

Sources of HR Department Power: Scale Development and Validation*

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Abstract

HR department power plays a significant role in increasing organizational performance by influencing how intended HR strategies and practices are actually embraced and utilized by organizational members. Referring to French and Raven's (1959) taxonomy, we present four bases (sanction, expert, referent, and legitimacy) of HR department power in the context of intraorganizational dynamics and develop their measurement scales. Findings indicate that the HR power bases represent an integrated framework that helps to build a coherent classification standard, showing meaningful relationships with HR department power, HRM strength, and organizational performance.

Keywords: HR department power, scale development, HRM strength

* This study is based on the Master's thesis of the first author at Seoul National University. The authors deeply appreciate helpful comments from three SJB anonymous reviewers and Shad Morris at Brigham Young University. The second author acknowledges financial support from the Institute of Management Research and the Institute of Industrial Relations at Seoul National University.

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INTRODUCTION

There is a tension among strategic human resource management scholars. On one hand, particular HRM systems that are utilized by a firm will lead to increased firm performance (Boselie, Dietz, and Boon 2005; Huselid 1995; McDuffie 1995). A HRM system that are both aligned with the firm strategy and aligned among its components can improve firm performance by getting employees to make more and better investments in the organization (Hailey, Farndale, and Truss 2005; Wright and Snell 1998). On the other hand, HR departments—the agents who design and implement HRM systems—often lack the power they need to ensure that these systems are effectively utilized in the first place (Drucker 1954; Morris and Snell 2010). While the HR department has increased its power over the years, it still struggles to gain the influence needed to fully impact firm performance (Ulrich 2005).

From an applied perspective, this tension may result in gaps between HRM systems intended or planned by the HR department and those actually used or perceived by employees (Wright and Nishii 2006). It is not the HRM system itself, but how much that HRM system is able to influence employee behavior that drives firm performance. Accordingly, strategic HR scholars have recognized that it is important to look at the process of HRM, that is, a process where HRM systems are perceived and interpreted by employees, to understand the influence of HRM on firm performance (Becker and Huselid 2006).

Bowen and Ostroff (2004) presented the metafeatures of an HRM system that motivate employees to adopt desirable behaviors and attitudes required from the HRM system. They consider the power of HR agents (i.e., department and its staffs) as a metafeature that contributes to reducing the gap between intended and realized HRM because it leads individuals to consider submitting to performance expectations as formally sanctioned behaviors. Other HR scholars have also recognized that the power of HR departments critically impacts their ability to influence strategic decisions (Welbourne and Cyr 1999; Wright et al. 1998). Similarly, organization theorists have emphasized that organizations consist of a coalition of bounded rational individuals, who have their own exclusive aspiration and interests (Cyert and March 1963). Power dynamics and its

proximal and distal consequences in an organization tend to affect the extent to which a subunit can achieve what it pursues (Pfeffer 1992). In this line, powerful HR agents are more likely to make significant contributions to the value creation process of a firm (Uen et al. 2009). In fact, successful implementation of HR strategies requires active participation and cooperation from line functions. Since line functions tend to pursue their own interests or goals in implementing HR strategies at work, their interpretations and perception of HR strategies are often inconsistent or conflict with the HR function's intentions (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). As a result, HR department power may be a linking mechanism between a company's HR systems and performance. However, there are few theoretical frameworks and measurement tools to understand how HR departments gain this power in the first place. This paper primarily intends to fill this research gap by identifying and measuring the sources (or bases) of HR department power.

To do this, we first discuss the definition and importance of HR department power in the context of intraorganizational dynamics and examine a theoretical framework for the bases of HR department power. We develop a comprehensive set of items to capture the bases of HR department power. Next, we develop and validate a scale to assess the psychometric properties and validity of these items as a framework for understanding the bases of HR department power. We followed four separate phases of scale development in a manner consistent with the suggestions of Hinkin (1995) and DeVellis (2003). Phase 1 aimed at generating initial items. In phase 2 and 3, we reduced and refined the items through exploratory factor analyses and confirmatory factor analyses. Phase 4 was designed to assess the validity issues of the scale. Finally, we discuss how this scale may be used to improve our understanding of the link between HRM systems and firm performance.

DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF HR DEPARTMENT POWER

Russel (1938: 10) argues that power is a fundamental concept in social science "in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics". While power in social science contains a variety of meanings and is measured in different ways, scholars seem to agree that it derives a change in the belief, attitude,

or behavior of others (Raven 1990), and it also involves one actor's ability to overcome a situation of potential conflict that is caused by individuals or groups who are trying to protect different interests (Pettigrew 1973). In this regard, power is generally conceived of as the ability of one social actor to prevail over another's resistance in attaining a desired result (Pfeffer 1981; Russell 1938). In the organization context, an organizational member's—individual or group—power can be defined as its ability to influence the behavior of other members in the pursuit of its own interests within an interactive open system (Astley and Sachdeva 1984).

While much research has tried to identify a variety of sources that affect internal power of an organizational member within an organization, French and Raven (1959) provide one of the most comprehensive frameworks to understand the sources of power (Fiske 2011). We adopt their framework to identify the sources of HR department power. The study conducted by French and Raven (1959) originally focuses on how a person could get the power to control or influence to others in the interpersonal relationship. Personal power bases may be different structural power bases (Pfeffer 1992). But, Bowen and Ostroff (2004) suggest that a HR department's power could be developed and exercised through the process what HR agents (department or its staffs) influence the perception and behaviors of other organizational members such as employees, managers, and executives. Thus, HR department power is influenced by the relationships between HR agents and other organizational members. Further, some empirical evidence shows that French and Raven's taxonomy could be applied to subunit and organizational settings (Fiske 2011; Mintzberg 1983). Accordingly, we believe that, although originally devised to address interpersonal power dynamics, French and Raven's taxonomy of power bases could be applied to explaining the sources of HR department power.

