

Military Organizations and Mass Mobilization in the Chinese Soviet Republic*

by Myung Chey**

The fundamental question of a revolution is to seize the reigns of government. Violence is a necessary means to eradicate the rule of the landlord and bourgeois class... In order to seize and consolidate political power, it is necessary to organize the army of our own class.

Cheng-chih kung-tso Chiang-shou ta-kang (November 25, 1933)

In all practical work of our party, correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of 'from the masses.' This means summing up, i.e., views scattered and unsystemic then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining them and popularizing them until the masses embrace [these] ideas as their own, stand up for them, and translate them into action by way of testing their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to sum up the views of the masses and once again take the resulting ideas back to the masses so that the masses give them their wholehearted support...and so on over and over again.

Mao Tse-tung (1943)

Actually the Soviet is a system of government which will enable the

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masses of people to participate directly in the policy-making process. The basic principle of soviet government is, therefore, to provide the workers, peasants, solidiers, and all toiling masses opportunities to participate in political processes and to express their own will.

Lo Fu (1933)

I. Introduction

This paper concerns the military organizational techniques of the Chinese Soviet Republic, as they emerged and took shape in the Soviet area of South-Central China, whose center was Kiangsi. Attempts will be made to analyse the military organizations of the Republic and its mass mobilization techniques in the Red Army expansion campaigns.

The organizational techniques of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Soviet Republic were the products of its unique experience of revolutionary struggle in the Soviet area. The crippling defeat of the CCP in 1927 brought the Communist movement close to annihilation. However, the debacle had led Mao Tse-tung and his associates to reassess the Party's approach to war and revolution and to pave the way for a new line of the peasantry emphasizing a combination of armed insurrection and agrarian revolution.

The principal policies formulated during this period primarily aimed at preserving the Soviet political system. Confronted with a series of "encirclement" campaigns launched by the Kuomintang (KMT) forces, the Chinese Soviet Republic like other revolutionary systems elsewhere in the world needed conscious efforts to survive. In order to survive, the Communist leaders headed by Mao Tse-tung adopted the organizational techniques of military mobilization and mass mobilization and

participation. These techniques were based on the principle of the "mass line." The principle means summing up the views of the masses then taking the resulting ideas back to them so that the masses give their wholehearted support to the Communist leadership. It is a set of techniques for arousing the masses. The Communist leaders learned the lesson that without mass support they could not survive.

In the history of the Chinese Communist movement, the Chinese Soviet Republic may be regarded as a failure, because the leaders of the Republic had no choice but to abandon their initial policies of agrarian revolution and armed insurrection in favor of an anti-Japanese united front and a new democracy. However, Mao's concept of the mass line and mass mobilization was first developed during the Kiangsi experience. And it became the foundation of the mass line politics during the Yen-an period as well as the post-1949 years.¹⁾

There are other reasons for analyzing the military organizations and mass mobilization of the Kiangsi era. We have two underlying hypotheses in this paper. The first hypothesis is that the Chinese Communist revolution was basically military in its character. The ultimate success of the movement was to be achieved by military means. In discussing the origins of Communist victory in China, therefore, the military aspects of the movement can hardly be neglected. The military organizations which took shape together with the policy of the Red Army

1) For the continuity of the mass line, see for example Mark Selden, "The Yen-an Legacy: The Mass Line," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969) pp. 99-151; and Ilpyong J. Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), p. 119. See also Mark Selden, *The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

expansion initiated during the Kiangsi period provided the Communist leaders with a rich experience. And this experience finally constituted a decisive factor in the ultimate success of communism in China. The second hypothesis is that China's basic social conflict was rural. The two opposing sides were the peasant masses and the landed upper class. To a certain extent, the agrarian revolution reflected intra party power relations. However, it was ultimately a means of exploiting the social conflict by differentiating the masses from the enemy class. The mass line policy was developed to win over the masses so that they might participate in the Red Army expansion and support the Party's leadership.

II. The Organizational Goal of the Chinese Soviet Republic

An organization must have three components: organizational goals, organizational techniques to achieve its goals, and members who have a certain degree of consensus on the goals and who work for the goals. These three components are closely interrelated.

The Kiangsi period witnessed the process in which the CCP as a political organization was pursuing the organizational goals of the Soviet revolution. In the Soviet area which was encircled by the KMT forces, the Communist leaders made relentless efforts to expand the peasant masses who were required to support their goals through the organizational techniques of the mass line. Therefore, it is necessary to review the organizational goals of the Chinese Soviet Republic before we discuss on its military organizations and its organizational techniques.

