Toward a Reconstruction of Rationality and Beyond: A Transdisciplinary Perspective

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I. Rationality as a Problem in Planning Theory and Practice

This project is intended as a contribution to the theory of rationality in planning and, in particular, as a meta-critique of the normative foundations of planning theory. In this effort, I shall consider the problem of rationality decisive for a critical reconstruction of planning theory. This work begins with the premise that all planning actions can be regarded as historical, social and self-reflective practices. My major aim is to provide a synthetic treatment of rationality as a problem in planning theory and practice.

There will be one leading theme— the problem of rationality in planning—recurring throughout the project. Rationality has recently come to the fore as a major concern for many planning theoreticians. Yet the notion of rationality remains confused despite the recent revival of interest generated by a series of theoretical debates on the subject (e.g., P. Healey, G. McDougall, and M. J. Thomas, 1982: Environment & Planning B: Special Issue on Rationality in Planning, March, 1983: R. Klosterman, 1983: E. Alexander, 1984: M. Breheny

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and A. Hooper, 1985; among others).

It also constitutes the most important subject for some planning theoreticians like Friedmann (1987; Friedmann and Hudson, 1973) and Faludi (1973, 1985). The problem of rationality as a subject-matter has run through most of their discussions on planning theory. The major object of planning theory, Friedmann has long argued, is to solve a meta-theoretical problem of how to make knowledge into action: this, he contends, is the problem of rationality (1973: 1987: 36). If we begin to see rationality as the object of planning theory as Friedmann does, then choosing a concept of rationality comes to the fore as a focus for the methodology of planning. Like Friedmann, Faludi, another leading planning theoretician, emphasizes the concept of rationality and has given the most significant theoretical implications of this methodological choice. (1982: 1983: 1985) In a similar but far more critical fashion, the problem of rationality also becomes an object of Habermas’ metatheorizing. Habermas writes in the Legitimation Crisis (1975: 139) that “the choice of a concept of rationality is decisive for the structure of a planning theory.”

What is Meta-Theorizing? and What is the Tool for It?

A ‘meta-theory’, according to Webster, is “concerned with the investigation, analysis, or description of theory itself.” Thus, the meta-theory is an appropriate label for the work of this project. There are, however, other reasons why the term ‘meta’ is descriptive for our project. Referring again to Webster, there are three definitions of ‘meta’:

(i) occurring later: in succession to: after: (ii) beyond: transcending: of a higher logical type: (iii) change in: transformation of something. (Unabridged. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1986)

All three describe the essential building blocks of this project.

First, the problem of rationality as a theoretical issue is raised in the context of yet one more analysis of the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber. Few social theorists have described the subject-matter with greater insight, scope, and consequence for the theory of rationality than Marx and Weber. Turner (1987) distinguishes metatheorizing as one of the four basic approaches to theory
construction: and he uses this meaning of the term "meta." 1) However, the dominant conceptions of rationality in planning have often been partial or incorrect interpretations of Marx and Weber. These interpretations force their ideas into false planning categories that is likely to lead any future rationality debate in the wrong direction.

Second, another meaning expressed by the word 'meta' is "beyond" or "transcending." I began with the premise that re-analysis of Marx and Weber for a theory reconstruction can lay a foundation for a systematic reflection on some crucial problems of rationality in contemporary planning. But this is not our main purpose. On this specific point, the goal is not simply to reconstruct the theory of rationality in planning through a re-analysis of Marx and Weber: it is rather to use that as a stepping stone to a new construct. In so doing, I shall move the theory of rationality beyond my own theory reconstruction rendered possible by Marx and Weber.

Third, and as a corollary of meanings (i) and (ii), 'meta' also carries the meaning of "change in" or "transformation of" something. In this sense of the word, the goal of this project is even more than a theory reconstruction. It is a theory replacement. Thus, it is truly intended as a "change in" and "transformation of" the currently prevailing planning thinking. In this respect, it is fair to say that the effort of retheorization of rationality by both Friedmann and Faludi does not seem to have gone far enough.

Having said this, our question goes beyond the realm of familiar theorizing in the currently prevailing line of planning thinking: the task, on this subject-matter, is thus to philosophize, in Heidegger's sense of "inquiry into the extraordinary." (1987: 12-3) My aim here is to philosophize the theory of (planning) rationality by means of the dialectical principle. "Dialectical reasoning is", as Ulrich (1983: 268) rightly put it, "the exact opposite of all schematic and dogmatic thinking: it is self-reflective, self-critical, self-transcendent thinking par excellence."

In this vein, I shall propose a dialectical conception of rationality in planning. The main idea of dialectic as a method, according to Markovic (1974: 32), is "to

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open up new problems, ... [and] to discover hidden contradictions in order to resolve them, in order to supersede critically the present state of the theory (and of the given social reality)." (emphases in original)

"The unique feature of dialectic as a method of social philosophy is", as Markovic (1974: 24) rightly puts it. "... (i) to discover in each (theoretical) system its essential limit. ... (ii) to show the concrete possibilities and ways of superceding such a limit." This is what he calls the "principle of the negation of negation". It is precisely in this sense that I wish to proceed in the same dialectical manner through an appeal to the very negation of my own reconstruction.

I shall divide my overall theoretical project into three basic concerns: first, to develop a metaframework consisting of a four-category schema through an appeal to the methodology of Marx and Weber; second, to systematically reflect on the divergent paradigms of rationality in planning toward their reconstruction; third, and most importantly, to supersede critically the limit of such a reconstruction in search of a new synthesis.