French and Raven (1958) originally identified five bases of power—reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert power base. But, subsequent research has found that reward and coercive sources of power are not clearly separated but intertwined (for a review, see Krause and Kearney 2006). These studies suggest that it is unclear how reward and punishment can be separated because in some cases, it may be difficult to discern whether something is more of a reward or more of a punishment and because withholding a reward could constitute a punishment and retracting a punishment could

constitute a reward (Krause and Kearney 2006). Raven also found later that all of the items measuring reward and punishment bases were loaded on one factor—although there is a demarcation between material and nonmaterial reward/punishment bases (Raven, Schwarzwald and M. Koslowsky 1998). Following this literature, we expect that reward and coercive power bases will be combined into a single construct (called ‘sanction’). In what follows we describe the four sources of HR department power.

Sanction

An individual comes to have power when he or she has the ability to give or remove what a specific target thinks valuable (French and Raven 1959). Scholars delineate the former as reward power and the latter as coercive power. Like an individual, a department may also have power within the organization by offering valuable resources to other departments or by being empowered with the ability to take away or remove resources from other departments (Mintzberg 1983; Pfeffer 1981). In this line, HR department power would be determined by other organizational members’ expectation that it could reward or punish them.

HR departments might primarily obtain sanction power within the organization by controlling the flow of human resources needed by other organizational members. Specifically, the HR department’s sanction power might be related to its discretion in supplying, developing, and motivating human capital for other organizational members. First, when an HR department exerts considerable influence over selection and staffing of other departments, it would hold greater power within an organization because good talent is relatively rare (Pfeffer 2010). Since in most organizations resources for training programs are often limited, an HR department’s discretion to allocate training resources would also constitute its power (Laird, Naquin, and Holton 2003). Finally, if the HR department has considerable clout in determining the compensation packages and promotion rate of other subunits, it would increase power by influencing target unit members’ motivation and productivity (Gerhart and Rynes 2003). While this sanctioning power comes in actual formalized systems and norms, if the HR department is also considered an expert at what it does, then the department may also exhibit power. Such power is separate from,

but related to sanctioning power.

Expert

According to French and Raven (1959), those who possess useful knowledge or special skills have an expert power base. Expectation theory (e.g., Berger et al. 1977) states that shared expectations of each member's ability to contribute to performance significantly determine the informal hierarchies of prestige and power that emerge in task groups. Although intragroup status may derive from other factors, such as formal authority, expectation theory offers compelling evidence to suggest that perceptions of expertise remain the dominant predictor of intragroup status in groups whose members have a shared interest in accomplishing an interdependent task (see Bunderson 2003; Ridgeway 1987). Group members who are perceived to be more expert on some tasks control a resource that the other members of an interdependent task group need and/or want in that they share the goal of performing the tasks quickly, efficiently, and/or with high quality. Perceptions of expertise therefore constitute a source of power and status within a group and tend to be associated with greater opportunities for involvement and influence (see Balkwell 1991; Berger et al. 1977; Littlepage et al. 1995; Van der Vegt, Bunderson, and Oosterhof 2006).

HR department (including HR staffs) that are perceived to be more expert are assumed to possess knowledge resources that are of valuable to other organizational members, not only because those resources can help accomplish organizational goals, but also because those resources, exchanged in the form of assistance and advice, can help each organizational members to accomplish its personal tasks. An HR department's expertise may come from three kinds of knowledge: functional, business, and environmental. First, HR functional knowledge is something that cannot be easily learned in a short period of time or substituted by other organizational members. In this sense, if an HR department has special knowledge or know-how, such as staffing and compensation expertise, then the department may possess expert power (Farndale and Brewster 2005). Next, as HRM is increasingly required to be aligned with overall business strategies, the HR department's expertise within the organization would require knowledge about the business of the organization (Heisler 2003). To do so, the HR department needs

to frequently interact with line functions. Lastly, the ability to cope with environmental uncertainties constitutes the potential power because such a capability is directly related to an organization's survival (Hickson et al. 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). In this light, an HR department is able to increase power by engaging in environmental scanning, which enables it to find new opportunities or threats that it can control and cope with (Russ and Galang 1994).

Referent

While sanction and expert power are associated with the perceived utility of resources with which an actor is expected to provide other actors, referent power is acquired from voluntary conformity through cognitive and emotional internalization from other actors. In other words, an actor could have referent power when other actors are emotionally attracted by the actor and are willing to identify themselves with the actor or when they perceive the similarity or fit with the actor (French and Raven 1959). In this line, an HR department will acquire referent power when other organizational members perceive HR agents (department and its staffs) as those entities that they can share the fate with and can benchmark.

More specifically, when HR staffs are perceived as personally cooperative, hardworking, and friendly, other organizational members are likely to form favorable impression about them, which in turn motivate other organizational members to voluntarily comply and cooperate with what the HR department intends to implement (Pfeffer 2010). Similarly, when a HR department and its staffs are seen as a role model within the organization, it also has referent power (French and Raven 1959). In addition, when other organizational members consider HR agents as a member of their community, the HR department could mobilize more voluntary cooperation or compliance from them. In general, the community perception or sense of *solidarity* from other organizational members can be formed with organizational culture that treats the HR function as a key player in a firm's value creation process. For example, GE made a strong statement that the HR department mattered when CEO Jack Welch referred to the Senior HR manager as his "right-hand man".