The ultimate goal of the CCP during the Kiangsi period was the achievement of a socialist revolution under the proletarian dictatorship. Since this was the ultimate goal, there were two short term goals that had to be pursued before the achievement of the ultimate goal. In the report delivered at the Central Executive Committee of the Second National Soviet Congress, Mao Tse-tung commented on the revolutionary situation in China.

The central factors in the present Chinese situation are widespread civil war, a life and death struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, and a sharp antagonism between the Soviet regime of workers and peasants and the landlord-bourgeois KMT regime.²⁾

In other words, Mao viewed China's revolutionary situation as being at the crucial stage of class struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. From this point of view, the CCP's basic line was decided upon. Namely, the basic line was aiming at destroying the encirclement campaigns of the KMT and to preserve and expand the Soviet political system. Mao continued:

The Soviet regime is now faced with the historic task of organizing and leading all the revolutionary masses... of mobilizing the broad worker-peasant masses to join the Red Army, of enlarging the local armed forces and guerilla units... of developing the class struggle along the working masses... of developing agrarian struggle of the peasants, of mobilizing the broad

2) Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui yü jen-min wei-yüan-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti pao-kao," *Hung-se Chung-hua* (Red China, hereafter cited as *HSCH*), Special Ed. of the Second National Soviet Congress, No. 3 (January 26, 1934). An extract of this report may be found in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 226-239.

peasant masses to fight for the acquisition and protection of the land, finally, calling upon all proletarian, peasant, and laboring masses of the soviet areas and throughout China to fight to the utmost and at all costs in the revolutionary war.³⁾

Thus, the basic line of the Party at this period was aimed at destroying the landlord-bourgeois KMT regime through revolutionary warfare and preserving and expanding the Soviet regime through class struggle. This means that China's revolutionary situation had been changed from a stage of "a crucial moment of the rising tide of revolution" into a stage of "revolutionary crisis."⁴⁾ Therefore, the techniques of military organizations and mass mobilization developed during the Kiangsi era must be understood within the context of the revolutionary situation which was perceived by Mao and his associates.

III. The Red Army Organizations

It was during the Kiangsi period that the Chinese Communist leaders acquired control of a definite geographic area of approximately 40 thousand square kilometers and a population of 12 to 15 million people.⁵⁾

3) *Ibid.*

4) Tso-liang Hsiao, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934: A Study of Documents* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 263-264.

5) The geographic extent and population of the Soviet area during the Kiangsi period varies from time to time. For the size of the territory, see "P'eng-p'eng p'o-p'o ti chung-kuo su-wei-ai yün-tung," *Hung-ch'i chou-pao* (Red Flag Weekly), No. 24 (November 27, 1931), in Nihon gokusai mondai kenkyujo (ed.), *Chugoku kyosanto shi shiryosu* (Collected Materials of the History of the Chinese Communist Party, hereafter cited as *Chugoku kyosanto shi*) (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1972), Vol. 5; pp. 352-353. For the population, see Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism*, p. 119. See also Trygve Lötveit, *Chinese Communism, 1931-1934: Experience in Civil Government* (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1973), pp. 8-9.

Therefore, the organizational goal of the Red Army was to preserve and expand the Soviet political system of workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship. And at the same time, the Communist leaders viewed the Red Army as the protector of the Soviet system and they identified its organization with the Soviet system itself.⁶⁾

According to the "Resolution on the Question of the Red Army," adopted at the First National Soviet Congress in November, 1931, "the Red Army is the most important protector of the Soviet regime. It is the class army and it is differentiated from the army of the KMT warlords and imperialism both in its tasks and spirit. The army of warlords and imperialism, being separated from the masses, is the tool of waging war of expanding colony in which the workers and peasants are oppressed. It is engaged in the war of aggression On the other hand, the Red Army is the army of the worker-peasant masses themselves and the armed forces of liberating the worker-peasant masses."⁷⁾

Therefore, the important and urgent task of the Chinese Soviet Republic during the Kiangsi period was the building of the Red Army. The Red Army of the Soviet area comprised two types of troops. One was the regular army, known as *Chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chün* (the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). The other was the local armed forces, consisting of the Red Guards, the Youth Vanguard, and the Red Army Recruit Corps.

Upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, then the chief of the po-

6) Ho Ch'ang, "Hung-chün ch'üan-kuo cheng-chih kung-tso hui-i," *Tou-cheng* (Struggle), Vol. 46 (February 9, 1934).