II. The Earlier Thoughts on Rationality: Marx and Weber

In formulating the concept of rationality in planning, Weber's notion of rationality seems to be the right place to begin, for it has provided the take-off point for many of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school as well as the rationalists among some planning theoreticians. Marx, on the other hand, is notable in his absence from the field of planning theory, in particular in the recent rationality debates. It stands in marked contrast to the frequent reference, whether pro or con, to Weber among planning theoreticians2). But Weber was not fairly treated there either; rather, he was too often mistakenly represented in 'good/bad' and 'for/against' terms3), thus trivializing his much broader theoretical vision. In what follows, both Marx and Weber's thought on rationality will be

3) Weber's investigation of rationality and the societal processes of rationalization was indeed an investigation and did not imply any normative stance on his part.
brought together, and brought into the methodological discourse.

Both Marx and Weber’s conceptions of rationality, despite their differences in substance, have fascinating methodological implications in common for this theoretical project. In order to demonstrate this contention, however, it is desirable to give a detailed analysis of their fundamental differences as well as their commonalities. Before doing so, I shall delineate some comparisons briefly, and give a preliminary indication of the major points of divergence and convergence in their theoretical account of rationality.

There are three particular issues which constitute the basis of my comparison of the work of Marx with that of Weber: (i) the starting point (ii) the duality of rationality (iii) the mode of analysis.

(i) Weber’s organization paradigm and Marx’s paradigm of production represent two radically different points of departure for the development of social theory. Weber (1947: 13) begins the process of systematic conceptualization by setting up a classification of four types of action. Weber’s fourfold typology of social action—affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end rational action—refers to universal capacities of Homo Sapiens. Instead of depending for their existence on societal, cultural, or historical constellations, these types of social action stand ‘outside of history’ as anthropological traits of man. (Kalberg, 1980: 1148)

In contrast to Weber, Marx (1976: 3–5) put forward the materialist conception of “the essence of man”. In opposition to Feuerbach, who had only an abstract conception of “man” in isolation from (specific) social relations and historical reality, Marx emphasized that real men could only be understood as products of social relations. In the Theses, Marx says that “the essence of man” is, in reality, “the ensemble of the social relations.” 4) I do not propose a reconciliation of the diametrically opposed standpoints they represent. Instead I shall argue it is very important to recognize that analysis of these differences must be made before the two can be methodologically interrelated.

(ii) I shall argue that both Marx and Weber’s formulations of the concept of rationality can best be understood if seen at both the action and systems levels. These two levels of theorizing must be construed as two ontological dimensions. I

have taken the duality of rationality in the works of Marx and Weber to be exceedingly important for analysis of the dialectical relationship between the rationality of acting subject and that of planning systems. What has not been recognized in the recent rationality debate in planning is the very great extent to which the duality of rationality - at the levels of both action and systems - is a common basis for the methodologies of both Marx and Weber.

(iii) Despite the aforementioned common ground, there is an important point of divergence between Marx and Weber in terms of methodological procedure. In a nutshell, it can be said that the dialectic of Marx’s mode of production has played a role of the same significance as the heuristics of Weber’s ideal-type.

In Marx, the internal law of development of the ‘mode of production’, a basic term in his historical materialism, is formulated in terms of the dialectical interaction of productive forces and social relations of production. Marx vested primacy in the forces of production over the production relations: This formulation implies that the social relations of production (the action level) and its dynamics are dependent on the development of structural forces of production (the systems level). His emphasis was on the logic of structural necessity.

In Weber’s scheme, the four ideal-types of action - affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end rational action - and their relations in the unfolding processes of rationalization constitute the pivotal concepts in his analysis. Having utilized his ideal-typical concepts – the types of rationality – as the basic heuristic tools, Weber scrutinized both the logic of situation with which rational agents confront (action level) and macro-societal processes of rationalization (systems level).

In what follows, I will begin to draw out these implications and try to recast them as a meta-theory of rationality in planning. It should be noted for our present purpose that the thought of Marx and Weber on rationality defies exact comparison if attention is focused on something other than the methodological plane. The question here is not whether Marx or Weber was wrong or right in their specific empirical predictions, but whether the categories with which they approached social reality are generally relevant to our understanding of the conceptions of rationality.
III. Against the Dichotomizing Trend in Planning Thinking

To begin with, historically the concept of rationality in planning thought seems to have appeared as a manifold: this well reflects the fact that there are divergent notions of rationality in existing planning thought and practice. The aim here is to provide a synthetic framework that can encompass and integrate those notions. Toward this end a four-category schema of the rationality concept was developed from the works of Marx and Weber. There were two well integrated pairs of theoretical orientations: namely, those to be found first in the ontological levels (action/Systems), and second in the epistemic domains (situation/structure). On this basis, I investigate the differentiation of divergent paradigmatic dimensions of rationalities in the current of planning thought, setting out the essential features of its problematics.

My analysis of Marx and Weber seems to suggest that some planning conceptions of rationality suffers on two dimensions: ontological on the one hand and epistemic on the other. The basic premise is to postulate a dichotomy in each of these two axes, and it seems well support my claim on the dichotomizing trend in planning thought. These dichotomizing trends seem to indicate that the problems of rationality have been explored on two different axes of conceptualization. Some theoreticians tend to choose to work on:

(i) the plane of either 'action' or 'systems' on the one hand, which is mainly concerned with the ontological levels of theorizing on rationality as the primary point of departure.

(ii) on the plane of either 'situation' or 'structure' on the other, which refers to the major epistemic domains of rational inquiry, using Faludi's term, for establishing the methodological principle.

I shall argue that 'either/or' conception of rationality in planning is fundamentally fallacious: I label the first (ontological) fallacy as the dichotomy Type-I and the second (epistemic) fallacy the dichotomy Type-II. The procedure adopted in the following section and the next combines elements of both systematic (or problem-centered) and reconstructive approaches.

