Schutz's Account of the Life-World
— In Search for a Political Sphere —

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I

In this Paper, I intend to pursue Alfred Schutz's account of the life-world. Schutz's central concern is methodology of social science. He sees in the notion of the life-world a new foundation for social science. He restates the methodology of social science in terms of Husserl's life-world. We can condense Schutz's ideal of social science as follows: methodology of "social science" is to be anchored in the "motivational understanding" of the "social world." In this statement, we find three critical terms, i.e., "social science," "motivational understanding" and "social world." In order to understand Schutz's ideal of social science, we need to explicate each of these terms carefully. In the following discussion, however, I will concentrate on Schutz's notion of the social world. In particular, I will explicate Schutz's ontological standpoint in contradistinction to the constitutional genesis of the social world. At the end of the discussion, I will give a brief account of my own search for the constitution of a political or public sphere within the life world.

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II

At first glance, Schutz seems to develop his notion of the social world along the line of Husserl's idea of the life-world. Schutz includes the social world in the realm of the life-world. As Schutz says, the life-world is "man's fundamental and paramount reality."1) And it is only in this pre-eminent reality of everyday life that we can find the social world. According to Schutz, the life-world is "the province of reality" which is given to "the wide awake and normal adult" in the "attitude of common sense" or "natural attitude." The life-world is "what is plainly given to us in the natural attitude."2) Schutz sees in this life-world two different realms, that is, the realm of "nature" or "the province of things in the outer world" and the realm of "fellow-men" or the "social world." The life-world includes, in its totality, both the "natural" and "social" world. This means that the social world is one realm of the life-world; it is the life-world shared among fellow-men; it can be experienced only intersubjectively. To put it another way, it is in the life-world that the individual experiences a social world, and enters the realm of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is one of the basic categories of the social world. The critical point Schutz raises here is that it is only in the pre-scientific life-world, that is, the world given in the natural attitude, that we can enter the realm of intersubjectivity; intersubjectivity is possible only in correlation with the natural attitude and the world given to it, that is, the life-world. This is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl, or, as Gurwitsch points out adequately, where "he deliberately abstains from raising questions of transcendental constitution and pursues his phenomenological analyses within the framework of the 'natural attitude'"4) Schutz

2) Ibid., p.6.
3) Loc. cit.
disagrees with Husserl on the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity. Schutz posits intersubjectivity of the social world as essentially an ontological problem of the natural attitude rather than a constitutional problem of the transcendental ego. Schutz argues that any attempt to constitute the intersubjective social world from the activities of transcendental subjectivity necessarily leads to solipsism; thus, no concrete problems of the social science, i.e., the problems arising in the intersubjective social world, can be solved by transcendental phenomenology.

At first, Schutz characterizes the social world as a realm belonging to the prescientific life-world. The social world has a prior existence in prescientific goals of our action and the means available for attaining them and the constructs which delimit the free possibilities of our action as well as helping us to find our bearings within the social world and to come to terms with it. The essential point Schutz brings out here is that the social world and, with this, its basic category, intersubjectivity, are already given in our prescientific natural attitude. Furthermore, Schutz holds that the intersubjective social world is possible only in correlation with the natural attitude. In this way, Schutz anticipates a critical reaccount of Husserl's constitutional view of transcendental intersubjectivity. In several places in his writings, Schutz indicates that Husserl took account of the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity but did not solve it. In particular, in that critical essay, "The problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," Schutz sums up "Husserl's attempt to account for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity" as a failure. The reason for this failure, Schutz says, is that "intersubjectivity" is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (Gegebenheit) of the life-world. "Intersubjectivity" is the fundamental ontological category of human life-world. The social world has a prior existence in prescientific life-experience, in common-sense perception. The social world in which men actually live with other men is a world built up in the naive natural point of view of everyday life. It is the world where men's lives are performed spontaneously in the natural attitude. Schutz argues, then,

that the social world, as a realm of prescientific life-experience, is an original or pre-predicative construct; it has pre-structure of its own. The "social world," Schutz says, "is not essentially structureless." On the contrary, it has "a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein."5)

From the outset, the social world is a preselected and preinterpreted world. It is a pre-constructed world — the pre-construct of the common-sense thought of men who live together naively within the natural attitude. The social world is given as a sum total of common-sense constructs. Constructs are not alien to the prescientific social world. Rather, they are inherent in the daily life of the social world. Even "the simplest interaction in common life presupposes a series of common-sense constructs."6) In this sense, the social world is the locus of all actual and possible common-sense constructs which, as Schutz says, determine our behavior, define the existence in the world and the locus of all philosophical anthropology. "As long as man is born of woman," Schutz concludes, "intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence."7) Schutz's ontological standpoint of the social world is fundamental in two senses: first, it is the point where Schutz departs from Husserl; second, it is the point where Schutz's own "philosophy of social science" begins.