7) "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-nung-ping ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chüeh-i-an (November, 1931)," in *Chugoku kyosanto shi*, Vol. 5, p. 473.

litical commissars in the Red Army, the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated the "Provisional Organization Charter of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" in June, 1933. It is with the promulgation of this charter that the Red Army was reorganized under a unified system. The important contents of this unified organizational system of the Red Army can be summarized as follows: (1) for the first time, the heads of the Red Army units were fully empowered to command their respective units; (2) the relationships among various departments within the army units were clearly established; (3) branches of the army were institutionalized (e.g., the three-three system of the infantry divisions was adopted.); and (4) combat organizations of the lower level were strengthened.⁸⁾

However, it was in the local armed forces that the organizational techniques for mobilization of the masses were most significantly utilized, although the regular forces provided the local armed forces with the organizing leadership.

The Red Guards was perhaps the most important local armed forces. It was a kind of militia force consisting of worker-peasant labor masses. Unlike the regular forces, recruitment to the Red Guards was extended to all persons of ages between eighteen and forty regardless of sex. But those who were members of the Youth Vanguard were exempt from recruitment to the Red Guards.

The form of organization of the Red Guards was almost similar to that of the regular Red Army.⁹⁾ Each *hsien* had an army unit (*chün*).

8) Wang Chien-min, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao* (Historical Materials of the Chinese Communist Party, hereafter cited as *Chung-kung shih-kao*) (Taipei, 1965), Vol. 2, p. 451.

9) For the organization of the regular Red Army, see *ibid.*, pp. 451-452.

A division was organized in every three districts (*ch'ü*), a regiment in each district, and a battalion in each *hsiang*. A battalion was divided into two to five companies, each of which consisted of three platoons. Again a platoon was divided into three to five squads, each of which consisted of ten to fifteen persons. And in cities, workers were organized as independent workers' Red Guards.¹⁰⁾

The Red Guards kept a close link with the regular army and was subject to the military districts (*chün-ch'ü*) of the Red Army. The head of the *hsien* military department was concurrently the head of the Red-Guard army, and the secretary of the *hsien* Party committee was concurrently its political commissar. The heads of divisions were recruited among chiefs of certain *ch'ü* military department. The division political commissars were appointed by the political department of the military districts from secretaries of certain *ch'ü* Party committee.

The head of the district military department was concurrently the head of the Red Guards battalion and the secretary of the district Party committee held the portfolio of the political commissar of the battalion. The heads of the Red Guards companies, platoons, and squads were appointed by the *hsien* military department upon the recommendation of the district military department. All units had some political personnel at every level of the hierarchy.

In addition to being engaged in production work, the Red Guards were supposed to assist the activities of the regular forces and to work for the strengthening and developing of the Soviet areas. Particularly, the model divisions and battalions of the Red Guards frequently partic-

10) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan hui kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün wen-t'i hsün-ling," *HSCH*, No. 34 (September 20, 1932).

ipated in guerrilla activities without being engaged in production work. The lower cadres of the Red Guards organized local activists and trained them to join the regular army.

The Youth Vanguard of the Soviet area began to be organized under the leadership of the Communist Youth Corps soon after the Fourth Central Committee Plenum of January, 1931. At the end of 1931, the First Youth Vanguard Congress of the Soviet area was held and it passed two important documents concerning its role and organization. They were the "Character and Future Work of the Youth Vanguard of the Soviet Area" and the "Constitution of the Youth Vanguard of the Soviet Area."¹¹⁾

However, it was not until the adoption of the "Resolution Concerning the Youth Vanguard of the Soviet Area" by the Communist Youth Corps in June, 1932, that the role and task of the Youth Vanguard were more specified. And its organization and form were unified with the promulgation of the "Regulations Governing the Organization of all level Corps (Department) of the Youth Vanguard of the Soviet Area" in March, 1933.¹²⁾

The Youth Vanguard was an organization for militarizing the youth masses of worker-peasant labor class. It was a support organization of the Communist Youth Corps and a reserve force of the Red Army. The Youth Vanguard had three important tasks: first, to strengthen and expand the Red Army and to participate in the struggle of land revolution and anti-imperialism; second, to struggle for the particular demands of the youth and to defend the struggle of the youth; and third,

11) "Su-ch'ü shao-hsien-tui ko-chi tui-pu tsu-chih tiao-li(March 23, 1933)", in *Chugoku kyosanto shi* (1973), Vol. 6, p. 232.

12) *Ibid.*, pp. 232-234.

to engage in a broad Communist education.¹³⁾

The Youth Vanguarders were recruited not only from the working class youth and the poor and tenent peasant youth but also from the middle peasant youth. One can find the fact that by 1933 the Communist leaders had included the middle peasants into the camp of friends. In any event, young persons of ages between sixteen to twenty three were compelled to join the Youth Vanguarders.

