

【연구논문】

The Determinants of Divided Government in the United States: Implications for the Case of Korea

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Introduction

Divided government¹⁾ in Korea has occurred several times since the 1988 National Assembly election. Although there are little systematic studies on the determinants and consequences of divided government in Korea, the issue itself has the potential to be controversial and explosive. For instance, President Roh Moo Hyun, recently proposing a coalition government with the major opposition party, pointed out the “ineffectiveness of policy makings (or governing processes) under split-party control of the executive and legislative branches of government”, and ascribed the causes of divided government and its gridlock to “regionalism”, which is reinforced by an “abnormal” electoral system. It is quite understandable that a president aspires to oversee effective

1) By divided government, I refer to the situation where different political parties control different branches of government. Thus, divided government occurs when no single party controls both the executive and legislative branches of government simultaneously. In the US, divided government refers to a broader situation where the president's party fails to control a majority in at least one house of the legislature.

governing processes, and to reform the abnormal electoral system to be normal (no matter how the terms of normal and abnormal are defined). Nevertheless, it sounds strange because President Roh's party captured a majority in the National Assembly election held on April 15, 2004 for the first time in twenty years.²⁾ Furthermore, President Roh's notion of the causes and effects of divided government is controversial at best and awaits corroboration by empirical evidence. Indeed, divided government occurs much more widely than is often thought in other presidential and semi-presidential systems, such as the United States³⁾ and Ireland.⁴⁾ Structural factors are not the only determinant of divided government.⁵⁾ Divided government is not always straightforwardly ineffective.⁶⁾ And unified government is not a necessary condition for

2) The president's party, which had only 49 seats in the outgoing assembly, tripled its representation in the National Assembly, winning 152 seats, three seats more than a simple majority. This was an astonishing victory for the president's party and marks the first time in twenty years that the president's party won the majority status in the National Assembly. For more details, see Table 5.

3) According to one study (Alen Ware, 'Divided Government in the United States', In Robert Elgie, eds, *Divided Government in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 21-22. Between the elections of 1836 and 2000 in the US there were eighty-two national elections. Of these elections, thirty-five (or 43 percent of the total) results in the presidency being held by one party while control of one or both chambers of the Congress is held by the other major party. In the years of 1948 to 2000 divided government occurred even more frequently than in the 19th century — of these twenty-six elections, sixteen (or 62 percent of the total) produced divided government.

4) Elgie, *Divided Government in Comparative Perspective*.

5) David Mayhew, *Divided We govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946~1990* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Morris Fiorina, *Divided Government* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1992); Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

6) Charles O. Jones, 'Separating to Govern: The American Way', In Byron E. Shafer, eds, *Present Discontents: American Politics in the Very Late Twentieth Century* (Chatham: Chatham House, 1997); Paul J. Quirk and Bruce Nesmith, 'Divided Government and Policy Making: Negotiating the Laws', In Michael Nelson, eds, *The Presidency and the Political System* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,

high output in government.⁷⁾

The current studies on the determinants of divided government in the United States, where it occurs frequently, allows me to draw some implications from a comparative perspective for a better understanding of the case of divided government in Korea. To that end, this paper begins with a review of the theories that account for the determinants of divided government in the United States. Then, I present my own hypothesis and a statistical model, by which I account for divided government, especially under Clinton presidency. Next, I demonstrate that the divided government that results from the 1994 and 1998 mid-term elections is caused by voters' motivations to induce moderate policy outcomes by instituting a balance in power between the executive and legislative branches of government. Finally, I wrap up the paper with a discussion of the implications of my results for studying divided government in Korea.

Competing Explanations of Divided Government in the United States

Divided government in the United States has occurred over six out

1995); Sean Q. Kelly, 'Divided We Govern: A Reassessment', *Polity* 25(1993), pp. 475-84; Sarah A. Binder, 'The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96', *American Political Science Review*, 93(1999), pp. 519-33; William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Rieman, 'Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-1994', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25(2000), pp. 285-312.

7) Key, V.O., Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1964); Randall Ripley, *Majority Party Leadership in Congress* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969); James Sundquist, 'Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States', *Political Science Quarterly*, 103(1989), pp. 613-35.

Table 1. Unified/Divided Party Control of Government in the U.S., 1945~2005

Year	President	House	Senate	Unified/Divided
1945-1947	Truman (D)	D	D	Unified
1947-1949		R	R	Divided
1949-1951		D	D	Unified
1951-1953		D	D	Unified
1953-1955	Eisenhower (R)	R	R	Unified
1955-1957		D	D	Divided
1957-1959		D	D	Divided
1959-1961		D	D	Divided
1961-1963	Kennedy (D)	D	D	Unified
1963-1965	Johnson (D)	D	D	Unified
1965-1967		D	D	Unified
1967-1969		D	D	Unified
1969-1971	Nixon (R)	D	D	Divided
1971-1973		D	D	Divided
1973-1975	Nixon/Ford (R)	D	D	Divided
1975-1977		D	D	Divided
1977-1979	Carter (D)	D	D	Unified
1979-1981		D	D	Unified
1981-1983	Reagan (R)	D	R	Divided-House
1983-1985		D	R	Divided-House
1985-1987		D	R	Divided-House
1987-1989		D	D	Divided
1989-1991	Bush (R)	D	D	Divided
1991-1993		D	D	Divided
1993-1995	Clinton (D)	D	D	Unified
1995-1997		R	R	Divided
1997-1999		R	R	Divided
1999-2001		R	R	Divided
2001-2003	Bush, George W. (R)	R	D*	Divided-Senate
2003-2005		R	R	Unified