We can contrast Husserl and Schutz in terms of two parallel terms: "transcendental" and "mundane." Against Husserl's notion of transcendental phenomenology and transcendental intersubjectivity, Schutz develops mundane phenomenology and mundane intersubjectivity. According to Schutz, Husserl develops the theory of constitution in terms of two epoches—the epoches in the sense of exclusions of the "natural attitude." The first epoch reveals the world as a transcendental phenomenon. The world effected by the first epoch, however, is not

6) Ibid., p.23.
the world "properly" given to the ego; the sense of the world is still codetermined by "strange" elements, by what is not "properly" of the ego. Another epoche is necessary "to create a unique philosophical solitude which is the basic methodological requirement for a genuinely radical philosophy." Thus, a second epoche is performed to obtain the realm of "what is peculiarly my own (des selbst-eigenen)." The aim of the second epoche is twofold: the first is to separate out all that is "properly" of the ego from all that is not of it; the second is to yield the constitution of the Other as a full monad within my monad. Schutz makes then a critical point: "Even within the transcendentally reduced conscious life"-in other words, even within the realm obtained by the first epoche- "the phenomenon 'world' is not experienced as my private synthetic product, but as an intersubjective world whose objects are accessible to everyone." Schutz reminds that several texts, including passages in Formal and Transcendental Logic, point to a "preconstituted substratum" (Unterstufe) of what is not "properly" of the ego. Then, Schutz asks: "Of what kind is the preconstitution of that substratum, and how does it come about?" How does that which is not "properly" of the ego manifest itself as such? Isn't it instituted already in the natural world and retained in the egological sphere as an intentional correlate? Isn't it the life of any ego-subject to imply, by way of empathy, other egos in its living stream of intentionality? Isn't that which is not "properly" of the ego a pre-constituted substratum of these other egos, which are implied within the living stream of the primal ego? Thus, isn't intersubjectivity an ontological problem, centering on the noematic-ontic manner of givenness of the mundane ego in the life-world, rather than a constitutional problem, that is, the problem of fashioning the noeses and noemata out of the activities of the transcendental consciousness? Is the problem of sociality not the one belonging exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world rather than to the constitution of the transcendental ego? Schutz wonders: How can we talk at all about Others within the transcendental sphere, within the line of demarcation of the sphere which is peculiar to my own concrete transcendental ego? For Husserl, the transcendental ego can never lose its singularity and personal indeclinability. In
this sense, Schutz characterizes his transcendental ego as a "singulare tantum," a term which is not capable of being put into the plural. How, then, can we transform the transcendental ego into a We-community?

Husserl, however, maintains in *Cartesian Meditations* that the ego eliminates, by means of the second epoche, the others from the thematic field of the transcendental universal sphere. Through the performance of the second epoche, I exclude all "that is other than myself" (*Fremden*). I exclude, first, Others—Others not only in the sense of ego-like beings, such as men and animals, but also in the sense of other minds such as the cultural objects which determine or co-determine my phenomenal world; second, I exclude the surrounding world and the corresponding cultural community in its being and sense as world for everyone.

"Husserl explicitly states," Schutz recalls, "that every reference of sense to a possible Us and We is excluded by the second epoche." After the performance of the second epoche, there remain in the thematic field only those actual and potential intentionalities in which the ego is constituted in its "proper sphere" (*Eigenheit*). I reduce the universe of my conscious life to my own transcendental sphere (*transzendentale Eigensphäre*), to my concrete being as a monad. It is, in the most radical and truest sense, my private world.8)

Within Husserl's reduced world-phenomenon, one object is always given in immediate presentation. It is my body. My body is distinguished from all other bodies as a living body (*Leib*). Within the primordial sphere of the transcendental ego, my body alone is a living body. According to Husserl, Schutz observes, "my living body alone is constituted originally as living, as a functioning organ." My body is distinct as a carrier of my field of perceptions, as a functioning organ of my kinesthetic movements, as a sum total of my organs which I command and control actively. In conformity with my experience, I attribute to my body a sensorial field. Within my primordial sphere, my body stands out as a living body, as a psychophysical unity acting within the world and being affected by the world.

through the body. This living body of the ego is the primal basis of constituting Others. In other words, in the sphere reduced to what is "properly" of the ego, the Other's conscious life is not originally accessible to me, but only in terms of appresentation or analogical apperception of my living body. In the primordial sphere, another human being's psychological life has no originary presence to the ego; no ego can have other ego's mental contents in actual originality but only in appresentation. The Other appears, first of all, only as a body (Körper) or as a "natural body" belonging to the outer world—the world which is oriented to the ego. The Other is first given as an object, not as a subject. Upon this other body (Körper), I-the ego-bestow the sense of "living body" (Leib) and more particularly "living body other than mine." I do this through appresentation, through analogical "interpretation" (not "inference") or through what Schutz calls an "assimilating apperception," that is, an apperceptive transfer or extension of sense through analogy of similarity. The Other body (Körper) is interpreted as analogous to my own living body (Leib) and is apperceived as Other people's living body (Leib). I interpret in the same manner of analogy the Other's bodily movements as gestures and their concordant behavior as an expression of his psychical life. In this way, the Other is constituted within my monad as an Ego that is not "I myself" but a second, an alter ego. The alter ego, and with this, "the common time-form" between the egos, is constituted by appresenting my present living body. I comprehend the Other's mind by appresentation of my living body through the intermediary of events in the outer world, occurring on or brought about by the Other's body.