The organizational principle of the Youth Vanguarders was that of centralism. The lower units were under the strict control of the higher units in its hierarchy. Although the battalion was the basic organizational unit of the Youth Vanguarders, the highest unit was the Central General Corps Department, under which the provincial corps department, the *hsien* corps department, the *ch'ü* corps department and the battalion department were hierarchically organized.¹⁴⁾

Like the Red Guards, the model battalion of the Youth Vanguarders was organized in each *ch'ü*. The model battalion carried out the Red Army's strategy, assisted the Red Army's military operation, engaged in guerrilla activities, consolidated the Soviet base, and made efforts to develop new Soviet areas.

The Red Army Recruit Corps was also a local armed force. Its main task was to fill vacancies in the regular army which was engaged in war in the front. It participated in the expansion campaigns of the Red Army and trained newly recruited Red Army soldiers. The Red Army Recruit Corps was developed through the recruiting experience of the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguarders. When the cadres of the Red

13) *Ibid.*, p. 232 (Art. 1).

14) For the organization of the Youth Vanguarders in detail, see *ibid.*, pp. 233-234. (Art. 6-9).

Guards trained its rank and file, they had them join the Red Army in close cooperation with the local "Support the Red Army Committee." Also, it was one of the Youth Vanguard's practices to have its rank and file enter the Red Army. These practices of the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard later developed into the organization of the Red Army Recruit Corps. By 1932, the Red Army Recruit Corps was organized in each *hsien*. The larger size of the corps had the scale of a regiment, the smaller one a company. In the Red Army Recruit Corps, the members had to receive a short term military and political education before joining the regular army.¹⁵⁾

For the Communist leaders during the Kiangsi period, to organize the local armed forces was to secure broad recruit sources of the Red Army. Therefore, the Communist Party branches of all levels had to strengthen the leadership in the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard. Particularly, they emphasized the Party's work toward model battalions of the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard. At that time, the Communist leaders set up a system of communication between the combat troops in the front and the masses in rear, especially the local armed forces. "The news of victories in the front and of lives of the Red soldiers must be at any time transmitted to the local masses, particularly to the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard. At the same time, by reflecting the situations of the rear area to the front, we must elevate more and more the Red soldiers' will to fight in the front and also heighten all the more the broad masses' support for the Red Army and

15) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui ti-shih-wu hao hsün-ling kuan-yü chi-hsu kai-tsao ti-fang su-wei-ai cheng-fu wen-t'i," *HSCH*, No. 35 (September 27, 1932) and Chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chün tsung cheng-chih-pu (ed.), *Chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chün* (July, 1932), pp. 7-8.

their enthusiasm to join the Red Army."¹⁶⁾ In short, the Communist leaders organized the local armed forces in order to mobilize the broad masses.

IV. The Red Army Expansion Campaigns and Mass Mobilization

Throughout the Kiangsi period, the Communist leaders were desperately concerned with the expansion of the Red Army. For the Communist leaders, in fact, one of the central tasks of the Soviet system was to lead and develop the revolutionary war. Therefore, all kinds of works had to be carried to win the war.¹⁷⁾ In the "Directive concerning the Question of Expansion of the Red Army" issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in September, 1932, the Communist regime expressed the importance of strengthening its military forces. "It is now a period of a revolutionary war. The Red Army is the field army which is engaged in military activities in the front. The Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard are not only the armed organizations of the broad masses, but also the defense and recruit forces that strengthen the Soviet district from which the Red Army soldiers are recruited. The regular forces of the Red Army is supposed to use military strength whereas the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard to reserve it."¹⁸⁾

16) "Kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün ti chüeh-i," *Tou-cheng* No. 19 (July 25, 1933).

17) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui ti-shih-wu hao hsün-ling kuan-yü chi-hsu kai-tsao ti-fang su-wei-ai cheng-fu wen-t'i," *HSCH*, No. 35 (September 27, 1932).

18) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün wen-t'i hsün-ling," *HSCH*, No. 34 (September 20, 1932).

In order to preserve the Soviet political system, the Kiangsi government gave a top priority to the policy of expanding the Red Army. The regime issued a number of directives and resolutions concerning the expansion of the Red Army and demanded that all personnel in the Party, the government, the army, and the mass organizations take the expansion movement into the most important and urgent consideration.

