Aboriginality, Multiculturalism
and the Land

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This paper constitutes another tentative step on a personal journey of exploration that began with an essay in a special volume of the *Journal of Canadian Studies* marking the beginning of the new millennium. As the witnesses to this next step are my hosts at the Korean Association for Canadian Studies who may not be familiar with it, I hope I may be forgiven for repeating elements of the earlier project in an effort to establish an adequate context for my remarks.¹ In the earlier essay I attempted to address the social fragmentation of Canada that has characterized the postmodern age. Naively (I have been told) I urged the recognition of interdisciplinarity — itself a product of postmodernity — as one important tool for the reconciliation of conflict between fragments, however defined. I wrote then that

Interdisciplinarity invites a return to history, to a newly negotiated narrative in which all may participate and recognize a place in a set of relationships, each dependent on the other and together constituting the health of the whole. Recognizing that conflict between fragments, and between individual fragments and the dominant culture, has been an undeniable fact of our history, is one thing. Working towards the resolution of this conflict is quite another. The primary human referents of resolution in Canada, at least for the foreseeable future, will be terms like equality, poverty,
Aboriginality, Multiculturalism and the Land

discrimination, communication, environment and Aboriginal rights. None of these terms is the property of any one discipline.\textsuperscript{2)}

Irrespective of its many failings, Canada remains a noble social experiment. In Canada, as Margaret Atwood reminds us, if we are not Aboriginal, we are immigrants, regardless of how many generations may precede us. Today, Canada's version of itself recognizes a postmodern nation comprised of fragments, often dispossessed, from elsewhere. As home to citizens from virtually every other country in the world, it is, in a sense, a mirror of that world. As a nation it has a responsibility to define itself for other nations. How is it the same, how different? What do the boundaries around and within it represent?

In the lexicon of postmodernism, conflict is held out by some as inevitable, by others as virtue. My project is driven by a conviction that conflict is an expression of a desire for its own absence. Immigrants and refugees have not come to Canada to perpetuate the reasons for having left their birthplace. They have come looking for something else, and they have brought ways of seeing. Among those whom they have found here are people indigenous to the place. And the people who are indigenous to the place, however small a minority, are the human incarnation of the lands they have occupied since time immemorial. Aboriginal peoples, their land (life-sustaining and beautiful beyond words), and other settlers from everywhere, living mostly in cities. These are elements of the picture that greets the gaze of the newcomer to Canada. The issue is not whether or not there will be conflict here. Conflict exists, its resolution fleeting. Still — it is resolution, not conflict, that drives our hope. The question is, how will we continue to foster among ourselves a conversation about social justice that respects the land, the First Nations and our fellow settlers? This conversation is difficult because it must understand and accept that Canada does not yet exist, but is emerging from a
perpetual process of invention. This paper is about some of the voices in search of that conversation.

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At the celebration of the Centennial of Confederation in 1967, Canadians might have been expected to rejoice in the overarching sense of unity that seemed to permeate the cultural life of the moment. To Expo 67 in Montreal, Canada welcomed millions of international visitors, many of them close relatives of Canadians, who had come to join in the festivities. Canadians persuaded themselves that their nation had finally put its house in order, that difference could exist in unity and that the way ahead was the way of shared hope and prosperity. It was not unreasonable to expect that a country that had survived for 100 years, had recently adopted a new flag to signal its pride in independence, and was universally revered for its promotion of world peace, would go on forever.3) But, as the horrific tragedy in New York recently reminded us, no nation should imagine itself immune to unanticipated cataclysmic events. Canada is no exception to this rule. The variables reshaping the lives of Canadians, and of Canada as a nation, accelerated exponentially immediately following 1967, sometimes in response to cataclysmic events in other places — like Vietnam, or China, or Czechoslovakia, or France sometimes — because, at home, voices silenced in our own history by power indulgent of itself suddenly spoke out in protest. Sometimes in seeking to address the wrongs voiced in one corner, Canadians were made deaf to those in another. One example of the confusions emanating from a quest for redress was the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established by the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson in 1963. Chaired by André Laurendau, Editor-in-Chief of Le Devoir, and
Davidson Dunton, former Chair of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and President of Carleton University, the Commission published six controversial volumes in fulfillment of its mandate. The Commission was conceived in the pre-Centennial era of bipolar (i.e. English/French) notions of diversity, yet the bulk of its published proceedings and analysis emerged after 1967. While it was clearly responsible for improving French language instruction in the provincial public school systems across Canada, and while it spawned the Official Languages Act of 1969, the Commission was chiefly valuable in the context of this paper for the fourth volume of its report, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, which also appeared in 1969. Aboriginal people are scarcely mentioned in any of the volumes, yet when their voices are recorded their concerns are predictable:

A special problem brought into sharp relief by the concept of two founding peoples is of course the situation of the Canadian Indian and Eskimo. Their unique position was put most poignantly in Sudbury by an Indian woman who asked the evening meeting, “Why is the Indian always forgotten? This was the first culture and this was the first language in Canada. We are told that the BNA Act was between the French and the English — where was the Indian during this time?” In Toronto . . . the chiefs who were present after recalling that many Indians speak French, summed up their fate in this way: “If the French people think they lost a lot of their rights since Confederation, what should the Indian say? They lost the whole land.” One of the participants in the discussion protested about school text-books: “Our children learn that Indians are all savages.” Finally, the increasing
assimilation of the Indians who are forced to leave the reserves for economic reasons was the object of another statement: "As soon as an Indian wants to succeed in Canadian life he must assimilate."6)