Schutz agrees with Husserl on that my living body is always present and given as the primal instituting organ. But what Schutz questions is that the constitution of the Other must be distinguished from the way in which my own psychophysical ego is constituted. I observe merely the exteriority of the Other's body whereas I experience my own body from within. Accordingly, my living body is "present precisely in a way which is as dissimilar as possible from the external perception of an animate body other than mine and therefore can never lead to an analogical
apperception." Another problem, which Schutz sees in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, is that the second epoche does not yield a "transcendental" alter ego but merely a "psychophysical" alter ego. "The second epoche," Schutz asserts, "could never yield the constitution of the Other as a full monad within my monad, but at most it yields appresentation of another psychophysical ego beginning from the substratum of my psychophysical ego."

Schutz concludes that the transcendental intersubjectivity as constituted by Husserl is not yet an "intersubjectivity." For him, the transcendental "intersubjectivity" which Husserl constitutes is a "subjectivity" existing purely in me, in the meditating ego. It is constituted purely from the sources of my intentionality, though constituted in such a manner that each transcendental subjectivity in every single human being may be the same. In other words, the problems Schutz sees in Husserl's theory of experiencing alter ego or, as Husserl often calls it, "empathy," are that: first, it ends up with the constitution of a psychophysical-not a transcendental-alter ego; the alter ego effected by the appresentation at the end of the second epoche is not a transcendental ego but a psychophysical ego; second, even if Husserl were right in constituting a transcendental alter ego, this alter ego still does not yield the relationship of intersubjectivity. No transcendental "community," no transcendental "We," is established by Husserl. On the contrary, "each transcendental ego has now constituted for himself, as to its being and sense, his world"; and the world which the transcendental ego has constituted is "just for himself and not for all other transcendental egos as well." Or Husserl's "transcendental intersubjectivity" would be a community for "me" or for "you," even "a cosmos of monads"; nonetheless, there is no "inter"-monadic relationship or "inter"-communication between a plurality of transcendental subjects. At this point, Schutz refers to a similar view as advanced by Eugen Fink, a later Assistant to Husserl. According to Fink, "[t]he creation of a universe of monads and of the objective world for everyone proves to be impossible within the transcendental subjectivity of the meditating philosopher,

9) Ibid., 75-77.
a subjectivity which is supposed to subsist for him, and for him alone.” To sum up Schutz's critical arguments: first, no transcendental constitutional analysis can disclose the essential relationship of intersubjectivity; second, no social science can find its true foundation in transcendental phenomenology; third, we have to turn to the intra-mundane center of our life-world, that is, the mundane ego. For Schutz intersubjectivity—the most fundamental category of all the social sciences and of our existence in the “human realities” of the social world—is a realm belonging to the mundane ego.

III

Mundane ego is the foundation upon which Schutz establishes his “philosophy of social science.” The ideal of social science as Schutz postulates is “to determine what society, the state, language, art, economy, law, etc., actually are in our mundane life-world and in its historicity and to determine how the meaning of each can be made intelligible in the sphere of our mundane experience.” For Schutz, “the mundane world” given to the “mundane ego” — this world alone “is the topic and ought to be the topic” of all the social sciences. The central point Schutz drives at concerning the mundane ego is its “natural attitude.” “Mundane ego” refers to the human being living in the “natural attitude” with the everyday life-world before it as the basis of his actions and thoughts. Schutz founds on the “natural attitude” of the mundane ego the whole realm of ontology of the social world. “Natural attitude” is the matrix within which the mundane ego experiences the world in the mode of self-giving. In the following, I will bring out this point more clearly, that is, the mundane experience of the world in the mode natural attitude. The question I am raising is: how is the social world actually “given” in the natural

10) Ibid., p.84.
attitude? This question is directly related to what Schutz calls the "ontology of the social world."

Schutz's ontology of the social world is based upon one fundamental thesis, that is, what Husserl calls the "general thesis of the natural standpoint." To put this "general thesis" in the simplest way: "in the natural attitude of everyday existence one accepts the existence of other men as taken for granted."\(^{13}\) Schutz takes, from the outset, the intersubjective social world as unquestionably given in the natural attitude. Schutz starts out, as he states very clearly in *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, "by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint."\(^{14}\) To the naive attitude of our everyday life, the Others are simply given as subjects. From the outset, the other-subjects are given to me in the unquestioned assurance of an uncontested "belief," and thus not on the ground of a particular act of positing or judgment. The existence of other subjects is an unquestionably given datum. For Schutz, the other's existence does not require proof. Only radical solipsists or behaviorists, Schutz argues, would demand proof of this fact — the fact that other intelligent fellow-men do exist. In point of fact, even these thinkers do not doubt in their natural attitude the existence of their fellow-men. In natural attitude, all men — that is, "men" in the sense of "healthy, grown-up, and wide-awake human beings"\(^{15}\) — naively presuppose the sphere of "We." "We," the basic relationship of the social world, is the first and most original experience given by the very ontological condition of my being in the world. I was born into others through others and brought up by others and live among others. As Schutz points out, the "basic We-relationship is already given to me by the mere fact that I am born into the world of directly experienced social reality."\(^{16}\) My knowledge of my "birth" and my expectation of my "death" assures my existence in the intersubjective social world. "I can not

locate,” Schutz says, “my birth in my inner duration”; nor can I derive the certainty of death from my solitary existence; they all arise out of my “existence in the intersubjective world.”\(^{17}\)

Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that Schutz rejects any possibility of questioning the existence of others. The existence of other-subjects is an unquestioned but always questionable background. Schutz goes even further: any “circumstance that what has up until now been taken for granted can be brought into question is a point with which, of course, we will still have to deal.”\(^{18}\) What Schutz asserts is rather that in the “natural attitude,” there is no reason to question the existence of Others. In the natural attitude, “[n]o motive exists for the naive person to raise the transcendental question concerning the actuality of the world or concerning the reality of the alter ego, or to make the jump into the reduced sphere. “Rather,” Schutz insists, “he posits this world in a general thesis as meaningfully valid for him, with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living beings (especially with human beings), and with meaningful products of all sorts (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, etc.).”\(^{19}\) Schutz asserts that the naively living persons hold fast to the belief that other-subjects exist; they live in and endure and support this belief. What Schutz indicates here is that “the natural attitude of daily life has a special form of epoche.” Natanson calls this epoche as the “epoche of the natural attitude” whereas George Psathas simply calls it as “specific epoche.”\(^{20}\) In the natural attitude, Schutz continues, the epoche is

17) Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structure of the Life-World, op. cit., pp.46-47. At this point, we need to keep in mind those comments made by Michael Theunissen, that is; “When, in the transition to the social world, he leaps out of the transcendental into the natural attitude, this only means that he situates his social ontology at a level on which the transcendental constitution of the Other is already presupposed.” Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, tr by Christopher Macann(Cambridge, Mass, and London, England: the MIT Press, 1986), p.345.


20) Maurice Natanson, “Introduction,” Alfred Schutz Collected Papers I, op. cit., p.XVII; George Psathas, “Multiple Realities and the World of Film,” (a paper presented at the
performed in a "special" or in a "positive" way by affirming the belief in the existence of others. In the natural attitude, we suspend not "the existence of other-subjects" but the very "doubt" concerning the existence of other-subjects and, more generally, the "doubt" concerning the existence of the world and its objects: "In the natural attitude, a man surely does not suspend his belief in the existence of the outer world and its objects. On the contrary, he suspends every doubt concerning their existence. What he brackets is the doubt whether the world and its objects could be otherwise than just as they appear to him."21)

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Schutz holds the position that "intersubjectivity is possible only in correlation with the natural attitude and the world given to it, i.e., the life-world." Schutz asserts that the "everyday life-world" is "fundamentally intersubjective" or "a social world," "[t]he life-world," Schutz reiterates, "is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience"; "it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture."22) These statements can be easily understood in terms of Schutz's basic thesis — the "general thesis of the natural standpoint." In particular, it is of critical importance to notice that Schutz means by the "natural attitude" "fundamentally intersubjective," "social," "common" or "public."

In his posthumously published work, The Structures of the Life-World, Schutz uses the term "social, natural attitude" instead of merely saying "natural attitude."23) For Schutz, what is "social" is already pregnant in "natural attitude"; "sociality" is something prepredicatively given in the natural attitude. To put this point more precisely: the social world and, with this, its basic category, intersubjectivity, are already given in our prescientific natural attitude; the social world is a

22) Ibid., pp.16, 68; Alfred Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Actions," op. cit., p.10.
pre-constructed world— the preconstruct of the common-sense thought of men living in the natural attitude. The essential point I want to bring out is: for Schutz, the natural attitude of the mundane ego, or what Schutz calls the “general thesis of the natural standpoint,” is the fundamental foundation of the “philosophy of social science.” Schutz’s philosophy of social science is, in a sense, an explication—a thematic explication—of the natural attitude.

Schutz’s methodological arguments can be summed up as follows: the social world has near and far zones. In the first, there is the domain of fellow-men or consociates (Umwelt), that is, the so-called We-relation. In this domain, you and I experience one another in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity. Beyond this domain, there is the domain of contemporaries (Mitwelt). Contemporaries are those other men with whom I do not share my spatial immediacy but only temporal simultaneity. I share temporal simultaneity with my contemporaries not in terms of inner time or what Professor Bernard P. Dauenhauer calls “lived time” but only in terms of “clock time” or world time (chronological or cosmic time). In multiple transitions, this domain passes over into those domains of predecessors (Vorwelt) and successors (Folgewelt). The social world is given from the outset as a “structured world”; it is given “within a horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship which is, as such, just taken for granted.” The structures of the social world are understandable by reducing them to human actions; they are, so to speak, sediments of human actions. Human actions, in turn, are understandable by referring them to typical motives out of which these actions arise; the subjective or immanent meaning the action has for the actor can be made understandable by revealing the motives which determine a given course of action. According to Schutz, motive signifies an intentional meaning of an action. There are two basic motives, i.e., in-order-to-motive (Um-zu-Motive) and because-motive (Weil-Motiv). The fundamental methodological problem Schutz sees in social science is that the social scientist, qua scientist, cannot experience the social world as it is experienced by

man living his everyday life within the social world. This is due to the particular attitude of the social scientist.

