Erosion of Public Confidence in the Korean National Assembly*

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Using recent survey data, this paper aims to empirically investigate the state and source of Korean citizens’ trust and confidence in the National Assembly. Roughly speaking, the National Assembly is trusted only by one out of ten citizens. Since the country’s democratization, citizens’ trust and confidence has been eroding. Presently, the National Assembly is the least trusted among the key public or private institutions. A cross-national comparison of liberal democracies in the world shows that only a few national legislatures are less trusted by their citizens than the Korean National Assembly. Furthermore, this study confirms the empirical validity of performance-based explanation about what factors generate citizens’ trust and confidence in the National Assembly. At the aggregate level, an erosion of citizens’ trustful attitude toward the legislature is matched by their decreased positive evaluation of the overall job performance by the legislature. At the individual level, a citizen’s legislative trust and confidence depends mainly on his or her evaluation of the performance of the legislature itself, the executive interacting with it, or the democratic regime as a whole. Most Koreans pass an unfavorable judgment on the performance of the legislature, not because they think it is a simply idle institution but because politicians are seen to pursue partisan interests too frantically within the institution. Given its drained reservoir of citizens’ favorable attitudes toward it, the present National Assembly, even with its heightened constitutional status and emerging policy activism, may not be likely to serve as a key agent for facilitating democratic consolidation on Korean soil.

Key Words: Korean Citizens’ Trust and Confidence in the National Assembly, Performance-Based Explanation, Democratic Consolidation

Introduction

In the past two decades, Korean politics has successfully undergone democratic transition and development. Korea is now an advanced

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1 In this paper, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea or South Korea.
electoral democracy in the sense that pluralistic competition through free, fair, and regular elections have firmly settled as “the only game in town” (Przeworski, 1991: 26) for a change of significant political power. Citizens enjoy a great deal of civil liberties and political rights. The rule of law has persistently expanded, and the civil society has become invigorated.

These remarkable political achievements notwithstanding, Korea has yet to consolidate the country’s democratic politics in the years ahead. Regarding the current state of Korean democracy, the relevant evaluation by foreign experts outside Korea deserves attention. According to Freedom House’s country-by-country analysis, Korea during the year of 2006 recorded a highest score of 1 on the seven-point scale of political rights, and also a second-highest score of 2 on another seven-point scale of civil liberties. Forty-nine out of 193 independent countries covered scored an average of 1 on these two scales, constituting the group of freest countries in the world. Next to this group, 13 countries received an average of 1.5, making the second-freest group. This group includes Korea and two other Asian democracies, Japan and Taiwan (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007).

For another thing, The Economist Intelligence Unit has attempted to measure the state of democracy in each country of the world as of the end of 2006. The measure also takes into account electoral process and pluralism, together with political rights and civil liberties. But this measure gives more weight to the elements of political participation, political culture, and the functioning of government than does the Freedom House index. The analysis by the Intelligence Unit has classified 165 independent states and two territories into four categories: “full democracies” (only 28 polities), “flawed democracies” (54), “hybrid regimes” (30), and “authoritarian regimes” (55). The first category includes most of the OECD countries, to which only one Asian country, Japan, belongs. Korea has not made the grade and falls into the second category. Still, Korea ranks 31st out of 167 polities, showing good prospects for advancing into the first category of full democracy in the near future (http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf).

The preceding description suggests that Korean democracy has not yet reached a point of no return to its previous authoritarianism. What should be done more for the Korean political regime to become consolidated as a full liberal democracy? Democratic consolidation means that both the elites and ordinary citizens are firmly committed to democratic values and working procedures attitudinally and behaviorally
as well (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond and Shin, 1999). As to the functioning of the government, an effective system of checks and balances should be established. This means not only competition but also cooperation at the elite level. Politicians have to overcome naked power struggle detached from policy competition and to be capable of building consensus. Also, elites’ accountability for their deeds to ordinary citizens needs to be enhanced by making national governance open and transparent. Korea was ranked 42 out of 163 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. Governmental institutions need to raise their level of confidence and trust among the citizens. Again, there is room for significant betterment on the fronts of political participation, civil liberties, and political culture. Ethnic minorities, such as foreign immigrants, could be given indiscriminate legal protection and societal inclusion. Women should be able to enjoy de facto equality in political, economic, and social spheres of life. The existence of the National Security Law should not lead to the arbitrary exercise of power in a way of limiting civil liberties.

Given the challenges for democratic consolidation, the National Assembly as a political institution is naturally expected to play a crucial role of facilitating the consolidation by closely linking the state and civil society, or the government and citizens. It symbolizes the ideals of representative democracy, and is designed as a key channel of political participation and representation on behalf of the people. While making laws or major policy decisions and also overseeing the executive branch, the National Assembly is to ensure both horizontal accountability among governmental institutions and vertical accountability of those in power to the general public. Undeniably, the settlement and proper working of the legislative institution lie at the heart of democratic consolidation. A properly working legislature can serve as a central site where societal demands and interests are transmitted into the governmental process. A responsive legislature with a robust policy influence can ultimately contribute to the maintenance of a democratic regime (see Liebert, 1990; Mishler and Rose, 1994; Pridham, 1990; Park, 1997).

In order for a legislature to perform its proper roles well and hence to facilitate the consolidation of democracy, it requires a considerable level of citizens’ favorable attitudes toward it. Citizens’ trust and confidence in, or support for the legislative institution constitutes the core of their positive attitudes toward it. The relationship between such attitudes and a well-functioning legislature is a reciprocal one. When citizens embrace the legislature as a trustworthy institution, a favorable
environment is created to help the legislature survive and prosper as well. In turn, a properly working and sustainable legislature leads citizens to perceive it as a valued institution (Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984: 159-160; Kim and Park, 1991: 78; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979: 283-292; Mishler and Rose, 1994: 8; Shin, 1999: 136).