D = Democratic Party; R = Republican Party

* Initially, the Senate was tied, but Democrats took control of the Senate after Senator James Jeffords from Vermont left the Republican Party and became an Independent.

of every ten years since 1981. As Walter Dean Burnham⁸⁾ points out, “probably the most important, single, structural feature of the new political order is divided government as a *normal condition*.” Indeed, as Table 1 shows, since 1945 the U.S. government has been under divided control for 38 years (63%).

There is a broad consensus that divided government is a function of “declining party saliency in the electorates”,⁹⁾ “increasing number of partisan independents”,¹⁰⁾ and their increased “ticket splitting”.¹¹⁾

More precisely, given that the paired pattern of government — Democratic House and Republican president — has been prevalent with the only exception of the 1994 and 1998 midterm election, “issue ownership” theory posits that the House has been locked by benefits of Democrats and the presidency has been secured by Republicans.¹²⁾ In

8) Walter Dean Burnham, ‘The Legacy of George Bush: Travails of an Understudy’, In Gerald Pomper, ed, *The Election of 1992* (Chatham, NJ: Catham House, 1993).

9) Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952~1980* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); John H. Aldrich, *Why parties? : The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

10) Larry M. Batels, ‘Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952~1996’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(2000), pp. 35-50.

11) The two major parties as of now are homogenized and partisan much more than a decade ago. Also split-ticket voting is no longer salient. In fact, only 59 of the 435 congressional districts went in different directions in presidential and House elections in 2004. In the remaining districts, voters either backed both President Bush and the Republican House candidate or John F. Kerry and the Democratic House candidate. In 2000, there were 86 such “split-ticket” districts, and in 1992 and 1996, there were more than 100 such districts (cf. *Washington Post*, March 29, 2005). Also see Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald, and Thomas L. Brunell, ‘A New Look at Split-Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model’, *The Journal of Politics*, 62(2000), pp. 34-50; Walter R. Mebane, Jr., ‘Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections’, *American Political Science Review*, 94(2000), 37-57; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, ‘A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting’, *American Political Science Review*, 92 (1998), pp. 533-544.

this line of explanation, the results of the 1994 and 1998 elections are counterfactuals because the previous pattern of controlling over the branches of government by the two parties are reversed.

The other possible lines of explanation of divided government are “surge and decline” theory, “negative voting” theory, and “balancing motivation” theory. These theories seem in general applicable to the results of the 1994 and 1998 elections, since they do not assume any fixed set of governing patterns by the two parties. First, according to surge and decline theory, or coattail voter theory, the outcome of a midterm election is largely a reflection of the outcome of the preceding presidential election. The more seats a party wins in the House in on-year elections as a result of presidential coattails, the more seats it loses two years later in off-year elections when those coattails are normally no longer present.¹³⁾

Second, negative voting theory, or angry voter theory, is based on the notion that a midterm election is a referendum on the state of the economy and the overall performance of incumbent president. It posits that the more dissatisfied voters are with economic conditions and the president's overall performance, the more seats the president's party loses. This result in large part from a function of turnout: dissatisfied members of the president's party are less likely to participate in the off-year election; while dissatisfied members of the opposition party

12) Gary Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946~1988* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

13) James E. Campbell and Joe A. Sumners, 'Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections', *American Political Science Review*, 84(1990), pp. 513-24; Albert D. Cover, 'Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections', *Western Political Quarterly*, 38(1985), pp. 606-19; Alan I. Abramowitz, Albert D. Cover, and Helmut Norpoth, 'The President's Party in Midterm Elections: Going from Bad to Worse', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(1986), pp. 562-576.

are more likely to go to the polls to punish the incumbent president and his party.¹⁴⁾

Third, another line of explanation is the balancing thesis. Fiorina¹⁵⁾ posits that some voters appreciate Madisonian government, in which the two branches of government, executive and legislative, should be in balance in power and ideally controlled by the two different parties that push for distinct policy alternatives. Given this condition, policy outcomes must be a compromise between the positions taken by the president's party and the party controlling Congress. For example, some voters may choose to vote for a Republican presidential candidate who is actually farther from their own issue positions than the Democratic presidential candidate. Voters do this because policy outcomes, given the Democratic control over the Congress, would be far left of their ideal issue positions if a Democratic presidential candidate were to win the election. These voters believe that voting for a Republican presidential candidate cancels out or balances the impact of a Democratic Congress and brings the policy outcomes closer to their ideal point. In sum, self-conscious, calculative voters may cast their ballots based on the prospect for moderate policy outcomes that are more likely to result from the balance in power between the executive and legislative branches of government.