First of all, Schutz characterizes the "attitude of the social scientist" as "that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world." Then he analyzes observation and the observer in correlation with the "one-sided Thou-orientation." There are two types of Thou-orientations: one-sided and reciprocal. One-sided Thou-orientations are correlated with the observational situation, while reciprocal Thou-orientations are correlated with the face-to-face We-relation. Schutz's analysis of the attitude of the social scientist begins from that of the reciprocal Thou-orientation. In a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the unique biographical situation, i.e., the physical and socio-cultural environment as defined by individual persons, is equally accessible to all fellow-men or consociates. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, I turn to you and you turn to me; we grasp each other in spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity; each of us is experienced "in person"—although only certain layers of the whole personality become apparent—and "in unique biographical situation"—although this is revealed fragmentarily. In reciprocal Thou-orientations, each other's stream of consciousness flows in "common time-form" and remains "tuned in" upon one another; we are growing older together. "To be with another," Richard M. Zaner elaborates, "is for Schutz to grow older with another"; "you and I grow older together by caring what becomes of each other." In reciprocal Thou-orientations, Schutz explicates, "[e]very phase of my inner duration is coordinated with a phase of the conscious life of the Other"; step by step, I grasp the conscious process of my fellow-man, i.e., my consociate; I submerge in the subjective contents of my fellow-man; the experience of each fellow-man is reciprocally determined, interwoven together; fellow-men are mutually involved in one another's biography in vivid present; they live, as it were,

in a common flow of experiences. As a unique phenomenon to reciprocal Thou-orientation, Schutz calls attention to the "reciprocal mirroring of self." In reciprocal Thou-orientations, Schutz says, "my fellow-man is...presented to me as more 'alive' and more 'immediate' than I am to myself"; my fellow-man experiences himself vividly through me and I through him. Schutz calls this "the reciprocal mirroring of self." In the complex refractions of mirror-reflexes, the intersubjective "We-relation" is developed and continually affirmed. The essential characteristics of the reciprocal Thou-orientation, Schutz observes, lies in "the mutual participation in the consociate's onrolling life"; "we direct our acts and thoughts towards other people"; "we live rather in Others than in our own individual life." In this way, in pure We-relation, Schutz observes, the action is "understood" from within or internally or "in terms of the meaning the action has for the actor." In other words, in a reciprocal Thou-orientation, the partner grasps the subjective meaning of the actor's action. I "understand" what you mean by your action in the same way I would "understand" my own analogous action if I were "There" (illit) instead of "Here" (hic). As already indicated, Schutz calls this "the subjective interpretation of meaning" or "Verstehen." For Schutz, "the subjective interpretation of meaning" or "Verstehen" is the proto-mode of everyday experience, the mode according to which man in daily life experiences the social world and organizes this experience.

But, if I am merely observing, my Thou-orientation is one-sided. In observation, my conduct is oriented to the observed, but his conduct is not necessarily oriented to me. The observer confronts a fellow-man, but the fellow-man does not take account or is not aware of the presence of the observer at all. In observation, the body of the Other is given to the observer as a field of direct experience. The observer may take observations of expressions that indicate the Other's conscious processes. Thus, the observer may apprehend both the manifestations of the Other's

conscious processes and the step by step constitution of the processes manifested. This is possible because he witnesses the Other's ongoing experiences in synchrony with his own interpretations of the Other's overt conduct in an objective context of meaning. But the observer is not in a position to verify his interpretation of the experiences by checking them against the Other's own subjective interpretations. The observer cannot project his "in-order-to" motives so that they will become understandable to the observed as his "because" motives. The "disinterestedness" or "detachment" of the observer makes it impossible to interlock their respective motives into common intentionalities for enactments of single projects. Under all circumstances, it is merely the manifested fragments of the overt conduct of the observed that are accessible to the observer. The overt conduct of the observed does not offer adequate clues to the subjective interpretation of the meaning the action has for the actor. The observer cannot tell whether and how the course of action is fulfilling the actor's subjective projects. According to Schutz, the observer cannot even say whether the observed fragments of overt conduct constitute an action — "action" defined as "conduct based upon a preconceived project" — in the pursuit of a projected goal or whether they are mere behavioral or physical movements. The observer cannot apprehend the subjective meaning of the action as intended by the observed as could a partner in a reciprocal We-relation. Schutz brings up here is the necessity of constructs of ideal types. In observational situations, Schutz argues, "it is possible to construct a model of a sector of the social world consisting of typical human interaction and to analyze this typical interaction pattern as to the meaning it might have for the personal types of actors who presumptively originated them." Schutz asserts that social science can actualize the idea of "Verstehen" by a modification of the first-order construct of the social world. That is the method of ideal types. "By this method of constructing and verifying ideal


31) Alfred Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Actions," op. cit., p.36.
types,” Schutz explains, “the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. In this way the structure of the social world can be disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meanings.” The crucial point is that Schutz takes the method of ideal types as the “only” one by which social science can “understand” or, rather, explain the social world. This means that the social scientist has to construct “thought objects” of his own, that is, the second order constructs which would then supersede the “thought objects” of common sense thinking, i.e., the first order constructs.

