Those who view trust from a normative or non-rational perspective regard trust as one-part or two-part relations in nature. Here, a one-part relation implies that trust depends only on the disposition of the trusting person, and two-part relations imply that the relationship between the trusting person and the trustee determine trust. Trust, however, is more complex and conditional, and should be regarded as a three-part relation, where A trusts B to do X. In this sense, trust can be seen as "encapsulated interest." This means that the trusted person should have enough motivation and interest to satisfy the expectation of the trusting person. It is assumed that the trusting person has options to affect the behavior or decision of the trusted person, and that the information and knowledge necessary for making a decision is available to the trusting person.

Hardin rejected the concept of institutional trust mainly on the grounds that trust relationships as defined above cannot exist between a person and institutions. As the relationship between a person and institutions or organizations is asymmetric in nature (Coleman, 1990), an individual person cannot have comprehensive information on how institutions or organizations are administered, nor have leverage to pursue his/her own interest against institutions or organizations. Therefore, when an individual puts trust in a certain institution, it cannot be more than just having a general expectation about the institution. If an individual person can show general expectation without leverage to pursue his/her interest, it is better to call it confidence rather than trust.

Luhmann (1988) also made a conceptual distinction between confidence and trust. According to him, both familiarity and confidence assume asymmetric relationships between system and environment, and especially, confidence has much to do with such institutions as religion, politics, or law, which appear in the course of adapting to danger or contingency. In contrast, trust appears only in modern society, where danger is replaced by risk, and it concerns internal calculation of external conditions inducing risk. Following Luhmann and Hardin, Heimer (2001) clarified a family of concepts relating to trusting relationships in a table.

Heimer added 'faith' and 'legal trust' to Luhmann's distinction between confidence and trust. To the extent that a person believes that the trustee is certain to act in his/her interest, and continues to believe this, despite information about conflicts of interest or evidence of the hostility or indifference of the trustee, then he/she is acting on the basis of faith. In trust relations

TABLE 1. THE FAMILY OF TRUST RELATIONS

	Faith	Confidence	Legal Trust	Trust/Distrust
1. vulnerability-entrustors have something of value that can be or must be entrusted	○	○	○	○
2. uncertainty-entrustors recognize their vulnerability and the disparity between their interests and those of trustees/and see that outcomes of interactions are uncertain		○	○	○
3. Trustees or trustees' agents acknowledge obligation to listen to complaints about entrustors' uncertainty and vulnerability			○	○
4. Entrustors have the right to try to influence trustees or alter situation				○

Source: Heimer (2001), p. 46.

falling into the category of legal trust, a person may feel vulnerable and uncertain about the trustee's intentions and competence, and may know that a specific person is supposed to listen to complaints on these subjects, but discover that no one will do more than listen. Such a situation is similar to legal arrangement of a trust, where a trustee's obligations are legally fixed and not subject to negotiation. The pure form of legal trust is exceptional in reality (Heimer, 2001: 47-8).

Heimer did not directly link such conceptual typology to the distinction between objects of trust. However, we can infer from Luhmann's and Hardin's expositions that the distinction between confidence and trust corresponds to the distinction between institutions or corporate actors and individual actors as objects of trust. When the object is an abstract entity such as society in general, certain institutions, or social categories, which are difficult to specify concrete relationships with, then the relationship is prone to be faith or confidence. On the other hand, if the object is more concrete in nature, such that we can make specific relationships with, then the relationship tends to be legal trust or trust. In this study, I intentionally use the concept of confidence to emphasize the asymmetry in influence and information between an individual citizen and public or civic institutions. Although

citizens recognize that their interests depend on the performance of institutions and competence of incumbents, they are constrained in their capacity to directly influence the arrangement of institutions. Therefore, people's level of confidence in institutions reflects their experiences with institutions and also their social and cultural value orientations.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE

Recently, scholars in sociology, economics, and political science have converged on the concept of "social capital" as a comprehensive explanation for why some communities are able to resolve collective problems cooperatively while others are unable to bring people together for common purposes (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam, 1993). Scholarly interest in social capital has been largely motivated by the linkage between the levels of social capital and collective outcomes; high levels of social capital appear to be crucial for such measures of collective well-being as economic development, effective political institutions, and low crime (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993).

Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993) postulated social capital as a property of communities. However, social capital as collective property should have its micro-foundation at the individual level. After all, it is not a "community" that participates or builds trust, but the people who comprise that community who belong to civic organizations and acquire positive feelings towards others. Brehm and Rahn (1997) regarded social capital as an aggregate concept that has its basis in individual behavior, attitudes, and predispositions. More specifically, they argue that social capital manifests itself in individuals as a tight, reciprocal relationship between levels of civic engagement and interpersonal trust.

Brehm and Rahn (1997) postulated that confidence in institutions should be seen as an outcome of social capital processes. According to them, interpersonal trust and civic engagement, which jointly comprise social capital, contribute to an individual's confidence in institutions. People who trust others have greater confidence in political and civic institutions. Because misanthropes doubt that others have benign intentions, they may believe that everyone is a potential cheater. People with a high degree of trust, on the other hand, do not fear that they will be taken advantage of by following the rules because they expect that others will follow them also. Therefore, people who expect that others will comply with authorities find it easier to accept the decisions of authorities. Such compliance is of fundamental importance for the government, because it means that political

authorities have less need to rely upon enforcement and coercion to control citizen's behavior.

Tocqueville (1954) favorably regarded the "art of association" as an important remedy in combating the government's centralizing tendencies. According to him, people who learned the virtues of self-interest through association with others would be less likely to look to the state for their needs and more likely to resist the temptations of centralization. However, the negative relationship between the level of civic participation and institutional confidence expected from Tocqueville's argument could be offset by the positive effect of civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963) or social capital (Putnam 1993) fostered by widespread civic participation. Putnam (1993) distinguished between horizontally organized (where all members are basically equal) and vertically organized (where power relations are hierarchical) associations, and argued that while horizontally organized associations build social capital and promote institutional confidence, vertically organized associations do not build social capital and many undermine it, leading to low levels of institutional confidence.

From the above discussion, I expect that social capital and social participation would have positive effects on the level of confidence in both public and civic institutions.

POST-MATERIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE

Inglehart (1990; 1997) revived the culturalist tradition in the study of democracy initiated by Verba and Almond (1963). According to him, when there is sufficient economic development to provide for the basic material needs of the population, then societies experience several changes in cultural values that are conducive to democracy. As service sectors and educational opportunities broaden, two changes particularly stand out: cognitive mobilization and a shift from materialist to post-materialist values.

Cognitive mobilization is an increase in the skills and the motivation required to engage in decision-making, including political decision making. According to Inglehart (1990), it is a byproduct of economic development because higher levels of education and service-sector employment raise a population's level of cognitive mobilization. According to Inglehart (1997: 330), persons in service sectors "become accustomed to thinking for themselves," and thus cognitive mobilization "makes mass publics more likely to want democracy and more skillful at getting it."

Cognitive mobilization and widespread material and physical security lead, in turn, to a shift from material values to post-material values.

Inglehart (1997) defines post-materialist values as emphasizing "individual self-expression and quality of life concerns." When materialists dominate a country's discourse, public opinion will be concerned with inflation, economic growth, and other issues that bear directly on citizens' material well-being. Post-materialists, on the other hand, are more concerned with personal autonomy, environmental issues, and quality of life concerns besides those directly linked to material possessions.

Inglehart argues that the post-materialist desire for self-expression and autonomy predisposes them toward democratic institutions and practice. Post-materialists tend to keep higher standards in evaluating their quality of life and opportunities for self-expression. Such high standards apply to the political life as well. Post-materialists are more critical of political elites and authority, and they are less satisfied with the performance of political institutions than materialists are. Therefore, post-materialist values should have a negative relationship with the level of confidence in political institutions (Inglehart 1997). Given that post-materialists are more critical of and less respectful of public authority, I expect that post-materialism would have a negative effect on the level of confidence in public institutions, but no effect on the level of confidence in civic institutions.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Recently, individual confidence in public and civic institutions has received increasing attention and has been extensively studied by social scientists. In western democracies, following the lead of Miller (1974) and Lipset and Schneider (1987), Nye and colleagues (1997) studied the reasons for declining confidence among American citizens; Klingemann, Fuchs and colleagues (1995) examined the dynamics of political trust in European countries, while Norris and colleagues (1999) and Pharr, Putnam and colleagues (2000) compared confidence in institutions across countries of established democracies. Confidence in institutions among members of new democracies has been studied by Mishler and Rose (1997, 2000) and Sztompka (1999). These extensive studies on institutional confidence show that subjective conditions are important factors in the level of confidence, as well as the objective performance of institutions.