After the third "encirclement" campaign of the KMT forces in 1931, the Soviet regime launched a series of Red Army expansion campaigns aimed at recruiting "one million iron Red Army soldiers." In December, 1931, the Central Bureau of the CCP adopted a "Resolution on the Question of the Red Army Expansion." In September of the following year, the Soviet regime issued a directive on the expansion of the Red Army. It is with the issuance of this directive that the Soviet regime began to take a census and subsequently to organize the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard. Again in June, 1933, the Party's Central Bureau adopted a "Resolution Concerning the Expansion of the Red Army",¹⁹⁾ in which the mobilization of the workers' and the peasants' masses to join the Red Army was reemphasized.

It is in the field of the Red Army expansion movement that the Communist leaders most fully utilized their organizational techniques of mass mobilization. Since the Red Army was in reality "the armed forces of the masses themselves to lead the national revolutionary war against imperialism," the Soviet regime made incessant efforts to absorb and organize the worker-peasant masses in the Soviet area as

19) "Kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün ti chüeh-i," *Tou-cheng*, No. 19 (July 25, 1933).

well as the white area to join the Red Army.²⁰⁾

According to a directive concerning the expansion of the Red Army, issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the source of the Red Army consisted of the following elements: the broad worker-peasant masses in the Soviet district and all the toiling masses, the broad peasants and sufferers who had been exploited by the KMT, warlords, and landlords, the volunteer soldiers of anti-imperialism and anti-KMT, and again the revolutionary soldiers in the white army.²¹⁾

As Ho Ch'ang, then Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, reported, the social background of the Red Army soldiers in the First Front Army showed that the workers occupied 30 percent, the peasants 67 percent, the office workers 1.6 percent, and others 1.1 percent by September, 1933.²²⁾ This meant that 97 percent of the Red Army soldiers had been recruited from the working and peasant class. Therefore, it is quite natural that the Communist leaders utilized the organizational techniques of mass mobilization in their campaigns to expand the Red Army.

Among a series of the Red Army expansion campaigns, the first was launched in November, 1931. Two important resolutions concerning the Red Army expansion were adopted at the First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet District and at the First National Soviet

20) "Kuan-yü hung-chün wen-t'i chüeh-i ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui t'ung-kuo (January, 1934)," *HSCB*, No. 152 (February 20, 1934).

21) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün wen-t'i hsün-ling," *HSCB*, No. 34 (September 20, 1932).

22) Ho Ch'ang, "Hung-chün ch'üan-kuo cheng-chih kung-tso hui-i," *Tou-cheng*, No. 46 (February 9, 1934).

Congress respectively in November, 1931.²³⁾ The Red Army expansion movement began to be materialized with the adoption of these two resolutions.²⁴⁾

It is here that the quality as well as the quantity of the Red Army soldiers were emphasized. The resolutions put emphasis on political education and leadership in the army in order to raise the quality of the soldiers. To this end, the regime demanded the strengthening of the army units. And the position and role of political commissars were more clearly defined. Also, the relationship between the Party organization within the army units and independent political organization of the army was redefined.

According to the December 25th resolution on the expansion of the Red Army, the Party's Central Bureau specifically instructed the following: (1) during the first three months of 1932, the Red Army must recruit 15,000 new soldiers in Kiangsi and Minhsi (western part of Fukien), 3,000 in Hsiang-Kan (border area of Hunan and Kiangsi), and 5,000 in Hsiang-O-Kan (border area of Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi); (2) the Party branches, the Communist Youth Corps, and labor associations of all levels, and all the mass organizations must organize "the Red Army Support Committees." The basic task of the committee was to engage in the recruitment of the Red Army soldiers, to recognize the Red Army's services, to work for the Red Army, to practice "regulations governing the preferential treatment for the Red Army," and to assist the families of the Red Army soldiers. The committee

23) "Hung-chün wen-t'i chüeh-i-an su-ch'ü ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui t'ung-kuo," in *Chugoku kyosanto shi*, Vol. 5, pp. 429-434.