Based on some available survey data, this paper aims to empirically investigate Korean citizens’ attitudes toward the National Assembly and also the sources of their trust and confidence in the legislature. More specifically, the study shows the erosion of citizens’ legislative trust and confidence to a significantly low level in democratized Korea. It seeks to explain individual variations among Korean citizens in legislative trust and confidence mostly in terms of their evaluation about the working of the legislature and the regime at large. At the end of the paper, we further discuss the implications of the findings for the country’s crucial political goal of democratic consolidation.

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK AND DATA

The concept of legislative trust and confidence

In this study, the concepts of legislative trust and confidence, or legislative support are not finely differentiated one from the other with regards to the inherent nature of attitudes, but both are grasped as favorable attitudes of a kind toward the legislative institution. We apply these two concepts to tap good feeling and will of a generalized and diffuse nature toward a legislature rather than positive attitudes toward specific policy outputs produced by it. Still, the level of political objects toward which citizens hold positive attitudes needs to be theoretically specified. Legislative trust and confidence, or legislative support may be directed toward the incumbent members of a legislature, the legislative institution as a collectivity, or the representative regime in which a legislature is embedded and operates in interaction with other governmental institutions under constitutional rules. Among these different levels of political objects, this study focuses mainly on the level of a legislative institution.

Although the existing literature on citizens’ attitudes toward the legislature may suggest subtle differences in nuance between the concept of legislative trust and confidence, and that of legislative support, this study does not much dwell on them. We delve into the former concept
at a great length, while believing it is deeply interconnected and complicated with the latter concept. In earlier studies on citizens' attitudes toward the legislature, the concept of legislative support prevailed (for example, Boynton and Loewenberg, 1973; Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton, 1975; Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984; Mishler and Rose, 1994). These studies were intellectually stimulated by Easton (1965) who posited political support as an input variable for maintaining the stability of a political system. In this research tradition, legislative support is a generic term that refers to individual citizens' attitudes upholding the legislative institution. Thus the question of legislative support is raised principally from the angle of the basic raison d'être of the legislative institution. On the other hand, more recent studies on citizens' attitudes toward the legislature tend to use the term trust or confidence more preferably and frequently than the term support (for example, Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Hibbing, 1995; Newton and Norris, 2000). Trust and confidence in the legislative institution (for short, legislative trust and confidence) seems to be a narrower concept than legislative support, the former of which reflects well a dynamic configuration of attitudes highly subject to change with time depending on what and how the legislature has done. In this study, we rather closely follow this recent line of research without ignoring insights gained from the earlier studies of legislative support.

Sources of legislative trust and confidence

Citizens will vary in the level of their favorable (or unfavorable) attitudes toward the legislative institution. In Korea, with regards to social background characteristics, who trusts the National Assembly more than his or her colleague citizen does? For what reasons do some citizens have a higher level of trust and confidence in the legislature than others? We seek answers to these questions about the individual variations in legislative trust and confidence analyzing the relevant questionnaire survey responses. In this study, we try to offer a set of political explanations by focusing on the independent factors directly relevant to the arena of representative democratic politics. In explaining differing levels of citizens' trust and confidence in the legislature, we exclude independent variables largely pertinent to the personal and private sphere of life, such as one's interpersonal trust, satisfaction with life, and so on.

This analysis tests four explanatory models. First, the performance
evaluation model is based on citizens’ evaluation of the performance of the legislative institution and regime as a whole. Second, in the member-focused model, the key independent factor is citizens’ perception about the qualities and activities of legislative members. Third, the civic commitment model sets a focus on citizens’ competence, engagement, and commitment for maintaining democracy. Last, in the partisanship model, citizens’ ideological orientation and party preference matter for explaining their level of legislative trust and confidence.

The performance evaluation model is predicated on the notion that attitudes toward the legislature change with perceptions of how well it, other governmental institutions closely interacting with it, and the entire regime perform. Indeed, prior research on legislative support or legislative trust and confidence in emerging democracies (Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1994) has shown that perception of legislative performance is a significant factor. In the context of Korean representative politics, citizens’ satisfaction with performance of the National Assembly even before Korea’s democratization was associated with legislative support (Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984). The legislature is probably the most visible political actor next to the chief executive, and citizens’ evaluation of its performance is highly likely to reflect its actual performance. Besides legislative performance, the performance model of this study considers the responsiveness of the central government (the executive branch at the national level) to citizens’ needs and interests. Furthermore, the model takes into account the working of the democratic regime encompassing the legislature and executive. In the study, performance evaluation concerns the overall job performance of the legislature and other core governmental institutions, and the responsiveness of the regime. It is not specific evaluation concerning segmented policy areas.

National Assembly the Institution is conceptually differentiated from its constituent individual members. In reality, however, ordinary citizens will not readily think of the legislative institution apart from its members. In part, they form their attitudes toward the institution via their perceptions of the members. This politician-mediated effect on legislative trust and confidence is captured by the member-focused model. First of all, this model tries to explain trust and confidence in the legislature in light of how well an individual citizen knows or receives the activities of the member elected from his or her district and also how much the citizen likes the member. The members of the current 17th Assembly got elected under a two-vote mixed system. In the
National Assembly, each voter casts two ballots. Two hundred and twenty seven members of a total of 299 are elected as representatives of single-member plurality districts. The remaining 72 are elected by the party vote under proportional representation (PR). Due to the predominance of the single-member plurality component, district representatives are more visible than PR representatives. Most of the National Assembly members do not afford to neglect their duty of constituency service for reelection. Studies (e.g., Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984) have shown individual citizens’ contact with their own members and awareness of what those members have done generate support for the legislature. Next, the model emphasizes that positive perception of members in general is likely to carry over to favorable attitudes toward the legislature. One recent analysis done by Shin (2005) has provided evidence that citizens’ satisfaction with general members’ responsiveness to the people is significantly related to trust and confidence in the legislative institution.