On the one hand, a limited set of theoretical problems of rationality, - i.e., the
Type-I and Type-II dichotomies - and a unique way of solving them, constitute the principles controlling the selection of the texts studied. For this purpose, the four-category schema will lay a foundation for a systematic reflection on the problems of rationality. Through this, I will define the two pairs of rivalry concepts (of rationality) and then bring them together. Along these two axes, I shall examine the four paradigm cases of rationality in planning: namely, the rational action vs. systems paradigms on the one, and, the contingent vs. structural paradigms on the other.

On the other hand, a reconstructive approach is even more influential in the manner in which the exposition is carried out. I will use the four-category schema as a guide to delineate the mode of inquiry of each perspective, review its partial character, and then offer a synthetic framework for its reconstruction. In doing so, though only in a limited compass, it will shed some light on the evolving stages of theoretical consciousness in the horizen of planning thought. It appears that there was indeed a process of evolving theoretical consciousness. But, from Marx and Weber’s standpoint, I would argue, it was a process of contraction rather than expansion and deepening of consciousness. Many explorations of the notion of rationality have failed to emphasize its multivalent embodiments.

There are two paradigm cases of rationality - rational and critical - two rival rationalities forwarded in the field of planning theory. It appears that the efforts to theorize rationality in planning thus far have been molded in two strands of theoreticians: the rationalists and the critical planning theorists. But in a closer look, the rationalist paradigm in planning is a mixture of ideas, a mixture of currents of thought, more often than not partial and one-dimensional, molded in various forms. Thus far there evolves three molds of the rationalist paradigm and critical theorists attempt to replace them as an alternative.

The rationality of (subjective) action represents the oldest rationalist thinking. In this model of planning action, rationality has been traditionally defined in terms of the means-end schema. Hence it has been called an instrumental, purposive or means-ends rationality. Despite much criticisms on this mode of inquiry, as a classical model of rational planning it still persists in contemporary planning thought and action. But the salience of the means-ends schema has been reduced in the later formulations, and gradually replaced by systems rationality.
Our concern, then, is with the more recent two molds of the rationalist paradigms in a far more sophisticated and cautious form: the systems model and its step-cousin, the contingency model of planning.

1. The Type-I Dichotomy: Action vs. Systems

The first fundamental point in regard to the levels of theorizing (the basic dichotomy of action and system) is that two different views of rationalist model emerge: for the action paradigm of planning, the problem of rationality is approached in terms of the conception of the (abstract) human individual as actor (acting subject): for the system paradigm of planning, the problem of rationality is approached in terms of the conception of the human individual(s) or society as a total functioning system. On the basis of the duality of the rationality principle, the rationalist paradigms represented by either the abstract individual action or the abstract whole system are demonstrably fallacious. In a nutshell, from this methodological standpoint, both the extreme holistic and individualist views involve a reductionism of a kind that any planning inquiry has to avoid.

2. The Type-II Dichotomy: Situation vs. Structure

In recent years we see the emergence of the two rival rationalities poised to displace the old means-end and systems views: a contingent model (paradigm) and a critical (structural) model, prevailing in each of their cases. In each of these models we see another trend of dichotomizing — two different kinds of claims, discourses, or premises: all contingent approaches to planning tend to consider only a synchronic aspect and not a diachronic aspect of decision environment while structural planning theoreticians tend to sacrifice the former to the latter.

The logic of a situation under the contingent paradigm attempts to offer an analysis of the synchronic functioning of the system. But structural paradigm presupposes a structure, namely, the existence of the diachronic functioning of the system. It is more concerned with a diachronic mode of analysis by offering diagrams of ‘transition’ from one state to another of the reconstituted system. The contingent model and the critical (structural) model each stress one of two essential domains of planning inquiries, and are thus complementary to one another. I will argue that an analysis of synchronic, situational contingency must be supplemented by the analysis of diachronic, structural relations.
IV. In Search of a New Construct and Beyond

In our theoretical account of the dichotomizing trend of planning thought developed, I have proposed that the current planning conceptions of rationality can be organized around two poles of significance, namely, the Type-I and/or the Type-II errors: and that the reconstruction of these problematics involves the application of a new conceptual strategy. The task calls for a radical break with the old frame of reference of the dichotomized notions - i.e., the action/system and situation/structure divisions - that have featured so prominently in the evolving thought of planning rationality. In place of each of these dichotomies, I advanced the notion that these dichotomies represent dialectical unities - namely, the necessary co-presence and mutual dependence of opposite determinations. Taking these two dimensions together, we get the duality of rationality principle. In what follows, I sum up this central methodological principle on two theses:

1. Action and System: The Dialectical Turn

One problematic in some of planning conceptions of rationality arose from the dichotomous error, Type-I. The action/system division proved too narrow to meet the first desideratum (the Type-I error elimination). On the ontological ground, I reject this dichotomy, because it proves too insufficient as well as too deficient to dwell on our planning theorizing within one or the other of these two levels (action/systems).

I assert that these two - thus far separate paradigms - must be brought together: both are necessary in establishing the 'rationality principle'. The conflict between the two paradigms (action vs. systems), as to which should become the point of departure for constructing the concept of rationality, can now be resolved. In short, it will be a two-way avenue by combining the two foci into a single mode of inquiry. This will place the (epistemic) domains of rational inquiry in another light: it is necessary to open up to a new mode of heuristics.