24) "Hung-chün k'uo-ta wen-t'i chüeh-i-an chung-yang-chü (December 25)," in *Chugoku kyosanto shi*, Vol. 5, pp. 528-531.

must be put under the control of the General Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Commission; (3) for the sake of the expansion of the Red Army, techniques of broad propaganda and agitation method must be utilized. In meetings, speeches, entertainments, and dramas, the victories of the Red Army must be propagated. The masses must be persuaded to join the Red Army. However, compulsory methods of recruitment may not be used. The voluntary joining of the Red Army may be recommended. In the work of the Red Army expansion, a strict class line must be maintained. People from landlord, rich peasant, and merchant class must not be allowed to enter the Red Army; (4) in the work of the Red Army expansion, efforts must be made to mobilize the masses and to have them assist the government's implementation of the resolutions governing preferential treatment for the Red Army; and (5) the members of the Party and corps must become the leaders of the Red Army expansion. They must work, as vanguards of the Red Army, for leading the worker and peasant masses so that the latter enter the Red Army.²⁵⁾

As indicated above, the techniques of mass mobilization was of primary importance in the expansion of the Red Army. The mass mobilization was further strengthened, as the expansion campaigns progressed. In the instruction concerning the question of the Red Army expansion, issued by the Central Executive Committee in September, 1932, the techniques of mass mobilization and political mobilization were further emphasized. The regime now ordered the reorganization and strengthening of the local armed forces. One can also find that the regime was moving toward the direction of adopting the conscription system rather

25) *Ibid.*

than the volunteer system.²⁶⁾

The techniques of mass mobilization in the expansion campaigns of the Red Army can be discussed in the following manner. The Communist leaders of the Kiangsi period decided that "all works must be subject to war and all energies must be concentrated on the development and strengthening of the revolutionary war."²⁷⁾ To this end, the Communist leaders made efforts to expand the Red Army through political mobilization. In this effort, they relied heavily on the method of propaganda and agitation, appealing to the revolutionary zeal of the masses. However, the method of persuasion was regarded as more important than that of compulsory order. In order to win the masses, the Communist leaders implemented a number of mobilization techniques. First, the Communist leaders decided it important to treat the Red Army soldiers and their families preferentially. A series of regulations governing the preferential treatment for them was promulgated, as will be discussed later. Second, the regime launched "the return-to-army campaigns" to the Red Army men who had for some reason deviated from the service. Third, the regime prohibited the decampment of the Red Army soldiers. Fourth, in order to promote the Red Army expansion work, the Communist leaders utilized the method of political propaganda and education through various meetings such as electorate meetings, *hsiang* delegate meetings, and meetings of the Red Guards, Youth Vanguards, labor unions, and poor peasant corps. Fifth, they strengthened the organizations of the local armed forces.

In December, 1933, the Central Military Committee of the CCP

26) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün wen-t'i hsün-ling," *HSCH*, No. 34 (September 29, 1932).

27) *Ibid.*

launched a shock attack campaign (t'u-chi yün-tung) of the Red Army expansion and ordered all units of the military to organize "dash teams (t'u-chi tui)." The Central Committee determined the number of the new recruits according to the population of each province under control. The Central Committee ordered the "dash teams" to recruit 25,000 new soldiers in the entire Soviet district by the end of 1933: the Kiangsi province, 13,400; the Fukien province, 4,600; the Yüehkan province, 4,000; the Juichin, 1,500.²⁸⁾

The goal of the Red Army expansion campaigns lay in the enlargement of the Red Army enrollment. Therefore, it is important to find out the total number of new recruits. Unfortunately, however, only bits of information concerning it are found. According to Mao Tse-tung in his report to the Second National Soviet Congress, approximately 20,000 new soldiers had been recruited in some *hsien* of the central Soviet district during a month period of May, 1933. Particularly, in Ch'ang-kang *hsiang* of Kiangsi which was a model *hsiang*, 320 out of 407 male persons between sixteen to forty-five years of age had been recruited to the Red Army (80%). And in Shang-tsai-chi *hsiang* of Fukien which was also a model *hsiang*, 485 out of 554 male persons had been recruited (88%).²⁹⁾ Considering the fact that these two *hsiang* were models, one can presume that other areas did not meet the record of these two cases.

In an article in *Hung-hsing Pao* (Red Star Journal) of August, 1934,

28) "Chung-hua chün-wei k'uo-ta hung-chün t'u-chi yün-tung ti chi-hua," *HSCH*, No. 132 (December 5, 1933).

29) Mao, "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui yü jen-min wei-yüan-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti pao-kao."

it was reported that families of the Red Army soldiers had occupied over half of the total population.³⁰⁾ From this information, one may assume that an overwhelming majority of male persons between sixteen to forty-five years of age had been recruited during the Kiangsi period. The shock attack campaigns of the Red Army expansion was quite successful, although the actual number of new recruits did not meet the planned number.³¹⁾

Again in *Hung-hsing Pao* of July, 1934, one may find statistics of the Red Army expansion from August, 1933, to July, 1934.