The civic commitment model suggests that civic orientations and engagements, together with general commitment to democratic values and principles, have a bearing on legislative support or legislative trust and confidence (see Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1994; Shin, 1999). The specific independent variables relevant to the civic commitment model include political interest, sense of political efficacy, involvement in organizations usable as a participatory vehicle, and preference of democracy over dictatorship, and the like.

The partisanship model is posited for the reason that legislative trust and confidence may not be a kind of political attitudes independent of an individual’s ideological orientation and party preference. Left versus right or progressive versus conservative ideological positions are expected to influence attitudes toward the legislature, a core democratic institution. In a dictatorial regime, change-oriented citizens are likely to favor or uphold the symbol of representative democracy. Yet this relationship may go reverse in a liberal democratic regime. Leftists or progressives who want to reform the regime for direct grassroots democracy may be more discontented with and unfavorable toward the existing legislature than rightist or conservatives. Party composition and strength vary from time to time. Citizens’ attitudes toward the legislature may be tinged with their party predilection. An individual citizen will rather see the legislature favorably when his or her preferred party controls the legislature by a stable majority than when otherwise.

In testing each model, four social background variables are considered
as controls: sex, age, education, and income. By entering these variables into the statistical models, we can obtain evidence for confirming social locations of legislative trust and confidence. Lee and Glasure (1997), in their study of Korean citizens’ confidence in public institutions including the National Assembly based on the 1982 and 1990 World Values Survey data, have found that old or less educated citizens reveal a higher level of institutional confidence than young or better educated citizens. Notably, other things being equal, the well educated turn out to be critical of and unfavorable toward the existing legislature.

Data and variables

The main data used for this study was collected from a nationwide sample survey in 2005. The East Asia Institute, Sogang University conducted this survey with a commercial polling agency, Research and Research, to investigate Korean citizens’ attitudes toward the National Assembly from October 21 to November 8 that year. Respondents in the Sogang Survey were selected based on multi-stage area sampling and quota sampling and were interview face-to-face. Also we utilize the supplementary datasets: the four waves of World Values Survey (1982, 1990, 1996, and 2001) and two annual Asia Barometer surveys (2003 and 2004) administered to Korean citizens (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org; http://www.AsiaBarometer.org). Where appropriate in this paper, results of 1996 Korean Democratization Survey are cited for the purpose of comparative analysis (Shin, 1999).

In the regression equations estimated for this study, the dependent variable is a respondent’s level of trust in the National Assembly. The following sets of independent variables are entered into the regression analysis. First, evaluation variables concerning institutional and regime performance are legislative performance; working of democracy; government does right; responsive government; and government for the people. Second, attitudes toward National Assembly members include like member from own district; know the member’s activity; and satisfaction with Assembly members. Third, the variables relevant to civic commitment are political interest; political efficacy; political discussion; vote in Assembly election; vote in national elections; organizational affiliation, and democratic commitment. Fourth, a set of partisanship variables encompasses ideology; and strength of party preference-- Uri Party preference; GNP (Grand National Party) preference; and DLP (Democratic Labor Party) preference. Finally,
sociodemographics considered in the analysis are sex, age, education, and income. Questionnaire wordings, response categories, and methods of their coding are described in Appendix.

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: A COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

*Longitudinal comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature*

The four waves of World Values Survey, two Asia Barometer surveys, and Sogang Survey generated data for comparing Korean citizens’ attitudes toward the National Assembly across time. These surveys have been conducted at six different points of time, one during the period of the 11th Assembly under authoritarianism and the other five from the 13th through the 17th Assemblies in the current democratic era.

In each of the four waves of the World Values Survey, citizens’ trust and confidence was measured with a four-point scale using the following question: “For parliament [the National Assembly], could you tell me how much confidence you have in it?” 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = a great deal (see Appendix) In 1982 when the country was ruled under a military authoritarian government, a bit over two thirds (68.3 percent) of respondents said they trusted the National Assembly a great deal or quite a lot. Korean citizens had a high level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World Values Survey</th>
<th>Asia Barometer Survey</th>
<th>Sogang Survey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust a lot</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust to a degree</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really trust</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-so</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather not trust</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not trust at all</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(949)</td>
<td>(1,238)</td>
<td>(1,136)</td>
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</table>

of legislative trust and confidence at the time. Due to their strong aspiration for democracy, citizens looked to the national legislature, a representative body with great potential for bringing democracy. The ensuing three World Values Surveys, however, show a monotonic decline in the favorable attitude since after democratization: 34.1 percent in 1990, 31.1 percent in 1996, and 10.8 percent in 2001. The levels of legislative trust and confidence have drastically become low as compared to that level in 1982. This suggests that as the political regime became democratized, citizens’ democratic zeal and their vague expectation of the national legislature as an engine of democratization weakened to a considerable extent. Very importantly, this also implies that due to the regime contextual factor one must be cautious about comparing the level of public attitudes toward the legislative institution across different political regimes. In this study, our longitudinal comparison is confined to the present democratic era.

The Asia Barometer surveys of 2003 and 2004 also asked the respondents about their level of trust and confidence in the National Assembly as follows: “Please indicate to what extent you trust the National Assembly to operate in the best interests of society.” 1 = don’t trust at all, 2 = don’t really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot. This Asia Barometer questionnaire item is worded slightly differently than the corresponding item in the World Values Survey. The former explicitly leads a respondent to reveal his or her level of legislative trust and confidence by judging on the responsiveness of the legislative institution to public interest. In other words, Asia Barometer invokes a respondent’s evaluation of institutional performance more than the World Values Survey. Anyway, in the 2003 Asia Barometer survey, 10.7 percent of respondents expressed a lot or a degree of trust in the National Assembly, which is a level similar to that of the 2001 World Values Survey. Then in 2004, 7.8 percent said that they trusted a lot or to a degree. Again, we find a decrease in citizens’ legislative trust and confidence.