2. Situation and Structure: The Heuristic Turn

As a natural corollary of the dialectical turn (i), we come to acknowledge, what we call the 'contingent-structure' intersections as essentially involved in all
planning situations. Here the two intersecting moments (situation/structure) presuppose one another in this heuristic mode of inquiry. Accordingly, another desideratum (the Type-II error elimination) is to relocate our analysis of epistemic domains from the perspective of the ‘situated’ rational agent to that of the ‘agent-situation/structure’.

I regard this heuristic turn in this mode of knowing as crucial mediating moments between the systematic, non-contingent, diachronic character of ‘structure’ on the one hand, and the specific, contingent and synchronic character of ‘situation’ on the other. Along the path of this transition on these two basic dimensions (i/ii), we come to have the idea of deriving the scientific, non-teleological, concepts of rationality: i.e., the ‘duality’ of rationality which centers on the facticity of rationality. In brief, this heuristics can take account of the relations between the situation of planning agents (action) and the structure of its (functioning) planning systems from a broader perspective of societal development; thus, serve to constitute the essential subject-object domain of rational inquiry. (What has been done up to this point might be called the (first) negation of the ‘dichotomized’ notions of rationality through its reconstruction. Then, what follows next, from a dialectical standpoint, is the turn to the ‘negation’ of (the first) negation, as set forth in the foregoing attempt, thereby superseding critically the very ‘limit’ of such a reconstruction (i/ii).)

Beyond Reconstruction: A Transdisciplinary Model of Decision-Making

Thus ‘far, the idea of the duality of rationality principle has been a maxim of our research that conforms to the scientific vision envisaged by Marx and Weber. Yet such a process of retheorizing (i/ii) through error elimination will only reveal the agent’s (knowing) consciousness (ii) of its empirical existence (i), i.e., the factuality of given-Being. In other words, the four-category of the rationality principle stands before the cognizing subjects as objective experience, that is, as objects of external experience. As such they are to be investigated and judged in accordance with the strict necessity of our actions as bound to time, space, and causality.

Taken together (i/ii), the duality of rationality principle only deals with the subject-object domain of intelligizing ego’s theoretical consciousness - the thinking
ego’s experience of external reality. In this sense, the four-category schema, reconstructed thus far under the name ‘duality of rationality principle’, is a methodological postulate or a meta-framework for analyzing the problem of rationality. As Karl Popper (1985: 359) adequately pointed out:

the rationality principle ... has nothing to do with the empirical or psychological assertion that man always, or in the main, or in most cases, acts rationally. Rather, it turns out to be an aspect of, or a consequence of, the methodological postulate that we should pack or cram our whole theoretical effort, our whole explanatory theory, into an analysis of the situation: into the model.

The duality of rationality envisioned by Marx and Weber seems to have taken a form of double imagery, or a double-double, as shown in our four-category schema. But it is still essentially a single vision, as Frye (1991) would, in no doubt, view it as the only one facet of the double: In other words, it still remains in the realm of the single vision seen from the eyes of the intelligizing ego. thus, as in Newton’s scientific outlook, it represents only one aspect of the double. What this means, then, scientific explanation, as Frye (1991: 24) pointed out, is still mainly non-teleological, confining itself to the how of things like the outlook of Isaac Newton. It is mainly concerned with the first aspect of Blake’s double vision, that is, the world of the thistle. In his posthumous book, Frye (1991) sought recourse to William Blake’s notion of the double vision and brought back the major themes of his life’s work. “The Double Vision” ia a phrase taken by Frye for the title of his book from a poem of Blake (1802):

For double the vision my eyes do see, And a double vision is always with me: With my inward eye “tis an old man grey: With my outward a thistle across my way.”5)

Moving beyond the scientific notion of the rationality principle originally envisioned by Marx and Weber, I must emphasize that planning theorizing cannot ground itself in the facticity of the rationality principle alone. To put it otherwise, in place of the rational reconstruction of the “old logic” of scientific discourse (Bohman, 1991: 53 & 76), I turn to a reflexive approach to planning action. This turn will give a new meaning to the reconstructive task of planning rationality.

As Bohman (1991: 76) contends that "as soon as reflexivity is introduced, so is indeterminacy." One self-reflective aspect of any planning practice is the changing and indeterminate character of planning actions. It appears that one important aspect of the recurrent theme of the double of our particular interest is the relation between the two elements of selfhood, within the human mind: one as the intelligizing self and the other as the transcendent Self. I shall argue that this duality always exists in the faculty of human mind and must work together in the making of a decision.

The idea of the kind of the double vision is not so new and can be found by many in various ways, both philosophical and scientific. Kant, as is well known, distinguished two realms, one of noumena or things-in-themselves, the other of phenomena or things-of-appearance. The latter realm is the only knowable one, and the former unknowable: Yet, in Kant’s conception, things-in-themselves constitute the real world which exists independently of human knowing. In accordance with his double vision, Kant also provided two aspects of human reasons of which I shall have to quote from Frye’s (1991: 32) description:

First was theoretical reason, which contemplates the objective world within the framework of its own categories, and hence sees the objective counterpart of itself, the world as it may really be eluding the categories. Second was practical reason, where a conscious being is assumed to be a conscious will, and which penetrates farther into the kind of reality we call existential, even into experience relating to God. (We can add here what Frye called questions of the kind teleological, relating to purpose and ultimate design.)