14) Edward R. Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', *American Political Science Review*, 69 (1975), pp. 812-26; Richard Lau, 'Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in Political Behavior', *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(1985), pp. 119-38.

15) Fiorina, *Divided Government*.

Elaboration on Policy Balancing Thesis

Lacy¹⁶⁾ brings in a conceptual innovation, by which “intentional voting” in the policy balancing model can be substantiated with empirical evidence. He demonstrates that certain voters are “unconditionally” Republicans (or Democrats) but “conditionally” not Republicans (or nor Democrats). In other words, a voter’s partisan preference for a candidate in one election is “conditioned” by or “nonseparable” from his/her partisan preference for another candidate in another election. “Conditional” and/or “nonseparable” preference makes it possible to fashion the “induced” preferences: a voter’s reaction to prospective election results in one institutional dimension is inherently induced by his/her preference of partisan options in another institutional dimension. For example, partisan control over the presidential office provides “balancing cues” to some voters, especially those who prefer moderate policy outcomes under divided government to extreme ones under unified government. Smith and associates¹⁷⁾ insist that:

Neither party identification nor any other indicator of unconditional partisan preference can capture the full array of partisan judgments that some citizens undertake in the course of voting for candidates in a single institution. For some voters, the institutional balance is important, and partisan preference is two-dimensional.

Although an individual’s party identification is considered immovable,

16) Dean Lacy, ‘Electoral Support for Tax Cuts: A case Study of the 1980 American Presidential Election’, *American Politics Quarterly*, 26(1998), pp. 288-302.

17) Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce, and L.M. Overby, ‘Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(1999), pp. 737-764, p.753.

it does not necessarily suggest that every party identifier always votes along partisan lines. Evidence shows that ticket splitters are not only partisan independents but also party identifiers. Therefore, some voters might choose a House candidate, given partisan control over the presidential office, with the intention to bring about moderate policy outcomes, a middle point between the two parties' policy positions.

Taking Turnout Choice into Consideration

Another causal factor necessary for accounting for divided government is turnout. Previous studies explain midterm slippage of the president's party in terms of turnout effects. The question is what part of the electorate is mobilized and goes to the polls.

Abstention of coattail voters is emphasized by surge and decline theory. Surge and decline theory emphasizes a big drop in turnout rates in midterm elections as a factor, explaining the loss of House seats of the president's party. The surge in support for the president's party occurs in presidential election years.¹⁸⁾

On the other hand, negative voting theory focuses on the turnout of angry voters. More specifically, negative voting theory emphasizes that the more angry a voter is with the incumbent party, the more he/she tends to turnout and vote against it in order to punish that party. In

18) Richard Born, 'Surge and decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(1990), pp. 615-645; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XIX(1994), pp. 95-129; Albert D. Cover, 'Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections', *Western Political Quarterly*, 389(1985), pp. 606-19.

reality, positive sentiment is a less potent force in attracting voters than is an equal intensity of dislike and anger. Table 2 summarizes the patterns of turnout and vote choice assumed by both models.

Table 2. Turnout Choice and Vote Choice

		On-yearElection	Off-yearElection
NormalVoter		no difference	
Peripheral Voter	AngryVoter (NegativeVotingThesis)	-	Angry voter: turnout for the out-party Positive voter: abstention
	CoattailVoter (Surge&DeclineThesis)	In-Party	Abstention
	BalancingVoter (PolicyModerationThesis)	Out-party	Out-party

Therefore, turnout or abstention of certain groups of voters plays a crucial role in making election outcomes different. Taking turnout/abstention into consideration, voters can be divided into two categories, habitual voters and marginal voters. Habitual voters refer to partisan voters who regularly go to the polls in order to secure their partisan interests or whatever stakes they consider to be necessary and important. By contrast, marginal voters, being less consistent voters or lacking congruence with partisan interests, tend to turnout when issues or candidates are salient and impressive enough to draw their attention. Concerning vote choice, habitual voters are likely to cast a straight ticket for a single party, while marginal voters are more likely to split their tickets into two parties. Balancing voters, defined as voters who intentionally vote a split ticket in order to achieve moderating policy outcomes in government policy making, are likely to be marginal voters.

In sum, partisan election outcomes are the function of how many of marginal voters actually go to the polls and to what extent they actually split their tickets, given the habitual voters' partisan choices. Consequently, divided government is largely determined by the effects of the marginal voters' turnout and their choice, holding distribution of habitual voters constant.

Setting turnout as an important factor in mid-term elections, citizens have three options to choose in a mid-term election, abstention, in-party voting, and out-party voting. This assumes that the utilities of all three options are jointly and simultaneously considered. Previous researches, however, fail to include abstention as a choice set into a single statistical equation.¹⁹⁾ What is necessary in constructing an empirical model on the midterm election outcomes is to treat abstention as a choice set like partisan choices.

Construction of the Statistical Model

Several statistical models can account for the case of three choice options of the dependent variable. First, a "Multinomial logit model" assumes that all the choice options are independent and equally distanced from one another (a property known as *Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives* [IIA]).²⁰⁾ That is, the odds of favoring any one option over a second would not be altered by the availability of the

19) Born, "Surge and decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis".