IV

In this final section, the point I am going to raise is the need to differentiate the public sphere within the realm of the intersubjectivity. There is no doubt that the life-world is an intersubjective world. What I suspect, however, is that the intersubjectivity of the life-world does not necessarily mean an openness or a transparent publicness. In this regard, I think Schutz and, along with him, Gurwitsch and, to some extent, Natanson too, are misleading. As indicated above, Schutz maintains that the “life-world is not my private world nor your private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world of our common experience.” More definitely, Gurwitsch characterizes “the life-world” as “a public world” by saying that: “Each of us does not experience the life-world as a private world; on the contrary, we take it for a public world, common to all of us, that is, for an intersubjective world.” In a similar vein, Natanson calls Schutz’s “common-sense world” as “the public domain”: “As common-sense men living in the mundane world, we tacitly assume that, of course, there is this world all of us

share as the public domain within which we communicate, work, and live our lives." 34) The points I am arguing for are these: intersubjectivity is not identical with the public; rather, it includes in itself both the private and the public realms; or, using Schutz's own terminology, each individual's "biographical situation" is not necessarily public, though it essentially belongs to an intersubjective realm. In order to make out these points clearer, we need to distinguish, after the fashion of David Hume, the "natural" or smaller social relation from the "civil" or political society.

According to Hume, men can live, as shown "in the American tribes", "in concord among themselves without any established government", and are able to maintain those "three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises" without having recourse to government. It is, however, "in time of war" or with the emergence of "a larger society" and, with this, the occurrences of disturbance or disorder in "the enjoyment of peace and concord," that men are prompted to "form" or "invent" government. 35) What Hume means here are these: first, men, "in the ordinary conduct of life,

35) Hume says: "when society has become numerous, and has encreas'd to a tribe or nation," the regard to public interest "is more remote", and, with this, "we may frequently lose sight of that interest which we have in maintaining order, and may follow a lesser and more present interest." With the increasing differentiation of society, men easily tend to forget the interest they have in common for their peculiar interest. All men are subject to the same weakness of preferring "any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society." In consequence,

it necessarily happens, that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain. You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity by showing me, that I should be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on my self a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness.

To put it another way, with the increase of society, the trust in convention or in the
look not so far as the public interest···”; rather, they are “naturally selfish, or endow’d only with a confin’d generosity”; second, with “the intervention of thought or reflection,” especially on convenient as well as inconvenient experiences of human life, there arises the sense of public interest; third, the sense of instability of this public interest causes men to quit non-political social life and to enter into political society; thus political life follows upon social life; or “civil society or government” is preceded by “natural society.” In short, the sense of public interest is not natural but artificial; it is, as it were, something constituted from “our reflections,” but is not itself a nature like “hunger, attachment to offspring, and other passions”; it is more the creation of human convention or the artifice of human contrivance, than naturally inherent in human mind; there is no such a nature as public interest in human mind in itself; it comes rather from the labor of reflections—the reflections on the common experience of human life; it is formed, neither by nature as such

common systems of conduct and behaviour becomes unstable-unstable in the sense that, though the systems of conduct and behaviour be sufficient to maintain any society, yet it is impossible for men to observe this systems “of themselves.” In this way, there arises a sense of the instability or ineffectiveness of voluntary observance of the public interest, which consequently occasions the “inducement to maintain, with the utmost zeal··· these forms and institutions, by which ··· the public good [is] consulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained and punished.” Men, thus, feel the need for the strict execution of measure to protect the public interest. Men’s passions now impel them to “run into the invention of government,” or to accept the duty of “obedience.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge(London: The Clarendon Press, 1968), pp.499, 535-538, 543, 554.

As Robert S. Hill summarizes it again, “[s]ome men are made rulers, i.e., they are placed in a position where they have an immediate interest in the impartial administration of justice and no interest or only a remote one in the contrary. The rest of men are ruled,” that is, they are “made” or “placed in a position” to see obedience to government as their immediate interest. Robert S. Hill, “David Hume,” in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, Third Ed.), pp.550-551

