The Chinese Civil War and Sino-North Korea Relations, 1945–50

Kim Sang Won

During the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and North Korea maintained a close cooperative relationship. During this period, North Korea provided military support to the CCP and became a rear base for the CCP as well. In return, the CCP assisted North Korea with urgently required necessities such as food. Furthermore, in 1949 and 1950 the CCP returned three ethnic Koreans divisions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to North Korea, greatly strengthening North Korea’s military capabilities. The grounds for cooperation on both sides were not only ideological, but also emerged from practical necessity. Sometimes, national interests were prioritized over ideological solidarity. Before and after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in order to establish a stable environment for economic development and to alleviate security risks, China continued to oppose North Korea’s pending attack on South Korea. In conclusion, China’s basic attitude towards the Korean Peninsula was to prevent a conflict between its own realistic and ideological interests; this attitude became the basis for the policy of the “stabilization of the Korean peninsula” that China implemented following its reform and opening up in 1980.

Keywords: Chinese Civil War, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), North Korea, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), ideology, national interest

Introduction

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Red Army attacked the Japanese army in Northeast China, thus substantially transforming the anti-Japanese War in China. Northeast China was geographically and economically important for both the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and the Chinese

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Communist Party (CCP). A major part of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army was concentrated in the north and in Shandong Province. Because the KMT already controlled South China, if the KMT were able to dominate Northeast China, the Eighth Route Army would find itself encircled. At the same time, Northeast China had highly developed heavy industry and agriculture and was of significant economic value.

Due to its geographical and economic importance, both the KMT and the CCP fully understood the strategic significance of the Northeastern area in terms of their future contentions. Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the National Government, had emphasized, “Without Northeast China, there would be no North China; without North China, there would be no China.”1 In this context, when the National Government and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in August 1945, the National government maintained that jurisdiction over China’s Northeast be returned to it and that no further Soviet assistance be provided to the CCP, in exchange for the Nationalist government’s recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia and the “special interests” of the Soviet Union in Northeast China.2 Thus was the Nationalist government able to take the lead in occupying this strategic territory.

The CCP realized the strategic importance of Northeast China as well. At the Seventh National Congress of the CCP, held in April 1945, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the CCP, stressed “the northeastern areas are particularly important for the future of the CCP and the Chinese revolution,” and insisted that “Northeast China is an extremely important area ... if we hold the Northeast while losing all revolutionary bases in other places, we could say that we still had a firm revolutionary foundation.”3 This explained the significance of the Northeastern area for China’s Communist revolution. Due to the

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strategic significance of this region, the intense struggle between the KMT and CCP for hegemony over it was inevitable.

In August 1945, the CCP hoped that the Soviet Red Army would cooperate with them in the region. Therefore, the CCP quickly sent a large number of cadres and armed forces to the region to mobilize the local populace and prevent KMT troops from entering the region. However, the situation soon developed counter to the expectations of the CCP; the KMT forces quickly marched into North China to secure the pass into Northeast China, while the US Navy occupied Tianjin and Qingdao, putting a stranglehold on the Bay of Bohai. What was worse, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, allowed no Chinese troops to enter the Northeast region and asked the Eighth Route Army to withdraw from the region’s major cities. In response to these developments, the CCP revised its strategy from one of exclusive occupation of the region to guerilla warfare, and transferred its main forces there to the regions bordering North Korea, the Soviet Union, and Outer Mongolia, with the determination of employing a long-term guerrilla strategy to deal with the KMT.

Based on this new strategic plan, the CCP began to pay attention to ethnic Koreans and other ethnic minorities who heavily inhabited areas in South, East, and North Manchuria, and took notice of the strategic value of North Korea, where the Soviet Union had complete control. The CCP thus began to adopt a friendly policy toward Northeastern minorities, including ethnic Koreans, encouraging them to cooperate proactively with the CCP. It also established a strategic policy that made North Korea a rear base. Meanwhile, the CCP decided to dispatch the Joseon Uiyonggun (Korean Volunteer Army, or KVA), which was under its control, to South, East, and North Manchuria, to encourage

4. The CCP believed that “as long as the activities of CCP troops in Northeast China do not directly violate Soviet obligations regulated in the diplomatic treaties, the Soviet Union would hold an attitude of non-interference and show great sympathy toward the CCP.” Zhongyang danganguan [Central Archives of China], Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji [Selected documents of the CCP Central Committee; hereafter ZWX], vol. 15 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 257–259.
ethnic Koreans to participate in the Chinese revolution.\textsuperscript{9}

After the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in the second half of 1946, North Korea, as a rear base of the CCP, provided tremendous economic and military assistance to the Chinese communists. In particular, the transport of military supplies and units through North Korea to southern and northern Manchuria made a significant contribution to the CCP’s war effort. At the same time, North Korea was suffering from food shortages, and the CCP in northern Manchuria provided a large amount of food to North Korea, crucially contributing to resolving food scarcities.\textsuperscript{10}

After the CCP occupied the entire northeastern area in November 1948, the economic, cultural, and social exchanges and cooperation between North Korea and the CCP-controlled area increased considerably. Moreover, direct conversations between Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung began in 1949 and allowed three ethnic Korean divisions in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be repatriated to North Korea, strengthening North Korea’s military defense capabilities and enhancing cooperation between the two countries.\textsuperscript{11}

Previous studies on the relationship between CCP China and North Korea during the Chinese Civil War have been limited by ideological frameworks. Based on documents and archives declassified in China, North Korea, and Russia, as well as the “Intelligence Summary of Northern Korea” (ISNK), this study aims to analyze the background and level of sincerity in the cooperative relationship between North Korea and the CCP during the Chinese Civil War, arguing that both the CCP and North Korea placed priority on their mutual security benefits and economic interests rather than on promoting ideological interests.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9} Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhanbu [United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee], Minzu wenti wenxian huibian (1921. 7–1949. 9) [Collection of documents on the nationality issue (1921. 7–1949. 9); hereafter MWH] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 978; Choe Gang, Joseon uiyonggunsa [History of the KVA] (Yanbian: Yanbian renmin chubanshe, 2005), 203–206.