The first aspect of Kant’s double vision, as Popper reaffirms this view, symbolizes the problem of our knowledge about the physical universe (like Newtonian mechanics). The second pertains to the invisible self, to the actions of will and to human freedom, as Kant explains. (Popper & Eccles, 1977: 3)

Sir John Eccles (1953), a preeminent physiologist who received the 1963 Nobel Prize, advanced a theory of the "will" acting on the material brain, thus giving rise to conscious actions. Some years later he developed with Karl Popper (1977) a

6) The theme of the double of human mind, the conscious-unconscious self, also appears in the works of the modern depth psychologists, like Freud, C. Jung, A. Maslow, and R. Assagioli.
concept of dualist-interactionism in the context of a wide variety of brain activities relating to self-consciousness. They proposed to use the term “self-conscious mind” for the highest mental experiences. (Eccles, 1992: 2; 1989: 201) Eccles is a determined opponent of materialist theories of the mind which is based on the “doctrine that men are machines.” (Popper & Eccles, 1977: 3) Eccles contended that the self-conscious mind (actions of will) must be accepted as an entity of divine origin which interacts with and controls the material brain.

This mind-brain interaction, as Eccles (1989: 205) put it, is a “two-way process” within which the “self-conscious mind unifies experiences.” His major hypothesis was that the self-conscious mind is not just engaged passively in a reading out the operation of neural events, but that it is an actively searching operation: thus, it gives a prime role to the action of the self-conscious mind, an action of choice and searching and discovering and integrating (Popper & Eccles, 1977: 472). Eccles (1992: 106-7) quotes R. Jung’s statement (1979) about the intentional action of the self and its relation to purpose and freedom of the will:

Human purpose and its relative freedom of will and action coexist with a causally determined world. ... because man has learned to use causal relations for goal-directed action and has systematized his knowledge in science and technology. ... The cognitional selection of percepts at higher conscious levels is intentional and guided by attention. Directed cognition is analogous to aimed action by using anticipation, purpose and memory.

What this implies is that it is not the intellect which ultimately determines the rationality of self-conscious, reflective agents. But the agent’s self-conscious mind (will) involves in a rather decisive manner as its decision-making faculty. The intellect alone, I shall argue, is not capable of furnishing grounds for the subject of planning to make decisions without recourse to the actions of the will. Schopenhauer viewed the role of intellect as purely instrumental and passive. He says, “Will is first and original: knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument.

7) Eccles was trying to prove the existence of mind and of self-conscious mind in relation to brain activities. See Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, (New York: Routledge, 1977), p. 472.: on the psychological plane, this assertion is in remarkable accord with Assagioli and Maslow’s idea of two-selves, that is, the “I” or the ego and the transpersonal Self. Assagioli (1973: 13) says of the relationship between the I and the Transpersonal, or higher, Self, of which the I is a reflection or projection.
belonging to the phenomenon of will. ... Only the will is active."8) Farrer (1963: 109) also stressed the dynamic aspect (action) of the will. He says that "'will' is action itself, in the full and personal sense of the verb 'to act.'"9) In the Jacob Boehme's philosophy of freedom, as Koenker put it, "... will is the source of self-actuation in man." Indeed for Boehme "being is will."10) To be sure, there is a reciprocal relationship between the intellect and the will. On this reciprocity between the intellect and the will, Sheeks has drawn more balanced view from his study of Schopenhauer. He concludes that: "... the will is dormant most of the time (the intellect is a servant of the will) (and) the will does not depend on the intellect for existence as the intellect depends on the will. Yet, the will depends on the intellect for any knowledge of its existence."11) As with W. James (1950) and Abraham Maslow (1968), I have made a distinction between decisions 'momentous' and decisions 'trivial': by decisions I only meant a type of the first which profoundly involves the subject's entire being and its commitment to the future.

V. Toward a Double-Opening of Consciousness

Hegel bases his theory of action on the autonomy of the will, and sees the action as the unity of poesis (creative making) and praxis (ethical action). The latter, he asserts, has its origin in the subject's act of will.12) In The Phenomenology of Mind (1952: 236), he says that "the (human) individual is only

what he has done. ... [Hence] the true being (Sein) of man is in fact his action or act (Tat).” On the “phenomenal” (human) level, therefore, Man as Man is not given Being, but creative Action. (Kojève, 1989: 221) This concept of action, as will become clear in subsequent discussion, inevitably leads to his ontology of Becoming through the dialectical category of Negativity (Nichts, Nothingness, or Not-being).

Likewise, for M. Markovic (1979: 6), man is essentially a “being of praxis”, and by the term ‘praxis’ (like Hegel) he refers to “both the subject, the man who acts, and also the object, the environment in which he acts and which is transformed by his action.” (Italic added) Seen from that praxis point of view, planning action as an ‘act of will’ (Ozbekhan, 1971: 173)13 is not only the transformation of objects in the decision environment but also consists in changing the agent himself - i.e., Becoming.

Thus a fundamental philosophical assumption is that the rationality of reflective agents takes two complementary forms of ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’: and that the first, which is passive in type, is largely the business of the intellect; while the second, which is dynamic in type, is the work of the will. They respond to the two main aspects which the self-conscious, reflective agent discerns in the making of decisions: Being and Becoming. Thus I treat the idea of the ‘self-reflective agent’ as a carrier of the inherently twofold meaning of human existence - being and becoming - with which both thinking and willing must be involved in the agent’s rational striving.

I shall now return to the main theme of our discussion, that is, the second aspect of the double. In this effort, it must be our aim to set up a necessary link between the two aspects of the double. In doing so, I will take a new step beyond reconstruction, enter into new considerations, that is, the intentional acts (or the “actions of will” as Eccles calls it.)14 Now it appears that by bringing out the theory of reflection, the idea of rationality lies in a wholly new dimension. But it does not need an entirely new point of departure. what we need is only to form a

14) By ‘intentional’ act, I mean ‘willed’ act or actions of will.
necessary connection between old and new dimensions.