Table I The Number of the Red Army's New Recruit
(August, 1933--July, 1934)

August, 1933	6,290	March	5,865
September	5,868	April	2,970
October	2,214	May	23,035
November	1,958	June	29,688
December, 1933~		July	2,450
January, 1934	23,258	Others	5,467
February	5,865	Total	112,105

Source: *Hung-hsing Pao*, No. 54 (July 20, 1934), p. 5.

As the Table I indicates, the number of new recruits was radically increased in December, 1933, and January, 1934, and April and May, 1934. The radical increase was due to the shock attack campaigns of the Red Army expansion. The degree of success of the shock attack campaigns varied from place to place. However, most successful places were Hsing-kuo *hsien* and Juichin.³²⁾

30) Liang Po-t'ai, "Yu-hung kung-tso ti chien-yueh yü nei-pu ti kung-tso," *Hung-hsing pao* (Red Star Journal), No. 57 (August 8, 1934), p. 5.

31) Wang, *Chung-kung shih-kao*, Vol. 2, p. 487.

32) "Kuan-yü chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chün yu-tai t'iao-chien chüeh-i (November, 1931)," in *Chugoku kyosanto shi*, Vol. 5, pp. 478-481.

During the Kiangsi period, the expansion campaigns of the Red Army also affected the local armed forces. Although the total size of the local armed forces at this period is not known, interesting statistics of the dash campaigns to expand the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard is found in *Tou-cheng*. In February, 1934, the Kiangsi Communist regime launched a month and a half shock attack campaign to expand the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard. The original goal for recruitment and its result are as follows:

Table II The Original Goal for Recruitment of the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard (March 1, 1934—April 15, 1934)

Area	The Red Guards	Model Battalion
Kiangsi	250,000	45,000
Yüehkan	50,000	10,000
Fukien	50,000	10,000
Chienlitai	4,000	1,000
Juichin	10,000	2,500
Total	364,000	67,500
	The Youth Vanguard	Model Battalion
Kiangsi	250,000	25,000
Yüehkan	40,000	7,000
Fukien	40,000	7,000
Chienlitai	1,500	500
Juichin	90,000	1,500
Total	340,500	41,000

Source: "Kuan-yü chung-yang su-ch'ü ch'ih-shao-tui t'u-chi yün-yung ti chüeh-ting," *Tou-cheng*, No. 49 (March 2, 1934), p. 3.

As the Table II indicates, the regime had originally planned to recruit 364,000 into the Red Guards, 67,500 into the model battalions, 340,500 into the Youth Vanguard and 41,000 into the model battalions during the shock attack campaigns to expand the local armed forces.

Table III The Result of Recruitment of the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguard in Percentage

Area	The Red Guards	Model Battalion
Kiangsi	67.5%	64.5%
Fukien	98.0	119.0
Yüehkan	122.0	114.0
Juichin	113.0	116.0
Chienlitai	50.0	20.0
	The Youth Vanguard	Model Battalion
Kiangsi	47.5%	64.1%
Fukien	82.7	114.4
Yüehkan	79.2	83.8
Juichin	119.4	101.5
Chienlitai	115.6	73.2

Source: "Ch'ih-shao-tui t'u-chi yün-tung ti tsung-chieh yü hung wu-yüeh tung-yüan," *Tou-cheng*, No. 57 (April 28, 1934), p. 1.

According to the Table III, about 90 percent of the original plan was achieved. This was a higher achievement compared with other expansion campaigns of the Red Army.

With the launching of a series of the Red Army expansion campaigns, the Communist leaders decided it necessary to gain support from the Red Army soldiers and their families. As explained above, there developed a policy of gaining support from the rank and file of the Red Army and their families. It was the policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families.

In the Red Army expansion movement, the Communist leaders utilized not only the policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families but the policies of prevention of escape from the military service and of "the return-to-the-Army." However, it was in the preferential treatment policy that methods of gaining support from the

masses were most applied.

The policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers and their families was first decided in the First National Soviet Congress of November, 1931, when the Congress adopted the "Regulations Governing the Preferential Treatment for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."³³⁾ Again in January, 1934, the Central Committee of the CCP and Central People's Committee jointly reached a decision on the preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families and in February, the Central People's Committee issued a "Regulation Governing the Preferential Treatment for the Red Army Soldiers' Families."³³⁾ This regulation was a kind of supplementary provision to the January decision and the "Saturday Regulations Governing the Preferential Treatment for the Red Army Soldiers' Families" which was also adopted in January, 1934. And in February, 1934, the Central People's Committee promulgated a supplementary "Ploughing Team Regulation Governing the Red Army Soldiers' Families." In any case, with issuance of a series of regulations governing the preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families, a number of privileges were given to the families of the Red Army soldiers.

The policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army families were of course designed to arouse support from the masses, since by 1934 the majority of the population under Communist control consisted of the Red Army families. The following is a review of some important privileges which were enjoyed by the families.

First, the Red Army families during the soldiers' active service were

33) "Yu-tai hung-chün chia-hsu t'iao-li (February 8, 1934)," in *ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 140-143.

provided with labor force for ploughing, if the families had no laboring power or were lacking it. For this purpose, the government organized "ploughing teams," consisting of persons of ages between sixteen and fifty-five, "sundry work teams" that helped the Red Army families with sundry works, and "inspection teams." The inspection teams were supposed to investigate the life of the soldiers' families and to supervise the implementation of the preferential treatment for the Red Army families.³⁴⁾

Second, during the soldiers' active service, the families were exempt from all taxes levied by the Soviet government.³⁵⁾ Third, during the soldiers' active service, children of the soldiers were free from all educational fees.³⁶⁾ Fourth, the Red Army soldiers' families could buy any goods from government owned shops and cooperatives at a discount rate of 5 percent.³⁷⁾

In order to implement the policy and work of the preferential treatment for the Red Army families, the Soviet government established special sections at all levels of administration. These sections worked in close coordination with the CCP, the Red Guards, the Youth Vanguard, and the mass organizations such as poor peasant corps. In short, the preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families was a policy to mobilize and agitate the masses so that they would support the Soviet system.³⁸⁾

34) "Yu-tai hung-chün chia-hsu keng-t'ien-tui t'iao-li (February 8, 1934)," in *ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

35) "Yu-tai hung-chün chia-hsu t'iao-li," Art. 2.

36) "Kuan-yü chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chün yu-tai t'iao-chien chuch-i (November, 1931)," Art. 6.

37) *Ibid.*, Art. 11.

38) "Kuan-yü k'uo-ta hung-chün ti chüeh-i," *Tou-cheng*, No. 19 (July 25, 1933), pp. 2-5.

V. Conclusion

During the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Communists attempted to secure the support of local masses for the preservation and the expansion of the Soviet system. In fact, this was only possible when the masses give their support to the system. For the Communists at that time, the fundamental question of a revolution was to seize the reigns of government. Faced with a series of the "encirclement" campaigns launched by the KMT forces, the realistic and primary goal of the Communists was the destruction of the KMT forces. And this had to be achieved prior to the realization of a socialist revolution under the proletarian dictatorship which was their long term goal. Therefore, all efforts of the Communists were placed upon the realization of the short term goal.

The Communists came to realize that their short term goal could be only achieved through revolutionary warfare and class struggle. To achieve this goal, they had to mobilize the masses and then to have the mobilized masses join the Red Army. In the mobilization of the masses and the subsequent building of the army, the Communists had to rely on the principle of the mass line. We have not discussed the mass line as such. However, it was the principle of leadership as well as the method of mass mobilization. Without it, the expansion movement of the Red Army would have not succeeded. After the Long March, the Communists changed their initial policies of armed insurrection (revolutionary warfare) and agrarian revolution (class struggle) in favor of an anti-Japanese united front and a new democracy. However, this did not mean that the organizational techniques of the Communists

during the Kiangsi period had failed.

First of all, the expansion movement of the Red Army was a success in itself. The Communists were able to mobilize an overwhelming majority of the local male adults into the Red Army. Second, the organizational principle of the mass line developed during the Kiangsi era became one of the foundations of the Communist politics in the Yen-an and the post-1949 period. Third, the adoption of the anti-Japanese united front did not mean that the Communists gave up their revolutionary strategy of armed insurrection. In fact, the great contribution of the Kiangsi period was the discovery of concrete methods for linking mass mobilization, and therefore participation, with the expansion of the Red Army and subsequently with the guerrilla warfare. Without the organizational techniques of the Red Army, the Communists might have been completely annihilated by the fifth "encirclement" campaign of the KMT forces and even the Long March would perhaps have never been possible.

"Political power grows out of a barrel of a gun." This is an often quoted famous dictum of Mao Tse-tung. Mao must have learned this even before the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Without the successful Red Army expansion through mass mobilization, however, Mao would have not gained "a barrel of a gun" sufficient to preserve the Soviet system. In spite of a series of setbacks and subsequent changes of their policies, there is no doubt that the techniques of military organizations and the policies of the Red Army expansion developed during the Kiangsi era provided the Communists with a precious experience which finally paved the way for the survival and victory of Communism in China.