\textsuperscript{12} Prior studies on this topic used primarily ideological explanations for the North Korean
KMT and CCP attitudes towards Northeast China

Just seven days after the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally. As Mao Zedong had earlier expected, the attack of the Soviet Union meant that a Chinese civil war was imminent.\(^{13}\)

Before the Japanese surrender, while the KMT government secured its *de jure* administrative hegemony over the Northeast region by signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the KMT government began to take steps to recover jurisdiction over Northeast China from the Soviet Union.\(^{14}\) For example, on September 1, 1945, the KMT government set up the Dongbei Xingying (Northeast Military Commission of the National Government), with Xiong Shihui as its director. On September 4, the KMT appointed governors of nine provinces as well as mayors of two special cities (Harbin and Dalian) in Northeast China.\(^{15}\)

Concurrently, the CCP also did their best to seize control of the Northeast. On August 11, four days before Japan’s surrender, the Eighth Route Army commander, Zhu De, issued the Second Order, ordering the former Northeast assistance to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War and the repatriation of ethnic Koreans troops. See for instance, Xue Xiantian, “Cong bingjiankangridao kangmeiyuanchao: yi dongbeigenjudi weizhongxinde zhongchaoguanxi” [From the War of Resistance against Japan to the War to Resist U.S Aggression and Aid Korea—the Sino-Korean relationship centered on the Northeast Revolutionary Base], *Jindaishi yanjiu* 6 (2012): 61–72; Baek Haksun, “Junggung naejeonsi Bukhangu bu buhan gusa wonja: Bukhangu bu pabyeong mit tubanggiji jegong” [North Korean military aid to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War: sending North Korean soldiers and providing rear bases], *Hanguk gwa gukje jeongchi* 10, no. 1 (1994): 263–281.

13. At the Seventh Congress of the CCP on April 24, 1945, Mao Zedong pointed out that the “KMT will cause a civil war when a certain ally’s army dislodges Japanese invaders from China in the future,” predicting the possibility of the future Chinese Civil War. Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 1051.


Army and the Eighth Route Army forces adjacent to Northeast China, such as those in North China, Rehe, and Liaoning, to march toward the Northeast.\textsuperscript{16} Then, on August 28, Liu Shaoqi, interim chairman of the CCP Central Committee, issued an order that “Cadres and troops withdrawn from Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei] and Shandong provinces be sent to Northeast China promptly, the sooner the better.” He went on to emphasize that “in order not to create diplomatic or legal difficulties for the Soviet Red Army,” all the Eighth Route Army troops ready to enter the Northeast should “be in the name of the Northeast Army or the Volunteer Army,” and that, furthermore, “rural areas and small cities where the Red Army was not stationed should be put under control first,” while only cadres were dispatched to work in the large cities.\textsuperscript{17} Accordingly, by around mid-September approximately 150,000 cadres and 80,000 soldiers were dispatched to Northeast China in order to organize the locals and build a strong base.\textsuperscript{18}

To strengthen and facilitate its leadership in Northeast China, on September 13, the CCP Central Committee decided to set up the CCP Northeast Bureau, with Peng Zhen as chief secretary. Furthermore, on September 17, the CCP issued its strategic guidelines titled \textit{Xiangbei Tuijin; Xiangnan Fangyu} (Advance on the North and defense of the South).\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, the CCP attempted to strengthen its control over the railways in the Rehe region and the Bay of Bohai in order to block the KMT troops’ land and sea routes to the Northeast. It also continued to send cadres and troops to the region, so as to secure exclusive occupation.\textsuperscript{20}

On September 14, however, the commander of the Soviet Red Army Malinovsky asserted decisively, “troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the CCP’s army must not advance on the northeastern area until the Soviet Army withdraws from the area” and demanded the withdrawal of the Eighth Route Army from the occupied cities.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, KMT troops had moved into the region of North China far more promptly than the CCP had anticipated. At the same time, the United States landed troops at the ports of Tianjin and Qingdao—the major transportation points for the control of North China and Bohai Bay—publicly announcing that it would use the US Seventh Fleet to move Chiang

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20. LSZ, vol. 1, 487.
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Kai-shek’s troops to North and Northeast China.22 Thus, the CCP’s plan to occupy Northeast China exclusively turned out to be impossible.

Considering this changed situation, on September 28, 1945, the CCP commander-in-chief ordered that “the main units of the CCP’s army in big cities and rural areas redeploy to regions near the Soviet Union, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Rehe Province, establishing a base for a long-term battle and preparing for a prolonged struggle with the KMT.” The CCP adopted a strategy of guerrilla warfare, luring the KMT troops into the remote northeastern areas and forcing them to disperse through the vast area of Northeast China before destroying them piecemeal.23

In accordance with the new strategy, the CCP started to relocate the main units of its army to South and East Manchuria, adjacent to North Korea, and to North Manchuria, neighboring the Soviet Union.24 Accordingly, the strategic value of ethnic Koreans, who inhabited these areas in relatively dense numbers, was significantly enhanced, and so the CCP thereby adjusted its policy for ethnic Koreans as well.25

First, the CCP Northeast Bureau ordered the Joseon Dongnip Dongmaeng (Korean Independence Federation, or KIF) and the KVA to participate in the Chinese Revolution rather than returning to North Korea.26 Therefore, the KVA held a soldiers’ meeting in Shenyang on November 10, 1945, deciding that most of the KVA members, with the exception of veteran cadres who would return to North Korea, would be sent to South, East, and North Manchuria, where there were dense settlements of ethnic Koreans, to encourage and organize them to actively participate in the Chinese Revolution.27 The KVA was divided into First, Third, and Fifth Detachments, which were then dispatched to Tonghua,