After acknowledging that "We found great sympathy in ‘white’ [sic] audiences for the plight in which Canada's two indigenous peoples find themselves, as the relentless march of North American industry and technology moves into territories once exclusively their own,"7) the Commissioners still found the contributions of settlers worthy of a special volume, virtually omitting altogether any mention of First Nations peoples. The omission was actually addressed and justified in these terms:

Our terms of reference contain no allusion to Canada's native populations. They speak of "two founding races," namely Canadians of British and French origin, and "other ethnic groups," but mention neither the Indians nor the Eskimos. Since it is obvious that these two groups do not form part of the "founding races," as the phrase is used in the terms of reference, it would logically be necessary to include them under the heading "other ethnic groups". Yet it is clear that the term "other ethnic groups" means those peoples of diverse origins who came to Canada during or after the founding of the Canadian state and that it does not include the first inhabitants of this country. . . However, the Commission considers it a duty to remind the proper authorities that everything possible must be done to help the native populations preserve their cultural heritage, which is an essential part of the patrimony of all Canadians.8)
This remarkable sleight of hand, coming from two respected intellectuals of the period, accepts that settlers may preserve themselves as a nation in the lands appropriated from those to be excluded from the definition of the nation but who are yet identified as an "essential" part of that nation's "patrimony." A unique opportunity was provided, almost simultaneously with the 100th year of Canada's birth, to acknowledge and to validate a partnership without which the nation's earliest settlers would never have survived. The circumstances in which Canada finds itself today vis à vis First Nations peoples speak eloquently to the fact that this opportunity was not merely overlooked, but effectively discarded.

Institutionalized multiculturalism, rightly recognized around the world as a humanitarian invention of Canada, was the offspring of the Laurendau-Dunton report. It was announced as federal policy in 1971 and one year later Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau brought Stanley Haidasz, the first Minister of State for Multiculturalism, into his Cabinet. The Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism commenced its work in 1973. The new policy was not without political sidebars. Among other things, it was intended to soften prairie opposition to bilingualism. Yet, and despite its rich and complex ethnic history, "the multiculturalism policy did not achieve a high profile in western Canada." It was much more successful in major cities like Toronto with large and (particularly after the liberalization of immigration regulations in 1967 and the new Immigration Act of 1976) rapidly diversifying immigrant populations of more recent arrival. In English Canada rural depopulation was paralleled by extraordinary urban growth. As immigrants (many of them refugees) from less developed countries grew in number, multiculturalism conjoined the voices of race with the voices of ethnicity, but with a decidedly urban edge. The impact of the creation of the Parti Québécois under the leadership of René Lévesque in 1968 and its assumption of power in 1976 was dramatically underscored by the violent events surrounding
the October Crisis of 1970. Québec had announced to Canadians, and to the rest of the world, that it would determine its own direction on culture and language. "Interculturalism" became its designated policy, meaning that the new voices of race and ethnicity would, after Bills 22 (1974) and 101 (1977), be French-speaking.

Developments in Québec and in federal policies on multiculturalism were matched toe to toe by the increasing political and cultural activism of First Nations peoples. To a large extent this was a response to the Trudeau government's White Paper of 1969 which advocated cancellation of the Indian Act and the treaties, ostensibly in the interest of fostering equality: Indians would be treated as individuals, rather than as communities, in a free and equal democratic society. There would be no need for special status or Aboriginal rights, meaning that services for Aboriginal people would be transferred from the federal to the provincial governments.\(^{11}\) When the terms of the White Paper are coupled with the language of the Commissioners in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* it becomes increasingly difficult to understand how the diversity of the settlers could have been privileged over the diversity of (and within) indigenous First Nations. The paradox was certainly not lost upon the Native inhabitants of Canada. It became absolutely clear that they would have to fight to win recognition of their rights as Aboriginal people living in their own land.

Resistance to the White Paper of 1969 was swift and vocal. It coincided almost precisely with the rise of the American Indian Movement (AIM), and with the publication (simultaneously in the United States and Canada) of Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (1971),\(^ {12}\) an eloquent and deeply moving history of the American West from a Native perspective that became a runaway bestseller. Probably more than any other single factor, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* aroused North Americans in general to the true
nature of the atrocities endured by Indians since contact. The response to this awakening was measured in Canada by a number of important developments. For example, the first Native Studies Department in a Canadian University was established at Trent in 1969. The National Indian Brotherhood, now the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), was formed in 1968. (The current Chief of the AFN is former Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees of James Bay, Matthew Coon-Come, an early student in the Trent program.) In the famous Calder case of 1973, the Nisgaa Nation won recognition in the Supreme Court of Canada for the principle of Aboriginal rights, forcing the Trudeau government to abandon the logic of its White Paper. Section 25 of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 records the reversal of Trudeau's position in a language so forceful that several provincial premiers attempted to block it:

The guarantee of this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including

(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and

(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

This is reinforced by Section 35 of the Charter which states:

(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.

(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

(4) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.

The Inuit response to the White Paper was the establishment, in 1971, of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC). By 1978, the ITC had developed a proposal for the creation of a self-governing territory called Nunavut, "Our Land." The Dene Declaration was issued in 1975, the same year as the signing of what has become known as "the first modern treaty" — the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. Filmmakers at the National Film Board used its new "Challenge for Change" series to bring The Cree Hunters of Mistassini to the classrooms of Canada in 1974, demonstrating for southerners the real impact of resource megaprojects (in this case the James Bay Power Project) on the culture of remote hunter-gathering Aboriginal communities, and allowing Native people to speak for themselves, in their own language, of the compelling reasons for their opposition to a development about which they had never been consulted yet which would alter irremediably the land they had occupied for generations.