Legitimate

Legitimate power is based on the target's perception that the agent has a legitimate right to control (French and Raven 1959). This source of power reflects the properties of a social system rather than the particular attributes or behavior of any specific individual or unit (Astley and Sachdeva 1984). First, because of the socially shared, institutionalized nature of hierarchical positions, formal hierarchy is perceived as one of the strongest sources of power. That is, the level and the number of management positions that HR managers occupy may represent the legitimate power as a proxy (Pfeffer 1992). In addition to formal positions, an HR department's position in intra- and inter-organizational networks influences its legitimate power (Mintzberg 1979). Organizational structure may result from informal or emergent patterns of behavior, as well as from formally prescribed positions. For example, workers may informally modify the prescribed workflow or engage in information exchanges that do not follow the formal communication channels. As these emergent interactions become recurring patterns of behavior, additional structure is informally implemented to the organization. In this sense, a department's structural position within the organization is the result of a particular combination or interaction of both formal hierarchy and emergent network (Astley and Sachdeva 1984). From this perspective, the HR department can increase legitimate power when its members have robust intra- and inter-organizational networks with diverse stakeholders including CEOs, boards, top management teams, and customers (Collins and Clark 2003). Finally, symbols can shape the evaluative frame of employees by affecting perceptions on what contingencies and resources are important in the organization (Galang and Ferris 1997). In this vein, we propose that the HR department can have legitimate power if it has physical signals or commodities that symbolize the importance of the department in the organization. Huge departmental size or lucrative working conditions, for example, can be such symbols because they necessarily accrue investments of organizational resources, which entail considerable costs (Pfeffer 1992).

SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

Based on the above theoretical framework, in what follows we

will develop a comprehensive set of items to capture the bases of HR department power. In doing so, we assess the psychometric properties of the scale, refine the instruments, and validate theoretically grounded instruments to measure HR department power. We also pay attention to issues of reliability and validity.

To develop the measurement instrument, we followed four separate phases of scale development in a manner consistent with the suggestions of Hinkin (1995) and DeVellis (2003). Phase 1 was aimed at generating initial items. In phase 2 and 3, we reduced and refined the items through exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. Phase 4 was designed to assess the validity issues of the scale. A summary of these phases in terms of activities and a sample description is contained in table 1.

Phase One: Item Generation

We created a pool of items for each power base following a deductive approach. Table 2 provides an overview of the definitions of power bases representing HR department power.

We developed initial items for the sources of the HR department power, following guidelines described by Hinkin (1998). Specifically, items were written in simple language and they addressed a single issue. We intentionally utilized some negatively worded items to reduce response biases (Nunnally 1978) and got feedback from the

Table1. Summary table of activities and data used by each phase

| | Activity | Sample description |
|---------|---|---|
| phase 1 | Item generation & review Item sort | 1 faculty member in SHRM 6 executives who have worked more than 10 years in the HR field. 5 HR major PhD and Master course students |
| phase 2 | Item reduction with exploratory factor analysis | 151 employees with working experiences of average 8 years. |
| phase 3 | Confirmatory factor analysis | 235 employees (121 MBA students and 114 fulltime employees, 107 of whom were in position of the executive) |
| phase 4 | Construct validity information | 235 employees (from phase 3) |

Table 2. Construct definition

| Power base | Power base description |
|------------|--|
| Sanction | The ability of HR department to help other departments get ahead or put them at disadvantage regarding intra-organizational competition and politics |
| Expert | The ability of HR department to retain and utilize HRM-specific information, knowledge or experiences that other departments appreciate |
| Referent | The ability of HR department to get other departments' identification and approval |
| Legitimate | The status of HR department that makes other departments perceive HR department as authoritative and influential |

three HR experts with work experience in the HR field over 10 years to increase the familiarity of the wording to prospective respondents. After the initial item generation phase, to assure that the items were perceived as tapping into the four power bases presented in table 2, another three HR professionals who did not know the intent or research questions of this study were asked to allocate the 55 items into 4 power dimensions. After this phase, 8 items were deleted because at least two of the three did not agree. Then, five HR-major graduate students who were ignorant of this study sorted the remaining 47 items. The sorting results were quite successful (.93 of inter-rater reliability). Based on these, we decided to advance with the 47 items.

Phase Two: Item Reduction

In this stage, we eliminated poor performing items by using exploratory factor analysis (EFA). By delineating CFA from EFA with a separate sample, as can be seen below in phase 3, we could be more conservative in item reduction process.

Methods. The 47 items were presented in random order via an online survey. For each item, we used a Likert scale ranging from 1 (entirely disagree) to 7(entirely agree) to maintain sensitivity of the scale. To capture the general perception of organizational power states, which pervade within the organization, we covered employees from executives to the rank- and-file workers as our EFA sample. Specifically, 180 full-time employees, who belong to various

departments (e.g. sales, marketing, R&D and so on) in different companies, were contacted to participate initially, resulting in a usable sample of 151 employees (83% response rate; 90 were at managerial positions or above) in Korea. Our final sample of 151 individual respondents came from 23 companies, all of which have more than 1000 employees. Respondents from each company vary from 3 to 8 individuals. Regarding to industry membership, ten firms operate at the manufacturing sectors, five firms at the finance industry, three firms at the wholesale and retail industry, and five firms at the professional service industry. All respondents had more than a year of service length in the company and had at least a high school degree. Average seniority was 8 years.