25. At that time, the CCP promised ethnic minorities either independence or self-autonomous government to garner their support. MWH, 976, 978.
26. Kim Baekyeon (alias Kim Dubong), the Chairman of the KIF, emphasized that he would “organize ethnic Koreans living in China and ultimately establish a new democratic republic in North Korea like China.” Given his statement reported in CCP newspaper, it could be inferred that the CCP intended to repatriate all of the ethnic Koreans residing in Northeast China to Korean Peninsula. Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], 14 August 1945, 2; Jiefang ribao, 15 August 1945, 1; Jinchaji ribao [Jin-Cha-Ji Daily], 17 August 1945, 2; Kim, “The Chinese Civil War and the Emergence of a Korean Ethnic Minority in Northeast China.”
Harbin, and Yanji, respectively. En route to Yanji, some members of the Fifth Detachment remained in Jilin and organized the Seventh Detachment.28

Apart from Yan’an’s KVA, there were several military organizations of ethnic Koreans organized in Northeast China. The Seongyeon Jongdae (KVA Vanguard Column), comprising 1,500 rank-and-file soldiers, was established in Shenyang and led by Han Cheng and Ju Yeon; the Harbin Baoanzongdui Chaoxian Dulidadui (Harbin Peace Preservation Army’s Korean Independent Corps), was established in Harbin by Yi Sangjo, a former KVA member, and comprised about 1,000 soldiers as well; and the ethnic Korean forces in Yanji organized by Gang Geon, originally a member of Soviet Far East 88th Brigade, comprising some 5,000 to 6,000 members. Later, the Third and Fifth Detachments merged with the Harbin Peace Preservation Army’s Korean Independent Corps and the force led by Gang Geon, respectively. In addition, the First Detachment in Tonghua was renamed the Li Hongguang Detachment at the end of February 1946.29

Furthermore, on November 19, 1945, the CCP Northeast Bureau issued a statement declaring that the “lives and legal rights of Koreans residing in Northeast China would be protected” and “conflicts between Chinese people and Koreans should be resolved fairly and reasonably,” thus protecting ethnic Koreans in the Northeast region.30 This policy was clearly aimed at encouraging ethnic Koreans to cooperate with the CCP, in stark contrast to the KMT policy, by which all property of ethnic Koreans in China was to be confiscated and


29. Choe, *Joseon uiyonggunsa*, 187–188, 287–289; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Documentary Research Department], *Chen Yun wenji* [Collected works of Chen Yun; hereafter CYW] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), vol. 1, 447–452; on February 3, 1946, the First Detachment of the KVA, stationed in Tonghua, played a key role in suppressing the so-called “2.3 Counter-Revolution Riot,” which was led by KMT members and about 3,000 remnant Japanese troops. The KMT and the US paid considerable attention to this riot. With the name “Korean Volunteer Army,” the CCP became concerned about its implications, giving the impression that it was dispatched from North Korea and thus might potentially cause unnecessary misunderstandings in the KMT and the US. Therefore, the CCP, on February 10, 1946, decided to rename the “Korean Volunteer Army.” Kim, “The Chinese Civil War and the Emergence of a Korean Ethnic Minority in Northeast China.”

30. MWH, 978; Zhu Dehai, one of the leaders of the KVA, described the status of ethnic Koreans residing in Northeast China immediately after the Japanese surrender, saying that “there are many bandits in rural areas, and they kill the ethnic Koreans they encounter, with no safe place for ethnic Koreans.” Zhu Dehai Yisheng Editing Team, *Zhu Dehai yisheng*, 74.
ethnic Koreans to be repatriated by force to the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{31}

On January 1, 1946, the deputy administrator of the Yanbian Administration, Dong Kunyi, announced that “those Koreans wishing to have Chinese citizenship may obtain citizenship and become Chinese nationals.”\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, on January 17, 1946, the CCP Northeast Bureau decided to allocate lands in CCP-liberated areas to both Chinese and ethnic Koreans equally.\textsuperscript{33} Equal land allocation became a catalyst for the full support among ethnic Koreans—mostly farmers—for the CCP, and played a decisive role in prompting many ethnic Korean young men to join the CCP troops as well.

Conclusively, the CCP’s policy adjustment toward ethnic Koreans laid a foundation for their stable settlement and the rapid development of ethnic Korean armed organizations. It also established an emotional foundation for active cooperation between the CCP and North Korea in the days to come.

The Chinese Civil War and North Korea

North Korea always kept an eye on the situation in Northeast China. In November 1945, CCP main troops begin to redeploy to South and East Manchuria bordering North Korea, thus placing the need for cooperation between North Korea and the CCP on the agenda.

Considering that Korea south of the 38th parallel was occupied by US forces, North Korea would be encircled to its north and the south if the pro-US KMT were to occupy Northeast China. Under these circumstances, Kim Il-sung stated that “judging from the perspective of our [North Korea] revolution, we must not tolerate Northeast China being turned into Chiang Kai-shek’s world” and decided without any reservations to lend his full support to the CCP.\textsuperscript{34}

In fact, North Korea and the CCP had established their cooperation even

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\textsuperscript{31} After Japan’s surrender, the KMT government determined that “all property and land of immigrants with Korean citizenship would be confiscated.” Zhongyang shejiu dongbei diaoche weiyuanhui [Northeast Investigation Committee of the Central Design Bureau of the Nationalist Government], “Rihan yimin” [On the immigration of Japanese and Koreans], \textit{Dongbei fuyuan jiabua} [Recovery plan for Northeast China], vol. 2 (unpublished, August 1945), 170–178.

\textsuperscript{32} Dong Kunyi, \textit{Zhonggong Yanbian Jidong Jidun diwei Yanbian zhuanshu zhongyao wenjian buibian} [Collection of important documents from the Yanbian Prefectural Commissioner's Office, the CCP Yanbian Jidong and Jidun Prefecture], vol.1 (unpublished, 1985), 8.

\textsuperscript{33} CYW, vol. 1, 485.