In accordance with the differentiation of the ruler and the ruled, the realm of intersubjectivity begins to be divided into two different areas, i.e., into the public and the private. The problem arising out of this division becomes acutest in the ruler. The Greek tragedies show how agonistic these conflicts are!
nor by instinct of human mind, but by reflection which “insensibly and by degrees” alters the direction of mind or remedies “in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections.”36) Hume thus makes it very clear that the intersubjective sense of public interest is something artificial or invented, not something natural or given. From this stance, he declares: “Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, form necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse.”37) To our surprise, Husserl also shows a similar position in a manuscript of 1910, entitled as “Die Menschlichen Gesellschaften und Gemeinschaften.” In it, he lays down that: “Unterschied zwischen offenen und personal gebundenen, geschlossenen geselligen Verbindungen. Eine Räuberbande, gemeinsame Verabredung zum Raub. Ein Verein, der Statuen hat, in denen er die Neuaufnahme von Mitgliedern offen lässt und regelt.” And he adds up: “Der Staat eine offene Gemeinschaft wie auch der Verein.” In a way, Husserl differentiates two different regions within the intersubjectivity: one is open one like “Verein” or “Staat” and the other is a closed one such as “Räubebande.” In any sense, for Husserl, the state is to be distinguished from “a robber band,” even though he recognizes that some states are hardly distinguishable. To repeat, the state is the sphere which belongs to the “open” or “public” intersubjectivity, though its individual members lack such a quality. This implies a paradoxical or, rather, an infinite, task inherent in the state: that is, the state ought to effectuate a public realm with members born private. At least, I read Husserl in this way, when he says that:

Ein Staat eine offene Gemeinschaft, die zugleich Abstammungsgemeinschaft insofern ist, als die Kinder der Bürger in die Staatsgemeinschaft hineingehören, ihre Rechte haben, obschon sie erst nach erreichter Reife zu vollen Bürger werden. 

... ein Staat erwachsend aus einer natürlichen Abstammungsgemeinschaft, erwachsend als Gemeinschaft der Unterordnung der Willens unter eine Autorität, des Stammeshauptes, der Despoten, Tyrannen etc.38)

As Schutz mentioned, “man is born of woman.” In this sense, man is a being condemned to intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, he is not to be conceived to be born public from the very beginning. Of course, publicness might be the truth of intersubjectivity, but not its reality. It is more like “something,” if we are allowed to paraphrase Husserl, “which mankind could have only in the form of the struggle for their truth, the struggle to make themselves true.”39) And I would even argue that Kant’s essay on “What is Enlightenment” can be read in a similar drift, that is, as exhorting “publicness,” especially in the use of human reason. “The public use of one’s reason,” Kant urges, “must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind.” It is also intriguing to note that Kant sets off the “scholar”, in a sharp contrast to the “citizen” in general, as the unchallengeable carrier of publicness and that publicness in Kantian sense is transnational or even transpolitical showing an inclination of cosmopolitan taste.40)

Anyhow, the point I am arguing is that both Hume and Husserl conceive of publicness as something acquired or constituted on a higher stage of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, I want to contend that the acquisition of the sense

of the public is so much agonistic as antagonistic a process, demanding choices, struggles and above all else, using Kant’s own expression, “audae” or courages and a process, somehow, entailing a tragic sense of absence of intimate communion, that is, “unhappy consciousness.” Hume, however, does not go into that extent on this matter. No sooner had he entered the domain, as Husserl quipped, than his eyes seemed “dazzled;” whereas Hannah Arendt dares to meet it on the front. I expect of her for substantial accounts of the political sphere.

In the first, Arendt contends that in the ancient city-state, the “division between the public and private realms, between the sphere of the polis and the sphere of household and family, and, finally, between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of life” was “self-evident and axiomatic.” She argues in detail: “the foundation of the polis was preceded by the destruction of all organized units resting on kinship, such as the phratria and the phyle”; “the rise of the city-state and the public realm occurred at the expense of the private realm of family and household”; even “Aristotle’s definition of man as zoon politikon” was “opposed to the natural association experienced in household life.” In order to bring out more clearly “the sharp distinction” underlying the two realms, she even quotes the authority of Fustel de Coulanges’ The Ancient City: “the regime of the gens based on the religion of the family and the regime of the city were in reality two antagonistic forms of government. . . . Either the city could not last, or it must in the course of time break up the family.” And he adds: “the gulf between household and city” was “much deeper in Greece than in Rome.” But “with the rise of society” in modern age, that is, “the rise of the ‘household’(oikia) or of economic activities to the public realm”, the dividing line has become “entirely blurred” and finally disappeared. In this sense, the “disappearance” can be said as “an essentially modern phenomenon.” This is what she says:

The disappearance of the gulf that the ancients had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the household and 'rise' into the realm of politics is an essentially modern phenomenon.43)

In the second, Arendt excludes "everything merely necessary or useful" from the realm of politics" and includes in it only two things: action (praxis) and speech (lexi). These two are what constitute the political life (bios politikos) in the original sense. In this way, she takes up to constitute the political sphere from the very beginning. Let me start out from her descriptions of "the" political sphere—"polis":

1) "To be political", she says, is "to live in a polis"; it means that everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence"; it refers to "a way of life in which speech and only speech" makes sense and "where the central concern of all citizens" is "to talk with each other"; on the other hand, everybody living outside the polis, that is, the slave or the barbarian, means to be deprived of such a way of life;44) 2) if everything is "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence," then speech and action are considered "to be coeval and coequal, of the same rank and the same kind"; it is only in the pre-political realm of violence or in the life of sheer survival as found in the family or in the barbarian empire of Asia, that man is in no need of them; violence is mute; it is only in so far as political action "remains outside the sphere of violence," that it is "transacted in words" and, to that extent, both action and speech belong together; what is fundamental in understanding the sphere of polis, she stresses, is that "finding the right words at the right moment is action";45) 3) action and speech are closely related; or "[n]o other human performance requires speech to the same extent as action"; speechless action is no longer action, because there is no longer an actor, and the actor is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words; the action is disclosed by the word; as often as not, an action