In Korea, confidence in government and other public institutions appeared as a topic for systematic empirical research in the late 1980s. Bae and Lee (1988) used their own survey research data to examine the determinants and consequences of levels of confidence in government among citizens and college students. They included both individual backgrounds and

subjective assessments of government performance in their model. Their study served as the first systematic empirical research on this issue, but their use of subjective measures of performance rather than objective measures undermined the reliability of the study.

Recently, the issue of confidence in institutions garners increasing attention from social scientists. As Yee (1998) explicated, Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) rekindled interest in this issue under the condition of severe economic crisis. Yee pointed out that Korean society suffers from the lack of public or institutional trust and from the excess of narrow private trust based on personal ties (*yeon-jul*). Oh and Park (2002) dealt with the methodological issues involved in measurement of confidence in government. They recommended using a multiple-item index of confidence instead of a single-item scale. We followed their recommendation and used a multiple-item index of confidence in this study.

Both Chang (2002) and Joo (2003) used the World Value Survey data to systematically investigate the correlates of confidence in political institutions. Chang (2002) analyzed the relationship between social capital and confidence, but used correlation rather than multiple regression methods. He found that civic engagement measured as political participation was negatively related to confidence in both public and civic institutions. He concluded that a vicious circle between social capital and confidence existed in Korean society, and therefore increasing social capital failed to promote confidence. However, in his results, participation in civic organizations had a positive relationship with confidence. He did not directly test his hypothesis with individual level variables of social capital and confidence.

Joo (2003) relied on both post-materialism and social capital to explain the individual level variance in institutional confidence. However, his measure of post-materialism is problematic. He did not use the measure of post-materialism developed by Inglehart (1997), but rather used "lack of respect for authority" as proxy for a post-materialist value orientation. He analyzed the 1995 data of the World Value Survey and reported that while progressive ideology and social capital are positively related with more confidence in government, post-materialism has a negative relationship with confidence in government. In this study, I took advantage of full data from 1981 to 1995, as well as additional data from the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research (ISDPR) social surveys between 1996 and 2003 to compare effects of social capital and post-materialism over time. I used compatible and systematic measures of social capital and post-materialism from these data.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS

Data analyzed came from surveys conducted in various years between 1981 and 2003. Two sets of surveys mainly provided data. One is the World Value Survey, conducted in 1981, 1990, and 1995. The other is Social Surveys conducted by the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research (ISDPR) at Seoul National University in 1998, 2001, and 2003.

The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. This project is being carried out by an international network of social scientists, with local funding for each survey. It has conducted representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the public in more than 65 societies on all six inhabited continents, containing almost 80 percent of the world's population. It builds on the European Values Surveys, first carried out in 1981. A second wave of surveys, designed for global use, was completed in 1990-1991. A third wave was carried out in 1995-1996, and a fourth wave took place in 1999-2001. South Korea has participated from the first wave of the survey, and in this study data from the surveys of 1981, 1990, and 1995 are used.

By comparing these two sets of survey data, one can see the trend of the changing level of confidence in public and civic institutions. One can also check how robust the effects of independent variables are across data from multiple surveys conducted at different time points. Sample sizes of the World Value Survey data are 970 in 1981, 1251 in 1990, and 1249 in 1995. After dropping cases with missing variables, the number of cases in the final data is 478 in 1981, 1104 in 1990, and 1204 in 1995. Sample sizes of the ISDPR survey data are 800 in 1998, 1520 in 2001, and 1200 in 2003. After eliminating cases with missing variables, 799 cases are used in the analysis for 1998, 1519 and 1198 cases are analyzed for 2001 and 2003 respectively.