Results. After data collection, the selected pool of 47 items was subjected to item analysis first. We checked for each item regarding the mean, standard deviation, and item-total correlations. Those items with an item-total correlation of more than .30 and a reasonably high variance in response (standard deviation of more than 0.40) were retained. For some constructs, removal of certain items considerably improved the Cronbach's alpha coefficient. As individual items were removed, values were recomputed for the remaining items and the new correlations were reevaluated. Through this procedure, a total of 43 items were retained for further examination.

Principal components analysis with oblique rotation was performed on the 43 items. Oblique rotation was used because we assumed that HR department power bases would share some common variances with each other. Based on several criteria including the eigenvalues-greater-than-one rule, the shape of scree plot, and plausibility of factor structure, 4-factor solution seemed appropriate, consistent with our theoretical framework of power bases. Based on the initial results, we deleted items that failed to load on any factor or load on more than one factor. To achieve more meaningful solutions, items were deleted (a) if they loaded comparably heavy on more than one factor and (b) if the biggest loadings were smaller than 0.35. With these items deleted, a second factor analysis was run with remaining items. Principal component analysis was again used and produced 4-factor solution once again. We repeated this process until every item loads on at least one factor and serious cross-loading doesn't show up. The process of scale purification in this stage reduced the number of items from

Table 3. HR power base EFA results at phase 2

| | Factors | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Sanction | | | | |
| 1. Opinions of the HR department are deterministic in hiring new employees our department may need. | 0.80 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| 2. Judgment of HR department can substantially change the rate of promotion across departments. | 0.44 | -0.07 | -0.06 | 0.24 |
| 3. It is predominant right of HR department to place workforce in each department. | 0.62 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.09 |
| Cronbach's α | .72 | | | |
| Expert | | | | |
| 1. The HR department has many members who have master degrees or Ph.D degrees in HRM. | -0.11 | 0.81 | -0.23 | 0.05 |
| 2. Members in the HR department frequently work with other departments through projects or TFT (task force team). | 0.19 | 0.48 | 0.10 | 0.06 |
| 3. The HR department knows well about real states of line departments. | -0.07 | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.03 |
| 4. The HR department recognizes the changes in external labor market and deal with them effectively. | -0.05 | 0.58 | 0.40 | 0.00 |
| Cronbach's α | | .69 | | |
| Referent | | | | |
| 1. The HR department members are worth of being paragon of other employees. | 0.13 | 0.30 | 0.62 | 0.06 |
| 2. The HR department members are friendly. | -0.07 | -0.16 | 0.61 | 0.13 |
| 3. The HR department has good reputation within the organization. | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.55 | -0.05 |
| Cronbach's α | | | .68 | |
| Legitimate | | | | |
| 1. HR seniors are in close relationship with CEO. | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.49 |
| 2. HR executives are in hierarchical positions in which they can influence organizational decision makings much. | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.66 |
| 3. HR managers are influential among managers and executives of other departments. | 0.19 | -0.08 | 0.06 | 0.70 |
| Cronbach's α | | | | .70 |

Table 3. (continued)

| | Factors | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|-----|------|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Inter-factor correlations | | | | |
| Sanction | - | | | |
| Expert | .03 | - | | |
| Referent | .05 | .33 | - | |
| Legitimate | .40 | .05 | -.09 | - |

Note: n= 151. Bold faced numbers represent the factor on which each item loaded most highly.

43 to 13; 3 for sanction base, 4 for expert base, 3 for referent base, and 3 for legitimate power base. EFA results are shown in Tables 3. Final 4-factor solution accounts for 63.97% of the variance in the items. All items loaded on their appropriate factor. Every item except one had factor loading over .40; however, the one item (“the HR department knows well about real states of line department”) was retained because it still loaded on the intended factor and the cross-loaded factor was thought to be correlated to the main factor conceptually. Factors showed considerable inter-correlations ranged from .00 to .40 as expected.

All subscales showed adequate reliability for a new scale with alpha coefficients (see lower part of table 3) ranging from .68(referent) to .72(sanction). To maximize scale reliabilities and minimize the number of items used in HR power base scale, ‘alpha if item deleted’ statistics were examined. But additional deletion did not promise significant improvements according to the analysis. Hence, we decided to retain every 13 item for the next phase, confirmatory factor analysis.

Phase Three: Confirmatory Factor Analysis

To evaluate whether new data would confirm the proposed structure of the items as determined in the exploratory stage of the research, we conducted a CFA to re-evaluate the factor structure.

Methods. The third phase was based on an independent sample of 235 employees in Korea. The pencil-and-paper based survey was distributed to 254 employees working for different companies and a total of 235 responses were usable (92.52% response rate). To

increase generalizability of our measures, we obtained the surveys from more diverse firms in terms of size and industry at this phase. 235 respondents that were included at the final sample came from 61 firms. Respondents from each firm vary from 2 to 11 individuals. The majority of sample came from manufacturing industry (36.4%). Other respondents represented a variety of service industries such as finance, wholesale and retail, professional services, and construction. Of the 235, 75.2% were representatives from large organizations with 500 or more employees. As in EFA phase, we measured perceptions of organizational members at diverse levels from rank-and-file employees to executives. 107 out of the respondents were above managerial level. This sample was consist of 37 % female and had average 7.28 years of tenure.