43) Ibid., p.33.
44) Ibid., pp.25-27.
45) Loc. cit.
can be perceived, even without verbal accompaniment, in its brute physical appearance, but it becomes relevant only through the spoken word; through words alone, man identifies himself as the actor, “announcing what he does, has done and intends to do.” The critical point, however, is this: man as an actor or as an agent, is never an author or a producer: since every actor “moves in relation to other acting beings,” he is not only an actor, but at the same time a sufferer, but never an author; for the same reason, in the world of politics, that is to say, in the world of speech and action, there is no such a being like an author. Arendt illustrates:

... in any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into motion; and although this agent frequently remains the subject, the 'hero' of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual outcome.

4) “[I]n acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities.” Here we need to note that Arendt distinguishes “the disclosure of who somebody is”—the “person” or “human essence”—from “what somebody is”—one’s “qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings” or “human nature”; what is disclosed in one’s speaking and acting is not his “what” but “who”; and the revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness”; and for her, the Ancient Greek polis is a paragon of such a “human togetherness”; it was supposed “worthwhile for men to live together (syzen)” in polis not only to win “fame” and to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinction”, but above all else to keep this memory of greatness immortal; but “whenever human togetherness is lost” and “when people are only for or against other people,” the

46) Ibid., pp.178-181, 185, 186, 190.
47) Ibid., p.185.
"speech becomes 'mere talk'" losing its revelatory quality; and along with that, action, too, loses "all human relevance."48)

In the third, Arendt, on the basis of the above descriptions of speech and action, undertakes to constitute the political sphere. In the beginning, she starts from a continuation of the previous descriptions: 1) "action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men"; they are dependent "upon the constant presence of others"; they "need the surrounding presence of others"; plurality is "the basic condition of both action and speech"; they are therefore unimaginable outside the plurality of men: this means that speech and action have "intimate relationship to the public", that they are the very activities which constitute the public. "Between men, she goes on, there lies the world of objective things" in which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests"; and these "interests" as Arendt elaborates, are what "constitute, in the words most literal significance, something which inter-est, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together." Now, Arendt re-designates "interests" as "inter-est" which is identified with "in-between" or "web." The most critical point is that the "in-between" or "web" owes "its origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another."49) Virtually, the last expressions, that is, "men's acting and speaking directly to one another" reminds us of Schutz's "'face-to-face relationship' between consociates"-a relationship in which consociates share "a 'vivid present'" within the space of "immediate observation of gestures and other physiognomical expressions" and by which each consociate grasps "one another's thoughts, plans, hopes, and fears,"50) or a relationship which Natanson characterizes, in contrast to a realm of "anonymity" and "agency", as the realm of "recognition" and "personhood".51) The real significance, however, lies in that the "in-between" or

49) Ibid., pp.23, 175, 182, 183, 188, 198.
“web” is integrated into a more comprehensive conception of “the space of appearance.”

2) “action and speech create a space between the participants”; Arendt has named this space as the “in-between” or the “web”; now she renames it as “the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word”; “the space of appearance” is that “space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly”; by this, she seems to mean the “revelation of men’ own authentic Being through the appearance of speech and action”; when people gather together, the space of appearance is potentially there, “but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever”; it is only when “men are together in the manner of speech and action”, that the “space of appearance comes into being”; the being of that space “ultimately resides on action and speech.” The space of appearance is peculiar in “that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men,” but also “with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves.” It is Arendt’s opinion that the first public space of appearance—that is, polis—came into being when “the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homestead”; in this sense, the authentic carriers of the polis are “not Athens, but the Athenians”, not the tangible locations but the intangible qualities arising out of the people; of course, before a man could act, “a definite space [has] to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place”; but Arendt argues that “these tangible entities themselves [are] not the content of politics”; they are pre-political, though not non-political. The publicness, and thus the political character, of the space of appearance consists in “the presence of others,” in “its appearing to all”; its reality comes “from being seen, being heard, 51)

51) Requited from Hwa Yol Jung, “Reading Natanson Reading Schutz”(to be published by the end of the year of 1999), p.94.
and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men”; “whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream” -the dream as the most “intimate” and “exclusive” domain of the private.52)

From the standpoint of Schutz, however, it is certain that there can be no such a “space of appearance.” Nevertheless, one can conceive of it as a realm of “in-between” lying somewhere between his consociates and contemporaries. On the one hand, it is not different from the realm of consociates in sharing the “spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity.” On the other hand, it is not like it, in being surrounded by audience or by some portion of contemporaries. This brings to mind that every political realm is an ambiguous sphere of inter-mixture wherein both consociates and contemporaries must meet and co-exist or the mediation of the They should not exclude the immediacy of Thou. It also shows that any elimination of this awkward being of inter-mixture might lead to the abolition of politics. I think this is a challenge to Schutz's social ontology today.

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