I secured the dependent variable for this study from respondents' answers to various questions asking their level of confidence in each type of institution. The questions were asked in Likert-style scales ranging from one (lowest) to four or five (highest), depending on the surveys. The World Value Survey used four-point scales, while ISDPR surveys used five-point scales. I took the mean score of respondents' answers to questions asking their level of confidence in each institution. Confidence in public institutions was calculated from answers to questions about courts, government, and armed forces. Confidence in civic institutions was calculated from answers to questions about media, universities, labor unions, and non-governmental organizations.

Two variables for social capital, social trust and social participation, are

measured as follows. Social trust was measured as a dichotomous variable representing whether the respondent agreed with the statement, "Most people can be trusted." Social participation was measured by taking the mean value for questions asking respondents' level of participating in such organizations as sports or recreation organizations, political parties, interest organizations, charity organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Social participation variables range from one to five, with higher values for higher levels of social participation.

Post-materialist values were measured as a multiple-item index from a set of questions asking respondents' priorities for national goals (for a detailed description of the measurement process, see Inglehart 1997: 108-130). The post-materialism index ranges from the value of one, representing materialism, to the value of six, representing post-materialism.

Respondents' self-assessed ideological orientation is measured and included in the models for the World Value Survey data. Conservative orientations are measured as one and progressive orientations are measured as ten in this variable. I expect that progressive respondents would be more skeptical about the capacity and reliability of public institutions, but more confident about those of civic institutions. The time spent on the internet is measured and included in models for the ISDPR data in 2001. Given the widely-mentioned reality that politically progressive forces utilize the internet as a means of political influence and mobilization, I expect that a person spending more time on the internet would have less confidence in public institutions, but would show no difference in confidence in civic institutions.

As background variables, I controlled for respondents' age, gender, and education, measured as the years of schooling. I also controlled for the amount of monthly household income measured in ten thousand won. I used multiple regression analyses to test the effects of social capital and cultural values measured at the individual level on the level of confidence in public and civic institutions held by the individual. I relied on OLS methods to estimate the regression coefficients of the models. For each survey data, separate regression models were applied and estimated.

RESULTS

Figure 1 shows the changing levels of confidence in public and civic institutions. I converted original four and five-point indices into percentages in order to make them comparable over time. Confidence in public and civic institutions shows a general tendency of decline. The tendency is more




FIGURE 1. TREND OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC AND CIVIC INSTITUTIONS

SOURCES: WORLD VALUE SURVEY (1981, 1990, 1995)

ISDPR SOCIAL SURVEY (1998, 2001, 2003)

emphasized for public institutions. People tend to have more confidence in civic institutions than in public institutions.

Table 2. shows estimates from a model predicting the level of confidence in public institutions for the World Value Surveys of 1980, 1990, and 1995.

In 1980, respondents' age, education, and post-materialist values are not measured, and therefore these variables are not included in the model for 1980. The effect of social trust is positive, while the effect of social participation is negative, and both effects are not significant ($p > 0.05$). The effect of political ideology is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and the more progressive person tends to show lower confidence. Higher household income tends to lower confidence, and the effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The gender effect is statistically not significant ($p > 0.05$). Overall, the model explains 8.9 percent of the total variance of the data.

In 1990, the effects of social trust and social participation are positive, but the effects are not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). The effect of post-materialism is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and having post-materialist values lowers confidence in public institutions. The effect of political ideology is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and the more progressive person tends to

TABLE 2. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (WORLD VALUE SURVEY)

	1980		1990		1995	
	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E
Intercept	3.458	0.083	3.167	0.096	2.736	0.109
Gender(female=1)	0.057	0.058	-0.089	0.035	0.006	0.030
Age			0.006	0.002	0.004	0.001
Education			-0.100	0.015	-0.093	0.015
Household Income	-0.059	0.011	-0.007	0.007	-0.002	0.008
Social Trust	0.046	0.059	0.028	0.036	0.094	0.032
Social Participation	-0.213	0.173	0.066	0.089	0.195	0.060
Political Ideology	-0.050	0.012	-0.044	0.008	0.014	0.007
Post-materialism			-0.075	0.015	-0.058	0.014
R ²	0.089		0.191		0.135	
N	478		1104		1204	

show lower confidence. Among the background variables, age, gender, and education have significant effects ($p < 0.01$). Female respondents show lower confidence, and younger and highly educated respondents' confidence levels are lower. After controlling for education, the significance of the income effect disappears. Of the total variance, 19.1 percent is explained by the model.