The Sogang Survey, which provides this study with the principal and most recent data, asked respondents as follows: “To what extent do you trust the National Assembly?” In a substantive sense, the wording is closer to the World Values Survey than to Asia Barometer. Still, unlike these two datasets, the Sogang Survey generates a five-point measure of institutional confidence rather than a four-point one (1 = do not trust at all, 2 = rather not trust, 3 = so-so, 4 = trust to a degree, 5 = trust a lot). In this survey, only 6.6 percent indicated a lot or a degree of trust.
Considering all the survey results shown above, one is struck with a clear longitudinal drainage of trust and confidence in the National Assembly during the years of democratic politics. The current aggregate level of legislative trust and confidence remains 10 percent or so. Five or ten years ago, the level hovered around 30 percent. It is clear that the level of citizens’ trust in National Assembly now has almost hit its nadir.

In a democratic regime, the representative assembly is closest to the people than any other public authority. The members are directly elected by the people, and their every action is watched by the electorate. As compared to the executive or judiciary, the representative institution is the most open to the public, and hence the most vulnerable to criticism by the attentive public. In this vein, it seems highly difficult for the National Assembly to enjoy citizens’ trust at a higher level than does the civil service or any law-enforcing institution. Even considering this, however, the current National Assembly receives too little favorable attitudes from ordinary citizens, being degraded to a target of ridicule. This is a dismal condition for the proper working of the legislature as a core democratic institution.

Why has the already not-so-high trust and confidence among Korean citizens in the National Assembly further declined over the past decade? Answering this question in a systematic manner requires the time-series aggregated data for candidate independent variables, which cannot be readily available at hand for this study. Here in this paper we suggest a reasonable hunch and examine it roughly. A simple but undeniable answer may be that the legislature has become less trusted than before, because more and more citizens have gotten disenchanted with the way this institution does its due work. In fact, we have found an increase in such unfavorable perception within a great bulk of the Korean citizenry in the past decade.

In his 1996 Korean Democratization survey, Shin included a question asking respondents to indicate how well or poorly they thought the National Assembly performed its duties for the country. Four response categories were given: “very well,” “somewhat well,” “somewhat poorly,” and “very poorly.” As seen in Table 2, “Somewhat poorly” was the modal response recording 57 percent. The most negative answer “very poorly” constituted about one-eighth (13 percent). Very few (1 percent) believed that it performed the most positively, “very well.” Less than a third (29 percent) said “somewhat well.” Thus, a decade ago, seven of ten Korean citizens evaluated the job performance of the
Likewise, in 2005, the Sogang Survey has investigated how Korean citizens think of their national legislature’s job performance. The relevant survey question was: “How do you think the National Assembly performs its role?” The distribution of responses showed the following pattern: “very well,” 0.6 percent; “somewhat well,” 4.4 percent; “so-so,” 28.6 percent; “somewhat poorly,” 47.5 percent; and “very poorly,” 18.9 percent. The greatest number of people answered in a somewhat negative way. Because of a five-point scale, these results may not be directly comparable to those of Shin’s previous study. A middle-ground response like “so-so” tends to attract its adjacent responses, “somewhat well” and “somewhat poorly.” For this reason, one had better look at the extreme responses. The most positive response is slightly lower than that in the context of Shin’s study using a four-point scale, but the most negative response has significantly increased from 13 percent to 18.9 percent. In all probability, this implies that Korean citizens now evaluate the working of the National Assembly more unfavorably than they did a decade ago. We are tempted to argue that at the aggregate level an erosion of trust and confidence in the National Assembly is matched by a negative perception of its performance.

Comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence across institutions or organizations

A set of survey data used for this study give plenty information about Korean citizens’ trust and confidence in a range of state or public-sector institutions, plus private and non-profit sector institutions, though the
institutions covered and response categories vary one survey from another. In the 2001 World Values Survey, non-profit organizations such as environmental protection movement and women’s movement received a great deal or quite a lot answers from 74.4 percent and 70.5 percent of the respondents, respectively. Next, among six state or public-sector institutions (civil services, the military, the police, the central government, political parties, and the National Assembly), the civil services were trusted a great deal or quite a lot by about two thirds of respondents (66.6 percent), which turned out to be the most favored among the six public institutions. The other public institutions that obtained a positive response from a majority were the military (64.3 percent) and the police (50.2 percent). On the other hand, the remaining three public institutions did not enjoy a high level of trust and confidence at all: the central government (30.3 percent), political parties

### TABLE 3. KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS/ ORGANIZATIONS, %

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<tr>
<td>Environmental protection movement</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organizations</td>
<td>Civic organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s movement</td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>The media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil services</td>
<td>Public health system</td>
<td>Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The press</td>
<td>The military</td>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>Big companies (domestic)</td>
<td>The military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>The media</td>
<td>Big companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>The police</td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police</td>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>The police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>Trade/Labor unions</td>
<td>The presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>Public education system</td>
<td>Civil services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Companies</td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: <sup>a</sup> The figure in the table is the percentage for “a great deal” or “quite a lot” category;  
<sup>b</sup> “trust a lot” or “trust to a degree.”

(10.8 percent, and the National Assembly (10.8 percent) (see Table 3).