It is easy to understand why Aboriginal people were angry in 1969, seeking remedies to protect themselves against the erasure to which political policies and assumptions of the day seemed virtually to condemn them. What may seem less obvious is why the federal government (in particular) responded so quickly and so emphatically in the years leading up to the Charter of 1982, apparently reversing its
own ideological premises and acceding to the demands of the First Peoples. The answer lies on the land.

For most Native cultures — and there are many in Canada — the land, the water and the air combine to constitute the source of all life and spirituality. The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples explains the relationship in this compelling language:

The cultures of Aboriginal peoples are tied to the land — to specific places held by tradition to have been given to them to care for and to supply what they need. Their histories and mythologies are tied to features of the landscape. The bones of their ancestors are buried there. With resources from the land, they have fashioned sacred objects for ceremonial purposes. They have carved mask and crests to record family histories and lineages and told of memorable events in songs, stories and dances. But Aboriginal people have lost control of many of their sacred sites. They have watched as objects of great power were taken away by outsiders and displayed in distant museums, often out of context and in ways that offend their sacred value.\(^{16}\)

However, for many Canadians, land, water and air have become mere commodities to buy and sell in the marketplace or in which to wash or bury the offal of capitalist material production. To these people, the land means "resources" — oil, gas, metals, wheat, forests, furs, fish, and so on. Historians have explained Canada’s growth to nationhood as a product of the exploitation of these staples in the service, first of mercantilism, and today of the metropolitan centres strung out like beads on a string in close proximity to the southern border which contain 80 per cent of Canada’s population, and therefore the power which governs the nation.\(^{17}\) Living in cities, Canadians know little
about the vast expanse of land occupied by most of their Aboriginal neighbours. Consequently they also know little about their Aboriginal neighbours, describing their home as “wilderness,” implying an absence rather than a presence.\textsuperscript{18} The average Canadian’s appreciation of nature is best tested when a commodity loses value on the Toronto Stock Exchange, or when the United States performs one of its ritual symbolic acts to challenge Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago. It was, therefore, a happy circumstance for Aboriginal peoples in Canada that their resistance to the White Paper coincided with the OPEC crisis of 1973 when the price of oil in Canada quadrupled overnight.

Native peoples across Canada have long understood the implications for their cultures of the relationship between their land and natural resource development. Following the election of his government, John Diefenbaker’s “Northern Vision” of the late 1950s had set the stage for a new wave of schemes aimed at nation building by extraction. It almost seemed as if by moving the land to other countries, or relocating it to different jurisdictions within their own, Canadians believed they could improve upon nature. Richard Rohmer's failed Mid-Canada Corridor proposal of 1969\textsuperscript{19} fell on the heels of the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska in 1968. Within two years the Trudeau government had invited two competing consortiums, the Canadian Arctic Gas and Foothills Pipeline companies, to identify and justify routes to carry natural gas from Prudhoe and the Beaufort Sea to southern markets. The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, appointed in 1974 and led by Justice Thomas Berger of the British Columbia Supreme Court, afforded the most graphic example of the growing strength of the Native voice. The process was also distinctive in that it visibly married the concerns of many environmentalists and Native peoples. The competing companies were required to undertake what amounted to the first serious environmental impact assessments in Canadian history. But just as significant was the manner in which the
Berger Commission conducted its hearings, flying in to Native communities along the length of, and adjacent to the Mackenzie Valley and receiving the oral testimony of all who wished to speak. This procedure, the results of which are recorded in Berger’s pathbreaking report, *Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland* (1977), constituted the first significant social impact assessment to precede the implementation of a major resource development project. What made it particularly distinctive was the fact that it reflected not only the views, but also the wishes of both Dene and Inuvialuit, concluding that a pipeline should not be contemplated before further, more detailed environmental planning to accommodate concerns about permafrost, and fish and wildlife populations, among other elements affecting local economies and cultures, and above all not before the settlement of comprehensive land claims in the region. The collapse of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Project in 1977 was remarkable symbolic evidence that the voice of Native peoples and the voice of the land had actually been heard and measured.

It is worth noting in the context of this discussion that the federal government created Canada’s Ministry of the Environment in 1970. By 1975 every province had followed suit. The Committee for an Independent Canada (now the Council of Canadians) was founded in 1970 to protect Canadian economic and cultural independence, but much of its work centered then, as now, on natural resource development (and therefore on environmental) issues. It is a central premise of this paper that the rise of Aboriginal activism, nationalism (of both Canadian and Quebec varieties) and environmentalism was driven in large part by resource issues. The 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and Canada’s active involvement in the Law of the Sea negotiations were both (not so thinly) veiled measures to reassert Canadian sovereignty in the North, a response to, among other issues, the discovery of oil and gas in the Beaufort Sea, and to the voyage of the American tanker *Manhattan* through the Northwest Passage in
1969. Both the James Bay Power Project, announced by Robert Bourassa in 1971, and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Project, announced by Pierre Trudeau in 1970, gained momentum with the international OPEC oil crisis which had placed home heating and basic transportation beyond economic reach for the people of a cold country whose cities were separated by huge distances. Energy issues especially drove the creation of the Canada Development Corporation in 1971, the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1974 and the Crown Corporation, Petro-Canada, in 1975. The present crisis in Afghanistan reminds us that energy issues are with us yet — and with the realization that the Middle East is becoming increasingly problematic as a supplier, and as its own reserves are inadequate, the United States has made clear its intention to look increasingly to its immediate northern and southern neighbours to guarantee the fulfillment of its needs.21) This means that Canada’s relationship with the Aboriginal peoples within its borders will become an increasingly more strategic element in the nations international affairs.22)