What is required in this new dimension will be its ultimate appeal to intentional acts of self-reflective agents, not to the knowledge of intelligizing ego. According to Husserl (1990), the world can not be thought of except as being "constituted" (knowable) by the transcendental ego's intentional acts. Husserl's theory of transcendental subjectivity as the double of phenomenal self is not original with him. As we have discussed earlier, Kant's double vision assumed the reality of the transcendental self, and Husserl simply followed Kant in this.

Recently Bratman (1987) also attempted to characterize planning actions in terms of intention. But his approach to intention is, as he admits, within the functionalist tradition in the philosophy of mind. (1987: 9) Despite Bratman's emphasis on the roles of intentions in planning (1987: 9-10), his planning conception of intention does not recognize the idea of reflexivity, that is, what Eccles calls the "intentional action of the self." (1992: 107) By bringing out intentionality, what I suggest is that the process of planning theorizing is not only concerned with a way of knowing, but also a way of being.

The objective of the theory of reflection, according to Stern (1989: 185), is to explain self-consciousness, and its most fundamental thesis is that self-consciousness arises as a result of reflection (or, as it is frequently put, of a reflective act). Self-consciousness, according to Assagioli (1973: 12), has two characteristics: "one introspective, the other dynamic." It expresses the intimate relationship between the "I" and the will, between being and willing: for instance, "I am aware of being and willing"; or "In that I am, I can will." The intimate relationship between the 'I' and the will, between being and willing, has been clearly set forth by Professor Calo which I shall have to quote here from Assagioli (1973: 12):

> Volitional activity is in close connection with the consciousness of the I as both an active and a unifying center of all the elements of psychic life. ... The will is just this activity of the I which is a unity, which stands above the multiplicity of its contents, and which replaces the the previous impulsive, fractional, centrifugal action of those contents. I and will are correlated terms: the I exists in so far as it has its own specific capacity for

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15) According to Rollo May (1969: 201), intentionality is the basis and the root of the will. He contends intentionality in human experience underlies will and decision.
action which is the will: and the will exist only as a distinctive and autonomous activity of the I.

My fundamental thesis is that the rationality of self-conscious, reflective agents is always the double. One aspect of the double is the intelligizing (thinking) ego, and another the intentional (willing) action of the self. An important task is to rejoin the two selves, in the process of planning theorizing, our thinking (the intellect) and self-conscious mind (the will), thus integrate both faculties of decisionmaking into a unity.

An Argument for Transcendent Turn (iii)

With this basic presupposition concerning the twoness of human mind, my synthesis will proceed in two directions:

First, it must be posited that rationality as a product of the process of theorizing (i/ii) can be considered to be an objectification of the (dialectic of) action/system. This is simply the agent’s awareness, via its heuristics (ii), of (the dialectic of) its Being (i) - i.e., the self and the self’s context. This only involves in the realm of the intellect (theoretical consciousness). Its heuristics (ii) (of situation/structure) in search of rationality is essentially directed toward objects of outer reality - the phenomenal world.

This implies that the process of planning theorizing taken by the step (i/ii) for the reconstruction is nothing more than an unfolding of consciousness in the activity of the intellect: this faculty only involves in the realm of cognition with the rational agent’s being able to identify the four-category of rationality principle. Hence, from our standpoint of the double, the act of knowing is only one side of the phenomenon of consciousness in human decision-making.

Second, it further postulates that, in addition to the dialectically-heuristic turn of (i/ii), a transcending turn (iii) must come to the fore as a unifying force to

16) Using Hegelian (ontological) terms, thought in the mode of (i/ii), - namely, the intelligizing ego’s knowing consciousness - does not reveal Being in its totality: it describes only the "abstract" (identical) aspect of Being. For this, see Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. see Chapter 7. The Dialectic of the Real and the Phenomenological Method in Hegel, pp. 169-259.
resolve the dichotomies confronting the subject of action. This must involve in the (intentional) act of the will - i.e., the self-consciousness of reflective agents. Its willing function is essentially directed toward the (transcendental) Self\(^{17}\) - namely, the object of inner reality.

This means that, in the act of transcendence, the self-consciousness of reflective agents consists of a dialectical process (of Becoming) through which genuine opposition is encountered and overcome. This transcending, which is inherent in willing, Nietzsche calls "Overcoming." Zarathustra says of it as follows\(^{18}\): "Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power; ... And life itself told me this secret: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that which must overcome itself again and again ... towards a goal, towards the higher, ..." (Italics original) According to Schopenhauer (1985: 9-12), the self-consciousness is the consciousness of one's own self, in contrast to the consciousness of other things (that is, of their existing for us as objects); this latter being the cognitive faculty and the former being intensely occupied with willing.

In this regard, Schelling describes a theory of three stages of knowledge "as progressing from sensation to perception, from perception to reflection, and from reflection to will." (Shein, 1970: 2) What this means is that knowledge ultimately derives from willing, which is the "action of the self." Arendt (1978: 69) also says of this reflexive nature of willing action, and asserts that:

... this reflexivity is nowhere stronger than in the willing ego: the point is that every I-will arises out of a natural inclination toward freedom, ... in the fight against the I-nill.

On the psychological plane, the Swiss psychologist Edouard Claparede asserted that "every voluntary act is the expression of a conflict and a struggle ... and the

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17) In *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl (1990: xviii) recognizes and assumes this transcendental subjectivity. It is the "noumenal self" in Kant’s term (Knox, 1936: 61): For Schopenhauer, it is the "inner being of man-in-himself" (1985: 97); it is the "Being-for-itself" in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* (Kojeve, 1989: 221): for Jung, it is the "numinous, transpersonal Self" (Edinger, 1972: 89); esp. in the psychology of Maslow (1968: 249) and Assagioli (1973: 113-9), it is the "Transpersonal Self" (or Being-cognizer of the self, fully involved with Being-values - i.e., with Self-realization).

function of the will is precisely to resolve the conflict.” (“Cited in” Assagioli, 1973: 240) As such, willing action always presumes a conflict of tendencies and the striving of the will is to resolve it.