Results. CFA was performed using the AMOS 18 package on 13 items derived from EFA of phase 2. Before administering CFA, we first replicated oblique EFA with this new sample. The results are presented in table 4. As in the prior analysis, 4-factor solution appeared appropriate, explaining 64.74% of the total variance. And every item loaded on the intended factor and showed similar pattern with other items from the same base as can be seen in table 4. Although item 3 of referent power base showed relatively high cross-loading with expert power base and item 3 of legitimate power base showed relatively high cross-loading with sanction power base, we interpreted these results as acceptable and retained the items because it is understandable that the expertise is related with referent power base and legitimacy is with capability to impose sanction within organizations as noted in table 3. In addition, the two items still loaded on the intended factor with clearly higher loading values compared to those on cross-loaded factor.

The chi-square test of the hypothesized four factor model was significant ($\chi^2 = 128.25$, $df = 59$, $p < .01$), rejecting correct fit of the data to the model. Yet, the chi-square statistic is known to be notoriously sensitive to sample size and is not recommended to be used as deterministic standard. Carmines and McIver (1981) suggest that a chi-square two to three times larger than the degrees of freedom is acceptable. For the hypothesized factor model, the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom was 2.17, which means acceptable fit. To supplement the indecisiveness of chi-square significance test results, several alternative goodness-of-fit indices were examined. Results revealed that all fitness values were satisfactory (CFI =

Table 4. HR power base EFA results with sample from phase 3

| | Factors | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Sanction | | | | |
| 1. Opinions of the HR department are deterministic in hiring new employees our department may need. | 0.70 | -0.11 | 0.11 | 0.21 |
| 2. Judgment of HR department can substantially change the rate of promotion across departments. | 0.65 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.26 |
| 3. It is predominant right of HR department to place workforce in each department. | 0.81 | 0.21 | -0.10 | -0.16 |
| Cronbach's α | .69 | | | |
| Expert | | | | |
| 1. The HR department has many members who have master degrees or Ph.D degrees in HRM. | 0.18 | 0.73 | 0.03 | -0.22 |
| 2. Members in the HR department frequently work with other departments through projects or TFT (task force team). | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0.17 | 0.00 |
| 3. The HR department knows well about real states of line departments. | -0.15 | 0.75 | 0.07 | 0.19 |
| 4. The HR department recognizes the changes in external labor market and deal with them effectively. | -0.05 | 0.86 | -0.17 | 0.17 |
| Cronbach's α | | .72 | | |
| Referent | | | | |
| 1. The HR department members are worth of being paragon of other employees. | 0.23 | -0.10 | 0.88 | -0.10 |
| 2. The HR department members are friendly. | -0.31 | 0.00 | 0.79 | 0.18 |
| 3. The HR department has good reputation within the organization. | -0.03 | 0.39 | 0.59 | -0.10 |
| Cronbach's α | | | .74 | |
| Legitimate | | | | |
| 1. HR seniors are in close relationship with CEO. | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.91 |
| 2. HR executives are in hierarchical positions in which they can influence organizational decision makings much. | 0.16 | 0.09 | -0.02 | 0.74 |

Table 4. (continued)

| | Factors | | | |
|--|---------|------|------|-------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 3. HR managers are influential among managers and executives of other departments. | 0.36 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.56 |
| Cronbach's α | | | | .78 |
| Inter-factor correlations | | | | |
| Sanction | - | | | |
| Expert | .21 | - | | |
| Referent | .18 | .56 | - | |
| Legitimate | .35 | .18 | .23 | - |

Note: n = 235. Bold faced numbers represent the factor on which each item loaded most highly.

.93, RMSEA = .07, GFI = .93, AGFI = .88, NFI = .87, and TLI = .90), suggesting that our HR power base subscales did show pretty good fit as a construct. Each relation between the latent variables and their respective indicators (lambda) was also large and statistically significant. The lambdas for the 13 items ranged from .52 to .86 with a mean of .67. Given the pattern of evidence (i.e., overall fit indices, lambdas, and reliability coefficients) and the theory behind the developed measure, we concluded that the scales for HR department power bases showed interpretable factor structures and were worthy of further examination.

Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggested that a hypothesized model should be compared to likely alternative models. We tested the goodness-of-fit of the hypothesized four-factor model in comparison to other competing models through sequential chi-square difference tests. The first alternative model (Model 1) was a single factor model in which all 13 items loaded onto a universal factor of power base, assuming that there is the single global power base domain ($\chi^2 = 445.94$, $df = 65$, $p < .01$, CFI = .59, GFI = .71, AGFI = .59, NFI = .56, and TLI = .51, RMSEA = .16). The second alternative model (Model 2) was devised to further explore the meaning of substantial inter-factor correlations discovered in factor analyses. Specifically, Model 2 reflected a two-factor model in which sanction base items load on the same factor with legitimate items and expert base items load on the same factor with referent base items ($\chi^2 = 178.88$, $df = 64$,

$p < .01$, CFI = .88, GFI = .89, AGFI = .85, NFI = .82, and TLI = .85, RMSEA = .09). The third alternative model (Model 3) was a higher-order model that four bases loaded on one common power base ($\chi^2 = 190.13$, $df = 61$, $p < .01$, CFI = .86, GFI = .89, AGFI = .84, NFI = .81, and TLI = .82, RMSEA = .10). As shown in goodness of fit indices above, the three alternative models did not make larger improvement in fit than our hypothesized four-factor model.