I have suggested that water, the life-blood of the land, is central to the cultures of First Nations peoples in Canada. In addition, the culture of water is one of the most significant variables distancing Canadian from American environmental history, an observation reinforced by any good hydrological atlas. Canada ranks third only to Russia and Brazil in terms of total water flow. The Ottawa River alone drains more water than all the rivers in England and Wales combined.23) While water is important for agriculture, it is far more important for industrial uses. To date, Canada has engineered a larger volume of interbasin water transfers than the United States and Russia combined — most of it for hydroelectric power production. In 1906 Ontario Hydro became the first state-owned electrical utility in Canada, setting the stage for similar developments in the rest of the nation, indeed in much of the world. By 1988 Canada serviced 62 per cent of its electrical needs with falling water at 400 generating stations, making
this nation, with a capacity exceeding 60,000 MW, the world's major producer of hydro-electricity. Production has increased dramatically since the 1960s. Wherever there is hydro-electric power generation there are dams. Their impacts are felt most emphatically on the land which they manipulate to suit the ends of their southern designers. Almost invariably, wherever a new dam is located a Native group is affected. Nowhere was this clearer than on the La Grande River in northern Quebec where the first phase of the James Bay Power Project transformed a complex web of interrelated ecosystems, into an industrial landscape. There were many instances of impact on the country food. Increased levels of naturally occurring methyl-mercury leached into the river from the flooding of organic matter. A traditional dietary staple of the Crees at Chisasibi, local fish species were so badly contaminated as to be inedible. In 1984, 10,000 migrating caribou drowned north of the Caniapiscau Reservoir when spill gates were opened to prevent an overflow. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, negotiated between 1975 and 1977 to legitimize the project and its consequences and to calm political fears of an invasive federal presence in Quebec affairs, was also intended to guarantee a secure supply of electrical energy to the province of Quebec, and potential exports for American and Ontario markets. The language of dams is the language of urban landscapes that have forgotten their dependence on rivers and the north. The transmission lines running from James Bay effectively reversed a current running to the sea. And these dams have made water just another commodity: Power from the North (1985) as Premier Robert Bourassa called it in his book, to the seat of democracy, the power in the urban south.

Reflecting back on the James Bay Agreement in 1990, the man who had negotiated for the Cree people, Chief Billy Diamond, wrote:

The Agreement index reads like a constitution of a
new country, and in many ways, that is what it was meant to be. We set up the Cree School Board and took control of Cree education... We set up the Cree Board of Health and Social Services... We secured special measures for the administration of justice and for setting up a Cree police force. And, we set up a program which provides a guaranteed income... for Cree hunters. The program encourages them to stay in the bush for 125 days a year. The Agreement promised federal legislation for Cree self-government, and in 1984,... Parliament finally passed the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act. This is a recognition of Cree sovereignty in the area of local government... The Agreement also set up a special regime for environmental review of proposed future projects... Finally, the Agreement provided for monetary compensation. The Cree portion (another $90 million was for Northern Quebec Inuit) is approximately $130 million, to be paid over twenty years. This is a Heritage Fund for future generations of Crees.26)

All that was negotiated was the first of three projects proposed by the Quebec government. Two other components, the Grande Baleine and the Nottaway-Broadback-Rupert projects, would require Cree approval, and further negotiation and compensation before going ahead.

In 1986 the government of Quebec announced that it was planning to proceed with phase two, the Grande Baleine Project, without troubling to observe the requirements of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement for a detailed environmental impact assessment. The Cree were compelled to take legal measures to force the federal and Quebec governments to meet their responsibilities. Ironically, the government of Canada committed itself to a national Green Plan in
1990. In 1991 it joined with the eight other Arctic nations in endorsing an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. In 1992 the federal government also sent a large delegation to the UNCED Earth Summit on sustainability at Rio de Janeiro chaired by Maurice Strong, himself a Canadian. The implication of these gestures was, surely, that the government of Canada was deeply committed to the protection of the environment. The explanation offered by analysts for the dereliction of the federal government in the case of James Bay was its continuing fear of alienating Québec and feeding the cause of separatism. Political considerations of this nature are always festering beneath the surface in any resource issue (a provincial jurisdiction) with implications for Aboriginal people (a federal jurisdiction). Without the courts to support them, First Nations peoples would often have been sacrificed on the altar of expediency in resource disputes. Fortunately for them, indeed for all Canadians, the courts were strongly supportive of the Cree position. Indeed, each legal agreement entered into by all other Aboriginal groups since 1975 has benefited from the painful experience of the James Bay Cree — both at the time of the negotiation of their Agreement, and subsequently. When it became clear that Québec did not require the additional energy to be generated at Grande Baleine, but intended to sell it in the American market, the Cree people, led by Matthew Coon-Come, launched an extraordinary international publicity campaign condemning the inadequacy of environmental assessments ultimately undertaken and persuading the states of the U.S. eastern seaboard, the potential purchasers of the power to be generated, to refuse to conclude contracts with Hydro-Québec. The issues were immense. The third phase on the Nottaway-Broadback-Rupert system was also being discussed as imminent upon the completion of Grande Baleine, effectively condemning all of the Cree lands and waters (and therefore Cree culture) to the production of electric power for urban dwellers in the south. When the northern states cancelled or declined to consider entering energy contracts, the market evaporated and the
Québec government was forced to drop the Grande Baleine project. This was an immense victory for the Crees of James Bay.29)