20) G.S. Maddala, *Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

remaining alternative. This indicates, however, that the IIA assumption of a Multinomial logit model does not account for the fact that Republican and Democratic ballots should be closer substitutes for one another than for abstention.

Given this problem, a “Nested multinomial logit” model appears more appropriate for capturing the features of the dependent variable. This model assumes that the first choice is made between 1 and {2, 3}. The second choice is made between 2 and 3 if the first choice was {2, 3}, or the second choice is unnecessary if the first one was 1. Thus, the choice set is organized into an hierarchical structure where more similar options are nested together, and the error terms of the nested options are assumed to be different from a non-nested choice option.

The “Constrained Multinomial logit model” is another way that accounts for three alternative choices in the dependent variable. This model allows us to account for different effects of each independent variable on the subset of choice opinions in the dependent variable. In this model, a choice is made among {1,2,3}, but some independent variables are expected to affect the subset of choice options and other independent variables are expected to affect a full set of choice options. Thus we can sort out independent variables into vote choice variables and turnout choice variables. Then we can generate two parameters per independent variable. Both parameters are calculated with reference to a choice opinion of the dependent variable as a default category. A parameter of turnout choice represents an independent variable’s effect in altering the utility of abstention relative to the utility of an in-party vote. At the same token, a parameter of the vote choice reflects the effects of an independent variable in changing the utility of the out-party vote relative to the utility of the in-party vote. It should be

noted that since the turnout variables are to be constrained to have the same effects both for in-party votes and out-party votes, only one parameter indicating the difference between abstention and participation (including in-party and out-party votes) is to be estimated.

Data and Measures

I examine the 1994 and 1998 National Election Studies (NES) data. Five sets of independent variables — principal political attitudes, coattail factors, negative emotional factors, sociotropic and pocketbook factors, and balancing motivation factors — are tapped. Variables and coding schemes are presented as follows.

Principal Political Attitudes

PID: Party Identification: 0 = strong Democrat, 1 = weak Democrat, 2 = Democratic Leaner, 3 = Independent, 4 = Republican Leaner, 5 = weak Republican, 6 = strong Republican.

I_PID: Intensity of Party Identification: 3 = strong Democrat and Republican, 2 = weak Democrats and Republican, 1 = Leaner, 0 = Independent.

Coattail factors

FEEL_PRE: Feeling Thermometer for the president; this variable is collapsed into three categories: 1=0~50, 2=51~75, 3=76~100.

Negative Emotional factor

ANGER_PRE: Whether one feels anger toward the president; 0 = never, 1 = yes.

Sociotropic and Pocketbook factors

NAT_ECO: Perceived National Economic Conditions; 1 = gotten better,

3 = stayed the same, 5=gotten worse.

PER_ECO: Personal Financial Situation; 1 = gotten better, 3 = stay the same, 5 = gotten worse.

Balancing Moderation factors

DIS_DEM_REP: Perceived distance between the Democratic Party's ideological position and the Republican Party's ideological position. It ranges from 0 to 6.

CARE_HOU: Care about the results of the House election; 1 = not at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = pretty much, 4 = very much.

POL_SOPH: Political sophistication: This variable is comprised of eight questions. Three asks about the job positions of three politicians and the other five questions ask about the issue positions taken by the two parties. In the question of job position, the answer is assigned a 1 if right, or 0 if wrong. In the case of issue positions, if a respondent positions the Republican Party onto the right side of the Democratic Party or at least the same position with the Democratic Party, then he/she is assigned a 1, and for all others a 0. A respondent can have a maximum of eight right answers, with the variable ranging from 0 to 8.

PREF_DIV: Preference for the partisan control over the branches of government; 1 = unitary control by one party, 3 = doesn't matter, 5 = split control by two parties.

Preliminary Analysis

Before executing the multivariate analysis, I conduct preliminary analyses to examine the basic characteristics of the groups of voters,

non-voters, and partisans in terms of the explanatory variables mentioned above. Table 4 shows that there are salient differences between voters and non-voters across the variables. In general, voters both in the 1994 and 1998 elections are stronger partisans, more politically sophisticated, more likely to feel angry toward the president, and perceive bigger differences between the two parties than non-voters. These characteristics of voters are consistent with the expectations.

In another way, there are differences between the 1994 and 1998 electorates. First, voters in the 1994 election are more likely to care about the results of the House election than non-voters while voters in the 1998 election are less likely to care about the results of the House election than non-voters. This implies that the decision on whether to go to the polls is not determined by the level of concern about House election outcomes.

Second, non-voters in the 1994 election are significantly more likely than voters to perceive that national economic conditions are worse. By contrast, there is no such difference in the 1998 election. This result does not support the prediction that an individual, who has the perception that national economic conditions are worse, is more likely to go to the polls in order to punish the incumbent party.

Third, when it comes to one's personal economic situation, there is no difference between non-voters and voters in the 1994 election. Yet, voters in the 1998 election are more likely than non-voters to report that their personal financial situation is worse. It suggests that the 1998 election is more likely to be influenced by personal private economic conditions than the 1994 election.