Phase Four: Validity Information

The power base scales developed in this study would make meaningful construct only if they can demonstrate good validity. First, HR power base scale should present evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. For the purpose of establishing convergent validity, we examined the relationship between power bases and a conceptually similar construct—HR involvement. For the purpose of establishing discriminant validity, we examined the relationship between power bases and a conceptually dissimilar construct—power distance perception. Finally, we demonstrated predictive validity of the scale by examining the relationship between HR department power bases and HR department power. In this phase, we used the same sample as in CFA phase following Hinkin (1998) and Bauer et al. (2001).

Convergent validity. The convergent validity analyses focused on the relationship between our power base measures and other conceptually related measures. Our power base measures were expected to show convergence with HR involvement scale because HR involvement—refers to the extent to which HR departments participate in strategic decision making processes in the organization—has been regarded as a symbol of influence of HR departments (Wright et al. 1998).

The sample for testing the convergent validity was the same as one used in phase 3. All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). HR involvement was assessed with Wright et al. (1998)'s seven-item scale ($\alpha = .85$). An example of the items is "Provide input into the facility's long-range strategic planning." To be conservative, we shuffled the items of power bases and other constructs and presented those on the same page of questionnaire after randomizing the order of each item.

Table 5. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of variables of phase 4 (validity information)

| | M | S. D. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------|---|
| 1 sanction base | 4.18 | 1.14 | - | | | | | | | | |
| 2 expert base | 3.60 | 0.95 | .27** | - | | | | | | | |
| 3 referent base | 3.71 | 1.02 | .16* | .62** | - | | | | | | |
| 4 legitimate base | 4.80 | 1.08 | .52** | .33** | .26** | - | | | | | |
| 5 HR involvement | 3.94 | 0.99 | .34** | .70** | .66** | .37** | - | | | | |
| 6 power distance | 3.01 | 0.94 | .38** | .27** | .20** | .16* | .15* | - | | | |
| 7 age (years) | 34.11 | 6.50 | .17 | .06 | .10 | .10 | .07 | .06 | - | | |
| 8 gender ^a | 0.63 | 0.48 | -.11 | -.04 | -.08 | .01 | -.05 | -.12 | -.42** | - | |
| 9 HR department power | 4.06 | 1.18 | .58** | .47** | .42** | .59** | .53** | .32** | .20** | -.07 | - |

Note: n = 237. *p < .05, **p < .01. Two-tailed. afemale = 0, male = 1.

Although HR department power bases were expected to correlate with the HR involvement variable we chose for the convergent validity analyses, our measure should be truly distinguishable from the HR involvement. Therefore, in accordance with Ferris et al. (2008), we tested convergent validity in the following ways. First, we examined the zero-order correlations between variables. Next, we tested any significant correlations via CFA to ensure the constructs were not convergent to the point of redundancy.

As can be seen in table 5, four HR department power bases were significantly and positively correlated with HR involvement ($r = .34, .70, .66,$ and $.37$ for sanction, expert, referent and legitimate power base respectively). Next, we tested the significant correlations described above via CFA to ensure the constructs are distinguishable. The results showed that two-factor models achieved better fit than one-factor model—sanction (two factor model: $\chi^2 = 175.56, df = 34$; one factor model: $\chi^2 = 265.46, df = 35$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 89.90, df = 1, p < .01$), expert (two factor model: $\chi^2 = 220.28, df = 43$; one factor model: $\chi^2 = 224.88, df = 44$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 4.60, df = 1, p < .05$), referent (two factor model: $\chi^2 = 179.14, df = 34$; one factor model: $\chi^2 = 206.73, df = 35$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 27.59, df = 1, p < .01$), and legitimate base (two factor model: $\chi^2 = 191.85, df = 34$; one factor model: $\chi^2 = 336.68, df = 35$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 144.83, df = 1, p < .01$). The results indicate that power bases are distinguishable from HR involvement. In sum, HR power base measures were convergent with HR involvement to some extent but were not identical with them to the degree of redundancy.

Discriminant validity. Discriminant, or divergent, validity is demonstrated when measures of one construct are found to differ from measures of another construct. Our discriminant analyses examined the relationship between HR power bases and organizational power distance perception. Power distance refers to “the extent to which individuals accept the unequal distribution of power in institutions and organizations” (Clugston, Howell, and Dorfman 2000). The degree of power distance employees perceive within an organization can influence their assessment of any subunit’s power bases. Put differently, individual employees with higher power distance perception might suppose HR department power bases as more influential or robust *ceteris paribus* because of his or her basic attitudes that deem formal units such as HR department as more powerful than the self as an individual. In this respect, individually estimated power distance of the organization

and subunit power bases share some variance. But, power distance and power bases are also clearly distinguishable. Power distance at an organization is about norm or culture that individuals embrace, which is applied to the whole organization and most subunits universally. In contrast, our measure of HR department bases is related to unique attributes of HR department and its staffs. In sum, power distance differs from HR power bases in that while the former (power distance) focuses on the common response pattern of those who are affected by organizational power dynamics, the latter focuses in the characteristics of specific power holder (i.e. HR department). Accordingly, we expect that our measures of HR department power bases will be distinct from the measure of power distance while the two measures may be moderately correlated.

Participants were the same ones introduced in phase 3. We measured organizational power distance with Dorfman and Howell (1988)'s power distance scale. We changed each item to represent the power distance within the organization, including the phrase "in your organization." All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). Sample items are "Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates; it is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates" ($\alpha = .67$). Item shuffling was again used as it was used for convergent validity test.