Also, the Asia Barometer surveys measure the levels of citizens’ trust and confidence in a number of institutions or organizations. The 2004 survey concerned nine domestic state or public institutions (the public health system, the military, the police, legal system, public education system, local government, the central government, political parties, and the national legislature) and into five non-profit and private-sector institutions (nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations, big domestic companies, the media, trade or labor unions). Because of discrepancy in wording, it is not advisable to compare the percentage figures directly between the World Values Survey and AsiaBarometer survey. Instead, one had better take note of general pattern the two survey results share in the order of institutional confidence. First, on the whole, state or public institutions are less trusted than non-profit and private-sector institutions by Korean citizens. Second, among public institutions only, citizens trust the military, public health system, legal system, the police, and public education system more than the central government, local government, political party, and the National Assembly. Public institutions held by citizens in high esteem are rather hierarchically organized and mainly in charge of executing policies. Third, the National Assembly, along with political parties, is invariably put at the bottom rung of the confidence ladder. The legislature and party are public institutions that make democracy work by organizing and representing citizens’ interests and opinions. If we say that Korean public institutions are in crisis due to lack of citizens’ trust and confidence, the core democratic institutions constitute a case in point.

Again, in 2005, the Sogang Survey examined citizens’ trust and confidence in an array of institutions or organization categories. On a five-point scale, either of two highest values (“trust a lot” or “trust to a degree”) is interpreted as revealing outright confidence in an institution. Based on the survey results, the institutions can be arranged in a descending order from the most to the least trusted: civic organizations (40.3 percent), the media (34.6 percent), courts (32.8 percent), schools (31.2 percent), the military (28.5 percent), big companies (24.2 percent), religious organizations (24.0 percent), the police (20.3 percent), the presidency (16.8 percent), civil services (13.1 percent), and the National Assembly (6.6 percent). This survey also has not failed to indicate that Korean citizens place the National Assembly at the bottom of the institutional confidence ladder.

The data from three different surveys conducted in early 2000s
consistently confirm that the National Assembly is less trusted than any other public institutions, not to speak of nonprofit and private-sector institutions. Not all of the Korean public institutions are facing confidence crisis. Citizens have relatively high levels of trust and confidence in public institutions of a hierarchical nature, such as the military and police. In contrast, the National Assembly, a key institution of representative democracy, is disregarded by an overwhelming majority of citizens. Currently in the very beginning years of the 21st century, citizens’ level of trust and confidence in the National Assembly remains at the percentages of low 10s or under. There is no doubt that the national legislature suffers from critical confidence deficit.

Cross-national comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature

Among the democracies of the world, where does Korea stand with regards to the aggregate level of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature? Figure 1 displays that level for each of 39 liberal democratic countries which were covered in the fourth wave of World Values Survey and also rated free by Freedom House at the time of the survey. Considering the regime factor, we have excluded the comparable percentages of non-democratic countries. The figure includes a wide range of liberal democracies which differ in geographical size and location, population, national income, and political institutional structures (presidential versus parliamentary, federal versus unitary, etc.).

Of the 39 national legislatures, the Iceland Althing enjoys the highest level of trust and confidence held by the country’s citizens. Including the Althing, eight national legislatures are trusted by a majority of their own citizens. Next to the top eight, 16 legislatures are the target of such positive attitude expressed by at least of one third of their citizens. In the lowest part of the figure, the countries, such as Peru, Lithuania, Korea, Argentina, and Czech constitute the bottom five whose national legislatures are trusted by less than 13 percent of their citizens. These five countries became democratized or re-democratized riding on “the third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991), and are undergoing democratic consolidation.

America (for example, Klingeman, 1999 and articles in Norris, 1999) reported that public institutions, especially parliaments or legislatures, suffered a marked erosion of citizens’ confidence during the 1990s. This phenomenon was explained by the growth of “critical citizens” or
“disaffected democrats” committed to democratic values but discontented with the existing structures of representative democracy. Still, as seen in Figure 1, from a cross-national perspective, the advanced democracies occupy the upper half of the confidence ladder.

Figure 2 shows the current state of legislative trust and confidence for
Asian liberal democracies included in the Asia Barometer Surveys of 2003 and 2004, and also rated free according to the Freedom House index. In this figure, Korea remains at the bottom rung of another confidence ladder. Japan, the most advanced democracy in Asia, is a country where public institutions, including the Diet, operate in the environment of citizens’ unfavorable attitudes toward them (Wang, Dalton, and Shin: 2006). Despite this, Japan’s national legislature has a less adverse environment than the Korean National Assembly.

All bits of information analyzed from different angles tell that a reservoir of good feelings toward the Korean legislature has been drained to a level incapacitating the institution from facilitating Korea’s democratic consolidation. As suggested above, citizens’ evaluation of the performance by the legislature may explain this drainage. But there may exist other systemic variables working at the national level. This prods a thorough cross-national study, which is beyond the present objective.
of this paper.

**SOURCES OF KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

*Multivariate analysis*

To explore explanations for individual citizens’ trustful attitudes toward the National Assembly, we estimated a series of Ordinary Least Squares regression models. For the performance model through the partisanship model, we regressed social background variables and the independent variables relevant to each explanatory model on legislative trust and confidence. The Sogang Survey provides data about a wider range of explanatory variables than the Word Values Survey or AsiaBarometer. The analysis of the Sogang Survey data generated the standardized coefficients and the adjusted $R^2$ as presented in Table 4.

In Table 4, Model I concerns the performance evaluation model; Model II, the member-focused model; Model III, the civic commitment model; and Model IV, the partisanship model. Model V is a full model which includes all the independent variables reaching a .10 significance level in the first four regression equations. The empirical fit of each model is judged based on the size of adjusted $R^2$ coefficient.

At a glance, the performance evaluation model whose adjusted $R^2$ is .29 surpasses any other model in explanatory power, while the civic commitment model with its $R^2$ being less than .01 is the least powerful as an explanation. In-between, the member-focused model and the partisanship model turn out to be significant but relatively weak explanations.

In the performance evaluation model, the standardized coefficient of legislative performance is .52, showing its overwhelming importance as an independent variable. A more positive evaluation of the performance of the legislature forcefully leads to a higher level of trust and confidence in the legislature. Working of democracy variable is significant at the level of .10. The more a citizen thinks the regime works democratically, the more trust and confidence he or she holds targeted at the legislature which is an institution embedded in the regime.