Similar issues are brewing in other First Nations communities that had emerged in the 1970s as major players in the energy debates following the OPEC crisis — most notably in the Mackenzie Valley. Here a proposal to build a gas pipeline from the Beaufort Sea to southern markets is once again on the table, anticipating growing American demands for dependable suppliers. The government of the Northwest Territories (led by Dene Stephen Kakfwi, formerly an active opponent of development) has actually endorsed a Mackenzie pipeline.30) The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (1998) was passed to satisfy promises made to the Gwichin and Sahtu Dene in their comprehensive land claim agreements of 1992 and 1993.31)

This statute effects important changes to the legislative framework for environmental impact assessment and land and water management; it establishes land use planning processes for the Gwichin and Sahtu settlement areas and will result in an environmental and cumulative effects monitoring program for the Mackenzie Valley. The MVRMA also establishes new institutions of public government responsible for environmental impact assessment, land and water management and land use planning.32)

The legislation has clearly been influenced by the James Bay Agreement and attempts to intercept conflict before it occurs.33) It will be of fundamental importance in the debate, already gathering momentum, on the location of a pipeline. Two parallel routes have been proposed, one along the Alaska Highway and one through the Mackenzie Valley. A third alternative has suggested an “over the top” route which would move gas from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields through an offshore underwater pipeline connecting with the Mackenzie Valley
route. This would eliminate the necessity of two pipelines and would funnel all gas from the Alaska North Slope and the Mackenzie Valley Delta to southern markets with potentially less environmental damage (or so argue its proponents).\textsuperscript{34)}

Somewhat ironically, therefore, now that their land claims are being settled, the Dene of the Mackenzie Valley find themselves arguing in favour of a pipeline to which in 1977 they, and especially their elders, were adamantly opposed. How do we explain the change of heart? Perhaps the most important reason is the rapidly growing (in \textit{per capita} terms the fastest growing in Canada) population of Aboriginal young people. Youth, not elders, are now driving the agenda.

Native groups not only want to benefit from mineral rights sales, but also from royalties, joint venture and wholly owned service businesses from catering to trucking, from direct employment on oil and gas rigs using their training from programmes already underway in the Edmonton area, and from equity positions in a pipeline. They are seeking long-term benefits.\textsuperscript{35)}

There is considerable evidence supporting the view that traditional people want jobs in a wage economy that is both diversified and sustainable. "New applications of traditional skills inherent to aboriginal cultures are being developed in adapting to new economic opportunities."\textsuperscript{36)} So far the Canadian government has said very little about the possibility of a new northern pipeline. But the energy needs of the United States will not allow the luxury of extended reflection. Fortunately the First Nations peoples of the regions are prepared before the conversation begins. All that remains to complete the piece is self-government.

As if to underline the immensity of the changes afoot in Canada, the conversation in Québec has taken an extraordinary new turn,
suggesting that the Crees of James Bay have been closely watching developments in the Mackenzie Valley. On October 23, 2001, Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, Ted Moses, announced the signing of an agreement in principle with Bernard Landry, the sovereignist Premier of Québec, in which “the Crees and Québec have decided to put the weight of history behind them and accept the challenge of resolving our differences in a peaceful manner so that we may work together for a stronger future for both of us.” The agreement, which at the time of this writing awaits ratification by the Cree people, includes a proposal to proceed, jointly, with an Eastmain-Rupert hydroelectric power project, subject to all the social and environmental impact provisions of the original James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement of 1975. The language of the Grand Chief’s speech is revolutionary: “This is the vision of a new nation to nation relationship based on the common desire of ensuring a flourishing Québec and a flourishing Cree nation.” Gone is the hostility of the last referendum when the Crees under Matthew Coon-Come were outspoken opponents of a sovereign Québec, defenders of a united Canada. Gone is the hostility surrounding the rejection of the Grande Baleine project. Ted Moses “see[s] the Cree people working with the Québécois on joint projects and on a shared vision of our common interests in the land.”

Most important for us will be the positive impact that this agreement will have in improving the prospects for our youth and children in the future. To be strong the Crees must continue to occupy and be involved in the whole of the James Bay territory through the pursuit of both traditional and non-traditional activities. We must continue to work together as the Cree nation and to build the institutions we need to further our political, economic and social interests.
Under the terms of the agreement the Crees will be full participants in the design of the project. "We will also renew an Agreement with Hydro-Québec concerning the mercury contamination resulting from past projects." Payments from Québec will allow the Crees to "assume responsibility for our economic and community development. . . We see this as a part of true self-government."[37]

All modern energy discussions are about the homelands of First Nations peoples in Canada. They are also about the cultures of those peoples and the ways in which they have conducted their lives for generations. Pressures from the south are obviously having an impact on those cultures even as the Aboriginal people gain greater control over their own lands. In the south most Canadians, from cultures all over the world, live in cities. These cities are dependent upon the north from which they draw their energy and other resources. In a sense they are therefore dependent upon the First Nations peoples for whom this north is home. There is a great need for the south and the north to engage, in respect, at the point where they meet. And that is on the land. Dependence on the land is the one thing that both share in common. However different their perspectives on it, the preservation of their cultures depends upon its health in perpetuity. It takes little more than re-reading the assumptions of multicultural southerners in the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to understand how dramatically the nature of the national conversation has changed since the Centennial of Confederation. The Nation is being reinvented. First Nations have rejoined the conversation of inventors.
50 John Wadland

Notes

1) In the correspondence inviting my visit to Korea, I was asked to relate the experience of Aboriginal people to multiculturalism in Canada. I looked for new ways to do this, but in the end came back as I always do to the land. I was struck, in comparing Korea to Canada, by the extraordinary differences governing our respective notions of land, Aboriginality and multiculturalism. Korea is a homogeneous nation. The Aboriginal people constitute 99 percent of the population. Ethnic and racial diversity are virtually unknown. The population of over 45 million people occupies a land mass roughly the size of the Maritimes. (By comparison, 30 million Canadians share the second largest country in the world.) Sixty-five percent of the land in Korea is mountainous and heavily forested. This means that the majority of people live in cities, in massive apartment buildings that tower high above streets filled with automobiles. Yet the land is immensely important to Koreans and to their culture.