\textsuperscript{34} Kim Ilseong (Kim Il-sung), \textit{Kim Ilseong hoegorok: segi-wa deobureo} [Kim Il-sung’s memoir: with the century (posthumous edition)] (Pyongyang: Joseon nodongdang chulpansa, 1998), vol. 8, 262.
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before the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War. On November 29, 1945, Kim Il-sung, at the invitation of Liaodong Military District commander, Xiao Hua, visited Andong (present-day Dandong). At the meeting, Kim Il-sung agreed that North Korea would provide transit for CCP forces then withdrawing from Andong to rural areas in South Manchuria. Kim also agreed to arrange for wounded CCP soldiers and their families to be housed at Sinuiju, Cheongsu and Junggang, across the Yalu River from Andong.\(^{35}\) By the end of March 1946, when full-scale civil war was about to break out, Kim Il-sung held talks in Namnyang (across the frontier from Tumen) with Zhou Baozhong, deputy commander of the Dongbei Minzhu Lianjun [Northeast Democratic Federated Army] to discuss details of cooperation, and decided to dispatch North Korean representatives to Yanbian to build contact with the Jidong Military Region and the CCP Northeast Bureau.\(^{36}\) In addition, in the spring of 1946, Chen Yun, deputy secretary of the CCP Northeast Bureau, visited Pyongyang and requested that North Korea provide weapons, uniforms, and other military supplies. At Chen Yun’s request, Kim Il-sung provided some 100,000 Japanese rifles, uniforms, and other military supplies.\(^{37}\)

In June 1946, after the Civil War had broken out, cooperation between the CCP and North Korea was further cemented. In the summer of 1946, the CCP Northeast Bureau established a strategy that would “make North Korea a rear base for assisting the struggle in South Manchuria,” thus dispatching Xiao Jinguanguang and Zhu Lizhi to Pyongyang and merging former temporary liaison offices sent by Dalian, Shandong, and Northeast Democratic Federated Army, into the “Northeast Bureau’s Korea Representative of the CCP Central Committee” (hereafter referred as the Northeast Bureau’s Korea Representative). Concurrently, branch offices of the Northeast Bureau’s Korea Representative were set up in the North Korean cities of Sinuiju and Manpo, neighboring Andong and Ji’an, respectively, as well as at the North Korean ports of Nampo and Najin, to secure smooth transportation by land and sea routes between


\(^{37}\) Documentation of Chen Yun’s visit to Pyongyang in the spring of 1946 exists only in North Korean records (Gil and Yi, *Jungguk dongbuk haebang*, 96–97); however, Chinese records note that Chen Yun arrived in Pyongyang in late November of 1946, having passed through Harbin, Jiamusi, and Tumen. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Documentary Research Department], *Chen Yun nianpu [Chronicle of Chen Yun; hereafter CYN]* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), vol. 1, 471–473.
Northeast China and North Korea.  
North Korea has consistently argued that the assistance to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War was provided of its own volition. However, considering North Korea was under the complete control of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s support for the CCP could not have been carried out without Stalin’s consent. Therefore, the author believes that CCP-North Korea cooperation during the Chinese Civil War was Stalin’s covert method of providing support to the CCP, against an international backdrop wherein the Soviet Union, constrained by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, was not able to provide open military assistance to the CCP.

During the Chinese Civil War, the CCP and North Korea pursued extensive and mutually beneficial cooperation in military, economic, and social fields, divided broadly into five categories.

First, North Korea became a rear base for the CCP. After the outbreak of the Civil War, the KMT army, with its superior weaponry, quickly occupied the main cities and the railway from Changchun to Dalian, cutting off the route linking South Manchuria to North Manchuria for CCP troops. By October 1946, Chiang Kai-shek had also established the military strategy of “Nangong beishou; Xiannan houbei” (offense in the south; defense in the north), concentrating the KMT’s military capability on South Manchuria. In less than one month, there were only four CCP-liberated areas remaining in South Manchuria—Linjiang, Changbai, Fusong, and Mengjiang—thus pushing CCP troops in these regions into helpless isolation.
Facing strong KMT attacks, CCP forces in South Manchuria were forced to retreat to the Yalu River on the North Korea border. Consequently, the CCP Northeast Bureau, after negotiating with North Korea, withdrew its wounded and a large number of remaining forces into North Korea for rest and re-grouping, and then later redeployed them in South Manchuria. The wounded CCP soldiers received treatment in several regions of North Korea. Some of them were even sent as far south as Yeoncheon and Cheorwon near the 38th parallel.\(^\text{42}\) North Korea also mobilized Party members to transfer more than 20,000 tons of strategic materials from South Manchuria to northern regions of North Korea for safekeeping.\(^\text{43}\)

Second, North Korea provided land routes linking CCP-controlled South Manchuria with North and East Manchuria. North Korea allowed the 184th Division of the KMT, which had surrendered to the CCP in May 1946, to enter Tumen via North Korea. This division had initially planned to go to Yanji from Andong through Tonghua, Baishan, and Tumen. However, on arriving at Baishan, they found passage through the thick forests to the north of Changbai Mountain and in West Gando very difficult due to the cold weather and rugged road. Therefore, Zhou Baozhong sent his special envoy to Kim Il-sung, asking that transportation and facilities be offered for this division to retreat to Tumen by way of Hyesan and Gilju in North Korea.\(^\text{44}\) Later, the railway line connecting Baishan and Tumen via Hyesan and Gilju became the main passage for transporting troops and goods between South Manchuria and North and East Manchuria during the Chinese Civil War.\(^\text{45}\) Before the CCP regained Tonghua,

\(^{42}\) When the CCP regained Andong in June 1946, 5,000 of its residents remained in North Korea. By the middle of 1947, this number had decreased to 2,000. ISNK, No. 20 (1 September 1946), incl. no. 4; ISNK, No. 24 (1 November 1946), incl. no. 5–6; ISNK, No. 30 (1 February 1947), incl. no. 3.


\(^{44}\) The KMT 184th Division arrived at Tumen in mid-November after passing through Baishan in China and Hyesan and Kilju in North Korea during the period November 4–12, 1946. ISNK, No. 30 (1 February 1947), incl. no. 3; Xiafei Peng, “Haicheng qiyi zhongde Pan Shuoduan tongzhi” [Comrade Pan Shuoduan in the Haicheng Uprising], Zhonggong renmin zhengzhiexieshanghuiyi Anshanshi weiyuanhui wenshiziliao yanjiuweiyuanhui [Research Center of Cultural and Historical Materials under the Anshan Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference], *Anshan wenshi ziliao xuankan* [Selected cultural and historical literature of Anshan], vol. 4 (Anshan: Zhongxing Anshanshi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1985), 43–44; Gil and Yi, *Jungguk dongbuk haebang*, 103–105.