Table 3. Voters versus Non-Voters

	1994			1998		
	Mean		$p < t $	Mean		$p < t $
	Non-voters	Voters		Non-voters	Voters	
PID	2.77 (1.89)	3.04 (2.27)	0.008	2.59 (1.84)	2.73 (2.26)	0.243
L_PID	1.65 (0.96)	2.07 (0.94)	0.000	1.63 (0.94)	2.08 (0.93)	0.000
CARE_HOU	2.77 (1.59)	3.12 (1.16)	0.000	2.75 (0.92)	1.95 (0.86)	0.000
FEEL_PRE	2.64 (1.52)	2.60 (1.62)	0.597	2.99 (1.65)	2.77 (1.69)	0.020
ANGER_PRE	0.43 (0.62)	0.52 (0.49)	0.001	0.49 (0.50)	0.68 (0.47)	0.000
NAT_ECO	3.01 (1.55)	2.63 (1.57)	0.000	2.34 (1.44)	2.35 (1.43)	0.900
PER_ECO	2.83 (1.65)	2.85 (1.56)	0.783	2.27 (1.57)	2.75 (1.80)	0.000
POL_SOPH	2.15 (1.14)	3.00 (1.13)	0.000	2.71 (1.50)	3.39 (1.27)	0.000
DIS_DEM_REP	2.04 (1.64)	2.76 (1.49)	0.000	2.37 (0.07)	2.69 (1.34)	0.000
PREF_DIV	0.08 (1.21)	1.66 (1.93)	0.000	3.26 (1.34)	2.94 (1.33)	0.000

Source: The 1994 and 1998 American National Election Studies

Note: Entries are means with the standard deviation in parentheses; *t*-ratio reported is the result of a two-tailed test.

Fourth, while non-voters in the 1998 election feel more favorable toward the president at a statistically significant level, I do not find such a difference in the 1994 election. This suggests that coattail factors in the 1994 election may be a bigger factor than in the 1998 elections in determining turnout.

Table 3 shows the partisan differences across the explanatory variables. Republican voters in the two elections are less likely to feel favorable toward president Clinton, more likely to be angry at him, and perceive the national economics to be getting worse. Also Republican voters in the 1994 election who care more about the House election, are politically sophisticated, and perceive a big difference between the two parties are more likely to prefer divided government to unitary control over the government. But this pattern is not found in the 1998 voters.

Table 4. Democratic Voters versus Republican Voters

	1994			1998		
	Mean		$p < t $	Mean		$p < t $
	Democrats	Republicans		Democrats	Republicans	
PID	1.53 (1.71)	4.39 (1.82)	0.000	1.38 (1.65)	3.97 (2.03)	0.000
I_PID	2.05 (0.95)	2.09 (0.93)	0.502	2.11 (0.94)	2.04 (0.92)	0.419
CARE_HOU	2.97 (1.27)	3.26 (1.02)	0.000	1.89 (0.84)	2.01 (0.87)	0.102
FEEL_PRE	3.51 (1.49)	1.79 (1.27)	0.000	3.52 (1.53)	2.08 (1.52)	0.000
ANER_PRE	0.37 (0.48)	0.65 (0.48)	0.000	0.56 (0.49)	0.79 (0.41)	0.000
NAT_ECO	2.47 (1.57)	2.76 (1.57)	0.006	2.22 (1.37)	2.47 (1.48)	0.044
PER_ECO	2.75 (1.55)	2.94 (1.57)	0.071	2.59 (1.79)	2.89 (1.80)	0.044
POL_SOPH	2.87 (1.29)	3.11 (1.22)	0.006	3.47 (1.28)	3.32 (1.27)	0.165
DIS_DEM_REP	2.42 (1.47)	3.06 (1.45)	0.000	2.67 (1.32)	2.70 (1.37)	0.783
PREF_DIV	1.05 (0.90)	0.75 (1.13)	0.001	2.98 (1.33)	2.90 (1.34)	0.503

Source: The 1994 and 1998 American National Election Studies.

Note: Entries are means with the standard deviation in parentheses; *t*-ratio reported is the result of a two-tailed test.

Hypotheses

From surge and decline theory, it can be hypothesized that a citizen who feels more favorable for the incumbent president is more likely to vote for the out-party or just abstain. From negative voting theory, a citizen who feels angry toward the president is expected to vote more for the out-party or just abstain. From economic voting theory (either sociotropic or pocketbook), a citizen who perceives that national or personal economic situations are worse is more likely to vote for the out-party or just abstain. I test these expectations.

My primary goal is to test the policy balancing thesis. First, I hypothesize that perceived ideological distance between the two parties

causes more votes for the out-party.

Given that balancing voters are expected to believe that policy outcomes should be moderated, more ideological distance encourages them to vote for the out-party.

Second, the question of “do you think it is better when one party controls both the presidency and Congress; better when control is split between the Democrats and Republicans, or doesn’t it matter?” is a good proxy as the preference for the partisan control over the branches of the government, and thus representative of an intention for vote choice. Given that the president’s party in the midterm election is fixed and that preferences for divided government are expressed, voters favoring divided control must vote more for the out-party, holding other variables constant.