The test of the member-focused model confirms that a citizen’s good feeling about the district representative of the National Assembly expectedly transforms into a trustful mind toward the institution. Also as expected, a citizen’s cognition of the member’s activity also leads to
positive attitude toward the legislature. In this model, education shows a significantly negative relationship with legislative trust and confidence. In Korea, educated citizens are more critical of and less trustful of the

### TABLE 4. SOURCES OF KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (2005): OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (Standardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>-.09**</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>-.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative performance</td>
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<td>.51***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working of democracy</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government does right</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like member from one district</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the member’s activity</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
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<td>Vote in Assembly election</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational affiliation</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic commitment</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uri Party preference</td>
<td>-.15***</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP preference</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>DLP preference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
The civic commitment model provides little explanatory power. Only education remains statistically significant, and again it is negatively related to legislative trust and confidence. The partisanship proves its explanatory power to some extent, though not remarkably. Ideologically conservatives are more trustful of the legislature than progressives. The strength of party preference either for the Uri Party or Grand National Party reveals a significant, negative relationship with legislative trust and confidence. Of the two party preference variables, the Uri Party preference is a better predictor. At the time of the Sogang Survey, no single party controlled the National Assembly. Of a total of 298 seats (with one vacancy), 49 percent (145 seats) were occupied by the Uri Party and 43 percent (125 seats) by the Grand National Party. The third largest Democratic Labor Party held nine seats; and still minor splinter parties and independents altogether, the remaining 19 seats. In the beginning of the 17th Assembly, the Uri Party started with a bare majority of 152 seats (51 percent), but it lost about half a dozen seats mostly due to court rulings on illegal election campaigning. Under the circumstances that either of the two large parties could not command a majority, citizens with a stronger preference toward either one might be led to less trustful of the legislature. In the test of the partisanship model, education proves consistently negative in association with trust and confidence in the legislature.

In a full model (Model V), all the significantly emerging variables from Model I through Model IV except for two, know the member’s activity and GNP preference, keep their statistical significance. By adding the member-focused model and the partisanship model to the performance evaluation model, the adjusted $R^2$ has increased to .31 from that of the performance evaluation model, .29. All this indicates that citizens’ overall performance evaluation regarding the National Assembly best accounts for their trustful attitude toward it. Other explanations based on citizens’ attitudes the members and also on their party preference are just supplementary.

We repeated identical analytic procedures using the 2001 World Values Survey and 2004 Asia Barometer data. This time some variables were newly added and others were omitted depending on the availability of questionnaire items. The four models were serially estimated, and finally a full model was constructed for each of the two dataset (see Appendix for the measurement of the variables). The test results of these two full models are shown in Table 5.
In the analysis of the World Values Survey data, the explanatory power of ideology relevant to the partisanship model proved nil. Above all, the variables related to the performance evaluation model exhibited their salience as independent factors explaining legislative trust and confidence. A citizen’s belief in the responsiveness of the central government is a strong predictor of his or her trustful attitude toward the National Assembly. The legislature interacts closely with the executive branch in the process of national governance. Citizens’ positive attitudes toward one institution are intertwined with those toward the other. The member-focused model is also empirically valid. Satisfaction with the way members of the National Assembly are handling national affairs spills over and turns into good will toward the legislature. Unlike its insignificance in Table 4, the variable of political interest becomes significant in the present analysis. The civic commitment model may not
be totally futile for explaining legislative support and confidence. Among the social background variables, education persistently shows its negative effect on trustful mind toward the legislature. Interestingly this analysis produces evidence that females trust the National Assembly more than males.

The regression analysis of the Asia Barometer data reinforces the findings discussed above. Performance evaluation variables are most important. Citizens who trust the central government to operate in the best interests of the society are highly likely to trust also the National Assembly in the same manner. As in the case of the 2005 Sogang Survey data, evaluation of regime performance gains vigor in explaining legislative trust and confidence. The member-focused model remains viable: the variable of satisfaction with Assembly members exerts a positive impact on the dependent variable. Finally, it is shown again that women are more prone to put confidence in the legislature than men.

To recapitulate, the trustworthiness of the National Assembly among the citizens greatly hinges on their perception of the performance of the legislature itself, the executive branch interacting with the legislature, and the whole regime. Citizens’ liking for their own district representatives or satisfaction with general members of the legislature constitutes a good source of their positive attitude toward the institution. More educated citizens are likely to be less trustful of the legislature.

Citizens’ evaluation of legislative performance revisited

Based on aggregated survey responses, this study has corroborated a longitudinal erosion of citizens’ trust and confidence in the National Assembly since the country’s democratization and suggested their increasingly critical evaluation of the overall performance by the legislature as the main cause of the eroding trustful attitude toward it. Furthermore, the individual-level analysis in the study has confirmed a citizen’s evaluation of the overall performance by the legislature as the uttermost significant determinant of the individual’s trust and confidence in the legislative institution.

Do Korean citizens judge the performance of the National Assembly more poorly than before because the legislature has done less and less what it is supposed to do? Is it a dormant, idle or do-nothing legislature? The reality is that the Korean legislature in this democratic era operates under an increasingly heavier workload and schedule. The members are now more and more engaged in their legislative activities. For example,
in the National Assembly with its committee-centered legislative process, there arises a great time demand on the members from the schedule of committee meetings. The yearly average of meeting days for the committees, standing and special altogether, during each legislative period generally increased over the whole span of the democratic era. Moreover it sharply did so in the recent decade: 406 days for the 13th Assembly (1988~1992), 318 for the 14th Assembly (1992~1996), 377 for the 15th Assembly (1996~2000), 476 for the 16th Assembly (2000~2004), and 610 for the present 17th Assembly (in its first half from 2004 through 2006). Also, its legislative capacity has grown remarkably. For example, the average number of bills enacted per year has dramatically augmented: from a low of 121.5 in the 13th Assembly to a high of 372.5 in the 17th Assembly (Park, 2006). In light of these measures, the National Assembly has done more work over the past two decades.