\(^{45}\) Chen Yun, Secretary of the CCP for South Manchuria, requested that Gao Gang, commander of Northeast Military District, provide support in the form of food and military troops. In response, Gao Gang transported food and troops to South Manchuria via North Korea. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Documentary Research Department], *Chen Yun wenxuan* [Selected works of Chen Yun], vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995),
Andong, and other transport hubs in the early summer of 1947, this route was the only land route for providing support to CCP bases in South Manchuria, contributing tremendously to the victory in its “Linjiang Baoweizhan” (Linjiang defense campaign).

At the same time, North Korea also provided sea routes for CCP forces. Military supplies and numerous industrial materials produced in Dalian, as well as the food stuffs of North Manchuria, were transported to CCP bases via North Korean ports. For example, weaponry and industrial products were shipped from the port in Dalian to the North Korean ports of Nampo, Najin, or Cheongjin to then be transported by train to CCP bases in South, East and North Manchuria, respectively. There were as many as 500 stevedores at Najin Port alone to facilitate this work, indicating the volume of trade at Najin.46

Third, North Korea provided large amounts of military supplies to the CCP. In the second half of 1946, the KMT army’s massive offensive resulted in huge losses of armament factories under the CCP’s control. Moreover, because of the influence of land reform conducted in the CCP liberated areas, large numbers of people joined the ranks of the CCP. As a result, the CCP army suffered from a lack of such military supplies as weaponry, uniforms, and shoes. Accordingly, Kim Il-sung provided great quantities of supplies, including the aforementioned 100,000 rifles, as well as shoes and cotton cloth for the CCP forces.47 Between April and August 1946, Kim Il-sung ordered cotton fabrics be collected throughout North Korea, and then had them transported to storehouses in Manpojin (present-day Manpo) and Pyongyang before sending them on to the CCP’s northeastern base area.48

Kim Il-sung encouraged thousands of young men in North Pyeongan Province to join the army under the 4th Independent Division in South Manchuria, known as the “Li Hongguang Detachment.” He also organized an artillery regiment and dispatched it to Northeast China for the CCP. This was the first documented example of North Korea dispatching military units directly to Northeast China.49

320–341; CYN, vol. 1, 484, 494.
46. Gil and Yi, Jungguk dongbuk haebang, 92.
47. To keep this weapons transportation secret, Kim Il-sung appointed his bodyguard, Gang Sangho, as chief of transportation. Concurrently, on August 26, 1946, Kim Il-sung issued order No. 149 to the person in charge of Namnyang and North Korea’s railroads, directing that “30 special cargos bound for Northeast China would be dispensed from inspection.” Gil and Yi, Jungguk dongbuk haebang, 99–101.
48. Gil and Yi, Jungguk dongbuk haebang, 112–118.
Fourth, North Korea and the CCP Northeast Bureau established mutually beneficial economic cooperation. In September 1946, the North Korean People’s Committee and the Northeast Bureau’s Korea representative concluded a joint transportation agreement, regulating specific details for tariff and costs. The CCP provided mainly food and grain to North Korea, while North Korea offered daily commodities, industrial equipment, and machine parts to the CCP. At that time, because of the severance of the food supply from South Korea as well as natural disasters, North Korea suffered from extreme food shortages, and thus urgently needed food and daily necessities. Concretely, the CCP supplied 21,313 tons of food and cooking oil to North Korea via the Tumen customs station alone in 1947. At the same time, daily supplies and industrial machine parts supplied by North Korea contributed to stabilizing people’s lives in the CCP-liberated area.

On October 21, 1947, the CCP Northeast Bureau made its first trade agreement with North Korea, determining export items and their quantities for the period 1947–1948. On September 24, 1948, when all of Northeast China

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50. CCP paid grain tariffs and railroad costs. The average tariff was less than one percent of the freight price, but the railroad costs were relatively expensive, provoking complaints from the CCP. However, it could be said that the sum of average tariffs and transport costs was relatively low. If necessary, North Korea stopped passenger transportation, prioritizing railroad for the transportation of CCP strategic goods. Song and Wu, Zhu Lizhi zhuuan, 473; Gil and Yi, Jungguk dongbuk haebang, 107.

51. CYN, vol. 1, 468.

52. Floods in North Korea in 1946 and 1947 decreased crop harvests sharply by approximately 300,000 tons. The influx of CCP soldiers from South Manchuria only aggravated this food shortage. A food riot occurred in Jaseong and Huchang (present-day Kim Hyongjik County) between February and March 1947, brought on by poor harvests and the increased food demand from by retreating CCP troops and the 1st Detachment of the KVA. “Report on the works of the Soviet Administration in North Korea for three years” (August 1945 to November 1948: Economy Volume), 9 December 1948, Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; hereafter AVPRF], fon’d. 0480, opis. 4, delo. 47, listy. 100; Korea Office, “Economic Information: Public Discontent in North Korea,” 4 June 1947, CIA-RDP82-00457R000600510008-5, Central Intelligence Agency CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, Room 3000.

53. Local History Compilation Committee of Jilin Province, Jilinsheng zhi, vol. 33, 34; Gil and Yi, Jungguk dongbuk haebang, 106.