Maslow (1971: 210) calls this kind of dichotomy-transcendence the “creation of a superordinate unity.” And Assagioli’s theory of will and psychosynthesis is based on this phenomenon of transcendence. Thus Assagioli (1973: 33) characterizes the will as an expression of the “synthesizing self.” In this connection, Jung (1960: 69) says essentially the same thing: In his analytical psychology, the so-called “transcendent function” arises from a union of opposites, two contrary entities – i.e., the union of conscious and unconscious contents of individuation process.

Palemality as a Dialectical Unfolding of Consciousness

Our scheme of the double demonstrates that there are really two distinct acts of ‘knowing’ and ‘willing’, two distinct kinds of the dialectical unfolding involved in the process of decisionmaking. Hence the full consciousness of reflective agents is developed not in one, but in two apparently opposite but really complementary directions, i.e., along the intellect-will axis. In this basic scheme of dialectics, as with Tillich (1963: 329), I will distinguish between an “objective” or “real” dialectic (i/ii) and a “subjective” or “methodological” dialectic (i/iii).

The first one, in the mode of (i/ii), describes the dialectic of rationality as a many-sided concept of the (manifested) outer reality – e.g., as shown in our scheme, the action/system on the one, and the situation/structure on the other. Each of the two basic dimensions of (i) and (ii) axis would be a distinguishable moment of that process of unfolding, but that has its unity in the necessary co-presence of opposites as an attainment.

But, the second (i/iii) reveals each of these “moments” in a unified, goal-directed process, namely, a process of dialectical unfolding of the self-conscious, reflective agent’s actions of will. Thus alongside the dialectic of being (i) and knowing (ii), that of consciousness (i/ii), we see a dialectic of willing, that of self-consciousness (i/iii)19). The root of this latter is what Hegel calls the

"certainty of self", a rich concept which designates at once the notion of the self and the self's context for which the reflective agent strives. The former he simply calls the "sensible certainty". (Taylor, 1975: 136-7 & 152)\(^{20}\)

The idea of the second aspect in terms of decisionmaking is to go a step further in bracketing the previous steps (i/ii) taken by the cognizing subject into the actions of will ((i/ii)/iii) through the accompanying reflections. By this, I am turning to a well known doctrine - the primacy of the actions of will in this dual formulation. In other words, the four-category of rationality principle (i/ii), reconstructed as such, becomes the referents of intentional acts of the will ((i/ii)/iii).

What I propose here by this step is essentially to superimpose the actions of the will (iii) on the rationality principle (i/ii) established by the steps which I have taken in the previous section. It simply implies that the action of the will (iii) be superimposed on the intellect (i/ii) with the centralty of the transcendental Self. Thus, in our scheme of the double, the dialectic of the first (i/ii) is to be embraced by that of the second (i/iii)\(^{21}\).

It is through the development of the third factor, the transcendent act of the free-will, the rational-reflective agents can accomplish a capacity to act with the knowledge of the self. (in Hegel, the "certainty of self")\(^{22}\) And, this striving of the will can also be understood as the acting subject's creative confrontation with the opposites and their synthesis in the (higher) Self through an act of transcendence\(^{23}\). With this capacity, a new consciousness is created. Thus a new consciousness is the third thing that emerges out of the every conflict of twoness -

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21 Assagioli has also given the supremacy to the will which, he contended, governs and directs the intellect (thought) through its regulating power. See his The Act of Will (N. Y.: The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 48-51.

22 For Schopenhauer, like Hegel, willing is directed toward its own objectivation, with the highest stage of its objectivation being the attainment to self-consciousness, the achievement of the capability of having knowledge of itself. See Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea vol.I, ch. 23 and ch. 29 and vol.II, ch. 28.

23 For this reason, Assagioli (1973: 33) characterized the will as an expression of the synthesizing self.
being and becoming, knowledge and action, and necessity and freedom. Out of all such conflicts can emerge the third, transcendent condition which is an unfolding of rationality, i.e., a new quantum of consciousness.

In summation, (in accordance with the theme of the double,) I have taken thus far a ‘two-step approach’ along the intellect-will axis:

First, I have set forth my attempt to connect the intellect with the (actions of) will by proceeding from the the former (i/ii) under the principle of causality. Then I attempted to make intentional actions of the will (i/iii) a teleological principle for resolving the necessity of phenomenal world. (In our scheme, the former is represented by the four-category of rationality principle which conforms to the causal principle) By a dialectical principle I meant a unity of these two principles of causality (Is) and teleology (Ought) which are involved in any planning inquiry.

But, by the doctrine of the primacy of the will, I also connect the traditional dualism concerning the relationship between knowledge (i/ii) and action (i/iii). The idea behind this was to bracket the knowledge (i/ii) into the actions of the will (i/iii), thereby the former became the referents of reflective acts of the latter ((i/ii)/iii). As such, dialectic of this scheme, explicated first in the knowledge of necessity (the phenomenal: being) and, then, in the actions of the will for freedom (the transcendent: becoming), was reconciled in the unifying principle of the latter.