As can be seen in table 5, power distance showed low to moderate relations with HR power bases ($r = .38, .27, .20, .16$ for sanction, expert, referent and legitimate bases, respectively). To show discriminant validity of power bases, we also tested these significant correlations via CFA. Two-factor models presented better fit than one-factor model in which items of both power base and power distance load one general factor for power bases (sanction: $\Delta\chi^2 = 54.39, df = 1, p < .01$, expert: $\Delta\chi^2 = 90.47, df = 1, p < .01$, referent: $\Delta\chi^2 = 122.80, df = 1, p < .01$, and legitimate: $\Delta\chi^2 = 139.00, df = 1, p < .01$). Finally, we used the above CFA results to conduct an additional test for the redundancy of two constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This test calculates the average squared standard factor loading of each item on its respective assigned factor and comparing this statistic to the shared variance between the two constructs. If the average squared factor loadings are higher than the shared variance, then the two constructs can be thought to be distinct. Results of this test were consistent with those of CFA (for

sanction, .35 vs. .32; for expert, .38 vs. .16; for referent, .38 vs. .15; for legitimate, .39 vs. .03). Taken together, our HR power base scale is discriminant from power distance.

Predictive validity. We attempted to establish predictive validity by assessing the HR power base scales' ability to predict HR departmental power construct. Participants were the same ones introduced in phase 3. We utilized Kohli's (1989) original four-item scale with slight modifications in wordings to capture the general perception of employees about relative influences of HR department to other units in the firm. HR department power was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). Sample items are "The functions performed by HR department are generally considered to be more critical than others; HR department is generally regarded as being more influential than others." Internal consistency coefficient for the measure was .89.

Table 5 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations of HR department power and power bases. As can be seen in table 5, all HR power bases correlated with HR department power significantly ($r = .58, .47, .42, \text{ and } .59$, for sanction, expert, referent, and legitimate bases respectively). Next, we examined the factor structure of HR department power to assure that HR power bases have some convergence with HR department power but not to the extent of redundancy. More specifically, we tested whether HR department power has unique variance beyond power bases via CFA. Two-factor solution, in which HR power items load HR power factor and power base items load power base factor respectively, gave better fit than one-factor solution (sanction: $\Delta\chi^2 = 34.05, df = 1, p < .01$, expert: $\Delta\chi^2 = 95.74, df = 1, p < .01$, referent: $\Delta\chi^2 = 109.94, df = 1, p < .01$, and legitimate: $\Delta\chi^2 = 73.43, df = 1, p < .01$). Finally, we conducted regression analyses that regress HR department power on four basic power bases. In these analyses, we controlled power distance and demographic variables (age and gender). By controlling power distance, between-firm differences in general climate about intra-organization power distribution can be addressed. Demographic variables were also included to control confounds of influence of individual raters' differences (Gilovich, Keltner, and Nisbett 2006). As can be seen in Model 6 in table 6, all HR power bases were positively related to HR power after partialing out the variance of control variables and other bases.

Table 6. Regression results: HR department power as dependent variable

| | Model1 | | Model2 | | Model3 | | Model4 | | Model5 | | Model6 | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| | β | t | β | t |
| age | .21** | 3.05** | .17** | 2.88** | .19** | 3.06** | .18** | 2.84** | .14* | 2.53* | .13* | 2.55* |
| gender ^a | .06 | 0.89 | .08 | 1.43 | .06 | 0.89 | .07 | 1.10 | .02 | 0.32 | .05 | 1.05 |
| Power distance | .29** | 4.62** | .09 | 1.53 | .19** | 3.17** | .23** | 3.82** | .21** | 4.01** | .06 | 1.10 |
| sanction | | | .55** | 9.57** | | | | | | | .33** | 5.87** |
| expert | | | | | .40** | 6.76** | | | | | .14* | 2.39** |
| referent | | | | | | | .35** | 5.91** | | | .16** | 2.78** |
| legitimate | | | | | | | | | .55** | 10.66** | .31** | 5.7** |
| R ² | .12 | | .37 | | .27 | | .24 | | .42 | | .55 | |

Note: n = 237. *p < .05, **p < .01. Two-tailed. afemale = 0, male = 1.

Additional Analyses: Relationship with HRM Strength

In the outset we expected that HR department power would enhance HRM strength because people vigilantly attend to power holders (i.e., powerful HR departments) and this elevated attention level, in turn, enables more effective reception of messages (i.e., HR strategies) from power holders (Fiske 2011). Thus, we additionally examined the relationships between the HR power bases and HRM strength.

A sample for these analyses includes 107 managers and executives, which are drawn from the sample used in phase 3. Sample was restricted to employees with managerial responsibility because HRM strength can be assessed more accurately with evaluation of those at managerial positions rather than that of non-managers (Delmotte, Winne, and Sels 2011). Of the sample, 22.86 % was female, and average age was 39.02 years. Participant worked for the current company for 11.19 years on average and 45.78 % of them represented firms with 2000 employees or more. HRM strength was measured with Delmotte, Winne, and Sels (2011)'s HRM strength scale, which comprises 31 items ($\alpha = .93$). Following Delmotte, Winne, and Sels (2011), we used a higher order HRM strength factor in the analyses, not distinguishing its sub-dimensions (distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus). Coefficient alpha for the measure was .68.

We used regression analyses to test the relationship between HR power bases and HRM strength. As shown at table 7, age and gender were controlled to address impacts of individual differences, and organizational power distance was controlled to handle confounding effects of inter-firm differences regarding sensitivity to intra-organizational power dynamics. Model 3, 4, and 5 indicated that legitimate, expert, and referent power bases were positively related with HRM strength respectively. In addition Model 6 showed that expert base ($\beta = .31$, $t = 3.19$, $p < .01$) and referent base ($\beta = .43$, $t = 4.50$, $p < .01$) were still significantly and positively related to HRM strength after controlling for the effects of other power bases.