3) In passing it must be noted that one of the islands on which Expo 67 was staged had been expropriated from the Mohawks of Kahnawake. At Expo 67 First Nations peoples, with the financial assistance of the federal government, built their own pavilion “where they publicly expressed, for the first time on a national scale, dissatisfaction with their lot.” Olive Patricia Dickason, Canadas First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times. 2nd Ed.
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 334, 361.

4) It seems not to have occurred to anyone at the time to conceive of biculturalism as an articulation of the differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures. Another point worth noting here is that Aboriginal cultures in Canada are not homogeneous. There is a rich diversity of linguistic groups and cultural traditions distinguishing each group. This is why we speak of First Nations or First Peoples. Indeed we might reasonably say that the First Nations are multicultural Aboriginal populations.


7) Ibid.


9) It is significant that in their first annual report, the members of the Council made no mention of Aboriginal people in their recommendations for action. Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, First Annual Report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, 1975). This did not go unnoticed by Aboriginal people. At the Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism held in Ottawa in February, 1976, Clive Linklater was invited to make what
was euphemistically described as a “Special Presentation” on behalf of the National Indian Brotherhood. In a deeply moving speech he said, among other things,

So long as the European immigrants and their descendants continue to use and share our lands, and, so long as they continue to derive benefits and riches from these lands, great in their bounty, we fully expect and demand of them and their succeeding governments, that they honour, respect and own up to the terms and spirit of the treaties and agreements that were signed with our forefathers and any other agreements we may enter today.

But we are not, also merely people of the past.

We are of this land today.

And we will be of this land in the time yet to come.

We declare and proclaim that even though their exists in the present reality a larger majority nationhood called Canada made up of the European immigrants and their descendants; that we are and will continue to remain as nations of Indian peoples or Indian nations within the larger Canadian nation.

Before the coming of the Europeans and other recent immigrants, our tribal forefathers lived a multicultural and multilingual existence, and still do to this day.

The intent of the European immigrants is to exterminate, to terminate, to dispossess, to extinguish and alienate us from our lands and to make us beggars, strangers and outcasts in our own lands.

But for yourselves, you now seek to establish a nation with a multiplicity of races, cultures and languages.

You would leave us, the indigenous owners of this land,
out of such an arrangement. . .
We consider such an action to be immoral, illegal,
unethical, unChristian, undemocratic and contrary to all
the values and mores you profess to believe.
We do not wish to live as islands unto ourselves. We
must live as part of the Canadian nation. But we wish
to live as participating, productive, accepted and
contributing members of the Canadian nation.

Clive Linklater, "Special Presentation," in Multiculturalism as State
Policy: Conference Report of the Second Canadian Conference on
Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Canadian Consultative Council on
Multiculturalism, 1976), 176-77.
10) Howard Palmer, Ethnicity and Politics in Canada Since
Confederation (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 23.
11) Dickason, 363-65. The White Paper was formally abandoned in
1971.
12) Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian
History of the American West (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston,
1971).
13) Dickason, 324-25
14) Canada, The Constitution Act, 1982. Sections 16 to 24 speak to
the Official Languages of Canada; Sections 15 and 25 address equality
rights and multiculturalism respectively. Section 27 states explicitly:
"This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
Canadians."
15) Boyce Richardson and Tony Ianzelo, Directors. Cree Hunters of
Mistassini. National Film Board of Canada, 1974. 58 mins. Three
families meet a film crew at their winter camp on lands to be directly
impacted by the James Bay project. They discuss their traditions and
take the crew out on the land with them to witness their hunting and trapping practices. In interviews they discuss their concern about the dramatic changes about to befall the environment where their families have lived for generations.


18) “Wilderness” is a word in common use in English Canada. Its meanings and properties are immensely complex. I use it to speak for a landscape which is “other” to the experience of, and therefore unknown to, most Canadians. Nevertheless, Canadians believe they do know what they are describing when they use the word. For a wonderfully reflective exploration of this issue, see Bruce Willems-Braun, “Buried Epistemologies: The Politics of Nature in (Post)colonial British Columbia,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 87:1 (1997), 3-31.


21) “The United States buys oil from some 60 countries, including Canada. Indeed, the United States imports more oil from Canada than

22) Of course energy is merely one commodity becoming scarce in America. Water itself is in short supply because of repeated droughts, a factor which again turns American heads north in search of bulk exports.


25) Robert Bourassa, Power from the North (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985). Bourassa had launched the James Bay Project in 1971, immediately on the heels of the October Crisis in 1970. Following the hegemony of the Parti Québécois under René Lévesque, Bourassa's Liberals were returned to power and in 1986 announced their intention to proceed with phase two, the Grande Baleine. It was taken as a great insult by the Cree of James Bay that in 25 years of dealing with them, Bourassa never once visited a Cree community.