Bibliography


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이동욱*

우선 이 논문이 담하는 바는 계획에서의 합리성 적임행위를 현실의으로 재구성(復元)하는 데 있다. 그러나 보다 적절한 계획 파라다임을 마련하려는 합리성 개념의復元(중복, 1992)을 위해서는 두 가지 선결조건이 필요하다고 보여진다. 첫째로는復元에 따라 향하는 이론적 비판의 틀을 마련하는 일과 둘째로는 설명 그 자체가 이루어진다고 하더라도 소위 복원에의 비판이 단순히 농담에 의한 영역에 머물지 않고 어떻게 하면 계획의 '리얼리'과 '실천' 이 갖는 과정을 극복할 것인가에 있다. 따라서 이 논문은 위의 두 문제에 대한 답으로서 시도되었다.

합리성에 관한 사회과학적 논의의 시작이라고 할 Marx와 Weber의 합리성론에 대한 비판적 복원을 시도한 결과 4개의 서양(主體/體制 및 狀況/構造)로 구성되는 틀(four category schema of rationality principle)을 얻게 된다.

이러한 이론적 틀으로 기존의 주차 계획론들을 조명한 결과 각기 다른 합리성을 그 중심 개념으로 하는 4개의 계획파라다임의 전개과정이 정해졌다. 또한 이와 같이 다양한 열거를 지닌 합리성 개념이 전개되는 과정에서 드러나는 여러 계획파라다임의 합성-復元이 곧 계획학의 분야로서의 종합과학적 레벨(interdisciplinarity)이라고 볼 수 있다. 이에 존재할 수 있는 (i) 계획主體(Protagonist)와 體制(System)의 辨證法(Dialectics), 그리고 認識論의 육성은 (ii) 狀況(Situation)과 構造(Structure)에 대한 創設法(Heuristics)이 그것이다.

그러나 저자는 이처럼 Marx와 Weber의 과학주의에서 비롯된 '合理性 原理'(i & ii)가 인간의식의 '로움 열림'(iii)을 통해 격주 변증법적으로 즉기(aufheben)되어야 할 것을 주장하고 있다. 여기에서 저자는 계획론과의 차이를 식별하는 主體의 知的思考力(Decline)과는 主體的 質的 意志(Will)을 보다 강조한다.

여기에서 저자는 두 단계의 접근방법을 시도함으로써 전통적으로 二分化되어은 認識的 思考(Decline)와 實質的 意志(Will), 事実性(Is)과 規範性(Ought) 및 因果論(Causality)과 目的論(Teleology)의 변증법적 통일을 지향하는 계획론모형을 제시하고 있다. 이는 곧 意識의 '두

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열립’(i/ii & i/iii)을 의미하며 또한 ‘시각적 인과의 대응’(i/ii/iii)이다.

여기서는 ('인'의 이전과 '바깥'을 향하는 '권령'을 통해) 계획주체가 ‘존재에 대한 물음’을 수반하는 내의 주관성(i/ii)을 확보하게 되며 이는 단순히 ‘권령론’(i/ii)을 둘어넘는 의

思決定이라고 할 수 있다. 다시 말해 계획주체의 실천적 위기의 자체의 등식화하고 있다. 따라서 이 계획주의로 합리적, 통합적인 접근법의 실천적 한계를 극복해 보고자 하는 전문학문의(trans-scientific) 내지는 분리된

(transdisciplinary)인 메타계획이론을 전개하고 있다고 볼 수 있다.

여기에서도 제시되는 계획주의의 방법론의 의의는 통합론계의 이론화의 표준화를 위한 도구로 이르는 점에 있다. 다시 말해서 계획주체의

고관의 ‘사물의 관계’(i/ii)이 자기의 상황을 통한 주관적 결정(i/iii)에 의해 결론 내린((i/ii/iii)되어야 할 수 있다. 이는 계획주체의 전반적 자본(subjectivity)(iii)에的概念의, 실천의, 주관성을 부여하여 향후(iii)가 전반(i/ii)를包括

(bracketting)((i/ii)/iii)하게 하는 대응적 계획행동이었다.

따라서 ‘의료의 기술’은 ‘계획주의의 합법’으로서의 도구, 계획주의의 합법적 인식적 인식론에 입각한 계획적 물음(forecasting)의 대상이라는 보다는 계획주체가 스스로의 삶의 모음을 빼앗아내고 계획(preceding)하는 ‘자유로운 합법’(trans-disciplinarity)과

이에 따라 실천적, 경제적, 사회적, 문화적, 정치적 등 다양한 요소의 통합을 통합적 삶의 모든 구현에

함께 귀여와져야 한다. 이는 전문학문의 전개적 삶의 모든 구현에

통합적 삶의 모든 구현에

환원적 삶의 모든 구현에
박사의 논문에 대한 의견이나 또는 자기 의견을 발표하겠습니다.

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그리고 강홍빈 교수께서 말씀을 하셨지만, 저의 피로용중 하나가 학생들이 현장을 무시한다는 것입니다. 그래서 대개 논문들을 보면 현장에 가깝지 않고, 현장분석이 부족하고, 실증분석이 부족하여 주로 이론적이고 추상적인 차원에 머무르는 논문들이 많 이 나오고 있습니다. 반면에 외국에서 돌아오는 박사들은 현장에 가깝고 실증분석에 가깝습니다. two culture in planning and planning education, 즉 계획과 계획 교육에 있어서의 두개의 분리된 문화가 존재한다는 것입니다.

그래서 그것이 국내에서는 좀 더 추상적이고 이론적인 반면에 외국에서는 실증적이고 분석적이고 현장에 가까운 경향을 강조하고 그러한 two culture에다가 또한 겹쳐지는 것이 국내박사나 국외박사나 하는 것이 겹쳐져서 two culture in planning and planning education의 벽이 상당히 두껍다는 것이 느껴졌습니다. 그벽을 깨기 위해 환경대학원에서는 과연 무엇을 하고 있는가 하는 자기성찰이 필요하다고 생각합니다.