Third, since balancing voters are expected to know more about how the political system works or how the proposed policies finally become the final law, it is highly probable that they are politically sophisticated. Given this sophistication requirement and policy balancing motivation, it can be hypothesized that voters who are more sophisticated and moderate in policy issues are more likely to vote for the out-party.

Finally, I add two interaction terms between PREF_DIV (=preference for unitary or split control) and POL_SOPH (=political sophistication) and PREF_DIV and DIS_DEM_REP (=perceived ideological distance between the two parties). I hypothesize that the effects of PREF_DIV on vote choice vary with the levels of political sophistication and the perceived distances between the two parties. To put it differently, the more a respondent is politically sophisticated and perceives the difference between the two parties, the more his/her preference for the

Table 5. Analysis of Electoral Decisions: Constrained Multinomial Logit Parameters

	1994		1998	
	Abstention /In-Party(Dem)	Out-party(Rep) /In-party(Dem)	Abstention /In-Party(Dem)	Out-party(Rep) /In-party(Dem)
L_PID	-0.25** (0.07)		-0.27** (0.08)	
CARE_HOU	-0.23** (0.05)		-0.82** (0.08)	
FEEL_PRE	-0.36** (0.06)	-0.73** (0.06)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.54** (0.06)
ANGER_PRE	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.28 (0.18)	0.50* (0.22)
NAT_ECO	0.00 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)
PER_ECO	0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
PREF_DIV	-0.12 (0.11)	0.24* (0.12)	-0.41* (0.18)	-0.13 (0.21)
DIS_DEM_REP	0.03 (0.06)	0.18** (0.07)	-0.34* (0.17)	-0.25 (0.19)
POL_SOPH	-0.38** (0.08)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.47** (0.17)	-0.06 (0.19)
PREF_DIV*				
POL_SOPH	0.06 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)
DIS_DEM_REP*				
PREF_DIV	-0.04 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Constant	3.48** (0.42)	1.31** (0.44)	6.59** (0.87)	2.19* (0.92)
N	1268		1004	
Pseudo R ²	0.616		0.247	
χ^2	1725.85		513.57	

Source: The 1994 and 1998 American National Election Studies.

Note: Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Positive sign indicates vote for the out-party or abstention, with reference to the in-party vote.

** $p(z) < .01$; * $p(z) < .05$ (two-tailed test)

split control over the government will be substantiated.

Results from the Constrained Multinomial Logit Model

Table 5 reports the results of the constrained multinomial logit

parameters for the two midterm elections of 1994 and 1998. Below, I flesh out some details of the results.

Constrained Factors

I look first at how the constrained variables affect turnout/abstention, with in-party voting being a reference category. `L_PID` and `CARE_HOU` are negative and statistically significant in both elections. This indicates that strong partisanship and high interests in the House elections encourage citizens to go to the polls. In other words, turnout is a positive function of levels of partisanship and interests in the election. This result implies that citizens tend to go to the polls to the extent that their partisan interests are supposed to be at stake in the electoral outcomes.

Conventional Factors

Shifting the attention to vote choice variables, first, presidential thermometers (`FEEL_PRE`) both in the 1994 and 1998 elections are all negatively signed and statistically significant. Negative signs indicate that a favorable assessment toward the president will tend to cause a voter to refrain supporting the out-party or engaging abstention. The implication of this result seems clear that despite the White House scandal and impeachment controversy in the 1998 election, the Clinton Presidency does not hurt Democratic House candidates. This result also explains why the Democratic Party actually gained seats in the 1998 midterm election, in spite of severe circumstances caused by the impeachment controversy during the campaign.

Related with the above result, angry feeling for the president (ANGER_PRE) shows only one significance in the out-party parameter in the 1998 election. This parameter is positively signed, which means that angry voters are more likely to vote for the out-party in the 1998 election. At the same time, however, anger does not significantly affect turnout rates. Meanwhile, as shown by the coefficient parameters, anger has no affect on whether to vote or how to vote in the 1994 election.

Given the results mentioned above, the net effects of the Clinton Presidency in the 1998 elections should be paid off. Thus, the presidential effects on vote choice in the 1998 election seems at most neutral or at least not harmful to the Democratic House candidates. And in the case of the 1994 election, favorable atmosphere toward Clinton presidency encourages citizens to vote for the Democratic House candidates.

Meanwhile, no variables of national or personal economic situations show significant effects both in vote choice and turnout choice. According to the referendum theory on the midterm election if the state of the economy is perceived as bad, it should generate negative assessments about the president's party and thus lead citizens to vote for the out-party. Both in the 1994 and 1998 elections, such negative effects on the president's party are not found. In short, no significant effects of the state of economy and paid-off effects between the favorable assessment and the anger for the president on vote choice in the 1998 election are comparable to the actual outcome of the 1998 election, in which the president's party did not lose much.

These findings suggest that referendum theory, coattail voter theory, and negative voter theory in midterm elections are not necessarily

wrong, even though they cannot consistently explain all the findings reported here. It is sure, however, that there still remains much to be explained.