27) Maurice Strong, Where on Earth are we Going? (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2001), 188-231. Maurice Strong was also a member of the Brundtland Commission which authored pathbreaking recommendations on sustainable development published in 1987. See
World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future: The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). To underscore the interconnectedness of these issues, it is worth noting that it was Lucien Bouchard, then Minister of the Environment in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who proposed the name of Maurice Strong as Canada’s nominee for the post of secretary-general of the Rio conference. Bouchard was soon to leave the Progressive Conservative Party over the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, first to lead the Bloc Québécois in the federal parliament, then to become the Premier of Québec as leader of the Parti Québécois.

28) The most sophisticated example of this is Nunavut, the new Inuit territory in the Arctic. Earlier in the paper I noted the origin of the Inuit Tapirisat in 1971. Nunavut was thus another successful product of the immediate post Centennial period of protest. Formally established in 1999, Nunavut is almost equal in stature to a province, with a premier and an elected 19-member legislative assembly based in the capital of Iqaluit on Baffin Island. The official language of Nunavut is Inuktitut. No one is eligible for elected office who does not speak Inuktitut. The population of Nunavut is 27,219 people, of whom 85 per cent are Inuit. Fifty-six per cent of the population is under the age of 25. The total area of Nunavut is 1.994 million square kilometres, or about 20 per cent of the total Canadian land mass. The creation of Nunavut included a land claim settlement, the largest in Canadian history, which recognized Inuit ownership of 350,000 square kilometres of land, including subsurface mineral rights in a scattered range of areas selected by the Inuit and accounting for 10 per cent of the total. The government of Nunavut is responsible for the educational, health, justice, cultural, housing and social service jurisdictions specifically. There are no political parties; all members of the legislature sit as
Aboriginality, Multiculturalism and the Land


31) The settlement of comprehensive land claims had been identified by the Berger Commission as one precondition for any future development in the Mackenzie Valley. The Inuvialuit of the Mackenzie Delta region had been founding members of the Inuit Tapirisat in 1971, but they elected to make an agreement separate from the Inuit of the western Arctic in 1984 to protect themselves from the immediate pressures of oil and gas exploration in the Delta and the Beaufort Sea. The Gwichin in the Mackenzie Delta and the Sahtu Dene in the region of Great Bear Lake settled their claims in 1992 and 1993 respectively. The Dogrib have signed an agreement-in-principle. "Arguing that if government honoured the spirit and intent of the existing treaties their land and governance issues would be resolved to their satisfaction, the Deh Cho First Nations in the Southwest NWT and the Akaitcho Dene First Nations (primarily south of Great Slave Lake) have refused to enter land-claims negotiations and are dealing with Ottawa through other mechanisms. The federal government has begun what amounts
to land-claims negotiations with the South Slave Métis Tribal Council (the only Métis organization in Canada to have such a claim accepted by Ottawa).” Graham White, “Government under the Northern Lights: Treaties, Land Claims, and Political Change in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories,” in A Passion for Identity: Canadian Studies for the 21st Century. 4th Ed. Ed. by David Taras and Beverly Rasporich (Scarborough: Nelson, Thomson Learning, 2001), 466. As the De Cho are on the route of any Mackenzie Valley pipeline, their support will be essential to any agreement to proceed. See also, Robert M. Bone and James C. Saku, “Looking for Solutions in the Canadian North: Modern Treaties as a New Strategy,” Canadian Geographer 44:3(Fall, 2000), 259-270.


33) Aboriginal people in the areas with firm comprehensive land claims settlements clearly have substantially greater control over their resources. Environmental impact assessments are overseen by co-management boards that represent the interests of the federal government and First Nations peoples.


36) Ibid., 112.

토착성, 다문화주의 그리고, 땅

존 와들랜드

1967년, 연방 설립 100주년을 맞아 캐나다인들은 국가의 내적 질서와 연합 내의 다양성을 확신하게 되었으며, 지난 노선이 평화와 번영의 노선임을 또한 확신하였다. 그러나, 지난 9월에 있었던 뉴욕 대еш사는 어느 나라도 이런 예기치 않은 대사건에 대해 예외임을 없음을 알게 되었다. 캐나다인들의 삶을 형성하는 변수들은 1967년 이래로 가속적으로 변화되었으며, 이는 종종 다른 지역의 대사건들에 대해 직접적으로 반응한 결과였다. 이 연구 논문은 이런 사건들 중 단지 몇 가지를 단지 언급하려고 하며, 이는 특허 이 사건들이 원주민들에게 영향을 주었고, 계속하여 영향을 주고 있기 때문이다.

우리는 캐나다 이주민이다. 오늘날 캐나다는 여러 단편 조각들로 구성된 탈근대국가이며, 국가의 미래는 서로를 존경하며 대화하고자 하는, 이 단편 조각들의 의지에 궁극적으로 의존하고 있다. 그러나 이주민인 우리의 책임은 여기서 끝나지 않으며, 우리는 원주민들을 인정하고 존경해야 한다.

1963년 2개 국어 평원주의와 2개 문화 평원주의에 대한 왕립위원회 (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism)가 설립되었는데, 이 위원회에서 만들어졌던 보고서 어느 부분에서나 원주민에 대한 언급은 거의 없다. 원주민과의 동반자 관계를 인정하고 그 관계의 유 효성을 확인할 특별한 기회도 있었지만, 오늘날 캐나다가 원주민에 대해 취하는 입장은 볼 때 이 기회는 간과된 것이 아니라, 효과적으로 바라진 것임을 알 수 있다.