These results recall Fiske (2011)'s argument that referent and expert power bases tend to elicit attitudinal change whereas sanction and legitimate power bases are easier to cause only behavioral change without attitudinal change. More specifically,

Table 7. Regression results: HRM system strength as dependent variable

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | | Model 6 | |
|---------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|--------|---------|-------|---------|--------|
| | β | t | β | t | β | t | β | t | β | t | β | t |
| age | .03 | 0.24 | .03 | 0.28 | .03 | 0.26 | .06 | 0.72 | .03 | 0.33 | .06 | 0.72 |
| gender ^a | -.09 | -0.87 | -.10 | -0.92 | -.10 | -0.99 | -.05 | -0.53 | -.10 | -1.16 | -.09 | -1.08 |
| power distance | -.02 | -0.16 | .01 | 0.09 | -.08 | -0.77 | -.10 | -1.14 | -.10 | -1.27 | -.09 | -0.99 |
| sanction | | | -.06 | -0.56 | | | | | | | -.14 | -1.43 |
| legitimate expert | | | | | .23* | 2.30* | | | | | .07 | 0.69 |
| referent | | | | | | | .54** | 6.19** | | | .31** | 3.19** |
| R ² | | .01 | | .01 | | .06 | | .29 | | .61** | | 7.61** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | .38 |

Note: n = 107. *p < .05, **p < .01. Two-tailed. ^afemale = 0, male = 1.

people can follow those who have authority without changing their minds even when they didn't agree with the powerful figure in the first place (Rahim and Afza 1993). People also attend to those who control valued resources not because they agree with or internalize the power holders' opinions but because following them is beneficial (Guinote, Brown, and Fiske 2006). On the other hand, expertise generally helps persuade targets through a variety of routes (for a review, see Petty and Wegener 1998). Referent power base makes targets to internalize messages from the power holder as a role model (Buchmann 1997). But legitimate power base tends to elicit only behavioral compliance (Rahim and Afza 1993). In sum, since persuasion, which means inducing target individuals to interpret situations in an intended way, occurs via active change of their attitudes, expert and referent base might be more directly associated with HRM strength than legitimate and sanction base.

DISCUSSION

Intraorganizational power exerts its influence not only in the decision making process but also in the implementation phase of the determined strategies (Pfeffer 1981, 1992). From this perspective, we posited in the outset that HR departments need to be powerful to enhance the effectiveness of HRM by realizing its intention through intra-organizational bargaining and by narrowing the gap between intended and implemented HR systems. By doing so, we open up the proverbial black box to better understand how HR systems lead to firm performance. Referring to French and Raven's (1959) taxonomy, we presented four bases (sanction, expert, referent, and legitimacy) of HR department power and developed their measurement scales. The empirical results confirmed the theoretically-driven power bases of the HR department. The results also showed that HR power base measures were convergent with HR involvement and discriminant from power distance. In addition, all these bases of power were positively related to HR department power and HRM strength (except sanction-base).

Our study would provide several valuable implications for research and practices. First, HRM scholars have tried to figure out why there is often a weak relationship between HRM and firm performance and paid increasing attention to the gap between

intended (or espoused) and realized (actual) HR practices as its possible cause. Several HRM scholars have noted that HR agent's power is an important feature of HRM system that contributes to reducing the gap between intended and realized HRM. Still there are few theoretical frameworks and measurement scales to understand the sources of the HR department power. Our study contributes to filling this research gap by identifying and measuring the sources of the HR department power. Future studies might build upon this scale to study of host of issues related to the strategic HRM black box. For example, it may help to answer the call from Nishii and Wright (2007) to explore why perceived and realized HR systems may often be quite different within the organization. Overall, such a scale can help to account for more of the variability that goes unexplained when examining the HR-performance link. In practical applications, our framework and measurement scales of HR power bases would provide HRM professionals with a management tool to understand and diagnose the causes of their relative weak power within the firm. Thus, our study would help HR professional develop the strategies to gain the influence needed to fully impact firm performance.

The current study has several limitations. Previous research suggests that the selection of power bases should take into account specific context conditions because particular power bases would become more salient at the particular situations and because the number of empirically confirmable power bases would vary depending on the context of the study (Krause & Kearney, 2006). While we tried to collect the data from a variety of firms to increase the generalizability, our small sample size did not allow us to test the validity of our measures by different contexts (e.g., different firm size, different industry). Accordingly, future research is required to test the validity of our measures at different contexts. Another related limitation of our study is that our sample was totally collected from employees who work for the Korean companies. Because individuals' perception about power and its sources and the relative importance of each power bases could be affected by national cultural and economic conditions (Pfeffer 2009), future research need to confirm the generalizability of our scales across nations and culture by replicating our scale development process with samples collected at other countries would provide an interesting topic for future research.

Next, for the nomological net analysis, we measured all the variables using self-report methodology. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the amount of common method variance occupied 21% of total variance. Even though the amounts are smaller than the average of published studies (Perry et al. 2010), there is still a possibility of method variance and this may have biased the result. Fourth, the data for analyses were cross-sectional. Thus, we couldn't figure out the exact mechanism on how the power bases affect other variables such as HR power, HRM strength and firm performance. Longitudinal studies should be conducted in the future to verify the causal relationship that may exist among the variables.

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Received May 22, 2013

Revision Received November 29, 2013

Accepted December 18, 2013