54. Both sides agreed on material exchanges. Specifically, the CCP was to provide North Korea with 11,250 tons of corn, 416 tons of sorghum, 2,014 tons of millet, 5,199 tons of soybean, 300 tons of beans, and 114 tons of unhusked rice; in exchange, North Korea was to provide the CCP with 100 tons of tool steel, 100 tons of special tool steel, 170 tons of thin steel plate, 1,500 tons of sulfur, 1,700 tons of fertilizer, 1,000 tons of calcium carbide, 2,000 tons of limestone, and 50,000 pairs of rubber shoes. Local History Compilation Committee of Jilin Province, Jilinsheng zhi, vol. 33, 280.
was on the brink of liberation by the CCP, the two sides reached their second trade agreement, establishing that the CCP would supply food, coal, red pine, and table salt while North Korea would in turn supply electronic zinc and aluminum, natural electrodes, explosive powder, and special tool steel during the period 1948–1949.\(^{55}\)

With the rapidly increasing exchange of human and material resources, both sides realized the necessity for enhanced border control. On November 13, 1946 and June 30, 1948, Chen Yun ordered the Tumen border office to tighten its control over the border to prevent unregulated trade and smuggling.\(^{56}\) North Korea also fortified its border by organizing a border military unit “composed of three garrison headquarters and 64 border outpost troops.”\(^{57}\)

With the reinforcement of border control, smuggling decreased considerably while the amount of legal trade increased rapidly. Between 1947 and 1949, the CCP exported 246,840,000 \(dlq\) (Dongbei liutong quan, the currency unit of Northeast China at the time) worth of goods while importing good to the value of 365,160,000 \(dlq\).\(^{58}\) While North Korea and the CCP provided each other some mutual grants in aid, they mostly maintained normal trade based on commodity exchange.

Fifth, North Korea ultimately appealed to ethnic Koreans in Northeast China to actively help and participate in the CCP. According to North Korean documents, the Zhengfeng Yundong (Rectification Movement) under the slogan of “clean up politics,” was begun in March 1947 by the CCP in the areas under its control. This sharply increased tensions between ethnic Koreans and the Chinese residents of liberated areas. Many Korean cadres in the CCP forces were expelled from the ranks while ethnic Koreans were arbitrarily deprived of their land. Moreover, speaking Korean was banned in the ethnic Korean schools in the CCP’s areas of control.\(^{59}\) Not only were there conflicts between the Koreans and the Chinese, but in some cases they began to regard each other as the enemy. As a result, many Koreans and Korean cadres participating with

\(^{55}\) Local History Compilation Committee of Jilin Province, *Jilinsheng zhi*, vol. 33, 280.

\(^{56}\) CYW, vol. 1, 554–555, 625–626.

\(^{57}\) “Three-year report on the work of the Soviet Administration in North Korea” (August 1945 to November 1948: Politics), 9 December 1948, AVPRF, fond.0480, opis.4, papka.14, delo.46, listy.255.

\(^{58}\) In this period, as payment for tariff and transportation charges the CCP offered a locomotive, 4,390 tons of food, and 82,280 tons of coal worth some 51.7 million \(dlq\). Local History Compilation Committee of Jilin Province, *Jilinsheng zhi*, vol. 33, 280.

\(^{59}\) Gil and Yi, *Jungguk dongbuk haebang*, 217.
CCP forces wished to return to North Korea.\textsuperscript{60}

To cope with this matter, on March 26, 1947, Kim Il-sung held a meeting with Zhou Baozhong in Namyang and decided to dispatch Lim Chunchu, a high-level officer who was born in Yanbian and had fought in the war against Japan, to Yanbian to stabilize the Korean society there.\textsuperscript{61} With the persuasion of Lim Chunchu, ethnic Koreans eventually stopped returning to the North Korea, and the discrimination against ethnic Koreans steadily dwindled. In March 1948, Lim Chunchu set up a Yanbian administration school for Party officials and appealed to ethnic Koreans to participate actively in the Chinese Revolution.\textsuperscript{62}

\section*{Sino-North Korea cooperation after the Liao-Shen Campaign}

On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established, and the CCP was able occupy all of Northeast China following the conclusion of the Liao-Shen Campaign on November 2, 1948. Accordingly, the threat to North Korea’s national security from the north was removed and North Korea was no longer needed as a rear base for the CCP. Based on these developments, military cooperation between both sides decreased while their economic, social, and cultural exchanges accelerated abruptly.

To promote bilateral trade, the DPRK sent a commercial delegation to Shenyang in early 1949 and established a trade representative office there. The Northeast Administrative Committee of the CCP also dispatched a commerce delegation to Pyongyang, and renamed the Northeast Bureau’s Korea Representative as the Pyongyang Commercial Representative of the Northeast Administrative Committee of the CCP.\textsuperscript{63} These two organizations effectively

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} From 1946 until December 1948, more than 380,000 Koreans in Northeast China returned to North Korea, mostly in the wake of the Rectification Movement. “Three-year report on the work of the Soviet Administration in North Korea” (August 1945 to November 1948: Politics), 9 December 1948, AVPRF, fond.0480, opis.4, papka.14, delo.46, listy.255.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Gil and Yi, \textit{Jungguk dongbuk haebang}, 220–221.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Gil and Yi, \textit{Jungguk dongbuk baebang}, 224–226; Kim Ilseong (Kim Il-sung), “Jungguk inmin ui hyeongmyeong eul jeokgeuk dowa juneun geos i uri ui gukjejuieok immu ida” [To help the Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle is our international task], in \textit{Kim Ilseong jeonjip} [Complete works of Kim Il-sung], vol. 8, 384–389.
\item \textsuperscript{63} In August 1950, this became the embassy of the PRC in Pyongyang. Pak Taeho, \textit{Joseon minijuui inmin gonghwaguk daeoe gwangyesa} [History of foreign relations of the DPRK], vol. 1 ( Pyongyang: Sahoe gwahak Chulpansa, 1985), 66; “On the Dismissal of the Northeast Commercial Delegation in North Korea and the Establishment of the Chinese Embassy in North Korea,” from April 7 to August 28, 1950, \textit{Zhongguo waijiaobu dananguan} [Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives; hereafter ZWD], no. 106-00002-01.
\end{itemize}
functioned as trade representative agencies for both sides.