Politicians working in the national legislature are not lazier at all than their predecessors. Then why do their citizens negatively assess the overall job performance of the legislature manned with busy and hardworking members? To this question, we will answer as follows: it is because National Assembly members continually keep fighting each other as before and further the fighting probably has become severer than usual at a critical time when they are expected to work productively and efficiently than ever. The national legislature continues to lack in its capability to resolve political conflict and build consensus. Actually, inter-party or executive-legislative conflict has further intensified in the recent legislative periods of the National Assembly. The incidences of conflict are abundant, which have eventually made attentive citizens sick and tired of political actors involved, including inevitably the boisterous legislature. In the 2005 Sogang Survey, respondents having evaluated the performance of the legislature unfavorably were further asked why they judged so. The most frequently mentioned reason is that National Assembly members are too much swayed by partisan interests and tactics (62 percent). The next frequent response is the National Assembly members have no quality and capability to do their job well (32 percent). The other reasons are that interest groups or civic organizations have too strong influence on and excessively intervene in members’ activity (3 percent) and that the executive often dominates over the National Assembly (3 percent). In Korean citizens’ eyes, partisan bickering is the most salient reason for their blaming the National Assembly.

The case of impeachment against President Roh Moo-hyun by the National Assembly in March 2004 dramatically illustrates the most
intense conflict that escalated on the legislative arena in recent years. On February 24 in 2004, President Roh publicly stated his will to support his Uri Party in the upcoming April general election for the 17th Assembly. On March 3, the National Election Commission ruled that the president’s remarks violated the election law requiring political neutrality of government officials in elections. The leaders of the Grand National Party and Millennium Democratic Party as well mentioned that they would have President Roh impeached if he did not deliver an apology. On March 9, the two parties submitted an impeachment motion against the president for his breach of the election law. In response, on March 11, President Roh at a televised press conference refused to make such an apology. On the next day, the National Assembly dominated by the Grand National Party, Millennium Democratic Party, and the United Liberal Democrats combined impeached the president on the charges of election-law violation, corruption, and incompetence by a vote of 193-2 (with no vote by the Uri Party members). President Roh became the first chief executive ever impeached since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948.

For almost three days when the impeachment vote was pending, the Uri Party members physically blocked the vote by keeping the Speaker from his podium. In the end, he ordered security guards to remove the blockers by force, and opened the impeachment proceedings. The vote started at 11:30 a.m. on March 12 and took 20 minutes to end. Just before noon, the Speaker announced the stunning result. Disappointed Uri Party members wept, cursed, and sang the national anthem. They called the passage of the impeachment motion “a coup d’etat by the National Assembly” (Park 2004).

The case of presidential impeachment clearly shows that the National Assembly hardly seeks the reconciliation of clashing interests and demands in a smooth manner. Despite that it serves as an important formalized setting for the interplay among political forces, it cannot facilely manage conflict within its deliberation process. Confrontation and gridlock often occur on the legislative arena. Conflict-ridden dynamics of legislative politics is a main cause that hinders the National Assembly from working properly. Citizens disappointed with partisan struggles pass unfavorable judgment on the performance of the legislature and have eventually become hardened in their distrust of it.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis discloses that the Korean National Assembly at the dawn of the 21st century has sunken into the quagmire of citizens’ distrust. Various survey results indicate that the legislative institution is trusted only by one out of ten citizens. There is a clear erosion of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature since the country’s democratic transition. A decade ago, no less than three out of ten expressed their trustful attitude toward the legislature. The National Assembly is the least trusted institution among the key institutions or organizations in Korea, public or private. By a cross-national comparison of liberal democracies over the world, we find that only a few national legislatures are less trusted by their people than the Korean National Assembly.

The analysis has also verified the validity of performance-based explanation for citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature. At the aggregate level, an erosion of legislative trust and confidence is associated with an increase in the negative evaluation of legislative performance. At the individual level, a citizen’s legislative trust and confidence depends mainly on his or her evaluation of legislative, governmental, and regime performance.

In most Korean citizens’ view, the National Assembly makes a poor record, not because it does little, but because the members are trying frantically to pursue their partisan interests. More and more citizens despair of naked power struggle among political parties and of existing politicians’ inability to accommodate their positions on the stage of legislative politics.

One cannot imagine the country’s successful consolidation of democracy without the legislature trusted by a great bulk of the citizenry. The legislature is a major setting for the interplay of significant political forces and is expected to contribute to an orderly and effective management of societal conflicts. This expected role can be fulfilled when ordinary citizens respect and comply with the enactments and other policy outputs made by the legislature. In short, an essential condition for a viable legislature is a reservoir of citizens’ good feelings toward it. In reality, however, the National Assembly is an object of deepening public disenchantment due to on-going inter-party confrontations and hence the improper working of the legislature. As long as the current practice of legislative politics persists, the National Assembly even with its heightened constitutional status and emerging policy activism may
not be capable of serving as a key, reliable agent of democratic consolidation on Korean soil.

The study strongly suggests that the members of the National Assembly should change their way of doing things in order to build up their good reputation among the citizens. Politicians should exert efforts at transforming their parties into policy-oriented, responsible, and internally democratic entities. Also they need to moderate their positions, build cross-party coalitions as readily as they can, and resolve conflict based on established rules of operation. In order to restore citizens’ trust and confidence targeted at political institutions, notably the National Assembly, Korean politicians must learn a valuable lesson from the following maxim: *Heaven helps those who help themselves.*

APPENDIX: MEASURES OF VARIABLES IN REGRESSION EQUATIONS

**Trust in the National Assembly**
(2005) To what extent do you trust the National Assembly? 1 = do not trust at all, 2 = rather not trust, 3 = so-so, 4 = trust to a degree, 5 = trust a lot.