In 1995, the effect of social trust and social participation are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and both variables representing social capital increase the level of institutional confidence. The effect of post-materialist values is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and respondents with post-materialist values show a lower level of confidence. The effect of political ideology is significant ($p < 0.05$), but the direction is reversed from previous years. Among the background variables, the effects of age and education are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and young age and a high level of education lower institutional confidence. Gender and income effects are not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). Overall, 13.5 percent of the variance in confidence level is explained by the model.

Table 3 shows estimates from models predicting level of confidence in civic institutions for the World Value Surveys of 1980, 1990, and 1995.

In 1980, as in the model for confidence in public institutions, variables for age, education, and post-materialism are not measured and therefore not included in the model. The effect of social trust on confidence is negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This result is contrary to the result from

TABLE 3. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (WORLD VALUE SURVEY)

	1980		1990		1995	
	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E
Intercept	3.260	0.084	2.892	0.095	2.756	0.104
Gender(female=1)	0.115	0.059	0.005	0.034	0.063	0.028
Age			0.002	0.002	-0.002	0.001
Education			-0.043	0.015	-0.034	0.014
Household Income	-0.067	0.011	-0.026	0.007	0.001	0.007
Social Trust	-0.039	0.013	-0.010	0.008	0.019	0.007
Social Participation	0.037	0.060	0.003	0.035	0.005	0.030
Political Ideology	0.156	0.175	0.064	0.087	0.117	0.057
Post-materialism			0.013	0.015	0.007	0.013
R ²	0.089		0.038		0.023	
N	478		1104		1204	

the model for confidence in public institutions. Social participation, another variable related to social capital, has a positive effect on confidence in civic institutions, but it is not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). Progressive ideology has a positive effect on confidence in civic institutions, but the effect is not significant ($p > 0.05$). Higher household income is negatively related to confidence in civic institutions ($p < 0.01$). The effect of gender is not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). Overall, the model explains 8.9 percent of the total variance in the data.

In 1990, the effect of social trust remains negative, but statistical significance disappears ($p > 0.1$). Social participation has a positive but not significant effect on confidence in civic institutions ($p > 0.1$). Post-materialist values and progressive ideology make no significant difference in the level of confidence in civic institutions ($p > 0.1$). Among the background variables, the effects of education and household income are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and a high level of education and household income are related with low levels of confidence in civic institutions. Gender and age effects are not statistically significant ($p > 0.1$). The proportion of the total variance explained by the model is only 3.8 percent.

In 1995, social trust has a significant positive effect on confidence in civic institutions ($p < 0.05$). The effect of social participation is positive but not statistically significant ($p > 0.1$). Post-materialist values and progressive ideology have no significant effects. Among the background variables, gender, age, and education have significant effects on confidence in civic institutions

TABLE 4. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (ISDPR SOCIAL SURVEY)

	1998		2001		2003	
	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E
Intercept	2.273	0.222	1.732	0.179	2.598	0.171
Gender(female=1)	0.042	0.054	0.120	0.038	-0.023	0.040
Age	0.004	0.028	0.005	0.002	0.006	0.002
Education	-0.006	0.010	0.004	0.007	-0.022	0.008
Household Income	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Social Trust	0.258	0.041	0.171	0.031	0.068	0.021
Social Participation	-0.101	0.094	0.282	0.065	0.061	0.077
Post-materialism	-0.109	0.023	-0.031	0.018	-0.046	0.021
Internet Use Time					0.000	0.000
R ²	0.077		0.052		0.06	
N	799		1519		1198	

($p < 0.05$).

Table 4 presents estimates from models predicting confidence in public institutions for ISDPR surveys of 1998, 2001, and 2003.

In 1998, the effects of social trust on confidence in public institutions is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The effect of social participation is negative but not statistically significant ($p > 0.1$). Respondents with post-materialist values tend to show a lower level of confidence in public institutions, and the effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). None of the background variables have statistically significant effects on confidence in public institutions. Overall, the model explains 7.7 percent of the total variance in the data.