From 1949 until the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War, the total bilateral trade amounted to approximately US$15.27 million. In this period, North Korea was able to secure about 250,000 tons of chemical fertilizer, thus sharply increasing its crop yields, and consequently no longer needed to import food from Northeast China. Accordingly, North Korea decreased its food imports while increasing imports of daily supplies, including yellow beans, coal, and cotton cloth from Northeast China. The CCP imported industrial goods, including gunpowder, fertilizer, bleaching agents, zinc, and color paint from North Korea.64

Although both sides maintained smooth economic cooperation, distribution from the Supung electric power plant caused friction. After the Liao-Shen Campaign, the demand for electricity rose rapidly in Northeast China and the CCP demanded that North Korea distribute electric power generated by the Supung power plant.65 However, both sides failed to reach an agreement. Therefore, Mao Zedong turned to Stalin for mediation. In July 1949, when Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, he explained to Stalin that “in the construction of the Supung power plant, Manchukuo had invested 75 million Japanese yen while colonial Korea invested 50 million yen,” and claimed that half of the 400,000 kilowatts of electricity generated by the plant should be supplied to China. He requested that Stalin put pressure on North Korea.66


65. After World War II, the Soviet Union transported the electric generators from the Supung power plant to the Soviet Union as war booty. As a result, North Korea rebuilt the plant through a vast investment of money and manpower. North Korea took this as its reason for refusing China’s request that it share half of the electricity, and proposed instead to share only 20,000 kilowatts. Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oboronny Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense; TsAMO], fond.66, opis.178499, delo.7, listy.547–554; TsAMO, delo.812, listy.558; delo.11, listy.490; TsAMO, fond.379, opis.11019, delo.8a, listy.23–25; TsAMO, fond.40, opis.11549, delo.2867, listy.7; Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng [Mao, Stalin and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2013), 78–79.

The power distribution problem was finally resolved on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 through negotiations between Gao Gang, Chairman of the Northeast People’s Government, and the North Korean Commerce Representative. According to statistics, in 1950, CCP purchased 900 million kilowatts of electricity from North Korea, including 868 million kilowatts for Anshan and Dalian and 112 million for other localities. Electric power purchased from North Korea contributed tremendously to solving electricity shortages in Dalian, Anshan, and other industry-intensive areas.

Interpersonal communications between the two countries also became quite prolific. Even before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, youth delegates from two countries had conducted mutual visits. After the two countries established formal diplomatic relations on October 6, 1949, North Korea sent government delegates to Beijing in November and December 1949 for the Asia and Oceania Labor Union Festival and the Asia International Women’s Festival. On December 22, 1949, Yi Juyeon presented his credentials to Liu Shaoqi and began duties as the DPRK’s first ambassador to China.

Cultural exchange on a private level was actively conducted as well. In April 1949, delegations of Chinese intellectuals from the liberated areas in the Northeast region and delegations of Sino-Soviet friendship associations from Dalian and Guandong participated at the Third Conference of the Korea-Soviet Cultural Association held in Pyongyang. In addition, in August 1949, the Joseon Munhwa Seonjeonbu Yeonghwa Gwalliguk (Film department of North Korea’s Culture and Propagation Ministry) and Zhongguo Dongbei Yingpian Jingli Gongsi (Film management company of the Northeast China) concluded a

69. On November 7, 1948, a CCP youth delegation, comprised of Jiang Nanxiang, Chen Xuzong, and Chen Mo, participated in the Third North Korean Democratic Youth Conference in Pyongyang. The delegation emphasized the necessity of reinforcing solidarity between the youth of the two countries. In April and September 1949, a North Korean youth delegation composed of Jang Seojoon, Yi Junggeun, and Yi Geumsun, also participated in the First and Second National Congresses of the Chinese New Democratic Youth League in Beijing, celebrating the victory of the Chinese Revolution. Dongbei Ribao [Northeast Daily], 17 January 1949, 3; Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 9 April 1949, 1; Pak Taeho, Joseon minjujuui inmin gonghwaguk vol. 1, 68.
70. Renmin Ribao, 8 October 1949, 1; Renmin Ribao, 2 December 1949, 1; Renmin Ribao, 13 November 1949, 1.
71. Renmin Ribao, 26 December 1949, 1.
The film exchange agreement, and a month later aired the film, “Three Years of the Liberation War in the Northeast and a Military Parade before Chairman Mao” in Pyongyang.73 On December 12, 1949, at a dance performance co-sponsored by the Culture Ministry of the PRC and the China National Federation of Literary and Arts, Choi Seung-hee (Choe Seunghui), a leading Asian dancer, performed “Korea’s customs, hardships, and the history of her struggle for independence under Japanese imperialism” and shared the history of struggle between the Korea and China.74

The Repatriation of Ethnic Korean Divisions and PRC Policies toward the Korean Peninsula

The return of the ethnic Korean troops of the PLA to North Korea is a representative example of the close Sino-North Korean relationship. During the Chinese Civil War, large numbers of ethnic Koreans living in Northeast China had joined the PLA to fight the KMT, such that the ethnic Koreans had formed three divisions of the PLA by 1949. The 164th and 166th Divisions of the PLA, which were responsible for garrison tasks in Changchun and Shenyang, returned to North Korea in July 1949. The Independent 15th Division of the Central South Military Area, reorganized in Zhengzhou in Henan Province, returned to North Korea during March and April 1950.75

The repatriated ethnic Korean troops enjoyed a rich combat experience greatly enhancing the military strength of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), which had only three infantry divisions and one infantry regiment. In particular, they performed a decisive role on the early phase of the Korean War.76 Therefore, the return of ethnic Korean divisions has often been used as evidence of China’s active assistance of North Korea in its preparations for the

73. Renmin Ribao, 14 October 1949, 1.
74. Renmin Ribao, 12 January 1950, 1.
76. In the early phase of the Korean War, among the totally 21 infantry regiments of the KPA fighting against South Korea, ten were made up of ethnic Korean troops coming from China. Kim Donggil, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhongde chaoxianshi hui Chaoxian wenti xintan” [Some new insights into the return of the PLA’s ethnic Korean divisions to North Korea], Lishi yanjiu (2006. 6), 103.
Korean War. However, recent research findings and archival evidence has shown that China’s agreement to North Korea’s request for the repatriation of the troops derived more from a Chinese fear of a South Korean attack on North Korea, as well as China’s own economic need for disarmament.

In May 1949, Mao Zedong received Kim Il, director of the political department of the KPA, and readily agreed to the North Korean request that the ethnic Korean units of the PLA be repatriated to North Korea. However, Mao opposed North Korea’s plan for an attack against South Korea, advising that North Korea might even end up retreating and sacrificing some of its territory should South Korea launch an attack on North Korea with the support of the United States or Japan.