Balancing Factors

Turning to our focal factors, the moderation and balancing variables, each variable is expected to be positive in vote choice. What is the most salient finding, among other things, is different patterns of results between the 1994 and 1998 elections. While the effects of the factors in the 1994 elections are significant in the vote choice parameters, the effects of the factors in the 1998 elections are significant in the turnout parameters, but not in the vote choice parameters. Balancing factors do work, but in different ways between the 1994 and 1998 elections.

Put precisely, in the 1994 election *PREF_DIV*, *DIS_DEM_REP*, *POL_SOPH*, and the interaction terms of *DIS_DEM_REP * PREF_DIV* show positive signs in out-party parameters and thus cause citizens to vote for the out-party, as is hypothesized. By contrast, in the 1998 election the same variables affect the vote choice parameters in the negative direction, although no effects on vote choice are significant. And balancing factors, showing statistical significance and negative signs in the 1998 elections, discourage the citizens to abstain when being compared with in-party voting.

To sum up, balancing factors in the 1994 election encourage the citizens to vote for the out-party, but have no significant effects on turnout choice; the same factors in the 1998 election encourage citizens to turnout, but have no significant effects on vote choice. Given the Democratic president, balancing voters in the 1994 election are en-

couraged or activated to vote for the out-party; balancing voters in the 1998 election are neither discouraged from going to the polls nor encouraged from voting vote for the out-party.

Summary

The results of the 1994 and 1998 midterm elections can finally be explained in terms of the function of the presidential feeling thermometer and balancing factors. As mentioned above, explanations in terms of balancing factors fit to actual electoral results of the 1994 and 1998 elections more nicely than other theories. I found that the explanatory power of policy balancing factors outweighs other factors in explaining turnout and vote choice in the 1994 and 1998 elections. These findings suggest that the intentional voting by a self-conscious public should be taken seriously when explaining the midterm election results of divided government.

However, there are some limitations that lie in the model tested in this paper. The election of 1998 may not have been a good case to test the effects of balancing factors. First, strong, short-term forces of the impeachment controversy, which was not included as variables in the model, may have influenced turnout and vote choice. For example, high levels of abstentions among anti-impeachment Republicans may have hurt the prospects of GOP House candidates, and thus, influenced the electoral outcomes.²¹⁾ Second, the state of the economic situation has

21) Alan I. Abramowitz, "It's Monica, Stupid: Voting Behavior in the 1998 Midterm Election". presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.

been stayed at its peak's prosperity, rather than showing fluctuations, over the periods of the 1994~1998 period. An excellent state of the economy may dwarf the economic variables.

Implications for Divided Government in Korea

In Korea the presidential election is based on a five-year cycle, while the National Assembly election is a four-year cycle. In addition to these non-coinciding terms of offices, the Constitution proscribes the presidential election and the Assembly election from being held together. This means that the Korean voters, unlike the American voters in the general election, have never voted for both the presidential candidates and candidates for the National Assembly at the same time; they have had no opportunity to decide whether or not, and/or how to, split their tickets into the president's party and the majority party in the National Assembly. Instead, what is usual for the Korean voters is a "balancing" situation, whereby the decision-making situation for the Korean voters constitutes choosing the party of a candidate in the Assembly given the president's party or the party of a presidential nominee given the majority party in the Assembly. Table 6 shows that since the 1987 presidential election the presidential elections and the National Assembly elections were held by turns, with the only exception being the two National Assembly elections in a row in 1988 and 1992 (without an interruption by the presidential election). Given this election cycle and decision-making situation, the Assembly election during the president's tenure is considered a referendum on the incumbent president's performance; the presidential election in the

Table 6. Election Results and Balancing Condition in Korea

Election Date	Presidential Election (%)	National Assembly Election (No. of Seats)	Balancing Condition
Dec.16,1987	Roh Tae Woo: 36.6 KimYong Sam: 28.0		
Apr.26,1988		In-Party: 125 Out-Parties+Independents:174	Yes ¹
Mar.24,1992		In-Party: 149 Out-Parties+Independents:150	Yes ²
Dec.18,1992	Kim Young Sam: 42.0 Kim Dae Jung: 33.8		No ³
Apr.11,1996		In-Party: 139 Out-Parties+Independents:160	Yes ⁴
Dec.18,1997	KimDaeJung:40.3 Lee Hoi Chang: 38.7		Yes ⁵
Apr.13,2000		In-Party: 115 Out-Parties+Independents:158	Yes ⁶
Dec.19,2002	RohMooHyun:48.9 Lee Hoi Chang: 46.6		Yes ⁷
Apr.15,2004		In-Party: 152 Out-Parties + Independents: 147	No ⁸

Source: National Election Commission: <http://www.nec.go.kr>

Note: Bold print in the presidential election column indicates the president-elect from the minority party in the National Assembly. And that in National Assembly election indicates that the number of seats including proportional seats outnumbers that of the president's party.

¹The president's party lost its majority in the National Assembly for the first time in Korea's legislative politics. However, due to merging e of three parties, including the president's party in January 1990, unified government had made inroads.

²The ruling party led by President Roh and party leader Kim Young Sam again failed to obtain a majority of legislative seats, coming up one seat short of a simple majority. During the period of the 14th Assembly, numerous legislative members changed party affiliation.