(1988, 1990, 1996, 2001) For the national parliament/legislature, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it? 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = a great deal.

(2003, 2004) Please indicate to what extent you trust the National Assembly to operate in the best interests of society. 1 = don’t trust at all, 2 = don’t really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot.

**Legislative performance**
(2005) In your view, how well or poorly does the National Assembly perform its role? 1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = so-so, 4 = rather well, 5 = very well.

**Working of democracy**
(2005) To what extent do you think our country’s politics works democratically? 1 = It works very undemocratically, 2 = It works quite undemocratically, 3 = It tends to work democratically, 4 = It works very democratically.

(2001) On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? 1 = not at all satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = rather satisfied, 4 = very satisfied.
(2004) Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the democratic system.
1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = somewhat dissatisfied, 3 = neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat satisfied, 5 = very satisfied.

Government does right
(2005) In your opinion, to what extent is the government doing the right thing? 1 = mostly not right, 2 = more often not right, 3 = relatively quite right, 4 = almost all right.

Responsive government
(2001) For the central government, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it? 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = a great deal = 4.
(2004) Please indicate to what extent you trust the central government to operate in the best interests of society. 1 = don’t trust at all, 2 = don’t really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot

Government for the people
(2001) Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 1 = run by a few big interests, 2 = run for all the people.

Like member from own district
(2005) How do you feel about the National Assembly member elected from your own district? 1 = dislike very much, 2 = somewhat dislike, 3 = neither dislike nor like, 4 = somewhat like, 5 = like very much.

Know the member’s activity
(2005) How well do you know about what your own member is doing? 1 = do not know at all, 2 = do not rather know well, 3 = know somewhat well, 4 = know very well.

Satisfaction with Assembly members
(2001) How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? 1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = fairly dissatisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, 4 = very satisfied.
(2004) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the National Assembly stop thinking about the public once they’re elected. 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4
= agree, 5 = strongly agree.

Political interest
(2005) How much are you interested in politics? 1 = not at all, 2 = not much, 3 = a little, 4 = very much.
(2001) How much are you interested in politics? 1 = not at all interested, 2 = not very, 3 = somewhat interested, 4 = very interested

Political efficacy: an average score of the responses to two items as below.
(2005) For people like me, politics is too complicated to understand; People like me do not influence what the government does. 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = strongly disagree.
(2004) Generally speaking, people like me don’t have the power to influence government policy or actions; Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don’t understand what’s happening. 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree.

Political discussion
(2005) How often do you talk about politics with people around you? 1 = rarely, 2 = once or twice a month, 3 = once or twice a week, 4 = three or four times a week, 5 = every day.
(2001) How often discusses political matters with friends? 1 = never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = frequently

Vote in Assembly election

Vote in national elections
(2004): How often do you vote in national elections? 1 = never voted, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = most of the time, 5 = every time.

Organizational affiliation: a score obtained by adding the recoded value for the response to each of the following question.
(2005) Are you a member of political party (labor union, civic organization, cooperative, and friendship club for those from your hometown, respectively)? 0 = no, 1 = yes.
(2001) Do you belong to labor union, political party, labor union,
political party, local political action group, human rights group, environmental group, and women’s group, and peace movement, respectively)? 0 = no, 1 = yes.

Democratic commitment
(2005) Which of the following about the political regime is closest to your opinion? 1 = sometimes a dictatorial regime is better than a democratic one, 2 = I do not care about democracy or dictatorship, 3 = democracy is always better than any other kind of regime.
(2001) For having a democratic political system, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? 1 = very bad, 2 = fairly bad, 3 = fairly good, 4 = very good.
(2004) Please indicate whether you think a democratic political system would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country. 1= bad, 2 = fairly good, 3 = very good.

Ideology
(2005) Where do you position your own ideological orientation on the following continuum? from 0 (progressive) to 5 (middle of the road) to 10 (conservative).
(2001) In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

Strength of party preference: Uri Party preference, GNP (Grand National Party) preference, DLP (Democratic Labor Party) preference.
(2005) How much do you like or dislike each of the following political parties? 1 = dislike very much, 2 = rather dislike, 3 = neither like nor dislike, 4 = rather like, 5 = like very much.

Sex

Age
(2005) 1 = 20 ~ 29 years old, 2 = 30 ~ 39, 3 = 40 ~ 49, 4 = 50 or over
(2001) 1 = 15 -29 years, 2 = 30 ~ 49 years, 3 = 50 and more years.
(2004) years old(not recoded)

Education
(2005) 1 = elementary school or less 2 = middle school, 3 = high school,
4 = college-level, 5 = graduate school  
(2001) 1 = lower, 2 = middle, 3 = upper  
(2004) 1 = no formal education, 2 = elementary school/junior high school/middle school, 3 = high school, high-school-level vocational-technical school, 4 = professional school/technical school, 5 = university/graduate school.

Income  
(2005) monthly household income (in Korean won): 1 = one million or less, 2 = more than one million up to 2 million, 3 = more than 2 million up to 3 million, 4 = more than 3 million up to 4 million, 5 = more than 4 million up to 5 million, 6 = more than 5 million up to one thousand, 7 = more than one thousand.  
(2001) 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high.  
(2004) annual household income (in Korean won, million): 1 = 20 or less, 2 = 20 ~ 30, 3 = 30 ~ 40, 4 = 40 ~ 50, 5 = 50 ~ 60, 7 = 70 ~ 80, 8 = 80 ~ 90, 9 = 90 ~ 100, 10 = 100 ~ 110, 11 = 110 ~ 120, 12 = 120 ~ 130, 13 = 130 ~ 140, 14 = 140 ~ 150, 15 = 150 ~ 160, 16 = 160 ~ 170, 17 = 170 ~ 180, 18 = 180 ~ 190, 19 = 190 ~ 200, 20 = more than 200.

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