In 2001, the effects of social trust and social participation on confidence in public institutions are both significant ($p < 0.01$) and positive. Being a post-materialist lowers the level of confidence in public institutions. Among the background variables, age and gender have significant effects ($p < 0.01$). Aged people and women tend to show more confidence in public institutions. Socio-economic background variables such as education or income do not show significant effects; 5.2 percent of the total variance is explained by the model.

In 2003, social trust and social participation have positive effects on confidence in public institutions, but only the effect of social trust is significant ($p < 0.01$). The effect of post-materialist values is negative and significant ($p < 0.05$). In 2003, the time spent on the internet was added to the model. Its

TABLE 5. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (ISDPR SOCIAL SURVEY)

	1998		2001		2003	
	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E	coefficient estimate	S. E
Intercept	2.824	0.196	2.605	0.177	3.229	0.156
Gender(female=1)	-0.003	0.048	0.109	0.038	-0.046	0.036
Age	-0.008	0.025	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002
Education	-0.007	0.009	0.000	0.007	-0.016	0.007
Household Income	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Social Trust	0.126	0.036	0.058	0.031	0.036	0.018
Social Participation	0.102	0.083	0.151	0.064	-0.099	0.070
Post-materialism	-0.010	0.021	-0.023	0.017	-0.011	0.019
Internet Use Time					0.000	0.000
R ²	0.021		0.020		0.012	
N	799		1519		1198	

effect, however, is not significant. Among other variables, age and education have significant effects on confidence in public institutions ($p < 0.01$). Aging tends to increase confidence, while education tends to lessen confidence. Overall, 6 percent of the variance is explained by the model.

Table 5 presents estimates from a model predicting confidence in civic institutions for ISDPR surveys of 1998, 2001, and 2003.

In 1998, social trust has a positive and significant ($p < 0.01$) effect on confidence in civic institutions. The effect of social participation and post-materialism are not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). None of background variables significantly affect confidence in civic institutions. Overall, the model explains only 2.1 percent of the total variance.

In 2001, social participation has a significant ($p < 0.01$) and positive effect on confidence in civic institutions. The effects of social capital is positive but not statistically significant. Post-materialist values have a negative and non-significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Among the background variables, only gender has a significant effect ($p < 0.01$), and female respondents show higher levels of confidence. Overall, 2 percent of the variance is explained by the model.

In 2003, social capital has a significant ($p < 0.05$) and positive effect on confidence in civic institutions. Effects of social participation and post-materialism are not significant. Time spent on internet use has no significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Among background variables, education affects confidence in civic institutions significantly ($p < 0.05$) in the negative

direction. Altogether, the model explains only 1.2 percent of the variance.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The results from regression models show that social trust and social participation, two aspects of social capital, tend to have positive effects on confidence in both public and civic institutions. Significance of effects varies by year and is more pronounced for public institutions. Post-materialist values have a negative effect on confidence in public institutions, but have no significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Despite some variance in statistical significance of the effects, the relationships between independent and dependent variables appear consistent across surveys. Therefore, it can be stated that confidence in institutions increases with social capital, but declines with post-materialism.

Overall fit of the models is not very good. Only two out of nine models explain more than 10 percent of the variance in confidence. Explanatory power of the model is especially weak for civic institutions. However, the situation is similar for other studies on institutional confidence in other societal contexts (Norris 1999; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Joo 2003). We can only say that much unexplained variance remains in institutional confidence.

If social capital and post-materialism affect confidence in institutions at the individual level, would changes in the level of institutional confidence result from changing levels of social capital and post-materialism, if we look at the trend over time? In other words, how much do social capital and post-materialism explain the decline in confidence that we have seen in Figure 1? Post-materialism became more prevalent between 1981 and 2001. Recently, however, post-materialism shows slight decline. Therefore, we can say that the growing influence of post-materialism accounts for some of the decline in confidence. Social trust consistently declines over the period between 1981 and 2003. However, the level of social participation is on the rise, especially for the period between 1981 and 2001. Therefore, the effect of social capital seems mixed in that while rising social participation has a positive effect on confidence, declining social trust has the opposite negative effect.

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