³Kim Young Sam was a nominee of both the president's party and the majority party in the National Assembly.

⁴The president's party gained a seat share of 46 percent, still short of a legislative majority.

⁵Kim Dae Jung was the first president who was elected as a nominee from the opposition party. Under the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, the president's party could not command a legislative majority, even combined with its junior coalition partner. Over time the ruling coalition gradually recruited legislative members from the opposition party. By co-opting legislative members from the other side of the aisle, the ruling coalition finally managed to achieve a majority in the National Assembly.

⁶The president's party failed to secure a majority seat, and the opposition party retained the biggest bloc in the Assembly.

⁷Roh Moo Hyun, a nominee from the minority party, was elected for second time in a row in the presidential elections.

⁸The president's party achieved success, earning the majority of the contested seats, for the first time in twenty years.

middle of the term of the Assembly is in part a referendum on the credibility and performance of the majority party in the Assembly.

Table 6 also shows that in four out of five elections since the 1992 National Assembly election, Korean voters have refused to give the president's party a majority in the National Assembly. Also, voters have chosen a nominee from the minority party as the president two times out of three since the 1992 presidential election.²²⁾ As a result, the president's party has seldom enjoyed the majority party status in the Assembly, and the majority party in the Assembly has frequently failed to extend its legislative power to the executive branch of government. In short, when it comes to the frequency at least, it is rather odd to argue that divided government in Korea is abnormal. Quite contrary, divided government in Korea is common as well as normal.

What determines this result? There is no clear-cut answer. Conventional wisdom is that regionalism is the single most important factor in the electoral politics of Korea. Some may assert that the election results in Korea can be easily predicted: regional base plus/minus turnout rates especially regarding marginal voters, like young voters or specific issue voters who vary to each election. There is no doubt that regionalism plays a crucial role in determining the election results. Yet the problem in this line of explanation is that regionalism can neither explain the variations across elections nor account for contingent factors in each election. Furthermore, regionalism alone cannot account for the vote choice of Korean voters who have fre-

22) Table 5 is based on election results, by which I mean that the Table 5 does not reflect any after-the-election-date-changes in the number of seats of the presidential and opposition parties.

quently chosen divided government. Consequently, the question remains as to Korean voters have cast their ballots so frequently for the presidential nominee of the minority party and for the Assembly candidates from opposition parties?

Drawing on this study and other evidence found in American politics, it can be hypothesized that the non-coinciding election cycles condition Korean voters so that quite often they must face the balancing situation and that they introduce the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. Is this pattern of voting a way for Korean voters — who have for a long time yearned for “new politics” based on “bargaining and consensus” rather than the politics of “distrust and hatred” — to bring in moderation in their politics and policy outputs? Is this pattern of voting the result from the beliefs of Korean voters who prefer Madisonian government (or divided but effective government) to unified government (or effective but less-democratic government)? Is this pattern of voting a solution for Korean voters who believe that consolidation of Korean democracy hinges on whether the president’s party can build a working relationship with the opposition party and engage in a dialogue on an issue-by-issue basis?

I admit that it is too hasty to conclude (or even suggest) that divided government in Korea is determined by balancing motivation of the voters, although the media used to interpret the election result of divided government as the “will of the people”. The balancing motivation thesis, of course, awaits empirical corroboration based on the data of the Korean voters. There is also a problem concerning the contextual relevance, or comparative applicability, of the balancing thesis to the politics of Korea. At the same token, it is too nave to

conclude that divided government in Korea is caused by regionalism. Granted, the proof of the pudding is in principle in the empirical data, not the reasoning or assertion. In this regard, I hope this paper to be read as a research proposal or a thought piece for other research plans to explore the determinants of divided government in Korea.

[Abstract]

The Determinants of Divided Government in the United States: Implications for the Case of Korea

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In the United States, the 1994 mid-term election spawned the Republican majority in the House of Representative under the Democratic control over the White House for the first time since the 1967. In the 1998 midterm election, for the first time since 1934 and only the second time in the twentieth century, the party controlling the White House actually gained seats in the House of Representatives. This paper addresses the question of what caused these unusual phenomena in the midterm elections. The paper tests (1) the previous competing explanations of the outcomes of the midterm elections such as surge and decline, presidential coattails, negative voting, and economic voting; and (2) the balancing motivation of inducing voters to cast the ballot for the moderation of policy outcomes by splitting control over the two branches of government. I demonstrate that in the US, the voter's motivation for moderating policy outcomes induces divided control over the executive and legislative branches of government.

In Korea, voters have frequently chosen split control over the executive and legislative branches of government: The presidential party has failed to secure a majority of seats in the National Assembly in four out of five elections since the 1992 National Assembly election. And, the nominee from the minority party in the National Assembly has won the presidency two times out of three since the 1992 presidential election. Drawing on the findings in the US and the voting patterns in Korea, I suggest that divided government in Korea is a choice of the Korean voters, who have balancing motivations like the American voters in the mid-term election.

Key Words

divided government, policy balancing motivation, election cycle