China’s opposition to a war on the Korean Peninsula remained unchanged even after the establishment of the PRC. On October 21, 1949, Mao Zedong cabled Stalin, expressing his opposition to any preemptive attack against South Korea by North Korea, to which Stalin agreed as well. Furthermore, in a preliminary meeting with Stalin in Moscow on December 16, Mao Zedong emphasized that “the most important task at present is securing peace. China needs three to five years of peace to bring her economy back to its pre-war level, thus stabilizing the country in general.” As for his conversation with Stalin in Moscow on the Korean Peninsula issue, Mao recalled in 1956 that, “the matter of their [PRC’s] concern at the time was South Korea’s attack on North Korea, rather than North Korea’s attack against South Korea.” This is good enough evidence to show that Mao Zedong was not in favor of North Korea’s preemptive attack against South Korea.

On January 30, 1950, Stalin agreed to Kim Il-sung’s request for permission

82. Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu [International Department, Central Committee of CCP], “Mao Zedong di’erci jiejian sugong zhongyang daibiaotuan tanhua” [Record of Mao Zedong’s second meeting with representatives of the CPSU (23 September 1956)], Mao Zedong jiejian waibin tanhua jilu huibian [Records of Mao Zedong’s conversations with foreign guests].
to initiate the Korean War, even as Mao Zedong was still opposed to it. In April 1950, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai received the DPRK ambassador to Beijing, Yi Juyeon, and informed him that, “If there has been a specific plan to unify the Korean Peninsula, Kim Il-sung’s visit to Beijing must be done in secret; if there is none, then it may be an official visit.” However, Zhou Enlai said that China hoped for an “official visit,” thus giving notice of its opposition to North Korea’s planned strike on the South.83

On May 13, 1950, Kim Il-sung visited Beijing, informing Mao that Stalin had agreed to his plan to unify the Korean Peninsula by force and requested China’s consent. At first, Mao Zedong hesitated to agree to Kim Il-sung’s demand, fearing US intervention.84 However, facing Kim Il-sung’s argument that Stalin had already agreed and that all the necessary assistance for the war would be provided by Stalin, Mao Zedong had no alternative but to agree.85

Why did Mao Zedong oppose Kim Il-sung’s demand for so long? The answer is closely related to China’s domestic situation and to circumstances on the Korean Peninsula as well.

First, as Mao Zedong emphasized in his talks with Stalin on December 16, 1949, economic recovery was China’s most urgent task. Even after the establishment of the PRC, the country was suffering from an unprecedentedly extreme shortage of supplies and food as well as high inflation and unemploy-ment rates.86 Without economic recovery, the stability of the CCP regime could not be secure. “Stability of the entire situation through economic recovery” was the primary national task for the Chinese government after the establishment of the PRC. As Mao Zedong pointed out, peace was necessary for economic recovery, and the stability of adjacent countries was necessary to maintain peace. It was very natural for Mao Zedong to oppose Kim Il-sung’s demand for


85. Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu [International department, Central Committee of CCP], “Mao Zedong di’erci jiejian sugong zhongyang daibiaotuan tanhua” [Records of Mao Zedong’s second meeting with Representative of CPSU, (23 September 1956)], Mao Zedong jiejian waibin tanhua jilu huibian [Records of Mao Zedong’s conversations with foreign guests].

launching the war on the Korean Peninsula, which could endanger the stability in China’s neighboring countries.

Second, securing national security was another urgent priority for the new China. To this end, Mao Zedong signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950, ensuring the security of the PRC together with that of the Soviet Union.

By the end of June 1949, US troops had departed South Korea, leaving behind only a small number of advisors; this situation was conducive to China’s security. In other words, a Korean Peninsula without foreign troops was in the best interest of the new China, and extremely beneficial to her national security. Mao Zedong was concerned that North Korea’s attack on South Korea would bring the US army back to the Korean Peninsula. His concerns were clearly apparent in his meeting with Kim Il-sung in May 1950. Later, he criticized Kim Il-sung many times, pointing out that the US Army had returned to the Korean Peninsula due to the Korean War, thus threatening China’s national security.87

Conclusion

To summarize, North Korea and the CCP maintained a close relationship during the Chinese Civil War. The KMT’s occupation of Northeast China could have threatened North Korea’s survival, and therefore North Korea provided as much assistance as possible to the CCP in its struggle against the KMT.

The CCP also provided food to North Korea, lending a decisive hand in addressing the food crisis then threatening North Korea. However, if we conduct a detailed analysis of the trade between the two countries, and consider such facts as the return of the ethnic Korean troops in the PLA to North Korea, the power distribution conflict surrounding the Supung electric power plant, as well as the CCP’s opposition to the Korean War, then it can be discerned that what principally drove the two sides was not ideological imperatives, but their own security and economic interests. Mao Zedong did not want China’s national and ideological interests to collide on the Korean Peninsula.

In conclusion, we can further state that after China’s reform and opening in 1980, its attitude towards the Korean Peninsula has its origins in its policy during the period 1949–1950.

87. Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu [International department, Central Committee of CCP], “Mao Zedong di’erci jiejian sugong zhongyang daibiaotuan tanhua” [Records of Mao Zedong’s second meeting with Representative of CPSU (23 September 1956)], Mao Zedong jiejian waibin tanhua jilu huibian [Records of Mao Zedong’s conversations with foreign guests].
### ABBREVIATIONS

APRF - Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Archive of the President of the Russian Federation]

AVPRF - Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation]

CYN - Chen Yun nianpu [Chronicle of Chen Yun]

CYW - Chen Yun wenji [Collected works of Chen Yun]

ISNK - Intelligence Summary of Northern Korea

JZLW - Jinian Zhu Lizhi wenji [Memorial collected works of Zhu Lizhi]


LSZ - Liu Shaoqi zhuan [Biography of Liu Shaoqi]

MWH - Minzu wenti wenxian huibian (1921. 7–1949. 9) [Collection of documents on the nationality issue (1921. 7–1949. 9)]

TsAMO - Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense]

ZWD - Zhongguo waijiaobu dananguan [Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives]

ZWX - Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji [Selected documents of the CCP Central Committee]