제도화된 다문화주의는 Laurendau-Dunton 보고서의 산물인데, 이는 캐나다 서부보다는 토론토와 같은 대도시에서 훨씬 더 성공적이었으며, 최
근의 이주민들을 급속도로 다양화시켰다. 
다문화주의는 중대 추세에 있던 원주민의 정치적, 문화적 행동주의와 경쟁적인 것이었다. 이 행동주의는 크게 보자면 인디언 관련 법령과 조약의 무효를 주장했던 1969년 트위도 정부의 백서에 반(反)하여 나온 것이었으며, '2개 국어 영용주의와 2개 문화 영용주의에 대한 왕립위원회'의 보고서 또한 원주민에게 불리한 것이었다. 원주민들이 원주민으로서의 권리를 인정받기 위해서는 싸워야 함이 분명해진 것이다.


1969년 원주민들이 왜 그렇게 해를 냈었는지는 쉽게 이해되나, 연방 정부가 왜 그토록 명시적으로 스스로의 입장들을 변복했는지는 확실치 않다. 그 대답은 몇에 있다. 대부분의 토파문화에서는 망, 물, 공기는 한데 어울려 삶 전체, 정신적인 일체를 구성한다. 그러나 많은 캐나다인들에게는 이런것들은 단순히 시장에서 사고 파는 물건 혹은 자본주의 상품의 생산 후 배출되는 쓰레기를 세척하거나 파묻는 단순한 물건이었다.

원주민들은 친연 자원을 개발할 때 그들의 문화가 어떻게 영향받을 지 오랫 동안 잘 이해해 왔다. ‘맥켄지 계곡 파이프라인 조사’는 원주민의 복소리가 한층 강해지고 있다는 것을 극명하게 보여 주는 예로서 원주민들의 주장, 망에 관한 주장이 실제로 받아들여진 상징적인 사건이 되었다.
원주민의 행동주의 또한 국가주의와 환경 보전주의가 일어나는 대부분의 경우 자원 문제 때문이라는 것이 이 논문의 주된 전제이다. 최근의 아프가니스탄 위기는 에너지 문제가 여전히 우리 결에 있음을 상기시키는 것이다. 미국은 자신의 에너지 필요를 채우고자 인근 나라들을 둘러보게 될 것이며, 따라서 캐나다와 원주민과의 관계는 국제 문제에서도 점점 전략적인 요소가 될 것이다.

필자는 물이 땅에게는 생명이라고 하고, 캐나다 토착문화에서 중심이 된다고 주장해 왔다. 물 문화는 캐나다인과 미국 역사 전반에 걸쳐가 느껴지고 있는 가장 중요한 변수이다. 또 물은 농업에도 중요하지만, 공업용으로 쓰기도 중요하다.

수력 발전이 있는 곳에는 어디나 댐이 있으며, 새로운 댐이 생기는 곳이면 거의 항상 원주민들이 영향을 받는다. 캐나다 북쪽의 La Grande River의 경우 이것이 아주 명백하게 드러났었다. 이 곳에서 '제임스만 발전 계획'의 첫 단계로 생태계에 영향을 가하였다. 이 생태계에 에스키모족과 크리족 문화가 의존하고 있었다. 또 식량에 영향을 가한 경우도 많이 있었다.

이 협정과 관련하여 크리족들과는 캐나다 정부가 제언한 세 가지 계획 중 첫 번째 것만이 협상되었을 뿐이었다. 그런데도 1986년 캐나다 정부는 위 협정의 두 번째 단계, 즉 Grande Baleine 계획을 추진 중이라고 공표하였다. 그러나, 이는 이전 1990년 국가의 'Green 계획(Green Plan)'을 앞서가는 등의 모습을 보였다. 어떤 자원 문제는 자연에 대한 정치적 고려가 그 이면에 존재한다. 그들은 도와 주는 법인이 없었다면, 원주민들은 자연 논쟁에서 이익 추구의 계획으로 회생되었을 것이다. 크리족들의 반대에 부딪치며 캐나다 정부는 Grande Baleine 계획을 포기할 수 밖에 없었으며, 이는 제임스만의 크리족에게는 엄청난 승리였다.

그러나, 다른 지역에서는 에너지와 관련하여 원주민에 영향을 주는 다른 계획들이 현재 추진 중이며, 그 중 유명한 것은 맥켄지 계곡의 경우이다. Beauford 해로부터 남쪽 시장까지 가스 파이프라인을 설치하려는 계획이 현재 다시 검토 중이며, 두 개의 파이프라인 경로가 제안되었고, 세 번째 대체안도 제시되었다. 반아적으로 지금은 땅에 대한 원주민의 요구는
확정되었고, 원주민들 또한 파이프라인에 대한 찬성을 갖고 있다. 과거에 강력한 반대를 했었으나, 그때는 북쪽에 새 파이프라인이 설치 가능하다는 것을 캐나다 정부가 거의 언급을 하지 않았었다.

남쪽 지방에서 가하는 압력이 원주민의 문화에도 영향을 미친다. 남쪽 지방 사람들은 에너지와 자원을 북쪽 지방에 의존하고 있다. 남과 북이 그들이 만나는 접점에서 서로 협력할 필요가 많이 있다. 양측은 모두 땅에 의존하고 있다. 비록 땅을 보는 시각이 다를지라도 땅이 영속적으로 활력을 유지할 것인가에 그들 문화의 유지 여부가 달려 있다.

[요약: 이호영(불문과 대학원)]